ABSTRACT

Title of thesis: "FOREBODING CIRCUMSTANCES": U.S. LABOR INTERVENTION AND THE CHILEAN LABOR MOVEMENT DURING THE COLD WAR, 1964-1973

Andrea Nicole Gutmann Fuentes
Master of Arts in History, 2024

Thesis directed by: Professor Karin Rosemblatt
Department of History

Recent scholarship in Cold War and transnational labor history has examined the role played by U.S. organized labor in neutralizing left-wing labor movements around the world, contributing to U.S. State Department goals of anti-communist containment in the Third World. Research from both within and outside the academy has examined how the AFL-CIO, operating primary through the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), acted to undermine the socialist Unidad Popular government in Chile, helping to set the stage for the U.S.-backed coup d'etat on September 11, 1973. However, this scholarship has suffered from a relative lack of Chilean primary source material and a failure to ground historical analyses in the local Chilean context. This has impeded a full view of how the AFL-CIO's labor intervention project unfolded in Chile, how it was perceived and responded to by Chileans, and the extent to which it was ultimately successful.

This thesis makes use of Chilean national press, books, and trade union and left-wing media, in addition to new source material pulled from the U.S. State Department and the AFL-CIO archives, to assess the successes and failures of the AFL-CIO's labor intervention

project in Chile. The thesis demonstrates that while the AFL-CIO failed to accomplish many of its concrete goals in Chile due to overwhelming opposition to its project among Chilean labor, the AFL-CIO's relationship with particular sectors of the Chilean labor movement effectively advanced a more general political goal of fomenting labor opposition from labor in strategic sectors of the economy to undermine the Unidad Popular government, thereby contributing to the success of the 1973 coup.

By examining AFL-CIO's complicated and paradoxical relationship with the centrist Christian Democratic Party, this thesis argues that the vast majority of Chilean workers from a broad array of ideological tendencies rejected the AFL-CIO's promotion of "free trade unionism," an explicitly anti-communist ideology advocating that workers reject a politics of class struggle in favor of class collaboration between labor and management. This thesis then demonstrates that the AFL-CIO encouraged and validated the decision of some conservative labor leaders in the stevedore labor movement to ultimately join the anti-Allende opposition. Under the intensely polarized political context of early 1970s Chile, in which conservative labor leaders faced social and political pressures to move leftward with the majority of the labor movement and to support the Unidad Popular, the decision of these labor leaders to join the right-wing opposition with support from the AFL-CIO was a significant event contributing to the 1973 coup.

“FOREBODING CIRCUMSTANCES”: U.S. LABOR INTERVENTION AND THE CHILEAN LABOR MOVEMENT DURING THE COLD WAR, 1964-1973

by

Andrea Nicole Gutmann Fuentes

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of the
Master of Arts in History
2024

Advisory Committee:
Professor Karin Rosemblatt, Chair
Professor Julie Greene
Professor Colleen Woods

DEDICATION

For my abuelito and abuelita,
Don Ramón Fuentes Gutiérrez and Señora Irma Celina Fuentes Palavecinos

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thank you first to my thesis committee, Dr. Karin Rosemblatt, Dr. Julie Greene and Dr. Colleen Woods. These three have brought to this project the perfect mix of experience and expertise in the history of Chile, global labor and the working class, and Cold War-era communist and anti-communist movements, which they have always been willing to share with me through honest advice, criticism, and guidance. I especially wish to thank my advisor and mentor Dr. Karin Rosemblatt, who has helped me to develop as a scholar both intellectually and professionally through my coursework, my graduate assistantship, our travels, and this thesis project.

I also wish to thank my classmates in the Department of History at the University of Maryland. I have learned so much through our conversations in and outside of the classroom, and my relationships with them have made my time as a student enjoyable and fulfilling. I have especially loved learning alongside my peers in the History and Library Science program— Rigby Philips, Dana Getka, Emily Frazier, and others.

As an archivist/librarian-in-training, I have a special appreciation for the librarians and archivists who have worked both with me and behind the scenes to provide access to my primary source material. Thank you especially to Ben Blake and Alan Wierdak at the George Meany Memorial Archives and Eric Van Slander at NARA II. Thank you also to Peter Kornbluh and the analysts and archivists at the National Security Archives for the crucial work they have done to declassify records on U.S. involvement in the 1973 Chilean coup.

Thank you to the many people in Chile who have helped me center Chilean perspectives in this project. Thank you to my Chilean family who have never fail to welcome me into Chile with open arms, warm bread and a hot soup, no matter if it's winter

or summer. Thank you as well to Maria Cristo (who, with her son Damián, so graciously welcomed me into her Santiago home), Soledad Muñoz, and Rodrigo Suarez Madariaga, the three of whom are doing important work to remember and honor the lives of those detained and disappeared during the Pinochet dictatorship. Thank you to Camilo Santibáñez Rebolledo for sharing with me his expertise and primary source materials on the Chilean maritime movement, without which my research on the Chilean stevedores would not have been possible.

I must also thank those workers and organizers who have since at least the 1970s critically researched the international operations of the AFL-CIO and fought for international working-class solidarity. I am indebted to Ruth Needleman, one of the first to research this topic. Our many conversations and the interviews she conducted with AIFLD officials in the 70s have firmly grounded me in the history of the AFL-CIO's anti-communist international project and continue to provide crucial context and clues. I also wish to thank Rob McKenzie, Patrick Dunne, and the organizers of the Labor Education Project of the AFL-CIO's International Operations for their willingness to speak with me about this history, for their commitment to reckoning with the imperialist legacy of the U.S. labor movement, and for pushing for archival transparency from the AFL-CIO.

I must also thank my comrades in the UMD Graduate Labor Union, with whom I have built a space where I have been able to (at least attempt to) put into practice some of the many lessons I have learned through studying labor history, particularly the history of the U.S. labor movement's complicity in imperialism and settler colonialism. Through the ups and downs of union organizing I have made some of my most cherished friendships, and I wish to express my love and gratitude for Rigby Phillips, Ashley Nguyen and Julia Hemphill.

I would be nothing without my family, and thank my mother, father, and sister Amy for their love and support. Thank you finally to my love Benjamin Allen, always willing to lend his sharp and critical eye to read my writing drafts and help me think through my arguments. Our two-person reading circles and our many conversations helped prepare me to write this thesis and I look forward to many more years learning and thinking alongside him.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION ..... **ii**

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..... **iii**

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..... **vi**

LIST OF FIGURES ..... **vii**

ABBREVIATIONS ..... **viii**

INTRODUCTION **1**

CHAPTER 1: THE AFL-CIO AND THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN CHILE **16**

Introduction *16*

International Trade Unionism in the Context of the Cold War *18*
Free Trade Unionism 19
The Founding of AIFLD 23

U.S. Labor Intervention in Chile, 1964-1970 ..... *26*
Splitting Chilean Labor 29
AIFLD and the Chilean Christian Democratic Party 33
1966 PDC Anti-AIFLD Resolution 46
Chileanization of AIFLD 50

Conclusion *57*

CHAPTER 2: CHILEAN MARITIME LABOR AND THE AFL-CIO **60**

Introduction *60*

"Don Wenche" and the Chilean Stevedore Labor Movement *64*
The Stevedores and Free Trade Unionism 70
"*Los Medios Pollos*" and the Maritime Aristocracy of Labor in Chile 72

Don Wenche's Leadership Under Frei: 1964-1970 ..... *77*
The Maritime Labor Headquarters on Calle Goñi 77
The Christian Democrats Sanction Moreno 80
Moreno's Decline 84

Chilean Maritime Labor under the Unidad Popular: 1970-1973 ..... *88*
AIFLD Re-strategizes under Allende 88
Revolution and Reaction in the Chilean Maritime Labor Movement 96

Conclusion *109*

CONCLUSION **113**

BIBLIOGRAPHY **119**

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Cover of *Los gremios patronales* (1973)..... 3

Figure 2: Maritime Union headquarters at Calle Goñi 49, Valparaíso..... 78

ABBREVIATIONS

AFL-CIO: American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations, USA
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
AIFLD: American Institute for Free Labor Development
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency, USA
CIT: Centro Interamericana de Trabajadores, precursor to ORIT.
CLASC: Confederación Latino Americana de Sindicatos Cristianos (Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unions)
COMACH: Confederación Marítima de Chile (Maritime Confederation of Chile)
CUT: Central Única de Trabajadores, Chile (Workers' United Center)
CWA: Communications Workers of America
FEMACH: Federación de Sindicatos Profesionales de Estibadores y Desestibadores y Marítimos de Chile (Federation of Professional Stevedore and Maritime Worker Unions of Chile)
FRAP: Frente de Acción Popular, Chile (Popular Action Front)
ICFTU: International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ITS: International Trade Secretariats
ITF: International Transport Workers Federation, trade secretariat.
MAPU: Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario (Popular Unitary Action Movement)
ORIT: Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores
OSS: Office of Strategic Services, USA
PCCh: Partido Comunista de Chile (Communist Party of Chile)
PDC: Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party)
PTTI: Postal, Telegraph, and Telecommunications International trade secretariat
WFTU: World Federation of Trade Unions

INTRODUCTION

It must have been a cold and rainy morning on July 21, 1973—typical of winter days in Chile's central valley—when an orange paperback titled *Los gremios patronales* appeared on the stands of newspaper kiosks across the city of Santiago. Printed in green on the front cover of the book was the head of a Medusa-like figure, scowling with nine snakes emanating from its skull, the snaky locks hissing and ready to attack. "The right prepares its forces," read the subtitle. "Those who pull the strings of *gremialismo*… Their instructions come from the exterior."

The book appeared a few weeks before the coup d'etat, backed by the United States, that would oust the government of the democratically-elected socialist president Salvador Allende in favor of a right-wing military dictatorship led by Augusto Pinochet on September 11, 1973. *Los gremios patronales* translates to "The Company Guilds," referring to the *gremialista* movement in Chile which formed an essential component of the right-wing opposition to Allende's Unidad Popular government. The book details the events of the October 1972 Trucker's Strike, in which right-wing members of the professional and middle classes including truck owners, small merchants, doctors, and lawyers participated in anti-government work stoppages and lockouts that nearly brought the Chilean economy to a halt. The authors warned of a second attempt by the right-wing to undermine Allende's government. By the time of the book's publication in July 1973, what has become known as the "Battle of Chile" had begun in earnest, with students, peasants, and the urban poor and working classes, struggling against Chilean capital, certain right-wing sections of the middle and professional classes, and an imperialist and interventionist U.S. government determined not to let the socialist experiment of the Unidad Popular succeed.

50,000 copies of the *Los gremios* were printed for distribution by the Chilean state's socialized book publisher, *Quimantú*. The volume caught the attention of one U.S. State Department official in Chile, who purchased ten copies and distributed them to his colleagues in the U.S. Embassy. The book was of particular interest because one of its chapters was devoted to discussing U.S. involvement in the October 1972 Strike, examining the interventionist role played by the CIA and U.S. capital—but also of the AFL-CIO and its nonprofit organization operating in Latin America, the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD). In his official State Department commentary on *Los gremios*, the U.S. Ambassador to Chile Nathaniel Davis adopted a nonchalant attitude, making liberal use of scare quotes and dwelling on minor errors in the text. "This 'document,'" he wrote, "merits little comment"— except that it could "tend to focus more public attention on AIFLD/Chile."[1] He failed to mention that on the whole, the book provided accurate information on the U.S. and AFL-CIO's joint interventionist project in the Chilean labor movement.

Davis' main concern instead centered on what the book revealed about attitudes of the Chilean government and workers towards AIFLD. The State Department had feared that AIFLD was at risk of being shut down by the Unidad Popular government due to mounting public criticism charging it as a U.S. government tool for labor infiltration and espionage. Such an outcome would have been quite unfavorable for the State Department, as AIFLD had become an indispensable apparatus for anti-communist containment in the Third World through its role in neutralizing left-wing labor movements. Labor was a prime target of influence for the U.S. government's Cold War in Latin America because, as historian Joshua

---

[1] "'The Company Guilds': New Quimantu Press Publication," Confidential Airgram, 25 July 1973, RG 59, 1970-1973 Subject Numeric Files, Entry 1613-D, Box 1394, National Archives and Records Administration II; Garcia F., Patricio, ed., *Los Gremios Patronales* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Nacional Quimantú, 1973).

Stern explains, fighting on that terrain allowed for "taking on communist and socialist parties at their base in the labor movement."[2] It is the purpose of this thesis to examine how the AFL-CIO's anti-communist project unfolded on the ground in Chile in the years leading up to the 1973 coup.



Figure 1: Cover of Los gremios patronales (1973) published by the Chilean state-owned Editorial Nacional Quimantú. Scan courtesy of Ruth Needleman.

Since at least the 1960s, left-wing researchers, such as the authors of *Los gremios patronales*, have critically investigated the AFL-CIO's interventionist activities abroad. They have shown that AIFLD, operational from 1961-1995 and largely funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), was a particularly effective apparatus for anti-

[2] Joshua Stern, "US Labor Intervention in Latin America: The Politics of Class Harmony and the American Institute for Free Labor Development," *The Latin Americanist* 65, no. 4 (2021): 513, https://doi.org/10.1353/tla.2021.0033.

communist action in Latin America.[3] In the years since, researchers both in and outside the academy have detailed how AIFLD ran anti-communist educational programs for Latin American workers; attempted to fracture left-leaning labor movements; persuaded workers to act against left-wing governments; and collected intelligence on left-wing workers and labor movements on behalf of the U.S. State Department and the CIA.[4]

Taking place within the context of the Cold War, the AFL-CIO's international project was an eminently ideological one aligning with the U.S. foreign policy goal of defeating communism in the Third World. A key component of this project was the AFL-CIO's promotion of an ideology known as "free trade unionism." This ideology held that labor unions should organize around demands that would provide immediate material benefits to union membership (e.g., better wages, benefits, and conditions), rather than engaging in broader political and social struggles (e.g., to fight against imperialism, to institute workplace democracy, or to fundamentally restructure a society's political economy for the benefit of the

---

[3] See for example Morris, George, *CIA and American Labor: The Subversion of the AFL-CIO's Foreign Policy* (New York: International Publishers, 1967); Radosh, Ronald, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy: The Cold War in the Unions from Gompers to Lovestone* (New York: Random House, 1969); Mellen, Jim, "Leaders for Labor: Made in America," in *New Chile* (NACLA, 1973), 54–58; Fred Hirsch, *An Analysis of Our AFL-CIO Role in Latin America or Under the Covers with the CIA* (San José, California: self-published, 1974); Jack Scott, *Yankee Unions, Go Home. How the AFL Helped the U. S. Build an Empire in Latin America*, Trade Unions and Imperialism in America, Vol. 1 (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1978); Spalding, Hobart Jr., "U.S. Labour Intervention in Latin America: The Case of the American Institute for Free Labour Development (AIFLD)," *Labour, Capital and Society* 17, no. 2 (1984): 38; Beth Sims, *Workers of the World Undermined: American Labor's Role in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1992).

[4] Recent publications detailing this history include John Haslam, *The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende's Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide* (New York: Verso, 2005); Kim Scipes, *AFL-CIO's Secret War against Developing Country Workers: Solidarity or Sabotage?* (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2010); Robert Anthony Waters and Geert van Goethem, eds., *American Labor's Global Ambassadors* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2013), https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137360229; Anthony Carew, *American Labour's Cold War Abroad: From Deep Freeze to Détente, 1945-1970* (Athabasca University Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.15215/aupress/9781771992114.01; Thomas C. Field, "Transnationalism Meets Empire: The AFL-CIO, Development, and the Private Origins of Kennedy's Latin American Labor Program*," *Diplomatic History* 42, no. 2 (April 1, 2018): 305–34, https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhw063; Jeff Schuhrke, "'Comradely Brainwashing': International Development, Labor Education, and Industrial Relations in the Cold War," *Labor* 16, no. 3 (September 1, 2019): 39–67, https://doi.org/10.1215/15476715-7569788; Stern, "US Labor Intervention in Latin America"; Rob McKenzie and Patrick Dunne, *El Golpe: U.S. Labor, the CIA, and the Coup at Ford in Mexico*, Wildcat: Workers' Movements and Global Capitalism (London: Pluto Press, 2022).

working class). Free trade unionism rejected the concept of "class struggle" between labor and capital in favor of class collaboration, or what Stern calls a politics of "class harmony," in which labor and management would cooperate supposedly for the mutual benefit of both.[5] Above all, free trade unionism was an ideology that stood in vehement opposition to communism.

Despite the ideological focus of the AFL-CIO's international labor project, the activities flowing from it did not remain relegated to the realm of discourse. As other researchers have convincingly shown, the AFL-CIO's activities in Chile leading up to and during the Unidad Popular period helped to undermine the Allende presidency and set the stage for the U.S.-backed military coup d'etat in 1973. The AFL-CIO's international project had real material consequences, and Chilean workers understood the stakes involved. The AFL-CIO was consequently faced with a conscious and polarized set of responses from Chilean workers. The AFL-CIO encountered fierce resistance against its activities by many—in fact, most—sections of the Chilean labor movement (exemplified by the fierce anti-imperialist rhetoric employed in *Los gremios*); it enjoyed a calculated embrace of its project from others (for example, as noted in *Los gremios*, from some in Chile's national maritime union COMACH). This thesis examines instances of Chilean organized labor's rejection and embrace of the AFL-CIO international project, and assesses why and how different sections of the Chilean labor movement confronted the AFL-CIO in these contrasting ways. Through this investigation, I show how the ideological struggle between free trade unionism and Chilean socialist labor politics was a small yet significant front along which the "battle of Chile" took place.

---

[5] Stern, "US Labor Intervention in Latin America."

Reading the history of the AFL-CIO's operations in the context of Chile's turbulent and politically polarized 1960's and early 70's reveals the challenges that the project of U.S. labor intervention faced in Latin America, and how U.S. labor leaders responded to these challenges in close collaboration with the U.S. State Department. I show that free trade unionism as an ideology was consciously and manifestly rejected by the vast majority of the Chilean working class in the 1960s and early 70s, and I explore their motivations for this rejection. Because of staunch resistance mounted by Chile's organized labor movement, the AFL-CIO found Chile to be a uniquely challenging country in which to operate relative to the rest of Latin America. A report and labor plan written in late 1971 describes the "foreboding circumstances" under which "AIFLD/Chile was force[d] to operate" due to the "hostile environment […] in the sense of Chilean nationalism vis-à-vis a Northamerican entity active in a delicate area."[6]

The economistic "free trade union" model of labor politics promoted by the AFL-CIO was unappealing to the vast majority of Chilean labor, among whom a socialist labor politics had developed that conceptualized the working class as the protagonist of the dynamic political, social, and economic changes occurring in Chile at this time.[7] U.S. labor intervention in Chile was most staunchly opposed by Chile's left wing, especially the Communist and Socialist Parties, who constantly sought to expose the activities of the AFL-CIO in their country as egregious cases of U.S. infiltration and espionage. But the AFL-CIO's project in

---

[6] American Institute for Free Labor Development, "Country Labor Plans for the Southern Region, 1972-1976," Section on Chile, p 11, Box 30, AR 2003-0075, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Unprocessed Collections, GMMA.

[7] The Chilean labor movement was one of the earliest to develop in Latin America, tracing back to the late 19th century. From its beginnings it remained independent of mainstream political parties and was characterized by a strong left-wing communist and anarcho-syndicalist political orientation. See Peter De Shazo, "The Valparaíso Maritime Strike of 1903 and the Development of a Revolutionary Labor Movement in Chile," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 11, no. 1 (May 1979): 145–68, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X00022331.

Chile also received denunciation from more ideologically conservative elements of the labor movement, such as workers aligned with the centrist Christian Democratic Party. It was only among a select few workers that the AFL-CIO's free trade union model found positive reception—notably the long-time partners of the AFL-CIO in the Chilean maritime labor movement, and in particular an elite and powerful group of workers in the stevedores' union.

The AFL-CIO ultimately failed to accomplish many of the concrete goals it set out to achieve in Chile, namely of splitting the predominantly left-wing labor movement to create a parallel non-communist labor movement that would oppose Marxism and espouse free trade unionism. Yet the AFL-CIO's influence on Chilean labor undeniably aided the right-wing opposition against the Unidad Popular, and thus the AFL-CIO fulfilled a more general geopolitical goal of undermining Chile's socialist project. Beyond directly influencing non-communist labor leaders through financial resources, the AFL-CIO's ideological project encouraged and validated the decision of some conservative labor leaders, such as those of the stevedore movement, to ultimately join the anti-Allende opposition. Under a period of intense political polarization in which conservative labor leaders faced social and political pressures to move leftward with the majority of the labor movement, that these labor leaders joined the opposition was detrimental to the Unidad Popular.

My research engages with recent scholars of the AFL-CIO's interventionist history who have been shaped by transnational theoretical frameworks bringing nuanced understandings of the relationship between the imperial core and its periphery. The transnational turn in history has challenged the notion that processes of imperial extraction and the transfer of ideas from North to South are passively received by those in the imperial periphery; rather, global interactions become sites of struggle as workers resist or otherwise negotiate the transfer of systems, objects, and ideas within their own lives, in the domestic sphere, on the shop floor, in their organizations, and within national and international

political contexts.[8] Scholars have thus viewed the dynamic relationships between U.S. and non-U.S. organized labor organizations during the Cold War as "a complex history of alliances, conflicts, and negotiations."[9]

Still, in his study on the AFL-CIO's activities in Bolivia, Thomas Field Jr. offers a valuable counterweight to the tendency among this transnational scholarship to overstate the agency of nonstate actors such as labor unionists both in the U.S. and the Global South. "When it comes to explaining the history of U.S. overseas labor policy," he writes, "nonstate actors surely deserve their share of active verbs, but the imperial state remained at the forefront of their minds."[10] As other scholars have established, the impulse to develop an anti-communist Cold War international project developed internally from within the AFL-CIO's high-ranking leadership, culled through the anti-communist purges of the CIO in 1949.[11] But this project was ultimately carried out in service of, and with the indispensable financial support of, the U.S. imperial state which viewed Latin American labor as a prime target of Cold War influence. As Chilean workers themselves recognized when they launched critiques against the AFL-CIO's labor program, an analysis of empire is critical for this history.

---

[8] See for example G. M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser, eds., *In from the Cold: Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War*, American Encounters/Global Interactions (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Waters and van Goethem, *American Labor's Global Ambassadors*; Heidi Tinsman, *Buying into the Regime: Grapes and Consumption in Cold War Chile and the United States*, American Encounters/Global Interactions (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014); Ernesto Semán, *Ambassadors of the Working Class: Argentina's International Labor Activists and Cold War Democracy in the Americas* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017).

[9] Vergara, Angela, "Chilean Workers and the US Labor Movement: From Solidarity to Intervention, 1950s–1970s," in *American Labor's Global Ambassadors*, ed. Waters, Robert Anthony and van Goethem, Geert (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2013), 202–3.

[10] Field, "Transnationalism Meets Empire," 315 citing Paul A Kramer, "Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World," *AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW*, 2011.

[11] Scipes, *AFL-CIO's Secret War against Developing Country Workers*; Carew, *American Labour's Cold War Abroad*; Field, "Transnationalism Meets Empire."

My research therefore joins an emergent wave of scholarship on the AFL-CIO that uses rigorous historical methods to seriously re-consider many of the same questions about the AFL-CIO's participation in U.S. foreign intervention as those examined by early critics of the AFL-CIO's international project. Early critics had perhaps approached the subject with more of an activist, rather than a scholarly, orientation; yet the subjects of their inquiries remain relevant, as historians like Thomas Field Jr., Jeff Schuhrke, and Joshua Stern have affirmed through their recent scholarship on AFL-CIO labor intervention. This new scholarship departs from an earlier group of historians, such as those collected in the 2013 edited volume *American Labor's Global Ambassadors*, who largely dismissed the inquiries of early researchers of the AFL-CIO's international project on account of their "overwhelmingly Leftist political orientation" and their "tending toward journalistic exposé rather than scholarly analysis."[12] For example, while noting the intensely-debated history of U.S. influence in Chile during the Unidad Popular period, and the conclusive evidence of CIA support for the military coup in 1973, Angela Vergara's chapter on the AFL-CIO and Chile concludes that the "relevance of US-attempted influence on the labor movement is less clear."[13] Challenging Vergara and earlier scholars on this topic who fell short of fully investigating such questions around the "relevance of US-attempted influence on labor

---

[12] Quote from Waters and van Goethem, *American Labor's Global Ambassadors*, 2. While the authors in Waters and van Goethem, *American Labor's Global Amabassadors,* largely dismiss early research on the AFL-CIO's international project, scholars such as Field Jr., Schurhke, and Stern not only incorporate these earlier works into their analyses as both primary and secondary sources, but also share with these early researchers a critique of U.S. empire at the foundation of their analyses. See Field, "Transnationalism Meets Empire"; Schuhrke, "'Comradely Brainwashing'"; Thomas C. Field, "Union Busting as Development: Transnationalism, Empire and Kennedy's Secret Labour Programme for Bolivia," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 52, no. 1 (February 2020): 27–51, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X19000646; Jeff Schuhrke, "Agrarian Reform and the AFL-CIO's Cold War in El Salvador*," *Diplomatic History* 44, no. 4 (September 1, 2020): 527–53, https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhaa024; Stern, "US Labor Intervention in Latin America."

[13] Vergara, Angela, "Chilean Workers and the US Labor Movement: From Solidarity to Intervention, 1950s–1970s," 210.

movement[s]," my research builds on new critical scholarship by historians who confirm and analyze the historical reality of U.S. labor intervention in the Third World within an imperial Cold War context.

To achieve a full understanding of how U.S. labor intervention manifested in Chile, I deploy new source material pulled from not only the U.S. State Department and the AFL-CIO archives, but also the Chilean national press as well as trade union and left-wing media. My use of Chilean sources and my historical grounding in the Chilean context addresses a shortcoming of much of the scholarship on the AFL-CIO's activities in Latin America during the Cold War, which often have not successfully incorporated Latin American perspectives, and have neglected the local Latin American historical context in which these activities took place.[14] It is only by considering Chilean sources and context that we can thoroughly assess the impacts of labor intervention in that country.

My interest in assessing labor intervention in Chile during the Cold War necessarily engages with a growing body of literature that turns its gaze on the Unidad Popular period and the ensuing dictatorship in Chile. This area of study has benefited greatly from the declassification of government records in the United States, Latin America, and Europe uncovering concrete evidence of the transnational and imperial dimensions of Allende's overthrow.[15] I contribute the matter of U.S. labor intervention to this literature by making

---

[14] Larissa Rosa Corrêa's newly-translated monograph is one of the first major works to rectify this weakness in the literature by using source material from Brazilian police reports, union newspapers, mainstream press, and interviews in her history of the Brazilian labor movement's relationship with the AFL-CIO under the dictatorship in Brazil from 1964-1985. Thomas Field Jr. and Ángela Vergara, as well, provide compelling examples of the importance of grounding this history in non-U.S. historical contexts. See Larissa Rosa Corrêa, *Anti-Communist Solidarity: US-Brazilian Labor Relations during the Dictatorship in Cold-War Brazil (1964-1985)*, trans. Sabrina Gledhill, 1. Auflage, Work in Global and Historical Perspective volume12 (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2022); Field, "Union Busting as Development"; Vergara, Angela, "Chilean Workers and the US Labor Movement: From Solidarity to Intervention, 1950s–1970s."

[15] Haslam, *The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende's Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide*; Peter Kornbluh, ed., *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability*, rev. and updated ed., 40th

use of declassified U.S. government documents as well as unprocessed records from the private AFL-CIO archives that have only recently been made available to researchers. My research affirms that the AFL-CIO consciously contributed to the U.S. government project of destabilizing and overthrowing the Allende government.

I also contribute to more internally-focused historical studies assessing the Unidad Popular period and the domestic reasons for its fall.[16] Such studies have looked in particular at the political positioning of the reformist center-left Chilean Christian Democratic Party (PDC) against the Unidad Popular and the complicity of its conservative leadership in the coup. Likewise, I consider the open embrace of Allende's overthrow by the conservative Chilean stevedore labor sector, for whom I present a portrait of the period which has not previously been studied in depth. Both the PDC national political leadership and the stevedore labor leaders had conservative political tendencies that, in large part, grew organically out of domestic historical circumstances. Still, their decision to join the right-wing opposition against Allende was not free of U.S. influence. As Chile underwent a process of extreme political polarization in the late 60s and early 70s, the PDC and the stevedore labor sector were both powerful agents of Chile's political center whom the U.S. targeted in order

---

anniversary edition (New York: The New Press, 2013); Tanya Harmer, *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War*, 1st edition (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014); Marco Morra, Eugenia Palieraki, and Rafael Pedemonte, "La Unidad Popular chilena (1970-1973): balance historiográfico y nuevas perspectivas trasnacionales," *Historia Crítica*, no. 90 (October 6, 2023): 3–28, https://doi.org/10.7440/histcrit90.2023.01.

