

ABSTRACT

Title of thesis "PILLAGED AND ROBBED SO WELL": CAPTAINS IN THE
HUNDRED YEARS WAR 1350-1380

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Captains were among the most influential military figures of the Hundred Years War. Despite this, there is scant scholarship on captaincy as a position within medieval society. This thesis seeks to rectify this gap in the scholarship by exploring the careers of influential captains serving England and France during the period from 1350-80. Drawing primarily from chronicle sources, this thesis examines the careers of this group of captains chronologically. It examines how their careers progressed and how they interacted with key cultural systems such as territorial lordship, chivalric culture, and the economic mechanisms of war. The overall findings of this paper reveal that these three systems mutually reinforced each other through captaincy by justifying chivalric violence.

“PILLAGED AND ROBBED SO WELL”: CAPTAINS IN THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR
1350-80

By

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"Pillaged and Robbed so well": Captains in the Hundred Years War 1350-1380

Chapter 1: Introduction

Scholars of the Hundred Years War, particularly in the field of military history, have discussed a change in the methods of military recruitment during the Edwardian period of the war (1337-69) that resulted in English dominance on the battlefield and in campaign. Andrew Ayton, one of the foremost experts on this phase of the war, argues that “it has become customary in discussing the Edwardian military revolution to focus particular attention on changes in methods of recruitment and forms of remuneration; in short, on the emergence of paid, contract armies.”¹ One aspect of this transition from reliance on the feudal levy to reliance on paid contract armies was the rise in prominence of captains who often contracted with the king and who recruited and led the men-at-arms comprising the armies and *routes* of the Hundred Years War. Many of these captains were among the most well-known members of the chivalric community; and their names appeared consistently throughout chronicles of the period. Despite their fame, there has been no dedicated study of these captains as a group, either militarily or socio-culturally. This thesis addresses this gap by examining a network of captains from England, Gascony, and France. The case studies are comprised of two French knights (Bertrand du Guesclin and Enguerrand de Coucy), two Gascons (Jean de Grailly and the Bascot

¹ Andrew Ayton, “English Armies in the Fourteenth Century,” in *Arms, Armies, and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War*, Anne Curry and Michael Hughes, eds. (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1994), 22.

de Mauleon), and three Englishmen (Hugh Calveley, Robert Knolles, and John Chandos). Looking at these captain's careers will help shed light on three questions about captaincy. First, does a diplomatic periodization of the Hundred Years War still accurately describe the events of the war when viewed through the lens of captaincy? Second, what does captaincy tell us about notions of just war and chivalric reform, and their relevance to the lives of captains? Finally, what was the relationship between territorial lordship, chivalric culture, and the economic mechanisms of war as they relate to captaincy? This thesis will argue that these systems were mutually reinforcing systems sanctioning the types of violence which calls into question the distinctions between just and unjust war and seem most egregious to both the ecclesiastic, reform-minded sources of the time and to modern readers.

To understand the careers of these captains as well as captaincy as a phenomenon in the transitional period from the Edwardian to Caroline phases of the Hundred Years War (1350-80), this thesis seeks to situate case studies within the prevailing structures of cultural practices, economy, and lordship. In the first section, this thesis discusses the major cultural systems affecting captaincy-- chivalry, lordship, and practices of war. Then, it analyzes the careers of the captains under study, highlighting events that show them interacting with the systems of chivalry, lordship, and economics. This discussion will be split over three chapters, each corresponding to key phases in the war. These chapter divisions roughly correspond to the diplomatic periodization in order to highlight the inadequacy of a purely diplomatic approach to the war. A key element of this work is that there are two conflicting chronologies: the diplomatic periodization—rooted in an understanding of the war based primarily on whether England and France were officially at war--and the periodization that emerges through examining the careers of the captains fighting in it. The latter reveals a periodization fundamentally at odds with the

diplomatic one. It is important, however, to establish the diplomatic periodization as a starting point.

Scholars have taken different approaches to the diplomatic periodization of the Hundred Years War. In the 1860s various English and French scholars named the conflict lasting from 1337-1453 the Hundred Years War. Early studies of this war were primarily based around national histories of the war. In 1951, Edouard Perroy released the first major attempt at a complete narrative of the war. His account, still mostly well-received, focuses primarily on the periods of official war, with the exception of when France experienced major defeats.² Also in the 1950s, Alfred H. Burne wrote a two-volume military history of the war. The first volume, *The Crecy War*, covers the war from its start in 1337 to the Treaty of Brétigny in 1360.³ The second volume, *The Agincourt War*, begins in 1369, but is mainly concerned with the period from 1415-53. He covers the period from 1369-89 in one chapter and refers to that phase as the Du Guesclin War.⁴

More recent histories of the Hundred Years War have introduced new temporal phases, changing the exact years, but still emphasizing a diplomatic understanding of the war. Christopher Allmand's division of the war into four periods (1337-60, 1360-96, 1396-1422, 1422-53) all align with major treaties.⁵ Anne Curry, in her 2003 introductory guide to the war, explicitly centers her periodization as based on wars in response to the failures of previous treaties. Her framing of the period of 1337-60 as the "wars of the treaty of Paris," the period from 1369-1420 as the "wars of the treaty of Brétigny;" the period from 1422-53 as the "wars of

² Edouard Perroy, *The Hundred Years War* (London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1951).

³ Alfred H. Burne, *The Crecy War: A Military History of the Hundred Years War From 1337 to the Peace of Brétigny in 1360* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1955).

⁴ Alfred H. Burne, *The Agincourt War: A Military History of the Latter Part of the Hundred Years War From 1369 to 1453* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1956).

⁵ Christopher Allmand, *The Hundred Years War: England and France at War c. 1300-c. 1450* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 12-32.

the treaty of Troyes” is overly concerned with the diplomatic fictions that justify war.⁶ Each of these texts is reflective of the traditional diplomatic periodization of the Hundred Years War. This periodization tends to create three phases: the Edwardian phase from 1337-60 (the beginning of the war to the treaty of Brétigny); the Caroline phase from 1369-89 (the resumption of war in 1369 to the truce of Leulinghem); and the Lancastrian phase from 1415-53 (from Henry V’s invasion of France to the loss of all English lands in France with the exception of Calais).

Although the traditional diplomatic periodization is flawed, it is still useful for the scope of the thesis. This study of captaincy focuses on the careers of knights from the end of the Edwardian phase (1356-60) through the early Caroline phase, ending the analysis in 1380. The chronology proposed in this study goes from 1356 with the Poitiers campaign to 1380 with the death of Bertrand du Guesclin, the constable of France from 1369 and one of the captains under study. The year 1356 and the Poitiers campaign is the ideal starting point both because the Battle of Poitiers created the conditions in France that led to these men’s careers taking off, and because the Poitiers campaign is the first of many campaigns where many of the captains under study were fighting together. The endpoint of 1380 and Bertrand du Guesclin’s death was harder to determine. Du Guesclin was not the last of the group to die, nor did the Caroline phase of the war slow down until 1389. However, Du Guesclin’s death marks the end of the interconnectivity between these captains. While certain events both before and after this range might be discussed, most of the analysis here will focus on that period.

Another major boundary is the number of knights under study. All of them are connected in multiple ways and interact with each other consistently throughout the period. The list of possible captains who could and should be studied is potentially massive; but for this project

⁶ Anne Curry, *The Hundred Years War*, 2nd edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 133.

more case studies are not realistic. Captaincy as a topic of inquiry is likewise potentially massive. To limit the range of topics, certain areas such as religion, familial networks, and in-depth financial analyses will not be addressed fully as they are not essential for understanding how captaincy shaped the Hundred Years War and vice versa.

Before examining the three dominant cultural systems influencing captaincy, there are a few terminological distinctions that need to be provided. The first is the label of captain compared to the label of knight. The term 'captain' has two different, though related, meanings and both are usages this thesis employs. The more concrete usage refers to a man receiving the captaincy of a castle or garrison. For example, in 1377, "all this season, sir Hugh Calveley, captain of Calais, sir John Harlston, captain of Guynes, the lord of Gomegines [sic] captain of Ardres, made many journeys into Picardy, every three or four weeks."⁷ In many cases, this definition of captaincy involved sanction by the system of lordship, as in the case of Calveley. In other cases, captaincy of a castle meant only the one who had control of the castle, very possibly from seizing it. The other definition of 'captain' is a looser term and means more generally a leader of men. This usage of captain could apply within a larger force like an army or a group like the Great Companies; or this usage of captain could mean the leader of a group of men operating independently. Like captaincy of a castle, this looser definition of captain could involve either sanctioning or non-sanctioning by the lordship system. Still, these two definitions are closely related and often the case studies were both captain-as-leader-of-men and captain-as-keeper-of-castle. Most captains were from the knightly class, but not all knights were captains.

⁷ John Froissart, *The Chronicles of Froissart*, trans. Sir John Bouchier, Lord Berners (London: David Nutt, 1901), 2: 463. I have translated all quotes from Froissart from the Middle English, including standardizing the spelling of names when possible.

This thesis is not a study of knightly participation in the Hundred Years War, but rather the participation of captains specifically within the war.

There are three other terms necessary to define. A *chevauchee* was the most common form of English campaign during these phases of the war. It consisted largely of mounted forces moving fast through enemy territory, looting everything in their path. Ultimately, a key aim of a *chevauchee* was to draw the enemy into a battle by sowing enough chaos that the people would demand their lords take action. Over this period of the war, the effectiveness of the *chevauchee* would fluctuate. Another key group of terms is *route* and *routier*. These terms are essential, as this thesis seeks to challenge the legitimacy of the distinction between a *routier* and a captain. A *route* is a group of soldiers often under the command of a *routier* who seize castles, pillage territory, extort ransom and protection money, and accept money from others to fight for them. What this thesis will show, however, is that this distinction between *routier* captain and captains in general is a false dichotomy. Finally, the idea of just vs. unjust war must be clarified. The strictest definition of a just war defined it as “military service to one’s king and to the crusading papacy” against only other combatants.⁸ This definition would exclude seignorial warfare entirely and inherently delegitimizes the *chevauchee* as a form of warfare. Ideas of just warfare, then, must exist on a spectrum based on profession and viewpoint. This thesis seeks to discover how captains viewed just warfare.

An understanding of the three cultural systems of chivalry, lordship, and the economic mechanisms of chivalric warfare are also necessary in order to situate captaincy as a phenomenon within its correct cultural context. The first of these systems--chivalry and chivalric culture--involves understanding chivalry, its definition, its relationship to ideology and class, and

⁸ Nicholas Wright, *Knights and Peasants: The Hundred Years War in the French Countryside* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1998), 30.

what behaviors it allowed in war. Chivalric culture was, along with Christianity, the dominant cultural influence on the way the warrior class functioned as a class. This dominance meant that it was a cross-territorial system, enabling communication and a common metric by which to judge and interact with people who might be enemies. This thesis will show the ways that chivalric culture enabled behavior that seems counter-intuitive from a modern pragmatic viewpoint but that becomes understandable within the framework of a shared ideology among a unitary military aristocratic class.

The fundamental idea of chivalry was as a “structure of prowess securing honor and blessed by piety.”⁹ Prowess in this definition is a combination of individual martial skill as well as skill as a captain. The key phrase that defines prowess in contemporary sources is deeds of arms. These deeds were not limited to specific targets or based on specific practices in combat. Honor is another term that needs clarification. Honor does not refer to the more modern conception of personal integrity but instead to the granting of rewards, whether social capital and reputation through the system of chivalric culture or lands and titles through the system of territorial lordship. When this thesis describes a captain’s actions being sanctioned by chivalric culture or territorial lordship, it means that their actions have brought them such honors.

An important element of chivalric culture that needs to be addressed is the relationship between chivalry, ideology, and its practitioners. It is difficult to deny that chivalry had an ideological component. Chivalric literature, like *chansons de geste*, were filled with lessons for proper knightly behavior. Outside of literature, non-knightly authors like Christine de Pizan, Ramon Llull, and the many secular and priestly chroniclers all passed judgement on knights, thus mediated what was acceptable in chivalry. Indeed, both knights themselves and outsiders to

⁹ Richard Kaeuper, *Medieval Chivalry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 33.

chivalric culture constantly mediated the ideal behavior of the knightly class. A minor theme of this study is that the judgements passed on knights by outsiders tended to be far harsher than the judgements passed by chivalric insiders. This lighter judgement does not mean, however, as some modern scholarship and much of modern popular culture might suggest, that “either chivalric ideas had no real existence or that the hard men of war knew the ideals but simply disregarded them as fanciful notions.”¹⁰ Instead, the best practice for understanding the knightly relationship to chivalry is to

insist, rather, that the chivalric ideals knights actually accepted and strove to fulfill were indeed realistic and deeply rooted in medieval rather than postmedieval life and concerns. Undoubtedly knights fell short, even by the standards they would have personally accepted; but discovering human imperfection once again can scarcely represent a surprising conclusion of historical analysis for any age.¹¹

For this study, the key takeaway is that the criticism or praise that captains may receive in the chronicles are part of the process of establishing the boundaries of chivalry. Because captaincy was a phenomenon limited to the knightly class, it is essential to understand whether the source comes from within the group or from without it.

The relationship between chivalry, knighthood, and class is an important concept, as many of the captains under study had to navigate the changing dynamic between official knighthood and chivalric participation. Knighthood (the official process of being knighted and being formally recognized as a knight) was narrowing, more and more tied to nobility, as the fourteenth century progressed. At the same time, chivalric participation was becoming more expansive due to both social changes and the ready availability of armed conflict with the opportunities it presented for deeds at arms. Ironically, as knighthood was becoming more and more associated with the nobility, chivalric participation was expanding to include more and

¹⁰ Kaeuper, *Medieval Chivalry*, 20.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

more people. Many of the captains under study came from traditionally non-knightly backgrounds, acquiring wealth and knighthood through captaincy, but never achieving noble status. The relationship between these captains and the aristocracy is another recurring theme of this study.

Finally, in order to understand the actions of these captains within their contexts, it is necessary to explore how members of the chivalric class viewed their own actions, what they found acceptable, and what brought honor. The most valuable insights into fourteenth century chivalric values comes from the writings of one of the most famous contemporary knights, Geoffroi de Charny, a French captain who died at the battle of Poitiers protecting the Oriflamme (the sacred war banner of the French). He was one of the highest-ranking members of the Order of the Star, the French corollary to the English Order of the Garter, and therefore one of the most renowned knights in France. If not for his death in 1356, he would have made an excellent case study of captaincy in this period. His greatest contribution to the study of chivalry lies in his *Book of Chivalry* (a text composed as a guide to knighthood for the Order of the Star) speaking about the qualities of a good man-at-arms. Charny's text is a knight's view of what constituted ideal chivalry. While this view may not be universal to all knights, it serves as a very effective baseline for understanding the ideology that guided these captains.

The clearest summation of Charny's attitude comes early in his treatise and repeats throughout. He argues that "there are no small feats of arms, but only good and great ones, although some feats of arms are of greater worth than others. Therefore, I say that he who does more is of greater worth."¹² Performing feats of arms made one a good man-at-arms, and while it was possible to be better than good, 'good' was the threshold. This idea that deeds of arms is the

¹² Geoffroi de Charny, *The Book of Chivalry of Geoffroi de Charny: Text, Context, and Translation*, trans. by Richard Kaeuper and Elspeth Kennedy (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 87.

main qualifier to be a good knight includes feats of arms for reasons that modern readers would likely find distasteful. Charny discusses those who do deeds of arms for reward and concludes they are good. Moreover, he praises men who demand extensive payment upfront, those “who do not want to leave their own area nor to bear arms for another if they do not reap great rewards before they are willing to depart, and do not want to put any of their own resources into the undertaking.”¹³ While Charny does not fully embrace or hold up this attitude as ideal, he still makes a point of saying that if knights are good enough as warriors, “these men-at-arms deserve praise for what they have achieved in the good armed combats in which they have participated, thus deserving the material rewards which they had had from this.”¹⁴ In this analysis, mercenary activity, as long as it was performed well, was a valid and praiseworthy performance of chivalry.

Charny praised groups that would likely shock both a modern reader and possibly even a medieval ecclesiastical reader. His discussion of those who are brave but too eager for plunder fits perfectly with the way *routier* captains, including many of the captains in this study, operated. He describes both the strengths and weaknesses of these men-at-arms, first describing “yet another category of men-at-arms, who deserve praise, who are strong and skillful, bold and sparing no effort, some of whom want to be at the forefront, riding as foragers to win booty or prisoners or other profit from the enemies of those whose side they fight. And they know well how to do it skillfully and cleverly”¹⁵ Charny is describing here the exact behavior of many of the greatest chivalric heroes. For example, William Marshal, one of the greatest English knights of the twelfth century, rose to prominence through collecting ransom, albeit in the only slightly more controlled arena of the tournament. Charny’s praise for these men is not as wholehearted as

¹³ Charny, *Book of Chivalry*, 95.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 99.

it may seem. He describes how some of these men-at-arms are killed during attacks on towns during their pursuit of loot or how they jeopardize battles by seeking to safeguard their prisoners who they can ransom.¹⁶ In the end, he provides a summary of what he considers the correct viewpoint of these men and their ways:

One ought instead to be wary of the booty which results in the loss of honor, life, and possessions. In this vocation one should therefore set one's heart and mind on winning honor, which endures for ever, rather than on winning profit and booty, which one can lose within one single hour. And yet one should praise and value those men-at-arms who are able make war on, inflight damage on, and win profit from their enemies, for they cannot do it without strenuous effort and great courage. But again I shall repeat: he who does best is most worthy.¹⁷

This perspective is not the wholesale condemnation one might expect to find based on a true chivalric code of conduct. Instead, this view shows that what mattered to even a highly respectable knight such as Charny was individual ability and success. The men-at-arms who die while raiding a town or who lose a battle have failed for moral reasons; but those moral reasons apply because they lacked the prowess to correctly perform chivalry. Fighting for profit and even prioritizing profit is not what is bad, what is bad is failing to earn honor through individual prowess. When the captains under study seize loot and attack poorly defended towns and extract wealth, that behavior, because it took skill to perform successfully, is sanctioned, although not the ideal, behavior within chivalric culture.

The second system which sanctioned and informed captaincy as a phenomenon is the system of lordship. This discussion of lordship will focus on three things: lordship as a structure replacing feudalism; the structure of reward through which lordship sanctioned action; and the idea of accountable government and the failure of that accountability. This thesis employs the term "territorial lordship" to replace heavily debated concepts like nations, states,

¹⁶ Ibid., 99.

¹⁷ Ibid.

and feudalism. Territorial lordship emphasizes that captains held loyalty to and felt obligations towards systems of power and their leaders, which were tied to land and territory. This term bypasses the fraught associations with nationhood and nationalism in the period, as well as bypassing the assumptions of an orderly system present in feudalism. Territorial lordship allows for the nuances of loyalty and obligations with which many of these captains dealt. At the same time, territorial lordship retains an understanding that the exercise of power was often rooted in personal relationships and systems of patronage. All of the captains under study here benefitted from the personal patronage of another member of the chivalric class, often either of higher class status and/or a higher position within the system of lordship.

Patronage provided one of the means by which lordship sanctioned the actions of captains. Successful service in war (and thus performance of chivalry) often led to greater responsibilities, during this period primarily the assignment of a captaincy as commander of a castle or garrison. The holding of a castle or defensive location during war was the lowest position in the system of lordship. Despite its low rank, it contained the potential for tremendous power and thus opportunity for profit. These positions of power gave captains leverage into greater success and reward. Leveraging captaincies into increased territorial expansion and plundering opportunism is largely the story of these captains, and is in itself consistent with lordship. Through the patronage of powerful military commanders, men with low social rank could gain access to the benefits of lordship. Those born with the benefits of lordship, who inherited land, also could benefit from the power granted to them through captaincy of a castle.

