DESIGN FOR DECLINE: Executive Management and the Eclipse of NASA by Nancy Petrovic Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 1982 copy I APPROVAL SHEET Title of Dissertation: Design for Decline: Executive Management and the Eclipse of NASA Name of Candidate: Nancy Petrovic Doctor of Philosophy, 1982 Dissertation and Abstract Approved: Dr. Stephen Elkin Associate Professor Department of Government and Politics Date Approved: ABSTRACT tive Management a nd on: Design for Decline: Execu Title of Dissert ati the Eclipse of N ASA Doctor of Philoso phy , 1982 Nancy Petrovic, Stephen Elkin, ssertation dir e ct ed by: Dr. Di Associate Profes sor, nt of Government and Politics Departme tional developme nt of the nes the organiza This study exami rom the creation of its and Space Admin istration f tics National Aeronau t focuses especi ally n in 1915 throug h the 1960s. I parent organizat io 's leadership est ablished which the organ ization ips on the relationsh with its own em plo yees . ividuals, as wel l as with external gr oups and ind ovide a more ade quate intends to: pr The dissertation sight currently exist s; gain some in e than explanation of N ASA's declin the evelopment organ izations within management of r esearch and d into the ty of using diff erent he utili eral government; and determine t fed organizations ch ange . The perspectives for exploring how theoretical isting theories o f he case study ar e related to ex findings from t e are t explanations o f NASA's declin ions, and differe n organizat evaluated. s identified for NASA's d e cline, reason Among the variou s entially conflict ing g of several pot management's mal adroit handlin ly. Steady decli ne in agenc y ent anizational goals figures promin org widely agreed , coupled with th e lack of appropriation lev els after 1965 management decis ions, and teria to evaluate its technical upon cri o r gani za tio n una ble t o triking example o f a n p r od uc e d in NASA a s t e rnal a nd int e rn a l e nvironment. es in it s ex s ucc e ssfully ada pt t o chang TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES V LIST OF FIGURES vi GLOSSARY vii Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 1 INTERPRETATIONS OF NASA ' S DECLINE 3 AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 8 METHODOLOGY 15 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 18 No t es 21 2. NACA : ITS CREATION AND EARLY YEARS 26 NACA IN 1927 26 THE DEVELOPMENT OF NACA : THE YEARS BEFORE 1927 58 Notes 85 3. NACA IN THE 1950s 95 INTRODUCTION 95 THE ORGANIZATI ON OF NACA : ANOTHER LOOK 97 CHANGES IN NACA : THE YEARS BETWEEN 1927 AND THE 1950s 127 Notes 150 ii Chapter Page 4 . NASA IN THE LATE 1960s 161 INTRODUCTION 161 THE ORGANIZATION OF NASA IN THE LATE 1960s 163 THE DEVELOPMENT OF NASA 204 Notes 243 5. NASA AND THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION 257 THE MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL ORGANIZATIONS 262 NASA AND IN-HOUSE RESEARCH GROUPS 268 THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION FAILURE 278 Notes 286 6. OTHER EXPLANATIONS OF NASA'S DECLINE 287 THE COMPETING GROUPS ARGUMENT 238 NASA AS A BUREAUCRACY 295 NASA AND EXTERNAL ACTORS 306 SUMMARY 316 Notes 318 7. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 320 THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION 321 CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONS 326 ORGANIZATIONS AND CHANGE: A STRUCTURALIST PERSPECTIVE 331 SUMMARY 337 Notes 338 iii Chapter Page 8. CONCLUSIONS 340 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 342 ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT 348 ORGANIZATIONS AND EXTERNAL ACTORS 352 BIBLIOGRAPHY A. BOOKS 360 B. PERIODICALS 368 c. NEWSPAPERS 374 D. NACA MATERIALS 376 1. MEMORANDA 377 2. REPORTS 379 E. NASA DOCUMENTS 381 1. MEMORANDA 382 2. INTERNAL DOCUMENTS 385 3. PUBLICATIONS 388 4. UNPUBLISHED SPONSORED RESEARCH 391 F. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 394 G. UNPUBLISHED WORK 401 APPENDIX A. PERSONNEL AND APPROPRIATIONS 404 B. LOCATION OF NASA INSTALLATIONS 415 i. V LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. NACA Personnel Data: 1915-1958 405 2. NACA Appropriations: 1915-1958 407 3. NACA App r opriations : 1940-1 958 410 4. NASA Personnel: 1959-1978 411 5. NASA Personnel by Installation: 1959-1969 412 6. NASA In-House vs. Contractor Employment, 1960-1979 . . . . . . . . . 413 7. NASA Appropriations: 1959-1979 414 V LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1. NACA Organization Chart: 1927 . . . . . . . . . 30 2. NACA Organization Chart: 1952 . . . . . . . . 98 3. NASA Organization Chart: 1967 . . . . . . . 164 4. NASA Organization Chart: 1961 . . . . . 222 5. NASA Organization Chart: 1963 . . . . . . . . . . 224 6. Location of NASA Installations . . . . . . . . 416 vi GLOSSARY BOB Bureau of the Budget csc Civil Service Commission GAO General Accounting Office JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory NACA National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration OART Office of Advanced Research and Technology OMSF Office of Manned Space Flight OSSA Office of Space Science and Applications OTDA Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition PAD Project Approval Document PERT Program Evaluation and Review Technique RIF Reductions-in-Force RTOP Research and Technology Objective and Plan Document v ii Chapter I INTRODUCTION In 1958 the National Aeronautics and Space Administration was 1 created to assure the nation's superiority in space. The support this organization received in its early years was unparalleled for a federal organization. By 1965 its annual appropriation had passed five billion dollars and over 400,000 individuals (contract and civil service) worked on NASA-sponsored projects. Its technological achievements were recognized throughout the world, and the nation's superiority in space was spectacularly made known to the world in 1969 when a NASA astronaut became the first man to walk on the moon. But if its achievements were impressive, equally impressive was its decline. Since 1965 NASA's appropriation level and personnel complement have steadily declined . Its 1977 appropriation was abou t half the 1966 appropriation in constant dollars, and the total civil service and contract employment had shrunk to 124,000 . Congressional and Executive personnel ceilings have resulted in the resignation of some of 2 NASA's top personnel and morale problems at all levels . New field installations were closed to offset the impact of the budget cuts on NASA's total program, and a 1975 internal institutional assessment brought into question the continued existence of some of its major field i. 3 nsta 11 ati.o ns. Equally distressing to NASA's leadership is the continued growth in the Department of Defense's space budge t . In 1981 for the first time NASA ' s share of the United States' space budget was less than the 4 Department of Defense 's. Perhaps more ominous to NASA's future survival 1 2 is Congress's requirement that NASA submit all requests for major program changes to the National Academy of Sciences before submission for 5 approval to Congress. Why did NASA change from a thriving, highly supported organization to one which has lost even the authority to propose major program changes? Was this decline caused by internal management problems, some performance failure on its part, or might the decline better be interpreted as simply the inevitable result of allocative decisions made by Congress after losing interest in space? This study attempts to provide some insight into NASA's decline by examining the historical development of the agency from its creation as the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in 1915 through its metamorphosis as NASA. It was undertaken for three reasons: to provide a more adequate explanation of NASA's decline than currently exists ; to gain some insight into the management of research and development organizations within the federal government; and to determine the utility of using different theoretical perspective 3 for e~plaining how organizations change or in this case fail to change. The findings from the historical study are related to existing theories of organizations, and the weaknesses and strengths of different explanations of NASA 's decline are discussed. 3 INTERPRETATIONS OF NASA'S DECLINE NASA's decline has been attributed by some authors to its Administrator, James Webb's, unwillingness to challenge the Executive Branch's decision in 1965 to lower NASA 's budget despite repeated requests from Congress that NASA's leaders propose programs which they 6 could support with additional funding. Others, while agreeing that NASA's decline began and continued because it was unable to come up with long-term objectives, argued that this failure was the result of an imbalance in the structure of power within NASA. 7 The group responsible for the manned space flight programs was able to virtually control the objectives of NASA because of its size, share of the organization's resources, and the dependence of the agency on the success of the Apollo program. Since the objective of the manned space flight program was to produce a technical capability, not a product which could be used to justify future appropriations, NASA was never able to establish adequate justification for its continued existence or high level of funding when competition for resources became high in the mid and late 196Os. Bauer and Meyer argued in a similar manner that NASA's leaders were never able to integrate the competing groups within NASA in any fashion adequate enough to engag 8 e in long-term planning. NASA, according to these theorists, was not one, but a number of competing bureaucracies whose objectives were never integrated into agency-wide objectives. This lack of coordination and cooperation extended to the performance of the agency's research and development activities, with one group letting 4 contracts for work which another NASA group was already accomplishing. The result was an unwillingness on anyone's part to support another group's programs. Chapman, in contrast to other analysts, concluded that the extensive bureaucratic apparatus which NASA set up for approving and monitoring its programs, stifled research innovation and made it difficult 9 for NASA to retain and attract highly qualified scientists and engineers. But Chapman also argued that NASA never established the informal structure of relationships necessary to assure organizational continuity. Informal relationships developed within project groups and individual field installations and ended with the completion of the project. NASA's Interpretation of Its Decline Although it is difficult to assess what the leadership of NASA felt with regard to the above evaluations, written records of their attempts to manage the decline show individuals very frustrated by the 10 lack of alternatives available to them. Its leaders attributed many of its morale problems to the "Reductions-in-Force" required by the Bureau of the Budget after 1965 and criticized the Civil Service Commission's regulations which NASA's leaders felt made reducing personnel unnecessarily difficult and resulted in the retention of poor performers, while highly qualified scientists and engineers who could obtain employment elsewhere simply left because of the problems created by these regulations. They also felt that Congress and the Executive Branch played a role in many of NASA's problems. The increase in monitoring, which Chapman gives as one of the reasons for NASA's decline, was described by its 5 leaders as necessary in light of the extensive investigations by Congress which followed any t e chnical failure. Its inability to produce new ideas was said to have occurred because the Executive Branch and Congress felt that research studies were only a bureaucratic mechanism for starting high cost projects. This prevented the accomplishment of the studies which could have produced new ideas and the basic research necessary to generate new technology. They argued that those individuals whose proposals for research studies were turned down simply left the organization in frustration. Cancellation of scientific programs which had been supported for many years by some scientists was said to have resulted in the withdrawal of the support of the scientific community- -the only other mechanism for obtaining new ideas. NASA's leaders did not disagree with the conclusion that the manned space flight group had enormous power within NASA, but they pointed out that the alternative of not providing the greatest amount of its resources to the manned space flight program never existed. It was the reason for the agency's existence and one accomplishmen t which all observers could understand and support, whatever the long- term consequences of accepting the manned space flight group 1 s objectives. The Importance of NASA's Decline While the above explanations offer a great deal of insight into NASA's current situation, they raise as many questions as they answer. Competing groups exist in all organizations, and yet these organizations have found ways to resolve the conflicts and obtain adequate funds. All f e deral agencie s have been require d to adop t bureaucratic structures s imi l a r to NASA' s , a nd ye t mo s t h ave manage d t o genera t e a dequate s upport 6 to ensure their continual funding. The decline in resources and manpower undoubtedly affected NASA's management's ability to manage the organization, but other organizations have gone through periods of decline and not only survived, but even pros 1p 1 ered. What, then, made NASA unique among these organizations? Perhaps most important, the explanations of NASA's decline, with the exception of that given by its leaders, ignore the role other groups played in NASA's downfall. Congress not only approved NASA's funding, it also evaluated its performance, and placed constraints on its ability to respond to the drop in funding. As NASA's leaders pointed out, various agencies in the Executive Branch eliminated many of the alternatives available to them after the cuts began. Leaving these questions unanswered seems unacceptable. If, as some of the above theorists argued, NASA's decline was partially related to its structure, then some effort should be made to find out why NASA's structure developed in the manner that it did. If NASA's decline is interpreted as a political decision which reflected a loss of interest in the achievement of major space advancements, then determining what the consequences of these decisions are remains important in making future policy decisions. The build-up of teams of scientists and engineers during the early 1960s was not only costly in terms of monetary resources but also in terms of the loss of these individuals' skills for other research and development projects. The breakup of these teams with little consideration of the impact on these individuals or our future capabilities is perhaps the most serious consequence of NASA's de:::line, and it appears to have been done with little understanding of the costs to the nation . If, as NASA's leaders argued, the decline could have been accomplished with less damage to the organization as a whole, as well as 7 to individual scientists and engineers, understanding why this was not accomplished so that future budget cuts can be more meaningfully managed seems important to anyone interested in organizations, but particularly to those interested in the management of research and development organizations. 8 AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH The study differs from the above in a number of importan t way s . It focuses on the relationships established both internally and with external actors with the assumption that an organization's internal management cannot be separated from its external relationships and the requirement s that external actors place on the organization. It also differs in that it presents a historical study rather than looking at NASA during one period of time or only after 1965 with the assumption that a more adequate explanation of NASA's decline could be given if there were a greater understanding of the factors leading to its decline. Finally, it not only examines other explanations of NASA 's decline in l ight of the findings from the case study, it also attempts to look at NASA from a number of different theoretical perspectives. Each of these differences is discussed in turn below. The Executive Function Rather than limiting the study to such factors as the number of competing g roups or methods of controlling subordinates, the study focuses on the performance of the executive function. To justify this focus, it 12 is necessary first to explain how the term ' executive function' is used . The executive function is defined a s the responsibility of executives to maintain an equilibrium between demands being made upon them by external actors and those being made by their subordinates in a manner which will ensure the organization's survival. In general this involves providing the organization' s c lientele with some type of product which will satisfy the clients and ensure that its suppliers, whether they be a political body s uch as Congress or the clients t hemselves as in t he case of most private 9 organizations, will provide adequate funds to meet the needs of the organization. To accomplish this, executives must either through negative or positive inducements convince their employees to produce at the level necessary to ensure that they receive adequate funds. Consequently, there is a very direct link between an organization's e.."Cternal environment and its internal management which cannot be ignored. Public organizations present a special case because the link is more formal in that other organizations, such as the Civil Service Connnission, can require it to meet certain demands which have little to do with the actual objective of the organization. Personnel regulations are only one of the many e..~amples of these types of demands. An executive in a public organization is thus not only faced with finding some equilibritnn between the demands from external and internal actors, but also establishing this equilibritnn within a set of rules and regulations which might make doing so even more difficult. I assume that adequate performance of this function requires that an organization's leaders establish an authority structure and objective which. are accepted as legitimate by subordinates. Authority structures are divided into two types--those based on expertise and those based on position, but most organizations are assumed to have a mixture of the two. This is true particularly for research organizations in which scientists and engineers may accept the authority of non-technical superiors to make decisions about administrative matters, but not about their research. The term 'obje~tive' or 'goal' is used rather broadly to refer to what Barnard calls the purpose of the organization. It is the end toward which the activities of the organization are directed. For example, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the organization which was 10 re-created as National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1958, had as its purpose the advancement of aviation. Its members believed that the best method of accomplishing this was through basic and applied research. The specific projects in which it engaged changed through the forty-four years of its existence; but this underlying purpose remained the same. I argue that an organization's purpose plays an important role in its survival because it is the criterion which is used to make decisions about the organization's activities. Without a legitimized purpose, executive leaders have no way of evaluating the importance of any activity to the organization's future survival, nor do they have any way of justifying their decisions to either subordinates or external actors responsible for their funding. I will argue that NASA's decline can most adequately be explained as a failure of the executive function. To be more specific, I will argue that NASA's leaders for various reasons failed to establish either an authority structure or purpose which was accepted as legitimate by their subordinates. They failed to understand both the importance of expertise as a source of authority to scientists and engineers and the importance of basic and applied research to obtaining their objectives. The result was that these individuals were unwilling to accept their authority and either left the organization or stopped presenting their ideas to NASA's leaders. NASA's leaders were in the end left without a mechanism for providing the organization with ideas about new technologies. They had, either because of their own unwillingness to accept the ideas ~f scientists and engineers or because the researchers themselves had given up trying to convince their superiors, no group which could provide the stimulus for the change in research activities nec essary to maintain Congress's support. It was 11 the executive function failure. which. led to the declj_ne in the :f;irs.t place, as well as made the impact of the cuts- in appropriations- and personnel so devastating to the organization. The Case Study The study presents a historical study of the development of NASA from the creation of its parent organization, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), in 1915 through NACA's re-creation as NASA in 1958. It ends in the late 1960s shortly after the resignation of NASA's second administrator, James Webb. NACA was included in the examination of NASA