[16] Studies focusing on the domestic reasons for the fall of the Unidad Popular include Gabriel Smirnow, *The Revolution Disarmed, Chile, 1970-1973* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979); Federico G. Gil, Ricardo Lagos Escobar, and Henry A. Landsberger, eds., *Chile at the Turning Point: Lessons of the Socialist Years, 1970-1973* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1979); Manuel Antonio Garretón Merino and Tomás Moulián, *La Unidad Popular y El Conflicto Político En Chile* (Santiago : Ediciones Chile-América : CESOC : LOH, 1993); Verónica Valdivia, "'Todos Juntos Seremos La Historia: Venceremos': Unidad Popular y Fuerzas Armadas," in *Cuando Hicimos Historia: La Experiencia de La Unidad Popular* (Santiago, Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2005), 177–206; Peter Winn, *La revolución chilena*, Primera edición, Historia (Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2013); Sergio Bitar and Crisóstomo Pizarro, *La caída de Allende y la huelga de El Teniente: lecciones de la historia* (Valparaíso, Chile: Ediciones Universitarias de Valparaíso, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, 2017).

to tip the balance of forces to the right. Just as the conservative PDC leadership received encouragement and financial support from the U.S. to oppose the implementation of a socialist project in Chile, so were leaders in the powerful stevedore labor movement sought out by the AFL-CIO and the U.S. State Department to counter the dominance of communists and socialists in Chile's national labor movement and weaken Allende's strong support from labor.

A relatively recent set of interests by scholars looking at the Unidad Popular has been the social, cultural, and political processes themselves that took place during this dynamic period. Few such studies, however, have engaged in transnational analyses.[17] In this thesis I offer an examination of how Chilean rank-and-file workers and labor organizations related to both domestic and international politics in the period before and during the Unidad Popular, illuminating the agency of Chilean workers in the geopolitical processes of what historian Tanya Harmer calls the "Inter-American Cold War."

In chapter one of this thesis, I examine the AFL-CIO's complicated and paradoxical relationship with the centrist Christian Democratic Party to show that Chilean workers from a broad array of ideological tendencies rejected the free trade unionist model of labor relations promoted by the United States. While leading Christian Democratic politicians had extensive ties to the U.S. government and the AFL-CIO, rank-and-file workers and labor leaders affiliated with the party overwhelmingly rejected the AFL-CIO's free trade union project in Chile. Chilean workers rejected the free trade union model for two reasons: first, on the basis that it represented an imperialist intervention into the Chilean labor movement which went

[17] Morra et al. provide an overview of recent historiography on the Unidad Popular and note the absence of transnational studies on the period (Morra, Palieraki, and Pedemonte, "La Unidad Popular chilena (1970-1973)"). One notable exception is Harmer's 2014 monograph which looks at Chile's political relationships with Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the United States under Allende (Harmer, *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War*.)

against prevailing anti-imperialist nationalist politics; and second, because of the radical working class consciousness that had been developing in Chile in the decades leading up to and during the Unidad Popular period. Whereas free trade union ideology conceived of workers as a constituent to be jointly managed by the state and the capitalist class on the road to industrial development, Chilean workers during the late 60s and early 70s saw themselves as the protagonists of the nation's political processes, and looked evermore towards the possibility of taking control over the national means of production as a class. A socialist conception of the role of the trade union movement in Chile's political, economic, and social structures and processes was more attractive to Chilean workers than the vision proposed by free trade unionism, and workers accordingly embraced the former and rejected the latter.

While the Chilean organized labor movement overwhelmingly rejected the AFL-CIO's project in Chile, there were certain sectors of the labor movement that embraced this project as well as free trade union ideology more generally. Researchers have previously identified particular Chilean unions who closely worked with, and sometimes were even formed with the assistance of, AIFLD. These included mainly unions of professionals and white-collar workers in the communications and transportation industries.[18] The AFL-CIO's most notable

[18] Hirsch, *An Analysis of Our AFL-CIO Role in Latin America or Under the Covers with the CIA*, 35. A list of "democratic" trade union allies is included in an ORIT report, including Chile's taxi drivers' union, the Commercial and Industrial Employees union, the Federación de Gremialistas de Chile, and the sugar employees union CONAZU (Basilio González Hermosilla, "Informe de las actividades cumplidas con motivo de la visita del compañero Arturo Juáregui Hurtado," 31 July 1966, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 7, GMMA.) Other authors have identified CUPROCH (Confederación Única de Profesionales de Chile), the National Command for Gremio Defense (formed in 1971, made up predominantly of professionals in the transportation and communication sectors), LAN-Chile, and ANEF (Agrupación Nacional de Empleados Fiscales) (McKenzie and Dunne, *El Golpe*, 49–52.) It is relevant to note that many of the unions the AFL-CIO closely worked with were in the transportation and communication sectors, corresponding to the strong presence in Chile of the AFL-CIO dominated PTTI (Postal, Telegraph and Telephone International) and ITF (International Transport Workers Federation) trade secretariats.

ally in Chile was the national maritime confederation COMACH, which according to AIFLD was its main collaborator since the beginning of its presence in Chile. A major goal of the AIFLD in Chile during the 1960s and early 70s was to create a labor union parallel to the left-wing, Communist Party-dominated Central Única de Trabajadores that would advance free trade unionism in Chile. AIFLD envisioned "Chilean unionists carrying the ball" for the plan, with "AIFLD remaining discreetly in the background."[19] This goal never came to fruition—partially because the non-communist labor movement was riddled with division,[20] and partially because the free trade union politics of this movement were simply unpopular among Chile's labor unionists in general.

However, while many aspects of the AFL-CIO's strategy in Chile failed, its relationship with particular sectors of the Chilean labor movement effectively advanced its overall goals—documented by previous researchers as well as in this thesis—of fomenting labor opposition to undermine the Unidad Popular government. Chapter two looks at the AFL-CIO's exceptionally close relationship with Chile's national maritime union COMACH, and especially with the powerful stevedores' national federation FEMACH, asking why and how this labor sector came to be the AFL-CIO's most reliable collaborator in Chile. The chapter takes a two-fold approach to explain how and why this relationship occurred. It first looks at the relationship the AFL-CIO fostered with the infamous maritime labor leader Wencelsao Moreno Ávila, and how the AFL-CIO both enabled and benefited from his

---

[19] American Institute for Free Labor Development, "Regional and Country Labor Plans, CY 1969," Section on Chile, p. 18, Box 30, AR 2003-0075, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Unprocessed Collections, GMMA.
[20] What AIFLD considered the "democratic," or "free" (non-Communist) labor movement in Chile was weak and rife with "constant political divisions, intrigue and personalism which debilitated the democratic union sector and barred effective cooperation." (American Institute for Free Labor Development, "Country Labor Plans for the Southern Region, 1972-1976," Section on Chile, p 11, Box 30, AR 2003-0075, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Unprocessed Collections, GMMA).

dominance as a stevedore labor leader throughout the 1960s. The chapter then examines the historical structure and organization of the stevedore labor movement, a sector within the broader national maritime movement that was particularly receptive to the ideals of free trade unionism, and whose leadership embraced the coup d'etat against the Unidad Popular government on September 11, 1973. Through an analysis of the stevedore labor sector's highly hierarchical structure known as the "*medios pollos*" system, I show how the logic of free trade unionism was agreeable to an elite stratum of workers in a critical industry who directly benefited from the super-exploitation of an underclass of workers. Free trade unionism was attractive to stevedore unionists because it accommodated their class collaborationist approach to labor politics and the myth of meritocracy that justified their elite status within the stevedore hierarchy; in contrast the socialist labor politics of the Unidad Popular did not, being instead a politics of class struggle and radical social equity.

Through this study, I demonstrate that an understanding of this history can most fully be achieved through careful consideration of the local Third World historical contexts in which the AFL-CIO operated—something neglected by many histories of the AFL-CIO's international Cold War project. Documents produced by the U.S. Government and the AFL-CIO tell only half the story of U.S. labor intervention into Chile. Chilean news media, books, and trade union pamphlets and other documents illuminate the domestic political processes occurring in Chile during the dynamic period leading up to and during the Unidad Popular, how workers played a protagonistic role in these processes, and how they conceptualized the AFL-CIO's role within this landscape. It is through an examination of these Chilean perspectives that we can fully assess where the AFL-CIO's project succeeded, where it failed, and why.

CHAPTER 1: THE AFL-CIO AND THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN CHILE

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the activities of the AFL-CIO in Chile during the presidential administration of Eduardo Frei of the Chilean Christian Democratic Party (PDC) from 1964 to 1970. Frei's 1964 platform proposed modest reforms aiming to spur Chile's stagnant capitalist economy primarily through land reform, a program which aligned closely with the U.S. government's development goals for Latin America under President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Frei's reformist-capitalist political program made his party appear a natural ally in the AFL-CIO and U.S. Government's joint project of promoting the free trade union model. However, the AFL-CIO, operating primarily through the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), found it difficult to carry out its projects in Chile under Frei's presidency. In this chapter I examine the complicated relationship between Frei's government, Christian Democratic workers, and the AFL-CIO's interventionist project in Chile. While the AFL-CIO developed a close working relationship with top PDC political functionaries and some PDC labor leaders, its projects in Chile faced suspicion and hostility from rank-and-file workers in the party.

Three historical examples demonstrate these challenges. In the first example, the AFL-CIO continuously tries and fails to split the Chilean labor movement and establish a new national labor confederation embodying its anti-communist "free trade union" ideals. In the second case, PDC unionists adopt a resolution at their National Convention calling for all party militants to disaffiliate from all foreign labor institutions, including the AFL-CIO's AIFLD. In the final example, AIFLD's plan to establish a Chilean Institute for Free Labor

Development fails, as Frei's administration fears the political fallout from public backlash against the project.

I show that disagreements between Christian Democratic Party elites and rank-and-file workers about whether to work with the AFL-CIO corresponded with a process of deepening class consciousness among the vast majority of Chilean labor unionists regardless of official political party affiliation, including those of the PDC. By the end of Frei's presidency, a left-wing faction of the PDC broke from the party to support Salvador Allende's socialist Unidad Popular coalition in the 1970 presidential election. The rebel faction espoused a socialist, anti-imperialist politics and was strongly supported by the party's labor unionists. A growing sense of class consciousness among all sections of the Chilean working class prompted Chilean workers to reject the AFL-CIO's model of free trade unionism for two reasons. First was the fact that workers identified the AFL-CIO's project in Chile as imperialist intervention into the national labor movement, and as such rejected this project. Second was the incompatibility between free trade union ideology and the working class consciousness developing in Chile across the 20th century, particularly leading up to and during the Unidad Popular period.

Chilean rank-and-file workers from a broad range of ideological political positions rejected the prospect of adopting the specifically anti-communist model of labor relations promoted by the United States, called "free trade unionism." The AFL-CIO's model of labor relations had little to offer the majority of Chilean workers, who, leading up to the 1970 presidential victory of the socialist Unidad Popular, were cohering into a strong class force with increasing political power expressed through independent labor institutions and at the ballot box. Chilean workers' rejection of the AFL-CIO was not simply a reaction against U.S. infiltration in their labor movement; it was a conscious disavowal of the model of labor relations promoted by the AFL-CIO through its international project.

International Trade Unionism in the Context of the Cold War

Like many histories of the AFL-CIO's international activities during the Cold War, this story will begin by following the character of Serafino Romualdi, a man who helped build the joint AFL-CIO/U.S. Government project of anti-communist containment in the Western hemisphere. Born in 1900 in Pesaro, Italy, Romualdi was shaped by his experiences with the Socialist Party under Mussolini's fascist regime. When the party split in 1921 into two wings– the Communists and Socialists– Romualdi "refused to follow the great majority of the youth section that went over to the Communists."[1] Thus, since his days as a young socialist, Romualdi fiercely believed that fascism and communism were two sides of the same totalitarian coin. He fled Italy to the United States in 1923, and soon became involved with the AFL as a staff member at the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union in New York. He then quickly rose through the ranks of the nascent joint project between the U.S. government and the AFL to combat the specter of communism in the Western Hemisphere.[2]

Romualdi embodied the close collaboration between the U.S. government and the AFL when it came to anti-communist action abroad in the post-war period. In the early 40s, Romualdi took an anti-fascist "organizing and propaganda" assignment, working with Italian immigrants across Latin America for the U.S. government's Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.[3] He later served as a labor officer in Italy from 1945-1946 for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor of the CIA, after which he was appointed the AFL's representative to Latin America.[4] In his memoir, Romualdi recalls lamenting the United

---

[1] Romualdi, Serafino, *Presidents & Peons: Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1967), 11.
[2] Stern, "US Labor Intervention in Latin America," 520.
[3] Romualdi, Serafino, *Presidents & Peons: Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America*, 17.
[4] Romualdi, Serafino, 20–21.

Front policies of labor movements abroad, wherein non-communist and communist labor elements worked together to fight fascism. He made efforts, he writes, "to strengthen the Socialist forces at the expense of the Communists. We were preparing for the day–which many of us regarded as inevitable–when the Communists would have to be opposed."[5] Romualdi's story is useful for understanding the emergence of an international web of labor organizations in the post-war period, and the AFL-CIO's influential role in shaping explicitly anti-communist global trade union institutions within this landscape. Romualdi also happens to have led the AFL's first significant foray into the Chilean labor scene when he offered the AFL's assistance to the anti-communist segment of Chile's fractured labor movement in the late 1940s. Following Romualdi's story therefore offers a window into the world of international trade unionism and the dynamic Chilean labor movement in the context of the Cold War.

Free Trade Unionism

Labor movements across the world became a target for U.S. influence at the close of the Second World War. Even before the end of the war, the State Department, the OSS, and later the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), deployed a corps of labor diplomats and agents across Latin America and Western Europe to collect intelligence on labor legislation and movements.[6] All the while, the government and the AFL promoted an explicitly anti-communist brand of labor unionism, which came to be known as "free trade unionism."[7] Free trade union ideology was professedly free of politics and focused primarily on bread-and-

---

[5] Romualdi, Serafino, 22.
[6] Schuhrke, "'Comradely Brainwashing,'" 43.
[7] For more on free trade unionism, see Magaly Rodríguez García, "Free Trade-Unionism in Latin America: 'Bread-and-Butter' or Political Unionism?," *Historical Studies in Industrial Relations*, no. 18 (September 2004): 107–34, https://doi.org/10.3828/hsir.2004.18.3; Schuhrke, "'Comradely Brainwashing'"; Stern, "US Labor Intervention in Latin America."

butter issues. It rejected class struggle in favor of a politics of class harmony, where the success of capitalist enterprises resulted in the mutual benefit of capital and labor. Above all, free trade unionism opposed "totalitarian" ideas about relations between labor, management, and the government. The ideology rejected fascist forms of labor relations, such as that of Argentina's Juan Perón, who in the mid-20th century deployed his own labor diplomats to promote a corporatist, and specifically anti-American, labor relations model.[8] But the efforts of the U.S. government and the AFL (and later the AFL-CIO) were mainly directed against the spread of Communism in the Third World. The U.S. labor movement and its relationship to capital and the state were to be the ideal model that Third World societies should look to on their path to development. In this model, class struggle and worker militancy were made obsolete within a tripartite system, in which disputes between labor and capital were to be arbitrated by the state under the supposedly apolitical principles of "industrial jurisprudence" and "workplace contractualism."[9]

Although free trade union ideology came about in the post-war period, many of its conceptual aspects can be traced back earlier in the history of trade union organizing. In the early days of the AFL under the leadership of Samuel Gompers, a labor politics focusing on economic gains for union members only was known as "pure and simple unionism," "business unionism," or "bread-and-butter unionism."[10] Lenin, writing during the First World War, identified a similar set of insular, "economist" labor politics among the English trade union movement that fragmented the working class into "'selfish' ('petty bourgeois') segments each

---

[8] For more on Argentina's labor diplomacy under Perón, see Semán, *Ambassadors of the Working Class*.
[9] Stern, "US Labor Intervention in Latin America," 521.
[10] For more on the origins of the conservative labor politics developed by the AFL under Samuel Gompers, see Julie Greene, *Pure and Simple Politics: The American Federation of Labor and Political Activism, 1881 - 1917*, 1. publ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 20–27.

pursuing its interest, if necessary in alliance with its own employers, at the expense of the rest."[11] For Lenin, this set of politics thrived among a "labor aristocracy" existing in the imperialist nations, where the national bourgeoisie could afford to carve out "a certain strata of the working class who *have been bribed* out of imperialist superprofits and converted to *watchdogs* of capitalism and *corruptors* of the labour movement."[12] Lenin's description of the set of reformist labor politics that would later be reconfigured as "free trade unionism" shows that the extremely anti-communist nature of free trade unionism was not simply an ideological construction of the anti-communist Cold Warriors in the U.S. organized labor movement. Rather, the anti- and pro-communist divide corresponding with the embrace and rejection of free trade unionism tracked with long-existing debates surrounding reformist versus revolutionary politics, and the role of the trade union movement within these. Left-wing trade unionists in Chile and around the world would have recognized Lenin's warnings against an "economistic," collaborationist set of trade union politics when presented with free trade unionism decades later in a new Cold War context.

Towards the 1950s, the United States and the AFL institutionalized their anti-communist efforts abroad by founding a series of international trade union organizations that explicitly espoused free trade union ideology. In 1949, the United States, with eager support from the AFL, founded the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), which sought to counter the Soviet bloc-dominated World Trade Union Federation (WFTU), founded in 1945.[13] The Inter American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT) was founded soon

---

[11] For a general overview of Lenin's writings on this subject, see Eric Hobsbawm, "Lenin and the 'Aristocracy of Labor,'" *Monthly Review* 21, no. 11 (April 4, 1970).
[12] V.I. Lenin, "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism (October 1916)," in *Lenin Collected Works*, vol. 23 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), 105–20. Emphasis in the original.
[13] Rodríguez García, "Free Trade-Unionism in Latin America."

afterwards in 1951 as the regional organization of the ICFTU for the Americas. The ICFTU founded several International Trade Secretariats (ITS) in various industries, which were international associations of national trade unions within the corresponding industry. The U.S. Communications Workers of America (CWA), for example, is an affiliate union of the Postal, Telegraph, and Telecommunications International trade secretariat (PTTI). The U.S.-based Retail Clerks International Association (RCIA) is an affiliate union of the International Federation of Clerical and Technical Employees trade secretariat. And so on.

The ICFTU, the ORIT, and the ITSs were technically multilateral organizations, since they were constituted by labor movements from countries around the world. In reality, U.S. affiliates, being some of the most well-funded members, held significant sway within ORIT and especially the ITS. What's more, the ex-CIA officer Philip Agee wrote in his memoir *Inside the Company* that the ICFTU, ORIT, and the ITS's were organizations utilized by the CIA to fight communism in the international labor movement.[14] U.S. affiliates of these organizations received money from private foundations which have been revealed as CIA conduits. Scholars have argued that the international operations of the AFL-CIO were not controlled by the CIA; rather, AFL-CIO's own foreign policy goals complemented those of the U.S. State Department and the CIA, and the AIFLD thus became a useful tool through which the U.S. state could further policy objectives in Latin America.[15]

The details of this alphabet soup of mid-20th century international trade union organizations should become clearer as this paper moves forward. What is important to

---

[14] Philip Agee, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*, American ed (New York: Stonehill, 1975), 58.
[15] Thomas Field Jr., for example, complicates Agee's narrative that AIFLD was "controlled" by the CIA, but confirms the close ties between AIFLD and the agency. According to Field's interviews with a CIA officer who worked in Latin America, Romualdi and his successor as AIFLD Director Bill Doherty were "very close to people in the agency," with Doherty being described as a "semi-agent." (Field, "Transnationalism Meets Empire," 330–31.)

understand now is that the world of international labor organizations became a battleground in the Cold War period, and the AFL-CIO worked closely alongside the U.S. government to persuade labor movements around the world to join the "free trade union" side.

The Founding of AIFLD

Following the 1959 Cuban Revolution, the project of spreading free trade unionism became all the more urgent for the U.S. Government and the AFL, which had undergone a merger with the CIO in 1955 to become the AFL-CIO. AFL-CIO leadership, unconvinced that multilateral institutions such as ICFTU-ORIT would be enough to effectively fight the spread of communism throughout the Western hemisphere, established the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) in 1961. AIFLD expanded the international labor education programs that the Communication Workers of America (CWA) had begun in the 1950s with support from the Postal, Telegraph, and Telephone International trade secretariat (PTTI). Through this program, the CWA invited Latin American communications workers to its facilities in Front Royal, Virginia to take courses on labor-management theory, collective bargaining strategy, and U.S. labor history; participants were then provided a stipend for nine months upon graduation to organize free trade unions in their home countries.[16]

In 1962, Kennedy's Alliance for Progress took AIFLD under its wing, appropriating the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funds towards the Institute. The vast majority of AIFLD's funding throughout its existence (on average over 85%) came from USAID.[17] Reflecting the free trade unionist ideal of labor and management cooperating in

---

[16] Romualdi, Serafino, *Presidents & Peons: Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America*, 416; Schuhrke, "'Comradely Brainwashing,'" 49.
[17] Mellen, Jim, "Leaders for Labor: Made in America."

class harmony for the good of the company and society, AIFLD's Board of Directors was composed of labor leaders as well as several "enlightened" businessmen who supposedly understood the value of strong labor organizations for the success of their enterprises. In actual fact, many of these businessmen had been strong opponents of unionization in their own corporations. Furthermore, businessmen on AIFLD's Board had business interests in Latin America. For example, Peter J. Grace was president of W.R. Grace and Co., a conglomerate corporation with diversified investments in Chile including the Kennecott Copper Corporation. Charles Brinckerhoff, also a member of the Board, was the President of Anaconda Company which owned many of Chile's copper mines.[18]

AIFLD started off its operations by continuing to invite Latin American workers to the United States for labor education seminars just as the CWA had done, but the Institute soon opened field offices in countries across Latin America to carry out a variety of in-country programs. In-country field offices carried out labor education seminars for workers, organized union-to-union exchange programs between local and U.S. unions in related industries, and funded small-scale "impact projects" for local unions. The offices also identified promising union leaders to send to the Front Royal Institute whom AIFLD staff believed would have the capacity for training others in the principles of free trade unionism upon graduation– this system for training the trainer was the so-called "multiplier effect."[19]

It is important to stress that AIFLD was not simply a trade union educational institution. AIFLD deepened the AFL-CIO's project of anti-communist containment in the Western hemisphere by moving beyond prior projects led by the AFL and the International Trade Secretariats which had trained leaders in organizational, administrative, and

---

[18] Mellen, Jim.
[19] Stern, "US Labor Intervention in Latin America," 527.

collective bargaining skills. As historians Jeff Schurhke, Joshua Stern, and others have written, AIFLD was founded with the goal of splitting Latin American labor movements so as to weaken socialist and communist parties whose base in labor provided strong support for anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist political projects in the region.[20] This was a project pursued jointly with the cold warriors in U.S. government institutions such as the State Department and the CIA. In many cases, such as in Chile, it became the explicit U.S. State Department policy to split the labor movement along communist/non-communist lines.[21] AIFLD provided the organizational capacity, personnel, and intelligence to pursue this strategy.

Serafino Romualdi was appointed Executive Director of AIFLD in 1962. In 1963, AIFLD set up shop in Chile with a field office in Santiago. AIFLD-Chile's operations were built on relationships that Romualdi had formed with anti-communist sections of Chile's labor movement dating back to the 1940s. At that time, the Chilean labor movement was characterized by deep divisions between socialist and communist unionists. When Chilean labor overcame its fractured state with the formation of the Central Única de Trabajadores (Workers' United Center, CUT) in 1953, it became Romualdi's priority to split the newly-formed labor confederation which was dominated by the communist and socialist left. He envisioned a second national labor confederation espousing free trade union ideology that could rival the CUT and orient the Chilean labor movement away from communism.[22] When AIFLD was founded in 1961, it inherited this goal as its major objective in Chile. In Chile,

---

[20] See Scipes, *AFL-CIO's Secret War against Developing Country Workers*; Schuhrke, "'Comradely Brainwashing'"; Stern, "US Labor Intervention in Latin America."
[21] Memorandum, "US policy with regard to Chilean organized labor," 1965, RG 59, Bureau of Interamerican Affairs, Records Related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 6, NARA II.
[22] Romualdi, Serafino, *Presidents & Peons: Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America*, 326–40.

AIFLD staff members collected detailed information on the political affiliations of unionists with whom they came into contact, and readily shared this information with U.S. State Department officials.[23] AIFLD-Chile also sought to directly influence Chilean politics by leveraging their contacts in the government. Throughout the 1960s and 70s the Institute inserted itself squarely into debates within the Chilean Christian Democratic Party (PDC) on whether to remain within the Communist-dominated CUT, or whether to form a rival union for combating communism in Chile.

U.S. Labor Intervention in Chile, 1964-1970

By the time Romualdi was appointed executive director of AIFLD in 1962, he was an experienced veteran of labor diplomacy in Latin America. He had made a routine of connecting with Catholic Church dignitaries and influential Catholic leaders in Latin America to discuss "the potential contribution of the Church to our efforts to contain and reverse the Communist tide by strengthening democratic trade unions organized on a nonpolitical, nonsectarian basis."[24] This had allowed him to become close friends with the Chilean Christian Democrats Eduardo Frei and William Thayer Arteaga.

On September 4, 1964, Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was elected president of Chile. AIFLD-Chile had only been established a year prior, but Romualdi's personal connections with the newly-elected leader of the party set the expectation that the Institute would closely collaborate with the new government. A few days after he was elected, Frei received Romualdi at his Santiago home. Romualdi was accompanied by William Thayer, who sat on AIFLD's Board of Directors and was later

---

[23] Stern, "US Labor Intervention in Latin America," 515.
[24] Romualdi, Serafino, *Presidents & Peons: Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America*, 407.

appointed Minister of Labor by Frei. As Romualdi tells the story, he had come "to congratulate an old friend on his victory" and discuss how AIFLD might be able to assist Chile's free trade union movement under Frei's future administration. Romualdi felt it was his duty to warn Frei that the Communists would use the CUT to sabotage the president-elect's "Revolution in Liberty" program. He recalls repeating to Frei over and over, "they are going to make your life miserable."[25]

Not 24 hours had passed after the meeting before it became a scandal in the Chilean left-wing press. On the morning of September 10, 1964, the Communist Party's daily paper *El Siglo* published a scathing attack against Romualdi and Frei for the meeting.[26] The attacks continued throughout the week. On September 12, *El Siglo* published a full-page spread with a double headline, accusing Romualdi of attempting to divide the labor movement in Chile. On the 13th, it published yet another full-page article arguing that Chilean labor unity was being "threatened by the imperialist agent Romualdi."[27]

This episode demonstrates two major themes that would characterize the relationship between AIFLD and the Chilean labor movement throughout the 1960s. The first is the extreme hostility from the Chilean Left, firmly rooted in the country's labor movement, that AIFLD received from the moment of its founding in Chile. Anti-imperialist sentiment was on the rise in Chile and across Latin America during this period, fueled in part by the success of the Cuban Revolution. In this context, as the scholar Alan Angell wrote during the period, the AFL-CIO's ideology of free trade unionism had little appeal and made little sense. "The

---

[25] Romualdi, Serafino, 336–37.
[26] "Frei Recibió al Agente Divisionista S. Romualdi," *El Siglo*, September 10, 1964.
[27] "Dirigentes Democratacristianos Atacaron Duramente a Romualdi," *El Siglo*, September 12, 1964; "Romualdi Embajador Del Divisionismo Sindical," *El Siglo*, September 13, 1964; Romualdi, Serafino, *Presidents & Peons: Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America*, 337.

participation of American business in [the AFL-CIO's foreign] activities," wrote Angell, "is an embarrassment for it in a country where attacks on American imperialism are common and where American corporations have been large employers of labour (including some of the most militant groups.) Its anti-communism is not likely to take it far where communism is both strong and in working agreement with the other important political forces in the labour movement."[28] From the time AIFLD began its operations in Chile in the early 60's, the Institute was treated with suspicion by Chilean trade unionists from across the political spectrum. Chile's left, and particularly the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh), led the charge against AIFLD in the public discourse. The left-wing press called attention to the Institute's financial ties with the U.S. government, its stated aims of manipulating Chile's organized labor scene, and evidence that AIFLD and its precursors had assisted U.S.-backed coups in Guatemala (1954), Guyana (1963), Brazil (1964), and the Dominican Republic (1965).[29] The left-wing media offensive against AIFLD severely complicated the Institute's task of integrating itself into the predominantly left-wing Chilean labor movement in order to split it.

But far from finding easy allies in non-communist sections of Chile's labor movement, AIFLD also confronted suspicion and outright denunciation from more ideologically conservative elements of the labor movement. This brings us to the second theme broached by Romualdi's meeting with Frei and Thayer in September of 1964, which was AIFLD's difficult relationship with the Chilean Christian Democratic Party (PDC). The PDC had been a broad, multi-class party that became plagued by deep ideological divisions under Frei's

---

[28] Alan Angell, *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile* (London, New York: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1972), 269.
[29] Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 2nd ed. (Empresa Editora Austral, 1969), 127–50.

presidency, with the left wing of the party moving towards a politics of anti-imperialist socialism. The right-wing supporters of Frei's 1964 campaign, on the other hand, turned rightward and took up a more radically anti-communist stance, willing to ally with the extreme right to oppose socialism.