Similar to this study's examination of chivalry and chivalric culture, this examination of lordship seeks to establish the behaviors that were acceptable within the context of lordship. Like chivalry, where knightly attitudes conflicted with ecclesiastical attitudes, conflict over the

performance of lordship was pervasive. The problem inherent in lordship was the abuse of power by those in charge of castles. Thomas Bisson has shown how the government of great lords (dukes and kings) attempted to create accountable government. These great lords faced opposition from local castellans who exercised theoretically delegated lordship with impunity. In the twelfth century and into the thirteenth century, there was a “deeper and more prolonged crisis (in the modern sense), a crisis, almost everywhere, of multiplied castles in the hands of people in quest of status and power. Not all such were defiant of princely authority, but quite enough of them were so to defeat the purposes of high justice in almost every European realm.”¹⁸ These “people in quest of status and power” used the power granted to them by holding a castle and controlling military power to extract money, food, and labor as they pleased, often in contravention of the laws of superior lordships.

The key difference between the holder of castles in the twelfth century and the holder of castles during the period under study here is that the “people in quest of status and power” were embroiled in a war where, in regions such as Gascony, Normandy, and Brittany, royal authority had vanished. Bisson has described the state of lordship in the earlier period as a state of crisis. Much the same can be said of the later period. However, the king of England was far less motivated to attempt to restrict his men from exploitative lordship; and for a long time, the king of France was unable to restrict exploitative lordship. For the king of England, the exploitative lordship of captains allowed those garrisons to pay and feed themselves enabling them to hold territory without burdening the English treasury. Without this type of exploitative extraction of resources, English territory would not have been able to support itself. The same is true for the French in these regions; they could not rely on a centralized state to provide pay, men, or food

¹⁸ Thomas Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century: Power, Lordship, and the Origins of European Government* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 576-7.

during much of the period under study. The tacit acknowledgement from each government that the security of essential domains hinged on exploitative lordship meant that:

a soldier could now reasonably claim that his service to the Crown was not incompatible with the plundering of its subjects, and non-combatants might find themselves attacked by “just warriors” from all sides. Du Guesclin’s captain on the Breton frontier, the squire Jean Dorenge, took prisoners for ransom, set fire to houses, robbed, raped and other assaulted people—all within the territory he was supposed to protect.¹⁹

From the lordship of kings to the lordship of captains, the war effort in this period of the Hundred Years War required exploitative lordship at levels well beyond the limit of what was theoretically acceptable. However, this thesis will show that not only were the captains who exploited their power in this way not punished, but they in fact benefited greatly from it, both in wealth and honor. Nicholas Wright, in his book on the Hundred Years War in the French countryside, argues that “the distinction between the just and the unjust was now as much a moral one as a legal one: were the armed men using their rights over non-combatant subjects in a genuine way, to further the king’s wars, ore merely as a pretext to enrich themselves?”²⁰ This thesis will argue that these two goals were not, in fact, mutually exclusive, but were rather mutually dependent, deriving from the chivalric ethos, the function of lordship, and the economic mechanisms of war.

The final piece of context necessary to understand captaincy as a phenomenon is the economic systems that supported it. The most important supporting economic systems were indentures, ransom and plunder, and mercenary service. Indentures were a system of army recruitment new to the English armies of the Hundred Years War. Where previously a large portion of English armies were comprised of the feudal levy, with knights and soldiers serving

¹⁹ Wright, *Knights and Peasants*, 40.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

for an agreed amount of time, indentured armies were formed around a contract between a captain and, typically, the king. Soldiers and their captains also signed indentures, providing layers of conditions for each group. Indentures served as a “mechanism designed to fill the administrative vacuum which appeared when the king was not leading the army in person and the clerical staff of the royal household were not on hand to supervise distribution of wages and related matters.”²¹ Typically, the indenture signed between captain and king dictated the number of men the captain must provide, the terms of the captain's own payment and salary, and the expected length of service. Furthermore, indentures also covered royal pardons to criminals who captains sought to recruit and the payment of the *regard*, essentially a signing bonus paid at the start of the campaign to each man-at-arms. Most importantly, they also covered the division of plunder and ransom, in some cases even stating that certain ransoms went to the king.

Indentures brought many changes to the English war effort allowing for greater recruitment of manpower, since fighting for wages enabled long-term service where the feudal levy did not. They allowed for far more varied military strategies and greater flexibility in the type and length of campaigns that could be ordered.²² Indentures also “offered great opportunities to the militarily talented members of the aristocracy whether from the higher nobility...or of more modest gentry stock.”²³ This opportunity aligned well with Edward III’s twin advantages of both knowing how to bring the aristocracy into the war effort and having many talented men with ability to take up the responsibility. These talented captains (the current case studies among them) both took responsibility for the actions of their men and also relieved “the crown of much of the burden of recruitment and military administration, and at the same

²¹ Ayton, “English Armies,” 25.

²² For a more detailed analysis of the advantages of indenture see Ayton, “English Armies”, 26.

²³ Ibid.

time acquired considerable influence in the direction of the war.”²⁴ Because of indentures, captaincy became necessary to the English for combating the economic power of France. Another consequence of indenture was that captains who had taken the responsibility of paying their men now found themselves operating with economic motivation much greater than simply the desire to profit from war, which Charny described as common among men-at-arms.

To fulfill this economic responsibility, captains had to succeed at acquiring wealth through plunder, extortion, and ransom. Plunder is the most straightforward of the three. Captains could easily capture enemy movables, food, furniture, livestock, etc., which could bring wealth or at least provisions allowing the campaign to continue. Raiding towns and cities for wealth could bring great affluence to a captain especially if he could do so without losing too many men. Similarly, captains holding castles or other fortified places could use their position to extract resources from the surrounding communities, as was discussed in more detail above.

The most profitable system for securing wealth during campaigns was ransom. Men-at-arms who capture knights in battles or skirmishes afterward would typically set a ransom price for them. The actual practice was far more complicated and included calculations of the social capital of both the prisoner and the captor, the economic status of the prisoner, and political considerations among other things.²⁵ After a ransom was set, the prisoner was typically released to raise the ransom, under oath to return to captivity and to not fight further against his captor. These two clauses were, surprisingly, for the most part followed. This thesis will show that fighting your captor often had a flexible definition; but on the whole this was a system that worked to both acquire wealth and preserve aristocratic lives. Ransom also had the effect of

²⁴ Ibid., 26.

²⁵ For a more complete coverage of ransom and its steps see Rémy Ambühl, *Prisoner of War in the Hundred Years War: Ransom Culture in the Late Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

encouraging captains to seek out battle, which served as the primary opportunity to take prisoners. Depending on these different sources of wealth, captains could, if they were successful, simultaneously maintain a campaign and profit from it.

The final economic aspect of captaincy important to this study is mercenary service and the opportunities it provided to captains. Most of the captains studied here as well as most of their contemporaries would not refer to all the activities that fall under mercenary service as making a man-at-arms a mercenary. For this study, mercenary service refers to fighting in return for payment from someone other than the employing captain's natural lord. Many of the soldiers who fought in France were stranded when the 1360 Treaty of Brétigny ended the war (at least theoretically for diplomats). For them, finding other opportunities for payment was a matter of survival. For the captains, however, mercenary service was less about survival and more about opportunity to achieve honor and wealth. Fighting under someone else's banner lent legitimacy to the performance of violence that might otherwise lead to an accusation of banditry. Skillful captains in this period navigated the line between mercenary warfare and mercenary raiding during their contracts. No figure better showcases how captains navigated that than Sir John Hawkwood, the most famous medieval English mercenary. Coming from a moderately wealthy landowning family, he was a second son and, before going off to fight, was apprenticed to a London tailor.²⁶ William Caferro, his most recent biographer, has suggested that he fought as an archer at both Crecy in 1346 and Poitiers in 1356, which holds some merit in light of his subsequent battle strategies.²⁷ After the treaty of Brétigny, he was a leader of the Great Company, a group considered little more than a bandit army during their initial activity. Hawkwood would

²⁶ William Caferro, *John Hawkwood: An English Mercenary in Fourteenth Century England* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 2006), 34-8.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 41.

eventually be hired to fight in Italy, crossing over in 1367 and remaining in Italy until his death in 1394. His career as a mercenary included service to the Pope, to the city-state of Florence, and to various others. During his service in Italy, he was not only knighted, but also acquired significant land there as well as in Essex, and married the bastard daughter of the duke of Florence. All the while he was performing the same deeds as he had as a *routier* in the Great Company, but his various contracts lent his actions legitimacy and brought him more success than any other mercenary in the period.

The example of Hawkwood, like Charny, or the actions of castle-holders in the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, demonstrates that these three systems of chivalry, lordship, and the economic mechanisms of war were all mutually reinforcing by sanctioning behavior that was questionable but which perpetuated those systems.²⁸ The case studies in this thesis will show the ways that this mutual reinforcement played out.

²⁸ The thirteenth century generally saw a continued increase in accountability and a decrease in exploitative lordship.

Chapter 2: Some Background and Chronology

By 1356, the English captain John Chandos had the longest career of any of the captains in this study. He was English gentry, a rank socially high enough to allow entrance into the circle of Prince Edward, so-called the Black Prince, by 1339; indeed, he had the highest social rank of any of the English captains studied here.²⁹ His career began as a squire early in the war at the 1339 siege of Cambrai, where the chronicler Jean Froissart noted that “John Chandos, who was then but a squire, of whose prowess this book speaks much, he cast himself between the barriers and the gate, and fought valiantly.”³⁰ His first major engagement was at the naval battle of Sluys (1340), also the first major victory for the English in the war. Not only did he participate in the battle, but also prior to it, Edward III had sent Chandos to scout the French fleet.³¹ His most prominent feat of arms pre-1356 was serving in the Black Prince’s contingent at the battle of Crecy in 1346, likely cementing his place as a founding member of the Order of the Garter.³² By 1356, he was part of the Black Prince’s government in Gascony. According to the Chandos Herald “these two [Chandos and James Audley] were of great renown and were appointed chief advisors.”³³ In the period 1356-80, Chandos’ career centered around the patronage of the Black Prince and illustrates the benefits derived from performing captaincy based on fulfilling the obligations of territorial lordship.

Further down the social scale, the English captains Robert Knolles and Hugh Calveley were both yeoman from Cheshire. Their earliest activity—like many of these captains—was in

²⁹ Richard Barber, “Chandos, Sir John” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, 25 May 2006. <https://www-oxforddnb-com.proxy-um.researchport.umd.edu/display/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-5110?rskey=vOESSB&result=2>.

³⁰ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 1: 111.

³¹ Henry Knighton, *The Chronicle of Henry Knighton*, ed. and trans. by G.H. Martin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 29; Froissart, *Chronicles*, 1: 148.

³² Chandos Herald, *Life of the Black Prince*, trans. Mildred K. Pope (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), 136; Froissart, *Chronicles*, 1: 277.

³³ Chandos Herald, *Life of the Black Prince*, 140.

the war of succession in Brittany (1341-64). Both are known to have been fighting as longbowmen there by 1346, with Calveley likely a commander and Knolles serving under him.³⁴ The Brittany war was fought over a contested succession and quickly became a proxy war for the larger conflict between England and France. Before 1356, Knolles' and Calveley's most notable deed of arms was fighting in the battle of the Thirty in 1351. This battle was an arranged combat between thirty English and Gascon knights and thirty French knights "fought according to exact rules fixed by agreement at a preliminary conference of the commanders. There was no limitation on the weapons to be used...but there were agreed starting signals, referees and truces for taking refreshments and dressing wounds."³⁵ The Breton/ French contingent defeated the English/Gascon contingent in the battle and both Knolles and Calveley were captured and soon after ransomed. Despite the defeat, the participants from both sides were widely honored.³⁶ During the period 1356-80, Knolles and Calveley embarked on the available pathways open to lower class English captains.

Jean de Grailly (also known as the Captal de Buch) and his sometime-subordinate the Bascot de Mauleon were two captains from Gascony, the only remaining part of the Anglo-French Angevin Empire at the start of the Hundred Years War, and as such central to the conflict of territorial lordship that defined it. Since the king of England owed homage to the king of France for Gascony, lords in Gascony could (according to the French) go to French courts to

³⁴ Michael Jones, "Knolles [Knollys], Sir Robert," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, 8 April 2021. <https://www-oxforddnb-com.proxy-um.researchport.umd.edu/display/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-15758?rskey=IGOk4M&result=2>; Kenneth Fowler, "Calveley, Sir Hugh," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, 4 October 2007. <https://www-oxforddnb-com.proxy-um.researchport.umd.edu/display/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-4407?rskey=PBCYF0&result=1>.

³⁵ Jonathan Sumption, *The Hundred Years War: Trial by Fire* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 2: 34.

³⁶ Jean le Bel, *The True Chronicle of Jean le Bel*, trans. Nigel Bryant (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2015), 213-4.

resolve their disputes, even when the king of England or his representative at Bordeaux had already issued a decree. When the war broke out lords with territory in Gascony had to carefully navigate their loyalties since both kings could make legitimate claims of being their overlords. Choosing who to fight for often came down to what support England and France could offer to individual lords.

Jean de Grailly is one of two Gascon nobles in this study. His family commanded various castles in Gascony essentially functioning as independent military governors in the region prior to the 1350s.³⁷ Like Chandos, his career dates from the 1340s when “he served in the Gascon campaign of 1345-6 of Henry of Grosmont, earl of Lancaster.”³⁸ It is also notable that also like Chandos, De Grailly was a founding member of the Order of the Garter, which particularly in the founding group, indicates a close relationship to King Edward III or his son and heir, the Black Prince. In the Chandos Herald’s *Life of the Black Prince*, the influence of and attitudes toward Jean de Grailly becomes clear:

And at that time there came from Gascony the doughty and valiant Captal, who was right brave and courageous and greatly beloved of everybody. He was welcomed right nobly. The Prince, who rejoiced greatly at his coming, took fresh courage. One day he said to the King his father and to the Queen his mother: ‘Sire,’ quoth he, ‘for God’s sake, you know well that thus it is, that in Gascony the noble and valiant knight’s cherish you so greatly that they suffer great pain for your war and to gain you honour, and yet they have no leader of your blood. Therefore if you were so advised as to send one of your sons they would be the bolder.’³⁹

However, Chandos Herald is conflating two events in order to aggrandize the Black Prince's prestige, a common element in these narratives. De Grailly arrived in England as part of a group

³⁷ Malcome Vale, “Grailly, Jean de [Known as Captal de Buch],” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, 3 January 2008. <https://www-oxforddnb-com.proxy-um.researchport.umd.edu/display/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-50126>; Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 1: 202.

³⁸ “Grailly, Jean de,” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.

³⁹ Chandos Herald, *Life of the Black Prince*, 139.

of Gascon knights asking for the Black Prince to be sent to rule in Gascony. The fact that De Grailly was part of this petition shows his influence in Gascony and that he was perceived by his fellow Gascons (correctly so) to have influence with the king and the prince. During the period 1356-80 the ways this influence impacted his relationships with various parties make him an excellent representative of Gascon noble captainship.

The Bascot de Mauleon has the least presence of all these captains in the original sources consulted for this study. In 1388, Froissart, while attending a feast at a castle of the Count of Foix, writes of a long interview with a famous Gascon *routier* captain named the Bascot de Mauleon, who recounted his life story that began in 1356 and seems to have ended around 1374. Scholars have questioned the authenticity of this story. On the one hand, if it is true, it is one of the only surviving interviews with a *routier* captain. The Bascot's life also connects to many of the major events and institutions of the time, making it an invaluable source for Gascon *routiers*. But Kenneth Fowler, writing on medieval mercenaries, sums up the doubts by arguing that the Bascot was "possibly a figure of Froissart's imagination, created to tell the story himself."⁴⁰ Fowler also claims that "remarkably, I have found no record of his existence in archival sources."⁴¹ Recent scholarship has begun to push back against this idea and seeks to reestablish the Bascot de Mauleon as an actual person and credible source. Guilhem Pépin, writing in 2011, amply demonstrates that there is archival evidence for the Bascot's life, and that the evidence mostly aligns with Froissart's narrative.⁴² Along with his perspective on military events, the Bascot's story is also valuable because of what it reveals about the economic and lordly relations

⁴⁰ Kenneth Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries vol 1: The Great Companies* (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 14.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 14 n.53.

⁴² Guilhem Pépin, "Towards a Rehabilitation of Froissart's Credibility: The Non-Fictitious Bascot de Mauleon," in *The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century*, Adrian R. Bell et. al., eds. (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2011), 175.

of *routier* captaincy. Although not much is known about his background before 1356, his value to this study is much like that of Geoffroi Charny's text on chivalry because it allows scholars to read about *routier* life described by an actual *routier*.

The next two captains, Bertrand du Guesclin and Enguerrand de Coucy, represent French captaincy. Enguerrand de Coucy is like the Bascot de Mauleon in that his career does not begin until the 1356-80 period. Like Jean de Grailly, De Coucy was a minor nobleman from the barony of Coucy in Picardy.⁴³ However, unlike De Grailly's experience of lordship centered in Gascony, part of the English territorial network, De Coucy's lordship experience was with the French territorial network. His career and experience of territorial lordship became complicated in the period under study and, despite only truly becoming a captain around 1369, his path to captaincy reveals how territorial lordship shaped participation in war.

Bertrand du Guesclin is probably the second most famous French figure of the Hundred Years War after Joan of Arc. He was born into a minor noble family in Brittany holding only a single motte and bailey castle.⁴⁴ Significantly, Du Guesclin's life is one of the better sourced post-1356. Before that date, however, the most complete source for his life is a *chanson de geste* written a few years after his death by Cuvelier, an anonymous poet.⁴⁵ The form and purpose of a *chanson de geste* makes it difficult to count as an accurate source for dates and places, although it does provide a useful perspective on the war in Brittany. It also, for the period 1356-80, fabricates interactions between captains in revealing ways which will be considered later. For

⁴³ M.H.Keen, "Coucy, Enguerrand [Ingelram] de, earl of Bedford," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, 23 September 2004. <https://www-oxforddnb-com.proxy-um.researchport.umd.edu/display/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-53074?rskey=Mxhqlj&result=1>.

⁴⁴ Richard Vernier, *The Flower of Chivalry: Bertrand du Guesclin and the Hundred Years War* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2003,) 18-19.

⁴⁵ Some scholars attribute this *chanson* to Johannes Cuvelier, a writer at the court of Charles V, of whom little is known.

1356-80, his surviving letters, orders, and musters provide a unique and valuable glimpse of Du Guesclin's economic and territorial relationships. His career before 1356 (and indeed, after) was defined by the war in Brittany. One notable early instance that can be attested was that he captured the castle of Fougeray.⁴⁶ What the *chanson* leaves out is that "within a few months, du Guesclin sold Fougeray back to the English, probably to Robert Knowles."⁴⁷ While there is far better attestation to interaction between these captains after 1356, there is a high likelihood that particularly the captains who fought in Brittany had fought against, or at least heard of, each other before 1356. The sale of Fougeray is representative of the type of economic mechanisms on which this study focuses; it is valuable to note that the norms discussed in the next chapter are not unique to the period under study, but are instead best exemplified by them. Du Guesclin is integral to this study not only because of his importance to the history of the period generally, but also because he is connected with so many of the other captains, arguably only surpassed in these connections by the Black Prince. Moreover, Du Guesclin was not just an exceptionally well-sourced French captain, but also one of the more compelling.