both because it was difficult to ignore the enormous role it played in NASA's development and because it could be used to show how another research organization coped with changes in its environment. Since I was interested in understanding the. relationship of the external environment to the management of organizations, the fact that NACA's period of existence spanned a time frame during which there were major changes in the management of federal organizations makes it very useful for unders-tanding the changes which occurred, as well as showing how another research organization copied with the changes. The fact that NACA was for many years successful in coping with the changes makes it particularly useful for understanding where NASA's leaders failed. NACA also went through a period in which its survival came into question, but in contrast to NASA it was able to respond in a manner which ensured its survival. Its reaction to this crisis period will be used to show the differences between two organizations' method of searching for solutions to a threatening environment. I will argue that NACA's leaders had established an authority structure and purpose which 12 was acceptable by their subordinates and were thus able to avoid the decline which faced NASA. Finally, NACA will be used to explain why it was so difficult for NASA's scientists and engineers to accept the authority structure based on position which NASA's leaders attempted to establish. NACA's scientists and engineers, as were many of the other researchers brought into NASA, were used to an authority structure based on expertise. Their superiors before joining NASA were scientists and engineers, most of whom were well respected in their fields. The origins of many of NASA's problems can be traced to this fact. The decision to end the study in the late 1960s was made for the simple reason that NASA's history after this period has only been one of continued decline. In 1969 this observation could obviously not have been made with as much certainty as today, but even at this early stage, NASA was displaying most of the symptoms of a declining organization. As I will discuss in the case study, it was, by the end of the 1960s, plagued with morale problems; having difficulty attracting and retaining highly qualified scientists and engineers, as well as promoting them; suffering from a high level of competition over remaining resources with dissatisfaction displayed about the level o f resources allocated to the manned space flight program; rapidly losing external sources of support; connnitting a high level of its resources to coordinating and monitoring its work activities; and continually raising the organizational level at which f i. na 1 d eci..s i.o ns were ma d e . lJ The choice of 1965 as the starting date of this decline was somewhat arbitrary and based primarily on the fac t that this was the year when the cuts in appropriat ions and personnel levels began. This is said 13 with some caution since, as w1ll be discussed in the case study, NASA's scientists and engineers were indicating their dissatisfaction with the situation within NASA prior to 1965. Finally, some note should be made of some problems created by using the case study approach. As with other case studies, it is difficult to generalize its conclusions to other organizations. This seems particularly to be the case with regard to NASA, which is unique in a ntm1ber of ways. As a research and development organization, it faced many problems which other government organizations do not face. The changes in federal management policies made it necessary for many research and development organizations to change their methods of accomplishing their activities, if for no other reason than the fact that many scientists and engineers were unwilling to accept the authority structure necessitated by the changes. ?he changes, as will be discussed in the analytical section, had less of an impact on organizations with staffs who were more amenable to structures based on position. NASA was also unique among research and development organizations. It was composed of a numbec of organizations which before their inclusion in NASA were used to an authority structure based on e.xpertise, and which had primarily been small in-house research groups. This presented it with many difficulties which most leaders of other government organizations do not face. For this reason, any conclusions from the study are only tentative and require additional studies of other organizations before they can be confirmed. 14 The Analytical Section The third difference between this study and others is that I will examine not only other explanations of NASA's decline and relate them to my findings, but also attempt to look at NASA from a number of different perspectives. I will conclude from my examination of other explanations (e . g., interference from external actors, competing groups) that neither my argument or the findings from the case study preclude accepting these explanations. NASA's decline can probably best be explained as the end result of a number of interacting factors . I argue, though, that the failure of the executive function provides a more complete explanation of why it began to decline and the enormous impact that the cuts in appropriations and personnel levels had on the organization. In addition, I will examine my findings from the case study using a number of different theoretical perspectives. This was undertaken to see if a more adequate explanation of NASA's decline could be given if I was not limited by one theoretical framework. I will use the executive function perspective to focus my examination and to explain how NASA's leaders failed. Cyert and March's problemistic search theory will be used as a mechanism for understanding how organizations change and to link the 14 executive function failure to the actual decline. The structuralist approach or those set of theories which examine organizations and their relationships with external actors over time will be used to show how 15 NASA differed from other organizations which existed during the 1960s. 15 METHODOLOGY The primary source of data for the analysis was the offici al 16 records of NACA and NASA. These records are e x tensive a nd particularly in the case of NACA go down to the level of handwritten no tes among staff all the members. Although the sheer volume of data prevented revi ewing records, an attempt was made to selectively review those m aterials which might provide some insight into the structure of the org an ization. In ongressional addition, minutes of conrrnittee meetings, NACA Annual Repo rts, C Hearings, and reports of oversight agencies (e.g., General Accounting Office) were reviewed. Public accounts (books, articles, and newspaper clippings) were used to supplement this review. In the c a se of NASA, these sources were supplemented by reports of NASA contrac tors on the organization. Many of these reports, since they evaluated some aspect of NASA's performance, were found to be fruitful s ources of i nformation on the organization. Since NASA also keeps copies of interview notes, both thos e done in-house and by individuals under contract, these were also examined with the hope that some insight could be gained on the perceptio ns of 17 organization members a bout NASA. Some note should be made of the problems assoc iated with t he data . ot all records were reviewed nor were these r e cords c omple te. First, n NACA's records alone comprise 5,232 cubic feet at the Nati onal Archives and . 18 Re cor d s Se rvice. They are also recognized a s incomplete and do not clude the records of many of the NACA laboratories nor rec ords on the in or ganization kept by other archiva l sources ( e . g. , Smithso nian, Johns Hop kins University) or ev e n those remainin g in the NASA Hi story Of f i ce . NASA rec ords pre sent even more diff icul t y . NASA i s r equire d by l a w t o 16 19 ma k e i? ts operations open tothe pu bli. c. This makes it a fascinating organization to study, but also leaves one innnersed in so much detail that it is difficult to understand the organization at all. Numerous histories of its ventures have been published, but they are primarily descriptive narratives largely devoid of attempts at analytic inquiry. It is easy to find out the name of a chimpanzee sent into space, but very difficult to determine the organizational arrangements which surrounded the ascent. This problem is compounded by the fact that any organization can destroy those records which it does not want reviewed or can at least make them difficult to find. Written records also do not contain those numerous verbal agreements which play such an important role in the development of any organization. This problem was somewhat alleviated by a review of the personal accounts of the NACA and NASA's staff, but these accounts obviously introduce their own biases. Personnel and appropriation data were reviewed, but their validity is questionable. This is particularly true in the case of NACA's records. Its leadership refused to classify their employees according to federal guidelines. This refusal was based on a belief that classification of their employees was the first step toward taking away their researchers' autonomy. This problem was exacerbated by the fa c t that the laboratories had a great deal of discretion with regard to personnel management, and no two laboratories operated exactly the same way. Administrative and personnel matters were considered secondary to the research work, and attempts to track employ ees took valuable time away from the r e al work o f the laboratories. This attitude continue d through the c reat io n o f NAS A. As l ate as 1966, an in-house r e port on personnel ma n a gement f ound tha t 17 NASA leadership was unable to track personnel and relate them to research and development needs for the simple reason that each field installation had its own personnel management system. Civil Service Evaluations continually found their personnel classification system inadequate with little uniformity among the NASA field installations, least of all with Ci. vi? 1 S 20 ervi. ce regu1 ati.o ns. Notwithstanding these problems, I f elt that rely ing on these records was the only way that a historical study of this nature could be accomplished. Interviews and personal observations not only have their own particular problems, but also are more suited to one point in . 21 time. Although some thought was g iven to using interviews to obtain data on NASA's current situation, I felt that, if properly interpreted and in adequate quantity , written records would provide as much i. n f ormati. on on t h e organ.i zati.o n as i. ntervi.e ws. 22 18 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY The study is divided into descriptive and analytical sections. The first section presents a case study of the historical development of NACA and NASA and is largely descriptive in nature. It is divided into three chapters, each of which discusses a period in which the organization has been through a major change in its management or research activities. Decisions about which periods to examine were based on a review of the history of NASA and NACA, other authors' conclusions about important periods in the history of the two organizations, and my own judgment. In general the organizations were examined approximately ten years after there was a major change in their external relationships in order to determine the impact of these changes on the organization. To avoid discussing temporary reactions to these changes, the organizations were not examined innnediately after the change. Rather than presen ting the story of NACA and NASA as a strict historical chronology, I have chosen to discuss the organizations ' external and internal management during one period of time and to follow this by an examination of those factors which I felt played a role in the establishment of new external and internal relationships. This was done to avoid innnersing the reader in details which had no relationship to the c entral argument and in recognition of the fact that a c omplete organizational history of NACA and NASA would require two or three volumes. The first chapter discusses the research activities, external r ela tions, and i n ternal manag ement of NACA in t he la t e 1920s. NACA , wh ich wa s creat e d in 1 915, ha d by this t ime fo rma lize d i t s r ela t i onships a nd 19 settled on those research activities in which it was to engage until World War II. The period prior to this time was one in which NACA was continually changing these relationships and research activities. The second chapter describes the organization as it existed i n the mid-1950s or shortly before Sputnik was launched and the transformation into NASA. This period was selected for two reasons. NACA had gone through a period after World War II when its continued existence as an independent organization was at stake. By the 1950s it had resolved this problem and re-established new relationships with external actors . In contrast to NASA's leaders, NACA's leaders were able to cope with a threatening environment and adopt new research activities which Congress and the Executive Branch were able to support. NACA, during this period, also was faced with requirements from external actors for changes in its internal management. Its staff's response to these demands provides some indication of the problems which faced NASA in the years following its creation. The third chapter discusses NASA during the late 1960s . NASA by this time had shown the world that the nation's technical capabilities in space were greater than the Russians ' and thus achieved its major objective. It was already suffering from the impact of personnel ceilings and budget cuts which had started in 1965. In contrast to NACA, it had after ten years of existence not been able to establish stable internal and external relationships. In the second section I present my interpretation of NASA ' s decline in light of the findings from the case study and existing theories of organizations. The f ifth chapter is devot e d to the development o f my argument in light o f the f indings. The six th and seventh chapters discuss 20 how my argument is related to other explanations of NASA's decline and existing theories of organization. The final chapter reviews the findings and their management and policy implications. The limitations of the data, as well as the exploratory nature of the study, imply that any conclusions I present are highly tentative in nature. I am primarily interested in raising some questions about the management of research and development organizations and the public policies which are adopted to guide them. I might also note that the study does not address the problem of what specific research and developmen t policies there should be or even if there should be public support of research and development projects. I accept such decisions as the one to g o to the moon as a given. Notes l Public Law 85-568 , 85th Cong., H.R. 12575, July 29, 1958 . 72 Stat. 426. The appropria tions and personnel statistics presented in this section were obtained fro~ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, United States Civilian Space Programs: 1958-1978 , Committee Print, 97th Cong., 1st sess., J a nuary 1981 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981); and Jane van Nimmen and Leonard C. Bruno, with Robert L. Rosholt, NASA Historical Data Book 1958- 1968, Vol. l; NASA Resources, ~ASA Publication #SP 4012 (Spring f ield, Va.: National Technical Informat i on Service, 1976). Appendix A c ontains a breakdown of NASA's personnel and appropria tions. 2 NASA's morale problems have been the subject of numerous internal investiga tions and other studies. See U.S . Civil Service Commission, "Evaluation of Personnel Management NASA Nationwide, August 1967, and the numerous Memoranda for the Record made in response to this evaluation; NASA, "Consideration in the Management of Manpower in NASA, September 8, 1966," Report of the ad hoc HASA Manpower Utilization Committee _ (Hjovnivik Re port); 1975 Institutional Assessment; "Shuttle Program Mangement Assessment," September 12, 1 979, Submitted by Special Staff of Individual Consultants, Ma rked " For Official Use Only." The results and details of the investigations are stored in the NASA History Office files. NASA is currently in the process of preparing an assessment of their management problems for Congress. 3 Ames, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Lewis have been under threat of closure or transfer to another organization for some time. Se e Appendix B for location and name of a ll NASA center s . 4 John Noble Wilford, "Space a nd the American Vision," The New York Times Magazine, April 5, 1981, pp. 53f f . 5 See "Science Academy Voted Role in NASA Projects," Avia t ion Week and Space Technology, December 1, 198 0, p. 20. The justifica tions for this transfer were c ost overruns and technical problems on most of NASA's proj e cts . The irony is that one million dollars o f NASA's research and program management fund was designated for the review of its programs by the National Academy of Sciences. 21 22 6 See U.S. House, Toward the Endless Frontier: History of the Connnittee on Sciences and Technology, 1959-1979 (Washington, D.C.: U. S . Government Printing Office, 1980); Raymond A. Bauer, et a l., NASA Planning and Decision Making, Final Report, 2 vols. Contract NGR 22-007-163, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, 1970; Transcript of Proceedings, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. "Management Advisory Panel Meeting," April 19, 1968, Washington, D.C. >IASA History Office Files. The latter presents some of Webb's views on management. Before being appointed as Administrator of NASA, Webb was the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. This appointment was felt t o have influenced his refusal to challenge the executive branch 's decision on NASA 's budget and objectives. Whatever his beliefs, his departure in 1968 resulted from a confrontation with President Johnson over the continual c uts in NASA's budget. His concern abou t NASA 's future is probably best presented in " Ad dress by James E. Webb, Administrator NASA ," John Diebold Lecture on Technological Change a nd Management. Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration, Boston. Mass ., September 30 , 1968, in which he argues that the U.S. through its expenditure policies was accepting a "second-rate position in space"; p. 4 . 7 Emmette S. Redford and Orion F . White, " What ~fanned Space Flight Program after Reaching the Moon? Government Attempts to Decide: 1962-1968." NASA Research Grant :JGL 33-022-090. Syracuse/ NASA Program, December, 1 971 . NASA History Office Files. 8 Bauer, lac. cit. 9 Richard L. Chapman. Project Management in NASA : The System a nd the Men (Wash., D.C.: NASA, 197 3 ). Chapman bases these observations on interviews with NASA staff members. Many critics of NASA have also focused on the bureaucratic structure of NASA as a reson fo r its continued decline. See Richard Goody, Michael McElroy, and Philip Morrison, "Huma n Issues in Space Exploration," Bulletin of the American Academv of Arts and Sciences, Vol. X.,'UCIII, No. 8 (May 1980), pp. 10-13. 10 The following description of the reactions of NASA 's leadership to its decline was based on numerous documents in NASA 's History Office Files. Specific examples will be cited in the case study. Also see National Academy of Public Administration Foundation, "Report of the -Ad -Ho-c Panel on Attracting New Staff a nd Reta ining Capability during a Period of Declining Manpower Ceilings," June 1973, NASA History Office Files, Washington, D.C. 23 11 See particularly Alfred D. Chandler, Jr F .,o r Gd, i aG nte n Eer na tl e rM po rt io sr es ,, and the Au tomobile Indust B ryra ce & (New W Yoo rr kld : , I Hn ac r., 196 c4 o) u. rt, The National Adv A ise oro ryn a Cu oti mc ms itw teh ei c h f ow r ill be discussed in the c p ae sr ei o sd t uo df y d we ec nl ti n te h rf oo ul glo hw ai ng World War II and ma n de ec e thss oa sr ey ct ho a ne gn es su re its survival. 12 The explanation given of executive func C tih oe ns t re er liB ea sr n ha erd a, v iF lyu n oc nt ions of the Executive (C Pr ae ms bs r, 193 i8 d) g. e : HarA vl as ro d s Ue ne i vJa em rse is t yG . March and Herb ( eN re tw AY . o Srk im: onJ ,o h On r gW ai nle izy a tions & Sons, 1958), for p a ro dp iso cs uit si so in os n o of f w thh ea t vi as r iog uen s erally known as the induce th me eo nr ty s. / contributions 13 These c h aracter1. st1. cs are a compos.i t o eb o f s erv ot h ati eo rn s aut h ors I with r egard to declining organiz I an tis oid ne s. Bu Sr ee ea u Acr na thc oy n y ( DB oo wst no sn , : Little, Brown a n L d. CS oti mn pc ah nc yo ,r n 1b 9e 6, 7" )S ; oc Aia rl t hS urt ructure and Organ O izr ag ta ion niz sa ,"ti o Hn as n, dbe od o. k J oam f es G. March (Chicago: Ra P ndu b Mli cs Nhi an llg y C Co 19 o. l, 6 l 5 e) g, e pp . 142-193; William H. Gr So tw at rh b ua cn kd , D "Oev re gl ao npm ize an tit o," n aH la ndbook of Organizations, ed. Ja (C mh ei sc a Gg .o : M aR rca hn d McNally College Publishing Co F .,r ee 1m 9a 6n 5 )a , nd p pM . i 4c 5ha 1e -5l 5T 3. ; H Ja on hn na n, "Growth and De O clr ig na e n Piz ra ot ci eo sn ss e, s" iA nm erican Sociological Revie R wic h 4a 0 rd ( 1M 9. 7 5C ),y e pr pt, . " 2T 1h 5e - 2M 28an ; agement of Univer D sie tc iere sa s oi fn g C oS niz se ta, n" t P ou rb lic Administration Review , V ( oJ lu . ly 3/ 8 ,A u Ngust 1 o9 . 