The ideological split in the PDC, which deepened throughout Frei's presidency, also manifested in a division among PDC labor unionists concerning how to relate to AIFLD's activities in Chile. While some PDC political and labor leaders worked closely with AIFLD, most rank-and-file unionists in the party were deeply suspicious of its interventionist activities in the Chilean labor movement. In fact *El Siglo*'s September 12, 1964 news story on Romauldi and Frei's meeting focused on the disapproval this meeting received from unionists affiliated with the PDC: "Christian Democrat leaders attack Romualdi hard," read the headline.[30]

Despite *El Siglo*'s vicious attacks in September of 1964, and perhaps fueled by them in his anti-communist fervor, Romualdi persisted in his endeavors, with the support of AIFLD, to split the CUT under the Frei regime. Given their connections in high places of the Frei administration, AIFLD officials in Chile believed that gaining the trust and cooperation of rank-and-file workers affiliated with the PDC would be a simple task. They would soon realize the error of this assumption.

Splitting Chilean Labor

In his meeting with Frei and Thayer following Frei's election, Romualdi had encouraged Frei to build up his "own labor support" to counter the Communist-Socialist

[30] "Dirigentes Democratacristianos Atacaron Duramente a Romualdi."

opposition.[31] This implied splitting the Communist-dominated CUT and building up an alternative "free trade union" confederation for Chile's labor movement, which was AIFLD's anti-communist strategy in Latin America. The strategy of splitting Chile's labor movement would become official U.S. State Department policy by 1965. It was not a new strategy, but rather one that Romualdi had tried to implement in Chile over the two decades prior. Beginning in the 1940s and through the late 60s, Romualdi and the AFL/AFL-CIO orchestrated several attempts to split Chile's leftwing-dominated labor confederations or otherwise establish rival free trade union confederations in Chile. Therefore, before continuing to explore U.S. labor interventionism under the Frei regime, it is necessary to move backwards in time to when Romualdi and the AFL first established ties with their anti-communist allies in the Chilean labor movement. In the process, this section will introduce Chile's increasingly polarized political climate in the mid-20th Century and the leftward trajectory of Chile's dynamic labor movement, both of which culminated in the Christian Democratic Party split and the rise of the socialist Unidad Popular coalition in 1970.

***

Romualdi first began offering financial and organizational assistance of the AFL to free trade unionists in Chile at a time when the Chilean labor movement was characterized by deep divisions between Socialist and Communist unionists in the 1940s. In these years, Romualdi had befriended and offered funding from the AFL to the Chilean anti-communist, Socialist labor leader Bernardo Ibañez Águila.[32] Together Romualdi and Ibañez formed the

[31] Romualdi, Serafino, *Presidents & Peons: Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America*, 337.
[32] Romualdi, Serafino, 326.

Centro Interamericana de Trabajadores (CIT) in 1948, which in 1951 affiliated with the ICFTU to become ORIT.[33]

As historian Angela Vergara observes, "the relationship between Ibáñez, a relatively obscure and unpopular leader in Chilean labor politics, the ORIT, and Romualdi suggests the difficulties of consolidating an anti-communist labor agenda in Latin America."[34] The influence of the U.S.-aligned-and-directed ORIT in the Chilean labor movement remained limited, even when Communist labor and political leaders were driven underground in 1948 under the Law for the Defense of Democracy, which stayed in place until 1957. The law dealt a significant blow to Chilean organized labor as a whole; unionization and collective action could be prosecuted as crimes against the state.[35] Even despite the years of repression, Communists, Socialists, and other left-wing organizations managed to come together to form a new national labor confederation in 1953– the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT).

The newly-formed CUT was firmly under leftist leadership. Its purpose was to unite the working class with other sectors such as the peasantry in a battle against large landowners and foreign enterprises, and its founding document declared its anti-capitalist principles.[36] Romualdi, as the AFL's representative to Latin America, had tried to warn Chilean delegates to the 1952 ORIT convention "not to fall into this Communist 'unity' trap."[37] But his efforts to guide the Chilean labor movement towards free trade unionism were failing, and ORIT's influence in Chile continued to diminish throughout the 1950's.[38]

---

[33] Vergara, Angela, "Chilean Workers and the US Labor Movement: From Solidarity to Intervention, 1950s–1970s," 204–5.
[34] Vergara, Angela, 206.
[35] Angell, *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile*, 59–60.
[36]Angell, 115.
[37] Romualdi, Serafino, *Presidents & Peons: Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America*, 332.
[38] Vergara, Angela, "Chilean Workers and the US Labor Movement: From Solidarity to Intervention, 1950s–1970s," 207.

As Romualdi and the AFL– soon to become the AFL-CIO– continued struggling to find allies in the Chilean labor movement, they made contact with leading Christian Democrats Eduardo Frei and William Thayer, who expressed an interest in breaking their party, the PDC, away from the CUT and joining forces with ORIT. At the CUT's 1962 convention, ORIT and certain PDC trade union leaders tried planning for a mass exodus from the CUT of the Christian Democratic trade unions (this was after a failed attempt to do the same in 1956). ORIT stacked the convention with anti-communist forces by paying the arrears in union dues owed to the CUT by federations that had not previously been affiliated, such as the maritime confederation COMACH and the Federation of Taxi Drivers. The plan was for these "free trade unions" to announce their disaffiliation with the CUT, exit the convention en masse, and gather in another hall space rented out by ORIT. At the last minute, the leadership of the PDC ordered those within the party who were involved to abort the plan.[39] The debacle evidenced disagreement among the Christian Democrats between those who favored working class unity in alliance with Chile's left, and those who sought to work with foreign labor elements such as the AFL-CIO to split the working class movement in the name of free trade unionism.

The AFL-CIO promoted several other unsuccessful attempts to split the CUT.[40] For example in 1968 Frei's government and the U.S. funded the formation of a new labor confederation to rival the CUT, but the PDC eventually banned members from

---

[39] Romualdi, Serafino, *Presidents & Peons: Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America*, 336.
[40] The AFL-CIO supported the formation of the Centro Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT) as an international free trade union-aligned rival to the CUT in 1957, but in Romualdi's own words, "in spite of ample support from abroad, the CNT never achieved a position of real strength." The CNT was revived in January of 1974 under Pinochet's military dictatorship, which banned the CUT as one of its first acts. The CNT under Pinochet vowed to be "apolitical democratic and free, independent of both government and political parties," and promised to collaborate rather than challenge employers. "Chile: La Resistencia Va!," *NACLA Latin America and Empire Report* 8, no. 2 (February 1974): 31–32; Romualdi, Serafino, *Presidents & Peons: Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America*, 334; Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 167–72.

participating.[41] Across the many attempts by the AFL-CIO (via ORIT and AIFLD) to split Chilean labor, a common theme emerges: some of Romualdi and the AFL-CIO's closest collaborators were top-level Christian Democratic party functionaries and labor leaders affiliated with the party, and yet, there was great opposition within the PDC to U.S. labor intervention in Chile. To understand this paradox, it is necessary to investigate why the AFL-CIO chose to work with the PDC rather than other political groups in Chile, and to examine the ideological divide that deepened within the PDC under Frei's regime as Chile's working class radicalized.

AIFLD and the Chilean Christian Democratic Party

This section will explore the PDC's rise to power and its contentious political position vis a vis labor. It will also introduce the complicated relationship between the Frei's Christian Democratic government and U.S. labor interventionist projects headed by AIFLD. The Frei regime sought to incorporate organized labor into the party structure to a limited extent, likely due to influence from close free trade unionist contacts in the AFL-CIO. Frei's labor relations model aligned closely with the model promoted by free trade unionism, which viewed labor as a passive constituency to be managed jointly by the state and capital. One major impetus for the radicalization of PDC labor unionists was their disenchantment with the way in which PDC political leadership viewed its affiliated labor unionists as merely a constituent that could facilitate political mobilization for the benefit of the party, rather than as political actors that should be meaningfully incorporated into policy making processes. Labor unionists increasingly became attracted to a socialist labor politics that conceptualized

[41] This confederation was called the Unión de Trabajadores de Chile (UTRACH). Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 167.

organized labor as an agent of political and social change. As PDC labor unionists radicalized under the Frei regime, they increasingly came to reject AIFLD's imperialist interventions as well as its formula for labor-government relations which had been embraced by the PDC political leadership.

Chile's political landscape became increasingly polarized along class lines throughout the 1960s and early 70s. The 1964 presidential election, whose major candidates were Frei of the PDC and Salvador Allende of the Socialist Party (PS), was framed by the Chilean mainstream media as a contest between communism and democracy. Frei's voter base in 1964 was composed of a broad, multi-class coalition of industrialists, professionals, peasants, and white- and blue-collar workers.[42] The PDC's platform called for income redistribution, agrarian reform, and modernizing reforms for Chilean industry. In many ways, this program aligned with John F. Kennedy's development goals for Latin America under the Alliance for Progress, which encouraged capitalist reforms in the region with the belief that they would prevent communist revolution. The party's political objectives thus naturally aligned with AIFLD's liberal-democratic and anti-communist project in Latin America. Chile's political right, whose traditional base was composed of the industrial bourgeoisie and the landed oligarchy, was politically weakened after six unsuccessful years of President Jorge Alessandri's reactionary administration. Economic stagnation under Alessandri had spurred support for the coalition of Communists and Socialists, heavily composed of unionized labor, supporting Allende called the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP).[43] Thus, the large-scale industrialists, financiers, and landowners, who had traditionally supported the Liberal and

---

[42] Barbara Stallings, *Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1958–1973* (Stanford University Press, 1978), 42.
[43] Stallings, 93–96.

Conservative parties, reluctantly put their support behind Frei to block Socialism from coming into power.[44] The final member of the PDC's broad alliance was the United States, which financially assisted Frei's campaign to ensure the defeat of Salvador Allende's socialist platform.[45]

The PDC's broad class composition was reflected in the wide range of political opinions that existed in the party during the Frei years– an array that became irreconcilable as the 1960s came to a close. Ideological divisions within the PDC made it difficult for AIFLD to maintain the smooth working relationship with the PDC that AIFLD had hoped for under Frei's presidency, as the party's rank-and-file trade unionists in particular rejected foreign infiltration in Chilean labor politics and, increasingly throughout the 60s, the AFL-CIO's model of free trade unionism.

Christian Democracy and Labor in Chile

The Christian Democratic Party rose to power in 1964 on a promise to enact a "Revolution in Liberty." Founded in 1957 from a regrouping of Chile's National Falange and other allied groups, the PDC started out as a relatively weak political force but gained in popularity under the right-wing presidency of Jorge Alessandri from 1958-1964 which was characterized by economic stagnation. Leading up to 1964, the PDC grew from a relatively small but influential cadre of middle class Christian intellectuals to a party with a mass base including members of the middle classes, the urban proletariat, and the peasantry. The PDC emerged from a modernist tendency within the Catholic Church that embraced the need for profound social changes under capitalism to prevent the working masses from pursuing

[44] Stallings, 90–96.
[45] Stallings, 96.

proletarian revolution. The PDC was different from Chile's other centrist party, the Partido Radical (PR), in that while PR represented a "pragmatic center" between the left and the right, the PDC proposed an alternative ideal for organizing Chilean society. However the PDC's alternative vision was never clearly defined. While some within the party argued for a reformist-developmentalist party that would modernize and "humanize" Chile's backward capitalist system, others wished to transform the PDC into an alternative revolutionary party that would replace the capitalist system with a new kind of society differing from both socialism and capitalism (Christian-Democratic trade unionists, we will see, tended to side with the left wing of the party which advocated for the latter). These two visions managed to coexist within the PDC as long as the party was not in power, but over the course of six years in power from 1964-1970, the party began to fracture.[46] This split meant that in the 1970 presidential election, the PDC candidate Radomiro Tomic placed behind both the left-wing candidate Allende and the right-wing candidate Alessandri.

The scholar Alan Angell, writing in the early 1970s, noted that trade unionist support for the PDC must be understood within the context of the growth of support for the party nationally. In other words, trade unionists were bound to join the wave of popular enthusiasm for the Christian Democrats, convinced by their rhetoric of modernization and reform.[47] The PDC enjoyed support from white collar as well as blue collar workers. Right-wing labor leaders, such as Wenceslao Moreno Ávila of the national maritime labor confederation COMACH, joined the party on the eve of Frei's election with the hopes that doing so would be politically beneficial to him personally. His close ties with AIFLD and ORIT would also

---

[46] Tomás Moulian, *Fracturas: De Pedro Aguirre Cerda a Salvador Allende (1938-1973)*, Historia (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2006), 194–235.
[47] Angell, *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile*, 185.

have prevented him from joining the Socialist and Communist parties, but he assumed that the PDC—given its leaders' close relationship to the AFL-CIO and the U.S. Government—would allow him to maintain ties with U.S. labor institutions.[48]

Support for the PDC among trade unionists in Chile must also be understood in relation to the regional phenomenon of "Christian trade unionism" which held significant appeal in Latin America beginning in the early 1960s and which maintained informal relationships with the region's Christian Democratic parties. The Confederación Latino Americana de Sindicatos Cristianos (CLASC– Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unions) was a regional trade union confederation similar to ORIT. These two regional trade union confederations viewed each other as rivals for influence among the non-communist sections of the Latin American labor movement. CLASC advocated peaceful revolution in the form of structural social change, the redistribution of wealth, the establishment of a robust welfare system, and the meaningful integration of rural and working class populations into the political systems of each nation. Although CLASC was non-communist in political orientation, it did not advance a vehemently anti-communist line as ORIT did, and in fact it more often spoke out against ORIT's free trade union ideology and its ties to the U.S. State Department than it did against communist politics.[49]

CLASC had a significant presence in Chile, where it was headquartered for several years in the 1960s.[50] CLASC's Chilean affiliate, the ASICH-CCT, never achieved as much influence as the FRAP-dominated CUT, but one estimate guessed that there were at least

---

[48] Angell, 185. More on Wenceslao Moreno in the following chapter.
[49] Michael J. Francis, "Revolutionary Labor in Latin America: The CLASC," *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 10, no. 4 (October 1968): 597–616, https://doi.org/10.2307/165319.
[50] Chile's national affiliate of the CLASC was the ASICH-CCT, Acción Sindical Chilena– Confederación Cristiana de Trabajadores. Although CLASC had a significant presence in Chile, Francis estimates that CLASC affiliates were numerically half as large as the CUT, and did not include key unions (Francis, 608.)

half as many CLASC affiliates in Chile as there were CUT affiliates by the late 1960s.[51] Chilean trade unionists affiliated with the CLASC held relationships with the PDC in Chile, but as scholar Michael Francis maintains, the CLASC was not an "appendage" of the party: in the 1964 election, Chilean CLASC leaders endorsed the PDC's political platform but did not endorse Frei himself, and they maintained that CLASC would support other political parties "if necessary."[52] Frei's campaign ultimately did enjoy support from CLASC-affiliated unionists in the 1964 election. However in general, the CLASC was politically further to the left than the PDC's political leadership in Chile. As will become clear, these differences align with the political rifts that split the Chilean PDC by the end of Frei's term. Considering the CLASC in Chile therefore sheds light on how and why this rift in the party developed, and where trade unionists in Chile's Christian political milieu were positioned with respect to this rift.

Despite the fact that labor composed a significant section of the PDC's mass base, organized labor held very little political power within the governing party under Frei's administration. This was a great source of frustration among Christian-Democratic trade unionists. The PDC under Frei had a "union department" in order to promote, train, and coordinate the work of party members in the unions. The union department's Executive Council was theoretically supposed to advise the governing PDC Political Commission on strategy in policy. However, the department's national director claimed that Minister of Labor William Thayer hardly consulted the department on his proposals to reform the labor code. Perhaps as a result, Frei's administration developed policy proposals for labor that were very unpopular among unionists. For example, Frei infamously instituted wage freeze

[51] Francis, 608.
[52] Francis, 609.

policies in order to curb inflation.[53] Another controversial proposal was to allow several unions to be created inside a plant. This would have abolished the closed shop, which formed the basis of one of the Chilean labor movement's great strengths.[54]

As Angell notes, there was no material reason for the PDC's union department to be influential within the party. The party did not claim to represent the working class above other classes, as the Socialists and the Communists did. Unionists did not fund the party, and therefore did not have financial leverage within the party either. Labor in general was not a central concern of the PDC.[55] Thus the PDC's relationship to organized labor was ultimately unsatisfactory to many rank-and-file unionists in the party, who were increasingly turning to a more radical set of politics, many of them espoused by the non-communist yet radical CLASC, and even the heavily-communist FRAP. Frei's administration clearly made an attempt to formalize a relationship with organized labor affiliated with the party. But in effect the purpose of this relationship was to facilitate political mobilization for the party within the unions, rather than to allow workers a position of power within the party and broader society. This was in fact one of CLASC's major criticisms of the PDC– "CLASC has frequently been frustrated by the attitude of the PDC in Chile," wrote the scholar Michael Francis in 1968. "It has felt that the university-trained hierarchy of the party does not

---

[53] Angell, *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile*, 190.

[54] Angell, 191. After the coup, Pinochet's Plan Laboral labor reforms "forbade a closed shop, made union membership voluntary, and promoted the formation of multiple parallel unions within the same enterprise by allowing as few as twenty-five workers as long as they represent at least 10 percent of the labor force […] to form a union" (Winn, *Victims of the Chilean Miracle*, 33). It is interesting to note the congruence between Thayer's labor reform proposals and those that Pinochet enacted under his rule, formulated for the express purpose of severely curtailing the power of labor unions in Chile. For more on Pinochet's labor reforms, see Peter Winn, *Victims of the Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 31–38. Here it is also relevant to note that in the mid 1980s Thayer was an active member of the Movimiento Social Cristiano, a PDC association organized around the basis of support for the military regime. Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, "William Turpin Thayer Arteaga: Reseñas Biográficas Parlamentarias," BCN.cl (BCN. Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile), accessed April 14, 2024, https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/William_Turpin_Thayer_Arteaga.

[55] Angell, *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile*, 188–89.

understand the problems of the union and is much more interested in controlling the CLASC affiliates for the good of the party than in seeing [them] develop into a viable, independent force."[56]

Limiting worker influence in the government seems to have been a deliberate policy choice– Minister of Labor Thayer wrote in his 1968 book *Trabajo, Empresa, y Revolución* that Chile's economy was not sufficiently developed to allow workers strong participation in the nation's economic life.[57] In many ways Thayer's ideas about labor relations show the influence of free trade union ideology from his relationships with the AFL-CIO. Thayer was a personal friend of Romualdi and served on the AIFLD's Board of Directors before being appointed Minister of Labor. His book emphasizes class collaboration between labor and capital, touts the importance of private property for creating a prosperous society for a nation's workers, and maintains that unions should be "free" from state, employer, and party domination.[58] His suggestion that Chile's economy was not sufficiently developed to allow workers a strong say in national politics readily embraced modernization ideologies popular among the U.S. industrial relations academics who promoted free trade unionism as the key to achieving a democratic, industrial society.[59]

In the end, the Frei Administration's unwillingness to grant labor a meaningful role in policy pushed many unionists away from the party, contributing to the fracturing of the

---

[56] Francis, "Revolutionary Labor in Latin America," 608.
[57] William Thayer, *Trabajo, Empresa, y Revolución* (Santiago de Chile: Empresa Editora Zig-Zag, 1968), 44. "Una nación en camino de desarrollo y con las características de la nuestra deberá soportar, durante un tiempo más o menos largo, una etapa en que el proceso del ahorro popular es insuficiente para alcanzar una participación más efectiva en las actividades de la vida económica…la multiplicación del poder sindical dentro de un esquema de clases que entregue a los grupos del trabajo la facultad o la posibilidad de exigir lo que no se está en condiciones de conceder, es decir, lo que no deriva del proceso de desarrollo económico, podría inducirnos a un colapso."
[58] Thayer, 181–82.
[59] For more on the U.S. academy's role in promoting free trade union ideology, see Stern, "US Labor Intervention in Latin America," 521–25.

party by the end of Frei's presidency. The Frei Administration's approach to labor relations cannot be solely attributed to influence from the AFL-CIO. However this influence clearly existed and the parallels between Frei's labor relations policy and free trade union ideology are evident. These parallels suggest that PDC labor unionists rejected both Frei's political model and free trade union ideology for the same reason– both subordinated worker power to the demands of capital and the state by diffusing class struggle and promoting a politics of class harmony.

Further evidence to support this conclusion comes from the fact that the CLASC in Chile, which was the major trade union institution representing Christian-Democratic trade unionists in Chile, consistently voiced criticism of ORIT, AIFLD, and the Alliance for Progress on a variety of questions that also put the CLASC at odds with Chile's Christian Democratic political leaders. For example, CLASC criticized the Alliance for Progress's overemphasis on free enterprise and its reliance on existing bureaucratic structures to solve the problems faced in Latin America.[60] Similarly, the CLASC held a self-consciously more radical position with respect to structural labor- and land-reform than the political leadership of the PDC– Francis described the CLASC as "much more in the vanguard of reform than the party."[61] Crucially, whereas CLASC specifically advocated for incorporating workers and peasants into the process of labor and land reform, one of its major criticisms of the Alliance for Progress was that it was not interested in promoting popular participation in politics. As stated above, the CLASC in Chile lodged similar criticisms against the PDC political leadership when it accused the party of using the trade union movement for the party's own political objectives rather than granting labor an active role in the nation's governance.

[60] Francis, "Revolutionary Labor in Latin America," 601.
[61] Francis, 609.

Finally, CLASC criticized ORIT's "bread and butter unionism," which Frei and Thayer clearly embraced through their personal and political connections to AIFLD. For CLASC, "the 'superficial' concentration on immediate issues sidetracks organized labor from its 'most profound economic, social, and political objectives'" of a revolutionary nature.[62] Maritime labor leader Wenceslao Moreno, a long-time ally of the AFL-CIO, remarked in 1968 that by that time CLASC had become totally "alien" to the principles of free trade unionism.[63]

To restate the thesis advanced here, Chilean trade unionists who were affiliated with the Christian Democracy specifically rejected a formula for labor-government relations, promoted by free trade union ideology and embraced by the PDC political leadership, that viewed labor as a passive constituency to be managed jointly by the state and capital, rather than as an agent of political and social change.

The PDC Split and AIFLD

When scholar Alan Angell wrote his 1972 book *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile*, he identified a clear division in the PDC between those who supported a plan to split the CUT and those who favored a united CUT to promote working class unity. While for the most part rank and file workers favored unity, Angell also perceived that the strategic divide did not fall neatly on any discernible politician-versus-unionist line. There were unionists and politicians who wished to split the CUT; there were unionists and politicians who believed it was worth giving up a few principles for the larger goal of working class unity.

In hindsight it appears that the line between the splitters and the anti-splitters was shaped heavily by influence from AIFLD and the U.S. State Department. The two big

---

[62] Francis, 599.
[63] Wenceslao Moreno to Andrew McLellan, 28 July 1968, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 10, GMMA

proponents of splitting the CUT that Angell identifies (one a politician, William Thayer; one a unionist, Wenceslao Moreno) both had intimate ties to AIFLD and related international trade union organizations. Frei's Minister of Labor William Thayer had been on AIFLD's first Board of Directors and was a personal friend of its first Executive Director, Romualdi. Angell gives the example of Wenceslao Moreno Ávila as a trade unionist who was also in favor of splitting the CUT. "Don Wenche," as he was called, was an unpopular labor leader of the COMACH maritime confederation, accused of corruption and political opportunism by workers on the left. Moreno also developed close ties with AIFLD in the 1960s. He joined AIFLD's Board of Directors in August of 1966, and AIFLD funded a variety of projects for his Valparaiso stevedore's union. The Communist journalist Eduardo Labarca Goddard wrote in 1968 that Don Wenche's lavish lifestyle was funded by misappropriated union dues as well as foreign funding– rumor had it among the port workers that Wenche owned a portfolio of rental properties, a fleet of taxi cabs, and an hacienda in Peru.

What was clear to Angell writing in the early 1970s was that as the Frei years went on, rank-and-file Christian-Democratic unionists grew more independent of the PDC apparatus while their identification with the national working class grew stronger. Having exited the CUT in May 1965, PDC unionists reentered it in 1968 after the party's labor section was taken over by leftists within the party. Meanwhile, Frei's broad cross-class coalition was bursting at the seams. The proletariat and the bourgeoisie both were cohering into unified and highly organized class forces, with increasing polarization and violence between the two. As Barbara Stallings writes, the Frei government was "forced to descend

from the position it was trying to occupy above the class struggle and to take sides openly."[64] He ultimately chose to capitulate to the bourgeoisie, thereby alienating labor.

The split in the PDC by the end of the Frei years was fomented in part by Frei's political failures while in office. One of the Frei Administration's biggest blunders was his unpopular plan to buy out majority shares of Chile's foreign-owned copper mines, dubbed the "Chileanization of copper." The implementation of this plan received criticism from the left, since his negotiations with the U.S.-based Kennecott and Anaconda mining companies resulted in a less than favorable deal for the Chilean state. Frei agreed to buy out majority shares of the mines for twice their market value; grant lucrative tax cuts to Kennecott and Anaconda; offer low-interest Chilean government loans to the foreign companies to support expansion; and ultimately allow the companies to maintain control over administration and sales.[65] Frei's Chileanization policy contributed to growing anti-imperialist political sentiment in Chile, and by the 1970 election, a solid majority of Chileans supported full nationalization of the nation's copper mines.[66] Within this climate, critiques of North American imperialism, infiltration and espionage resonated with large swaths of the Chilean population, spelling trouble for the AFL-CIO's project in Chile.

When many of Frei's other promised reforms began to stagnate around 1967, a left-wing "rebel faction" consolidated within the PDC calling for an alternative to capitalism. This fissure led to the formation in 1969 of the Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria (Popular Unitary Action Movement, MAPU), which adopted a more explicitly anti-imperialist, Marxist-socialist political outlook, and joined the Unidad Popular coalition for the 1970

---

[64] Stallings, *Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1958–1973*, 113.
[65] Bodenheimer, Susanne, "Stagnation in Liberty," in *New Chile* (NACLA, 1973), 118–27; Stallings, *Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1958–1973*, 43.
[66] Stallings, *Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1958–1973*, 124.

presidential election. The ruling politicians of the PDC, including Frei and Thayer, remained on the right-wing of the party. On the other hand, the Chilean Right feared that Frei's private property reforms, which had necessarily eroded the property rights of the landed oligarchy, would continue to deepen and threaten the industrial bourgeoisie's private property rights.[67] The Right thus abandoned the PDC as well, and threw their support behind Jorge Alessandri once again. These defections weakened the PDC in the 1970 election, and the party came in third place after Allende and Alessandri.

The opposition to AIFLD among PDC unionists, which will be explored in depth in the following sections, reflects the split in the party that deepened from 1967-1969. The rebel faction was critical of Frei's labor policies, U.S. imperialism, and the system of capitalism as a whole. Christian-Democratic rank-and-file unionists tended to side with this rebel faction. They understood AIFLD as an apparatus of the U.S. imperialist state, and protested against AIFLD projects in Chile accordingly. Furthermore they rejected the idea, present in the Frei Administration's labor relations policies and that of free trade unionism, that militant working class struggle should be subordinated to the needs of capital and the state; that only a politics of class harmony would allow Chilean society to advance on the road to becoming an industrialized democracy in the image of the United States.

The following two sections give examples of PDC unionist opposition to AIFLD, demonstrating how unpopular the Institute was among the working class members from across the political spectrum, including among non-communist workers. In the first example, PDC unionists passed a resolution at their Nacional Congress in 1966 banning party militants from affiliating with international trade union institutions including AIFLD, ORIT,

---

[67] Moulian, *Fracturas*, 228.

and the ICFTU. In the second example, Frei's Minister of Labor William Thayer waffles on the question of whether to support AIFLD's plan to establish a "Chilean Institute of Free Labor Development," due to his anticipation of public backlash against his cooperation with the project of U.S. labor intervention.

1966 PDC Anti-AIFLD Resolution

Recall that when Romualdi met with Frei and Thayer in 1964 to discuss splitting the CUT, he was pursuing a strategy that he had been pursuing since his rendezvous with the anti-communist Ibañez in the 1940s. The Communists in the CUT "are going to make your life miserable," he kept telling Frei during that 1964 meeting.[68] The strategy of splitting the CUT was soon to be formally adopted by the U.S. State Department. In a 1965 confidential memo, U.S. Ambassador to Chile Ralph Dungan lamented that the AIFLD and ORIT programs in Chile had given "less than hoped for results" due to hostility from the CUT and the antipathy of important Christian Democratic labor elements. Dungan agreed with Romualdi that the FRAP-dominated CUT would do nothing but "attempt to thwart and discredit the Frei regime" – and the United States government desperately needed Frei's administration to succeed in order to convince Latin Americans of the viability of capitalism.

"In terms therefore of U.S. and Chilean interests and policies," continued Dungan, "the release of Chilean labor from CUTCh domination must become the main goal of U.S. policy." Despite the difficulties AIFLD and ORIT had faced in Chile, Dungan was optimistic that Chile's Christian Democratic labor unionists were ready to take the big step of gathering "all labor elements in the democratic sector into a new labor federation which will rival and oppose the CUTCh." The ambassador was prepared to place the resources of the U.S.

---

[68] Romualdi, Serafino, *Presidents & Peons: Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America*, 336.