With the backgrounds of these captains established, it is necessary to provide a quick summary of the major events of the period under study because these captains move between campaigns and theaters of war with such alacrity. In 1356, three major conflicts were active under the umbrella of the Hundred Years War. England and France had been at war since 1337 and by 1356, England had won the vast majority of the battles although failing to conquer much territory. A war of succession in the duchy of Brittany between John de Montfort, backed by the English, and Charles de Blois, backed by the French, began in 1341 and from the outset was a sub-conflict of the broader war. Finally, Charles, the king of Navarre and a member of the French

⁴⁶ Cuvelier, *The Song of Bertrand du Guesclin*, trans. Nigel Bryant (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2019), 42-3.

⁴⁷ Vernier, *The Flower of Chivalry*, 43.

royal family, was fighting on and off with France to claim territories throughout France that he had been denied. Throughout this conflict, he allied with the English, only breaking the alliance when it no longer served him. In 1356, conditions in France changed when Edward, the Black Prince defeated and captured the king of France, Jean II, at the battle of Poitiers. In the aftermath, both English and Navarrese captains would pillage Normandy and the Île-de-France, as well as other territories, seizing castles and looting. Groups of looters, led by captains, were called *routes*. This period of looting slowly decreased in the 1360s.

In 1360, the treaty of Brétigny ended the war between England and France thus, in a diplomatic periodization, ending the Edwardian phase of the war. However, the English captains, many of whom were *route* leaders, continued to fight, forming companies to carry on looting and pillaging in the name of Charles of Navarre and for other reasons discussed below. Charles of Navarre's interests in Normandy and the war in Brittany would both conclude in 1364, with the Battles of Cocherel and Auray, so combat continued despite the three major conflicts having theoretically ended. Companies from the war, comprised of *rouitiers*, also continued to loot and take castles, with low-level warfare continuing in Gascony. The major theaters of war from 1364-9 were split between *routes* in Burgundy and a joint operation of French and English captains in Spain attempting to overthrow an English ally, Pedro I of Castile. Overthrown by his bastard half-brother Henry of Trastamara, Pedro appealed to the Black Prince for aid, and he invaded Castile to restore Pedro's rule. At the battle of Najera (1367), the Black Prince defeated Henry of Trastamara accomplishing the restoration. This victory, however, bankrupted the Black Prince because he failed to receive the money promised to him by Pedro I. In 1369, the start of the Caroline phase of the Hundred Years War, fighting officially resumed between England and France. France swiftly took the initiative with much success against the English, with the English

suffering their first major battlefield defeat in 1370 at the battle of Pontvallain. Warfare would continue with another failed English *chevauchee* under John of Gaunt in 1373. The war de-escalated consistently as new conflicts and new leaders emerged for both kingdoms up to the 1389 truce of Leulinghem. The captains under study moved between these conflict zones rapidly, fighting alongside or against each other at a dizzying pace. The next three chapters trace their movements, and in doing so demonstrate more fully how they navigated chivalric culture, the systems of territorial lordship, and the economic mechanisms of war.

Chapter 3: 1340-60: The Height of English Success

This chapter focuses on the end of the Edwardian phase of the war, beginning with the Poitiers *chevauchee* and ending with the treaty of Brétigny. It covers the chaotic aftermath of Poitiers and how the captains under study moved between the war zones of Brittany, Normandy, and Gascony, sometimes fighting directly under a lord, but largely fighting as *routier* captains. Further, this chapter explores the fluidity of captaincy even during a period of official warfare and also explores the devastating consequences and opportunities when territorial lordship failed in the face of hostile military might.

The Battle of Poitiers

In 1355 the Black Prince set out from Bordeaux on a *chevauchee* that ended in the battle of Poitiers, one of the most catastrophic French defeats of the war. *Chevauchees* were primarily mounted campaigns making use of fast-moving forces that burned and pillaged with a multifaceted purpose. First and foremost, they aimed to cause psychological damage. They aimed to seize movable wealth and food as loot and they also aimed to force battle via the psychological damage they inflicted. In addition, the campaign had more specific aims as revealed in an indenture between Edward III and the Black Prince. This document's existence alone reveals the unique dual role that the Black Prince had to fill. On the one hand, his indenture was a typical document contracting the prince for military service. It contained the standard language about his payment, the number of troops he was required to provide, and details about the responsibilities of both parties.⁴⁸ Where it differed from a typical indenture, however, was in

⁴⁸ Mollie M. Madden, "The Indenture between Edward III and the Black Prince for the Prince's Expedition to Gascony, 10 July 1355," *Journal of Medieval Military History* 12 (2014): 166.

describing the Black Prince's part. This indenture “endowed the prince with royal authority as the king’s lieutenant in Gascony” granting him the vast responsibilities and powers of territorial lordship concomitant with such a position.⁴⁹ This indenture, then, makes the Black Prince both a captain and a great territorial lord by requiring him to both consider the responsibilities of a captain--the acquisition of wealth and the performance of deeds of arms--and the responsibilities of a powerful lord--to balance bestowing favor with maintaining the loyalty of sub-lords. The Black Prince succeeded in this campaign, with this indenture initiating a trend that places him in this dual role throughout the chronology of this study—although sometimes with far less positive results.

Participating in the Poitiers *chevauchee* were Chandos, De Grailly, and the Bascot. Their participation highlights the inherently Gascon nature of this campaign. Its purpose revealed in the indenture was to increase English control in Gascony. The presence of the Black Prince, the king’s lieutenant in Gascony, and De Grailly, one of the most powerful Gascon nobles loyal to England, projected an image of united English/Gascon loyalty necessary to reinforce English control in the territory. Chandos and De Grailly were on the march from the beginning and were important captains during the campaign.⁵⁰ Chandos was both trusted to scout the field and to advise the Black Prince on the eve of the battle.⁵¹

The battle of Poitiers itself was one of the most important battles of the Edwardian phase of the war. Besides its political results, which will be discussed shortly, the battle also showcases

⁴⁹ Ibid., 166.

⁵⁰ Chandos is mentioned in Geoffrey le Baker, *The Chronicle of Geoffrey le Baker*, trans. David Preest (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2012), 117-20. De Grailly is mentioned as being on the march in Baker, *Chronicle*, 111-2. Both are mentioned in Chandos Herald, *Life of the Black Prince*, 140-6 and Froissart, *Chronicles*, 2: 360-78.

⁵¹ Baker, *Chronicle*, 142.

how success on the battlefield could shape the reputation and careers of the captains. During the battle of Poitiers:

the captal de buch [sic] was going around the French flank, withdrawing from the hill where had just left the prince at the foot of its slope... The unhappy French were now being attacked on both sides, for in their rear they were being cut down by the captal de Buch's armed knights and pierced by the dread hail of the archers assigned to him. So then the whole formation of the French was cut to pieces.⁵²

This attack was both daring and successful, and, in addition, was the turning point of the battle enabling the capture of King Jean II and many other prisoners. It also created the circumstances in France that led to the rise of the Great Companies and the concomitant rapid rise in the careers of many of these captains. Further, this battle is also important for its direct impact on the career of the Bascot.⁵³ He describes how “the first time that I bore armor was under the Captal de Buch at the battle of Poitiers, and as it was my happe [sic], I had that day three prisoners, a knight and two squires, of whom I had one with another 4000 franks.”⁵⁴ Success in battle, such as the Bascot's capture of prisoners, could lead to great immediate wealth.

By opening with Poitiers, this thesis is not only demonstrating the moment when many of these captains embarked on their careers, but also a moment that broke with the chivalric norm for actions. Battles fought between two large armies on the field were a rarity. The Hundred Years War, and this period in particular, is unique for both the number of battles and how

⁵² Baker, *Chronicle*, 130-1. For secondary source analysis of De Grailly's maneuver see Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 2: 242.

⁵³ This flanking maneuver also affects scholarship on John Hawkwood. There is a real possibility that he learned lessons at Poitiers that contributed to his great success. Caferro argues that “the similarities between the decisive maneuver at Poitiers and Hawkwood's tactics at Castagnaro suggests that Hawkwood may well have been among the one hundred archers who accompanied Captal de Buch in his march.” (Caferro, *John Hawkwood*, 42). This claim will probably never be substantiated, nor even the claim that Hawkwood was actually at Poitiers. Even being the most cynical about his career (which is likely unwarranted) Poitiers was a famous enough victory, and its consequences great enough, that to say Hawkwood learned lessons about both battles and campaigning from Poitiers, even second handed, is reasonable. If he was one of the archers accompanying De Grailly, and probably the Bascot, then the origins of his career as a captain in the 1360s becomes even more rooted in this initial event of the period under study.

⁵⁴ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 4: 151.

lucrative they proved to be. Poitiers resulted in unprecedented economic gains for the English captains. The many knightly prisoners meant many large ransoms for their captors as well as the social rewards of honor engendered by victory. De Grailly's maneuver and its results perfectly demonstrated Charny's notion that knights and captains who perform great deeds of arms, even if out of a desire for money, deserve those rewards as well as praise. Because the risk in battle is so great, deeds of arms there bring greater honor and thus greater reward. Battle is not just high-risk, high-reward from a political or tactical angle; it is also high-risk, high-reward from the angle of captaincy.

Poitiers also resulted in a fundamental destabilization of French lordship. It inflicted the capture or elimination of the vast majority of King Jean's noble councilors—the very men who administered French lordship. More importantly, the king's capture caused far more damage to effective lordship than his death in battle would have done. Jean's capture by necessity created two competing centers of lordship. The chaos of the next four years was a direct result of his capture when French royal authority collapsed. This vacuum provided opportunity in the short run for the vast majority of the English and Gascon captains in this study to achieve fame due to their ability to exploit this chaos. For the purposes of analysis, this four-year period is split in two: 1357-8 marks the initial emergence of the companies, the siege of Rennes, and the Jacquerie (a major peasant revolt in both Paris and the countryside); 1359-60 marks Edward III's last French campaign which ended in another major turning point, the Treaty of Brétigny.

1357-8: The Siege of Rennes

The first large-scale activity in which these captains were included was the siege of Rennes, lasting from October 3, 1356 until July 5, 1357, when a truce agreed by the Black Prince forced its end. Exact sources for which captains were at the siege are sparse. Froissart mentions

only that “[t]here was a young bachelor called Bertrand du Guesclin, who during the siege fought with an Englishmen called sir Nicholas Dagworth.”⁵⁵ This siege was likely a continuation of the type of warfare that dominated Brittany: siege warfare against guerrilla warfare. Jonathan Sumption describes this as “a life like that of so many English commanders, halfway between warfare and banditry. Du Guesclin hung about the siege lines at Lancaster’s rear, attacking his supply trains, destroying equipment, ambushing and killing isolated groups of his men.”⁵⁶ Cuvelier’s *Song of Bertrand du Guesclin* also puts him there in a similar role. The *Song* also places John Chandos and Robert Knolles at Rennes.⁵⁷ However, Chandos’ presence is unlikely based on the timeline of the siege and the battle of Poitiers, and there is no reference to his presence at Rennes in any of the chronicles. His appearance in Cuvelier does demonstrate a perception of Chandos as belonging to this network of captains.

It is harder to place Knolles and Calveley during the period of the siege. Strangely, Calveley (often paired with Knolles) is not mentioned by Cuvelier as having been at Rennes. Moreover, neither is it possible to firmly place Knolles at the siege. Despite these gaps, it is reasonable to state that both Knolles and Calveley were involved in some way with the siege since they were among the major captains of the Brittany war before 1356. They both controlled a considerable number of garrisons surrounding Rennes which helped to prevent French reinforcement.⁵⁸ There is some chronological evidence to suggest Knolles’ participation. In the latter part of 1357, after the siege ended “when the Duke Henry of Normandy returned to England he left Sir James Pipe and Robert Knowles in Normandy as his lieutenants, and many others who had joined them from among the best men-at-arms and experienced archers in

⁵⁵ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 1: 395.

⁵⁶ Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 2: 271.

⁵⁷ Cuvelier, *Song of Bertrand du Guesclin*, 45.

⁵⁸ Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 2: 268.

sufficient numbers, and, astonishingly, they went to the aid of the king of Navarre.”⁵⁹ The timeframe of Knolles’ movements suggest that he likely participated in the siege. Then, when it was lifted and his patron left for England, he used the opportunity of a newer warfront in Normandy to continue fighting. Establishing that Knolles and Calveley were likely at Rennes is important because it inaugurates a trend that becomes increasingly apparent: captains fought in theaters of war where wealth and patronage were available. By participating in the actions around Rennes, Knolles and Calveley did their duty dictated by the system of lordship. They gained the economic rewards of warfare; they gained the honor conferred by deeds of arms; and they fought for their patron as duty within lordship demanded. When it was no longer necessary for that duty to be fulfilled, all three systems--lordship, chivalry, and the economic mechanisms of war--allowed them to fight elsewhere.

1357-8: The Jacquerie

After the siege of Rennes, the movement of these captains becomes easier to trace. Jean de Grailly and the Bascot de Mauleon encountered the Jacquerie in an engagement that reveals the entanglements of chivalry, class, and captaincy. The Bascot reports that on their way back from crusading in Prussia:

the next year after I was. . . with the earl of Foix and the Captal his son [actually his cousin], under whom I was. And at our return, at Meaux in Brie, we found the duchess of Normandy that was than, and the duchess of Orleans, and a great number of ladies and damsels, who were closed in and besieged by them of the Jacquerie; and if God had not helped them, they had been enforced and defiled, for they were of great puissance, and in number more than ten thousand, and the ladies were alone. And so we, in the aid of those ladies, did set on them, and there were slain of the Jacquerie more than six thousand, and they rebelled never since.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Knighton, *Chronicle*, 161.

⁶⁰ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 4: 151.

This incident, despite being clearly hyperbolic, is nevertheless revealing about the hierarchies and entanglements of class, chivalry, and captaincy. Firstly, in a purely strategic sense, the Jacquerie was acting against both Gaston Phebus, earl of Foix, and De Grailly's enemies. Moreover, the Jacquerie was partly working in concert with aims similar to those of Charles of Navarre, who De Grailly immediately after Meaux went to serve—and who was allied with Edward III. The duchess of Normandy was the wife of the Dauphin, the future Charles V. Despite these strategic considerations, ideals of chivalry and the duty to enforce the status quo through violence meant that these great enemies of the king of France and the Dauphin attacked one of the most immediate threats to the king. This act reinforces that chivalric culture functioned as a non-territorial-specific unifying culture. The Jacquerie posed a threat to class hegemony and, in response to a typical opportunity for chivalric action, the barriers of territorial lordship were removed. "Rarely had political divisions been so completely closed by the common interest of caste."⁶¹ Meaux is also important for being the first mention in the chronicles of Enguerrand de Coucy, who "after the discomfort thus done at Meaux they [the Jacquerie] never assembled again together after, for the young Ingram [Enguerrand], lord of Coucy had about him certain men of war, and they ever slew them as they might meet with them without any mercy."⁶² De Coucy's involvement here is mainly to demonstrate that, at this time, he was just a young lord fulfilling his role within the hierarchy of lordship.

1357-8: Robert Knolles in Normandy

If the Jacquerie was the greatest internal threat to France in 1358, the ambitions of Charles of Navarre and his alliance with England was a close second. That year saw the mass transfer of fighting from Brittany (where the treaty caused a temporary de-escalation) to

⁶¹ Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 2: 334.

⁶² Froissart, *Chronicles*, 1: 407.

Normandy and the Île-de-France, where Charles and his younger brother Phillippe were fighting over Charles' claim to lands throughout France. It is in this fighting that Robert Knolles achieved notoriety as a *routier* captain. The chronicles that discuss Knolles' actions here reflect differences in perspective largely rooted in the chroniclers' territorial loyalties. Jean le Bel takes the harshest stance on Knolles, describing his pillaging in catastrophic terms:

Elsewhere, along the Normandy coast, there was another even greater company whose leader and captain was Robert Knolles. They likewise took control of the land destroyed and plundered far and wide. It should be accounted a true wonder that the greatest, most illustrious land in the world should have been wasted and pillaged thus, in the very heart of the kingdom...had done so well for himself—by a mixture of luck and guile—and won so many castles in Saintonge, Poitou and Brittany, by force and otherwise, that he had a revenue of forty thousand ecus and, it was said, had amassed property worth one hundred thousand. He plundered and conquered ceaselessly with the mercenaries he kept in his pay; and he made it clear that he wasn't fighting for the King of England but for himself and in his own name, and he paid his soldiers well with his own money.⁶³

Le Bel's account uses the language of unjust war to place Knolles in the wrong. The vocabulary of chivalry is not present; Le Bel does not describe Knolles as winning through might or prowess but rather through "luck and guile." He refers to Knolles commanding "mercenaries" and, most significantly, states that Knolles was officially fighting not for his liege lord but instead "for himself and in his own name." Le Bel's description seeks to remove Knolles and his actions from just war and deny him the gloss of chivalry to justify his actions. Le Bel even misattributes elements of Knolles' origin, though perhaps due to misinformation rather than intention. The chronicler describes Knolles as working "in the cloth trade when these wars began! And then he became a foot soldier in Brigandine."⁶⁴ The reference to brigandine is likely to reinforce a notion of Knolles as lower class, implicitly denying him the right to use violence.

⁶³ Jean le Bel, *Chronicles*, 233-4

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 233.

Henry Knighton's account of this same period strikes similar notes in depicting Knolles' wealth although it differs in key details. Knighton introduces Knolles as "a certain soldier, as he then was, who with the passage of time become a great knight and a powerful lord, the constable of many castles, fortified places, fortalices, and towns in France, both by the duke of Lancaster's gift and by his own enterprise."⁶⁵ He depicts Knolles as a knight, explicitly part of the system of lordship through both the duke of Lancaster's patronage and Knolles' own inherent abilities. Knighton, like Le Bel, does not shy away from the violence of Knolles' raid saying he "came to the town of Orleans and fired the suburbs, and killed as he chose, and carried away many goods and treasures which he found there."⁶⁶ Likewise, during his attack on Auxerre he "killed many of the inhabitants, and the citizens were so astonished that many fled to the walls and leapt over and broke their necks, and many drowned themselves in their fear, so that more were killed by terror than by the sword."⁶⁷ Also like Le Bel, according to Knighton, Knolles' violence brings great wealth. Knighton describes how "the English took away, seized and carried off, uncounted goods, and became exceedingly rich. And there was no Englishman there so poor but that with gold, and silver, and jewels, and other precious things he was made a wealthy man.... On their return they took prisoners, and many townships, and all the riches they wanted, and so came back to their base."⁶⁸ Violence inflicted on citizens, in both Le Bel and Knighton, propelled the economic mechanisms of war as much as battle and ransom.

Where Knight and Le Bel truly differ is in discussing Knolles' motivations. Le Bel has Knolles denying any association with Edward III while Knighton ties them together. On returning to his base, "Knolles sent word to the king in England that all that he had taken in

⁶⁵ Knighton, *Chronicle*, 165.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 165.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

France, castles, towns, goods, and everything else, he wished to put freely at the disposal of the king, his liege lord, for him to use at his pleasure. And he asked the king for his lordship and goodwill, and the king and all his sons were greatly pleased with him.”⁶⁹ Knighton is clearly showing Knolles’ violence as sanctioned within the system of lordship, at least from an English perspective. His campaign was among the most successful and also is representative of the actions of Calveley and many other English, Gascon, and Navarrese captains in 1357-8.