7 48 ), pp. 344- 350; Irene Rubin, R "e Ptr oe ln ic th im cse n at ni dn the City: A Case Study," paper P po rl ei sti ec na tel dS c ai te n tc he e M Me ide t Win eg ss t, April 1979; Albert a n 0d . L Ho iry sa cl ht my: a n, R Ees xp io tn , se Vs o it co e Decline in Firms, O (C rgam anb ir zid ag tie o, nM s,a s as n: d H Sta arv tea srd University Press, 1970). 14 Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A B th ee h aF vi ir om r al( E Tng hl ee ow ryo od o f Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963). 15 See Stinchcombe, lac. cit.; Howard P f Ei .f f Aer l, d ri" cE hn v ai nro dn m Jee fn ft rs e yo f Organizations," An pp 79 n- u. 1 a0 l 5 R; eviews a In nd c .M , ic 1h 9a 7e 6l , T . Hannan and John H. E c Fo rl eo eg my a no ,f "O Tr hg ea n Piz oa pt ui lo an tis o, n" Environments and Org M ae ny ie zr a ta in od n sA , s es do sc .i a Mtes a rs( hS aa ln l F Wr . ancisco: Jossey-B p ae sr ss p Pe uc bti lv ise h w eri sl ,l 1b 9e 7d 8i )s . cu Tss he e d in greater detail in Chapter 7. 24 16 Staff members o f the NASA Headquarters History Office have prepared extensive reports on the a vailability and integrity of NASA records and data . These can be obtained by contac t ing this o f fice . Of particular interest are the bibliographical essay of Alex Roland, Research by Committee, A History of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics: 1915-1958, Comnent Edi tion, April 1980; and by the same author, A Guide to Research in NASA History, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C .: NASA, September 1979). 17 Interviews with NASA staf f members are recorded and k e pt on file in the History Office. These are in most cases of two t ypes : (1) interviews which c ontractors have undertaken, and ( 2 ) wha t NAS A calls exit interviews. The latter interviews are those which NASA st a ff give shortly before they leave the organization. 18 See Roland, op . cit ., for a discussion of the problems and the location of these data . 19 Public Law 85 - 568, 85th Cong., H.R. 12575. July 29, 1958, 72 Stat . 426 . 42 U.S.C . 2454 . For a compilation of the texts of all public laws relating to aeronautical and space research, see U.S . Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, National Aeronautics a nd Space Administration Act of 1958, as amended, and related legislation, Committee Print, 95th Cong., 2d sess ., Washington, D.C .: U.S. Govt . Printing Office, 1978. 20 NASA has gone through a number of evaluations by the Civil Service Commission because of its personnel management system. See particularly, " Evaluation of Personnel Management System, " op. c i t. NASA ' s response and Headquarters evaluations of the field installations are contained in the files for 1967-1968, but similar reports exist for most years . 21 I might note here that I was employed by the Goddard Space Flight Center , NASA, in the mid-1970s . The observations I ma de while employed t here were not made part of the current study, but were used to evaluate some of the more recent data I reviewed . 22 Th ere i? s some precedent for this approach . See Alfre d D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass .: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977); Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The Svstem Worked (Washington, D. C.: The Brooking s Institution, 1979); A. Hunter Dupree, Science in the Federal Government ( Cambrid ge , Mass.: Th e Be l knap Press of Harvard university Press , 195 7); James C. Thompson, Ro l ling Thunder (North Ca roliua: unive rsity o f North Ca r olina , 19 79 ) . Section I NACA and NASA : 1015-1970 NASA 's organizational history started in 1915 with the creation of the Na tional Advisory Conrrnittee for Aeronautics. This section, which contains the case study, traces NACA 's development from 1915 until its transformation into NASA in 1958 and NASA's development until the end of the 196Os. It is divided into three chapters, the first of which describes NACA as it existed in 1927. This is followed by a chapter which discusses NACA's development up to 1958. The final chapter describes NASA as it existed in the late 196Os. 25 Chapter 2 NACA IN 1927 INTRODUCTION On March 3, 1915, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics was established through a rider attached to the Naval Appropriations 1 Act. The rather ambiguous one-page legislation established a committee composed of twelve unsalaried members appointed by the President from both the public and private sectors and appropriated five thousand dollars for its needs. Although the legislation did not specifically order the establishment of research laboratories, it did state that, In the event of a laboratory or laboratories. either in whole or in part, being placed under the direction of the committee, the committee may direct and conduct research and experiment in aeronautics in such laboratory or laboratories .?? 2 What Congress expected of this new Committee was equally broad and vague. It was to determine the aeronautical problems requiring solution, discuss their solution, and supervise the scientific research required to solve the problems of flight. Whatever their mandate, the members of the Advisory Committee acted like they knew exactly what was expected of them. In their first meeting on April 23 1915 they formulated the rules and regulations for the ' ' conduct of their new organization as specified in NACA's legislation. Between 1915 and 1927 they proposed eighteen amendments to these rules and regulations but these amendments were minor or primarily involved the new ' research laboratory. No additional amendments were proposed until 1944. 26 27 Within six months the Advisory CoI'!lillittee requested funds for a laboratory in Hampton, Virginia. By 1927 this laboratory was engaged in those research activities wnich it was to perform with little change until after World War II and witn an organizational structure which allowed the laboratory to perform its technical activities to the satisfaction of its 3 researchers and the Committee members. The twelve-member committee by 1927 was assisted by a research agency employing 165 individuals and numerous corrnnittees which reviewed and disseminated aeronautical research not only in the United States but also in Europe. Its five thousand dollar appropriation had increased to an annual appropriation of over five hundred thousand dollars. It is hard though to argue that NACA's development was the result of any systematic plan on anybody's part. NACA in the beginning performed a number of technical research activities which it later dropped when external actors found for some reason that NACA's performance of these activities was unacceptable. The Advisory Committee also attempted to establish a different structure from the one which existed in 1927, but this attempt also failed. Rather than a planned development, NACA appeared to develop rather haphazardly in response to each situation it encountered. The individuals who made up NACA did not choose a specific technical activity or type of structure from all the alternatives available. Rather they settled on the task which met three criteria. It needed to be accomplished to advance aviation. It was not being accomplished adequately, if at all, by others, and its performance brought no criticism whic h "'-:ACA' s leaders f elt could seriously hurt the organization. The structure, on the other hand, was influenced by the nature of NACA's work, Ill 28 the philosophies of the leaders and staff members and the constraints presented by the environment. The purpose of this chapter is to show how and why NACA developed in the manner it did. The first part of the chapter describes NACA as it existed in 1927. The second is devoted to a discussion of those events and factors which played a role in the formation of the 1927 organization. 29 NACA IN 1927 INTRODUCTION In contrast to the vertical hierarchical structure administered by a single individual appointed by the President existing in most government agencies today, NACA in 1927 a nd throughout its history had wha t amounted to a two-tier structure. As Figure 1 shows, the first tier consisted of the Advisory Committee, the Executive Committee, and the various technical committees and subcommittees. The second tier consisted of the Langley Rese a rch Laboratory under the direction of Henry J. E. Reid. What tied the two g roups t oge ther was the relationship which developed between Joseph S. Ames, the Chairman of the Executive and Advisory Committees, George W. Lewis, the Director of Aeronautical Research, and John F. Victory, the Secretary for NACA. These three individuals formed a triumvirate which ruled NACA unti l World War II. Dr. Ames, a physicist, while not engaged in the da y-to-day operating matters of the research laboratory, worked with Lewis in establishing the policies and research progr a ms of NACA. The Advisory Committee with the assistance of the t ec hnical committees and subcommittees was r esponsible for general policy dec isions, supervision of the a ge ncy's research activities, a nd NACA's r elat i o n ships with other organizations, but as Chairman, Ames was able to guide the vario us committees in the dir ec tion he desired. Lewis, an e ng ineer, was responsible fo r exec uting and dire ctin g NACA 's activi ties and any resea r ch conduc t ed a t Langley or a t other laboratories under contrac t to NACA for specific research projects. He 30 Advisory Committee (Chairman-Walcott) Executive Committee ..__ Special Committees Technical Commit tees ,,,,? (Chairman-Ames) Subcommittees Secretary Director of Aeronautical (Victory) Research (Lewis) Administrative Technical Langley Laboratory (Reid) F; _gW t e, 1 NACA's 1927 Organization Chart 31 r e port e d dir ectly to Ames and was an ex o66ic.J..o member of all technical committees. He prepared NACA's Annual Report and performed those activities related to Congress and the Executive Branch, as well as acted as the Committee's liaison with the military services, other government agencies, private industry, and universities when necessary . Victory served as Secretary of the Executive Committee and as general administrator for the Langley Research Laboratory. He directed the administrative work of NACA and supervised its expenditures and personnel employment. The various committees and subcommittees provided technical and administrative assistance to the Advisory Committee. They had no formal or legal control over the Research Laboratory, but made recommendations a bout Langley's research proposals to the Advisory Committee. NACA performed two types of activities: in-house aeronautical research and the coordination of e xternal aeronautical research. The first was performed at the Langley Laboratory and primarily consisted of applied aerodynamical research. The latter function was performed by the Advisory Committee with the support of the various committees and the headquarters unit under the direction of Lewis and Victory. NACA worked for and with a small group of organizations and was largely unknown outside of the aeronautical research community . Its leadership had established good relationships with a number of Congressmen, and its requests for funds were generally approved with f ew comments. It had from the beginning maintained strong ties to the military service s who were the major use rs o f it s s ervices . 32 GENERAL MANAGEMENT NACA developed a rather unique committee structure to fulfill its Congressional mandate. The Advisory Committee was the main committee responsible for exercising all the functions authorized by NACA's legislation, but it was the Executive Committee, composed of seven of the original twelve Advisory Committee members which actually performed the executive functions of the organization. Lewis and Victory with the assistance of Ames were responsible for the day-to-day general management of the organization. Reid, the Director of Langley. reported directly to Lewis and was responsible for the direction and coordination of the research activities at Langley. The Advisory/ Executive Committees The Advisory Committee was composed of twelve unsalaried representatives of the aeronautical research community. Seven of the members were government representatives and five were representatives from t h e private ae . rona 4 utical researc h community. Since the Advisory Conrrnittee met only twice a year, the Executive Committee which met monthly handled most of the work required to maintain NACA. The Advisory Committee and its Executive Committee established general policies for NACA, approved a broad research program based on reconnnendations from the technical committees, other government agencies engaged in aeronautical research, and Ames and Lewis. The Committees were also responsible for the performance of such administrative functions as approving NACA's budget requests and expendi tures. Fina l d e cisions about NACA' s Annual Report to Congress, its technical resear ch reports and what 33 aeronautical research information would be collected and disseminated to other organizations were made by these two committees. The Leadership Although the Advisory Committee had legal authority and responsibility for all of the activities of NACA, it was Ames, Lewis, and Victory who virtually controlled the operations of the organization, the specific research projects which the organization funded, and the formation of NACA's general policies. Victory had full responsibility for the adminis trative and personnel direction of the agency, as well as the disbursement of funds. He reported directly to the Executive Committee secretary, and his direction of the adminis trative affairs of NACA was accepted by both the technical staff and the Advisory Committee. Lewis and Ames exercised their control over the research program and general direction of the organization through their control of the research authorization process and their knowledge of the day-to-day operations of both the Committee and the Laboratory. ~esearch Authorization Process Requests for research came from three sources : (1) the staff at Langle-v?, (2) other government agencies (primarily the military services); and (3) the private sector (primarily industry representatives). In theory all requests once received were sent to the technical committees and subcommittees. The technical committees were responsible for making specific recommendations to the Executive Committee on broad problems and developments in research in the field for which they were responsible. They met twice a year and based their recommendations on their knowled g e of the 34 problem and the advice received from the technical subcommittees under their jurisdiction. The subcommittees were generally responsible for a specialized problem, Although some remained in existence only for a short period of time, others were appointed to handle problems which took many years to solve. There were five subcommittees and seven committes in 5 1927. The Executive Committee then selected those programs which NACA would support from the recommendations submitted by the technical committees. The purpose of this general review was to provide the organization with a research program which reflected the decisions of the various aeronautical experts on the technical committees and subcommittees. The problem was that the system did not work exactly as NACA's leaders' envisioned it. Requests from the Laboratory staff went directly to Reid, and from Reid to L 6 ewis. No staff member was allowed to present any new material to the subcommittees if it had not been approved by Lewis. The requests from government agencies went directly to the Executive Committ c ~, chaired by Ames and staffed by Lewis. They were approved automatically unless research was already in progress on the requests. Requests from the private sector did go directly to the technical subcommittees, but there were a number of factors which mitigated how much influence these subcommittees had even on the approval of these requests. First, NACA's leaders were very wary of approving requests submitted directly by industry--the major source of these requests. For this reason, many industry requests were funneled through the military services 7 and then back to Lewis and Ames, Second, even those which wer e 35 approved were then sent to the Executive Committee where they again had to be approved by Ames. The ineffectiveness of the technical subcommittees is probably best attested to by the continual lobbying by industry to obtain representation on the Adviso r y Committee from which 8 they would have an opportunity to join the Executive Committee. Lewis and Ames also had a great deal of control over the agenda of all the commit tees. Lewis was an e.x 0 1 11ic.J...o member of all the commit tees, and man y staff members attended the meetings in their respective fie l d of interest. The staff's responsibility for the day-to-day administrative affairs of the committees also played a role in what would occur at any meeting. Perhaps the major factor in the role they played in setting the agenda was the fact that they were able to limit what the members of all the committees reviewed. If Lewis and Ames turned down a research req ues t from a Laboratory staff member, the subcommittee never ev 9e n reviewed it . This situation was exacerbated by the fact that both Lewis and Ames approved some r equests without even notify ing the Advisory Committee. In addition, Lewis instructed his staff to present all research authorization requests to the technical subcommittees in a non-technical manner which could be understood by any layman. The reasons for this instruction are eviden t in a memo from Lewis to the staff. Dr. Ames and I both realize the importance of interesting the Committee as a whole in the scient ific research that the Committee is carrying on, but feel that the ma t ter must be presented to the members i n such form t hat it will demand their immediate inter est, an d not be read to them in the form of a report. This will be in line with the f unctions of the Co~mittee, and I feel that will a lso be of a n educational value, as most of the members of the Committee, with the possible exception of Admiral Taylor, do not fully appreciate the necessity of their hearty support of scientific research. 10 36 Although the reason given for this instruction was the lack of technical c ompetence of the members, it also meant that: (1) their approval of any research authorization was less than knowledgeable and probably done with a great deal of guidance from the staff and Lewis; (2) the staff was given a very broad mandate when their research proposals were approved; and (3) the committee members would have difficulty tracking what the staff was doing. Day-to-Day Operations While NACA's leaders argued in just about all its reports that the part-time, unpaid status of its committee members was the key to its success, as well as saved the organization money, it also had the dysfunctional aspect of almost ensuring that the full-time paid staff would develop into the major determiners of NACA's policies and prog 1r 1a ms. The full-time staff was there when problems and questions arose. They defined these problems and questions for the various committees. They had first -hand knowledge of possible solutions and could implement them when the committees were not available . The situation was exacerbated in the case of government committee members. Their membership on the Advisory Committee was linked to their government positions. Consequentl y they did not have the knowledge of NACA's activities which the full-time staff had nor the knowledge of a member from the private sector whose tenure was not b . a .s e 12 d on position. Ames, who was willing to corrrrnit his time to NACA's activities for many years, had the advantage over all those individuals unwilling to do so. 37 Management of the Agency The control of the Advisory Committee over the activities of the organization was further undermined by the amount of discretion given the agency and its staff with regard to technical and administrative matters. If the committee tier of NACA is ignored, the headquarters /research laboratory section of NACA looked at least on paper very similar to a normal bureaucracy. Lewis and Victory directed and coordinated the technical and administrative activities of the organization in much the same manner as any contemporary administrator would. As suggested above, Reid, the Director of the Langley Research Laboratory, reported directly to Lewis and Victory. The laboratory itself was organized into research and administrative divisions which were directly under the control of Reid. This formal structure though did not provide an accurate picture of the actual relationships which existed within NACA. This is best evidenced by examining the process by which the agency accomplished its research activities. The research authorizations approved by the Advisory Committee only provided general guidelines for the laboratory staff. The Director of the Laboratory, Reid, had some control over the priority given the project and allowed his staff to select the means of completing the project. 13 Changes in the research plan, if they were felt to be necessary, could generally be made at the laboratory. Lewis not only condoned interpreting the research authorizations very broadly, but at times allowed research under one research authorization that even Reid felt required a new authorization. 14 Perhaps the best example of the discretion both the laboratory and Lewis felt they had, involved one of the wind tunnels. On April 28 , 1925, the laboratory started work on the wind tunnel . Formal committee approval was not given until Ju 15n e, 1925. 