Embassy in Chile behind this project to the fullest extent– "utilizing both overt and covert tactics".[69]

The PDC did effectively withdraw from participation in the CUT at the Confederation's National Congress in May of 1965.[70] But Dungan's optimism that PDC trade unionists were ready to ally themselves with international free trade unionism turned out to be misplaced. At the PDC's second national congress in August of 1966, PDC representatives voted to pass a resolution calling for party militants to publicly disaffiliate from AIFLD and other non-Latin American international trade union organizations including the ICFTU, ORIT, the ITSs, and the Soviet-aligned WFTU.[71] AIFLD and U.S. State Department officials were stunned, and spent the following months figuring out how to respond. To them it was obvious that the resolution was aimed at U.S. labor activities in Latin America by those in the PDC who viewed organizations like AIFLD as an arm of U.S. imperialism.[72] State Department officials worried that the resolution "raised the specter of USG activities in labor in Chile being circumscribed more than they already were."[73]

In early October, top State Department and AIFLD officials gathered to figure out what was to be done. The discussion surrounded whether to denounce the resolution, or instead pursue a low-key response and hope that the anti-AIFLD sentiment would blow over and that the resolution would ultimately be ignored. Embassy officials argued for the latter

---

[69] Memorandum, "US policy with regard to Chilean organized labor," 1965, RG 59, Bureau of Interamerican Affairs, Records Related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 6, NARA II.
[70] Stallings, *Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1958–1973*, 104.
[71] "AIFLD Administrator's Weekly Report No. 31," 16 September 1966, RG18–007, Series 5, Box 17, Folder 16, George Meany Memorial AFL-CIO Archive (GMMA), University of Maryland, College Park, MD.
[72] Information Memorandum, "Your Meeting with AFL-CIO Representatives on Wednesday, October 5," 5 October 1966, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 7, National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, MD.
[73] Arthur Shankle to Rudy Fimbres, 23 September 1966, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 7, NARA II.

option– they pointed out that the PDC had passed a similar resolution three years prior which was never really put into effect.[74] Andrew McLellan, the Inter-American Representative for the AFL-CIO, expressed his concern that the anti-AIFLD sentiment would spread to other Latin American countries.[75] It was clear to him that Christian Democratic labor leaders were "being instructed" to work more closely with Christian labor movements to counter U.S. labor– instructed by whom, he did not say.[76] Others worried that PDC leaders were looking towards establishing a hemispheric labor movement modeled after Peron's corporatist model for government-labor relations– a model which rivaled North American free trade unionism.[77]

All agreed that despite clear opposition from some PDC political leaders, President Frei remained an important ally for U.S. labor interests in Chile. AIFLD Chile Program Director Michael Boggs claimed that President Frei had personally called him on the phone to express his disappointment in his own party's decision (although the Communist reporter Eduardo Labarca retorted in his book that this phone call likely only occurred in Bogg's imagination).[78] Ambassador Dungan as well received assurance from the Frei government that the resolution wouldn't cause AIFLD any difficulties. Whether or not Frei had called Boggs, and whether or not Frei was correct that AIFLD wouldn't encounter any difficulties resulting from the resolution, Frei had consistently affirmed his commitment to promoting

---

[74] Information Memorandum, "Your Meeting with AFL-CIO Representatives on Wednesday, October 5," 5 October 1966, RG 59.
[75] Memorandum of Conversation, "Views of AFL-CIO on International Labor Resolution of Chilean Christian Democratic Party Congress," 5 October 1966, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 7, NARA II.
[76] Information Memorandum, "Your Meeting with AFL-CIO Representatives on Wednesday, October 5," 5 October 1966, RG 59.
[77] Memorandum of Conversation, "Views of AFL-CIO on International Labor Resolution of Chilean Christian Democratic Party Congress," 5 October 1966, RG 59. For more information about the international influence of Argentina's trade union model, see Semán, *Ambassadors of the Working Class*.
[78] Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 147.

free trade unionism in Chile's labor movement.[79] Embassy officials argued that picking a public fight against the resolution would only harden anti-U.S. positions in Chile, lessening Frei's ability to have the resolution ignored.[80]

AIFLD and the Embassy agreed to adopt a "wait and see attitude" towards the resolution in the hopes that PDC leaders and local unions would disregard it and continue to cooperate with AIFLD, ORIT, and the ITSs.[81] Rather than direct confrontation with the Party, the Embassy would offer "friendly council" to the Chilean Government in the form of letters from the International Transportation Workers trade secretariat and the ICFTU indicating the seriousness of the situation and the importance of having the Party ignore the resolution.[82]

Initially, it seemed that this approach would bear positive results. In November of the same year, the resolution was violated twice by PDC members. First, PDC Senator Tomás Pablo Elorza, who had presided over the party congress which had passed the resolution, gave a passionate speech at an ORIT seminar held in Talcahuano.[83] Then, CONAZU, a national confederation made up of white- and blue-collar workers in the private sugar refinery industry, ratified a proposal submitted by a PDC deputy to formally affiliate with ORIT at their national congress. AIFLD was present at the CONAZU congress as well. The Institute had organized a workshop for congress delegates, one course of which was led by

---

[79] Memorandum of Conversation, "Views of AFL-CIO on International Labor Resolution of Chilean Christian Democratic Party Congress," 5 October 1966, RG 59.
[80] Information Memorandum, "Your Meeting with AFL-CIO Representatives on Wednesday, October 5," 5 October 1966, RG 59.
[81] Information Memorandum, "Your Meeting with AFL-CIO Representatives on Wednesday, October 5," 5 October 1966, RG 59.
[82] Memorandum of Conversation, "Views of AFL-CIO on International Labor Resolution of Chilean Christian Democratic Party Congress," 5 October 1966, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 7, NARA II.
[83] Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 148.

PDC parliamentarian Hector Valenzuela Valderrama.[84] In other words, at least some PDC militants with connections to AIFLD had chosen to ignore the resolution, just as the Embassy had hoped they would.

However other factions of the party remained resolute in their conviction to curb AIFLD and ORIT's ability to operate in Chile. Pressure from PDC leaders forced several ORIT-organized education seminars and courses to be indefinitely postponed as a result of the resolution.[85] An internal AIFLD program assessment in 1971 acknowledged that the PDC position against international affiliation quite effectively "hindered democratic international cooperation," contributing to AIFLD's overall inability to gain a significant foothold among Chilean organized labor.[86] It is certainly true that AIFLD still had some "trade union friends" left in Chile, and most were affiliated with the PDC and the center-left Partido Radical.[87] But anti-AIFLD sentiment within the PDC was significant. Although it was ignored by influential party leaders, the PDC's 1966 anti-AIFLD resolution clearly reflected a growing conflict within the PDC about how the party should relate to AIFLD and, by extension, U.S. interventionist activities in the country, and this conflict would continue to cause problems for AIFLD's operations in Chile.

Chileanization of AIFLD

In the early months of 1965, AIFLD-Chile and State Department officials had entered into talks with the Frei administration about the possibility of establishing a "Chilean

---

[84] Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, 140–41.
[85] Arturo Jauregui to Eduardo Frei, Confidential Memo, 21 October 1966. RG18, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 8, GMMA.
[86] American Institute for Free Labor Development, "Country Labor Plans 1971 and 1972," Section on Chile, p. 6. Box 30, AR 2003-0075, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Unprocessed Collections, GMMA.
[87] American Institute for Free Labor Development, "Country Labor Plans 1971 and 1972," Section on Chile, p. 6. Box 30, AR 2003-0075, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Unprocessed Collections, GMMA.

Institute of Free Labor Development." The new institute would be financed by AIFLD through USAID, and would essentially carry out AIFLD-Chile's current educational activities on a larger scale by securing greater participation and buy-in from Chilean unionists. This plan was not unique to Chile—in most Latin American countries in which AIFLD operated, the AFL-CIO attempted to established a national institute that directly sponsored education seminars, with AIFLD maintaining the key roles of "supervision, control of finances, and, most important, planning."[88]

In the Chilean context, AIFLD nicknamed the plan (still in preliminary stages) to establish a national institute the "Chileanization of AIFLD," which was a play on the Frei administration's "chileanization of copper" plan to buy majority shares of foreign-owned copper mines in Chile.[89] President Frei's Minister of Labor William Thayer served as the main point of contact for the plan. The Minister had previously been on AIFLD's Board of Directors, but he reluctantly resigned from the Board when he was appointed minister. His resignation was in accordance with Circular Number 22 of the PDC's Labor Department, which had been a precursor to the 1966 anti-AIFLD resolution in its declaration that PDC militancy was incompatible with cooperation with foreign labor organizations.[90]

Thayer was a mighty believer in free trade unionism, as well as AIFLD's central mission of spreading its union model to Latin America. In his 1968 book *Trabajo, Empresa, y Revolución* he stressed the politics of class harmony rather than class struggle, and argued that the correct role of unions in society is to focus on economic rather than ideological

---

[88] American Institute for Free Labor Development, "Country Labor Plans 1971 and 1972," Section on Chile, p. 11. Box 30, AR 2003-0075, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Unprocessed Collections, GMMA.
[89] "Chileanization of AIFLD," 25 March 1965, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 6, NARA II.
[90] Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 147.

questions. Most importantly, he wrote, trade unions should always remain "free" (presumably, this meant "free" from communism).[91] Early in talks with AIFLD and USAID officials for the Chileanization of AIFLD, Thayer was optimistic that establishing a Chilean Institute of Free Labor Development was feasible. However, no matter what Thayer's previous relationship with AIFLD had been– he had been a personal friend of Romualdi, and clearly adhered to the Institute's guiding ideology– it is evident that as time went on, Thayer began to feel uneasy about the political repercussions of continuing to associate with the Institute. Early on in talks with AIFLD and USAID he clearly expressed that did not want to formally sign off on the plan as Labor Minister for fear of public backlash.[92]

Frei had received quite a lot of disapproval from PDC militants when he appointed Thayer as Labor Minister. Approval of Thayer among PDC unionists only continued to decline throughout the Frei administration due to his controversial wage freeze policies meant to curb inflation.[93] Frei and Thayer were therefore faced with enough problems "without stirring up new Party controversies over AIFLD."[94] Furthermore, Frei was at that very moment – April 1965 – attempting to get his Chileanization of copper agreements approved. Thayer thought that "controversy over AIFLD would provide the opposition with a possible charge that as the Frei agreements allegedly began to Chileanize the companies, the imperialist influence began to penetrate the Chilean labor movement through AIFLD."[95] As evidence for this point, the Minister mentioned the "oft-heard charge" that Peter Grace and Charles Brinkerhoff were on the Board of Directors of the AIFLD. In reality, this was

---

[91] Angell, *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile*, 191.
[92] Memorandum of Conversation, "AIFLD Education Program," 28 April 1965, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 6, NARA II.
[93] Angell, *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile*, 190.
[94] Memorandum of Conversation, "AIFLD Education Program," 28 April 1965, RG 59.
[95] Memorandum of Conversation, "AIFLD Education Program," 28 April 1965, RG 59.

not so much a "charge" as a statement of fact– Grace and Brinkerhoff, the presidents of the Kennecott and Anaconda respectively (the two largest copper corporations in Chile) were indeed on AIFLD's Board of Directors throughout the 1960s.[96]

Thayer was thus clearly very conscious of anti-imperialist sentiments growing among the Chilean public and within the ranks of his own party. He offered AIFLD and USAID staffers firm advice: the only way for the plan to succeed would be to carry it out in cooperation with an "existing and respected Chilean organization" through which AIFLD could carry out its programming. Otherwise, Thayer advised, the resulting institute "would be quickly and publicly revealed as an AIFLD creation." He suggested that AIFLD approach the University of Chile, or the Catholic University of Valparaiso, to discuss the possibility of working with them on the project.[97]

At the very moment that Thayer suggested that working with a Chilean university would be the best way to chileanize AIFLD, however, an international scandal was brewing involving the alleged infiltration of Chilean universities by U.S. government agencies: that of the ill-fated Project Camelot. Project Camelot, conceived in 1963, was a wide-reaching sociological study involving the United States' leading behavioral scientists. Its objective was to "determine the feasibility of developing a general social systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the developing nations of the world."[98] The project was funded by the Special Operations Research Organization (SORO), an institution loosely affiliated with American University

---

[96] Minutes of Annual Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the American Institute for Free Labor Development, 4 May 1970, RG18–007, Series 5, Box 17, Folder 18, GMMA.
[97] Memorandum of Conversation, "AIFLD Education Program," 28 April 1965, RG 59.
[98] Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot: Studies in the Relationship between Social Science and Practical Politics*, Rev. ed (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1974), 4.

that carried out scientific research for the U.S. Department of Defense. Project Camelot was to carry out comprehensive, multi-phase studies in twelve Third World countries.[99] Ironically, Chile was not one of the countries to be studied. However when Chilean expat Hugo Nutini, a contractor for the project, tried promoting Camelot among Chilean scholars by telling them that it was financed by the National Science Foundation rather than the U.S. military, some of his colleagues became suspicious. When they learned Camelot's true source of funding, they went to the Chilean Senate and the left-wing Chilean press with the information.[100]

On the morning of June 12, 1965, the front-page headline of the Communist Party daily paper *El Siglo* read "Yankees study invasion of Chile." The news spread like wildfire, fueled primarily by three small left-wing news outlets– *El Siglo*, the Socialist-affiliated *Ultima Hora*, and the left Christian Democratic *Clarin*.[101] Pro-Christian Democratic government and left wing opposition journalists alike agreed that the project "was intended to investigate the military and political situation prevailing in Chile and to determine the possibility of an anti-democratic coup."[102] In July, the Chilean Congress held a special session to investigate the Project. Chilean politicians from across the political spectrum — the Socialists, the Communists, and even the conservative Radicals — took to the floor to denounce the egregious instance of Yankee imperialist infiltration and surveillance in Chile. Even the notoriously reactionary paper *El Mercurio* used words like "espionage" to describe the affair.[103] U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara canceled the project on July 8, but the scandal remained at the center of public debate in Chile from the time it broke until

---

[99] Horowitz, 11.
[100] Horowitz, 13.
[101] Juan José Navarro, "Cold War in Latin America: The Camelot Project (1964–1965) and the Political and Academic Reactions of the Chilean Left," *Comparative Sociology* 10, no. 5 (2011): 816, https://doi.org/10.1163/156913311X599089.
[102] Horowitz, *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot*, 14.
[103] Horowitz, 88.

December of that year.[104] It remained a symbol in Chilean anti-imperialist discourse for years afterward: Project Camelot became the subject of jokes among young Chilean intellectuals; to call a situation akin to "Plan Camelot" was to denounce it as a case of imperialist American espionage.[105]

It is undeniable that Frei and Thayer had Project Camelot at the front of their minds when "Chileanization of AIFLD" talks continued into late 1965 and 1966. It was in April of 1965 that Thayer had first proposed the possibility that AIFLD could work with a Chilean university to grant the project some legitimacy in the eyes of the Chilean public. His proposal had come two months before the Camelot scandal erupted. In the aftermath of Camelot, affiliation with a Chilean university would only have heightened the public's suspicion of AIFLD as a tool of U.S. soft power imperialism.

Left-wing Chileans certainly did not believe that the failure of Project Camelot meant the end of all imperialist infiltration in Chile via the country's academic institutions.[106] In his wildly popular book *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a la Intromisión Extranjera*, which was published in 1968 and sold out within 28 days of publication, the Communist journalist Eduardo Labarca Goddard detailed both Project Camelot and the academic exchange program funded by USAID which developed between University of Chile and the Cornell School of Industrial and Labor Relations between 1961 and 1965.[107] While Labarca also meticulously examined AIFLD's interventionist activities in Chile, he did not quite make the connection that the educational program developed from the collaboration between Cornell

---

[104] Horowitz, 16; Navarro, "Cold War in Latin America," 816.
[105] Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 110; Horowitz, *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot*, 23.
[106] Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 249.
[107] Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, 254–55.

and Chile's major university was directly put into practice at AIFLD's Front Royal Institute.[108] If AIFLD were to have succeeded in its Chileanization plan through the universities, the case would most certainly have been detailed in Labarca's chapter on U.S. infiltration through Chilean academia, "*Una Elite Estratégica*."

In addition to the post-Project Camelot climate, the anti-AIFLD PDC resolution of August 1966 only served to make matters worse for AIFLD's chileanization plans. Following the resolution, State Department officials began to sense that Thayer believed AIFLD was becoming "a political burden" to him personally. Even worse, Thayer was becoming pessimistic that Chileans would ever be on board with the idea of establishing an institute in Chile publicly identified as being controlled and funded by AIFLD.[109] Besides all this, Thayer's public image was poor regardless of his associations with the AFL-CIO. He was in fact removed from his position as Minister of Labor due to his unpopularity among workers toward the end of Frei's administration.[110]

The plan for the Chileanization of AIFLD in collaboration with the universities was scrapped by the end of 1967.[111] Instead, AIFLD would expand their programming by working with a Chilean Institute for Union Education formed by Chile's "democratic" unions. AIFLD was to have complete control of the funds and a final say in the programming offered. The U.S. Embassy approved of the plans, but even this plan never came to fruition. Chile's "hostile environment," as described in a 1971 AIFLD report and labor plan, meant that AIFLD was never able to establish a domestic "Chilean entity," as it had in other Latin American

---

[108] Stern, "US Labor Intervention in Latin America," 517, 522.
[109] Information Memorandum, "Your Meeting with AFL-CIO Representatives on Wednesday, October 5," 5 October 1966, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 7, NARA II.
[110] Angell, *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile*, 204.
[111] "The American Institute for Free Labor Development Country Labor Plan for Chile FY 1968," March 1967, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 7, NARA II.

countries.[112] The educational programs that AIFLD *was* able to carry out in the following years was severely limited due to resistance towards what Chilean workers viewed as imperialist labor infiltration. AIFLD was forced to limit the content of its seminars to technical material rather than more ideological or political content: "democratic philosophy was hinted at […] but Communism could not be directly attacked, since AIFLD would be intruding on internal political matters."[113]

While ultimately AIFLD found a way to carry out limited programming in Chile, the failure of the original plan under a presidential administration sympathetic to AIFLD's goals was emblematic of the enormous rift that had grown between the Frei Administration and the Chilean working class, including workers affiliated with the PDC. The increasingly intense anti-imperialist sentiment brewing among the Chilean populace– even within the PDC– had limited ability of AIFLD's friends in the top echelons of the PDC to assist the Institute in its Chilean operations.

Conclusion

The unification of the Chilean labor movement through the formation of the CUT in 1953 had been a remarkable feat. In the decades prior to its founding, the Chilean labor movement was plagued by state repression, left wing political rivalries, and seemingly irreconcilable divisions. By the 1960s, Chilean unionization rates rivaled– and by some measures surpassed– those in the industrialized United States.[114] Almost all Chilean

---

[112] American Institute for Free Labor Development, "Country Labor Plans for the Southern Region, 1972-1976," Section on Chile, p 11, Box 30, AR 2003-0075, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Unprocessed Collections, GMMA.
[113] American Institute for Free Labor Development, "Country Labor Plans for the Southern Region, 1972-1976," Section on Chile, p 11-12, Box 30, AR 2003-0075, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Unprocessed Collections, GMMA.
[114] Angell finds exact unionization rates in Chile to be very hard to calculate due to inconsistencies in the reported numbers used for this purpose. Stallings writes that "when we look at union membership as a percentage of blue-

unionists were united under the CUT. The AFL-CIO's activities throughout the 50s, 60s, and 70s aimed to split the Chilean labor movement, dominated by Chile's Communist and Socialist parties. To achieve this goal, ORIT and AIFLD funneled resources towards anti-Communist labor leaders and orchestrated plans to found "free trade union" confederations that could rival the CUT. A key component of these plans was targeting labor unionists in the PDC. While the PDC did indeed leave the CUT for a period of time in the 1960s, there was always sizable opposition among party unionists to the idea of embracing ORIT and AIFLD. The multiple attempts to split the CUT never succeeded, and rival union confederations never gained much influence.

Under the Frei Administration, AIFLD hoped to take advantage of a sympathetic presidential administration and expand in-country programming by establishing a new "Chilean Institute for Free Labor Development." This plan, as well as AIFLD's continual efforts to split the CUT, were never successful as a process of radicalization among the working class continued to deepen under Frei. The working class increasingly opposed imperialist intervention into national politics and the ideology of free trade unionism. This opposition grew so strong among Chilean workers that the Frei Administration was forced to limit its working relationship with AIFLD in a broader attempt to save his administration from political ruin.

A 1967 letter to the editor published in Chile's right-wing daily *El Mercurio* asked: "Why is it that free trade unionism has not had an official following in Chile, while the CUT,

---

and white-collar workers, Angell's figure increases from 30 percent to over 40 percent; it would be much higher if only those who could legally join unions were included." Angell, *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile*, 40–41.

associated with revolutionary Marxism, has been treated with such unjustified favor?"[115] This chapter has sought to answer this question, showing the extent to which the Chilean working class rejected the AFL-CIO's project in Chile by exploring how and why even the more ideologically conservative, non-communist Chilean workers affiliated with Christian Democracy opposed the AFL-CIO's imperialist labor intervention and politics of free trade unionism.

By the end of the 1960s, the Chilean working class had achieved a level of class consciousness that came into direct conflict with the AFL-CIO's ideology of free trade unionism and its project in Chile. Rank-and-file Christian-Democratic workers were part of this process of radicalization, and thus rejected the AFL-CIO's activities in Chile. Where the AFL-CIO worked closely with the State Department and the CIA to directly influence Chilean labor politics, the Chilean working class rejected imperialist intervention in all its forms. Where the AFL-CIO's representatives encouraged Chilean workers to abandon the CUT and form a rival "democratic" labor union based on the principles of free trade unionism, the Chilean working class favored unity under the left-dominated CUT. Where the AFL-CIO promoted the ideology of free trade unionism, in which labor was to be a passive constituent managed by capital and the state, Chilean workers embraced a socialist project in which the working class was to be the vanguard of a political process bringing forth radical changes to Chilean society under the Unidad Popular coalition.

---

[115] "Sindicalismo Político y Sindicalismo Libre," El Mercurio, (Santiago de Chile), 23 February 1967. "Qué justifica, pues, que el sindicalismo libre no haya tenido audiencia oficial en Chile, mientras que la CUT, asociada al marxismo revolucionario, haya sido tratada con tan injustificado favor?"

CHAPTER 2: CHILEAN MARITIME LABOR AND THE AFL-CIO

Introduction

This chapter examines the AFL-CIO's relationship with Chile's organized maritime labor movement. As I have argued, the AFL-CIO found Chile to be a uniquely difficult country in which to carry out programming. The AFL-CIO struggled to find and maintain strong allies in the Chilean labor movement even among more politically conservative labor unionists, such as those affiliated with the Christian Democratic Party. However, Chile's maritime labor sector stands out as an exception to this general rule. Scholars, journalists, and other observers of Chilean labor politics have long acknowledged the exceptionally close relationship between Chile's national maritime union, COMACH, and U.S. organized labor.[1] This chapter asks why and how Chile's maritime labor sector came to be AIFLD's most reliable collaborator in Chile. To answer this question this chapter first follows the trajectory of the maritime labor leader and ally of the AFL-CIO Wenceslao Moreno Ávila, who came up in the Valparaíso stevedore labor movement. It then also examines the historical structure and organization of the stevedore labor movement, a sector within the broader national maritime movement that was particularly receptive to the ideals of free trade unionism, and whose leadership embraced the coup d'etat against the Unidad Popular government on September 11, 1973.

Wenceslao Moreno Ávila was a legendary and controversial figure in the history of Chilean labor politics who worked closely with the AFL-CIO throughout the 1960s and early

---

[1] See for example Angell, *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile*; Fred Hirsch, "The Labour Movement: Penetration Point for U.S. Intelligence and Transnationals," in *The CIA and the Labour Movement* (Spokesman Books, 1977), 7–48; Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*; McKenzie and Dunne, *El Golpe*; Pancho Justo, "La Rebelión de Los 'Medios Pollos,'" *Punto Final* 6, no. 142 (October 26, 1971): 30–32.

1970s. I show that AIFLD fostered a mutually beneficial relationship with Moreno, an ally with whom AIFLD could develop in-country seminars, development projects funded by AIFLD grants and loans, and trips for maritime labor leaders to the Front Royal free trade union institute. Moreno, meanwhile, leveraged his access to these resources to maintain his position as a high-ranking maritime labor leader through arrangements of political patronage. Both the AFL-CIO and the State Department recognized Moreno as an indispensable ally to their joint project of free trade unionism in Latin America. In this chapter I document how the AFL-CIO's international project both enabled and benefited from Moreno's dominance as a stevedore labor leader throughout the 1960s.

Moreno was an unusual leader in the Chilean labor movement in that he was an anti-communist who championed bread-and-butter-style union politics and worked closely with U.S. government and labor institutions, whereas most other Chilean labor leaders during the 20th century held communist or socialist, explicitly anti-imperialist, political orientations (a fact that was consistently lamented internally by AFL-CIO and State Department officials).[2] According to Chilean maritime historian Camilo Santibañez Rebolledo, Moreno's dominance in the Chilean labor movement, despite his uncharacteristic labor politics, is best understood within the context of the hierarchical nature of the stevedore labor sector.[3] In this labor sector, prior to the 1980s, workers were organized into a hierarchical structure maintained by the labor unions themselves in which unionized workers, who occupied the top of the hierarchy, directly exploited non-unionized workers through an informal yet entrenched

[2] American Institute for Free Labor Development, "Country Labor Plans for the Southern Region, 1972-1976," Section on Chile, pp. 5-13. Box 30, AR 2003-0075, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Unprocessed Collections, GMMA.
[3] Camilo Santibáñez Rebolledo, Conversation with Author, 12 April 2023.

subcontracting system called "*los medios pollos.*"[4] I elaborate on Santibáñez's claim by showing that the hierarchical structure of the stevedore labor movement helps explain not just Moreno's leadership in this sector, but also the stevedore labor movement's embrace of free trade union ideology, which Moreno espoused. Through an examination of this labor sector's structure, I show how the logic of free trade unionism was compatible with a labor sector in which a powerful minority of workers in a critical industry directly benefited from the super-exploitation of an underclass of workers. Stevedore union gains were concentrated into the hands of an elite stratum of workers who were reluctant to give up the class-collaborationist politics that had effectively won them handsome pay and benefits, as well as a myth of meritocracy that justified their place in the stevedore hierarchy. Free trade unionism accommodated these considerations, while the socialist labor politics of the Unidad Popular did not, instead calling for a politics of class struggle and radical social equity.

This chapter makes two main historiographical contributions. First, it contributes to the historiography on the AFL-CIO's free trade unionist project in Latin America, and specifically in Chile, by considering a rare case in which a section of Chilean workers actually embraced this project. While others have identified the close relationship between the AFL-CIO and Chile's maritime union movement in the past, this is the first investigation to consider in depth how and why this relationship occurred. Second, this chapter sheds light on the stevedore union movement's relationship with the Unidad Popular government and the coup d'etat which overthrew it on September 11, 1973, a topic on which there is currently little research.[5] Researchers studying the Unidad Popular period have long been interested

---

[4] Camilo Santibáñez Rebolledo, "'La clase más baja del sindicato': nota de investigación sobre los pincheros en el puerto de Valparaíso (1967-1981)," *Revista de Estudios Marítimos y Sociales* 13, no. 17 (July 2020).
[5] Santibáñez touches on the Unidad Popular period and the coup in "La clase más baja del sindicato," an article analyzing a memoir written by a low-ranking Valparaíso port worker writing on his experiences as a worker in

in cases in which workers, white-collar employees, and professionals opposed the Allende government and carried out work stoppages to undermine it. These have included the famous Trucker's "Strike" of 1972 and the copper miners' strike of April 1973.[6] This chapter examines a different case in which workers seemingly, and in fact overtly, embraced the Unidad Popular government, but ultimately supported the 1973 coup d'etat ousting Allende and placing Pinochet in power.

This chapter examines the trajectory of Chile's maritime labor movement in the 1960s and 1970s, with special emphasis given to the stevedore labor movement, which was the most influential labor sector within the greater maritime industry. It follows the AFL-CIO's relationship with the maritime labor movement, and particularly with Wenceslao Moreno Ávila, through the eyes of AIFLD administrators, U.S. State Department officials, and maritime workers themselves. In doing so, this chapter demonstrates why the Chilean stevedore labor movement, through its national federation FEMACH, was the most reliable

---

the late 20th century. In *Estiba y Desestiba*, Aguirre González compiles oral histories of port workers with a short chapter on this period, "Relatos sobre la Unidad Popular, Dictadura Militar y las transformaciones en el puerto (1973-1981)."