Knolles’ actions in Normandy are one of the clearest signs that lordship, chivalry, and the economic mechanisms of war all sanctioned captaincy even at its most violent. None of the sources deny or even downplay the level of violence inflicted by Knolles. Nor do the chronicles differ in describing the amount of wealth Knolles earned from that violence. What does differ is the moral judgement of Knolles: Le Bel condemns his actions in no uncertain terms whereas Knighton praises his deeds. By looking closer at the descriptions in each text and what happened to Knolles afterward, however, makes it clear that Knighton’s narrative better describes the reaction of English territorial lordship. Knolles retained many of the castles he seized, much of the wealth he took, and was rewarded with land, honors, and more opportunities for service in subsequent years. His increased role in lordship indicated that not only were his actions acceptable, but also that they were valued by these systems. This valuation is both a result of the fact that English lords appreciated that he inflicted damage on an enemy and an acknowledgement that Knolles had performed captaincy exceptionally well according to the standards of the sanctioning systems. In contrast, Le Bel’s condemnation came from outside these systems, from groups that sought to reform chivalry from the outside.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

1357-8: Jean de Grailly and Charles of Navarre

If Knolles was less directly associated with the aims of Charles of Navarre and instead exploited the opportunity presented by his war, then Jean de Grailly and the Bascot de Mauleon were more clearly working for Charles of Navarre. Almost immediately after battling the Jacquerie at Meaux “there arrived at Cherbourg the Captain de Buch, cousin to the king of Navarre, who had retained him with two hundred spears in wages.”⁷⁰ Soon after, he would take Clermont, around the time Knolles lifted the siege of Saint Valery, a Navarrese castle.⁷¹ The Bascot described their service to Charles of Navarre in sentiments similar to those Knighton used to describe Knolles’ experience:

it was truce between France and England, but the king of Navarre made war in his own quarrel against the French king...my master the Captal and I and other abode still with the king of Navarre for his wages; and then we and other that aided use made a great war in France, and then we were lords of the fields and rivers, and conquered great finance.⁷²

The Bascot’s framing of their service occurring during a truce is notable. Captaincy, and the search for battle and pay, was an acceptable part of performing chivalry. De Grailly and the Bascot joined “for. . . wages,” not the truth of their claims or even because Navarre was allied with De Grailly’s liege lord. Those may well have been factors, but they are not presented as the deciding factors. Nor, as will be seen, was this service mutually exclusive to fighting for Edward III. De Grailly is the most consistent example within these case studies of a captain who succeeded in serving two lords. He consistently maintained service with Charles of Navarre due to a combination of blood relation, compensation, and a mutual enemy. Serving two lords, while among the chief causes of the Hundred Years War, was clearly not necessarily impossible for

⁷⁰ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 2: 7.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁷² Froissart, *Chronicles*, 4: 151.

individual captains, particularly when one lord was a territorial lord and the other was paying for service. This dynamic meant that so long as the conditions of territorial lordship were met, service to other lords was not only possible but beneficial. Only when a captain was stuck between conflicting systems of territorial lordships did problems emerge.

1359-60: Edward III's Last Campaign

Around the time De Grailly entered Charles of Navarre's service, Edward III was preparing an invasion of France. This campaign (which ended in the treaty of Brétigny) was fought parallel to the end of Charles of Navarre's campaign, in which John Chandos and Robert Knowles both fought. Chandos joined up early and was in Henry of Grosmont's company when they took the castle of Cernay.⁷³ Knolles, conveniently already in Normandy near the landing point, also joined the campaign. During an ambush, he was captured but "rescued straightaway by his men who came after him, who were so enraged then, seeing their leader's trouble, that they threw aside caution and attacked."⁷⁴ This anecdote might be a case of chivalric hyperbole, but even so it means that Knolles was deemed worthy by the chronicler, Sir Thomas Gray, to be included within the chivalric conventions of captains beloved by their soldiers. If this is true, then there is a case for general loyalty to Knolles beyond perhaps simply wages. Finally, De Grailly and the Bascot were parts of this campaign. Gray's *Scalachronica* mentions De Grailly commanding English troops in operations for Navarre with permission from both kings.⁷⁵ During the campaign, Charles of Navarre made a truce with the Dauphin; however, the truce "made no difference to the operations of the companies and it was ignored by many of his own partisans."⁷⁶

⁷³ Knighton, *Chronicle*, 171; Froissart, *Chronicles*, 2: 38.

⁷⁴ Thomas Gray, *Scalachronica*, trans. Andy King (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2005), 181; Knighton, *Chronicle*, 165.

⁷⁵ Gray, *Scalachronica*, 173.

⁷⁶ Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 2: 421.

De Grailly was still at Clermont, ostensibly held for Navarre, when, the Bascot reports, “the king of England sent for my master...and there made war for the king against all the country.”⁷⁷ Even during this period of truce between Navarre and France, Edward III sent De Grailly to meet with Charles of Navarre since the two were close.⁷⁸ The campaign ended with the siege of Rheims followed by the Treaty of Brétigny, which caused significant changes in captaincy while also retaining many similarities.

This chapter began and ended with an official campaign undertaken by a powerful lord within the system of territorial lordship. These campaigns had drastic effects on the diplomacy and politics of the war; and they often serve as the centerpiece of studies of the Hundred Years War. Within a study of captaincy, however, the campaigns serve a different function: representing the fulfillment of the captains’ obligations within the system of territorial lordship. When things went well as at Poitiers, the actions could lead to incredible wealth and honor for the participating captains. Notably, Edward III’s last campaign did not achieve glorious results but neither was it a failure. It resulted in a diplomatic victory with the Treaty of Brétigny, ending the war diplomatic but superficial level.

⁷⁷ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 4: 151.

⁷⁸ Gray, *Scalachronica*, 183.

Chapter 4: War during an official peace, 1360-9

This chapter explores the period between the first two phases of the Hundred Years War from 1360-9. It begins with an exploration of the immediate consequences of the treaty of Brétigny for these captains. Then, it explores how these captains navigated the period of the Great Companies, how the actions of the Companies intersected with the remaining conflicts—Charles of Navarre and the war of succession in Brittany—and how, fundamentally, very little changed for the captains actually fighting the war. The chapter concludes with an exploration of the captains' experience in Spain where once again continuity of action, motivation, and consequences dominate the narrative.

1360-4: The Treaty of Brétigny and its Aftermath

The Treaty of Brétigny (1360) restored almost the entirety of the old Angevin Empire to Edward III, free of any homage for those lands due to the king of France. The treaty did not resolve, however, the conflict in Brittany, nor did it seriously affect the near constant level of *routier* warfare in Gascony. By ending the official war while so many captains continued occupying castles and earning income by extracting wealth from nearby communities, the treaty also created large bands of essentially unemployed soldiers in formerly hostile territory. These captains' careers demonstrate the wide array of results of the treaty. For Chandos, his ties to the Black Prince brought him both rewards and responsibility post-treaty. Chandos received land in the Cotentin, in Normandy, which he held in homage to the kings of France and England, since the castles in the Cotentin were not subject to the Treaty of Brétigny.⁷⁹ In truth, it was only because of England's dominance that this grant was made, and the reality was that it served as a

⁷⁹ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 2: 72.

reward for Chandos' service. Chandos was also given multiple important roles in the new English domains: he "was sent on behalf of the King of England, to undertake the implementation of the treaty, having a sufficient commission, to deliver the conquered castles and strongholds in various parts of the kingdom of France."⁸⁰ By 1361, Chandos had been appointed the king's lieutenant in Aquitaine, serving under the Black Prince.⁸¹

While Chandos received a high position within the system of lordship, other captains such as Knolles, Calveley, and Du Guesclin simply resumed fighting as if nothing had changed. In 1360, Knolles captured and ransomed Du Guesclin.⁸² Soon after, in either late 1360 or early 1361, Calveley captured and ransomed Du Guesclin.⁸³ Captains like Knolles, Calveley, and Du Guesclin lived entirely off the profits of war. Indeed, they had little choice but to continue fighting, with their ability to perform chivalric violence as their main contribution to the system of territorial lordship. Unlike Chandos or De Grailly, neither served as advisors to princes nor had the territorial holdings to merit princely cultivation. Where Chandos and De Grailly earned their place through both counsel and warfare, Knolles, Calveley, and Du Guesclin could count only on their aptitude for violence. It is worth remembering, however, that having only violent tendencies on which to rely did not diminish their honor or their importance as captains.

The aftermath of the Treaty of Brétigny also saw the emergence on to the political landscape of Enguerrand de Coucy. In 1360, as part of the security to allow King Jean II to collect his ransom, many hostages were sent to England.⁸⁴ With De Coucy was Jean II's son, Louis, duke of Anjou. De Coucy was a young and promising noble who had already

⁸⁰ Gray, *Scalachronica*, 197.

⁸¹ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 2: 77.

⁸² Bertrand du Guesclin, *Letters, Orders, and Musters of Bertrand du Guesclin: 1357-1380*, ed. Michael Jones (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2004,) 3.

⁸³ Du Guesclin, *Letters*, 3.

⁸⁴ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 2: 74.

distinguished himself as a captain dealing with the Jacquerie. His lands were within French territory; but close enough to English territory to still have a viable relationship with England. Aristocratic hostages—and prisoners more broadly—especially in this case, provided a means of communication across allegiances. It also provided opportunities for the hostage to build connections among opponents. It is in building connections that De Coucy is particularly useful as a case study. His actions as a captain are far less important to this study than the evolution of his career to captaincy, which happened only because he became a hostage.

In 1363, Louis, duke of Anjou escaped from the English garrison at Calais. In response to this breach of honor, his father King Jean II voluntarily returned to England as a hostage. Jean's voluntary return strikes the modern reader as an act of political foolishness. But however much it may read as an utter failure of realpolitik it highlights the magnitude of chivalric culture's influence. Jean returned because his son's escape broke the terms of his ransom. It was his duty to return to England as a hostage or face the grave dishonor breaking his oath would bring. Within a few months of his return, he became ill and died, making Charles V king of France, and with his ascension in 1364, the war changed drastically.⁸⁵

1360-4: The Emergence of the Great Company

The Treaty of Brétigny neither ended warfare in Brittany—the treaty failed to address much less resolve the dispute--nor in Gascony where *routier* bands continued to fight; nor in France where the Great Company raided its way through Burgundy. The Great Company was comprised mainly of Gascon, Navarrese, and English soldiers. In its raiding, the Bascot de Mauleon became an independent captain. His account of the Companies provided a unique insight into their motivation and makeup:

⁸⁵ Ibid., 99-107.

When this peace was thus made between these two kings, it was ordained that all men of war and companions should avoid and leave their fortresses and castles that they held. Then all manner of men of war and poor companies drew together, and the captains took counsel what they should do; and then they said, though these two kings have taken peace together, yet we must live. Then they went into Burgundy, and there were captains of all nations, English, Gascons, Spaniards, Navarrese, Almaines [Germans], Scots, and of all manner of nations, and there I was as a captain...and in the same company there were a three or four thousand of good and chosen men of war, and as subtle in all deeds of arms as might be, and apt to advise a battle, and to take their advantage, and as hardy to scale and assail a town or castle. And that was well shown at the Battle of Brignais, where we overthrew the constable of France...this battle did great profit to the companies, for before they were but poor, and then they were all rich, by reason of good prisoners, towns and castles that they won.⁸⁶

These troops came from a variety of cooling war zones. Anglo-Navarrese companies served with Gascon and English companies under men like Knolles and Calveley, retaining their own unique structures while pursuing similar aims of profit.⁸⁷ The Bascot, like many chroniclers, frames this raiding as within the structures of chivalry by centering it around prowess and deeds of arms. The Companies' victory at the Battle of Brignais allowed them to reach Avignon and blockade the city, economically restricting the Pope and sparking a joint project between the Pope and France to send the Company elsewhere. Aspects of this project included the Pope recruiting parts of the Company for warfare in Italy. The Bascot de Mauleon, in his discussion with Froissart, reported that this involved paying them money both to work for him and for leaving Avignon alone.⁸⁸ The remaining members of the Great Company would continue fighting in the area until 1364.

The activities of the Great Company, especially its victory at Brignais, came as yet another shock to the French government. The Great Company won despite lacking nobles

⁸⁶ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 4: 152.

⁸⁷ Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries*, 3-6.

⁸⁸ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 4: 152.

leading the army. Its leaders were instead captains, men of lower—though certainly not low—social standing. Their ability to defeat an army led by French nobles demonstrates a few noteworthy points. First, the expansion of participation in chivalric culture combined with ever-increasing opportunities for chivalric violence meant the group of people most likely to become captains—the lower landowning gentry and lower aristocracy—were becoming professional soldiers capable of defeating armies with traditional leadership structures. Second, the idea of the Great Company and its ilk as scourges of public order came from their assault on the ecclesiastical class, not because of their assault on the peasantry. In other words, by attacking the Pope they performed chivalric violence against a group supposed to be immune to violence: they performed actions not within the bounds of territorial lordship's traditional targets--the peasantry and each other.

1360-4: The Battle of Cocherel

The year 1364 saw two battles that, for a time, ended two of the proxy wars fought in France: the Battle of Cocherel and the Battle of Auray. From 1361-4, Jean de Grailly continued to act for both the king of Navarre and the Black Prince. Charles of Navarre had largely failed to take advantage of the weakness of the French crown in 1358 and had returned to Navarre though he continued to intrigue with the English against the French crown. His “chief counsellor and confidant at this juncture was the famous Gascon paladin, Jean de Grailly, Captal de Buch, who had recently been betrothed to his sister.”⁸⁹ De Grailly was primarily involved in diplomacy first in Burgundy with the Pope, and later with the Black Prince planning a new French campaign. De Grailly’s role is instructive as to how the network of captaincy influenced politics. The Black Prince, despite a truce that greatly benefitted him and his father, aided attacks on the French—

⁸⁹ Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 2: 504.

and not for the last time. Sumption argues that the Black Prince's decision to interfere despite the risk to his own self-interest was because "friendships are likely to have played a large part, as they generally did in the Prince's political decisions. The prince had been a close friend of the Captal de Buch since the Poitiers campaign of 1356 and was reputed to have arranged his betrothal to Charles of Navarre's sister. Sir John Chandos, the Prince's closest advisor, was the lord of Saint-Sauveur in the heart of Charles' Norman domain."⁹⁰ The Black Prince also had an increasing tendency over time to view political decisions through the lens of captaincy rather than lordship. Interpersonal relationships as a means of coalition building sometimes clashed with the political interests of territorial lordship yet aligned well with chivalric culture.

The planned campaign began well, and 1363 numerous castles and towns were captured in Normandy. In May of that year, however, De Grailly's coalition of English, Navarrese, and Gascon forces battled an army composed of French, Breton, and notably, Gascon mercenaries commanded by Bertrand du Guesclin. In the days leading up to the battle, there was communication between the Gascon captains on both sides, each expressing displeasure at having to fight the other.⁹¹ Froissart claims that De Grailly "laid his hand on his own head, and said, in great displeasure, 'by Saint Anthony's cap, Gascon against Gascon.'⁹² On the French side, Arnaud de Cervole, the Archpriest, a prominent French captain and mercenary, ordered his men to fight but left the field himself since he owed ransom money to many of the Gascon knights who had been at the Battle of Brignais.⁹³ The Battle of Cocherel was a defeat for the Anglo-Navarrese, the first defeat the English suffered on the field. Its timing, corresponding to the coronation of Charles V, was auspicious. During the battle De Grailly was captured and Du

⁹⁰ Ibid., 505.

⁹¹ Ibid., 109-10.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid., 117.

Guesclin took part of the ransom as leader. The Battle of Cocherel greatly reduced the king of Navarre's influence in France, particularly in Normandy. The battle began the process of placing Bertrand du Guesclin on the broader stage of the Hundred Years War, as well as ending Charles of Navarre's most active period.

1360-4: The Battle of Auray

In 1364 the war of succession in Brittany ended at the Battle of Auray, where Charles de Blois, the French-backed claimant to the duchy of Brittany, was killed. John de Montfort, the English-backed candidate, was laying siege to Auray, a strategically important port and one of De Blois' largest remaining loyal cities. He called his allies, as did De Montfort, when he heard that King Charles was coming to relieve the siege:

As soon as the lord Montfort knew these tidings, he sent word there of into the duchy of Aquitaine, to the knights and squires that were there of England, and especially to sir John Chandos, desiring them heartily, that in his great need they would comfort him, in trust that in Brittany they should do many a deed of arms, to which all the knights and squires to advance their honors should attend. And when sir John Chandos saw that the earl of Montfort desired him so effectuously[sic], than he asked license of the prince of Wales, his lord and master, who answered and said, he was content that he should go: saying it was no breach of the peace between England and France: for the Frenchmen in likewise took part with Charles of Blois against the earl of Montfort, and so to do, they had good leave of the French King.⁹⁴

Similar to De Grailly at Cocherel, service in these wars (clearly pitting English interest against French) was justified by the participants through the lens of chivalry and territorial lordship. De Montfort appealed to chivalry by emphasizing the opportunity for honor through deeds of arms that service to him would bring. At the same time, the relationships of lordship between these captains and lords like De Montfort and the Black Prince created networks allowing for the types of multi-lord obligations that this thesis has shown commonly existed among captains. Joining Chandos in De Montfort's host were Robert Knolles and Hugh Calveley who came to Auray

⁹⁴ Ibid., 128.

because of their longstanding involvement in the Breton war.⁹⁵ The Bascot de Mauleon had also joined up with Calveley at some unknown time before the battle.⁹⁶ The *Anonimalle Chronicle* takes a less nuanced approach by simply associating all the English knights together; it was a monastic chronicle written in York slightly later (1380s) so this chronicle's less nuanced understanding of these captains' political loyalties is both understandable and informative.⁹⁷ The treatment of captains in the chronicles seems to shift depending on the chroniclers' understanding of the performance of chivalric culture.

Bertrand du Guesclin, who only five months prior had won at Cocherel, was the chief advisor to Charles de Blois.. Despite John de Montfort's rank and initial command of the campaign, Chandos quickly took command of the army, both because of his relationship with the other captains and the advice of Edward III. Froissart first claims that when he arrived "then the captains drew together, first, sir John Chandos, by whose counsel especially they would all be ruled."⁹⁸ Later, however, Froissart explains that "Sir John Chandos, who was principal captain over them, though the earl of Montfort were chief, for the king of England had written so to him, that he should especially attend to the business of his son, the earl of Monfort, who should have his daughter in marriage."⁹⁹ Chandos' command over an earl and claimant to a duchy is a somewhat unique phenomenon among captains. The other attempt at this, in 1370 under Robert Knolles, did not go nearly as well. The difference may come down to either prestige or personalities, yet it is nonetheless important to note this for later consideration.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 130.

⁹⁶ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 4: 157.

⁹⁷ Anonymous, *Anonimalle Chronicle*, ed. V.H. Galbraith, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1970), 50.

⁹⁸ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 2: 131.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 132.

At the start of the battle, Chandos placed Calveley in reserve, which, according to Froissart, caused an argument. The key point here is that this position would prevent Calveley from performing deeds of arms in battle and gaining honor. It is only when he is assured by Chandos that no dishonor is meant and that he will still have a chance to earn honor that he reluctantly acquiesces.¹⁰⁰ It is tempting to also see Calveley's desire to be in the frontline as a bid for greater access to potential prisoners and thus, ransom. Froissart, however, like Charny, does not tend to critique a money motive and mentions it in equal opportunity. Chivalry and the economic mechanisms of war are not only not in opposition, but in fact are often mutually reinforcing. As it happened, the battle, like many of the great English victories of the period, resulted in both considerable economic and political outcomes. The Bascot de Mauleon reported "that I recovered by loss, for the journey was ours, and I had to my part good prisoners, by whom I had two thousand franks."¹⁰¹ Chandos also earned large profit. During the battle, he captured Bertrand du Guesclin and soon after ransomed him for 100,000 franks; Du Guesclin had to acquire financial help from multiple friends in order to pay it off, although it would in fact still be owed years later.¹⁰²

The period 1360-4, ending in the Battles of Cocherel and Auray, marked a shift in the war. All the major war zones of the 1350s had achieved either official peace or an actual resolution of the conflict at hand. While warfare and raiding certainly continued in Brittany and men still fought in Charles of Navarre's name, the main proxy wars had ended. The violence continuing to engulf France was that of the *routier* companies, some of whom had joined the

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 133.