38 The research staff also played a role in this process. Although some projects obviously had to be accomplished, the researchers were allowed to engage in the research which interested them. Whether a particular project was accomplished was heavily dependent upon some staff member taking an interest in it. Those projects without an interested researcher were given to new staff members who might or might not stay interest ed. One research authorization had a twenty-year history and numerous individuals working under it before the results obtained from the work were substantial enough to produce a report. Changes or extensions in the Research Authorizations could be made by attaching an appendix to the original Research Authorization unless the changes exceeded a certain amount or their cost was more than the cost of 16 the original Research Authorization. These required a new Research Authorization. There was also no attempt to separate the c osts of the extensions from the costs of the work performed under the original Research Authorization. No formal procedures wer e required if the research was felt to be going nowhere. As Abbot pointed out, Under the method of control of research used by the NACA which amounts to audit after the fact, it was relatively easy for the laboratory staffs to fail to progress on the problem in which they lacked interest, and to proceed vigorously on those they wanted to pursue. Staff had far more research freedom than in any other g overnment agency, and management insisted on keeping it this way. l7 The Research Authorizations were only required for major programs. Job orders were used for suci1 work as the d evelopment and rnovernment Contra , The Politics of ookings Institution, 1968 ) and Daniel S. Greenberg Br Science (New York : New American Library, 1967). .f_ure 42 Anderton, op. cit ., P? 13. 90 43 Adventures in Research: A Hi story of Ames Edwin P. Hartman, ashington, D.C.: NASA , 19 70), p. 4. Research Center 1940-1965 (W . . n 1 y exam.i ned by the 44 NA CA ' s requests f or appropriations were o f the Committee on Approp riations. nt Offices o Subcommittee on Independe World War II. The d not face an authorizatio n committee until after It di House's Committee on Appropriatio ns generally accepted the Senate recommendations . 45 f Flight: See Richard P. Hallion, "T o Study the Problems o Committee for Aeronautics , The Creation of the Nation al Advisory .C., hed manuscript, NASA Histo ry Office, Washington, D 1911-1915," unpublis cit.; and Hunsaker, loc. cit . loc. 1976; Roland, loc. cit.; Le vine, 46 h 'b. d f om appo.i nti.n g any ~ormnission The President was pro i it e r gress d government employees wi thout the approval of Con Which involve . Bonny, "So tion 9, 35 Stat. 1027, March 4 , 1909. See Walter T by Sec f the NACA, o Quietly .... ," Unpublish ed draft of the History o Much, S Office Archives, Washingt on, D.C. n.d., NASA History 47 n lcott was one of a number o f men who were involved i Wa cit. ntific bureas during this period. See Depree, loc. establishing scie ? d . h "D ocumentary History 48 The major documents are co ntaine int e ttee fo r Aeronautics," type script, n.d., of the National Advisory C ommi fice Archives, Washington, D.C. NASA History Of bid. 49 is memorandum is in the "Docum entary Hi s tory ... ", i Th t to 50 W. Irvi.n Chamb ers, "Re por t on Avia tion," Annual Repo r g hed as Appendix 1 to the Annual Re port the Bureau of Naviga tion, publis tary of the Navy for 1912, pp . 155-169. of the Secre oland , 1 oc . ci . roughly 51 t., both thoLevine, loc. cit., and R that s urrounde d this issue a nd its w the "burea ucratic squab bling" revie CA even after it was creat ed. impact on the NA 52 Chambers, loc. cit. 14, 53 or W. Murray Crane, FebruaryRichard Mac Laurin to Senat imilar a r gument in a lette r to William f. Durand, 1913. Taylor made a s f the Woodward Cormnission and a member o February 13, 1913 . Durand wa s ty. an enginee r at Stanford U niversi 91 54 e Hunsaker, loc. cit., and Ro land, loc. cit., for a Se description of these laborato ries. 55 The United States at the start of World War I had fallen er of the Europeans in this developm ent as indicated by the numb behind France had 1,400; Germany 1,00 0; Planes which they were produc ing. . It was ussia 800, Great Britain 400, and the United States had 23 R s for airplanes during the war , See Hunsaker, dependent on other countrie G. Gray, Frontiers of Flight: The Story of NACA loc. cit.,and George !esearch (New York: Alfred A . Knopf, 1948). 56 p. cit., p. 218. Testimony fro m Joint Cited in Dupree, o , to Consider the Present Or:.an ization of the Signal Service Commission Office cal Survey, Coast and Geodet ?c Survey and the Hydrographic Geologi ncy and the Navy Department, with a V iew to Secure Greater Efficie of blic Service in said Bureau ... , he Pu Economy of Administration of t , 1886, 49th Cong., 1st sess . , Sen. Misc. Doc. 82 ~stimonv, March 15 Allison Commission. Cser. 2345), pp. 23-26. Here after cited as 57 ony from Allison Commission, p p. 999- Ibid., p. 219. Testim y behind some of 1000. The extreme of this vie w was seen in the philosoph in which attempts were made to the industrial research labora tories by rol the engineers completely. See David F. Noble, America cont the Rise of Corporate Capitalis m Q,_esign: Science, Technology and (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1 977), pp. 71 - 72. 58 nittee for Aeronaut ics Aeronautics: Report of the A dvisory Corm cited by Roland, .!_or the Year 1909-1910 (Lond on: HMSO, 1910), pp. 4-5, tual t. The concept of an advisory committee as well as the ac loc. ci legislation which created the British Advisory Committee language of the ongress's ken from the legislation. The difficulty of determining C were ta y f the lack of interest display ed b intent is partially a function o hat ressmen about the NACA. The a ppropriation was small and w Cong n was the result of lobbying e fforts of the various interest was show Participants. 59 em. See Dupree, op. cit., for a di scussion of this probl h ? .f ? ati?o n for providing 60 This assumpti? on was use d as t e Justi ic re try and is revealed in all ear ly Annual Reports. It was mo aid to indus s so much difference believable in 1915 than it is today since there i between military and commerci al airplanes. 61 See Note 1, this chapter. 92 62 See National Advisory Connnittee for Aeronautics, Minutes of Meetings of the Full Committee and the Executive COllllilittee, October 14, 1915 and October 15, 1915, Record Group 255, National Archives, Washington, D.C. This is a simplification of the actual process. The Navy did object to NACA's request and was able to influence President Wilson. A visit by Walcott to a number of congressmen apparently took care of the problem. General Schriven, the NACA chairman at the time and active member of the Army, was responsible for the original idea. Thus the Laboratory's creation may have simply occurred because of interservice rivalry. 63 Appendix A contains a complete personnel and budget breakdown. 64 Griffith to Executive Committee, September 4, 1918. Ames to Durand, August 19, 1918; Victory to Durand, August 31, 1918. These memos are stored in the National Archives, Record Group 255, and at the NASA History Office Archives, Washington, D.C . 65 These duties are specified in the Annual Reports. 66 Leigh M. Griffith, "Final Report of Engineer-in-Charge to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics Covering the Period Ending December 31, 1925." National Archives Record Group 255, Washington, D.C. 6 7 Ibid. 68 0 ne o f the reasons that Griffith left was that Am es was no t satisfied with the quality of the research produced by the Laboratory . 69 Both Gr.if.fit h and Warner questioned Victory's authority to direct the Laboratory. Victory apparently was one of the maj o r reasons for the success of the NACA, but the fact that he was so dif f icult to get along with was one of the reasons for the high turnover at the Langley Laboratory during this period. 70 For example, Walcott, Stratton and Ames. 71 Roland, loc. cit,, describes these a ttempts t o hire sc i e nt ists . 93 72 oland, ibid., p. 1 59. R 73 NACA Annual Repor t for 1g27, 74 ts are discussed b elow, These attemp to justify 75 cit., p. 263, Hu nsaker was trying N Hunsak er, op, ation advancements in Europe, p up with avi cit,, and ACA's failure to kee missile advanceme nts. Levine, op, ermans' ainst NACA on Particularly the G for and ag interesting argum ents Abbot, op. cit., provide th is issue, that such radical 76 e of thinking is The result of this typ nored. s the jet engine a nd rockets are ig advancements a . 77 Appendix A. Roland, op. cit., criticisms of the work 78 from minor These criticisms r anged f the quality of t he work in major critiques o ale, of the subcommitt ees to Millik~n to George Ellery H s. See Robert A. mes to Durand, ~he Annual Report , 1917; A 18; E. B. Wilson to Hale, April 25 uly 31, 19 nd, August 31, 191 8; Griffith 918; John Victory to Dura August 10, 1 tember 4, 1918. to Executive Comm ittee, Sep 79 utive Committee, A pril 8, 1919. Griffith to Exec ting, January land 80 inutes of Executiv e Committee Mee M January 24 , 1918. , 1917. 81 mittee Meeting on Patents, July 10 Minutes of Subcom in Roland, Chapte r 2 . ed This controversy is discuss , Public Law 254, 69th Cong., 1st 82 Air Commerce Act o f 1926 at 568) gave respo nsibility for the 1926 (44 St t of sess., passed May 20, epartmen gulation of civil aviation to the D d re is legislation are Promoti0r. an ns of the drafts o f th port Commerce, The va rious versio Annual Re or 1920, pp. 54-56 and Printed in the NAC A Annual Report f for 1921, pp. 13-21. 94 83 Reorgani zation of the Executive Departments, H. Rept. 93 7, 68th Cong ., 1st sess., to accompan y H. R. 9629, 1924. Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st sess ., Vol . 6 5 , Part 10, p. 10414 . 84 Since the Act gave this r esponsibility t o the Depar t ment of Commerce, it had little choice by 1926 . Chapter 3 NACA IN THE 195Os INTRODUCTION as 7 had a fairly simple fo rmal structure. It w NACA in 192 directed and coordinate d the and engineers who controlle d by scientist s s. Its earchers through the us e of positive incentive Work of it s res exchange of aeronautic al co . forum for the rnmitt e e structure provi ded a l research both within rch info rmation. It ac complished aeronautica resea oduct was ry and through contracts . NACA's principal pr its own laborato this research. It had t wo the NACA Report containing the r e sults of vices and private r clientele for its serv ices--the milita r y ser majo bers of whom were satisfied with its product. Few mem industry--both of ed strong knew of its existence, b ut those who did provid Congress even environment contained fe w d existence. The support for its continue es, and those, such as the competitors who could o ffer similar servic autical r e search, did no t ge in aeron Bureau of Standards whi ch did enga ACA's primary focus. engage in aerodynamical research, which was N NACA's structure in the late 1950s was more In contrast to this, in the informal. NACA no long er played a major role complex and less t a major c onduit betwe en al research nor was i coordination of aeronau tic inued to engage in ilitary services and pri vate industry . It cont the m h search and produce metic ulously edited researc applied aerodynamical re which n advanced e ngineering proj e cts reports, but it also wa s engaged i a nd into daily contact w ith took its r esearc hers ou t of the l a bora tory rt ant fo r our purp oses , i t s e l opment wo r k. Pe rha ps more impo dev ich ll r e se a rch o r gan iza t ion s , wh environment wa s no l on g er a s benign. Sma 95 96 vices similar to NACA's, h ad developed and ended offered the military ser r th nce on NACA. Oversight ag encies had grown in powe e military's depende ACA's early leaders d size and regulated its activities in ways that N an gined. NACA in 1927 had b een one of a number of had never ima A in the which maintained an in-ho use research staff. NAC organizations few government 0s was somewhat of an arch aism. It was one of the 195 nd it was ns which continued to con duct in-house research, a organizatio nt organizations managed b y developme surrounded by large resear ch and rk. NACA continued gle administrators who le t contracts for their wo sin y utation for excellence, bu t it was having difficult to retain its rep ning highly qualified sci entists and engineers in attracting and retai this new environment. y NACA changed The purpose of this chapt er is to show how and wh he first young thriving organizati on of the late 1920s. T from the ization as it existed in t he 1950s in more section examines the orga n actors followed by a section whic h examines the various f detail. This is nges which occurred. Which played a role in the cha 97 I OK THE ORGANIZATION OF NACA: ANOTHER LO INTRODUCTION en NACA in 1927 and the betwe The most visible di fference igure 2 shows, the s was the change in size. As F organization in the 195O 17 members. 1 The four ry Committee had ex panded to include Adviso er Plants, Construc tion, ynamics, Pow st tees--Aero d anding technical co mmit l ived recommendation s from 23 technica e and Operating Probl ems--rec dred individuals. a total membership of nearly five hun subcommittees with close to eight thou sand technical, tee supervised a sta ff of The Commit ee research inistrative individu als located at thr scientific, and adm 2 h stations. laboratories and tw o researc companied by a chan ge in d been ac The change in size ha an of the Departmen t hairm . A new chairman, Jerome Hunsaker, C leadership nstitute of Technol ogy, the Massachusetts I of Aeronautical En gineering at , a physicist and fo rmer Associate ed Ames. 3 Dr. Hugh L. Dryden had replac had replaced Lewis as rds, ctor of the Nationa l Bureau of Standa Dire Dryden was al Research. Perha ps more important, Director of Aerona utic e co-equal ality the operating head of NACA. Th both legally and in re 4 dditional layer of ry had been changed . One a rule of Lewis and V icto a former Langley e mployee, ded. Gus Crowly, authority had also been ad search and as such r esponsible for the ate Director for ReWas the Associ ties of the agency. nical activi Scientific and tech NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AERONAUTICS -- (17 members) I i 4 TECHN ICAL COMMITTEES INDUSTRIAL CONSULTING COHMITTEE and 23 SUBCOMMITTEES (9 members) (448 members includ- HEADQUARTERS OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. ing 49 from NACA) (165 employees) AHES .AERONA~TICA~ LABORATORY \ LANGLEY AERONAUTICAL LABORATORY LEWIS FLIGHT PROPULSIO N (1207 employees) (3239 employees) LABORATORY (2 719 employees) . -- -----7 . ~7 WESTERN COORDINATION OFFICE PILOTLESS AIRCRAFT RESEARCH HIGH- SPEED FLIGHT WRIGHT-PATTERSON (2 employees) STATION RESEARCH STATION COORDINATION (78 employees) (240 employees) OFFICE (2 employees) F, i.9Lt11.e 2 NACA Organization Chart, 1952 "CX?> 99 GENERAL MANAGEMENT structure remaine d very similar committee /agencyNACA's 1950s ions. The 7, with some very important except 2 to that which exi sted in 19 al recognition at deal more integ rated . The form organization was a gre art of the leaders hip of ade him an integra l p of Dryden's autho rity had m ll as the staff mittee members, as we ' the organization. The te chnical com ommittee hierarchy . These changes position in the c had enhanced thei r accompanied by a growing ts were osition of some of the participan in the p ps between indivi duals tionshi zation of the stru ctur e. The rela formali 7. By 1950 it had NACA had been very informal in 192 and groups within ior and gave regulations which guided its behav les and adopted formal ru cipants' authority . some of the parti legal validity to at least !_he Leadership controlled NACA's ry and Ames virtua lly In 1927, Lewis, V icto a ing the Advisory C ommittee, played mmittees, includ activities. The co ess, but this proc ess was tightly on-making proc role in the decisi wis ontrol, at least i n the case of Le trolled by the thr ee. This c con had a great deal o f fficially recogniz ed. Lewis and Victory, was not o erating head of th e r all practical pu rposes was the op power and fo t his tenure desp ite the ou t he remained a su bordinate through agency, bu the istrative talent an d authority over to his admin recognition given onsiderably. Dryd en ed c rangement had cha ng agency. By the 1 950s this ar his rked with Hunsaker before had been a commit tee member and wo tation in his fiel d and had 5 u ent. He had an i nternational rep appointm These t equal to any com mittee member's. s credentials as a s cienti 100 a stature which Lewis was never able to attain. credentials gave him zed through an amendment to NACA's Rules and Dryden was recogni but also as an lations not only as opera ting head of the agency, Regu 6 rrnnittees. Lewis's power stemmed ex 0 66iuo member of all standing co mes' willingness control over information about the agency and A from his hority was his authority over the l aboratory. Dryden's aut to accept ls as ed, and his power came as much from his credentia formally recogniz t to say that the Advisor y his control over informa tion. This is no ut that d not retain its control over the organization, b Committee di s the leaders was recogniz ed and accepted. NACA' Dryden's place among ittee to the 1950s compared the ro le of the Advisory Comm leaders in oration. filled in any private cor p that which the Board of D irectors The Chairman and members of the Committee meet y and constitute in effec t a Board of Directors monthl g f a typical American busi ness corporation, servin o an thout compensation . They elect annually a Chairm wi and a Vice Chairman . . . The position of Chairman at of a 'Chairman of the corresponds in effect to th ation. The Director, the or Board' of a business corp ecutive Secretary, and th e Associate Director for Ex earch, are the full-time career executives whose Res mittee, to each other, and relations to the main Co m o the staff of approxima tely 7,000 employees, are t a President, Executive quite similar to those of President, and General M anager of a corporation. Vice organization They are the executive o fficers of the ? ff . 7 who actually manage its a airs. mpanied by a change in th e relationship This change was acco isory Committee n the staff and the Advi sory Committee. The Adv betwee on the in-house staff for information about in 1927 was very dependen t p between ress of aeronautical rese arch and the relationshi the prog iders. NACA's l eaders NACA's research efforts a nd the efforts of outs ailable to 9S0s had more sources of information than were av in the 1 its leaders in 1927. 101 ulting Committee, composed of the heads of major An Industry Cons ted. Its objective was to keep NACA n crea aviation companies, had be e d industry ndustry's views on the rel ationship between NACA an aware of i eral policy issues. This on gen and to advise the Executiv e Committee gal authority, but the fac t that it was the one committee had no le ory Committee, rather than act with the Advis group which had direct con t r one of the other committ ees, made its contact through Dryden o A's dations difficult to ignore . The ambivalence of NAC recommen olicy was reflected in the ir leadership with regard to this change in p instructions to new commi ttee members. of technical subcommittee s appointed by the Members NACA from outside the Gove rnment are appointed in cities as individuals and n ot their professional capa their employers . . . In orde r to as representatives of promote free discussion, t he meetings of the , the minutes subcommittee are closed; a ccordingly are confidential documents and are made available bcommittee member and his only for the use of a su immediate staff. 8 mittee chnical committees, which provided the Advisory Com The te ams, had also become more With recommendations regar ding future progr 1927 the role of the subc ommittees was at best knowledgeable. In by the control which Lewi s evidenced ambiguous. This was proba bly best rams, but ercised over the formulatio n of NACA's research prog and Ames ex standing which their membe rs had lack of under it was also evident in the and some committee about NACA's policies and programs. NACA's staff le as one of simply rubber stamping decisions members viewed their ro 927 NACA's already been approved by the agency's staff. In 1 Which had es were a valuable tool fo r leaders claimed that these subcommitte subcommittee members determining aeronautical r esearch needs, but the 102 actually p layed a small role in the decision-making process within NACA. Dry den was strongly committed to using the subcommittees to keep himself and the Advisory Committee informed about aeronautical research needs. He not only explained their role, how the research authorization process worked, and the agency's technical activities, he also e xplained what a research program should look like and pointed out It is quite obvious that the ramifications of an adequate research program are so great that no single individual can master or guide the details. The technical staff of the Washington Office has been increased, and we have asked for a further increase in the 1949 budget. I believe that it is your function to determine t he general policy as to the objectives of research in relation to aeronautical development and air policy . Through the standing technical committees, the technical goals in specific fields are reviewed in light of general objectives, and recommendations made to you ... 