[6] The October 1972 work stoppage was organized by employers' guilds, led by the Truck Owners Confederation, in a concerted effort to undermine the Unidad Popular government. The initial "employer lockouts" were then joined in solidarity by strike activity from white-collar employees and professionals such as bank employees, lawyers, physicians, merchant marine officers and some students and university professors. The famous "*cordones industrials*" were formed by the Chilean working class as a response to the lockouts. The October 1972 work stoppages encapsulate the much-discussed ideological division between blue collar workers and the middle-class white collar workers, employees and professionals (Smirnow, *The Revolution Disarmed, Chile, 1970-1973*, 65–80.) The April 1973 copper miner strikes were different in that they originated from a section of the working class historically supportive of the left and the Unidad Popular project. These strikes began over a wage dispute between the workers and the state-owned National Copper Corporation. Sergio Bitar argues that these initially economistic grievances were politicized and fomented by political forces opposed to the government, including employer guilds, professional organizations, and the right-wing of the Christian Democratic Party as well as the National Party. The strikes were hugely detrimental to the Chilean national economy and Allende's political legitimacy (Sergio Bitar and Crisóstomo Pizarro, *La caída de Allende y la huelga de El Teniente: lecciones de la historia* (Valparaíso, Chile: Ediciones Universitarias de Valparaíso, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, 2017)). Several authors have detailed the role AIFLD played in supporting both of these anti-Allende actions. See Garcia F., Patricio, *Los Gremios Patronales*; Hirsch, *An Analysis of Our AFL-CIO Role in Latin America or Under the Covers with the CIA*; Haslam, *The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende's Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide*, 130–32; McKenzie and Dunne, *El Golpe*.

collaborator of U.S. labor's anti-communist free trade union project in Chile. This chapter reveals a brief period during the late 1960s and early 70s, coinciding with the rise of the Unidad Popular coalition, which saw various waves of left-wing reform movements looking to unite and democratize the maritime labor movement as a whole; to affiliate all of the national maritime confederation, COMACH, with the CUT; and to disassociate the maritime labor movement from the international anti-communist free trade union movement. Conservative stevedore labor leaders faced strong pressures from below within their own sector, and from leaders across different labor sectors, to move leftward with the majority of the labor movement and to support the Unidad Popular government against domestic and foreign opposition. By September 11, 1973, however, FEMACH was in full support of the coup d'etat which overthrew the presidency of Salvador Allende, and FEMACH labor leaders publicly declared their intention to collaborate with General Pinochet's military regime.[7] This chapter documents how the AFL-CIO's free trade union project in Chile encouraged and validated the stevedore leaders' ultimate decision to join the right-wing opposition by September 1973, thereby contributing to the success of the coup.

"Don Wenche" and the Chilean Stevedore Labor Movement

Wenceslao Moreno Ávila is a controversial yet iconic figure in Chilean labor history, a man shrouded in portworker mythology and remembered as both hero and villain by maritime workers today. Portworkers praise Moreno for the great material gains achieved by their union under his leadership in the 1950s and 60s; they curse him for the role he played in the privatization of Chile's ports under Pinochet's neoliberal reforms as a political

[7] "Editorial," *RECALDA* N. 32 (1973): 1.

appointee of the military regime.[8] Described by one Chilean contemporary as a "short, small," man "with a dark complexion and a very Chilean face," not much information is available about Moreno's early years.[9] The legend of "Don Wenche," as he was known in the ports, says that he came to Valparaíso from the countryside in his youth, "with few social skills, almost illiterate," before coming up as a leader in the local stevedore labor movement.[10] After being elected president in 1946 of the Sindicato Profesional de Estibadores y Desestibadores de Valparaíso, one of the most powerful unions in the country by the mid-20th century, he made a rapid ascent through the ranks of the maritime labor movement. In 1950 he was elected president of the Confederación Marítima de Chile (COMACH), a confederation of maritime labor union federations and locals representing at the time about 30,000 stevedores, bay employees, sailors, merchant navy crewmen and officers, and other maritime workers.[11] Soon after, in 1953, he participated in the founding of the Centro Única de Trabajadores (CUT).[12]

By the mid-20th century, the maritime labor union movement was organized into a federated structure. Maritime-sector labor local unions were craft unions, meaning that workers were organized on the basis of their particular trade rather than by industry. Union locals in a particular trade then federated into a national union federation for that trade– for example, FEMACH, the Federación de Sindicatos de Estibadores y Desestibadores Marítimos de Chile, united stevedore union locals from 27 ports across Chile's coast.[13] Finally, the Confederación Marítima de Chile (COMACH) was a national industry-wide confederation uniting all maritime labor federations, as well as non-federated union locals in the maritime

---

[8] Valentina Leal Román and Carlos Aguirre González, *Estiba y desestiba: trabajos del Valparaíso que fue (1938-1981)*, Colección Historia 3 (Barrio Puerto, Valparaíso: Inubicalistas, 2020), 115–20.
[9] Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 135.
[10] Leal Román and Aguirre González, *Estiba y desestiba*, 115.
[11] Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 134.
[12] Jorge Barría Serón, *Historia de La CUT* (Ediciones Prensa Latinoamericana, 1971), 56.
[13] *RECALDA* N. 30 (January 1973), 6.

industry, across Chile. FEMACH was a particularly powerful federation within COMACH, and the local stevedore labor union from Valparaíso, Chile's largest and most important port, was influential within both the national stevedore federation FEMACH and the national maritime sector-wide confederation COMACH. Wenceslao Moreno was a founding leader of FEMACH in 1960, and served as its first president.[14] He held leadership positions in Valparaíso's stevedore union local, FEMACH, and COMACH throughout the 1950s and 1960s, oftentimes holding elected leadership positions at all levels at once.

According to the Communist journalist Eduardo Labarca Goddard, Moreno achieved his rapid ascent in the maritime labor movement due to vacancies left by labor leaders imprisoned under President Gonzalez Videla's Law for the Defense of Democracy signed in 1948, which heavily repressed Communist labor leaders.[15] No doubt he was also a "shrewd, gut-fighting labor leader" as described by U.S. Labor Attaché Arthur Shankle ("the kind Chile needs more of," in Shankle's opinion), and Moreno's savvy political skills must also have helped him in his rise to power.[16] He was a professed radical under the Radical Party government of González Videla, an ibañista under the populist right-wing Ibáñez presidency, an alessandrista under the conservative Alessandri administration, and entered the Christian Democratic Party just before Frei's election in 1964.[17] He did not, however, become a supporter of the Unidad Popular under Allende's presidency, and instead joined the far-

[14] Eric Allen Andrade, "Breve Reseña Histórica de la Federación de Sindicatos Profesionales de Estibadores de Chile 'FEMACH,'" *RECALDA* N. 32 (1973), 2-4.
[15] Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 134.
[16] Arthur Shankle to Rudy Fimbres, 23 September 1966, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 7, NARA II.
[17] Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 135.; "Wenceslao Moreno Explica Por Qué Renunció al PDC," *La Unión* (31 August 1966).

right Partido Nacional.[18] He was rewarded for his anti-Allende position when he was appointed labor attaché to the Chilean embassy in Washington D.C. under Pinochet.[19]

While his party loyalties may have shifted with every presidential election, Moreno's commitment to the international free trade union movement, once made, remained consistent. Throughout the 1960s and early 70s Moreno held high-ranking positions on all of the major free trade union movement international organizations. Throughout the 1960s and early 70s he served as a board member of the AIFLD, as the vice president of ORIT, on the executive committee of the ICFTU, and as the vice president of the International Transport Worker's Federation trade secretariat (ITF).[20] Under his leadership COMACH collaborated with these free trade union organizations to sponsor national education seminars and international conferences for the national and Latin America maritime labor sector.[21]

As of yet it is unclear when Moreno first made contact with the AFL-CIO and its array of free trade union international organizations.[22] By the early 1960s, however, Moreno was on board with the AFL-CIO and U.S. State Department's plans to split Chilean organized labor on communist/anti-communist lines, and to form a new free trade union confederation in Chile, parallel to the CUT, that would affiliate to the anti-communist ORIT. He remained

---

[18] Pancho Justo, "La Rebelión de Los 'Medios Pollos,'" 30–32.
[19] Embassy of Chile, "The Chilean Cabinet as of September, 1979," RG1-038, Series 4, Box 68, Folder 27, GMMA.
[20] Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 138.
[21] "Informe del Seminario Sindical Internacional de Integración Económica de América Latina," 23 January 1966, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 7, GMMA; Wenceslao Moreno Ávila, "Informe de la Comisión Cumplida por Wenceslao Moreno de Acuerdo a un Convenio entre I.T.F y IADSL," circa 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 12, GMMA.
[22] Moreno's involvement in the founding of CUT in 1953 as a member of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP, Popular Socialist Party) suggests that Moreno was not always the staunch anti-communist he turned out to be later on (Barría Serón, *Historia de La CUT*, 56.) The PSP was a faction that split from Chile's Socialist Party in 1948 due to the PSP's opposition to the anti-communist Ley de Defensa de la Democracia (Angell, *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile*, 99–100.). The PSP thus opposed the anti-communist faction of the party led by Bernardo Ibañez, who was the AFL-CIO's main "democratic labor" ally in Chile during this time (Angell, 265; Romualdi, Serafino, *Presidents & Peons: Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America*, 38, 326.) Moreno's relationship with the AFL-CIO therefore likely developed sometime after 1953.

committed to the AFL-CIO and State Department's "parallel union confederation" plan well into the 1960s. Towards this end he led a failed effort in September 1966 to form the "Consejo Nacional de Confederaciones, Federaciones, y Organizaciones Gremiales de Chile" with a handful of labor unions.[23] While ORIT generally struggled to obtain affiliates from Chile's labor movement, the Moreno-led COMACH was affiliated to ORIT by 1962.[24] A letter from the ORIT Secretary General Arturo Jáuregui to Moreno in July of 1962 assured the labor leader that the ORIT, the ICFTU, and the ITF had always been, and would always be, there for COMACH even through the confederation's "difficult moments."[25] COMACH was part of the plan, which ultimately failed, to break ranks at the August 1962 CUT convention in the event that free trade unions could not control the congress.[26] Serafino Romualdi also entrusted Moreno to select scholarship candidates to attend one of the first Front Royal Institute seminars in the early years of AIFLD.[27] AIFLD and U.S. State Department officials worked closely with Moreno to strategize how to relate to Chilean organized labor. When AIFLD was confronted with resistance from labor unionists affiliated with the Christian Democratic Party under the Frei presidency, Moreno participated in strategy meetings held with AIFLD-Chile officials, and the U.S. Ambassador and his staff.[28]

---

[23] Basilio González Hermosilla, "Informe Sobre la Primera Reunión Constituyente del 'Consejo Nacional de Confederaciones, Federaciones y Organizaciones de Chile,' Realizada el 2 de septiembre de 1966," 5 September 1966, RG 18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 8, GMMA.; Emanuel Boggs to Andrew McLellan, 7 September 1966, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 8, GMMA.

[24] Heriberto R. Berganza, "Informe #26," 24 March 1962, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 2, GMMA.

[25] Arturo Jáuregui to Wenceslao Moreno Ávila, 30 July 1962, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 2, GMMA. ("Deseo reiterarte lo que te expresé en esa occasion en el sentido de que tanto la ORIT como la CIOSL y la ITF continúan prestando toda su valiosa colaboración en todos los asuntos de la COMACH. En todos los momentos dificiles que ha confrontado la COMACH siempre hemos estado presentes.")

[26] Morris Paladino to Arturo Jáuregui, 5 August 1962, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 2, GMMA.

[27] Morris Paladino to Serafino Romualdi, 5 August 1962, RG 18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 2, GMMA.; Serafino Romualdi to Wenceslao Moreno, 17 August 1962, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 2, GMMA.

[28] Rudy Fimbres to Ralph Dungan, 14 June 1966, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records Related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 6, LAB 1 Gen, NARA II; Memorandum of Conversation, "Views of AFL-CIO on International Labor Resolution of Chilean Christian Democratic Party Congress," 5 October 1966, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 7, NARA II.

Yet AIFLD officials kept a careful watch on Moreno's activities– a rumor that he had attended a CUT conference in May 1966, for example, had to be pointedly investigated to ensure his loyalty to the free trade union cause.[29] Furthermore Moreno's faithfulness to free trade unionism did not necessarily ensure allegiance from the rest of the Chilean maritime labor movement. One high-ranking ITS leader warned Inter-American AIFLD Representative Andy McLellan in 1962 not to treat COMACH as the "great, one and only" labor union in Chile, when "the truth is that COMACH collaborates with everyone and affiliates with everything." COMACH's base, he went on to say, was more in line with CUT than with ORIT; if ORIT failed to implement measures enforcing unity and discipline from the confederation, COMACH would be controlled by communists in the long run.[30] The Chilean maritime labor movement was thus far from secure, and neither was Moreno's leadership. When the Antofagasta COMACH affiliate boycotted an anti-CUT labor conference organized by Moreno in early 1963, U.S. Labor Attaché Thomas Walsh wrote that "many of the COMACH locals are slowly being invaded by [communist types] which is steadily weakening Wenceslao Moreno's control and will eventually topple him."[31]

The warning that Moreno's leadership within COMACH could give way to communist leadership came to pass less than a decade later. Moreno's decline as a labor leader was due in part to a high-profile scandal in which Moreno was involved, as well as a widespread

---

[29] Emanuel Boggs to Andrew McLellan, 7 September 1966, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 8, GMMA. Moreno claimed he did not attend the CUT Conference, but sent an informer to provide him with a first-hand report on the event.

[30] José Fregoso to Andrew McLellan, 20 September 1962, RG 18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 2, GMMA. ("La ORIT equivocadamente sigue su política de considerar que lo único y grande de Chile es la COMACH, pero la verdad es que COMACH juega con todos y está afiliada con todos, pero las bases de COMACH, están más con la CUTCH que con la ORIT y a la larga la COMACH será controlada por los comunistas, si la ORIT no aplica medidas de unidad y orientación a esta organización, como de disciplina orgánica.")

[31] Thomas Walsh to Andrew McLellan, 11 March 1963, RG 18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 3, GMMA. Note that the letter from Walsh to McLellan is dated March 18, 1962, but the letter was filed in a folder for 1963, and context clues confirm the letter was written in 1963.

rejection of the free trade union principles Moreno espoused. In 1971 under the Allende presidency, COMACH underwent a reformation led by communist leadership, described by contemporaries as the "birth" of a "new COMACH."[32] While COMACH and FEMACH both saw attempts to radicalize and democratize the organization of their labor sectors, these processes were not allowed to reach completion. FEMACH in particular was unable to overcome the hierarchical organizational structure in which union members directly benefited from the hyper-exploitation of non-unionized portworkers, a system called "*los medios pollos*." Come Pinochet's coup d'etat on September 11, 1973, not only did FEMACH leaders embrace the coup; some evidence suggests they helped carry it out.[33]

The Stevedores and Free Trade Unionism

Moreno embraced the guiding principles of free trade unionism not only as an actor within the international free trade union movement, but also in his activities as a labor leader for the Chilean maritime movement. These principles held that labor and management should work together at the bargaining table for the mutual benefit of both, and that labor leaders should focus on bread-and-butter gains for union members rather than on broader political and social questions. Moreno boasted of his "very cordial" relationship with the Cámara Marítima de Chile, the major business interest group representing maritime capital interests in Chile.[34] In recent oral histories, workers describe the "apolitical," "unionist" nature of Moreno's politics, concerned only with the interests of the workers he represented.[35]

---

[32] American Institute for Free Labor Development, "Country Labor Plans for the Southern Region, 1972-1976," Section on Chile, p. 6, Box 30, AR 2003-0075, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Unprocessed Collections, GMMA.
[33] Hirsch, "The Labour Movement: Penetration Point for U.S. Intelligence and Transnationals," 31; Spalding, Hobart Jr., "U.S. Labour Intervention in Latin America: The Case of the American Institute for Free Labour Development (AIFLD)," 150, 159; McKenzie and Dunne, *El Golpe*, 43–46.
[34] Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 135.
[35] Leal Román and Aguirre González, *Estiba y desestiba*, 118–19.

In his own words, Moreno was "nothing more than a syndicalist and my politics are the politics that have been freely-embraced by the workers, which is why [...] I have rejected all political or sectarian intervention that might harm the sacred interests of the workers."[36]

Given the critical importance of port workers within the economy of Chile– a nation with 4000 miles of coast relying heavily on foreign imports of manufactured and agricultural goods[37]– Moreno's method of forgoing class struggle in favor of labor-management collaboration managed to secure great gains for members of Chile's stevedore unions. A single day of work stoppage by all 31 of Chile's ports could rack up an estimated loss of $40,000 in profits in 1968 USD.[38] By 1972, shortly after Moreno's decline as a union leader, the material gains of Chile's national stevedore union federation, FEMACH, included fair workplace compensation, retirement at 55 years of age, generous time off, education funds for the families of stevedores, guaranteed income despite fluctuations due to the market and the weather, and high wages relative to the rest of the Chilean working class.[39] Today, stevedore unionists of Moreno's era remember "Don Wenche" as having "dignified" the port workers through these material gains won by the union, as well as through the magnificent union headquarters he built in Valparaíso, furnished with a grand marble staircase, a library dedicated to the late U.S. President John F. Kennedy, and a dental clinic (the financing for the building of this hall, we shall see, became the subject of a great crisis involving AIFLD

---

[36] Wenceslao Moreno to Arturo Jáuregui, 5 September 1966, RG 18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 8, GMMA. ("Durante toda mi vida he sido nada más que sindicalista y mi política es la política de los trabajadores libremente adoptadas, por eso, con la misma lealtad que siempre he demostrado en defensa de nuestra noble causa, he rechazado toda intromisión partidista o sectaria en perjuicio a los sagrados intereses de los trabajadores.")
[37] Alberto E. Valdés, "Trade Policy and Its Effect on the External Agricultural Trade of Chile 1945–1965," *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 55, no. 2 (May 1973): 154–64, https://doi.org/10.2307/1238432.
[38] Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 135.
[39] *Así Trabajo Yo*, vol. 18, "Nosotros Los Chilenos," Como Trabajamos (Santiago de Chile: Quimantú, 1972), 28.; "Editorial," *RECALDA* N.29 (November 1972); 1; *RECALDA* N. 32 (1973): 2-4.

and the U.S. State Department in the late 1960s).[40] Workers also remember Moreno for having "given knowledge" to unionists by organizing union training seminars (these seminars were sponsored by AIFLD and the ITF trade secretariat).[41] However there was also a darker side to the collaborationist, "bread and butter" approach dominant in stevedore union politics: not all workers who labored loading and unloading cargo in Chile's ports–the work of the stevedore–could enjoy the benefits won by the union.

"*Los Medios Pollos*" and the Maritime Aristocracy of Labor in Chile

The Chilean stevedore labor sector was organized into a highly hierarchical structure. This hierarchy was ironically the result of concessions from the Cámara Marítima granting labor, not management, the daily responsibility of allocating employment opportunities in the ports to workers, a process called "*la nombrada*" (the naming).[42] Since the number of workers needed fluctuated daily according to the nature and volume of the cargo on any particular ship, stevedore unions used a rigid system of seniority called "*la matricula*" to allocate workers to job openings. This system stratified the labor sector into three groups.

At the top of the hierarchy were the "*matriculados*" (matriculated workers).[43] *Matriculados* were always selected first by default in *la nombrada*. In the port of Valparaíso, Chile's largest and most important port, this group was made up of only about 350 workers in 1972.[44] Next were the "*suplentes*," (substitute workers), who were junior members of the union, considered "trainees" under the *matriculados*. Most *suplentes* could hope to become *matriculados* after working for a period of about five or six years. In the year 1972, there

---

[40] Leal Román and Aguirre González, *Estiba y desestiba*, 115–16.
[41] Leal Román and Aguirre González, 116.
[42] *Así Trabajo Yo*.
[43] These were also sometimes known as the "*titulados*" (titled workers) or the "*trabajadores de planta*" (plant workers).
[44] *Así Trabajo Yo*.

were about 120 *suplentes* associated with the Valparaíso union.[45] At the bottom of the hierarchy were the "*pincheros,*" workers whose labor was subcontracted on a daily basis by the *matriculados* themselves under a system known as the "*medios pollos*," (half chickens). Through this system, *matriculados* directly hired *pincheros* during particularly busy days at the port, remunerating them with half or a fourth of the *matriculado*'s own day's wages. While the number of *pincheros* working in Valparaíso's ports in 1972 is unknown, one worker estimated that nationally there were 19,000 *pincheros* working in the late 1960s, compared to 3,500 *matriculados* and 2,500 *suplentes*.[46] A portion of the wages earned by both the *suplentes* and the *pincheros* went to stevedore union dues. However while *matriculados* were full union members, and *suplentes* enjoyed a junior non-voting status in the union, *pincheros* did not have official status in the union, and thus did not enjoy any benefits won by the union.[47] The life and work of the *pincheros* was highly unstable and precarious due to daily informal contracts and low wages paid in cash, and dangerous due to the fact that they were generally assigned the most treacherous duties by their stevedore-employers.[48] *Pincheros* generally came from extremely impoverished backgrounds, many coming to work at the ports around the age of 15 to support their families.[49]

The *medios pollos* system was infamous in Chile for maintaining an exploitative hierarchy among Chile's port workers. Stories abound of *matriculados*, particularly those more senior, subcontracting *pincheros* for a day and spending the day themselves relaxing at

---

[45] *Así Trabajo Yo*.
[46] Santibáñez Rebolledo, "'La clase más baja del sindicato': nota de investigación sobre los pincheros en el puerto de Valparaíso (1967-1981)," 104.
[47] Pancho Justo, "La Rebelión de Los 'Medios Pollos,'" 32; Santibáñez Rebolledo, "'La clase más baja del sindicato': nota de investigación sobre los pincheros en el puerto de Valparaíso (1967-1981)," 106.
[48] Pancho Justo, "La Rebelión de Los 'Medios Pollos.'"
[49] Leal Román and Aguirre González, *Estiba y desestiba*, 96.

home or eating barbeque on the beach, while keeping half or more of the day's wages.[50] Workers have attested that those tapped for promotion through the ranks from *pinchero* to *suplente* to *matriculado* were friends and family of other *matriculado* workers–without the right connections, a *pinchero* worker was doomed to remain one.[51] The hierarchical structure of the sector allowed union leadership to stay in power by leveraging loyalties forged through allowing or denying workers' passage through the ranks.[52] Union leadership could also collect a greater amount of dues for the union by denying *pincheros* future work if they refused to hand over a portion (or all) of their wages as dues.[53] Even without some of the more corrupt practices that took place within this system, *matriculado* workers inherently benefited from *pinchero* labor by accruing union benefits (such as retirement) from the labor done by both them and their *pinchero* subcontractors, while *pincheros* were left only with a meager wage.[54]

Thus Chile's *matriculado* stevedores were so well-off, and their union so powerful, precisely because of the hierarchical craft guild-like system that resulted in a huge share of maritime profits–extracted from the labor of *matriculado* and non-*matriculado* port workers alike–going to a small minority of workers who had reached *matriculado* status. I argue that the existence of this hierarchical structure explains why free trade union ideology gained its strongest foothold in the Chilean stevedore labor sector, while failing to make lasting inroads in other sections of the Chilean labor movement. Two complementary reasons help to explain

---

[50] Pancho Justo, "La Rebelión de Los 'Medios Pollos,'" 31; Leal Román and Aguirre González, *Estiba y desestiba*, 101, 128.
[51] Leal Román and Aguirre González, *Estiba y desestiba*, 98–100; Santibáñez Rebolledo, "'La clase más baja del sindicato': nota de investigación sobre los pincheros en el puerto de Valparaíso (1967-1981)," 104.
[52] Santibáñez Rebolledo, "'La clase más baja del sindicato': nota de investigación sobre los pincheros en el puerto de Valparaíso (1967-1981)," 104–5; Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 135; Leal Román and Aguirre González, *Estiba y desestiba*, 96–101.
[53] Santibáñez Rebolledo, "'La clase más baja del sindicato': nota de investigación sobre los pincheros en el puerto de Valparaíso (1967-1981)," 105.
[54] Leal Román and Aguirre González, *Estiba y desestiba*, 101.

the Chilean maritime labor sector's propensity to accept the AFL-CIO's free trade union project.

The first of these is the personal relationship that the AFL-CIO fostered with the powerful labor leader Wenceslao Moreno Ávila, an ally with whom AIFLD could develop in-country seminars, development projects funded by AIFLD grants and loans, and trips for maritime labor leaders to the Front Royal free trade union institute. Moreno, meanwhile, leveraged his access to these resources to maintain his position as a high-ranking maritime labor leader.[55] Both the AFL-CIO and the State Department recognized Moreno as an indispensable ally to their joint project of free trade unionism in Latin America. This was true to such an extent that the U.S. State Department concerned itself with securing $50,000 USD in financing for Moreno when he was unable to obtain a Chilean state loan previously promised to his union to build a new headquarters building after being sanctioned by the Christian Democratic Party in 1966.[56]

The second reason that the Chilean stevedore labor movement were predisposed to embrace free trade unionism has to do with the structure of this labor sector itself. The logic of free trade unionism was compatible with a labor sector in which a powerful minority of workers in a critical industry directly profited from the super-exploitation of an underclass of workers, the *pincheros*. Free trade unionism's contention that organized labor and capital could mutually benefit from a system of collaboration rather than class struggle rang true in a labor sector in which only a small number of workers reaped the benefits of shared profits

---

[55] Morris Paladino to Serafino Romualdi, 5 August 1962, RG 18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 2, GMMA.; Serafino Romualdi to Wenceslao Moreno, 17 August 1962, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 2, GMMA.
[56] Memorandum of Conversation, "Views of AFL-CIO on International Labor Resolution of Chilean Christian Democratic Party Congress," 5 October 1966, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 7, NARA II.

with capital, even though these profits were extracted overwhelmingly from the labor of non-*matriculado* workers who did not benefit from union gains. In other words, the material gains for which the stevedore unions bargained were concentrated into the hands of a small stratum of elite workers in the industry; and maritime capitalists were more than happy to collaborate with the stevedore labor unions to grant this elite stratum handsome pay and benefits if it meant that labor and capital could both benefit from the labor of the super-exploitated *pincheros*.

Moreover, free trade unionism's argument that unions should focus on material, bread-and-butter gains for union members only, rather than on broader social and political issues, was agreeable to *matriculado* workers who felt entitled to their share of union gains within a union framework that naturalized their position at the top of the union hierarchy as a reward for years of hard work rising through the ranks from *pinchero* to *suplente* to *matriculado*. It was not just that the *matriculado* workers had achieved the "good life" under capitalism and were reluctant to give it up for the unknowns that a socialist government might usher in, or the sacrifices it might exact; it was also that the *matriculados* had very much internalized a meritocratic worldview that justified their place at the top, and were unconvinced by calls to democratize their labor sector. [57]

Moreno's relationship with the AFL-CIO did further the project of free trade unionism in Chile. But only by considering the nature of the stevedore sector can we understand both Moreno's leadership within the sector, as Santibáñez argues, and the sector's general embrace of free trade union ideology—a fact that had profound consequences on September

[57] Oral histories of retired stevedores espousing this view can be found in Leal Román and Aguirre González, *Estiba y desestiba*, 96–106.

11, 1973 and the years that followed. This chapter follows Moreno, the AFL-CIO and the State Department, and the stevedores in the years leading up to that day.

Don Wenche's Leadership Under Frei: 1964-1970

The Maritime Labor Headquarters on Calle Goñi

One of the things Moreno is best remembered for by port workers was his project of building the magnificent maritime union headquarters in Valparaíso. Moreno first began to pursue this project as the leader of COMACH in the early 60s. While it was originally a COMACH project, ownership of the project was not always transparent–the building was variously referred to as the headquarters of the COMACH, the FEMACH, and the Valparaíso local stevedores' union. Moreno dominated all three organizations for most of the 1960s, but it is likely that as his leadership positions in each of these organizations began to waver in the late 60s, so too did clarity around which organization actually owned the project. Even the institutions financing the loans needed to construct the building–including the AFL-CIO and the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF)–were unclear on which of these three organizations was the actual recipient of their loans.[58]

COMACH purchased its headquarters building, an old building on Calle Goñi in Valparaíso's Barrio Puerto, sometime before the early months of 1963.[59] The project of rehabilitation began in 1964, and the first stage of the project was completed in July of 1966.[60]

---

[58] Memo from Robert O'Neill to Andrew McClellan, 3 September 1971, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 15, GMMA; Andrew McLellan to Lester Spielman, 30 April 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 11, GMMA; Andrew McLellan to Wenceslao Moreno, 12 August 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 12, GMMA.

[59] Having been unable to obtain a loan from the Interamerican Development Bank, Moreno wrote to Andrew McLellan, the Interamerican Representative of the AFL-CIO asking for money to fund the rehabilitation of the building: "the only hope we have is in are friends, which are you." (Wenceslao Moreno to Andrew McLellan, 14 May 1963, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 4, GMMA). It is unclear if the AFL-CIO fulfilled this particular request.

[60] "Statement on Free Trade Union situation in Chile," circa 1966, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 8, GMMA.

The project was considered "the first of its kind in Latin America" by AIFLD staffers, "providing individual lockers for each union member, showers, a restaurant serving meals at cost 24 hours per day, and medical and dental clinics serving members and their families," a theater, an assembly hall, classrooms (where AIFLD seminars were held), an aquarium, a library, and a state-of-the-art radio transmitter.[61]

Figure 2, Maritime Union headquarters at Calle Goñi 49, Valparaíso. (Source: Leal Román and Aguirre González, Estiba y desestiba, p 117).