¹⁰¹ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 4: 157.

¹⁰² Du Guesclin, *Letters*, 35-7.

Great Company, others of whom ruled territory freely. The subsequent period (1365-9) was largely concerned with these *routiers* and their captains.

1365-7: Aftermath of Cocherel and Auray

De Grailly spent less than a year as prisoner before he paid his ransom. For his part in winning the battle and capturing De Grailly, Du Guesclin received 4000 francs and lands in Normandy formerly belonging to Charles of Navarre.¹⁰³ In 1365, Jean de Grailly would be instrumental in making peace between Charles of Navarre and Charles V, for which he was released from prison. In fact,

the French King showed him indeed great sign of love, and gave him the fair castle of Nemours, with all the appurtenances, the which was well worth of yearly revenues, three thousand franks. And so the captal became liegeman to the French king, of whose homage the king was right joyous, for he loved well the service of such a knight as the captal was in his time.¹⁰⁴

When he returned to the Black Prince, Froissart reports, the prince “greatly...blamed him, and said, how that he could not aquit himself truly to serve two lords, and that he was too covetous to take land in France, where he was neither beloved nor honored.”¹⁰⁵ In response to these accusations, De Grailly renounced his oath and titles granted, remaining with the Black Prince.

This incident is telling because it is so different from the case of Chandos, who received land in the Cotentin and had to swear homage. It may be that De Grailly was more suspect because the gift was freely given rather than extracted. It may also be that the Black Prince did not trust his Gascon vassals, even those with whom he was friendly, as much as he trusted an Englishman like Chandos. This incident also reinforces the relationship between captaincy and dual lordship. When De Grailly held lordships through Charles of Navarre, it was clear who his

¹⁰³ Du Guesclin, *Letters*, 20-21.

¹⁰⁴ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 2: 149-50.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 150.

liege lord was and thus to which system of territorial lordship he belonged. By taking land in homage to the king of France, De Grailly was placing himself under both English and French territorial lordship. This dual position parallels the position traditionally held by the English territories in France, which de facto belonged to the king of England, but according to the French, only in his capacity as a vassal to the king of France. Dual lordships could only work in very specific circumstances--circumstances not relating to De Grailly. It is also worth noting that the way the Black Prince reprimands De Grailly using the language of chivalric culture, and not that of lordship. By emphasizing that De Grailly was not "beloved nor honored" in France, the Black Prince was taking advantage of the chivalric quest for honor, using it to reinforce De Grailly's place within lordship.

Enguerrand de Coucy also experienced the inherent conflicts of dual lordship during this period. For him, however, it worked out far better than it did for De Grailly. In 1365, De Coucy married Isabella, daughter of Edward III, and was given the earldom of Bedford to reside in his bloodline.¹⁰⁶ Around the same time, he was granted a stall in the Order of the Garter as well as lands "which he had claimed in the right of his great-grandmother."¹⁰⁷ Due to this marriage, De Coucy had a unique relationship with both Charles V and Edward III. In 1367, before the war broke out, De Coucy had gained the earldom of Soissons from another hostage, Guy de Blois. This acquisition required a "treaty between the king of England and his son in law, and sir Guy de Blois, that by the counsel of both brothers, lord John of Blois and sir Guy, and by the agreement of the French king, they clearly resigned into the king of England's hands, the earldom of Soissons, the which land the king of England gave to his son in law the lord

¹⁰⁶ Knighton, *Chronicle*, 193.

¹⁰⁷ "Coucy, Enguerrand," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*; for the Order of the Garter see George Frederick Beltz, *Memorials of the Order of the Garter* (London: Pickering, 1841), 151.

Coucy.”¹⁰⁸ De Coucy’s social status as a high ranking lord in France and his new status as an earl in England married into the royal family meant that the context of his lordship required both networks of lordship to engage with one another in order to preserve De Coucy’s position. Unlike Chandos, whose grant of land from the king of France was basically extracted, or De Grailly, who was shamed for taking land and returned it in order to remain loyal to the Black Prince, De Coucy was allowed to have dual loyalties for a time because he already belonged to two systems of territorial lordship.

1365-7: Du Guesclin and Calveley in Spain

There were a few ways that the French, and to a lesser extent the English, dealt with the companies. Fighting them was essential; *routier* bands would be defeated and the captains executed. Other captains were granted legitimacy and official positions. For this study, the most informative way captains were dealt with involved turning the companies loose in a new war zone that would soon become the site of yet another proxy war: Spain. The background to the Castilian Civil War lies in the conflict between Pedro I, king of Castile, and his bastard half-brother, Henry of Trastamara, over the throne. Trastamara was supported by, and granted land by, Pere III of Aragon whom Pedro I had been fighting since the 1350s.¹⁰⁹ Trastamara had close connections with France, while Pedro I had, in 1362, formed an alliance with England, in particular the Black Prince.¹¹⁰ In 1365-6, the French, cooperating with the Papacy, put a plan into motion to both remove a large number of *routiers* and support French political aims to place Henry of Trastamara on the throne of Castile.

¹⁰⁸ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 2: 251.

¹⁰⁹ P.E. Russel, *The English Intervention in Spain and Portugal: In the time of Edward III and Richard II* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), 3.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

The French agent in charge of this plan was Bertrand du Guesclin, now undivided in his loyalties after the death of Charles of Blois. At the start of negotiations, Du Guesclin received letters of recommendation from the Pope to the Black Prince, Jean de Grailly, and John Chandos in order to “discuss with them plans for him to lead the Companies against enemies of the faith.”¹¹¹ The original framing of the Spanish operation as crusading was likely to increase the chance of Bordeaux allowing so many English and Gascon captains to depart. When it became obvious the target was Pedro I, it was only because of Du Guesclin’s connections to these captains and the need to provide a target for violence that the campaign went ahead. The choice of Du Guesclin to bring the Great Company into Spain makes sense when considering that he, as well as being loyal and a great knight, “was also a professional, fighting for pay and other profits, and so to a certain extent the men of the Companies could recognize him as one of their own.”¹¹² Cuvelier’s *Song of Bertrand du Guesclin* reinforces this idea of a personal relationship and recognition between the captains of the Great Company and Du Guesclin. In Cuvelier, when Bertrand arrives at the Company's camp the major captains spoke together and happily agreed to see him:

They showed him the way to their captains, and when Hugh Calveley spotted Bertrand he came up and embraced him, warmly calling him companion and friend. Bertrand replied that no one would be his companion unless he agreed to do as he was about to ask, and Calveley, hearing this, said: ‘by the creator Bertrand, I’ll be a good companion to you in every possible way! I’ll follow you wherever you choose to lead, and fight anyone anywhere in the world—except the Prince of Wales: I’ll never be his adversary; I’ll go to him whenever he calls, for so I vowed some while ago.’ ‘I approve of that, sir;’ Bertrand said.¹¹³

Literary sources like these are not reliable for historical fact. What exactly happened at the meeting between Du Guesclin and the Great Company captains and Calveley will never be

¹¹¹ Du Guesclin, *Letters*, 38.

¹¹² Vernier, *Flower of Chivalry*, 85-6.

¹¹³ Cuvelier, *Song of Bertrand*, 164.

known. But what Cuvelier brings to this historical moment is a perspective on what a believable medieval narrative would be. Du Guesclin and Calveley had many prior shared experiences, not including the possibly fictitious encounters described by Cuvelier. Chivalric society was a small society that was fundamentally cross-territorial. Du Guesclin and Calveley may have been friendly, but what truly matters here is that those personal relationships do not trump obligations to territorial lordship—at least when they are embodied in an individual such as the Black Prince.

The Great Company agreed to accompany Du Guesclin, with command of the entire force split three ways between him, Arnoul d’Audrehem, and Hugh Calveley. Arriving in Spain, Pere III held a feast on New Years' Day 1366 for the group.¹¹⁴ The campaign to oust Pedro I from Castile began officially in late February and lasted until early April or early May at the latest of that year and saw no pitched engagements and very little opposition.¹¹⁵

From January to May a fascinating series of economic negotiations occurred which reveal a great deal about both the economic mechanisms of war and how territorial lordship was entangled with those mechanisms.. On January 9, only a few days after their arrival in Spain, Du Guesclin performed “homage for the castles of Borja and Magallon, in the kingdom of Aragon, and the valleys of Elda and Novelda in the kingdom of Valencia, granted him by Pere IV [Pere III] the Ceremonious, king of Aragon.”¹¹⁶ On January 26, Du Guesclin sent men to dine and negotiate with Charles of Navarre which resulted in a neutrality agreement.¹¹⁷ On February 16, an official contract of indenture was signed between Du Guesclin and Calveley, specifying the division of spoils and land between them. It also established that should “Edward III, any of his sons, or Sir John Chandos enter the war in the Peninsula, Calveley and those under his command

¹¹⁴ Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 2: 533.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 536.

¹¹⁶ Du Guesclin, *Letters*, 51.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 52.

were to be free to join them, and they could also return to England or elsewhere if recalled for good reason.”¹¹⁸ Nine days later on February 26 “in return for an annual rent of 2000 florins, on lands confiscated from the king of Castile in the kingdom of Valencia and still to be assigned, and the rank of baron of Aragon, Sir Hugh de Calveley, swears homage to Pere IV, reserving his fealty to Edward III, to his children born and to be born, and to Du Guesclin.”¹¹⁹ Near the end of the campaign, Henry of Trastamara rewarded Du Guesclin with the duchy of Trastamara and made Calveley count of Carrion.¹²⁰ Du Guesclin was still required on July 3 to pay the wages of Calveley from the campaign.

These series of negotiations and oaths demonstrated the borders within which territorial lordship, chivalric culture, and the economics of captaincy interacted. This campaign provided an opportunity for these captains to earn money and honor—the rewards of economics and chivalry respectively—sanctioned by territorial lordship. The captains involved had to meet certain criteria for those different systems to sanction the campaign. The system of lordship required oaths of homage as well as restrictions on that homage. Chivalry required that Du Guesclin and Calveley confirm their relationship and respective statuses through indentures. Indentures also served to clarify the economic relationship and ensure, at least in theory, they received the rewards they earned through chivalric action. Following this series of oaths and contracts provides a unique look at the complex infrastructure of captaincy and shows perfectly how captains had to navigate the economic, lordly, and chivalric requirements of their profession.

The cooperation of these two captains in this campaign and their ability to work and negotiate together also highlights a fundamental feature not just of captaincy, but of chivalric

¹¹⁸ Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries*, 170; Du Guesclin, *Letters*, 53-4.

¹¹⁹ Du Guesclin, *Letters*, 55.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 57.

culture generally: both of them were a means not just of cross-territorial communication but also of cooperation and trust. Du Guesclin and Calveley had to trust each other to not betray the other on campaign. They had to be able to cooperate effectively and have enough trust to maintain a partnership in order to achieve their desire for wealth and honor. Chivalric culture and the shared experience of captaincy was the foundation of that trust.

1367-9: the Battle of Najera and its Aftermath

A month after the end of the initial campaign, on August 1, 1366, Pedro I arrived in Bordeaux to seek the aid of his ally, the Black Prince. Chandos and Jean de Grailly were both trusted companions of the prince and Chandos was involved in counselling the Black Prince on whether to intervene or not.¹²¹ In the end, he chose to intervene, which the Chandos Herald attributes to the pursuit of chivalric fame, having the Black Prince say: “You have well seen that France was, as I think, the most puissant Christian country, and now have God and right granted us strength to conquer our right...and if it could be in our time we should be held the more valiant.”¹²² Froissart’s narrative is more complicated. The Black Prince is advised not to help Pedro I because of his reputation as a “a tyrant, and, without title or reason has always grieved and made war with his neighbors...and by his own men, how he caused to die his wife, your cousin.”¹²³ The argument from his vassals is based on moral reasons as well as reasons of poor lordship. The Black Prince’s response emphasizes the right to lordship:

It is not covenable [sic] that a bastard should hold a realm in heritage, and put out of his own realm his brother, rightful inheritor to the land, the which thing all kings and king’s sons should in no ways suffer nor consent to, fir it is a great prejudice against the state royal. And also beside that, the king, my father, and this king

¹²¹ Chandos Herald, *Life of the Black Prince*, 151-2.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 151.

¹²³ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 2: 163.

Dampeter [Pedro I], have a great season been allied together by great confederations, wherefore we are bound to aid him.¹²⁴

The Life of the Black Prince said he aided Pedro I for essentially chivalric reasons. Froissart says he aided Pedro to maintain the principles and structures of dynastic, territorial lordship and the ideas of hereditary kingship. But clearly, another reason for the Black Prince's aid was financial. He extracted promises of territory in exchange as well as the promise of complete reimbursement for the expenses of the campaign.¹²⁵ Russel argues that "the attitude of the prince, however, was quite inexcusable and the evidence of his desire to profit personally from his ally's misfortunes makes curious reading when set against the noble sentiments put in his mouth by Froissart when the latter is discussing his hero's reason for aiding Pedro."¹²⁶ This reading of the Black Prince's motivations fails to account for both the possibility of a financial as well as a chivalric motivation and that such an attitude was an accepted norm within chivalry. Russel treats the Black Prince as a mercenary in a derogatory sense, when this study has shown that fighting for the motivation of pay was both commonplace and respectable within chivalry.

Chandos and De Grailly were also instrumental in securing Charles of Navarre's agreement that allowed them to pass through Navarre into Castile.¹²⁷ Both captains also negotiated with the *routier* companies nearby and recruited them.¹²⁸ Over the next few months, many captains traveled to Bordeaux to join the Black Prince's force. Calveley—accompanied by the Bascot de Mauleon--and Knolles both answered the Black Prince's call independently. John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster and second son of Edward III, also travelled to Brittany on his journey to join his older brother's campaign: "Duke John of Brittany came; with him the greatest

¹²⁴ Ibid., 163.

¹²⁵ Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 2: 545; Russel, *English Intervention*, 67.

¹²⁶ Russel, *English Intervention*, 67.

¹²⁷ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 2: 167.

¹²⁸ Chandos Herald, *Life of the Black Prince*, 151-2; Russel, *English Intervention*, 62.

barons of his land, those he held most dear, Clisson, Knolles, and many who did him great honour.”¹²⁹ Knolles’ position in Brittany may at first appear to be within the dual lordship that proved so problematic for men like De Grailly at times. The difference, however, is that the duke of Brittany was, for the time, part of the same territorial lordship network as the Black Prince. Thus, there was no conflict of loyalty. Knolles travelled from Brittany to Bordeaux with John of Gaunt. Knolles’ decision to leave Brittany also had no bearing on his loyalty to the duke. Knolles was doing both his chivalric and territorial duty by serving the Black Prince on campaign. On January 2, 1367 Calveley received letters lifting his obligations since, to continue his contract, he would have to fight the Black Prince.¹³⁰ He would not march to Bordeaux, but instead seized castles along the Black Prince’s way.¹³¹ The list of captains “suggests something like a veterans’ reunion, bringing together the toughest survivors of the past twenty years of warfare, from Crecy to Auray.”¹³² With his army gathered, the Black Prince marched from Bordeaux into Spain intending to return Pedro I to the throne of Castile.

On April 3, 1367, the Black Prince, accompanied by John Chandos, Jean de Grailly, Hugh Calveley, Robert Knolles, and the Bascot de Mauleon defeated Henry of Trastamara, with Bertrand du Guesclin as his right hand at the Battle of Najera. Du Guesclin was taken prisoner and the rights to own his ransom taken from his captors by the Black Prince. The details of the battle itself are irrelevant for this study, It is notable that within two years of this theater of war opening up, every single captain in this study (with the exception of De Coucy) became involved. What started as just Calveley and Du Guesclin fighting for profit and—for the latter, political motivations--escalated as it became another proxy war where captains and the chivalric

¹²⁹ Ibid., 153.

¹³⁰ Du Guesclin, *Letters*, 61.

¹³¹ Chandos Herald, *Life of the Black Prince*, 153.

¹³² Vernier, *Flower of Chivalry*, 109.

class could perform deeds of arms and earn profit, including those at the top of the system of lordship like the Black Prince.

For two years following the Battle of Najera there were attempts to settle the economic and political aspects of the campaign. The Black Prince spent this time trying to get Pedro I to pay the promised wages. His effort included sending Hugh Calveley to get payment from Pere III for money owed to the Black Prince¹³³ Pedro slowly reduced the agreed payments and promised lands were prevented from being delivered by local customs of which the English were unaware.¹³⁴ In August, Pedro I reneged on his payments completely and the Black Prince returned to Bordeaux.¹³⁵ All of this put the Black Prince in financial difficulty from which sprang tax policies in Gascony that alienated many of his vassals and contributed to the repudiation of the Treaty of Brétigny and the resumption of war with France in 1369. While most scholarly literature treats the failure of Najera as a political failure for the Black Prince, it is more correct to view it as his failure as a captain. The Black Prince attempted to perform captaincy in the way he handled Pedro I; the prince saw the opportunity for profit and honor and expansion of his lordship. The Black Prince, however, was not a captain like the others. He was of much higher status in the system of lordship and thus needed to operate under a different paradigm to be successful. He gambled the wealth of his territory for payment—with disastrous results—and failed to recoup the cost because his social status was too high. The social dynamics between the Black Prince, expected to be a king in charge of a large territory, and the king of neighboring kingdoms were very different than those between a captain and a king. Captains on the winning side largely managed to get their ransoms and payments, with the exception of Calveley (as

¹³³ Du Guesclin, *Letters*, 69-70.

¹³⁴ Russel, *English Intervention*, 113-4.

¹³⁵ Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 2: 558.

discussed below) because receiving their payments made sense within the logic of the systems of warfare economics, lordship, and chivalry. The Black Prince used the economic and chivalric tools of captaincy while at the same time being one of the most powerful territorial lords within the entire conflict. He misunderstood the relationship of his hereditary royal position to captaincy and so his attempt to act as a captain inevitably proved unsuccessful. Du Guesclin and Calveley successfully received lands in Spain as reward for service because those rewards were appropriate for their status within the context of lordship.

However, Bertrand du Guesclin and Hugh Calveley also spent most of 1367-9 trying to resolve economic consequences of the Castile campaign and Najera. Sometime between December 7 and December 27, 1367 Du Guesclin's ransom was set at 100,000 *doblas*.¹³⁶ Sumption argues that "a man of du Guesclin's stature could be counted on to pay his ransom sooner or later. His place in the comradeship of arms mattered to him. Moreover, he could expect to encounter his captors again."¹³⁷ At the same time, Du Guesclin was also still paying the ransom he owed to John Chandos for his capture at Auray.¹³⁸ On January 17, 1368, Du Guesclin was released from Bordeaux and returned to Castile to support Henry of Trastamara later in the year.¹³⁹ In March, Calveley sued Du Guesclin in the Aragon courts, kicking off a nearly year-long lawsuit.¹⁴⁰ The suit is itself immensely complicated wages from different lands given to Du Guesclin and Calveley which they in turn exchanged and promised for other lands.¹⁴¹ Further complicating matters, and ending Du Guesclin's involvement, was a letter he sent to Calveley before the suit saying, to use Fowler's summarization, that "authorizing payment of the residue

¹³⁶ Du Guesclin, *Letters*, 73-5.