9 By t he 1950s the subcommittees were recognized as e f fective bodies ev en b y NACA' s cr i tics. Th e Advisory Committee and Dr yden could obtain additional i nformation fr om Headquarters research divisions. A Re search Admini s tration Division reviewed and e dited reports produce d b y NACA' s in-house s t aff . A Research Coordination Division was respon s ible for conducting NACA' s contract researc h program; reviewing prop o sa l s ; pr e paring recommendations on them; and auditing the progress of these c ontra cts. P e rhaps more important were three research divisions ( Propulsion, Aerodynamics, and Aircraft Loads and Structures ) a nd the Oper ating Problems branch under the Re sea rch Coo rdinat ion Divis ion. They were respons ible f or reviewing t he r esult s o f a ll NACA resear c h 103 by ions for future re search. Staffed and determining t heir implicat visory groups provided D ryden and the Ad these technical special ists, e 1920s was only during th ee with technical expertise, which Committ available at the laboratory level. !_esearch Authoriz ations to develop broad p olicy guidelines The procedures use d . The Executive C ormnittee after cedures remained similar to the 1927 pro e military ical committees, t h ng recommendation s from the techn receivi l s, and the Directo r of Aeronautica ices, other govern ment agencie serv f thorizations. Wit h the exception o rch au Research, prepared resea mitted to the ent agencies, all requests were sub requests from gov ernm xecutive Committee es for review, but as the E itte technical subcomm tions of the subco mmittees, out in the descrip tion of the func Pointed 10 h n was not mandato ry. tis submissio ommittee's es differed was at the Executive C Where the procedu r authorizations w as based on a al of specific res earch level. Its appro v plant, operating lative research ne eds in the power review of the re ted nstruction areas. The sta lems, aerodynamic s and aircraft co Prob f expenditure for each area were: used to determine the level o criteria needs? cilities; (2) actual r esearch ' (l) the availabili ty of NACA fa rocedures impleme nted by P relative state of aeronautics. and (3) the re information abo ut the projects n gave the Adviso ry Committee mo Dryde f each n each project, an d the relation o being undertaker., the progress o 11 . Dryden and th e Advisory Project to particu lar program areas their decisions ab out ation on which to base Committee had mor e inform ch the priority of the p rojects in whi the allocation of funds and the 104 for the simple reason tha t they were tracking the agenc y would engage, projects more than Lewis and Ames ever had. progress of the research el was search authorization proc ess at the operating lev The re as more formalized. similar to that which ex isted in 1927, but it w did in 1927, left the con trol over research Headquarters, as it rmal al laboratories. The onl y fo activities in the hands o f the individu nformation System, which was control device was the M anagement Control I 12 the 1927 research authori zation request. Each an expanded version of adquarters approval for r esearch obtain he laboratory was required to -annual (a specific problem) unde rtaken and submit a semi projects d projects). The projec t am (relate report on the status of e ach progr ope of the project and proval contained a genera l description of the sc ap did not specify the meth ods or experiments to be underta ken. It project. There were no f ormal in the Procedures which would be used Each laboratory was pecifications or requirem ents for these reports. s ocedures for producing th e n methods and pr allowed to develop its ow ntained some ports required by headqu arters. Although all co re rent at on costs, how these costs were reported was diffe information irements ry. There was no attempt to standardize the requ each laborato objective was to prevent on an agency-wide basis. The primary relative amount of funds track the duplication of research w ork and to arters made no attempt spent in the four major r esearch areas. Headqu they should be spending on each project to tell the laboratories what rch activities. provide criteria for the evaluatio~ of the resea or to n System was onl y used to The Management Control In formatio comput e r r esear c h we r e track some research activ ities. Instrument and 105 at uarters in any manner. Job orders were used not t racked by headq ufacture, installation, and development laboratory to approve the man each rs) for research uments and computing d evice s (e. g ., compute of instr obtain approval from the projects. The laborat ory staff had to tor, but not from head quarters for these ective laboratory dire c resp job s' staff was not advers e to using items . As in 1927, th e laboratorie when they felt the s rather than formal r esearch authorizations order research wouldn't be a pproved. dget division was respo nsible for The headquarters' bu funds among ng the annual budget a nd allocating agency prepari ions ts. Af ter receiving th e Research Authorizat organizational uni ficials, Committee and consultin g with labora tory of from the Advisory umber of personnel and commendations on the n this division prepared re search programs within any funds required for car rying out all the re These recommendations w ere then sent to year at the laborator ies. 0 ne ry . personnel ceilings for each laborato Dryden, who approved m oneta r y and e r the laboratories' eadquarters budget of fi cer had no control ov The h Thi s was the responsib il i t y of lotments once they had been approved. al esearch laboratory . the budget officer loc ated at each r ared s eparat e l y f rom d e s i gn Construction budgets w ere prep ived from each l a bora to ry . imates rece outlines and rough cos t est o ff icials informally ratory officials consu lted with headquarters Labo ts, but they were the r espons ibility of re preparing these req ues befo gned by a ries. The priority of the requests wa s a ssi the laborato e headquart e r s budge t off i cer was facilities pane l a t he adquarters . Th pria t ions req uest for ponsible only f or prep ar i ng t he ac tua l a ppro r es 106 been r the constructio n requests had th dget afte e Bureau of the B u ry Committee . approved by the A dviso .!_racking Mechani sms he level of track ing which was What had changed from 1927 was t largely relied o n the NACA A's leaders in 19 27 NAC being accomplishe d. e 1950s, they had rmance. By th rts to evaluate t he staff's perfo repo was not How effective the se measures were nisms. adopted other me cha clear. le for the rs Fiscal Divisio n was responsib The Headquarte for those proced ures tivities of NACA . Except accounting and a udit ac itten g Office, NACA ha d no wr re ? quired by the Ge neral Accountin lling its expendi tures. Each tro Procedures for au diting and con edures for collec ting costs and oped its own proc laboratory had de vel used for making c ost estimates, these data were o nly financial data, a nd e in the methods c ntrol device . Th e differen not as a managem ent or co ese activities. le for headquarte rs to control th used made it imp ossib What erformed on an ag ency-wide basis. es p There were no au dit activiti d by individuals whose s accomplishe iting and account ing were done wa aud ther administrati ve ano technical service s, or Primary job was r esearch, activity. ract division chi ef was cont The headquarters procurement and A to the Executiv e AC ent activities of N responsible for t he procurem ff " rs were responsi " bl e to ce contracting o i Offi? cer, but the lab oratory at each laborator y. cer for the procu rement policies the Executive Of fi ch laboratory und er the nd services was d one by ea Purchase of goods a 's contract offic er. ry ision of the resp ective laborato superv 107 t if any, control ove r these procuremen Headquarters had li ttle, dures and paper flow at each monitored the proce activities and only ed that even General Accounting Office in 1953 not laboratory. The Executive Officer' s e th curement activities which required th ose pro ' staff. sentially handled b y the laboratories approval by law wer e es ntire preliminary Almost without exce ption, the e ngs, including nego tiation of these proceedi by laboratory emplo yees. ted contracts, are cond uc hief of contracts are then reviewed by the c The t Division (headqua rters) rac Procurement and Co nt rded by the Executiv e awa and are approved or e cer. Information s ubmitted with thes Offi erally inadequate to serve as a contracts is gen valuating the contr acts before their basis for e liance is placed to a large approval or award. Re of the contracting extent on recommen dations 13 the contracting pr ocesses. officer who directe d ot only provided quarters divisions a lready discussed n The head ck the work of CA's leaders, but co uld be used to tra information to NA e Research Informat ion Division was th f. In addition, the staf all NACA irection, control an d dissemination of responsible for the d clearing house for all published central Reports. It served as a the quantity of rese arch being tical research. Alt hough aeronau if not ed States made it d ifficult accomplished throug hout the Unit n which could this division could supply informatio impossible to track , to 's researchers in re lation used to examine the progress of NACA be 14 Other researchers. y of committed to contin uing NACA's polic Dryden, while fully ad with a great deal o f autonomy, also h rs Providing its resea rche NACA. He had the previously infor mal procedures of formalized some of reports; e processing of all instituted an index system for th mad2 the results av ailable in a est rts which a bl ished memorandum repo 107 ent f any, control ov er these procurem i Headquarters had little, ures and paper flo w at each acti ? ? ies and only mon itored the proced vit noted that even General Accountin g Office in 1953 laboratory. The er's ed the Executive Offic th rocurement activi ties which requir ose p ' staff. tially handled by the laboratories ssen approval by law w ere e ntire preliminary Almost without ex ception, the e gs, including neg otiation of these proceedin y laboratory empl oyees. ucted b contracts, are co nd he chief of contracts are th en reviewed by t The Division (headqu arters) ntract Procurement and C o ded by the Execut ive r awar and are approved o these icer. Information submitted with Off ally inadequate to serve as a contracts is gene r luating the contra cts before their basis for eva nce is placed to a large Relia approval or award . of the contractin g extent on recomm endations contracting proce sses. 13 the officer who direc ted ssed not only pro vided adquarters divisio ns already discu The he ack the work of 's leaders, but co uld be used to tr information to NA CA search Information Division was th tion, the Ree staff. In addi of all NACA ction, control an d dissemination responsible f or t he dire aring house for a ll published a central cle Reports. It serv ed as quantity of resea rch being cal research. Al though the aeronauti not ited States made i t difficult if accomplished thro ughout the Un n which could is division could supply informatio th impossible to tra ck, n to CA's r esearchers i n r ela tio sed to examine th e progress of NA be u 14 Other researchers . icy of ommitted to contin uing NACA's pol Dryden, while ful ly c o had with a great deal of autonomy, als ers Providing its res earch NACA. He had previously inform al procedures of formalized some o f the reports; the processing of all instituted an i nd ex sys t em fo r sults available in a e emorandum reports which mad,~ the r e s t ablished m 108 a e; and required that al l laboratories produce shorter period of tim of all of their researc h . 15 Perhaps ly report listing the s tatus month staff and tant, he instituted proc edures which forced the more impor ution to one problem, nnittees to examine NACA 's results not as a sol con ppropriate research prog ram. He accomplished but in relation to an a ers earch authorizations an d job ord this by requiring the div ision of res result of these effort s was that programs. The into appropriate resear ch end a project informal ly or allow it to go it was not as easy to had been in the 1920s. eriod of time as it unfinished for a long p Directors had also form alized their methods The Laboratory rch of a g their research and tra cking it. The resea ccomplishin t each Director was resp onsible entralized in tha laboratories remained d ec and was g the methods used to a ccomplish the research for determinin t the ome control over the pr iority of the project a able to exercise s ssigned to a laboratory was turned over to laboratory. A project was a ection head, who assigne d a Division Chief who in turn sent it to the s gineer (scientist). The project engineer was it to a project en rch, making sure it was ails of the resea responsible for the det it. He supervised the d esign and completed, and writing a report on struction of test models and test nts and con manufacture of instrume were conducted by the cilities by technical em ployees. Actual tests fa chnical employees had co mpleted their work. roject engineer once the te P o supervise ries assigned an operati ons project engineer t Some laborato used by obtained from the t e sts were the technical emplo yees . The data rt. Research proj ects e proj e ct en gineer (sci entist) to write a repo th 109 re handled completely by the e which were theoretical in nature w scientist involved. an editorial committee Once written, the report went to mposed of four members-- the . It was co appointed by the Division Chief was for senior engineer and two others. If the project author, a was generally represented on the other government agency, this agency an sent to After approval by this co mmittee, the report was Committee. al resulted in submission to th ief, whose app rov e respective division ch at this point that the re port was t was only the Laboratory Director. I approved for submission t o headquarters, where sent for final typing and . . 16 it again went through the editing process. 110 NACA'S PERFORMANCE: A RE-EVALUATION Their legislative manda te iation. NACA's goal was to adva nce av ning which problems st d that this should be a ccomplished by determi ate nd mmending possible solut ions to the problems, a existed, reco toward complishment of aeronau tical research directed supervising the ac aders argued they were hough NACA's 1927 le advancing aviation. Al t on of some groups, as achieving their goal, t he lack of representati y to develop a research program meant that the re well as their own failu 17 as they claimed. The y adequately were not performing the ir work as search which the leader s also were not accomplis hing the scientific re ite this, the evidence s uggests that as. Desp claimed the organizatio n w they were advancing avi ation. somewhat different NACA's performance in th e 1950s was also s. It was also quite a bit different tor than envisioned by its crea ers . than envisioned by its 1927 lead esearch Needs and Their Solution .Q.etermination of R ave problems carrying ou t their objective in NACA continued to h than the 1927 organizati on tly different reasons the 1950s, but for slig h ronautical research bein g conducted ae did. The growth in the amount of de it difficult for anyo ne to plexity ma and the increase in its com General Accounting t ? 1 research. As the tra c k and coordinate aero nau ica l research has 53 aud..;t of N ACA, "Aeronautica Offi? ce noted in its 19 .. nt that it is no longer practical for the NACA expanded to such an ext e 11 18 autical research. di? rect all of the Natio n's aeron to super v i s e and 111 s compounded by the fact that the military This problem wa ty for so much of the ae ronautical had taken over responsi bili services . Prior to which was being accompl ished during this period research ervices and private ld War II, NACA had been used by the military s Wor ome of the problems asso ciated with writing industry to avoid s nes. radically different air pla specifications and estim ating costs for for the discussion of pr oblems The committee structure provided a forum ld d s between the two groups . 19 The laboratory cou an possible solution ustry and to estimate costs a nd help ind be used to write specifi cations ists refused to contract had been writ ten. Since many scient once a ices, NACA also provided a ilitary serv work under contract for the m ould let contracts mechanism for supporting basic research. It c s. and assure scientists that they were ithout detailed specifica tion W 20 regulations their professional coll eagues. Procurement Working for ces with the ability to support e military servi in the 1950s provided th NACA's committees for esearch and development projects without using r ablishment of their own aeronautical research this purpose.21 The est CA's technical staff.22 ervices' reliance on NA laboratories ended the s nical advice and assistan ce, but the NACA continued to provid e tech hority necessary to acco mplish military services did ha ve the legal aut . these tasks without NACA ove, had r hand, the Advisory Com mittee, as discussed ab On the othe es it was using to track aeronautical f sourcinc reased the number o the case rts. It had made membe rships, particularly in research effo terests to a larger variety of in of private industry, mo re accessible 920 The fact that the organization' s th . an it had in the late 1 s 112 their laboratory, but involved in staff were no longer iso lated in private industry on a daily projects with the mili tary services and autical research t that they were in ma ny ways tracking aeron basis, mean than they had in 1927. activities more adequa tely ees in the n's efforts to involve the technical connnitt Dryde is demands that the org anization s, as well as h decision-making proces ther than simply solve problems rogram ra attempt to develop a r esearch p was at least attemptin g hey arose, also meant that the organization as t activities. to be more systematic in its research !_esearch Activities ned its research effor ts to ad broade The agency by the 1950 s h t t ypes of research. ude a wider range of a ctivities and differen incl ff primarily directed i ts efforts toward Although the research sta research laboratories, blems, one of the new Solving aerodynamical pro research (e.g., been built specifically to engage in engine Lewis, had ., loads, vibration , nuclear, fuels). St ructural research (e.g rocket es. erials) was conducted b oth at Langley and Am and flutter, mat ., icing, meteorology, fire ms (e.g Research on operating proble ngley. Research on vention) was conducted at both Lewis and La Pre nal luid mechanics, stabili ty and control, inter aerodynamics (e.g., f laboratories, but flow, propellers) was conducted at all three arily at Ames and Langl ey. Prim types of research in which it the The agency had also ex panded ovement expansi?on for the most part was a m Was engaged. While this ed a to advanced engineering , it also includ from appli'ed engineering 113 research. NACA in th e 1950s could claim ific shift toward more sci ent ts ranging from the "d evelopment of theory th ecat it engaged in proj nd development in essing through experim ental verification a Progr and nels to verifications in large-scale wind specialized wind tun 23 sts." Pressure tunnels or a ctual flight te eering which during th e 1940s and It was the advanced e ngin earch most publicity . The H igh Speed Flight Res 1950s brought it the ngaged in the testing of n e st tati o ation and Wallops Pil otless S 24 del aircraft. One o f the airplanes turbojet and rocket-p ropelled mo te g with the military se rvices and priva Produced by this grou p workin 25 ions break the speed of so und. The two stat ? lndustry was the firs t to ces and ecifically to work wit h the military servi Were established sp projects which require d earch and development Private industry on r es gineering planning age in many different activities, "from en them to eng administration, fligh t planning, flight 0 n the airplanes, thro ugh ance. 112 6 ainten ng, interpretation of data, and m testing, ground track i d the production of re search aircraft The projects were dire cted towar speeds. capable of reaching s upersonic two groups differed fr om NACA's earlier The work of these nding on wind umber of important wa ys. Rather than depe research in a n ine the se programs used actua l aircraft to determ tunnel data, the supersonic speeds. Th ey required closer impact of flying at private industry than the military services and collaboration with th e tomed to. This impli ed the taff had previously b een accus agency s se the ighter administrative arrangements. Becau establishment of t edom in designing the planes, contractors were given almost complete fre development phase. actively involved in the entire design and NACA was 114 some of NACA's researchers out of their The projects thus brought e development process and th laboratories and into con tact with the e . these projects. They requi red the establishment xcitement generated by s. They were directed tow ard goals edules and specific objec tive of sch d of sound) rather hich were often political (e.g., breaking the spee w fiscal conservatism pract iced by than scientific.In contrast to the hese projects stressed rea ching an eaders, the managers of tNACA's l the costs. The objective within a specif ied time frame, whatever k of NACA was directed tow ard producing a report careful methodical wor directed highly reliable. The work of these new groups was Which was roblems ossible to solve specific p toward producing data as f ast as p ject. whl? e pro ch were preventing the co mpletion of th ~A's Accomplishments a smaller role in the aero nautical research Although NACA played ts were still significant. plishmen community in the 1950s, it s accom y staff member, received t he Collier Trophy twice John Stack, a Langle 7 llen, an Ames ' fl' ht 2 Harry Julian A for his research on high-spee d ig ? e was responsible for the di scovery of the blunt nos staff member, design for reentry vehicle s minimized the Principle. The blunt nose on most ballistic missile s and was used aerodynamic heating of ree ntry ed the Collier aft . 