In attendance at the inauguration of the building in late July 1966 was a range of national Chilean and local porteño politicians– including the Christian Democratic President of Chile Eduardo Frei and Minister of Labor William Thayer – as well as a crew of free trade union leaders of the Chilean labor movement, and high-ranking representatives of the ORIT

[61] "Statement on Free Trade Union situation in Chile," circa 1966, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 8, GMMA; Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 136–37.

and AIFLD.[62] A welcome speech by Moreno was followed by a speech by the President of the Cámara Marítima de Chile, which had donated $300,000 Escudos for the project– reflecting the labor-management collaboration championed by free trade unionists.[63] After a ceremonial blessing of the John F. Kennedy Library, generously funded by a $7000 grant from the AFL-CIO, AIFLD Director William Doherty gave an additional speech.[64] Moreno, having joined the Christian Democratic Party on the eve of Eduardo Frei's presidential election victory in 1964, invited Frei to deliver the headline speech.[65] In it Frei underscored the importance of "the separation of political and unionist functions," which according to an AIFLD internal report, gave "encouraging support for the goals of AIFLD in Chile [...] where the unions have long been tightly enmeshed in the political parties and vice versa."[66]

Moreno assured the attendees that this was only the first stage of the project. The second stage would entail the construction of the "Institute for Trade Union Education," a concept inspired by AIFLD's trade union education seminars.[67] However, funds to continue construction were running dry. Earlier in the month of July, Moreno had approached President Frei asking to borrow money from the Chilean state-owned Central Bank and was

---

[62] Basilio González Hermosilla, "Informe de las actividades cumplidas con motivo de la visita del compañero Arturo Juáregui Hurtado," 31 July 1966, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 7, GMMA.
[63] English Translation of *El Mercurio* article, "The Government's Policy: To enlarge and make economic life more dynamic," 31 July, 1966, RG18-007, Series 5, Box 17, Folder 1, GMMA.
[64] "The American Institute for Free Labor Development Country Labor Plan for Chile FY 1968," March 1967, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 7, NARA II; Basilio González Hermosilla, "Informe de las actividades cumplidas con motivo de la visita del compañero Arturo Juáregui Hurtado," 31 July 1966, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 7, GMMA. Note that while one AIFLD memo claims that only $2000 was given for the library, another more definitive report states that $7000 was given for the library alone (compare Thomas Cooke, "Recent Speech of President Frei at the Inauguration of the headquarters of the Maritime Union," 22 August 1966, RG18-007, Series 5, Box 17, Folder 1, GMMA and "The American Institute for Free Labor Development Country Labor Plan for Chile FY 1968," March 1967, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 7, NARA II).
[65] Moreno explains that he joined the PDC just before the 1964 election in "Wenceslao Moreno Explica Por Qué Renunció al PDC," *La Unión* (31 August 1966).
[66] Thomas Cooke, "Recent Speech of President Frei at the Inauruation of the headquarters of the Maritime Union," 22 August 1966, RG18-007, Series 5, Box 17, Folder 1, GMMA.
[67] English Translation of El Mercurio article, "The Government's Policy: To enlarge and make economic life more dynamic," 31 July, 1966, RG18-007, Series 5, Box 17, Folder 1, GMMA.

promised a 10-year loan at 5% interest. Everything seemed to be going according to plan, until the Christian Democratic Party passed the 1966 resolution calling for all party militants to publicly disaffiliate from AIFLD and other non-Latin American international trade union organizations including the ICFTU, ORIT, and the ITSs.[68]

The Christian Democrats Sanction Moreno

Moreno, as a board member of the AIFLD, ORIT, and the ITF, was exactly the kind of person the crafters of the 1966 resolution must have had in mind when introducing it to the PDC national congress. On August 31, the national paper *La Unión* published Moreno's open letter to President of the PDC, Patricio Aylwin, declaring his resignation from the Party.[69] In it he proclaimed his loyalty to President Frei over the Party, and lamented that his life as a labor leader "has been dedicated to the defense of liberty," yet "for this permanent position I have exposed myself to slander and vilification."[70] President Frei and Minister of Labor Thayer, both disturbed by and opposed to the resolution, personally urged Moreno to withdraw his resignation, and each of them vowed to personally intervene to prevent enforcement of the resolution in the Party, but Moreno remained resolute in his decision to resign.[71]

Moreno's construction project for the maritime union headquarters, however, had to go on. When he inquired about the loan he was promised by Frei, the Central Bank informed him that his rate had increased from 5% to 19% and that it was to be repaid in a single year

---

[68] "AIFLD Administrator's Weekly Report No. 31," 16 September 1966, RG18–007, Series 5, Box 17, Folder 16, GMMA.
[69] La Union article: "Wenceslao Moreno Explica Por Qué Renunció al PDC," La Unión (31 August 1966).
[70] Wencelsao Moreno to Patricio Aylwin, 30 August 1966, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 8, GMMA. ("Mi vida como dirigente sindical ha sido de una mantenida linea de defensa de la libertad—por mi permanente posición me he expuesto a ser calumniado y vilipendiado.")
[71] "Statement on Free Trade Union situation in Chile," circa 1966, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 8, GMMA; Wencelsao Moreno to William Doherty, 2 September 1966, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 8, GMMA.

rather than ten.[72] PDC party president Aylwin, in accordance with the 1966 PDC resolution, had personally instructed the state Central Bank not to extend Moreno the low interest loan originally arranged informally with President Frei.[73] Moreno would have to obtain financing elsewhere. He thus turned to the AFL-CIO to ask not just for a loan, but for assistance in getting the PDC to drop the sanctions against him. With this goal in mind Moreno planned a trip to Washington D.C. to secure the loan and convince President Meany himself to meet with Chilean Ambassador Rodomiro Tomic to get him to urge the Party to renounce the resolution.[74]

When informed of Moreno's resignation following the passing of the PDC resolution, ORIT and AIFLD had praised Moreno for "standing firm on the side of free trade union principles–that political parties should not dominate labor movements."[75] AIFLD regarded the resolution as an act of sanction against Moreno and COMACH in general, and a "serious threat to democratic trade unionists."[76] Yet answering Moreno's call for help with the political fallout he suffered as a result of the resolution was not as simple as getting approval from Moreno's old friends in AIFLD. The U.S. Embassy in Chile was closely monitoring the situation around the PDC resolution and working directly with AIFLD-Chile to determine

---

[72] "Statement on Free Trade Union situation in Chile," circa 1966, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 8, GMMA.
[73] Memorandum of Conversation, "Views of AFL-CIO on International Labor Resolution of Chilean Christian Democratic Party Congress," 5 October 1966, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 7, NARA II.
[74] Arthur Shankle, "Conversation with Wenceslao Moreno, Secretary General of COMACH," 23 September 1966, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 7, NARA II.
[75] William Doherty, "Christian Democratic Party Action- Chile," 8 September 1966, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 8, GMMA; Arturo Juáregui to Wenceslao Moreno, 6 September 1966, RG 18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 8, GMMA.
[76] "Statement on Free Trade Union situation in Chile," circa 1966, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 8, GMMA; William Doherty, "Christian Democratic Party Action- Chile," 8 September 1966, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 8, GMMA.

how to respond, and not everyone at the embassy agreed on whether intervening in the internal affairs of the PDC would be politically prudent.

The U.S. Government Labor Attaché to Chile at the time, Arthur Shankle, expressed the Embassy's doubts on the advisability of having "non-Chileans" interject into the issue by confronting Ambassador Tomic. Shankle suspected that Moreno was looking to take advantage of this situation given that his base in COMACH was becoming "less than secure."[77] Recall from a previous chapter that at this time, AIFLD was looking to establish a new "Chilean Institute for Free Labor Development," a plan whose viability was suddenly thrown into doubt following the PDC resolution. With Moreno playing a significant role in the planning of the new institute, Shankle suspected that "from [Moreno's] point of view, an open fight with the Party over his role in labor affairs and over the Institute might provide him with AFL-CIO and ORIT commitments that would ensure his primacy in whatever new Institute is formed."[78] Moreno, he warned, may be attempting to "[exert] more influence than his stature in Chilean labor circles would warrant."[79] Moreno and Tomic, Shankle concluded, should deal with the situation "Chilean to Chilean."[80]

However the loan was another matter, and after more than a month of deliberation through personal conversations, strategy meetings, internal memos, and correspondence, the U.S. Embassy recommended that Moreno's request for a loan be granted. The Embassy held

---

[77] Arthur Shankle, "Conversation with Wenceslao Moreno, Secretary General of COMACH," 23 September 1966, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 7, NARA II. The Communist journalist Eduardo Labarca concurred with this perspective, claiming that Moreno was "taking advantage" of the PDC resolution to acquire large sums of money from international free labor ("Moreno aprovechó el acuerdo del PDC para efectuar nuevas gestiones internacional de alto nivel financiero," Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 139.).
[78] Arthur Shankle, "Conversation with Wenceslao Moreno, Secretary General of COMACH," 23 September 1966, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 7, NARA II.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid.

a meeting with key players from the State Department, the AFL-CIO, and Moreno on October 5, 1966, to discuss what was ultimately to be done about the PDC resolution situation.[81] Here Moreno gave an "impassioned account" of the political maneuverings that led to the adoption of the resolution, of the way he was being persecuted by the PDC and the Central Bank, and of his resignation from the PDC "to demonstrate dramatically that COMACH could not tolerate efforts within the PDC and of imperialist Marxism to undermine free labor in Chile."[82]

Ambassador Ralph Dungan himself then recommended squaring away Moreno's immediate practical problem of the loan.[83] At Ambassador Dungan's request, the AFL-CIO Executive Council approved a $25,000 loan for COMACH on November 17, 1966, with the idea that the International Transport Workers Federation trade secretariat (ITF) would issue a matching loan to supply the remainder of the required funds.[84] Four days later the ITF approved a $28,000 loan for COMACH.[85] Answering calls from their brother in the free trade union movement Wenceslao Moreno, several U.S. labor unions affiliated to the ITF had

---

[81] In attendance were Lincoln Gordon, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Interamerican Affairs; U.S. Ambassador to Chile Ralph Dungan; Jay Lovetone, AFL-CIO International Affairs Director and arch-anti-communist "cold warrior"; Andrew McLellan, AFL-CIO Inter-American Representative; William Doherty, AIFLD Director; Emmanuel Boggs, AIFLD Representative in Chile; and Wenceslao Moreno. The presence of top-ranking leaders from the AFL-CIO and the State Department emphasizes the seriousness with which these institutions took the handling of this crisis.

[82] Memorandum of Conversation, "Views of AFL-CIO on International Labor Resolution of Chilean Christian Democratic Party Congress," 5 October 1966, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 7, NARA II.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Translation of cables exchanged between Andrew McLellan and Wenceslao Moreno, November 1966, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 8, GMMA

[85] Translation of cables exchanged between Andrew McLellan and Wenceslao Moreno, November 1966, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 8, GMMA; Thomas Walsh, "COMACH," 25 November 1966, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records Related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 7, Folder LAB 3-3 Int'l Labor Orgs. Chile 1966, NARA II.

issued resolutions and written letters condemning the "repression of trade union liberty" and expressing their support for the granting of loans by the AFL-CIO and the ITF.[86]

International free labor came through for Moreno, their trusted ally in the Chilean labor movement, when he came under attack due to his loyalty to the international free trade union movement. But, as Shankle had noted in his analysis of the PDC's sanctions against Moreno, Moreno's base in COMACH was becoming "less than secure."[87] Unfortunately for the AFL-CIO and the ITF, Moreno's decline in the Chilean maritime labor movement caused headaches when it came time for the loans–totaling over $50,000–to be repaid.

Moreno's Decline

Moreno's decline is correlated with the process of increasingly rapid radicalization that the Chilean working class as a whole underwent in the late 1960s and early 70s, culminating in the Unidad Popular government. Critiques of Moreno from within the stevedores' federation FEMACH and the maritime labor confederation COMACH expressed a broader desire to democratize the labor sector and unite with the rest of the Chilean working class under the CUT, anathema to Moreno's free trade union loyalties.

Challenges to Moreno's leadership cropped up every so often throughout the 1960s, and at an increased rate towards the end of the decade.[88] At a national COMACH congress held in 1967, Moreno faced what he called the "biggest political scandal in the history of the

---

[86] Morris Paladino Memorandum to Andrew McLellan, 10 November 1966, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 8, GMMA. See also Donald S. Beattie to George Meany, 10 November 1966, RG1-038, Series 4, Box 68, Folder 26, GMMA; Memorandum of Conversation, "Views of AFL-CIO on International Labor Resolution of Chilean Christian Democratic Party Congress," 5 October 1966, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 7, NARA II; Wenceslao Moreno to Morris Paladino, 26 October 1966, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 8, GMMA.

[87] Arthur Shankle, "Conversation with Wenceslao Moreno, Secretary General of COMACH," 23 September 1966, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 7, NARA II.

[88] For example, when a publication of the Chilean bay employees published a piece slandering Moreno in May 1967 (Wenceslao Moreno Ávila, "Informe del 11 Congreso Nacional de COMACH," 8 May 1967, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 9, GMMA.)

confederation" when delegates from the left wing of the PDC, the Socialist Party, and the Communist Party formed a pact to "destroy Wenceslao Moreno."[89] For the first time, COMACH's "morenista" leaders were left in a minority position within COMACH's steering committee.[90] Moreno was able to just barely hold onto the presidency at this congress' elections, but U.S. labor attaché Shankle still described the "FRAP advance" within the COMACH as "serious" (to make matters worse, COMACH was due to make its first loan payment to the AFL-CIO and the ITF in March 1968, and Shankle was worried FRAP leadership would dismiss these debts).[91] The insurgents also managed to pass a statute declaring "absolute independence" internationally, a resolution mirroring the 1966 PDC resolution in rejecting international free trade union organizations.[92]

Meanwhile in the stevedores' federation FEMACH, resentment began to build over the course of the 1960s against the Valparaíso local's outsized influence on FEMACH's steering committee. In August 1968 this call came to a head when a special congress was called to oust Moreno and other "morenistas" from leadership.[93] Half of FEMACH affiliates withheld dues from the federation for a period of time, causing financial problems.[94] Another common complaint among the maritime workers criticized Moreno's control over who in the maritime labor movement could gain access to AFL-CIO-sponsored seminars and international trips.[95]

---

[89] Wenceslao Moreno, "Informe del Congreso Extraordinario del COMACH," 13 October 1967, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 9, GMMA.
[90] Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 2nd ed. (Empresa Editora Austral, 1969), 168.
[91] Arthur Shankle, "Brief Analysis Recent L.A. Labor Events," 19 October 1967, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records Related to Chile 1957-1975, Box 6, Folder LABOR 1. GENERAL, NARA II.
[92] Wenceslao Moreno, "Informe del Congreso Extraordinario del COMACH," 13 October 1967, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 9, GMMA.
[93] Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 168.
[94] Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, 168.
[95] Mario Rodríguez Contreras to George Meany, 27 August 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 12.

In 1969, by which time Moreno's decline seemed inevitable, he was accused by two fellow stevedores of embezzling 200,000 Escudos in union funds, a scandal which would twice lead to warrants for his arrest.[96] Lester Spielman, the U.S. labor attaché who replaced Arthur Shankle in 1967, first alerted the AFL-CIO of the accusations in a personal letter to AFL-CIO International Affairs Director Jay Lovestone. The Communist journalist Eduardo Labarca had published a piece on February 20, 1969 detailing the accusations, and according to Spielman, even pro-Moreno Chilean workers affiliated with the ORIT confirmed the story's veracity.[97] The accusations not only put Moreno's career as a Chilean labor leader at risk–it also threatened his place in the international free trade union movement. Spielman, in his personal letter to Lovestone, warned that AIFLD "might be making a serious mistake by backing Moreno" if he were to lose his union post. "I understand," he wrote, "the loyalty which the labor movement has towards those who stick by them in times of need but Moreno, it seems to me, is an unreliable character who seems to have sticky fingers"– reminding Lovestone that Moreno had not in the past been "adverse to digging into AIFLD funds" for his own use.[98]

When AFL-CIO Interamerican Representative Andrew McLellan learned of the scandal, his first concern was naturally with the fate of the $25,000 COMACH loan, and whether or not it would ever be repaid.[99] Moreno wrote to McLellan a few days later making no mention of the embezzlement accusations, but rather complaining that he had been

---

[96] "Dictan orden de detención contra Wenceslao Moreno," El Siglo, 23 July 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 11, GMMA; "Arrest of Portworker Leaders: Follow-Up," American Embassy Santiago confidential telegram, 2 March 1971, RG 59, 1970-1973 Subject Numeric Files, Entry 1613-D, Box 1394, Folder LAB CHILE, NARA II.
[97] Lester Spielman to Jay Lovestone, 25 February 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 11, GMMA; Eduardo Labarca, "Acusan a Wenceslao Moreno por Fraude de E. 200 mil," *El Siglo*, 20 February 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 11, GMMA.
[98] Lester Spielman to Jay Lovestone, 25 February 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 11, GMMA.
[99] Andrew McLellan to Lester Spielman, 4 March 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 11, GMMA.

accused by the Communists and the Christian Democrats of being a CIA agent representing U.S. interests in Chile.[100] "Not a single person has come out in my defense," he bemoaned before vowing to leave Chilean labor politics, and asking McLellan for a job at the AFL-CIO.[101] He made the same request for a job from the AIFLD, ORIT, and the ITF, through separate letters to each.[102] The AFL-CIO was unwilling to extend Moreno a job at least until the loan repayment was settled– the second loan payment, due in March of 1969, had not yet been made, and by the end of April there was no indication that payment was forthcoming.[103]

Meanwhile, legal proceedings surrounding Moreno's fraud accusations dragged on through May and June. Moreno believed that the case against him had either been dropped or postponed, when in late July the criminal court issued a warrant for his arrest.[104] On July 24 the right-wing newspaper *El Mercurio*, never one to give up a chance to expose labor's faults, reported that the money Moreno had allegedly stolen had suddenly reappeared right after the accusation was made–for which *El Mercurio* called him a "consummate wizard" and "Mandrake Moreno."[105] When Spielman traveled to Valparaiso on the 29th to check in on Moreno, he was told by three different people that Don Wenche had taken a trip up north, that he had fled the country, and that he was hiding in Santiago.[106] "Why 'Wenche' should hide to avoid the trial is beyond me since he claims that no money is missing," Spielman quipped sarcastically in a letter to McLellan.[107] McLellan replied that at least the second

---

[100] Wenceslao Moreno to Andrew McLellan, 28 March 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 12, GMMA.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Andrew McLellan to Lester Spielman, 30 April 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 11, GMMA.
[103] Ibid.
[104] "Dictan orden de detención contra Wenceslao Moreno," *El Siglo*, 23 July 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 11, GMMA; *El Mercurio*, 26 July 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 11, GMMA; Andrew McLellan to Lester Spielman, 14 August 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 11, GMMA.
[105] *El Mercurio*, 26 July 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 11, GMMA.
[106] Lester Spielman to Andrew McLellan, 28 July 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 11, GMMA.
[107] Lester Spielman to Andrew McLellan, 28 July 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 11, GMMA.

installment on the loan had been issued in early July.[108] The charges against Moreno did eventually drop (for a period of time) but not without further tarnishing Moreno's standing as a maritime labor leader. The charges would resurface again under the Unidad Popular government.

Chilean Maritime Labor under the Unidad Popular: 1970-1973

AIFLD Re-strategizes under Allende

The AFL-CIO and its AIFLD-Chile office did not favor Allende's victory in the 1970 presidential election. The ideological reasons for this are obvious, but AIFLD-Chile had practical reasons as well for opposing the victory of a socialist government. The Institute had already suffered many obstacles under a sympathetic presidency (detailed in the previous chapter) and AIFLD and State Department officials expected that U.S. labor programs would only encounter more resistance from unionists and governing politicians under the Unidad Popular, and that AIFLD might even be asked to cease operations.[109] In the early days of Allende's presidency, discussions took place within the State Department about how to proceed. The option of shutting down AIFLD-Chile was considered but rejected. AIFLD was far too important to the State Department's objectives in Chile: it had the potential to serve U.S. interests under Allende by maintaining close ties with, and strengthening, Chile's non-Marxist labor leaders.[110]

In order to ensure its survival in the country, AIFLD would not cease operations but rather modify them. It would not resume in-country seminars, which had ceased in

---

[108] Andrew McLellan to Lester Spielman, 14 August 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 11, GMMA.
[109] "AIFLD in Chile," joint State/AID confidential telegram, 13 January 1971, RG 59, 1970-1973 Subject Numeric Files, Box 1411, NARA II.
[110] "AIFLD in Chile," joint State/AID confidential telegram, 13 January 1971, RG 59.

anticipation of the contentious election. Instead, the Institute would concentrate on international training programs, "selecting labor leaders of radical, socialist, and PDC orientation" (but not communists) for 30-day union-to-union programs with U.S. trade unions, Front Royal courses, and attendance at the ORIT Institute located in Mexico. (It would also carry out covert operations, mainly through its allied network of free trade union ITSs.)[111] AIFLD's immediate objectives under the Unidad Popular were twofold: 1. to fortify and preserve the position of "democratic" (non-Marxist) labor leaders, concentrating on major sectors such as mining and seaports, and 2. to isolate "extremist" trade union leaders and "create [an] atmosphere for coalitions to resist government domination of the labor movement," encouraging opposition leaders to unite against the government.[112]

Chilean maritime labor had been considered a part of the Chilean "democratic labor movement" by the AFL-CIO and the State Department for many years. As the beginning of this chapter has shown, the leadership of Wenceslao Moreno Ávila, and his personal

---

[111] AIFLD facilitated "non-attributed funding for International Trade Secretariat [ITS] Seminars in Chile." ("AIFLD in Chile," joint State/AID telegram, 13 January 1971, RG 59, 1970-1973 Subject Numeric Files, Entry 1613-D, Box 1411, NARA II; emphasis added.). This activity was deliberately not disclosed to the Government of Chile. As others have written, AIFLD routinely shifted educational programming to the International Trade Secretariats when the political context of a country had grown too hostile for normal operations to continue. The international makeup of the ITSs lent them plausible deniability that they were not controlled by U.S. labor, while their lack of financial transparency as private multinational corporations made it possible for U.S. agents to utilize the ITSs as conduits for covert intervention in the Third World. As confirmed by ex-CIA agent Philip Agee in his 1975 memoir, the ITSs were not only mechanisms by which AIFLD could continue to carry out its anti-communist activities covertly; they were also mechanisms through which the CIA could more effectively penetrate the labor movement [Agee, *Inside the Company*, 112.] The ITS were especially important in Chile. The AIFLD Country Labor Plan for Chile in 1969 stated that since "a democratic national confederation does not exist, it is highly and mutually advantageous to organize as many activities as possible in conjunction with the ITS. This has been done in the past and certainly will continue" (American Institute for Free Labor Development, "Regional and Country Labor Plans, CY 1969," Section on Chile, Box 30, AR 2003-0075, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Unprocessed Collections, GMMA). For more on AIFLD's covert action through the ITS, see Spalding, Hobart Jr., "U.S. and Latin American Labor: The Dynamics of Imperialist Control," *Latin American Perspectives* 3, no. 1 (January 1976): 45–69, https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X7600300104; Spalding, Hobart Jr., "U.S. Labour Intervention in Latin America: The Case of the American Institute for Free Labour Development (AIFLD)."

[112] American Institute for Free Labor Development, "Country Labor Plans for the Southern Region, 1972-1976," Section on Chile, Box 30, AR 2003-0075, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Unprocessed Collections, GMMA.

relationship with the AFL-CIO's array of free trade union organizations, was a crucial piece keeping this labor sector non-Marxist. Moreno's leadership decline thus directly conflicted with AIFLD's first objective of preserving the leadership positions of non-Marxist labor leaders in Chile.

With the inauguration of the Unidad Popular government in late 1970, the left-wing of the Chilean maritime labor movement strengthened its push to oust the "morenistas" from power, to democratize the labor sector, and unite it with the CUT. The rise of left-wing leadership in the maritime sector forced U.S. State Department and AIFLD to contend with the fact that they had lost their hold on the one labor sector in which they had once held significant influence. Moreno's decline was both a warning that free trade unionism was increasingly being rejected by maritime workers, and also a sign that the AFL-CIO's ability to exert influence in this sector would become increasingly difficult. The latter was most concretely exemplified by the fact that AIFLD had trouble getting new maritime labor leadership to even recognize their debt to the AFL-CIO and the ITF. To counteract this predicament, AIFLD would continue to court leaders in the maritime labor movement throughout the Allende years, namely Martín Bustos who would be elected president of FEMACH in January 1973.

Don Wenche, Discarded

According to a U.S. State Department memo, Moreno had been "the only trade union leader of any stature to declare for Alessandri" in the 1970 presidential election.[113] Although Moreno subsequently endorsed Allende when he won the popular vote, Allende later "stated

[113] "Arrest of Wenceslao Moreno, Ex-Portworkers Chief," American Embassy confidential telegram, 22 February 1971, RG 59, 1970-1973 Subject Numeric Files, Entry 1613-D, Box 1394, Folder LAB CHILE, NARA II.

in public he would have nothing to do with him."[114] The Unidad Popular period was therefore the first time Moreno found himself at odds with the governing administration in his decades as a labor leader. His political failings did not stop there: since Moreno's embezzlement charges were first brought against him, he had failed to be reelected as president of COMACH, FEMACH, and the Valparaíso Stevedores' Local, although he still held a lower-ranking position on the board of Valparaíso's local stevedores' union.[115]

Moreno continued to plead for a job from the AFL-CIO in the U.S.[116] McLellan's excuse for not being able to secure Moreno a job was the high unemployment in the U.S., but in reality the AFL-CIO was beginning to sour on Moreno, both because of his scandal-ridden decline as a maritime labor leader and because of his shadiness around the still-unpaid loan.[117] "Between you and me," wrote AIFLD-Chile Director O'Neill to McLellan, "Wencie sucked us in on the loan," pointing out the way in which Moreno had alternately referred to both COMACH and the local Valparaíso union as beneficiaries of the loan–and the way in which this switch corresponded to his ousting from COMACH leadership, even while he was able to hold onto a low-ranking position on the Valparaíso local stevedore unions' steering committee.[118] McLellan gave O'Neill the order that AIFLD was not to assist Moreno financially until the loan was settled.[119]

Moreno's embezzlement scandal resurfaced in February of 1971, when Moreno and two other high-ranking, non-Marxist COMACH leaders Martín Bustos and Oscar Frías,

---

[114] "Arrest of Wenceslao Moreno, Ex-Portworkers Chief," American Embassy confidential telegram, 22 February 1971, RG 59, 1970-1973 Subject Numeric Files, Entry 1613-D, Box 1394, Folder LAB CHILE, NARA II.
[115] "Arrest of Wenceslao Moreno, Ex-Portworkers Chief," American Embassy confidential telegram, 22 February 1971, RG 59, 1970-1973 Subject Numeric Files, Entry 1613-D, Box 1394, Folder LAB CHILE, NARA II; Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 12 February 1971, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 15, GMMA.
[116] Wenceslao Moreno to Andrew McLellan, 3 November 1970, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 12, GMMA.
[117] Andrew McLellan to Wenceslao Moreno, 20 November 1970, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 12, GMMA.
[118] Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 22 February 1972, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 16, GMMA.
[119] Andrew McLellan to Robert O'Neill, 31 August 1971, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 15, GMMA.

were detained for misappropriation of COMACH funds.[120] The U.S. State Department's analysis of the arrests inferred that the earlier case was reopened at the prodding of the government in an attempt to "discredit old COMACH leadership" at a time when the government was pushing for the "creation of an enlarged COMACH which it hopes to control."[121] This time around, the charges against Moreno, Bustos, and Frias were quickly dropped after the stevedores of Valparaíso–still a "morenista" stronghold–held a one and a half day strike in support of their labor leaders.[122] But the U.S. State Department recommended to AIFLD that getting Moreno out of Chile, as O'Neill had requested in a telephone conversation, would "not serve [the] interests of [the] democratic movement in [the] maritime sector at this time."[123]

The value Moreno personally brought to AIFLD and the U.S. State Department's project of promoting free trade unionism in Chile had been exhausted by mid-1971. But that didn't necessarily mean that the maritime labor movement was destined to be led by communists forever. While a wave of left-wing reform swept through the sector under the Unidad Popular period, the radicalization of the stevedore labor movement in particular remained limited. AIFLD, in the meantime, worked to court labor leaders like Martin Bustos both to pay the loan and to pursue its plan of encouraging opposition to the socialist project of the Unidad Popular in Chile.

---

[120] Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 24 February 1971, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 15, GMMA. Although Bustos ran in the Valparaíso stevedores' local union election as a partisan of the Unidad Popular party, he was an ex-Communist who had been expelled from the Communist Party (Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 14 February 1972, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 16, GMMA).
[121] "Arrest of Wenceslao Moreno, Ex-Portworkers Chief," American Embassy Santiago confidential telegram, 22 February 1971, RG 59, 1970-1973 Subject Numeric Files, Entry 1613-D, Box 1394, Folder LAB CHILE, NARA II.
[122] Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 3 March 1971, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 15, GMMA.
[123] "Arrest of Portworker Leaders: Follow-Up," American Embassy Santiago confidential telegram, 2 March 1971, RG 59, 1970-1973 Subject Numeric Files, Entry 1613-D, Box 1394, Folder LAB CHILE, NARA II.