¹³⁷ Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 2: 556.

¹³⁸ Du Guesclin, *Letters*, 71. The payment was made on October 20, 1367.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 75,

¹⁴⁰ The surviving documents in Du Guesclin, *Letters*, 78-90, extend from March 19-October 20.

¹⁴¹ Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries*, 250-1.

of wages for military service still outstanding to him and his men, the total of which they were agreed upon, from Aragon crown debts which Du Guesclin claimed to be still outstanding to him.”¹⁴² Calveley contended with the Aragon courts until his death in 1393, and his heir (his nephew) would remain involved far longer due to debts from Calveley’s marriage to an Aragon noblewoman.¹⁴³ Du Guesclin remained in Spain until June 1370, paid to fight for various lords until he was recalled to France¹⁴⁴

Calveley’s long engagement with the Aragon courts for his wages demonstrated key elements of the economic calculations of captaincy. Calveley and Du Guesclin’s involvement in Spain led to massive financial rewards, both cash and land, from multiple systems of territorial lordship. His payments also relied upon the stability of those systems and those lords continuing to need to keep Calveley happy. Once Calveley was away in England and no longer backed by the Black Prince, there was no real pressure to give him his rewards that had been extracted in very different circumstances. Calveley saw an opportunity to obtain a massive payday from easy service and only failed to secure everything he wanted because the circumstances changed before he could succeed. He attempted to force himself into a greater position in Aragon lordship than his captain status allowed.

This chapter showed the activities of captains during the gap between two phases—the Edwardian 1337-60 and Caroline 1369-89—of the traditional diplomatic periodization of the Hundred Years War. First, this coverage shows that that periodization ignores a vast number of conflicts (including some that began during the Edwardian phase). These conflicts were as much a part of the Hundred Years War as the events of the Edwardian phase. In fact, the events of this

¹⁴² Ibid., 251.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 254-8.

¹⁴⁴ Du Guesclin, *Letters*, 124.

period, particularly the rise of Bertrand du Guesclin and the cost to the Black Prince of the Najera campaign arguably had a greater impact on how the war progressed in the Caroline phase than the English victory at Crecy. It also showed the many ways that dual loyalties could manifest and how captains navigated them successfully or not. Calveley's duty to territorial lordship allowed him to fight against an ally of his lord so long as he was allowed to switch sides if his lord got involved. De Grailly could have a second lord in Charles of Navarre since he was the Black Prince's ally, but when he attempted to hold lordship from France, he was shamed for dual loyalties. Meanwhile De Coucy, was far more successful in navigating dual lordship. In his case, he achieved success both because of his social status and his beginnings as a largely neutral figure, unlike De Grailly. He also benefited from his marriage into Edward III's family. This marriage moved him outside a traditional lordship structure and into a familial relationship, allowing the rules to be bent more than they could be otherwise.

Chapter 5: The Caroline Period, 1369-80

This chapter explores the first half of the Caroline period of the war, 1369-80, a period dominated by French victory and English disaster. It begins with the French resumption of war and campaigns in Gascony from 1369-70, a series of critical defeats culminating in the first battlefield defeat for the English at Pontvallain. From there it moves through the slow degradation of the English position and prestige, resulting in the failure of John of Gaunt's 1373 *chevauchee*. The chapter continues to focus on the fates of these captains and shows that, while captaincy as a phenomenon remained unchanged in its operations, it was no longer producing the benefits for either the system of territorial lordship or for the captains it had produced earlier in the war.

1369: Renewed French Offensive

The war between England and France resumed in 1369 with a French offensive into Gascony, a campaign which began the reversal of fortunes that lost the English much of the territory acquired in the 1340s and 1350s. The Bascot de Mauleon, describing the period in 1388, wrote: "I was there in the company of Sir Hugh Calveley, and I returned with him into Aquitaine. Then the war renewed between the French king and the Prince; then we had much ado, for we had sore war, and many captains, English and Gascon, were slain, and yet, I thank God, I am alive."¹⁴⁵ At the start of the offensive, "the Prince wrote to sir John Chandos, who was in Cotentin, at Saint-Sauveur le Viscount, commanding him incontinent after the sight of his letters, to come to him without any delay: and Sir John Chandos, who would not disobey the Prince hastened as much as he might to come to him."¹⁴⁶ On arriving, the Black Prince "received him

¹⁴⁵ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 4: 153.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 2: 254.

with great joy. Than [sic] the Prince sent him with certain men of arms and arches to the garrison of Montabon, to make war against the Gascons and Frenchmen.”¹⁴⁷ This pattern of description was repeated by Froissart, discussing Calveley and Knolles as well. Each case emphasized loyalty to the Black Prince in response to France breaking the Treaty of Brétigny in 1369. The only exception to this pattern is Jean de Grailly, who remained with the Black Prince throughout these years and thus never needed to be summoned.

Joining shortly afterwards was Hugh Calveley. He was still very much involved in Aragon courts as well as the politics of the royal court. Yet, despite legal circumstances involving his wealth (meaning it would be in his economic self-interest to remain in Spain), he and his army freshly out of Spain:

as soon as he knew that the Frenchmen made war to the Prince, he, with his company...and so came to the Prince to the city of Angouleme, to whom the Prince made great cheer, and was glad of him, and kept him still there till the companions were come out of Normandy, who had sold their fortresses to come to him. And as soon as they were come to Angouleme the Prince ordered sir Hugh Calveley to be their captain.¹⁴⁸

Froissart’s narrative leans more toward attributing Calveley’s participation to his loyalty to the Black Prince over the possibility of pay. He also continued the literary and chivalric device of finding out about the war, going to Angouleme, being received with joy by the prince, then being sent out to fight.

Robert Knolles is given a much clearer, expansive motivation because he is featured heavily in the subsequent sections of Froissart, thus there is more need to characterize him fully. Like Calveley, he joined the war because he heard that “the Frenchmen made the Prince so great war, and would disinherit him of his inheritance of Aquitaine...was sore displeased therewith in

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 254.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 263.

his mind and purposed to assemble together such people as he might and to go and serve the Prince at his own cost and charge.”¹⁴⁹ The implication that Knolles fought to protect the Black Prince’s inheritance leans more toward loyalty to a system of territorial lordship than a desire to take advantage of an economic opportunity for personal profit. Arriving at Angouleme, “the Prince and Princess were right glad of his coming, and made him such cheer, that the Prince made him master and chief sovereign of all the knights and squires of his court, because of his valor and chivalry, commanding all his court to obey him as their sovereign.”¹⁵⁰ The resumption of official war targeting all three patrons of these men meant that they were once again fighting within the paradigm of territorial lordship, almost completely uncoupled from economic considerations. The initial fighting of 1369 brought devastation and little permanent change. Both Knolles and Chandos launched *chevauchees* against former Gascon vassals who had switched sides with little consequence.¹⁵¹ An incident germane to captaincy occurred early in Knolles’ *chevauchee* when he encountered the Gascon captain Bertucat d’Albret, his former comrade now fighting for the French. Knolles “showed him how it was greatly to his blame to turn himself French, and to forsake to serve the Prince, who so well hath honoured and loved him in time past.”¹⁵² Because of this meeting with Knolles, D’Albret switched sides and fought for the English. An important continuity in this study is territorial lordship and chivalric culture mutually reinforced each other through captaincy.. In 1369 when the system of territorial lordship could not necessarily determine the loyalty of a Gascon captain, the interpersonal bonds of captaincy facilitated navigation and resolution of such tensions.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 279.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 279-80.

¹⁵¹ Nicolas Savy, "The chevauchée of John Chandos and Robert Knolles: Early March to Early June 1369." *Journal of Medieval Military History* 7 (2009): 39-56.

¹⁵² Froissart, *Chronicles*, 2: 280; Savy, "The Chevauchee," 42-3.

When war broke out in 1369, De Coucy uniquely navigated the conflict based on his relationship with both kings. He was a type of lord who, according to Froissart, was “sore troubled in their minds, because they saw thus nightly and daily the war multiply between these two kings of France and England.” Froissart suggests that he was troubled because “he had fair inheritance in England, as well by himself as by his wife, who was daughter to the king of England: which land he must renounce if he would serve the French king, of whose blood he was, and of the same nation.” His solution was to “dissemble with both kings. And so to forget the time, he thought to depart out of the realm of France for a season.”¹⁵³

Territorial lordship typically required that lords chose a side for which to fight. However, in De Coucy’s case, his familial connection to both kings and the geography of his territorial possessions meant that no matter which side he chose, losing access and privileges in the other territory was unavoidable. The only way to not renounce either his English or French lands was to not fight. Indeed, De Coucy chose to leave France and not fight, an option not available to De Grailly and Chandos. Moreover, both sides tacitly acknowledged and respected De Coucy’s personal decision. In a period where *routier* warfare was common and accountability for lords was rare, “the land of the lord of Coucy abode in peace, there there[sic] was neither man nor woman that had any hurt, the value of a penny, if they said they belonged to the lord of Coucy.”¹⁵⁴ Because of his position within the complex structure of lordship, there seemed to have been at the very least an agreement to treat him as a neutral party. He remained out of the fighting until 1377, though he was fighting as a captain throughout this period in Germany and Italy. His time in Italy included joining forces with John Hawkwood to defeat enemies of the

¹⁵³ Ibid., 325-6.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 345.

Pope at Montelchiari in 1373.¹⁵⁵ Mercenary employment provided the way for De Coucy to essentially remain neutral in this conflict, thereby maintaining his dual lordship. He returned to France in 1374, then to England in 1376, allowing him to be “at the deathbed of the Black Prince in June, and attended his funeral.”¹⁵⁶ De Coucy remained neutral until 1377.

1370: Breakdown of The English Position

In 1369 English forces achieved little but also lost little, while in 1370 they experienced a series of both personal and military catastrophes. The first catastrophe was the death of John Chandos on January 1, 1370. He set out to destroy a French captain and his company and during the battle, Chandos was slain.¹⁵⁷ The reaction to Chandos’ death in the sources is interesting. The Chandos Herald, for example, reports that:

when the French knew that the famous Chandos was dead they made great joy everywhere and rejoiced greatly, saying: ‘all this will be ours, as true as is the paternoster.’ Then King Charles of France had word sent incontinent to Sir Bertrand du Guesclin, the bold and true, in Spain, where he was, where he served the Bastard King, and announced that Chandos was dead. Gladly did he hear the tidings.¹⁵⁸

Chandos Herald was reflecting a commonly held attitude among both English and French knights that John Chandos was critical to the defense of Aquitaine. However, the reveling in his death seems to diminish the notion of a chivalric brotherhood of arms emphasized in other sources. Even Froissart's attempts do not wholly create a perception of a chivalric brotherhood:

For his death, his friends, and also some of his enemies, were right sorrowful. The Englishmen loved him, because all nobleness was found in him. The Frenchmen hated him, because they doubted him; yet I heard his death greatly complained among right noble and valiant knightes of France, saying, that it was a great damage of his death; for they said, better it had been that he had been taken alive; for if he had been taken alive, they said, he was so sage, and so imaginative, that he would have found some manner of good means, whereby the peace might have ensued, between the realms of England and France; for he was so well beloved with the

¹⁵⁵ “Coucy, Enguerrand,” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 3: 47-8.

¹⁵⁸ Chandos Herald, *Life of the Black Prince*, 169.

king of England, that the king would believe him, rather than any other in the world. Thus both French and English spoke of his death, and especially the Englishmen, for by him Guyenne was kept and recovered.¹⁵⁹

Still, there are some key similarities between these two accounts of Chandos' death. In both, neither his marshal prowess nor his value to the English was denied. The opinion among the French described in both also seems reasonable. Many saw his death as the elimination of a dangerous and capable opponent, while others saw it as a lost opportunity to exploit the dynamics of lordship and captaincy for the achievement of peace. His value was largely because of his personal relationship to the king of England. Captains used their interpersonal relationships as effective cards to play as they navigated and resolved tensions within lordship.

The success of the French offensive had far more to do with the deployment of resources than with the skill of the combatants. The Black Prince had squandered most of the treasury of his territory on the Najera campaign while Charles V had built up forces and money to commit to reconquering the territories lost in the Treaty of Brétigny. The Black Prince's illness denied the English their best commander. The death of John Chandos meant the loss of another top commander and skillful politician. Knolles, Calveley, and De Grailly were highly capable and certainly contributed to the defense of Gascony; but they lacked both the financial resources to hold off the French and access to the type of warfare that enabled them to acquire that wealth.

1370: Robert Knolles' *Chevauchee* of 1370 and the Battle of Pontvallain

After the death of John Chandos on January 1, 1370, the English sent an expedition to northern France that would fight from August to December. Offensive warfare had always been where the English performed best. Both the large campaigns commanded by kings and princes and the smaller scale *routier* warfare practiced by Knolles and other captains had brought the

¹⁵⁹ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 2: 324-5.

English their greatest successes. Robert Knolles commanded the force, likely an acknowledgement that he was the English commander most capable of commanding an army. However, the expedition took an innovative new approach to payment and command, albeit an experiment that ended in failure when a large part of the force was defeated at the Battle of Pontvallain. Unlike the other official campaigns up to this point in the war whose indentures covered the whole period of the campaign:

Rather than receiving a daily wage, Knolles was to receive a flat fee of 1000 marks. More importantly, the king agreed to pay the men's wages at double the customary rates (and double *regard* for the men-at-arms), but only for the first quarter year (thirteen weeks) of the campaign...thereafter they were to live off the land and from the booty taken during the campaign.¹⁶⁰

Edward III financed this campaign in order to take as much advantage of the *chevauchee* style of warfare as possible using a financing system that doubled down on that method of warfare.

Knolles was a good choice for this type of command theoretically. He had experience in both *chevauchee* and *routier* warfare and was one of the most experienced English captains. However, this campaign also shows that even a captain as successful, well-respected, and capable as Knolles could not necessarily transition to warfare that required leading a host on an official campaign. Previous large campaigns had all been commanded by men of the highest social rank. Edward III had led the Crecy campaign as well as that of 1359-60 which ended in the Treaty of Brétigny. The Black Prince had led the Poitiers and Najera campaigns. In Brittany, Henry of Grosmont, duke of Lancaster, was in charge until his death in 1360. Knolles was not an aristocrat and “this fact was not lost upon Knolles or the king. A week prior to sealing his indenture, on 13 June, Knolles had agreed, with the acquiescence of the king, to share the command of the army

¹⁶⁰ Gary P. Baker, “Sir Robert Knolles’ Expedition to France in 1370: New Perspectives” in *Military Communities in Late Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Andrew Ayton*, Gary P. Baker, Craig L. Lambert, and David Simpkin, eds. (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2018), 150.

with three other men.”¹⁶¹ The three other men were “closely associated with the person of the king or the royal household,” lending legitimacy not only to the expedition, but also to his command. Despite captaincy’s ability to provide wealth for gentry men in addition to fame, high standing in chivalric culture, and even high positions within the structure of lordship, it did not necessarily confer class benefits that came from blood heredity. The English, like the French, had not wholly learned the lessons of the Battle of Brignais; in particular, they had not learned that professional captains were able to command armies as well as the nobility.

The expedition itself, arriving in France during August 1370, quickly encountered problems with the command structure. There were some initial successes, but by late November tensions were heightened between Knolles, many of the other captains, and some of his co-commanders. The narrative in the *Anonimalle Chronicle* blames Knolles for not distributing loot fairly and for wanting to winter at Derval in Brittany rather than continuing to raid.¹⁶² Strategically, wintering at Derval would have meant securing the profits of the campaign thus far, which would have secured payment for the men. Thomas of Walsingham similarly emphasizes that many of the other captains desired to fight.¹⁶³ In either case, disaster soon followed. The army split into four groups: one led by a co-commander Thomas de Grandison; one led by John Minsterworth; one led by a lord Fitzwalter; and the final one commanded by Knolles, who had been joined by Hugh Calveley.¹⁶⁴ These breakout groups were defeated at the Battle of Pontvallain by an army commanded by none other than the newly appointed Constable of France, Bertrand du Guesclin.¹⁶⁵ In the aftermath, Knolles and Calveley, who had not been at the

¹⁶¹ Baker, “Sir Robert Knolles' Expedition,” 151.

¹⁶² *Anonimalle Chronicle*, 64-5.

¹⁶³ Thomas of Walsingham, *Quondam Monarchi S. Albani, Historia Anglicana* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 310.

¹⁶⁴ *Anonimalle Chronicle*, 64.

¹⁶⁵ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 2: 360-1.

battle, went to Knolles' castle of Derval, as he had initially planned.¹⁶⁶ For Knolles, the campaign marked the lowest point of his career. He was blamed for the failure of the campaign in the immediate aftermath, along with his co-commanders, and "consequently, the king confiscated the lands given to Knolles to provide him with his fee for the campaign."¹⁶⁷ Knolles would not return to political favor until 1373-4.

The 1370 expedition marked a turning point in the war. Sumption has argued that the immediate result was that "it ended the myth of English invincibility on the battlefield, which had for years been among their most valuable military and diplomatic assets."¹⁶⁸ On the grand strategic scale it established a trend of inefficient or failed campaigns that dominated the war in France until the ascension of Henry V. Partly this was due to finances; the experiment in payment for this campaign was predicated on the limited financial resources of England. It also showed a generational divide among the captains and their relationships with the monarch. At the height of Edward III's power he had command over both the financial state of the realm and, equally importantly, he also controlled English chivalric culture that cultivated extensive martial participation among the nobility and gentry, cementing their personal ties to him. By 1370, the only captains who could match Bertrand du Guesclin as a commander were the Black Prince (who was and would remain too ill to command for the rest of his life) and Robert Knolles (who lacked the social status necessary to conduct these types of campaigns). The great early campaigns of the period had all been *chevauchees* led by the king, the Black Prince, or Henry of Grosmont.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 362.

¹⁶⁷ Baker, "Sir Robert Knolles' Expedition," 174.

¹⁶⁸ Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 3: 93.

Pontvallain also highlights a signal difference between English and French captaincy. For the most part, this study has shown primarily similarities in behavior and motivation. Bertrand du Guesclin's success as Constable of France, despite the fact he came from the same social class as Knolles, requires deeper assessment. With a comparable class dynamic in both England and France, "a Constable risen from the lower would be exposed to the scorn and derision of princes and great lords; worse yet, his social superiors might feel justified in disobeying his orders."¹⁶⁹ The key differences between Du Guesclin and Knolles came down to royal support within the system of lordship and the economic pressures on each type of campaign in which they participated. Bertrand du Guesclin was given an official and respected position in the governing structure of France, as Constable, which meant that he was chosen and supported by the highest lord in France. the king. Conversely, Knolles was not given royal support. He was not placed solely in command and the implicit class bias against him was tacitly supported by Edward III denying him full command. Edward III in the 1340s or 1350s would likely have had the kind of relationship with the captains that allowed him to enforce his desired command structure; but the king at that juncture also possessed far more talented commanders.

The economics of each type of campaign also shaped Du Guesclin's ability to effectively exercise command. From the outset, Knolles' campaign was self-funding. By structuring the financing this way, the campaign focused less on military objectives, instead forcing economic considerations to dominate the action when the payments from Edward III stopped. Since a *chevauchee* worked best through fast movement and mass destruction, it follows that motivations derived from the need to pay troops and having no solid command structure would cause the campaign to fracture along the lines of disagreements. Command structure was probably the

¹⁶⁹ Vernier, *Flower of Chivalry*, 158.

most important factor in the failure of the campaign; however, the funding issue and the economic consequences for the army greatly exacerbated the split. Du Guesclin, on the other hand, had the direct responsibility for hindering or stopping Knolles and his army was paid for, allowing him to focus on purely strategic considerations.