28 Richard T. Whitcomb also receiv er its discovery. hich made for the discovery of the a rea rule, a design rule w Trophy 29 The supersonic research personic flight more of a possibility. su major role in the advances a s of which they were a pa rt played Program 30 95 os. made in supersonic flight in the i 115 lso continued to have an impact, although The committees a nt of aviation. This is best the developme Perhaps less than in 1927, on cientists and NACA's ability to brin g together leading s evidenced by ers hed Sputnik I. NACA' s lead engineers in 1957 whe n the Soviets launc on Space Technology w hich was composed of ommittee appointed a Special C engineers who were in terested in scientists and almost all the leadin g 3 1 the new space program. 116 N AND COORDINATION O F RESEARCH DIRECTIO nd more complex. It as a great deal larg er a NACA in the 1950s w ad in 1927. Despite ed in more diverse a ctivities than it h also engag reat deal of th continued to allow its researchers a g is, its leaders ns adopted more tracki ng and authorizatio discretion. They ha d and were ms were not terribly effective mechanisms, but thes e mechanis with more informati on. They ACA's leaders largely used to prov ide N s which had been use d in of the same mechani sm continued to rely on many f the organization . activities o 192 e 7 to direct and coo rdinate th .?_ernalization of Values uring its staff's co mpliance in f the major methods of ens One o d as lization of NACA's v alues which occurre a l927 was the gradual intern tion process, the ea rly training th sult of such factors as the selec e re vided by its d of operating, and the environment pro in NACA's metho inued to be known fo r their rchers in the 1950s cont leaders. NACA's res ea some important diff erences in the but there were high V.,pJu.t de ~onp~, to ensure their com pliance. methods used continued to recruit CA's leaders In the first place, while NA ols, they were having difficulty scho individuals from top flight ualified individuals . The new ning highly q recruiting and retai ed for scientists an d he ne chnologies of the 19 50s had increased t te States. Competitio n for them was gineers throughout t he United en ly could not A, as other federal organizations, simp enormous and NAC new ered by private indu stry. The compete with the hig h salaries off y, could ch as the Jet Propul sion Laborator research organ .i zati.o ns, su 117 32 nvironment similar to NACA and more pay. Som e also were offer an e erforming research activities similar to those which NACA was performing. p The result was that NACA had difficulty not on ly recruiting highly ulty keeping qualified scientists and engineers, but it also had diffic ere hired. Since the older employees were more apt to them once they w resist recruitment because of loyalty to NACA, the average age of NACA's staff continued to g o up during the 1950s. Congress passed a number of laws in the late 19 40s and 1950s to alleviate some of these problems. Public Law 8 0-313, passed in 1947, and amended in 1949, 1956, and 1958, allowed NA CA to pay a specified salaries, but these number of scientists and technical employees h igher were used by NACA to reward older employees ra ther than for Positions the recruitment of newer ones. The Classificat ion Act of 1949 which a created three new supergrade positions, also pr ovided NACA with iding higher salaries to its employees. But ag ain , mechanism for prov rather than recruiting more scientists and eng ineers for these Positions, it promoted the older employees and in some cases gave the Positions to administrative personnel--a practi ce which resulted in the ese positions in Civil Service Commission questioning NACA's nee d fo r th lace. The problem was that NACA's leaders were having to the first p balance the needs of their older employees with th e need to attract new d engineers, employees . If they focused on attracting new s cientists an were being recruited by industry, would leave. their older p oyees, who em 1 If they focuse d on retaining older researchers, as they did, they would hey not be able to at tract new researchers of the q uality they wanted. T y the Bureau hact neither the funds nor had been allocated th e positions b 118 33 to meet both needs. As NAC A's leaders argued, of the Budget irreplaceable [It was] losing outstanding an d plest and leaders in aeronautical scienc e. Sim best remedy [was] enactment of legislation uthorizing the government to p ay th~ going a ate for scientists and enginee rs. 34 r ecruitment and retention of hi ghly The problems associated with r used to ied individuals was not the on ly difference in the methods qualif formal transfer of ideas and internalize NACA's values. Th e in of operating had become more 's method socialization into the agency ave of formal. Graduate Study progra ms which provided a year's le with pay for promising scienti sts and engineers had replaced absence ed during the 1920s. The info rmal the informal in-house training offer ed in the exchange of ideas over lunch w as not as easily accomplish , but the staff's work brought them into contact larger organization f the isolation With other groups' ideas and m ethods and thus ended some o from other ideas which had exi sted in the 1920s. s also not the tightly knit gro up which existed in 1927. NACA wa e size and geographical This situation was partially a function of th of the research laboratories, but it also occurred because distribution vanced engineering) and catego ries d different types (e.g., applied and a s) of research were performed ynamic (e.g., engine, structural, and aerod by different groups and laborat ories. ntained the largest complement of The Ames Laboratory co d" individuals. 35 Their work was primarily theoretical "research-minde rnical problems. The researche rs and applied research on genera l aerodyna ularly Ames because of "its qu asi-academic had come to NACA and partic . pti?veness to new and so metimes radical fo cus on research, its rece 119 m from 1136 relative obscurity and freedo po1i? t?i cs... These concepts, its managing large p r ograms, engaging in in individuals had little interest gh level of appropriatio ns, or th n a hie politics necessary to obtai tors. coping with individual contrac ged from theoretical to development, but Research at Langley ran These th ent work was performed o nly by specific units. e developm sions, the Pilotless luded the Flight and In strument Research Divi inc aft isions, and the semi-auto nomous Pilotless Aircr Aircraft Research Div ps Island. This arrange ment worked, but it Research Station at Wal lo c ynically, ays harmonious. As Bec ker pointed out rather Was not alw hat the To a large degree, there fore, one finds t ARD) Pilotless Aircraft Rese arch Division (P eports tended to be data reports for specific r n general or analytical test objects rather tha 37 treatments of research p roblems. ops Island staff gave fi rst priority to In contrast to this, the Wall ecific projects and argu ed, sp eral research program at Wallops was less ... gen odel program exciting than the speci fic m irplanes because it did not relat e directly to a 38 and missiles in being. velopment work, but its development lied and de Lewis engaged in both a pp ision. cated in one division--t he Flight Research Div ~vork was also lo ordinated these differen t NACA's leaders organized and co ommittees both ities through the use of permanent and ad hoc c activ this did not solve the problem of ithin and between labora tories, but W NACA in the jectives which existed w ithin the organization. competing ob bers had integrated group whos e mem 1920s had been a tight-k nit highly distinctly s plit into imila r objec tives. NACA in the 1950s was v e r y s 120 was the tendency to com pletely feel s. What had ended, thou gh, two group was the only way. The advanced th workat NACA's way of accomp lishing its eavily up had its own method o f operating which was h engineering gro ivate industry and the m ilitary ced by the methods used by pr influen he applied research ervices. These methods were not the same as t s s tended to disparage th e other's methods. group's, and both group r their is, NACA's researchers c ontinued to be known fo Despite th earchers. the closeness of its res attachment to the organ ization and Research Environment ovide their researchers with NACA's leaders also con tinued to pr ive to research. Its ro le in the supersonic an environment conduc ders with an important provided NACA's lea research aircraft progra m ract advanced engineerin g d to att incentive which could b e use duals the opportunity to work gave these indivi researchers. The progra m dustry on some of the m ost With both the military services and private in the 1950s. exciting aeronautical p rograms of ays provided its staff w ith the opportunity Although NACA had alw onautical research, its roups engaged in aer to be involved with othe r g 0s than it had been in 1 927. bility to do so was much greater in the 195 a the staff's position in the committee Thi? s si?t d because uation ex .i ste ed nd because they also att ended meetings sponsor hierarchy had improved a in their t of Defense and private industry . The change by the Departmen hnical t be seen in their enhan ced position on the tec role can bes embers of the Executive c ommi ttees. The three t op officials were m 39 ac h appointed chairmen of st anding committees . E c ommitte e and could be 121 t least one staff member from each of the research subcommittee had a from the headquarters staff w ho served as laboratories and one member nded for the committee. In 1927 agency researchers had atte secretary aff, not as actual members meetings, but they functione d as committee st e. By the 1950s they were ac tual members and served as of the committe ittees. NACA's researchers ha d earned chairmen of some of the subc omm professionals well the right to go to the committ ee meetings as eir fields. The relationship between the researchers respected in th served on the committees was of NACA who and individuals from outside nal colleagues. They also se rved on the Department of between professio ices' committees which made decis ions about the military serv Defense ttendance at these meetings, 11, s. Their a aeronautical research program de them a much coupled with their membershi ps on NACA's committees, ma art of NACA's technical decis ion making than NACA's more important p attended the meetings as researchers had been in 1927 when they only representatives from the lab oratory. e f the staff on the committees and as Al though the new rol O tive s of NACA to other groups enh anced the use of this incen emissarie o meant that the researchers work, it als for encouraging the staff to less time for their had to attend meetings more often, which gave them t always esearch. The attitude of som e of the researchers was no r Positive to this incentive. y there were local comm~ttees which p~r~lleled At Langle the NACA committees; their fu nction was _to facilitate ? f rmation at the working le vel on th e exc h ange o f in o d t o coor dinate general res earch h common prob 1 ems an r researc were activity . Most new proposals fo 122 such committees for comment. T hese re fe rred to committees were useful as a m eans of keeping up with findings all over the laborato ry but new research a source of new ideas. Idea s came they were rarely orkers. To these idea men, the from individual w were a part of the s ystem which various committees erate. 40 they had to tol f.ontrol o f Output rchers in 1927 Whatever the other incentive s, NACA's resea anization's goal directed their research acti vities toward the org o epted its goals and the auth ority of the individuals wh because they acc ects in which they would eng age. NACA's made decisions about the pro j t its had established an internal structure which ensured tha leaders ere hers were evaluated for perfo rmance by individuals who w researc ers in the 1950s continued - to A's lead experts in their fields. NA C taff on the Provide this structure, and the enhanced role of the s of ndoubtedly increased their a cceptance of the decisions committees u em remained the major method of NACA's leaders. Its report syst in 1 927 were uating the researchers' perf ormance, and promotions as eval leaders had made some import ant change s sed on performance, but NACA 's ba nat es. in the ir method of controllin g their subordi orized into standardized Civ il Job descriptions had been ca teg schedul e of gr aded r esponsib ility eral Service job descriptions. A gen de had been With a maximum and minimum s alary range for each gr a y continued to be responsible f or promoting establishe d. Each laborator n each dividuals into grades below GS-14, allocating jobs withi i n r sonnel sta ti s t ics . ca t egory, and ther e was littl e tracking of pe ?d d to the labora t ories , NAC A ' s leader s had Wh atever the autonomy provi e 123 had previously rejected because accepted a concept which they aced labels on people and classification systems in their minds pl . Since their researcher s were ideas restricted the free flow of of rformance, not tenure or position, the acceptance rewarded for pe of structures based on p osition and ive mechanisms more represen tat ophy of NACA's method of philos tenure struck at the und erlying f's activities. NACA's l eaders avoided the controlling its staf ontinuing to promote for conflict between the two structures by c the new mechanisms was n ot a good option of performance, but their ad er unique or their future capabilit y to maintain their rath omen f structure. 124 AND OTHER ORGANIZATI ONS NACA s vironment in which N ACA accomplished it The rather benign en th very complex and anged to one which w as bo activities in 1927 had ch ch organizations atening. The small aeronautical resear somewhat thre ed by large research and lac thin the military se rvices had been rep Wi tion of a centralize d c velopment organizati ons under the dire de single . 41 These organizat ions controlled by Dep artment of Defense r a centralized vert ical esponsibility fo administrators who h ad r ate industry for the iv chical organization let contracts to pr hierar contract ecific products. Th ey had established manufacture of sp ntrolled aeronautical researc h organizations co I' all relationships with s m meet their basic an d t owned by the gover nment to . by Universities, bu to come to NACA needs. The military services continued applied research own ce and advice, but t hey also had their for technical assist an when they needed te chnical ey could turn in-house staff to w hich th assistance.42 h which ancially strapped av iation industry wit The small, fin d ecome by the 195Os a major political an b NACA worked in 1927 had 43 power emands known to Con gress. I .ts economic power which made its d ustry Consulting Com mitt ee t evidenced by the e xistence of the Ind is bes ber also evident in the increase in the num was discussed above, bu t it ommittees. NACA's 1 927 es on NACA's c of industry represe ntativ es in the committee ting the role of ind ustry representativ Policy of limi ernment the 1950s T hree of the non-gov ? St ructure had been aba ndoned bY presentatives from the Advisory Committ ee were filled by re Posit ions on 125 forty percent of the mem berships of Industry held more tha n industry. he chairmanships of all four th ted for t e technical committees a nd accoun chnical committees, as w ell as sixteen of the of the main te 44 little, who replaced Huns aker as tees. In 1956 James H. Doo subcommit rman who was not a chairman of the committe e, became the first chai 45 t. NACA continued to w ork gineer or scientis practicing academician, en emained ith industry and the mili tary services and they r closely w ent on groups were not as depen d satisfied with its servi ces, but the two CA as they had been in th e 1920s. NA in the 1950s had lost man y of its Perhaps more important, NACA Albert Thomas from Texas who had replaced Judge friends in Congress. the Appropriations Subcom mittee airman of Woodrum from Virginia as Ch s state NACA's requests, had ne ither a laboratory in hi Which reviewed re and of NACA. He disapproved of the committee structu nor a great love h the normal authorizatio n ot have to go throug the fact that NACA did n d Victory that for its construction req uests. In 1950 he warne Process n annual A' d" A to obtai NAC d forced NAC s "d ays were numbere an . . 46 r its construction proJec ts. In 1952, fo authorization legis lation eneral Accounting and he requested au dits of NACA from the G 1953, 1954 may have been able to ig nore this change in its Office.47 NACA so begun to cut its budg et Congress hadn't al Cong -f ressional relations 1 dropped Between and 1955, th e funds it had available requests. 1953 n and Cold War, and at th e d despite the Korea steadily.48 This occurre ases in their time the military servic es were receiving incre same 49 funds. research and development 126 ied by changes in other oversight These changes were acc ompan reau of the Budget, the General organizations. Althou gh the Bu e Commission existed in 1927, Civil Servic Accounting Office, and the whose primary concern was ittle impact on NACA, their activities had l sonnel ceilings nal oversight. By the 195Os NACA faced per Congressio ons by the General set by the Bureau of t he Budget, investigati ersonnel regulations is sued by the Civil Accounting Office, and p ith which its leaders o perated in Service Commission. T he discretion w deviation from what t he e 195Os. Any 1927 had almost disapp eared by th re efficient management practices was being three agencies felt we ent and Congress. reported to the Presid n, 127 II CHANGES IN NACA BETWEEN 1927 AND THE 1950s THE YEARS nization just the 1927 organiza tion to the orga The change from es. The years l ingly in some cas ct? cussed was not mad e easily nor wil is ion both made s were ones in wh ich the organizat between the two p eriod t of aviation and ones in ons to the advance men uti significant contri b nts and Congress. to its clie ch its failures be came evident both Whi nged so dramatica lly its environment ch a They also were ye ars in which community continu ally utical research that NACA's place in the aerona became less secure. 1;. d methods of copin g with had foun NACA's leaders by the 1950s in the aeronautic al research nological changes and the changes the tech federal found an answer t o the changes in not community. They h ad th to the organiza tion and as acceptable bo management policie s which w change their meth ods of ey gencies which dema nded th to the oversight a they were willing to give up their NACA's leaders, unless operation. d of coping with ling the organizat ion, had no metho method of control es a number of fac tors which played on discuss these changes. T his secti e 1950s organization and set the stag e a role in the deve lopment of th mation into NASA, but its its transfor for NACA's accepta nce of s in federal regul ations which is is on the chang e Particular emphas structure of NACA. undermined the en tire 128 THE PERIOD OF CRISIS id-1930s had establish ed some of the best NACA's leaders by th e m hey had, or at least acilities in the wor ld. T aeronautical researc h f s in th , overcome the early lead of the European ought they had the military service s, lationships with aeronautical researc h. Their re ACA's world began to t. N ate industry, and Co ngress were excellen priv NACA and 0s when the military services approached 3 change in the mid-19 include more research rogram to requested an expansio n of its research p 50 y request was followed b ? ropulsion and structu ral areas. This in p Research and Charles ts from both its Off ice of Aeronautical repor ancements being made ember, on the adv Lindbergh, an Adviso ry Committee m ork load at Langley, ease in w Europe. It was the se reports, the incr in o rope which led to the establishment of tw in Eu and the impending wa r 51 s. new laboratories , Ames and Lewi tories and an increas e in its w labora The establishment of two ne did it end not solve the need f or more research nor appropriations did mplished in Europe an d NACA's ap between the resea rch being acco the g ull A began to realize th e f esearch. It was not until 1941 that NAC r est from the military esponding to a requ extent of these adva ncements. R pecial committee on J et Propulsion rvices, its leaders created a s se for the development o f ustry ich recommended lettin g contracts to ind Wh time both the Britis h and Germans had jet propulsion, but by that ct of the nation's fa ilure to The full impa alr ead y flown turbo jets . lly recognized until ments was not fu keep abreast of aero nautical advance eenemu" at P nde and their m scovery of the Germa ns' V-2 rocket progra the di 129 sile capable of striking is the Un ited Plans to build a ballist ic m NACA's previously State . 