The Strategic Value of AIFLD's Loans and Grants

Moreno's decline in leadership was troublesome for the AFL-CIO's ability to secure repayment for the headquarters loan. The second and third payments had slowly trickled in to the AFL-CIO months past their deadline.[124] Then, the payments stopped with $17,500 still left in debt of the AFL-CIO.[125] The U.S. Comptroller's Office began pressuring AIFLD to get the loan settled throughout 1971, and despite Moreno's promises that the loan would be liquidated by the end of that year, no payments came.[126] Now that Moreno's leadership position was marginal in the maritime labor movement, AIFLD was having trouble getting newly elected leaders to recognize the loan at all. Martín Bustos, a key leader in the Valparaíso local, FEMACH, and COMACH, had what O'Neill described as a "negative attitude" towards requests to acknowledge the debt, contending that there was "no legal written agreement."[127] Since Moreno had "carried the office in his hat," O'Neill admitted that the new leadership might indeed not have the documentation, and arranged to send copies of the agreements to the local Valparaíso union to convince leadership to pay.[128]

The seriousness with which the AFL-CIO took the repayment of the maritime union loan did not stop at purely financial considerations. Offering loans and grants to Chilean labor unions was one of the key ways that AIFLD exerted influence in the labor movement. Since the U.S. State Department had ordered AIFLD to shut down its in-country educational activities in Chile for fear of its expulsion under Allende, awarding loans and grants was one

---

[124] Andrew McLellan to Wenceslao Moreno, 12 August 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 12, GMMA; Note 8 June 1970, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 11, GMMA.
[125] Andrew McLellan to Robert O'Neill, 31 August 1971, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 15, GMMA.
[126] Andrew McLellan to Robert O'Neill, 31 August 1971, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 15, GMMA; and Andrew McLellan to Robert O'Neill, 23 September 1971, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 15, GMMA.
[127] Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 22 February 1972, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 16, GMMA.
[128] Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 14 February 1972, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 16, GMMA.

of the only overt activities AIFLD was still authorized to do, alongside arranging union-to-union exchange programs and the scholarship program sending Chilean workers to free trade union seminars abroad.[129] As repayment of the maritime union headquarters loan was delayed further and further, AIFLD officials argued over the importance of providing loans to make allies in the free trade union movement in Chile.

Robert O'Neill, as the Director of AIFLD-Chile, felt strongly that grants and loans were essential to AIFLD's project in Chile, pointing to a loan made out to the Bay Workers Union of Talcahuano, whose president was later elected as Vice President of the new COMACH– in other words, AIFLD loans could help buy Chilean union elections.[130] O'Neill often used this sort of tactic. For example, in an attempt to stave off FEMACH's affiliation to CUT in 1971, O'Neill had arranged to have 20,000 metric tons of basic foodstuff distributed among the Valparaíso council of maritime unions on the day before the election. He had arranged the distribution with minimal publicity to keep accusations of Yankee vote-buying at bay, but O'Neill assured McLellan that "the council leaders all knew where it came from."[131]

Andrew McLellan, the AFL-CIO Inter-American Representative based in DC, vehemently disagreed with O'Neill's position on the essential nature of the loans and grants. "If the only way we can maintain contact with democratic unions in Chile is through a loan arrangement," he retorted, "then the contact is worth no more than whatever money is

---

[129] American Institute for Free Labor Development, "Country Labor Plans for the Southern Region, 1972-1976," Section on Chile, pp. 9-13, Box 30, AR 2003-0075, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Unprocessed Collections, GMMA.
[130] Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 17 February 1972, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 16, GMMA.
[131] Quote from Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 19 July 1971, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 15, GMMA. Also see American Institute for Free Labor Development, "Country Labor Plans for the Southern Region, 1972-1976," Section on Chile, p. 7, Box 30, AR 2003-0075, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Unprocessed Collections, GMMA.

involved, and international trade union solidarity cannot be built on such a base."[132] McLellan may have been involved in the AFL-CIO's international projects longer than O'Neill, as he was sure to point out in his letter, but O'Neill was the man dealing with the Chilean labor movement on the ground. O'Neill's understanding of the importance of loans and grants were informed by his daily struggles to maintain AIFLD's influence in the Chilean labor movement. To McLellan's point on the other hand, if AIFLD no longer held enough authority in Chile to get labor unionists to even acknowledge their debts to the AFL-CIO, as was the case with the headquarters loan, clearly the loans were not doing the job.

O'Neill and McLellan at least agreed that the headquarters loan ought to be repaid, and so the AFL-CIO issued sanctions against Moreno and other labor unionists involved in non-payment of the loan. For example, McLellan instructed O'Neill in 1971 that Moreno would not be assisted financially until the loan was repaid;[133] and in late 1972, all COMACH leaders involved in non-payment were barred from attending an AFL-CIO-sponsored conference for Latin American port workers to be held in Lima.[134] (O'Neill and McLellan made an exception for Martín Bustos, slated to become FEMACH's next top leader, with the hopes that he would be more receptive to paying the loan if he *were* to be invited).[135]

In the end there is no evidence that the loan was ever settled under the Unidad Popular government. O'Neill pointed out to McLellan that a March 1972 article clipping on the stevedores' headquarters declared that the stevedores had built the headquarters "with blood sweat and tears," but made no mention of the $50,000 loan from the AFL-CIO and the

---

[132] Andrew McLellan to Robert O'Neill, 24 February 1972, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 16, GMMA.
[133] Andrew McLellan to Robert O'Neill, 31 August 1971, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 15, GMMA.
[134] Andrew McLellan to Robert O'Neill, 13 September 1972, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 16, GMMA.
[135] Packet of Correspondence between Andrew McLellan and Robert O'Neill, September-October 1972, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 16, GMMA.

ITF. "It seems to me," wrote O'Neill, "that we are going to be left 'with the blood, sweat and tears,' while they will be left with the headquarters."[136]

That the AFL-CIO loan was never repaid under the Allende administration reflects the Chilean maritime labor movement's alienation from the AFL-CIO during this time, spurred by Moreno's personal decline and the labor movement's process of radicalization. The following section takes a closer look at this process of radicalization as it relates to the AFL-CIO's free trade union project in Chile, demonstrating how and why the stevedore labor movement was unable to fully effect a left-wing reformation of its sector.

Revolution and Reaction in the Chilean Maritime Labor Movement

COMACH Unity Congress

Towards the end of the Frei administration the resolute anti-CUT stance espoused by Moreno, AIFLD, and the U.S. State Department became increasingly unpopular in the maritime labor movement, as many workers saw the benefits of unifying with the rest of the Chilean labor movement to advance the interests of the national working class. The inauguration of the Unidad Popular government in late 1970 deepened these desires. The question of CUT affiliation debate was so significant across the maritime sector that COMACH split into two briefly in 1969, with one COMACH supporting Moreno, and the other looking to affiliate with the CUT.[137] According to AIFLD Chile Director Robert O'Neill, COMACH actually ceased to exist for a short period of time in the early months of the Allende

[136] "Me parece que nos vamos a quedar 'con la sangre, sudor, y lágrimas,' mientras ellos se quedan con la sede." Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 14 March 1972, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 16, GMMA.
[137] Lester Spielman to Andrew McLellan, 18 December 1969, RG18-001, Series 4, Box 18, Folder 11, GMMA.

presidency.[138] This was likely due to internal political turmoil in the wake of Moreno's high-profile embezzlement scandal and heated debates around CUT affiliation.[139] Eventually the question of affiliation seemed to settle on the side of national working class unity, as by mid-1971, all maritime unions in Chile were either affiliated to the CUT or on the road to affiliation.[140] Union locals could vote to affiliate individually, and so could entire federations. The stevedores' federation FEMACH voted in July 1971 to join the CUT; and even the local Valparaíso stevedores' union, whose president was Moreno, supported the resolution to join.[141]

A "new unitary COMACH," emerged in mid-1971 with Socialist and Communist leadership supporting the new Unidad Popular government.[142] The "rebirth" of COMACH, as it was referred to by unionists and observers, united the whole of the maritime labor movement– stevedores, bay workers, shipyard workers, port workers, sailors, fishermen of the high sea and artisanal fishermen, mercantile employees, crew members, employees of naval corporations, retirees, and other maritime sector workers.[143] Pedro Figueroa, a maritime labor leader and militant of the Communist Party, served as interim president of COMACH leading up to the grand unity congress to be held in December 1971. In an

---

[138] O'Neill wrote in a letter in April 1971, "There are plans for a COMACH Congress, but the outcome is cloudy [...] Right now there is no COMACH." Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 12 April 1971, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 15, GMMA.

[139] I have found little documentary evidence shedding light directly on how the break up and reformation of COMACH took place. However, it is clear that the split took place over the question of CUT affiliation and support for the Unidad Popular government. An editorial in the monthly magazine of the national stevedore federation FEMACH, *RECALDA*, mentions the "absurdly divided" nature of COMACH in June of 1971, and underscores the need to unite the maritime labor movement, but shies away from explaining further, saying "it is not worth" analyzing in depth the reasons for disunity ["Editorial," *RECALDA* N. 16 (June 1971), 1.] In the editorial for the following month in July 1971, *RECALDA* celebrates the "birth" of the new COMACH, gives an explanation for why FEMACH has decided to affiliate with the CUT, and congratulates Allende for his decision to nationalize Chile's copper mines ["Editorial," *RECALDA* N. 17 (July 1971), 1].

[140] *RECALDA* N. 19 (September 1971), 18.

[141] Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 19 July 1971, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 15, GMMA.

[142] Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 24 August 1971, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 15, GMMA.

[143] *RECALDA* N. 19 (September 1971), 18.

interview published in FEMACH's monthly magazine *RECALDA,* Figueroa declared that COMACH must unite with the campesinos, the miners, and all workers and employees of Chile to achieve a "system that dignifies the life and work of all Chileans."[144] Towards this end he called on maritime workers of all sectors to "leave behind small differences and look only towards complete unity" at the upcoming unity congress.[145]

AIFLD and U.S. State Department officials closely monitored the maritime labor movement's rapid leftward shift as COMACH made preparations for its big unity congress.[146] A confidential State Department memo acknowledged the "prospect of Marxist domination of top jobs," and accused the Allende government of mounting to "force" non-Marxist "dissidents into line."[147] "For the first time in many years," wrote U.S. Ambassador Davis, this "important sector [...] may fall under Communist and other far left influence."[148] The State Department and AIFLD were both dismayed to find that COMACH interim president Figueroa had invited two Soviet maritime workers to visit Chile in September 1971, in a program quite similar to AIFLD's union-to-union exchange program.[149] Davis suggested that the AFL-CIO try to secure an invitation to the congress as an international observer "to

---

[144] *RECALDA* N. 17 (July 1971), 20.
[145] *RECALDA* N. 17 (July 1971), 20.
[146] "Labor: Maritime Congress," American Embassy Santiago confidential telegram, 11 November 1971, RG 59, 1970-1973 Subject Numeric Files, Entry 1613-D, Box 1394, Folder LAB CHILE, NARA II.
[147] "Labor: Maritime Congress," American Embassy Santiago confidential telegram, 11 November 1971, RG 59, 1970-1973 Subject Numeric Files, Entry 1613-D, Box 1394, Folder LAB CHILE, NARA II.
[148] "Labor: Maritime Congress," American Embassy Santiago confidential telegram, 11 November 1971, RG 59, 1970-1973 Subject Numeric Files, Entry 1613-D, Box 1394, Folder LAB CHILE, NARA II.
[149] Memo from Robert O'Neill to Andrew McClellan, 3 September 1971, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 15, GMMA; "Labor: Maritime Congress," American Embassy Santiago confidential telegram, 11 November 1971, RG 59, 1970-1973 Subject Numeric Files, Entry 1613-D, Box 1394, Folder LAB CHILE, NARA II. FEMACH later received three U.S. longshoremen workers invited by the former President of the CUT and Minister of Labor Luis Figueroa in late 1972. During the exchange (which to be clear was not arranged through AIFLD) the workers discussed labor systems and organizations, the future of the sector, and other topics on maritime and port labor. According to *RECALDA*, the visit was a positive experience for both the Chilean and their U.S. counterparts, with the U.S. workers reporting that many of the negative perceptions they had had about Chile prior to the trip, for example the notion that Chile was in a constant state of civil war under the Unidad Popular, were demonstrably unfounded. *RECALDA* N. 29 (November 1972), 18.

enable first-hand impressions of Chilean situation."[150] The December 1971 COMACH unity congress was proclaimed a success by maritime workers. *RECALDA*, the monthly magazine of the stevedores' federation FEMACH, wrote in their January 1972 editorial that "at last, after waiting for so long, the unity of the maritime workers of Chile has been realized."[151] AIFLD's O'Neill reported that a Communist was elected president COMACH.[152]

The socialist wave within the maritime labor sector under the Unidad Popular is undeniable. However it does not tell the whole story of the maritime labor movement's relationship with the Unidad Popular and the coup d'etat which overthrew it. Although there was a veritable leftward trend within the maritime labor movement that swept through even some of the most historically conservative parts of the maritime sector, such as the stevedores' union movement, a closer look at this period is warranted to determine how deep this process of radicalization went.

FEMACH under the Unidad Popular

The hierarchical *medios pollos* labor system was deeply rooted in the stevedore labor sector, and I argue that this system predisposed *matriculado* stevedore workers to hold conservative political positions that would naturalize and secure their position at the top of the labor hierarchy. These conservative political positions inherently conflicted with the spirit of national working-class solidarity called for by the Unidad Popular project, and aligned closely with free trade union ideology espoused by the AFL-CIO. An examination of how FEMACH in particular related to the Unidad Popular government reveals only a brief,

---

[150] "Labor: Maritime Congress," American Embassy Santiago confidential telegram, 11 November 1971, RG 59, 1970-1973 Subject Numeric Files, Entry 1613-D, Box 1394, Folder LAB CHILE, NARA II.
[151] *RECALDA* N. 22 (January 1972), 1.
[152] Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 21 March 1972, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 16, GMMA.

wavering support for Chile's socialist project which was totally reversed by the time of the coup d'etat on September 11, 1973.

FEMACH was one of the most influential federations within COMACH through the 1960s and early 70s. Wenceslao Moreno and the other "morenistas," mostly from the Valparaíso local union, dominated both FEMACH and COMACH at this time. Moreno's decline as a labor leader was likely partially due to a left-wing democratizing impulse spreading throughout the labor movement in the 1960s, but his personal decline due to scandal also had the effect of allowing this radicalization process to deepen within the stevedore labor sector. Early in the Allende presidency, Moreno was voted off FEMACH's steering committee and lost his position as president of the local Valparaíso stevedores' union–positions which he had previously held for at least a decade.[153] Soon after Moreno's ousting, FEMACH and the local Valparaíso stevedores' union both supported affiliation to the CUT, implying some correlation between anti-Moreno sentiment and a pro-CUT position.

The editorial bias of FEMACH's monthly magazine *RECALDA* also veered heavily towards support for the Unidad Popular project, with articles consistently celebrating the new-found unity of the maritime movement through COMACH, and the FEMACH steering committee issuing statements of support for many of Allende's policy initiatives. Several times, *RECALDA* even justified government positions that denied the stevedore labor sector certain immediate material benefits; it did so by explaining that while all sectors of the Chilean working class share many interests in common, other interests may at times be conflictual–workers should thus remain patient and altruistic in solidarity with the national labor movement as a whole.[154]

---

[153] Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 12 February 1971, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 15, GMMA.
[154] *RECALDA* N. 30 (January 1973), 11-14.

The stevedore labor movement had many reasons to support the Unidad Popular government during its governance. Allende's government administration made extraordinary efforts to consult with workers from all labor sectors when formulating policy, and this was certainly also the case with the stevedores, one of the most powerful labor sectors in the country. In 1972, FEMACH sent a series of proposals to the government calling for reforms to the process of applying for retirement, the establishment of a technology cooperative for workers to provide them with tools such as forklifts, and tax reforms, among other initiatives.[155] Minister of Labor Luis Figueroa attended FEMACH's national assembly in January 1973 to address and discuss the stevedores' proposals. Following the assembly, *RECALDA* reported that Figueroa had addressed all the major proposals the stevedores had made, and that the assembly had resulted in a concrete plan for moving forward many of these projects and policy proposals.[156]

In another major win for the stevedores, a tripartite commission presided over by Minister of Labor Mireya Baltra (who preceded Figueroa as Minister) issued a ruling favorable for FEMACH in September 1972 which established a guaranteed annual salary for both *matriculado* and *suplente* workers, regardless of fluctuations in commerce due to the market and the weather.[157] This ruling issued not just a material benefit to the *matriculados*. It was also a major democratizing reform to the stevedores' labor sector, as the *suplente* workers, who had previously only received payment if they were chosen to work on a particular day, were now guaranteed a minimum annual salary determined by the average

[155] *RECALDA* N. 30 (January 1973), 11-14.
[156] *RECALDA* N. 30 (January 1973), 14.
[157] *RECALDA* N. 28 (September 1972), 9-11. Full text of the ruling reprinted at *RECALDA* N. 29 (November 1972), 11-17.

suplente wage during the year 1970.[158] FEMACH viewed the ruling as "overtly favorable," establishing a guaranteed remuneration system which they considered much more advanced than those in Europe and the U.S.[159] While *pincheros* were left out of this reform, the ruling was an undoubtedly progressive development for the labor sector.

Nonetheless, a conservative streak remained among the stevedores. There were great expectations, held both by workers in the stevedore labor sector and within the government, that the *medios pollos* system would be eradicated. The Chilean state-owned publishing house Quimantú featured the stevedore labor sector in a 1972 publication from its book series "Así Trabajo Yo," which gave in-depth profiles of Chile's diverse labor sectors. The book gives a description of the "irresponsible" *medios pollos* system, and reports that the practice had been greatly "reduced," but neglects to go into much detail.[160] Chilean historian Camilo Santibáñez's analysis of a memoir written by a *pinchero* from Valparaíso confirms that despite high hopes that the system would end under the Unidad Popular, it never was.[161] Even worse were accusations that the stevedore unions used unpaid *pinchero* labor to fulfill voluntary labor duties solicited by the Allende administration, for example unloading cargo when Chile received large shipments of rice donated from China, machinery from the USSR, and sugar from Cuba.[162] The *pinchero* memoirist writes with resentment that FEMACH leaders "stuffed their mouths," in reunions with government leaders, exploiting unpaid *pinchero* labor while hypocritically declaring that "'our union is with the Unidad Popular.'"[163]

---

[158] *RECALDA* N. 29 (November 1972), 15.
[159] *RECALDA* N. 28 (September 1972), 9-11.
[160] *Así Trabajo Yo*, 18:30.
[161] Santibáñez Rebolledo, "'La clase más baja del sindicato': nota de investigación sobre los pincheros en el puerto de Valparaíso (1967-1981)," 107–10.
[162] Santibáñez Rebolledo, 109.
[163] Memoir quoted in Santibáñez Rebolledo, 109.

FEMACH briefly supported labor leaders of the Marxist left under Allende, but this did not last. When COMACH elected as president a militant of the Communist Party at the December 1971 "unity congress," O'Neill reported that "unfortunately the stevedores voted for a fellow stevedore [for president], albeit a communist, rather than for a Christian Democrat who is a bay employee."[164] His comment suggests that AIFLD still had expectations that the stevedore maritime sector would remain anti-communist in orientation. These expectations indeed came to fruition when Martín Bustos, an anti-Marxist "morenista" of the Valparaíso stevedore movement, was elected president of FEMACH in January 1973. Bustos had been arrested alongside Moreno in early 1971 for the embezzlement scandal. An ex-Communist who was expelled from the party, Bustos fashioned himself a member of the Unidad Popular Party under Allende, but AIFLD always had the suspicion that he could be an ally of free trade unionism in Chile.[165] "Martín is an ex-communist (I hope) but he sits on the fence like an expert," wrote O'Neill in a letter to McLellan in 1972.[166] AIFLD offered Bustos several invitations to the United States and to international maritime conferences in an attempt to secure repayment of the headquarters loan in addition to his cooperation with the AFL-CIO's objectives in Chile.[167]

A "determination to amply collaborate" with the military junta

Indeed, under Bustos' presidency, FEMACH gave full support to the military regime that ousted the Unidad Popular from government on September 11, 1973. *RECALDA*'s first issue following the coup included an editorial declaring that "with great optimism and

---

[164] Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 21 March 1972, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 16, GMMA.
[165] Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 12 February 1971, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 15, GMMA.
[166] Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 22 February 1972, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 16, GMMA.
[167] Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 21 September 1972, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 16, GMMA; Robert O'Neill to Andrew McLellan, 4 October 1972, RG18-010, Series 4, Box 5, Folder 16, GMMA.

tranquility it is hoped today that, through this new path of patriotic reconstruction to which Chileans are committed, it will be possible to fulfill the desires of the [maritime sectors]."[168] Instead of the fluff pieces usually reserved for the end of *RECALDA* magazines – recipes, health advice, social announcements – the issue published Pinochet's series of military decrees, "in order to preserve the order and tranquility of the citizenry."[169] The re-printed military decrees included statements on the illegitimacy of the Allende government and condemned its fomentation of an "inauthentic" class struggle, a hit list of left-wing political and labor leaders, as well as an indefinite suspension of collective bargaining rights.[170]

In the weeks following the coup *RECALDA* reported that FEMACH had notified the military junta of the existence of their state-of-the-art radiocommunications network, installed over the course of 1972, to be left "at the disposal of the government authorities of the armed forces and the police."[171] International critics of AIFLD's activities in Chile have drawn attention to the existence of the ship-to-shore radio system in the Valparaíso maritime union headquarters paid for with AFL-CIO funds. COMACH's membership, critics have indicated, was composed largely by maritime officials, many of whom served as officers in the Navy.[172] Since the coup began in the early hours of September 11 in the port of Valparaíso,

---

[168] "Sin embargo, con gran optimismo y tranquilidad se espera hoy que, a través de esta nueva senda de reconstrucción patriótica en que están empeñados los chilenos, se logre dar cumplimiento a los anhelos de los sectores antes señalados." *RECALDA* N. 32 (1973), 1.

[169] Note that these were the words of the *RECALDA* editorialist, not those of Pinochet. "La Directiva Nacional de la Federación de Estibadores Marítimos de Chile, FEMACH, comunica a las directivas y asociados de las organizaciones afiliadas a esta Central, que la Revista 'RECALADA' correspondiente al número 32 ha dado preferencia en su material informativo a las instrucciones que a la fecha de editarse esta Revista había entregado para conocimiento de la opinión pública la H. Junta de Gobierno de las FF.AA. y Carabineros, a fin de preservar el orden y la tranquilidad de la ciudadanía" (*RECALDA* N. 32 (1973), 12.)

[170] *RECALDA* N. 32 (1973), 13-21.

[171] "…desde el primer momento la Directiva tomó como medida principal el ponerse a disposición de la Junta Militar de Gobierno y de la Intendencia de la Provincia. De igual forma, dimos cuenta a las Autoridades de la existencia de una red de radiocomunicaciones, que dejamos también a disposición de las Autoridades de Gobierno de las Fuerzas Armadas y Carabineros, detallando los puertos que tienen conexión con FEMACH por este medio." *RECALDA* N. 33 (1973), 20.

[172] Hirsch, *An Analysis of Our AFL-CIO Role in Latin America or Under the Covers with the CIA*, 35.

with US Naval vessels waiting offshore, critics consider the possibility that the radios might have assisted in the coup itself.[173] FEMACH's public announcement that it had offered to allow the military junta access to its radio network days after the coup certainly lends plausibility to this theory.

Soon after the coup, Bustos and other labor leaders met with Pinochet's military junta to "reiterate their determination to amply collaborate [...] in the tasks being carried out by the members of the new government."[174] The leaders handed the junta a memo with problems FEMACH workers were facing; the junta said they would "study" the matters and get back shortly.[175] Collaboration with the military junta had its perks initially. For example, when the junta proposed a "compensatory bonus" for Chileans, the stevedores asked for some modifications to be made to the proposal so that the stevedores would not lose out on their special benefits system, and were able to reach a favorable agreement.[176] Labor agreements under Pinochet such as this could only be reached through backroom deals between the junta and collaborationist labor leaders–not through collective bargaining. Labor no longer occupied the protagonistic role it had under the Unidad Popular; it was prohibited from exercising the strike weapon, and even the tripartite collective bargaining regime ostensibly promoted by the AFL-CIO was abolished.[177]

---

[173] Fred Hirsch and Richard Fletcher, *The CIA and the Labour Movement* (Spokesman Books, 1977), 31; McKenzie and Dunne, *El Golpe*, 43–46. Spalding as well writes that "AIFLD controlled unions helped the military by keeping open communications and port facilities" Spalding, Hobart Jr., "U.S. Labour Intervention in Latin America: The Case of the American Institute for Free Labour Development (AIFLD)," 159.

[174] "[La junta directiva de FEMACH] se entrevistaron con la Junta Militar de Gobierno, a quienes reiteraron su determinación de colaborar ampliamente, a través de sus actividades, en las tareas en que están empeñados los integrantes del nuevo gobierno," *RECALDA* N. 33 (1973), 5.

[175] *RECALDA* N. 33 (1973), 5.

[176] *RECALDA* N. 33 (1973), 7.

[177] In the limited instances where striking was permitted under the military regime, its power was severely curtailed on account of Pinochet's targeted anti-labor decrees. For more on Pinochet's labor reforms of 1979-1981 which abolished the tripartite collective bargaining system and severely defanged workers' power to strike, to the point where two analysts concluded that "the right to strike does not exist in Chile," see Winn, *Victims of the Chilean Miracle*, 22, 31–37. Quote on page 35.

The AFL-CIO refused to condemn Pinochet's bloody military coup even amidst the unprecedented breakdown of basic labor rights in Chile.[178] In contrast many rank-and-file workers from the first world who were affiliated with the free trade union movement came out against Pinochet's anti-labor policies. Just weeks after the coup, several English and Italian affiliates of the International Transport Workers Federation trade secretariat (ITF), to which FEMACH was linked through Moreno, instituted a boycott of Chilean ships in solidarity with the stevedores of Chile whom they believed were being persecuted by the junta.[179] FEMACH leadership assured Pinochet's government that they condemned the ITF actions, and sent a cable to the ITF urging workers to end the boycott. The stevedores of Chile, they claimed, were cooperating with the "honorable military junta" to "achieve the reconstruction of our country," and "all social and union rights have been totally respected and our labor as workers and leaders are developing normally. Any information contrary to this truth is completely alien to the Chilean stevedores and is a total falsity."[180] FEMACH leadership then proposed to the junta to send a delegation of stevedores on a European tour to reassure workers of "the truth of the Chilean situation."[181] The junta heartily agreed with the plan and commended "the patriotic and loyal attitude of the stevedores and maritime

---

[178] Hobart Spalding noted that only when the junta's policies began to threaten AIFLD-oriented unions in the early 1980s did the AFL-CIO and AIFLD change their tune and actively oppose the military junta. Even then, AIFLD ostensibly opposed the junta yet refused to work with "progressive forces thus weakening the movement towards democracy" (Spalding, Hobart Jr., "U.S. Labour Intervention in Latin America: The Case of the American Institute for Free Labour Development (AIFLD)," 150; see also Spalding, Hobart Jr., "The Two Latin American Foreign Policies of the U.S. Labor Movement: The AFL-CIO Top Brass vs. Rank-and-File," *Science & Society* Vol. 56, no. No. 4 (Winter, 1992/1993 (1992): 427.)

[179] *RECALDA* N. 33 (1973), 6.

[180] *RECALDA* N. 33 (1973), 6. Full cable text reads: "estibadores marítimos de chile estamos cooperando con honorable junta militar de gobierno objeto lograr la reconstrucción de nuestro país. las garantías sociales y gremiales han sido totalmente respetadas y nuestra labor como trabajadores y dirigentes la estamos desarrollando normalmente. Cualquier otra información contraria a esta verdad es completamente ajena a los estibadores chilenos y de una falsedad total."

[181] *RECALDA* N. 33 (1973), 6.

workers in general and offered their complete backing to realize this important decision."[182] FEMACH leadership's collaboration with Pinochet's military junta was immediate and absolute.

Don Wenche's Return

Wenceslao Moreno rose again from disgrace when the military junta elevated him to the "highest rank of leadership" in the newly-revived, military-sanctioned Centro Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT).[183] In January 1974, while the CUT was outlawed and its leaders exiled, jailed, or disappeared, 26 labor groups connected with AIFLD and the ITF joined together under the CNT, a union that was proclaimed "a-political and free from all the traditional vices of the trade union movement."[184] The left-wing elected leadership of COMACH were imprisoned and replaced with AIFLD seminar graduates.[185] Luis Figueroa, the former president of the CUT, stated in exile that "it is precisely with money from the AFL-CIO that the Military Junta now seeks to create new Chilean unions that are docile in the face of the dictatorship."[186]

Chilean maritime historian Camilo Santibáñez writes that there was generally a positive reception of the military junta among Chile's maritime labor sector.[187] In return for their loyalty, the Pinochet regime delayed maritime labor's incorporation into the privatization and union-busting schemes he directed at virtually every other Chilean labor

---

[182] "El planteamiento hecho por los dirigentes encontró la más amplia acogida de la parte de los miembros de la Junta Militar de Gobierno, quienes ponderaron la patriótica y leal actitud de los estibadores y marítimos en general y les ofrecieron su total respaldo para concretar esta importante decision," *RECALDA* N. 33 (1973), 6.
[183] Hirsch and Fletcher, *The CIA and the Labour Movement*, 31.
[184] Hirsch and Fletcher, 32.
[185] Hirsch and Fletcher, 31–32.
[186] Quoted in Hirsch and Fletcher, 31.
[187] Santibáñez Rebolledo, "'La clase más baja del sindicato': nota de investigación sobre los pincheros en el puerto de Valparaíso (1967-1981)," 113.

sector under his Plan Laboral in 1979. By 1981, maritime labor was the only sector left to reform, and Pinochet ruthlessly turned his sights onto the stevedore sector and its system of *matricula* in order to privatize Chile's ports. The *matricula* system, in which the labor union was in charge of allocating job opportunities to unionized and non-unionized workers, was replaced with a permit system in which anyone could apply for and obtain a work permit from employers. Technically this "democratized" the labor pool. But as a result of Pinochet's reforms, all rights and benefits won by and for the *matriculado* workers were obliterated. Santibáñez calculates that the average *matriculado* wage decreased by 80%.[188]

The stevedore unions desperately instituted strikes in order to re-establish the *matricula* system. These failed when former *pinchero* workers ignored the *matriculados*' appeals to strike. The extremely hierarchical labor system of the stevedore sector, writes Santibáñez, had fomented a strong feeling of resentment from the sector's lowest stratum of workers which facilitated Pinochet's dismantling of the union.[189] As a result, the working conditions of Chile's ports worsened for all workers.