1371-3: The Aftermath of Pontvallain

The English military situation continued to fall apart 1371-2. John of Gaunt, second son of Edward III and duke of Lancaster, was placed in charge of the failing plight in Gascony. He positioned Jean de Grailly in increasingly high positions of power and, when he arrived in Gascony, placed John Hastings, earl of Pembroke in charge. Shortly afterward, Pembroke was captured. De Grailly was in charge of defending the Atlantic port of La Rochelle and the surrounding region. During an action before Soubise, on September 8, the French captured him and he remained imprisoned until his death.¹⁷⁰

This same period saw the Bascot de Mauleon returning to the *routier* warfare that defined life in Gascony. He describes how during this period of renewed conflict he:

knew but few except myself that were slain. I have held frontiers and made war for the king of England, for my heritage lieth in Burdelois [the region surrounding Bordeaux]. Sometime I have been so overthrown and pulled down, that I had not the wherewithal to leap a horseback; and others time I have been rich enough, when good fortune came. And in this season I and Raymonet de la pee [sic] were companions together, and we had in Toulouse, on the frontier of Bigore, the castle of Malvoisin, the castle of Trygalet, and the castle of Nentilleux, which as than did us great profit. Then the duke of Anjou took them from us, by force of puissance, but than Raymonet de Peel turned French, and I abide still good English, and shall do while I live.¹⁷¹

As is usually the case with the Bascot, the story he recounted to Froissart neatly sums up the English experience of the early 1370s. He had great success as a *routier* captain before losing

¹⁷⁰ Du Guesclin, *Letters*, 180; Froissart, *Chronicles*, 2: 406.

¹⁷¹ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 4: 158.

everything he had gained when the French launched their offensive. The language of becoming or turning French continues in this excerpt, which seems like a good way to discuss the unique Gascon experience of lordship in relation to the territorial lordships of England and France. Some Gascons turned French while others turned English. The experience of Gascon captaincy, unlike English or French captaincy, meant choosing to fight for either England or France. It was not simply a choice of which system of territorial lordship they would join; it was a choice of identity as well.

The last major combats of the war prior to 1377 took place in 1373. In Brittany, the resumption of war between England and France led to a concomitant reignition of the proxy war there. As in Gascony, this war turned quickly in the French's favor. Robert Knolles was one of the last English commanders to organize the defense of Brittany after John de Montfort fled to England, removing to his castle of Derval as part of this defense. It had, in fact, been besieged and agreed to surrender, but when Knolles arrived, he took command and "broke all the treaties and appointment before made, and renounced them all, and sent word to the duke of Anjou, and to the Constable, that he would not keep no such appointment, as his men had made in his absence without his leave, saying, they had no such authority so to do."¹⁷² Knolles' actions marked a break with the accepted traditions of warfare. A further, more drastic break would occur when Prince Louis, duke of Anjou arrived to personally oversee the siege of Derval. He sent a herald to speak with Knolles, threatening to execute hostages if Knolles did not surrender:

Sir Robert answered, by God, herald, for all the menacing of your masters, I will not so lose my castle, and if so be that the duke cause my men to die, I shall serve him in like case: for I have here within both knights and squires prisoner, and though I might have for them a hundred M. franks, I will save never a one of them. And when the herald was departed, and had made his report, the duke of Anjou called forth the hangman, and made to be brought forth the hostages, two knights and a squire, and caused their heads to be stricken off, near to the castle, so that

¹⁷² Froissart, *Chronicles*, 2: 434.

they within might see it and know it. Incontinent, Sir Robert Knolles made a board to be put out of a window of the hall, and brought there four prisoners that he had, three knights and a squire, for whom he might have had great ransoms, but he made their four heads to be stricken off, and did cast them down into the dykes, the bodies one way, and their heads another way. Then they broke up the siege, and all manner of men went into France, and namely the duke of Anjou went to Paris.¹⁷³

This incident highlights the fallout from the breakdown of typical war processes. Froissart points out twice (once through Knolles and once on his own) that this decision flew in the face of what a captain should do according to the economics of war. Knolles' decision should best be understood within the realm of lordship and as a captain's defense of his greatest source of power--his wealth. At a time when his position in Brittany had collapsed and his reputation in England had been destroyed, his ruthlessness defending Derval makes sense. That it escalated into mutual execution of hostages further shows the necessity of honoring the traditions of chivalric culture to maintain some semblance of protection for the chivalric class. It is worth noting that within a year of this incident, "at the request of the Black Prince and John of Gaunt, who doubtlessly knew Knolles from their time fighting in France, the king pardoned Knolles for the failure of the campaign [of 1370]."¹⁷⁴ Although a direct link between these two events cannot be proven, Knolles' attitude and loyalty toward English interests on display at Derval were qualities that, by English standards, were deserving of forgiveness. In the same way Knolles' reputation in Jean le Bel's chronicle differed heavily from what it was in Knighton's, the context of lordship allows Knolles' breaking of two tenets of chivalric culture to be interpreted rather as loyalty and devotion. The desperation of the English position in 1373 was also reflected in their counter-offensive.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 441.

¹⁷⁴ Baker, "*Sir Robert Knolles' Expedition*," 175.

1373-80: John of Gaunt's *Chevauchee* and the Congress of Bruges

A renewed effort at an English *chevauchee*, this time led by John of Gaunt, was made in 1373. He was accompanied by “several of the great captains of past campaigns” including Hugh Calveley.¹⁷⁵ It was a relatively large force, paid in the traditional way, and in most respects, very similar to the *chevauchees* that ended in the victories at Crecy and Poitiers. But instead of great victory, Gaunt's *chevauchee* achieved only defeat. The land through which John of Gaunt travelled from Calais to Bordeaux had been wasted by war or purposely emptied to deny food to armies and their supporters. His army that arrived at Bordeaux in December had suffered serious casualties, both from French raids (although they avoided actual combat) and the lack of food.¹⁷⁶ This devastation marked the end of the last major English campaign of the 1370s.

Previous campaigns led by princes or kings had ended in success, at least militarily. Crecy, Poitiers, and Najera had all ended with decisive victories in battle. Edward III's campaign of 1359-60 had ended outside the walls of Paris quickly followed by the Treaty of Brétigny. This campaign ended in failure and humiliation, part of which can be blamed on John of Gaunt. He was nowhere near the capable captain that his father Edward III or his older brother the Black Prince was. Indeed, Gaunt's military career after this period was one of consistent failure. A larger part of the failure of this *chevauchee* however, rests on the success of the French strategy. Charles V and Bertrand du Guesclin both knew the risk of engaging the English in pitched battle, the latter despite his victory at Pontvallain. Denied battle, the only benefit the English could hope to acquire was loot and food. As an experienced captain Du Guesclin knew well the weaknesses of this type of warfare—warfare rooted in the considerations of captaincy. Du Guesclin and Charles V burned fields and emptied granaries to deny English armies the provisions they

¹⁷⁵ Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 3: 187; Froissart, *Chronicles*, 2: 434.

¹⁷⁶ *Anonimale Chronicle*, 74; Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 3: 195.

needed. With these tactics, the very best type of captaincy campaign became useless to the English. This new French strategy marked the end of *chevauchees* effectiveness, at least for the time being.

In response to Gaunt's failure, an attempt at peace began in the Congress of Bruges, ultimately creating a treaty that lasted from 1374 to 1377. Gaunt returned to England, abandoning his rule over Gascony to the care of the seneschal; the English government largely abandoned that war front; and "no major English expeditionary army would set foot there again until ... 1412."¹⁷⁷ The loss of any powerful figure such as the king's lieutenant in Gascony meant that the system of territorial lordship in the region lost its epicenter. Without that central high-ranking figure, local lordships based around castles and large familial holdings warring with each other became the dominant Gascon political reality. The area devolved into rule by *routier* captains similar to the Ile de France and Normandy in 1357-9. Gascony became a prime example of the type of unaccountable lordship that Bisson attributed to the twelfth century and that had characterized Northern France from 1356 to 1364.

While John of Gaunt's *chevauchee* and the Congress of Bruges did not affect the end of captaincy, they did mark the point at which the careers of many captains studied here evaporated. Knolles returned to England and largely retired from warfare by 1380. Calveley was appointed captain of Calais in reward for his services over the previous thirty years, continuing to hold numerous positions of authority until he retired in 1385..¹⁷⁸ The fate of the two surviving captains (Knolles and Calveley) reflects the fate of the English war effort generally in the 1370s and 1380s--still there but far less successful due to lack of opportunities for great deeds of arms.

¹⁷⁷ Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 3: 207.

¹⁷⁸ Froissart, *Chronicle*, 2: 459; "Calveley Sir Hugh," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.

Neither man accompanied John of Gaunt on his Spanish campaigns as knights from the previous generation who, by 1380 were in their late 50s/early 60s.

Of the Gascon captains, the Bascot de Mauleon was still alive for an interview with Froissart in 1388, but his career and fate after that date are unknown. However, based on his earlier career, it is very possible he remained a *routier* captain in Gascony until his death. Jean de Grailly died in prison in 1377, his death tied up with the Congress of Bruges. Both English and French knights pressed Charles V for de Grailly's freedom. Charles promised that:

if he would swear never to bear arms against the crown of France, that than he would condescend to his deliverance. The Captal answered, that he would never make that oath, to die in prison; so he abode in prison in sure keeping a five year with little joy, for he took his prisonment [sic] with little patience; and so long he was there that at last he died in prison.¹⁷⁹

The refusal of ransom happened rarely and likely reflected both the superior capability of De Grailly as a knight and Charles V's awareness of how intractable he was as a foe. Unlike Chandos, whose death in battle meant the end of a potential path forward for peace, De Grailly's death was simply the elimination of a stalwart foe. He was respected by the French for his capabilities and honored after his death; but his reputation was too strongly established for him to be allowed to fight again.

Like the Gascon captains, the careers of the French captains differed. While Edward III was alive, Enguerrand de Coucy remained neutral. When Edward died, the personal ties of marriage to the king's daughter lost their political meaning and De Coucy returned his Garter, announcing his service to Charles V.¹⁸⁰ De Coucy had a career as a captain stretching into the 1390s, being offered the position of Constable twice, turning it down both times. He was from a younger generation than the rest of the captains in this study and was an aristocrat. His position

¹⁷⁹ Froissart, *Chronicles*, 2: 462-3.

¹⁸⁰ "Coucy, Enguerrand," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.

within the higher echelons of lordship meant that participation in the war was deemed more necessary for him than older gentry captains like Knolles or Calveley. Bertrand du Guesclin would fall out of favor with Charles V over events in Brittany although he remained Constable until his death in 1380. When war resumed in 1377, he continued to fight in Gascony, Brittany, and Normandy. In one of the last interactions between the captains studied in this thesis, Du Guesclin met and negotiated a treaty with Hugh Calveley, guaranteeing that it would be honored by the duke of Anjou.¹⁸¹ Thus, even in 1379, personal relationships continued to exert weight in the conduct of war. Du Guesclin's death in 1380 serves as the endpoint of this study because it was the point at which this group of captains largely lost their connections with one another.

This chapter shows the reversal of positions politically, militarily, and within captaincy caused by the renewed French offensive. Politically, the English lost much of their territory in France, including nearly everything gained by the Treaty of Brétigny. Militarily, English battlefield dominance was ended, at least temporarily, by their defeat at Pontvallain and Gaunt's disastrous *chevauchee*. The phenomenon of captaincy, however, did not end in this period, although the previously potent fusion of captaincy and *chevauchee*--the most successful form of English warfare--was over. Captains continued to successfully fight in the incessant *routier* warfare, exploiting castles and lordships in Gascony and Brittany. Some of the captains in this study died, like Chandos, De Grailly, and Du Guesclin, while others retired, like Knolles, Calveley, and possibly the Bascot de Mauleon. Only Enguerrand de Coucy remained at all active as a captain, although his activity was far less than that of the typical captain of the 1360s and 1370s. After 1380 the war de-escalated until the truce of Leulinghem, which brought about a twenty-three-year diplomatic break in the conflict.

¹⁸¹Du Guesclin, *Letters*, 315.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Captaincy is one of the most critical areas of study in the Hundred Years War because captains were among the most influential historical agents in the war. The major questions this thesis set out to answer all relate to explaining how captaincy worked and what captaincy might demonstrate about the history of the Hundred Years War. First, does a diplomatic periodization of the Hundred Years War still accurately describe the events of the war when viewed through the lens of captaincy? Second, what does captaincy reveal about notions of just war, chivalric reform, and how they affected the actions of captains? Finally, what is the relationship between territorial lordship, chivalric culture, and the economic mechanisms of war and how do they intersect in the phenomenon of captaincy?

To begin formulating answers to these questions, this thesis described the three cultural systems that most influenced captaincy: territorial lordship, chivalric culture, and the economic mechanisms of war. This thesis discussed chivalry, its definition, its relationship to ideology and class, and what behaviors it allowed in war, which showed that chivalric culture's main concern was that participants acquired honor through deeds of arms. The circumstances or motivations behind those deeds of arms mattered far less than the quality of the deed. The circumstances of the Hundred Years War meant that the chivalric class had many more participants able to attempt deeds of arms at the expense of aristocratic and noble dominance over chivalry.

This thesis then discussed territorial lordship, focusing on lordship as a scholarly approach to governance replacing the more traditional notion of feudalism; as a structure of reward by sanctioning violent action; and as an ideal of accountable governance as well as the failure of that accountability. Territorial lordship is a better description of the power arrangements during this period than the strict definition of feudalism. Feudalism prevents the

type of elastic relationships between captains and lords and lords and their subjects that the primary sources show existed. Territorial lordship, on the other hand, better explains the type of complex arrangements and dual loyalties which consistently appeared in this study. Lordship rewarded the chivalric action of deeds at arms via granting lands, honors, and opportunities. A key difficulty for the system of lordship, however, was ensuring the accountability of commanders of castles or fortifications. In the twelfth century, these men impeded the function of government. At the same time, the expansion of government bureaucracies worked to restrict these castellans and create accountability for servants of the crown and holdings of castles. In the twelfth and thirteenth century, the expansion of bureaucratic government continued to expand and restrain exploitative lordships, though never fully or completely. However, in the fourteenth century the requirements of warfare in areas like Gascony or Brittany required exploitative lordship to conduct the war. Both England and France lacked the economic apparatuses to fully fund their soldiers. The lack of funding made it necessary for captains of castles, acting as part of the system of territorial lordship, to exploit their power to extract resources from those they had power over. Thus, unlike in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, in the fourteenth century exploitative lordship became a necessity on a much larger scale to support the territorial ambitions of both England and France.

Next, this thesis discussed the economic mechanisms of war--mainly indentures, ransom, plunder, and mercenary service. Indentures (contracts both between a king and captains and between captains and their men) provided structure of service for captains. These contracts delineated the many aspects of service, and, in defining terms of pay and distribution of loot, created an incentive for captains to fight and loot aggressively. The chief method of acquiring monetary reward was taking loot, food, and movables from populations through which captains

and their troops marched, or by taking knightly prisoners for ransom. Ransom culture was supported by notions of chivalric honor that forced captured knights to fulfill the obligations of their ransom. Finally, mercenary service allowed captains opportunities outside of service to liege lords for earning honor and wealth. As in the examples of Enguerrand de Coucy and Jean de Grailly, mercenary service also enabled earning honor while remaining neutral, whether because they were either personally attached to their captors, like De Coucy, or restricted from fighting the owner of their ransom, like De Grailly.

After examining the cultural systems that most influenced captaincy, this thesis examined the careers of a group of captains through the framework of the Poitiers campaign, where the Black Prince's dual role as lord and captain facilitated a great victory over the French. In this battle, many captains achieved tremendous wealth, reinforcing the idea of using the *chevauchee* to force battle as the ideal form of warfare for the English. The ramifications of the battle of Poitiers were also explored. The siege of Rennes around the same time introduced the captains fighting in Brittany to the ways in which the patronage of a powerful lord (like Henry of Grosmont, duke of Lancaster) created opportunity. When that powerful lord no longer facilitated opportunity, however, captains like Robert Knolles were well within their rights to pursue opportunity elsewhere. In Knolles' case, that opportunity was pillaging Normandy during the Jacquerie. This pillage and the subsequent rewards amply demonstrate that even extreme violence was sanctioned for the phenomenon of captaincy. During the Jacquerie, the careers of the group of captains studied here demonstrated the class solidarity of the chivalric class by ruthlessly putting down any challenge to their right to deploy violence. When Jean de Grailly joined forces with Charles of Navarre, it initiated the first instance of De Grailly's largely acceptable dual loyalties. Finally, the chapter ended with Edward III's last campaign bringing

together many of the captains who took advantage of the chaos in France. That campaign ended with the Treaty of Brétigny, officially, diplomatically ending the war.

Chapter two covered the many continuations of fighting after the official peace. The Battles of Cocherel and Auray took place four years after the Treaty the Brétigny, belatedly ending two wars still being fought after peace was negotiated. At the same time, the Great Company and its ilk continued fighting and pillaging French lands, clearly manifesting their associations with the English cause. The plans to push the Great Company out of France resulted in both an increase of mercenary activity in Italy and English and French captains cooperatively participating in a war in Spain. Calveley and Du Guesclin affected the swift overthrow of Pedro I of Castile. The entire Spanish campaign illustrates the fact that chivalric culture and captaincy comprised the foundation of cross-territorial relationships. In the aftermath of the campaign, the Black Prince entered the contest in support of Pedro I. The prince sought a large payday like that of Calveley and Knolles, and was willing to gamble the resources of Gascony to acquire it. And while this gamble was militarily successful, it was a political, economic, and strategic catastrophe, thrusting Gascony into such a weakened state that Charles V seized the opportunity to invade.

Chapter three covered the French offensive resuming the war in 1369. This offensive retook much of the English gains from the Treaty of Brétigny and, perhaps more damaging, killed John Chandos. Responding to the offensive, Robert Knolles led a campaign into Normandy funded by an experimental payment and leadership scheme. At the same time, John of Gaunt led a *chevauchee* into Bordeaux intended to force battle; however, new French tactics completely neutralized Gaunt's *chevauchee*. The campaign highlighted the class prejudices still at play among the aristocracy as well as the advantages the French acquired by having a

professional captain with the full backing of the king in command. Finally, the Congress of Bruges and the subsequent three-year ceasefire largely led to the retirement of the last of the captains in this study; the few remaining were mostly dead or retired by 1380.

Studying this network of captains' careers has shown that the traditional, diplomatic periodization of the Hundred Years War is overly simplistic and fails to account for key trends dictating the course of the war. On the most basic level, fighting continued between the Edwardian and Caroline phases of the war along the same territorial lines as before. Raiding and fighting between small castle garrisons remained constant throughout the entire period of 1356-80 and even beyond. The Great Company and its ilk were largely comprised of soldiers from the groups loyal to England, primarily raiding targets hostile to England; consequently, the Company was targeted by groups allied with France.