52 end to s This discovery brought an e in aeronautical researc h. r excellenc The unquestioned reputation fo listic missiles were German advancements in j et propulsion and bal 53 unmatched in the United States. he ct of this development wa s enormous not only on t The impa d d enjoyed for years with the military services an relationship it ha cal try, but also its own per ception of its aeronauti Private indus 54 e of its creation had arg ued ACA from the tim research capabilities. N ensure the United it was responsible for th e research necessary to that ngressional investigation s Although Co States' aeronautical sup eriority. the military services fter the war failed to p lace the blame on NACA, a ir jet engine development excluded from the didn't agree. NACA was A about the for the remainder of the war. Questions from NAC Program continue its ment of the jet engine w ere met by directives to develop 55 nventional engines for th e duration of the war. Work on co et ewhere for technical adv ice on j The services began to loo k els rmy took over sponsorship of the Jet Propulsion engines. In l940 the A NASA. it until it was transferr ed to Laboratory and continued to fund her van Braun and the oth er German to Wern After the war it turned ' n ated the German ballistic missiles. The creat i o Scientists who had cre in 1947 under the Departm ent of ent Board of the Research and Deve lopm NACA and ed the military services' complete dependence on Defense end within the Department of g a group establi s hed the policy o f keepin .d adequate technical aid to all re search and Def en se which could prov1 e 56 development programs. 130 s had established a plac e for itself in the NACA by the 1950 attempts shortly after the war were not very w technologies, but itsne pecial Committee on successful. Hunsaker in 1944 established a S 57 les, but it was disbande d in 1947. The Self-Propelled Guided M issi own Guided ent of Defense by this t ime had established its Departm ard. ommittee under the Resea rch and Development Bo Missiles C r s' efforts to establish a coordinating role fo NACA's leader ere met by objections fr om the organization in nucle ar propulsion w d Deputy Chief of the Ai r Staff for Research an General Curtis LeMay, the Army Airforce ent, who made it quite c lear to NACA that only Developm NACA. d approval for a nuclea r research program, not ha w and separate N.A.C.A. The establishment of a n e n orrnnittee or group to pu rsue such work would, i c sence, duplicate to a la rge degree authority es d, responsibility already v ested in the A.A.F. an and rstood, would be contrar y insofar as is presently unde ? E Co mm? iss?i on. 58 to the desire of the Ato mic nergy ed funds for a National Supersonic In 1949 when it request uild ress provided the new Ai r Force with funds to b Research Center, Cong g down le at the same time turn in a new aeronautical rese arch center, whi CA's leaders' strategy o f showing industrial NACA's requests.59 NA by as met with a note of sa rcasm support by obtaining en dorsements w Senator Hugh Mitchell. se for the information We would be glad to hav e tho d go of the committee but I d on't think t~ey shoul is hear~ng. 0~ course, into the printed record of th aise the mber of people who will pr , t h ere are an Y nu NACA and certainly we d on t wa~t to do work of ssen that praise of the Job you have . le . anyt hing t o rees on that. I think t he d one. Ev ery b o dy ag . on why ? ? terested in k nowing the reas committee i ?s in ? b a better job--well, not a better job ? 1 d . a greater JO ,? b -was not done in ea ing up to b ut a bi .gger JO - the war.60 131 ilitary services were unwill ing to allow the Although the m in some of the new technol ogies, they dvisory Corrnn.ittee to play a role A . cept the NACA's proposals f or joint research programs In 1941 did ac a research aircraft program sed John Stack, a Langley resea rcher, propo ough he was turned down, ot her individuals from Bell to Lewis. Alth Aeronautical Laboratory at rmy Airforce Aircraft Corporation, the A eronautics were also pressin g for au of A Wright Field, and the Navy Bure l proposed a me tyPe of program. In 194 3 Robert A. Wolfe from Bel so oduce y-Navy / Private Industry/ N ACA research program to pr joint Arm and ata on the effect of transo nic speeds. Both the Army aeronautical d . 61 nd NACA's inclusion in the projects Navy agreed to these propos als a A established a group to wo rk at the Army Airforce In the mid-1940s NAC earch alifornia, on the Bell XS-1 res Flight Test area in Muroc D ry Lake, C to a joint program with the Navy and t agreed Plane. At the same time, i ircraft. 6 2 duce a turbojet propelled an to pro Douglas Aircraft Corporatio or rocket-propelled model In 1945 NACA established a testing site f ps Island, Virginia. The B ell aircraft was the first aircraft at Wallo rought a great deal of posi tive airplane to break the speed of sound and b Publicity to NACA. programs ended NACA's The success of the research aircraft r e new technologies, provide d NACA' s staff with a majo exclusion from th ture in the e ? nd ;mproved the agency 's sta rol in their development, a ~ unity and with Congress. Wh at the research programs aeronautical comm was return NACA to its pre-W orld War II place in the did not do NACA became part of the aer 0 nautica l research conununity . rld, but the milita r y military / i ndus tria l resear ch and development wo ch and develo pme nt services es t a blis hed the ob jectives of the r es ea r 132 lishment of the research , and evaluated ms, directed the accompProgra h the vari?o us parti? ci?p ants. NACA n either directed t e performance of plished. he aeronautical research which was being accom nor coordinated t this staff to help the It Provided a research staff and directed their technical problems . This is not to say military services with just elds beyond research. It was that NACA played no role in the new fi had appointed cormnittees th which NACA at this role changed fro m one in y the various aeronautic al research problems, nder its auspices to studu committees established by the vited to join to one in which NACA wa s in ratories t of Defense and under i ts authority. The labo Departmen ess, but NACA's role in the the research proc continued to play a role in had changed. The impac t formulation of aeronaut ical research programs 's pre-World War II resea rch NACA of this change was enorm ous . its control had occurred not through coercion, but through coordination as its control formation. What NACA lo st after World War II w 0 ver in ices. tion. This control pass ed to the military serv 0 ver informa a role in its acceptanc e of d NACA's period of crisis playe dependence of the milit ary services on NACA's er changes and ended theOth ons found and created other organizati services. The military services had plied research during th e on which they could depe nd for basic and ap ere disillusioned about NACA's performance. Period in which they w ' dependence on NACA and brought e services Thes d e organizations en e d th a unique need which no o ther meeting NACA's claim that it wa s In addition, its accepta nce of question org ani. zation was meeting, i?n to ? rch activities took it o ne step sea development work as one of its re which it was cre ated. further away from the s cientific research for 133 keeping at least some minimum , it ended NACA tr adition of Finally J. Mead, a retired George ween itself and p rivate industry. distance bet d n propulsion resea rch, was appointe ce i aircraft executiv e with experien oblems with ee after NACA bega n experiencing pr tt to the Advisory C ommi h coupled ack of experience in engine researc Its l the Lewis laborato ry. this laboratory's regarding ith the criticism it was receiving W e pressures for th e y to withstand th performance weake ned its abilit Advisory Committ ee. Once representatives on the inclusion of indu stry n NACA's committe es memberships o dition had been b roken, industry's the tra antly. increased signific 134 ADVANCED ENGINE ERING APPLIED AND S IN NACA'S STAF F CHANGE in the 192Os we re unable CA's leaders One of the reaso ns that NA ir in scientific r esearch was the ep their commitm ent to engage to ke qualified scien tists. The 194Os ighly ability to attra ct and retain h in retaining highly attracting and brought lty in a new problem-- difficu lied engineering to engage in ap p were qualified capable individu als who nt excitement of th e new developme nd willing to ignor e the a were ecessity of hirin g rbated by the n jects. This situ ation was exace Pro rs during World War II. trained researc he Poorly ing changes to the War primari ly involved mak NACA's work duri ng esponding to any d r es for the milit ary services an existing airplan d changed into a n ha blems which aros e. By 1941 it emergency pro t the same it did developme nt work, while a itted organization whi ch adm pplied research. 63 st a minimum of a ime trying to ac complish at lea t d n cy as d evote to me eti. ng t he emerge w Over seventy percent of its work avy that NACA rvices. The wor k load was so he se needs of the mi litary g contracts in-house research started lettin t to even with its co rmnitmen University and all as recormnending approval for for its work, as well 64 claim that it di d s ilities. Even it industry request s for more fac To accommodate t he needs of ewhat idealistic. m development work was so an organization rcraft industry, it became he military serv ices and the ai t nes which had al ready been engaged in quick fixes to airpla Which primarily irected what rese arch NACA's sentially d tary services es built. The mili stablished the p riority of that sh and e laboratories wou ld accompli research. 135 as type of work in whi ch it was engaged w This change in the force which existed at all the companied by a chan ge in the work ac e trained or even awa r laboratories. ' NACA s ability to k eep its staff being made in th jor technical advan cements which were of e ma t? was limited. The n ecessity of hiring aerona u ics during the w ar technicians becaus e of the untrai d rchers and ne or poorly train ed resea Abbot pointed out, he situation . As manpower shortage o nly exacerbated t d to rely chiefly o n newly graduated [NACA] ha y lower ineers from four-ye ar courses (usuall eng wn art of classes and from less well kno p people did include some e universities). The s t mostly became excellent r esearch people, bu who capable of research and mistook the they were in had been doing at NACA for testing they advanced scientific research.65 angley. Approximat ely 100 of 340 employees at L In l936 there were only his number NACA had to fill the these were actually researcher s. From t ince there was littl e, ies. S ership positions at two new laborator lead s during als who could fill these top position dividu if any, hiring of i n r over d researchers respo nsible fo th e war, this left ve ry few experience four thousand 66 employees. , after his appointm ent in 1947, were Hunsaker, Lewis, an d Dryden ck to their pre-Wor ld ba st mmitted to returnin g the laboratories rongly co g program was imple mented A major re trainin War I work.I applied research the poorly trained to get rid of and a deliberate at tempt was made t was not totally su ccessful for aff . This attemp members of NACA's s t made NACA's commit ment to basic i'ch had reasons similar to those wh place. The revolut ion in ve in the first research so difficu lt to achie the war and the mil itary tic s which occurred during and after aeronau 136 ew advancements m eant that e n connnitment to "c atch up" with th services' e the need for NA CA to be not completely a lleviat the end of the war did es. NACA's failu re to keep up on specific airp lan involved in resea rch t that it could n ot hnology prior to the war mean With the changes in tec ces. Some of its re the needs of th e military servi afford to igno hese needs, whate ver its directed toward m eeting t resources had to be research. The d emand for highly return to applie d o leaders' desire t emained high, and after the war r ualified scientis ts and engineers q racting the indiv iduals who were eputation made at t NACA's tarnished r individuals who difficult. Altho ugh many of the available ever mo re n plied research, so me groups of eve returned to ap remained with NAC A ested in solving lified researchers were more inter the most highly q ua the new airplane s. They t problems associa ted with n the new developme ratories and enga ging in g to NACA's labo had no interest i n returnin n the excitement of major ey could be engag ed i applied research when th programs. research and deve lopment ft programs made of the supersonic research aircra The success t of and only increase d the enticemen impossible dropping them alm ost NACA archers. By the end of the 1940s CA's rese development work for NA applied and adva nced h ganization which accomplished bot Was an or back to an organ ization ity to change ngineering resear ch, and its abil e easing as it ente red cr d research was de Whose primary wor k was applie the 1950s. 137 TECHNOLOGICAL CHA NGE: ITS IMPACT ON NAC A e researchers to ave been able to return th NACA's leaders ma y h of the 1940s had not ch, if the techno logical changes applied resear tance it gave on the is such an enormous need for the ass created cts. The discove ry of the German s rcraft p roje upersonic researc h ai ion, it also hurt t ought NACA's repu tation into ques br advances not only gress bility. Both the services and Con credi the military serv ices' ship in aeronauti cal ion's leader re committed to r egaining the nat we d technical chang e which rapi This commitment c oupled with the research. ect was not as ield meant that c osts of any proj Was occurring in the f needed a e project. The m ilitary services important as com pleting th eaking a period of time as possible. Br hort major achievement in as s od by all America ns as a t could be unders to the speed of soun d, since i bjectives of the new hrough, became on e of the major o major breakt Programs. k of uch one of techno logy, as the lac as m The problem was n ot cture igh speeds on the airplane's stru pact of h knowledge about t he im a problem usual procedure, when faced with and pilot. NACA 's e its wind tunnel s to ment of aviation, was to us Preventing the ad vance l technology had not kept pace e various designs , but wind tunne test th be Reliable measurem ents could not ith advancements i n aeronautics. W ea of most ch 1.3, and this was the ar obtained between Mach .07 and Ma et the needs of th e 67 If NACA was to me concern to the re searchers. er method of gath ering th tary s ervices, it had to find ano mili ile mor e search aircra ft p roposal, wh aerodynamical dat a. The re 138 t antage. It would p rovide the data no adv expensive, had a m ajor ind tunnel testing. available through w role in NACA's ado ption of the new These events played a ctual impact on the s a gineering task, but the new research' advanced en igh level of uncert ainty h ization came after its adoption. The organ rly ment project was pa rticula surrounding any res earch and develop duction of the new airplanes. The involving the pro evident in projects e lack of understan ding of the new logical change and th speed of techno different plane could be radi cally technologies meant that the final air design. As Price a rgued, from the original ped complex systems are ultimately develo Very few the beginning; for d down at along the lines lai the aircraft develo ped alf example, more than h h cond World War were finally built wit since the se those originally engines quite dift58ent fro m planned for them. at the engineer, wh ether uncertainty was th The consequence of this was drawn into the r not, ginally engaged in applied research o ori not be ject. All the desig n problems could ment phase of the p ro develop -consuming, start of the projec t. While the time solved prior to the 's clients, they wer e not ts remained useful to NACA Well edited NACA re por rtant to the partici pants po e during a period w hen time was so im adequat ady ot be known until t he project was alre might n and the actual prob lems started. plexity of the new a irplanes which in com It was the increase d introduced the ad vanced h an the approach to ae ronautical researc changed ers to new methods of organizing ng group and other NACA research engineeri o r ment's commitment to using i ndus try f overn their work . The fe deral g 139 e increase in the number of whenever possibl e coupled with th its work d their on, communication s, navigation) an subsystems (e.g., propulsi ps from A was only one gr oup of many grou C complexity meant that NA duction of the new airplane. ro t organizations in volved in the p differen much of he second World W ar, became as Producing a new a irplane, after t roblem. The mili tary services m as a technical p a management prob le management probl ems, management tools to solve these f adopted a number o elopment phase of the dev brought NACA eve n closer to the two of which "concurrency," i nvolved t, nd development pr ojects. The firs research a the g, and vances in researc h, design, testin Parallel ad ts, design and nufacture of vehic les and componen ma f ion of test facil ities, testing o construct tion of ts and systems, ex pansion and crea componen and the building of launch ties, i~dustrig~ facili sites ... pted to expedite the t technique was ad o The new managemen tep-by-step ystems during a p eriod when the s ons s Production of new weap before it was ev en produced. plane rocess resulted in an obsolete air P ere uch as NACA's res earchers, who w It also meant tha t individuals, s rch process, becam e actively lved in the resea generally only in vo a new airplane o r missile of the production of cts involved in all a spe researchers were NACA's stem. In the process at least some of sy complishing their to new methods of research and ac ed becoming accustom Work activities. evelopment of form al ed the d The second manage ment tool involv s rdinate the variou administrative arr angements to coo and informal s Hallion argued, Proj ect subsystem s. A 140 tributed research-aircra ft program con the One area in whi ch arch organizatio n . . . As the re was that of r ese t Muroc expanded , to the futu tivities of the X-1 and D-558 a the research ac rganization, wit h so did the need for tighter o A research cente rs ... [In 1948 ities of the oth er NAC activ n of a Research Airplane this resulted in the] formatio m the various N ACA resentatives fro nt Projects Panel with rep when initiating developme ater, in 1954 formed a laboratories ... L and the Navy A, the Air Force to of the X-15, NA C X-15 steering co mmittee better hree-man e airplane. Of special t ment program on th administer the develop as the tight rticular importa nce, however, w y pa between NACA, th e militar organizational relationship ent and rivate industry in the developm services, and p nes. 7 0 rpla testing of the r esearch ai nly actively inv olved in ng group was no t o NACA's advanced engineeri rplane, they we re also the nature of t he ai Projects which w ere changing iques which were adopted to ement techn being trained in the new manag to accommodate w changes 's leaders made f e Produce the new planes. NACA staff was becom ing ties, but at lea st part of its the new research activi ves, priorities established by objecti stomed to time schedules, set accu tative of a ement techniques more represen others, and new manag h organization. an applied resea rc development org anization than 141 CA' S LEADERS: NA IZATION THEIR IMPACT ON THE ORGAN n f ound itsel f in hich the organ izatio The period of crisis w orkforce, and osition of the w p s, the changes in the com uring the 194 O stimuli to th e d as s which occur red all acted ange the technolog ies ch partially , but these fa ctors only s organization1950 h creation of t he . The specif ic steps whic nt of this org anization me , explain the d evelop made by NACA 's leaders anges were response to the above ch aken in t his period. Were t NACA into same leaders who brought not the able and these wer e hich had been st Committee, w membership of the Advisory The f the new mem bers change in 1937 , and many o or many years , began to ams and its f ailure f ch progr I' NACA's resear I een former cr i tics of both had b ms of th e eronautical re search progra oordinate ade quately the a of Munk, to c ewis, after th e de parture and industry . Ames and L rsities r am f or NACA . unive pro g d to developin g a research ith regar had done littl e w e r esearch pro gra ms of ing th n interested in coordinat They had not bee ugh the t e chn ica l ally thro universities except inform industry and the nt f or the f u ture of NACA , s more import a 1926. Perhap g connnittees a f ter t changes were occurrin tha is refused to acknowledge ew he both Ame s and L gue t ha t t ere confident enough to a r In 1926 they w in the airplane . main theore t ica l he) time had arriv ed when [t aid and we ma y in t he been l foundations h ave d t to find ex te nsions of an ure expec rather than n ew fut xisting theory additions to e . ns ... 