"We knew what was coming," said one retired stevedore in a recent oral history interview. "There were premonitions that a squeeze was coming for the stevedores, because we were the only ones left [...] we told ourselves, it won't happen to us, it won't happen to us, because we are untouchable– that's what we thought, [...] they don't touch us because our union was big, we were united in such a way that we had the support of all the unions in the world."[190] In this last bit, this worker was likely referring to the international free trade union

---

[188] Santibáñez Rebolledo, 113.
[189] Santibáñez Rebolledo, 110.
[190] Quoted in Leal Román and Aguirre González, *Estiba y desestiba*, 125–26."...nosotros sabíamos los que nos venía, teníamos antecedentes que venía un apretón de mano y de cuello para los estibadores, porque éramos los últimos que estábamos quedando, ya le habían cortado la cola a todos los trabajadores de la V región, de Santiago y de todo el país, los sindicatos los estaban eliminando y nosotros decíamos -a nosotros no nos tocan, a nosotros no nos van a tocar porque nosotros somos intocables-, así éramos nosotros, nosotros somos intocables, nosotros no

network from which the maritime workers had enjoyed support for years through the ITF. AFL-CIO leadership, however, did not seem keen on efforts by rank-and-file U.S. workers to organize solidarity boycotts against Chile aiming to restore basic labor rights under Pinochet. An internal AFL-CIO memo warned that "at some point" San Francisco labor leadership "will have to deal with the problem" of solidarity boycott organizing.[191]

Wenceslao Moreno, for his part, served as Pinochet's Labor Attaché to the United States under the privatization reforms, implicitly giving his blessing, a fact which stevedores today describe as the "tragic" end of his career as labor leader.[192] Read in the context of history, Moreno's second coming as a Chilean labor leader was not so much tragedy as farce.

Conclusion

The case of the AFL-CIO's relationship with the Chilean maritime labor movement is like a microcosm allowing us to study the successes and the failures of U.S. labor's project of free trade unionism in Chile. The exceptional nature of this relationship indicates AIFLD's failure to achieve significant influence in the Chilean labor movement as a whole—in fact, Chilean labor presented the AFL-CIO with some of the strongest challenges to its project of free trade unionism in all of Latin America. The AFL-CIO found its strongest allies in a labor sector (the stevedores) whose hierarchical union structure readily benefited from, and enjoyed ideological justification from, central tenets of free trade unionism: namely labor-management cooperation and bread-and-butter unionism. Yet the AFL-CIO's anti-

---

nos tocan porque el sindicato era muy grande, estábamos aglutinados en forma tal que teníamos el apoyo de todos los países del mundo, aparentemente, porque cotizábamos para otras regiones de otros países, hacíamos una cosa, como para hacer boicot, por ejemplo, nosotros estábamos: no importa, vamos a la huelga nos más si nos quieren aplicar la ley vamos a la huelga, entonces nos dieron $1.400.000 creo que nos dieron por entrar a la matrícula, en esa época..."

[191] Memo from unknown sender to Lane Kirkland and Don Slaiman, 17 January 1979, RG1-038, Series 4, Country Files, 1960-1979, Box 68, Folder 27, GMMA.

[192] Leal Román and Aguirre González, *Estiba y desestiba*, 120.

communist politics could never be taken for granted within the maritime movement in general, or even within the more-conservative stevedore movement in particular. Chile as a whole was undergoing an increasingly rapid process of working-class radicalization from which even the conservative stevedores were not fully immune. To secure their position in the stevedore movement, the AFL-CIO fostered relationships with key labor leaders such as Moreno and Bustos, strategically leveraged loans and grants to secure goodwill from rank-and-file workers and to influence union elections, and even, as authors elsewhere have argued, directly coordinated and supported maritime workers' actions to undermine the socialist Unidad Popular government.[193] The AFL-CIO's activities, summarized here, explain how the relationship between the AFL-CIO and the maritime sector took place, but the structure of the stevedore labor movement explains why.

I have argued that the hierarchical *matricula* system structuring the Chilean stevedore labor sector and union movement predisposed the stevedores' embrace of free trade unionism. The political implications drawn from free trade union ideology served the interests of the small and powerful minority of *matriculado* workers who directly profited from the super-exploitation of *pinchero* workers. Free trade unionism's notion of labor-management collaboration, an explicit rejection of class struggle, was demonstrably effective in a labor sector in which only a small and elite class of *matriculado* workers at the top of the union hierarchy enjoyed high wages and benefits extracted from the labor of both *matriculado* and non-*matriculado* workers. This was evidently proven by Wenceslao Moreno's successful leadership style in the 1960s, which he himself insisted relied on a

[193] Hirsch, "The Labour Movement: Penetration Point for U.S. Intelligence and Transnationals," 31; Spalding, Hobart Jr., "U.S. Labour Intervention in Latin America: The Case of the American Institute for Free Labour Development (AIFLD)," 150–59; McKenzie and Dunne, *El Golpe*, 43–46.

cordial relationship between capital and labor. Free trade unionism's economistic focus on material gains for union members, and its rejection of broader social and political issues, provided ideological justification to the *matriculado* workers' elite status by rejecting broad working-class solidarity in favor of an insular political framework seeking to achieve material gains for union members only. In oral histories, *matriculado* stevedore workers justify the *matricula* system as a way of creating job opportunities for more workers, and assert an identity, founded on a myth of meritocracy, as professionals who worked hard to achieve their *matriculado* status.[194]

There evidently was a desire within the stevedore sector to democratize the labor sector and cooperate with the Unidad Popular government. The stevedore union leadership would doubtless have sought cordial relations with the Unidad Popular if only as a way to ensure favorable policy. But the leftward impulse within the sector may also have originated from the *pincheros* themselves in a process of "revolution from below," so essential to the Unidad Popular experience.[195] Like the *pobladores* (urban poor) who staged land expropriations to build homes, like the *campesinos* who did the same to establish farming cooperatives, and like the workers who struck to hasten the socialization of their industries, the *pincheros* may have been the driving force behind the stevedore sector's marked process of democratization during this period.

Nevertheless, by September 1973, the elected stevedore union leadership had made the calculation that a military coup d'etat defeating the worker's government would be the best way to preserve the union's gains, at least in the short term. Rather than having to

---

[194] Leal Román and Aguirre González, *Estiba y desestiba*, 96–106.
[195] Peter Winn, *Weavers of Revolution: The Yarur Workers and Chile's Road to Socialism* (New York, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986).

balance the interests of the *matriculado* workers with those of the rest of the national working class, the stevedores could focus on preserving and advancing their narrow material interests as an elite class of workers—as long as they could maintain a collaborative relationship with the military regime, as they managed to do for the first few years of the Pinochet dictatorship. The stevedores did not anticipate that no amount of collaboration with the fascist regime could spare them from Pinochet's ruthless union-busting schemes of the 1980s. With the rest of the labor movement dismantled from 1979-1981 through the Plan Laboral, and with a dearth of solidarity from the *pincheros* after years of exploitation from their fellow workers, the *matriculado* stevedores found themselves all alone. And so in 1981, the military regime swiftly moved to demolish their union.

CONCLUSION

The ironies inherent in free trade union ideology are readily apparent to anyone who studies the AFL-CIO's Cold War international program. The free trade unionists of the AFL-CIO preached the separation of politics from labor activism, yet never acknowledged the fundamentally political nature of their close collaboration with the U.S. government to advance the U.S. imperial project of anti-communist containment in the Third World. Free trade unionists purportedly championed liberal democracy; yet the case of the AFL-CIO's interventions in Chile shows that for free trade unionists, even a brutally anti-labor fascist regime was preferable to a democratically-elected socialist government. When Salvador Allende was elected president of Chile, backed by a broad multi-party coalition of workers, peasants, students, and other popular classes, the AFL-CIO worked diligently alongside the U.S. Government to undermine the socialist government, and vocally welcomed the coup d'etat that violently overthrew Allende on September 11, 1973. "Free trade unionists did not mourn the departure of a Marxist regime in Chile which brought that nation to political, social, and economic ruin," affirmed a resolution adopted by the AFL-CIO Executive Council in August of 1974. While the resolution was drafted to denounce the "autocratic actions" of the ensuing Pinochet dictatorship, the AFL-CIO's condemnation was couched in language justifying Allende's overthrow as a "necessary act."[1] The AFL-CIO did the same throughout Latin America. Prior to Chile's coup in 1973, AIFLD had assisted U.S.-backed coups in Guatemala (1954), Guyana (1963), Brazil (1964), and the Dominican Republic (1965).[2] The

---

[1] "Military Dictatorship in Chile," *The AIFLD Report, Vol, 12 No. 5*., October/November 1974.
[2] Labarca Goddard, Eduardo, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*, 127–50.

AFL-CIO continued to collaborate with right-wing Latin American dictators throughout the latter half of the 20th Century.

Why was the AFL-CIO so invested in the U.S. government's imperialist project of anti-communist containment in the Third World, and particularly in Latin America? Had the AFL-CIO become the representative body of a U.S. "aristocracy of labor," and, in the words of Lenin, "*bribed* out of imperialist superprofits and converted to *watchdogs* of capitalism and *corruptors* of the labour movement," creating an alliance between U.S. workers and capitalists against other countries?[3] Eric Hobsbawm reminds us that Lenin's formulation of an "aristocracy of labor" was meant to explain the roots of reformism among a specific group of workers (the British trade union movement), in a specific historical situation (the fall of the Second International).[4] Yet it is worth remembering Lenin's words, as they connect us to long-held international debates on the left around reform and revolution, and the role the trade union movement ought to play in a political society—debates with which many Chilean workers in the 1960s and 70s would have been familiar.

Though it has not been the purpose of this thesis to fully consider the questions raised above, it is interesting to consider that in some instances the AFL-CIO was explicit about its investment in protecting the privileges of U.S. workers as consumers who benefited from the U.S. position as a world power through access to cheap commodities. The AFL-CIO-drafted "Program for the Americas" of the International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers trade secretariat, which operated across Latin America including in Chile, stated the importance of "shoring up relations with Latin America" in order not to let nuisances such as "political ploys, more severe economic demands upon the petroleum companies, [and]

---

[3] Lenin, "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism (October 1916)." Emphasis in the original.
[4] Hobsbawm, "Lenin and the 'Aristocracy of Labor.'"

growing nationalization" interfere with South America as a critical source of petroleum products for U.S. consumers.[5] Marcel van der Linden proposes ways in which wage earners in the Global North profit from the exploitation of workers in the South as consumers with access to cheap commodities and services. The resulting "relational inequality within the world working class" may entice workers in the Global North "to consciously or unconsciously give priority to their sectional interests over general class interests" as members of the international working class.[6] In other words, the AFL-CIO's international project may not have been built purely on ideological notions of anti-communism, but rather on a real material investment in maintaining U.S. hegemony that could ensure the elite position of U.S. workers within the capitalist global economy through access to cheap consumer goods. Free trade union ideology repackaged Samuel Gompers' "bread-and-butter unionism" for the Cold War era, adding a hefty dose of anti-communism to a labor politics narrowly focusing on short-term economic gains for union members only, often at the expense of the long-term interests of the broader national and international working class. In many ways this ideology served not just as a tool to carry out U.S. labor intervention abroad, but as an ideological justification for U.S. labor's role in the U.S. imperial project.

Not all U.S. workers consented to the AFL-CIO's project of anti-communist action in the Third World. Many rank-and-file members of the AFL-CIO launched critiques of the AFL-CIO's complicity in the U.S. imperial project, and were crucial to the building of the Chile solidarity movement during Pinochet's 17-year-long dictatorship. Fred Hirsch, a plumber of the AFL-CIO Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 393 in Santa Clara, California, organized a

---

[5] "IFPCW Program for the Americas, 1972-1976," Box 1, AR 2003-0075, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Unprocessed Collections, GMMA.
[6] Marcel Van der Linden, "Workers Who Benefit from the Exploitation of Other Workers," *Revista Latinoamericana de Trabajo y Trabajadores*, no. 1 (November 8, 2020): 227, https://doi.org/10.48038/revlatt.n1.8.

gathering of activists and labor unionists on December 1, 1973 where they formed an "Emergency Committee for the Defense of Democracy in Chile."[7] Soon after, Hirsch wrote one of the first exposés of the AFL-CIO's role in Chile, *Under the Covers*, and proposed a resolution in the Santa Clara Labor Council condemning AIFLD's role in undermining the Allende government.[8] By the end of the 1970s a "Committee for an All-Labor AIFLD" had formed by members of the AFL-CIO rank-and-file to disseminate information critical of the Institute and protest its actions.[9] The growing body of research looking at the AFL-CIO's international Cold War project owes its origins to the critical investigations made by these U.S. workers, who embodied international working class solidarity.[10]

Just as, on the whole, the AFL-CIO leadership had its reasons for embracing and promoting free trade union ideology, Chilean workers had their reasons for rejecting it. In the years leading up to the Unidad Popular period and the September 1973 coup, Chilean labor unions were confronted with two conflicting trade union ideologies. One was the anti-communist free trade unionism promoted by the AFL-CIO; the other was a socialist and anti-imperialist labor unionism that saw organized labor power as the leading force for progressive social change. In very few cases was the former attractive to Chilean workers. Over the course of the twentieth century, the Chilean labor movement had struggled through times of unity and fragmentation to build a developed labor politics championing class struggle, radical social equity, anti-imperialism, and the protagonistic role of the working

---

[7] "Unionists join in close-up look at U.S. Involvement in Chile," Northern California Labor Santa Clara Council Edition. 14 December, 1973.
[8] Hirsch, *An Analysis of Our AFL-CIO Role in Latin America or Under the Covers with the CIA*; Scipes, *AFL-CIO's Secret War against Developing Country Workers*, 70.
[9] Spalding, Hobart Jr., "The Two Latin American Foreign Policies of the U.S. Labor Movement: The AFL-CIO Top Brass vs. Rank-and-File," 430–31.
[10] Hirsch, *An Analysis of Our AFL-CIO Role in Latin America or Under the Covers with the CIA*.

class in the nation's political processes. This political project culminated in the Unidad Popular government, ultimately cut short by the coup on September 11, 1973. In this thesis, I have shown the extent to which Chilean workers from a broad array of ideological tendencies rejected the foreign politics of free trade unionism in favor of Chile's organic tradition of socialist labor politics, and I have looked at the exceptional case of the Chilean stevedore labor movement to examine some of the particular historical and structural circumstances that made this minority of workers receptive to the AFL-CIO's message.

Examining where the AFL-CIO's interventionist project in the Chilean labor movement failed to penetrate, and where it succeeded, has shown the significance of the U.S. labor's interventionist project in Chile. It may not be that all Chilean workers conceptualized or expressed the opposing paths of "free trade unionism" versus "socialist labor unionism" in these exact terms, but this dichotomy, and workers' choice of which path to take—even if only momentarily—profoundly affected the nation's political trajectory. Though not specifically analyzed in this thesis, the Unidad Popular government suffered a detrimental economic and political blow after copper miners accepted the "bread-and-butter unionism" argument that union activity should concern itself with the immediate material interests of union members above the long-term interests of the national working class.[11] The stevedore unions, studied in Chapter Two, voted into leadership anti-communists who upheld their union's hierarchical *matricula* structure, compatible with free trade unionism's central tenets, and then collaborated with (and helped bring about) a military regime that decimated labor rights for all Chilean workers, eventually including the stevedores themselves.

---

[11] Bitar and Pizarro, *La caída de Allende y la huelga de El Teniente*.

In the "battle of Chile" between the left-wing Unidad Popular and the right-wing domestic and foreign opposition, the adoption and rejection of these ideologies, or elements of them, had deep and lasting consequences. The conservative stevedore labor leaders' ultimate defection to the right-wing opposition went directly counter to the leftward movement of the Chilean working class and its overwhelming support for the Unidad Popular government. Providing financial encouragement and ideological validation for this choice, the AFL-CIO's labor intervention project in Chile helped tilt the balance to the right. And in this way, the AFL-CIO's project of free trade unionism, directed and executed alongside the U.S. government, left a deep impact on the course of Chilean history.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archives and Libraries

Colecciones bibliográficas y documentales. Sección Periódicos y Microformatos. Biblioteca Nacional de Chile, Santiago de Chile.

George Meany Memorial Archive (AFL-CIO), University of Maryland Special Collections and University Archives, College Park, Maryland.

AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Unprocessed Collections.

Country Files, Latin America and the Caribbean, 1959-1970, AFL and AFL-CIO International Affairs Department.

Country Files, Latin America and the Caribbean, 1969-1976, AFL and AFL-CIO International Affairs Department.

George Meany Papers, International Affairs, 1957-1979, AFL and AFL-CIO Office of the President.

International Labor Organizations, International Labor Institutes, 1962-1980, AFL and AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Records.

General Records of the Department of State. United States National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

Bureau of Interamerican Affairs, Records Related to Chile 1957-1975.

1970-1973 Subject Numeric Files.

North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) Archive of Latin Americana. University of Maryland Libraries Microform Collections, College Park, Maryland.

Newspapers and Periodicals

The AIFLD Report, 1968-1974.

El Mercurio, 1964-1973.

El Siglo, 1964-1969.

NACLA Latin America and Empire Report, 1971-1976.

Punto Final, 1965-1973.

RECALDA, 1968-1973.

Published Primary Sources

Agee, Philip. *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*. American ed. New York: Stonehill, 1975.

Así Trabajo Yo. Vol. 18. "Nosotros Los Chilenos," Como Trabajamos. Santiago de Chile: Quimantú, 1972.

Garcia F., Patricio, ed. *Los Gremios Patronales*. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Nacional Quimantú, 1973.

Hirsch, Fred. *An Analysis of Our AFL-CIO Role in Latin America or Under the Covers with the CIA*. San José, California: self-published, 1974.

Labarca Goddard, Eduardo. *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*. 2nd ed. Empresa Editora Austral, 1969.

Leal Román, Valentina, and Carlos Aguirre González. *Estiba y desestiba: trabajos del Valparaíso que fue (1938-1981)*. Colección Historia 3. Barrio Puerto, Valparaíso: Inubicalistas, 2020.

NACLA. *New Chile: 1973 Edition*. North American Congress on Latin America, 1973.

Romualdi, Serafino. *Presidents & Peons: Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America*. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1967.

Thayer, William. *Trabajo, Empresa, y Revolución*. Santiago de Chile: Empresa Editora Zig-Zag, 1968.

Secondary Sources

Agee, Philip. *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*. American ed. New York: Stonehill, 1975.

Angell, Alan. *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile*. London, New York: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1972.

Así Trabajo Yo. Vol. 18. "Nosotros Los Chilenos," Como Trabajamos. Santiago de Chile: Quimantú, 1972.

Barría Serón, Jorge. *Historia de La CUT*. Ediciones Prensa Latinoamericana, 1971.

Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile. "William Turpin Thayer Arteaga: Reseñas Biográficas Parlamentarias." BCN.cl. BCN. Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile. Accessed April 14, 2024. https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/William_Turpin_Thayer_Arteaga.

Bitar, Sergio, and Crisóstomo Pizarro. *La caída de Allende y la huelga de El Teniente: lecciones de la historia*. Valparaíso, Chile: Ediciones Universitarias de Valparaíso, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, 2017.

Bodenheimer, Susanne. "Stagnation in Liberty." In *New Chile*, 118–27. NACLA, 1973.

Carew, Anthony. *American Labour's Cold War Abroad: From Deep Freeze to Détente, 1945-1970*. Athabasca University Press, 2018. https://doi.org/10.15215/aupress/9781771992114.01.

"Chile: La Resistencia Va!" *NACLA Latin America and Empire Report* 8, no. 2 (February 1974): 31–32.

Corrêa, Larissa Rosa. *Anti-Communist Solidarity: US-Brazilian Labor Relations during the Dictatorship in Cold-War Brazil (1964-1985)*. Translated by Sabrina Gledhill. 1. Auflage. Work in Global and Historical Perspective volume12. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2022.

De Shazo, Peter. "The Valparaíso Maritime Strike of 1903 and the Development of a Revolutionary Labor Movement in Chile." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 11, no. 1 (May 1979): 145–68. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X00022331.

El Siglo. "Dirigentes Democratacristianos Atacaron Duramente a Romualdi." September 12, 1964.

El Siglo. "Frei Recibió al Agente Divisionista S. Romualdi." September 10, 1964.

El Siglo. "Romualdi Embajador Del Divisionismo Sindical." September 13, 1964.

Field, Thomas C. "Transnationalism Meets Empire: The AFL-CIO, Development, and the Private Origins of Kennedy's Latin American Labor Program*." *Diplomatic History* 42, no. 2 (April 1, 2018): 305–34. https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhw063.

———. "Union Busting as Development: Transnationalism, Empire and Kennedy's Secret Labour Programme for Bolivia." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 52, no. 1 (February 2020): 27–51. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X19000646.

Francis, Michael J. "Revolutionary Labor in Latin America: The CLASC." *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 10, no. 4 (October 1968): 597–616. https://doi.org/10.2307/165319.

Garcia F., Patricio, ed. *Los Gremios Patronales*. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Nacional Quimantú, 1973.

Gil, Federico G., Ricardo Lagos Escobar, and Henry A. Landsberger, eds. *Chile at the Turning Point: Lessons of the Socialist Years, 1970-1973*. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1979.

Greene, Julie. *Pure and Simple Politics: The American Federation of Labor and Political Activism, 1881 - 1917*. 1. publ. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Harmer, Tanya. *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War*. 1st edition. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014.

Haslam, John. *The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende's Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide*. New York: Verso, 2005.

Hirsch, Fred. *An Analysis of Our AFL-CIO Role in Latin America or Under the Covers with the CIA*. San José, California: self-published, 1974.

———. “The Labour Movement: Penetration Point for U.S. Intelligence and Transnationals.” In *The CIA and the Labour Movement*, 7–48. Spokesman Books, 1977.

Hirsch, Fred, and Richard Fletcher. *The CIA and the Labour Movement*. Spokesman Books, 1977.

Hobsbawm, Eric. “Lenin and the ‘Aristocracy of Labor.’” *Monthly Review* 21, no. 11 (April 4, 1970).

Horowitz, Irving Louis, ed. *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot: Studies in the Relationship between Social Science and Practical Politics*. Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1974.

Joseph, G. M., and Daniela Spenser, eds. *In from the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War*. American Encounters/Global Interactions. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008.

Kornbluh, Peter, ed. *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability*. Rev. and Updated ed., 40th anniversary edition. New York: The New Press, 2013.

Kramer, Paul A. “Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World.” *AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW*, 2011.

Labarca Goddard, Eduardo. *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a La Intromisión Extranjera*. 2nd ed. Empresa Editora Austral, 1969.

Leal Román, Valentina, and Carlos Aguirre González. *Estiba y desestiba: trabajos del Valparaíso que fue (1938-1981)*. Colección Historia 3. Barrio Puerto, Valparaíso: Inubicalistas, 2020.

Lenin, V.I. “Imperialism and the Split in Socialism (October 1916).” In *Lenin Collected Works*, 23:105–20. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964.

Manuel Antonio Garretón Merino and Tomás Moulián. *La Unidad Popular y El Conflicto Político En Chile*. Santiago : Ediciones Chile-América : CESOC : LOH, 1993.

McKenzie, Rob, and Patrick Dunne. *El Golpe: U.S. Labor, the CIA, and the Coup at Ford in Mexico*. Wildcat: Workers’ Movements and Global Capitalism. London: Pluto Press, 2022.

Mellen, Jim. “Leaders for Labor: Made in America.” In *New Chile*, 54–58. NACLA, 1973.

Morra, Marco, Eugenia Palieraki, and Rafael Pedemonte. “La Unidad Popular chilena (1970-1973): balance historiográfico y nuevas perspectivas trasnacionales.” *Historia Crítica*, no. 90 (October 6, 2023): 3–28. https://doi.org/10.7440/histcrit90.2023.01.

Morris, George. *CIA and American Labor: The Subversion of the AFL-CIO’s Foreign Policy*. New York: International Publishers, 1967.

Moulian, Tomás. *Fracturas: De Pedro Aguirre Cerda a Salvador Allende (1938-1973)*. Historia. Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2006.

Navarro, Juan José. "Cold War in Latin America: The Camelot Project (1964–1965) and the Political and Academic Reactions of the Chilean Left." *Comparative Sociology* 10, no. 5 (2011): 807–25. https://doi.org/10.1163/156913311X599089.

Pancho Justo. "La Rebelión de Los 'Medios Pollos.'" *Punto Final* 6, no. 142 (October 26, 1971): 30–32.

Radosh, Ronald. *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy: The Cold War in the Unions from Gompers to Lovestone*. New York: Random House, 1969.

Rodríguez García, Magaly. "Free Trade-Unionism in Latin America: 'Bread-and-Butter' or Political Unionism?" *Historical Studies in Industrial Relations*, no. 18 (September 2004): 107–34. https://doi.org/10.3828/hsir.2004.18.3.

Romualdi, Serafino. *Presidents & Peons: Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America*. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1967.

Santibáñez Rebolledo, Camilo. "'La clase más baja del sindicato': nota de investigación sobre los pincheros en el puerto de Valparaíso (1967-1981)." *Revista de Estudios Marítimos y Sociales* 13, no. 17 (July 2020).

Schuhrke, Jeff. "Agrarian Reform and the AFL-CIO's Cold War in El Salvador*." *Diplomatic History* 44, no. 4 (September 1, 2020): 527–53. https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhaa024.

———. "'Comradely Brainwashing': International Development, Labor Education, and Industrial Relations in the Cold War." *Labor* 16, no. 3 (September 1, 2019): 39–67. https://doi.org/10.1215/15476715-7569788.

Scipes, Kim. *AFL-CIO's Secret War against Developing Country Workers: Solidarity or Sabotage?* Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2010.

Scott, Jack. *Yankee Unions, Go Home. How the AFL Helped the U. S. Build an Empire in Latin America*. Trade Unions and Imperialism in America, Vol. 1. Vancouver: New Star Books, 1978.

Semán, Ernesto. *Ambassadors of the Working Class: Argentina's International Labor Activists and Cold War Democracy in the Americas*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2017.

Sims, Beth. *Workers of the World Undermined: American Labor's Role in U.S. Foreign Policy*. Boston, MA: South End Press, 1992.

Smirnow, Gabriel. *The Revolution Disarmed, Chile, 1970-1973*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979.

Spalding, Hobart Jr. "The Two Latin American Foreign Policies of the U.S. Labor Movement: The AFL-CIO Top Brass vs. Rank-and-File." *Science & Society* Vol. 56, no. No. 4 (Winter, 1992/1993 (1992).

———. "U.S. and Latin American Labor: The Dynamics of Imperialist Control." *Latin American Perspectives* 3, no. 1 (January 1976): 45–69. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X7600300104.

———. "U.S. Labour Intervention in Latin America: The Case of the American Institute for Free Labour Development (AIFLD)." *Labour, Capital and Society* 17, no. 2 (1984): 38.

Stallings, Barbara. *Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1958–1973*. Stanford University Press, 1978.

Stern, Joshua. "US Labor Intervention in Latin America: The Politics of Class Harmony and the American Institute for Free Labor Development." *The Latin Americanist* 65, no. 4 (2021): 511–38. https://doi.org/10.1353/tla.2021.0033.

Thayer, William. *Trabajo, Empresa, y Revolución*. Santiago de Chile: Empresa Editora Zig-Zag, 1968.

Tinsman, Heidi. *Buying into the Regime: Grapes and Consumption in Cold War Chile and the United States*. American Encounters/Global Interactions. Durham: Duke University Press, 2014.

Valdés, Alberto E. "Trade Policy and Its Effect on the External Agricultural Trade of Chile 1945–1965." *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 55, no. 2 (May 1973): 154–64. https://doi.org/10.2307/1238432.

Valdivia, Verónica. "'Todos Juntos Seremos La Historia: Venceremos': Unidad Popular y Fuerzas Armadas." In *Cuando Hicimos Historia: La Experiencia de La Unidad Popular*, 177–206. Santiago, Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2005.

Van der Linden, Marcel. "Workers Who Benefit from the Exploitation of Other Workers." *Revista Latinoamericana de Trabajo y Trabajadores*, no. 1 (November 8, 2020): 223–39. https://doi.org/10.48038/revlatt.n1.8.

Vergara, Angela. "Chilean Workers and the US Labor Movement: From Solidarity to Intervention, 1950s–1970s." In *American Labor's Global Ambassadors*, edited by Waters, Robert Anthony and van Goethem, Geert. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2013.

Waters, Robert Anthony, and Geert van Goethem, eds. *American Labor's Global Ambassadors*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137360229.

Winn, Peter. *La revolución chilena*. Primera edición. Historia. Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2013.

———. *Victims of the Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004.

———. *Weavers of Revolution: The Yarur Workers and Chile's Road to Socialism*. New York, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986.