All of the captains in this study engaged in campaigns between 1360 and 1364 that were the same type of conflict as those prior to the Treaty of Brétigny. Charles of Navarre and Jean de Grailly fought in Normandy in 1358, remaining there until 1364. Calveley, Knolles, Du Guesclin, and Chandos all fought in Brittany before 1360 and remained fighting there in the same conflict with the same sides until 1364. These smaller conflicts were inherently related to the broader conflict of the Hundred Years War. For example, the war of succession in Brittany was fought between John de Montfort, a man with English titles raised in England, and Charles de Blois, a cousin of the king of France. Charles of Navarre fought for his claim to lands in France, even at times the French throne, and was willing to give Edward III all the territories that made up the former Angevin Empire without homage. Proxy wars, then, were inherently aspects of territorial lordship which was the essence of the Hundred Years War. Simply by looking at the

period 1360-4, the notion that the war ceased or entered different phases is only justifiable through the narrowest diplomatic terms.

The nine-year gap between the Edwardian and Caroline phases becomes even more incomprehensible when examined through the lens of the Spanish war and its consequences. On a purely diplomatic level, England and France had been competing for the aid of Castile across some years prior to 1360. The rebellion against Pedro I, England's ally, provided an opportunity for the French to instead place their ally on the Castilian throne. That the Black Prince even allowed his men to participate in the campaign should not be taken as a sign of peace but rather one of political miscalculation. The Black Prince's own involvement with the Najera campaign, also a massive miscalculation, was very clearly an attempt to shore up a strategically important alliance. In the short term, the consequences of the campaign precipitated the resumption of "official" war due to the Gascon government's bankruptcy following Najera. Looking at just short-term continuity, the beginning of the Caroline phase derived from events outside the traditional war periodization. The impact of English involvement in Spain transcends the short-term as well. John of Gaunt's marriage to Pedro I's daughter would lead to Gaunt's invasion of Castile from 1385-9. In preparation for the campaign, he was a leading advocate of a ceasefire with France. His absence on campaign was also a crucial period in the reign of England's king, his cousin Richard II. In fact, Gaunt's absence left a power vacuum that contributed to the crisis of the Lords Appellant.

The question of periodization also applies to the debate over the Hundred Years War as a distinct historical event. The framing of the Hundred Years War as a discreet period derives from scholars' focus on Edward III's claim to the throne of France. Like the diplomatic periodization of the war, however, this is based on a diplomatic framing of the event taken to its greatest

extreme by Anne Curry's notion of a war of treaties. The conflict over lordship in Aquitaine goes back at least to 1152 with the marriage of Henry II of England and Eleanor of Aquitaine. There is even a good argument that the true root of the conflict lies in the dual role of William the Conqueror as king of England and duke of Normandy. Edward III's claim to the kingship of France in the fourteenth century was a move in the broader conflict, not the start of a new conflict. Furthermore, the amount of time between the last war with France and the start of the Hundred Years War is shorter than the gap between the traditional dating of the Caroline and Lancastrian phases. Thus, an argument could be made that the Hundred Years War is itself a phase of the broader conflict over the lordship of Aquitaine and the Plantagenet-Capetian rivalry to control territory in continental Europe.

The best argument for the Hundred Years War as a different conflict is not diplomacy, as has been traditionally argued (most persuasively by Anne Curry) but, in fact, the phenomenon of captaincy. First, the perspective of captains is the perspective of the people doing the fighting. It is the perspective of the historical agent. A diplomatic periodization of the Hundred Years War privileges political fictions; and incredibly important political fictions though they may be, they do not necessarily reflect the reality of the conflict. A periodization based on the phenomenon of captaincy centers the historical actors and aims to reflect the changes in their experiences of the conflict. Second, captaincy as a system arose from the change in military organization stemming from paid armies. While the beginning of that change in military organization lies in the reign of Edward I, it did not reach its apogee until the reign of Edward III at the start of the Hundred Years War. Thinking about the war in terms of diplomacy actually de-legitimizes the war as its own field of study. Thinking about the war in terms of captaincy and its attendant changes is what lends the most legitimacy to the Hundred Years War as a unique field of study.

Creating a periodization of the Hundred Years War based on captaincy requires more research into how captaincy manifested in later parts of the war. A very preliminary periodization does not look dissimilar to a diplomatic periodization but removes the gaps because it acknowledges that for the captains and soldiers doing the fighting there was no peace. The first phase would go from 1337-73, the start of the war to the battle of Pontvallain. This phase of the war covers the height of English success using captaincy to its lowest point with the defeat at Pontvallain. This phase is the *chevauchee* phase. The second phase, from 1373-1415, is the skirmish phase. This phase is defined by the French mastery of guerilla tactics that counteract the *chevauchee* and the subsequent English abandonment of that strategy. The final phase, the conquest phase, goes from 1415-53. This phase is characterized first by Henry V's conquest of France, then by Charles VII's reconquest of France. This phase is particularly interesting for the study of captaincy as the ability of English captains to perform exploitative lordship was heavily restricted by the need to maintain the loyalty of English holdings in France. This three-phase construction is based on the reality of the actual fighting. It is also similar enough to the traditional diplomatic periodization that scholars could still use earlier scholarship.

This study of the phenomenon of captaincy also sheds light on how the theories of just warfare and the aims of chivalric reform affected that position. In the Hundred Years War, warfare and chivalric reform simply had little impact on the actions of the captains under study. The strictest definition of just war as “military service to one’s king and to the crusading papacy” conducted against only other combatants is clearly not applicable after detailed examination of the captains' careers.¹⁸² “Military service to one’s king” is itself loosely defined in practice. For example, interpreted loosely, Knolles' and Calveley's service to John de Montfort at Auray might

¹⁸² Wright, *Knights and Peasants*, 30.

be defined as service to their king's aims. Reaching further, Jean de Grailly's service to Charles of Navarre was serving a need parallel to his king's aims. Knolles' raid in Normandy or Calveley's participation in the Great Company are far harder to rationalize under this definition of just war--and Calveley working with Du Guesclin in Castile would certainly be considered unjust by this standard. Yet these captains did not face the consequences of participating in unjust war. Instead, they benefited, both economically and socially. The only standard that seems to apply is that captains did not make war against their own lord. However, even that standard is complicated and difficult to adjudicate. Gascon lords who fought for either Edward III or Jean II were fighting against someone who had a strong legal claim to be their lord. Some Gascon lord-captains switched sides opportunistically depending on who was in power at a given time. The only real consequence of switching sides was that they became targets of their previous allegiance.

The same dynamic exists for the notion of who could be harmed in war. That only combatants were valid military targets has been clearly shown to be inapplicable as a standard for the behavior of captains. Even campaigns with political objectives led by King Edward III included actively and purposely inflicting violence on noncombatants. Finding a standard that was consistently upheld when determining noncombatants is nearly impossible. While there are very few accounts of entire cities or towns being massacred, many accounts do indicate that some villages were wiped out, whether instantly or incrementally. The only standard that seems to be observed was what a captain could get away with or deemed necessary. Knolles, for example, inflicted most of his violence on enemy populations, which seems to be fairly standard operating procedure for captains. It should not be forgotten, however, that underpinning nearly all of the garrisons in contested regions was the exploitative violence of lordship conducted

against their putative subjects. As with the circumstances under which just war could be fought, in practice captains seemingly had no accepted standard.

What this analysis suggests is twofold. First, definitions of just or unjust war are definitions acquired by scholars from sources outside of captaincy yet applied to captaincy. Writers and theorists like Christine de Pizan, Honore Bonet, and Ramon Llull approached these topics from a removed, often clerical, perspective. The standards popularly understood about just war were established by non-participants who may have only observed chivalric culture remotely. Theoretical limits on just war as well as limits on chivalric violence were just that: theoretical. Conversely, all these activities can be considered legitimate under the standards which captains and lords set for themselves. Their guiding principles were likely the pragmatics of poorly supplied, inconsistently paid commanders in a cultural system that prized deeds of arms and members of an aristocratic military community. The positioning of these captains relative to theories of just war and chivalric reform ideology is not meant to suggest that captains did not engage critically with ideas of acceptable behavior either in terms of chivalry or military conduct. Instead, what is suggested here is that the pragmatic considerations of their position in war and their actual interactions with the systems of chivalric culture, territorial lordship, and the economic mechanisms of war took precedent over intellectual engagement with theories of conduct formulated in other, further removed cultural contexts.

Discussions of just war, chivalric reform, and accountable governance tend to fall within a prominent narrative about the late medieval period: it saw governments achieve new levels of centralization and control over who could perform violence. A study of captaincy both supports and challenges that thesis. The period under study in this thesis, 1356-80, does not support that thesis. Governments during this part of the war were either not successful at or not seeking to

centralize control over violence. The English government needed captains to have freedom and opportunities to perform violence in order to sustain the war. In the fifteenth century, however, there is more evidence of an intention to control the use of violence. Henry V forbade exploitative lordship in Lancastrian Normandy and both Lancastrian France, and the kingdom of Bourges (the name given to the French territories loyal to the Dauphin) began to claim all ransoms as legally belonging to the king. More research is needed on this topic to determine whether this change was a victory of reformers outside of chivalric culture and captaincy or a reform from within to better achieve changing war goals.

The final question is: how did the systems of territorial lordship, chivalric culture, and the economic mechanisms of war interact to shape the phenomenon of captaincy? This study has shown that these three systems mutually reinforced each other through this phenomenon. Their processes not only sanctioned but in fact encouraged the type of warfare and violence discussed in this thesis. Lordship reinforced chivalry through captaincy by providing opportunities for deeds of arms. The Hundred Years War was at base a conflict centered around a crisis of lordship in the rivalry between England and France. The war itself, as well as each proxy war that arose, was based on what were fundamentally competitions for lordship. Charles of Navarre was denied his lordship in Normandy by Jean II; Pedro I lost his lordship to Henry of Trastamara; John de Montfort and Charles of Blois competed for the lordship of Brittany. Each of these competitions provided an opportunity for captains to perform chivalry and earn honor.

Dual loyalties and mercenary service of captains are the concessions made to chivalric culture by the system of territorial lordship. The examples of Jean de Grailly working with Charles of Navarre or Enguerrand de Coucy taking mercenary service in Italy were acceptable because they were relationships that did not threaten the integrity of the over-arching lordship

relationship. Jean de Grailly's land and his homage owed to Charles V, however, did represent a challenge to De Grailly's place within that arrangement. His censure by the Black Prince and subsequent renouncement of his oath to Charles V are examples of lordship co-opting the language of chivalry to reinforce relationships within a lordship structure.

The capacity for lords to censure captains using the mediums of honor and shame was a way chivalric culture reinforced territorial lordship through the phenomenon of captaincy. Another important chivalric reinforcement of lordship was providing the elite fighters and leaders necessary to conduct warfare. For example, English success in the Edwardian phase was largely based on Edward III and the Black Prince having access to highly capable, motivated soldiers. Edward III was a master of using chivalric culture for his war effort, as was the Black Prince. By 1369, however, Edward III had lost his close bonds with the aristocracy due to his longevity and their mortality, and thus, lost many of his most able commanders, including his own son, the Black Prince, who predeceased him. The reversal of English fortunes late in the war is as much a result of lost personnel, including great captains like John Chandos and Jean de Grailly, as of any economic or political factors.

Lordship reinforced the economic mechanisms of war in three major ways. In the first instance, lords functioned as patrons, granting economic rewards to captains who achieved results beneficial to their lord. For example, Knolles, Calveley, and Du Guesclin were all consistently rewarded for their deeds at arms. Edward III bought many of the castles Knolles had taken in Normandy after the Treaty of Brétigny. Both Calveley and Du Guesclin were paid handsomely for their involvement with Henry of Trastamara's bid for the Castilian throne.

Secondly, lordship provided the opportunity for—and indeed sometimes the requirement for—captains to seize plunder. The inability of medieval governments to ensure consistent

payments to campaigning or garrison soldiers meant that captains exploited their ability to inflict violence for extracting money and resources. For garrison captains, this exploitation was the difference between mutinous or loyal soldiers. For campaign captains, moving through enemy territory provided the perfect opportunity to seize the wealth of communities through which they passed—particularly when those communities were unlikely to become subjects of their lords.

The third way lordship reinforced the economic mechanisms of war was through indentures, contracts that facilitated the perfect fusion between the requirements of lordship and the economic mechanisms of war. Indentures allowed the king or the captain to set the limits of their investment and risk from the outset of a campaign, while also ensuring that its strategic aims were met. Up to 1369, indentures helped transform the *chevauchee* into a highly effective military tool. However, after 1369, when the French started to successfully counter the *chevauchee*, the lack of financial resources provided to campaigning armies based on the assumption they could plunder led to disaster for both Robert Knolles' 1370 expedition and John of Gaunt's 1373 *chevauchee*.

The economic mechanisms of war were essential for supporting lordship. As Sumption noted: “Long wars between established states are ultimately contests in the deployment of economic power.”¹⁸³ In the economic mechanisms of war, captains functioned as a tool to transfer wealth acquired from one system of lordship to another. For example, French wealth falling into English hands not only denied France resources but also enlarged England's constrained means. Captains who succeeded economically bolstered the strength of the lordships they served. The economic mechanisms of war also reduced the economic burden on lords by providing captains an independent means of income.

¹⁸³ Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 5: 14.

The economic mechanisms of war reinforced chivalric culture by providing rewards for excellent chivalric performance. Entering chivalric culture and possessing its material accoutrement—a warhorse, armor, good weapons—required an investment of time and money (as well as risk to life) which dictated that the rewards be equally worthwhile. Capturing a prisoner, seizing plunder, or taking a castle all required effective chivalric performance. For example, captains like Knolles and Calveley, who came from gentry rather than aristocratic backgrounds, could only achieve successful careers because they acquired significant wealth on campaign.

Chivalry reinforced the economic mechanisms of war by creating the boundaries within which business was conducted. Throughout the careers of these captains, cross-territorial economic relationships functioned surprisingly well. Such relationships worked because chivalric culture and its metrics for evaluating individuals remained consistent across territorial limits. Chandos, Knolles, and Calveley, for example, all took Bertrand du Guesclin prisoner at some point in their careers. Each time, the economic process of ransoming occurred. Chivalry provided a universal framework within which each captain knew Du Guesclin's reputation as well as the fact that he could be trusted to abide by the laws of ransom. And in each case, Du Guesclin did abide by those laws. His participation at Najera while still owing ransom to John Chandos is a grey area. However, there was some justification for his actions because Chandos was not in command there. The most striking example of chivalry reinforcing the economic mechanisms of war through establishing standards was the French king, Jean II, returning to English captivity when his son, a hostage for his surety, broke the agreement. This incident is so contrary to modern political reasoning that it is more than astounding. Yet within the context of chivalric culture and the metrics by which its members were judged, Jean's conduct becomes not

only admirable but also necessary. It represents the clearest example of chivalric culture functioning as one of the two dominant cultural paradigms of the period, the other being Christianity.

The study of the phenomenon of captaincy and its interactions with these systems is not just limited to England and France. The Hundred Years War and its proxy wars involved captains from the Holy Roman Empire, Italy, France, England, Castile, Aragon, and Portugal. Each of these lands produced famous captains who had to act within the networks of territorial lordship, chivalric culture, and the economic mechanisms of war as they manifested in their own lands. Looking at these manifestations of captaincy would help clarify the differences between these cultures as well as reinforce similarities. Based on the findings of this study, it is possible that captaincy, as a vector through which chivalric culture, lordship, and the economic mechanisms of war interacted, served as a cross-territorial phenomenon interconnecting the aristocracies of Europe and provided a common cultural context matched only by Christianity. One feasible way of pinpointing the end of the medieval period, then, is to discuss when these systems were no longer the dominant cultural forces of the Hundred Years War.

Looking at these questions allows some broader conclusions about the Hundred Years War and the medieval period in general. One conclusion is that captaincy as a phenomenon was instrumental to English success prior to 1369. The combination of highly capable captains produced by chivalry and the necessity for the French to fight due to the economic devastation of *chevauchees* led to the decisive English victories at Poitiers, Auray, Brignais, and Najera. English tactics in the period from 1356-69 were perfect for taking advantage of the symbiosis between territorial lordship, chivalric culture, and the economic mechanisms of war. The reversal of fortunes in 1369 came about because the French learned the weaknesses of that type of

warfare and exploited them. Thus, English captains were victims of their own success. Consistent success taught French captains like Du Guesclin to not engage the English in battle. Captains learned from each other because they were part of a network that transcended territorial divisions. The consequences of intercommunication, both personally for the captains and within the broader action of the war, is a key theme in this study. In other words, understanding the phenomenon of captaincy is essential to understanding the Hundred Years War on any deeper level.

The new French strategy also reveals interesting insights into kingship. Edward III, one of the most successful practitioners of chivalric kingship, took full advantage of the plethora of capable captains available to him. Encouraging their participation was integral to early English success. But by 1369, Edward III was too old to perform effective chivalric kingship. He could no longer lead campaigns personally; and a new generation of aristocrats that he could not bind to himself as effectively as the previous generation was coming of age. The simultaneous illness and retirement of the Black Prince meant that there was a crucial lack of powerful lords who could command armies, and do so successfully. By contrast, Charles V was a very different kind of king. He well knew that the great weakness of Jean II was performing chivalric kingship, although he was as capable of doing it as Edward III. However, Charles V was far more willing to divorce his performance of lordship from chivalric culture. He refused to let his armies battle because of chivalric challenges to his lordship. His refusal to ransom Jean de Grailly denied the English one of their most loyal and influential Gascon captains. Therefore, Charles V could not and would not compete within the bounds of chivalry. Because he refused to compete on chivalric grounds, he was somewhat ironically able to exploit the weaknesses of the English style of warfare. Unlike the English court, Charles V's court was not concerned with chivalric culture

and it is no surprise that Charles V's biographer Christine de Pizan's heavily reformist focus on just warfare and chivalric culture emerged from that court.

Another conclusion concerns fourteenth century lordship and the differences between its exploitation of the peasantry and the twelfth century lordship discussed by Bisson. In the twelfth century governments attempted to create accountability for the purpose of curbing exploitative lordship. In the fourteenth century government, in both England and France, relied on exploitative lordship to fund their military endeavors in the service of territorial aims. Kings like Edward III understood the symbiotic relationship of territorial lordship, chivalric culture, and the economic mechanisms of war because they were not new systems like they had been in the twelfth century. Because they were better understood and more tightly entangled, they were easier to manipulate, thus creating the circumstances that enabled England to achieve military success. That success, despite much less manpower and economic power, created the perfect storm that swept in a new epidemic of exploitative lordships.

Finally, there are a few areas of further research that could expand on this study. The first would be an increased number of case studies. Many captains are well represented in the sources and studying them in addition to the sample considered here would provide valuable insights into the topic. Arnoul de Cervole, the Archpriest, provides a fascinating examination of a French captain from a clerical background that merits consideration. Another interesting case is Thomas Felton, the Black Prince's other main advisor, who held a position equal to that of John Chandos and was seneschal of Aquitaine at various points during this period. Also instructive is Olivier Clisson who began his career fighting for the English, then defected to become Bertrand du Guesclin's right hand. He also succeeded Du Guesclin as Constable of France, becoming a divisive figure in medieval French politics. John Hawkwood's career would be a very good

addition to a study on the subject of captaincy. Another area of further research would be extending the chronology to examine captaincy in the fifteenth century during the Lancastrian phase of the war. Tracing the differences in how chivalric culture, territorial lordship, and the economic mechanisms of war manifested in that phase would tell scholars a great deal about the evolution of those systems over time. The fact that the phenomenon of captaincy in any period has remained unstudied as its own subject is because captaincy exists at the intersection of so many different areas of inquiry about the Hundred Years War and the medieval period. The advantage of studying captaincy is that it sheds light on each of these systems that scholars have previously studied independently. The results of this study demonstrate that captaincy was an essential part of the history of the Hundred Years War and may have much broader value for the study of the medieval period as a whole.

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