71 f undamental c onceptio ry on e J e t Propuls ion La bora to f th sed the work o They not only dismis ende d against t he Ar my ocke t en gines , bu t r ecomm 72 liquid- propel led r r a t or y in 193 8 . r the l a bo equest fo r wi nd tunnels fo funding a r 142 ad been a ormer Langley e mployee, who h Edward Warner, the f y for changes i n NACA's hing unsuccessf ull mber since 1929 , had been pus me es and industry . After 1935 representation of universiti Policies toward ber, joined Warn er in ttee mem ergh, another A dvisory Commi Charles Lindb engine but he focused on the lack of olicies of NACA , criticizing the p als were joined by idu 938 these two in div research at Lan gley. In 1 ush of Carnegie Institution . var B ker of MIT and V anne Jerome C. Hunsa ritic of NACA, f elt that its y years had bee n a c n Hunsaker, who f or ma ld provide more s shou ened, the corrnn ittee earch program s hould be broad res nd that more re search nity, a tation to the a viation commu represen addition, he wa s critical t to universitie s. In contracts shoul d be le ced by Langley . orts produ of the quality of rep w NACA n new ideas wit h respect to ho ew members brou ght i The n le on the e willing to pla y an active ro e mor should be run a nd wer changes as the Such the older memb ers had been. Advisory Commi ttee than ttee, written for mal Advisory Comm i ustrial represe ntation on the ind and additional , on of NACA's re search program Procedures, exp ansi ant to NACA's e leaders . Mor e import laboratories we re made by thes den in 1947. D ryden from ir appointment o f Dry future, though, was the d existed betwe en Victory - equal rule whi ch ha the co the beginning fo und tructure at the he traditional s o t s unacceptable. He was used t and Lewi re his authority rds and was not willing to sha Standa National Bureau of ule worked out is rejection of the informal r h Victory. H as Director wit ing given legal his be ctory ended with between Lewis, Ames, and Vi a t Dryden' s di rection t was r the entire or ganization. I authority ove 143 , ome more knowledge able and effective nnittees bec that the technical con ent of e more systematic a bout its developm on becam that the organizat i cedures discussed the pro programs, and the formalization of research above occurred. 144 NAGEMENT POLICIE S FEDERAL MA ~DM~ cal changes whi ch the techni leaders were ab le to adjust to NACA's ronautical rese arch the changes in the ae had occurred, a s well as it equests were be ing approved; appropriations r its community. By 1956 it had found a ces; and e military serv i regained the c onfidence of th had t was the chang e in h community. I onautical resea rc Place in the ne w aer A's leaders with an C nt policies whic h presented NA eme the federal man ag been willing to give up em--that is, un less they had unsolvable prob l ctivities of th eir irecting the a r method of con trolling and d thei r esearchers. criticism beca use had been subjec t to NACA throughout its history epted conceptio n ore acc id not fit the m committee/ agen cy structure d its his criticism d id not end in izational struct ure. T of an efficient organ enate Select Co mmittee to Brookings for th e S study by 1927. In 1937, a ded that NACA's overnment conclu e the Executive Agencies of G Investigat vide the Presid ent as inefficient a nd did not pro committee struc ture w 73 responded ent funds. N ACA's leaders ol over governm With adequate c ontr dividuals ir work required that those in e of the by arguing that the natur zation be scien tists hin the organi ng decisions wi t responsible for maki this background were unable to individuals with out ecause and engineers b ip to the advan cement and their relati onsh evaluate techni cal proposals ACA's leaders w ith the ided N The committee s tructure prov of aviation. s without any c ost to the any different fi eld from m advice of exper ts n erformance was not in questio gued that their p government. Th ey also a r 145 . The eir structure w as efficient ple evidence th at th and this was a m indication of the this argument provides some response of Br ookings to spond to what was n trying to re s facing NACA' s leaders whe Problem . essentially an ideology Division f of our Govern ment Research af which the It seemed to th e st ight be the eff iciency with ever m ent agency, its ?.? that, what end s been conducte d as an indep in terms of N.A.C.A. ha us could hardl y be justified t lem was studied independent sta rob rmanent organi zation. The p ization. effective pe general princip les of organ f character, solely in term s o mmittee had bee n of a unique t the co ctively, did n ot The fact tha ned effe that it has thu s far functio maintained and for recommendin g that it be 74 seem a sound re ason ishment. tely as an inde pendent establ indefini rs had been ab le to cond World War , NACA's leade Before the se friends in Con gress who isms, because NACA had ignore these c ritic r the t the situation changed afte u it with adequ ate support, b Provided ecause Congres s and b e was in questi on r both because its competenc Wa eilings and sta ndardizing personnel c to pass legisla tion setting began 75 Congress was a ided in nt's operating procedures. the federal go vernme he growth in p ower ecutive Branch and t x attempts by ch anges in the E these 76 ies in NACA's e nvironment. of the oversig ht agenc ecutive Branch was by the Ex jection of NAC A's structure The re ce bill in 194 7. 's veto of the National Scien Truman shown by Presid ent ity would be al authority an d responsibil ent could Full Governmen t ime officers w hom the Presid art-t administration . placed in 24 p roper ively hold resp onsible for p ible by the not effect the Director be held respons e Foundation Neither could would be the a ppointee of th he y two layers o f President, for ent b be insul~ted fr om the Presid and would t-time boards. 77 par 146 an to examine get. under Harol d D. Smith. beg When the Bureau of the Bud cies, organizati ons such as deral agen structure and p rocedures of fe the n that they did not rveillance for t he simple reaso NACA came under su e Budget took th is one ucture. The Bu reau of th str have the "prope r" hat they needed scientists' clai m t st ain st the ep further by ar guing ag the notion that d al workers and r ejecte more autonomy th an other feder tions. As Willi s Shapley, the ust head scienti fic organiza Scientists m ppropriations re quest, et analyst who h andled NACA's a Bureau of the B udg argued, the NACA require s agency like A specialized s cientific someone whose qu alifications mewhere in the top command agency, so c fields covered by the extend beyond th e scientifi e meet this me members of th e main committe and while so it would be desi rable if in part, I belie ve that d enc y be a nee or the assistant head of the ag the head Development Boa rd either rson. The Resea rch and f a nontechnical pe hard way that th e management o ot is learning the e s n rch and developm ent program do tific resea s, and it is we ll scien r re scientists, b ut administrato requi rely that one fi nds scientists known that it is very ra. . 7 8 istrators wh o are also ad min of the been able to i g nore the Bureau have NACA's leaders m ight required to obe y d not been ilosophy of mana gement if it ha Budget's ph ACA's sion's personnel regulations. N Commis the Civil Servic e rades, and salar ies g ns, acceptance o f ndardization of job descriptio sta structure based ts ly undermining i n these grades, which were slow based o vil Service , were all respo nses to the Ci gues 0 n evaluation by collea au of the ations. The fac t that the Bure el regul Commission's pe rsonn their t personnel ceil ings only made rity to se Budget was given the autho ons more diffic ult. s to cope with t he new regulati a ttempt 147 singly made i t unting Office which increa It was the Ge neral Acco es, and it wa s known ci A to avoid th ese two agen or NAC more diffic.ul t f unting Office, at the o this. The General Acco for its abili ty to d It, as other vities. gan to audit NACA ' s acti request of Co ngress, be ctory ? NACA's perform ance satisfa d evaluators, f oun conducted activities ar e generally ACA le, we belie ve, ??? N torily. This is attributab satisfac its employees , their high the high qua lity of to terest in the cere in rale, and thei r sin lthough in iso lated mo eronautics. A development o f a e of uneven d istribution es there is e videnc instanc staffing is no t evident of workload, general over 9 in the agency . 7 ing spent on ries and expe nses were be sala ~ funds appropr iated for rical ounting was " only a histo acc ction and equ ipment; its onstru t"; there was c ng did not ex is iti enditures and internal aud record of exp ; "inadequate ns the laborator ies' operatio inadequate co ntrol of ctivities"; a nd contracting a l of laborator y direction and contro ere perfo rming n-a dministrati ve w s no als whose prim ary task wa dividu Office's in in the Gener al Accounting 80 The problem,d tasks . a ministrativ e administrativ e ose ACA was only performing th uditor's mind , was that N a e General Acc ounting th the Bureau of the Budget, ired by functions req u nission. nd th e Civil Service Conn Office, a through inspe ction and ve controls t nec essa r y i n Positi ex ten rting do not e xist to the r e po this nature. tion of centralized o pera re based to a a de therefo Management de cisions are corresponden ce, , extent on tel ephone calls arge format ion l ontact, and th e general fn personal c 8 system. provided by th e budgetary research phi losophy ' s ned from the f act that NACA , sterm This, they fe lt had been exten ded to the om direction a nd control of freedom fr or ganization . s of the administrativ e activitie 148 NACA had two options when faced with these criticisms. It could e ither tota lly reject them or it could establish a program or o r ganization unit which made the organization at least look like it was carry ing out the recommendations or directives of these organizations. Two of its responses to the oversight agencies are indica tiv e of its a ttitude toward recommend a tions that it tighten up i ts procedures a nd c ontrol structure. The recommendation of the General Accounting Office that it integrate its ac c ounting and budgeting so that t o p managers could control its expenditur e s better "was rejected on the basis tha t it would cause undesirable rigidity in the conduc t o f t h e o pera tions a nd would also result in a dditiona l exp e nse to ope r a t e the accounting sys tem." 8 2 This response wa s g ive n two years afte r the General Accounting Office first made the recommendation. During the fir s t y e a r, NACA did implement a new ac counting sys t em, but it didn't meet the General Accounting Office's standards. A r e que s t by the Bureau of the Budge t tha t NACA imp lement a Management Improvement Pro gr am with the obj ective o f d ev e loping " s t a ndard organizational patterns for NACA a dministra tive Off i ces ," r esu l t e d in the c r ea tion of a Management Improv ement Of f i ce a t head qu a rte rs a nd Lewis. Ames a nd Langley mad e little i f a n y r espons e . The connne nt on the l a st page o f the 1 953 r ep or t wr it t e n in r espo n se t o thi s reque st a nd the Burea u of the Budge t' s qu e st ions about why a fed e r a l-wide a wa rd s pr ogram had not bee n imp l e me nt e d provides s ome i ndica tion of the s taff ' s a tt i tude towa rd the who le progr a m. It s t a t e d t ha t NACA ' s s t aff fe lt the award s prog r am t o be unnecessar y a t NACA, " because it assumes c r ea t ive a n d innova t ive wo r k from all its SJ emp l oyees ." 149 roblem. The y re not solvin g the p ugh, we CA's respons es, tho - 195Os faced NA leaders by t he mid rategies. N ACA's. re only dive rsionary st n the we unsolvable problem. O must have be en an tive hat from the ir perspec d on a belie f that w base management system was rnal one hand, th eir inte scientists a nd e managed by other engineers c ould only b scientists a nd cisions abou t the their de ir researche rs accepted e the engineers. Th ing e those indi viduals mak programs bec aus h ation's rese arc tical researc h organiz needs of aer onau derstood the ons about th eir work un decisi and the adv ancement work een the rese archers' the relatio nship bewt and d with deman ds from e her hand, th ey were fac ot of aviation. On the the method of c ontrolling de maintainin g their which ma external act ors not imposs ible. f In th e ization very difficult i tivities of the organ o promote fo r ac continuing tution by d found apa rtial sol ut this 1950s they h a ucture, b ining the co mmittee str mainta earch achiev ements and res bbot argued, t. As A ore difficul becoming inc reasingly m Was as ACA-t ype org anization w The N es have chan ged . ific research in an .?? tim promote sci ent research wa s to ic well suited en scientif ortant area a t a time wh and the imp novelty in government, of a e of ver y still someth ing ere not so la rge as to b res for it w rcely concei vable expenditu yone. It is sca .84 much concern to an arise again a situation will ever that such NOTES 1 These changes were made through amendments to NACA's original legislation. Public Law 908 (70th Cong., 1st sess.) approved March 2 1929 (45 Stat. 1451) increased the membership to 15. Public Law 706 ' (75th Cong., 2d sess.) approved June 23, 1938 (52 Stat. 1027), Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, required that two representatives from the Department of Commerce be members. Public Law 549 (80th Cong., 2d sess.) approved May 25, 1948 (61 Stat. 600) increased the membership to 17 and also limited the tenure of non-government members to 5 years. The Air Force representative replaced the Army representatives and a representative from the Department of Defense was added. This left the government positions at 10 and the non-government at 7. 2 The laboratories were located throughout the United States as follows: Ames, established in 1941 at Moffett Field, California, is currently called Ames Research Center; High Speed Flight Research ~tation, established in 1946 at Edwards Air Force Base in California, :s today the Hugh L. Dryden Flight Research Center. Langley, established in 1917 at Langley Field near Hampton, Virginia, is now the Langley Research Center. Lewis, established in 1942 at Cleveland, Ohio, is Lewis Research Center today. Pilotless, established in 1945 at Wallops Island Virginia, is currently the Wallops Flight Center. ' 3 Vannevar Bush replaced Ames as chairman in 1940, but wa s only chairman for a year. Hunsaker replaced him in 1941 and remained chairman until 1956. James H. Doolittle, a Ph.D. from MIT, retired Lieutenant General from the Air Force and former Director of Shell Oil Company, was chairman from 1956 until NACA became NASA. As will be discussed below 11 of the then 15 mem~er Advisory Committee were appointed betwee ' n 1937 and 1939. 4 This was accomplished through formal changes in NACA's rule s and regulations in 1944 and 1949. 5 Dryden was chairman of the NACA subcommittee on High Speed Aerodynamics at the time of his appointment. He was also a member of the Air Force's Scientific Advisory Board, the National Academy of Sciences and former member of the National Defense Committee. He worked under ' Dr. Ames and had authored numerous NACA technical reports. See Richard K. Smith (ed.), The Huh L. Dr den Pa ers 1898-1965: A Preliminar Catalogue of the Basic Collection (Baltimore, Md.: The Milton s. Eisenhower Library, The Johns Hopkins Univ., 1974). 150 151 ormal the head of the agency by a f 6 ted as Dryden was desi gna 9. rules and regu lations in 194 change in the , February 7, 19 49. As will 7 Harry S. Truma n ized from the b . Jerom e Hunsaker to ly criticcture was stron g ry could discussed belo w, NACA's stru ndust e cians believed that private i 193 ny politi her tement was a ra t 0s on. Since m a a er than the gov ernment, the st g bett its structure with private do everythin rt to associate ?bvious attempt on NACA's pa plishing its wor k. nd f accomi ustry's meth od o nd lities o: Standin g Committ:es a 8 nctions and Res ponsi~i ," "Fu sory Committee f or Aeronautics S . ational Advi py in Alex Rola nd, mittees of the Nubcom 0, p. 1. Co Dryden, January 1, 195 1980, Appendix H. firepared by Hug h L. ril, mittee," Comment Edition, Ap Research by Com 9 5. Dryden, op. cit ., p. 10 Ibid. e discussed belo w. 11 ar These procedure s eport on Survey of the 12 General Accoun ting Office, "R e ? 11 e cs, forwarded b y cover letter S ittee for Aerona uti omm f the U.S. to Jo hn Nat i?onal Advisory C eral of tes, Acting Com ptroller Gen of the Manageme nt Control r~m Frank L. Ya for a discussion ~hillips, Febru ary 20, 1953, . nformation Syst em 13 Ibid., p. 50. 948; Hugh 14 o Jerome Hunsak er, March 30, 1 t Sears, April See w. R. Sears April 13, 1948; and ~ ryden ~o ker, d with tracking en to Jerome Hu nsa lems associate~;Yd as for a discussi on of the prob Part of NACA ' s problem w , 1948, r World War II. blems were aeronautical re search afte which informatio n pro period in ugh data during a hat it existed f tracking is ac complished thro ~ this type o e Technical Info rmation creasing. Toda y n h as the Defe ns i ch in tion systems suc identify resea r management info rma to sts and enginee rs Center, which e nable scienti mputer. Progress throug h the co 152 15 a required part of the Management The semi-annual reports were simply listed by title ntrol Information System . The monthly reports Co gaged. Dryden made the tories wer e en all the projects in whi ch the labora nds for more ts a requirement in resp onse to continual dema ~onthly repor e laboratories' projects from industry. The information regarding th mplete information as in dustry ly co lab~ratories' unwillingn ess to supp ription. ired resulted in a list of titles with no desc des 16 cit., for a discussion o f fice, op. See General Accounting O f this process. 17 st of discussed below, NACA's failure to keep abrea As will be te clearly to all all aeronautical researc h was demonstrated qui erman aeronautical advan cements became known Participants when the G during World War II. 18 ing Office, op. cit., p. 17. General Account 19 . Danhof, Government Co ntracting and See Clarence H , D.C.: The Brookings I nstitution, ~chnological Change ( Washington s 19 on J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapon 68) and Mert rvard Process: An Economic A nalysis (Boston: Ha ~guisition the problems surroundin g cussion of University, 1962) for a dis arch and development wo rk. government contracting for rese 20 es established contract relationships with The military servic World War which were very productive for Scientists during the S econd the war, scientists cont inued to work for the both groups. After hese gencies. The success of t military services and o ther federal a entists' fear that worki ng for relationships mitigated at least some sci , ould end their research autonomy. Don K. Price the federal government w lknap Press of Harvard e Scientific Estate (Ca mbridge, Mass.: The Be Th cs of Pure Press, 1965); Daniel S . Greenberg, The Politi University 7); and A. Hunter Dupre e, ibrary , 196 ~ (New York: New American L (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press ee in the Federal Gove rnment ~n of Harvard University P ress, 1957) . 21 g Act of July 2, 1940 (P .L. 703, peditin The National Defense Ex , Act of and the First War Powers Act of 1941 (Title II July 2, 1940) 001 55 Stat. 83, implemented by Executive Order 9 r 18 1941 departme' Decembe ' ' y g overnment nt De cember 20, 1941) provid ed the services and an nt with the authority to negotiate, amend, or esignated by the Presided ilitated. The two contracts if America's war effort would be fac modify high level d the government to neg otiate contracts when a acts permitte anhof, rounded the development of a final product. D of uncertainty sur acts in more detail. loc. cit., discusses the se 153 Public Law 415, 81st Cong., 22 nnel Act of 194 9, with a request nitary Wind Tu gan in 1944 U . The history of this act be ecame ber 27, 1949 research cente r, After it b Octo for a it the Army Airfo rce for funds , by were in compet ition for funds and the Army The original obvious that NA CA cilities. combined plan f or research fa riated $253,000 ,000, Proposed a rop 2,200,000,000, Congr ess app ory of $ ist timated cost wa s , pp, 4- 6, cont ains a short h es nnual Report the California NACA's Thirty- N inth A partment of Def ense also used l. The De ratory for some of its this proposa bo chnology's Jet Propulsion La Institute of Te esearch needs. r Eighty to 23 ting Office, op , cit,, p. 36. oun design problems of General Acc t s applied resea rch directed a wa d research was in eighty-five per cent is applie lanes, Seventy percent of th specific airp ests, nse to specific military requ respo Story of the lion, Supersonic Flight: The 24 chard P. Hal Co,, 1 972); See Ri -558 (New York: The MacMillan uglas D nd Flight Test 11 X-1 and the Do ~ llop s Isla hortal, A New D imension: Wa n (Washington, and Joseph A. S ars, NASA Refere nce Public a tio fteen Ye n, 1978). B?nge: The Fir st Fi tratio eronautics and S pace Adminis D.c.: National A ken by Air Forc e Captain 25 br o The sound barri er was first e. It was bui lt by Bell er in the X-1 re search airplan Yaeg t NACA / Airforc e project. Phillip E. as part of a jo in nd w Aeronautical Aircraft Corpo ration a Sixty Years of Anderton, A's See Hallion, ib id.; David A. ; a nd NAC ashington, D. C.: NASA, 1980) ch 1917-1977 (W Flight Research ," pp. 5-10. B.._esear pori "High-Speed !_arty- third An nual Re 26 on, op. cit., P , 196, Halli hn Stack a nd hi s achiev ement s. 2 7 s JoHallion, ibid., discusse Frontier: Case Hi s t ories of ed Also ee John v. pe Becker, The Hig h-S ASA, 80) for a s 1950 (Washingto n, D,C.: N 19 !._our NACA Programs, 1920- or Stack . discussion. B ecker worked f more personal rcury and Apollo e 28 ose design was also used on M lunt n es M. Grimwood, and The b n, Jr,, Jam Lloyd S, Swenso oject Mercury space vehicles. See : A His tory of Pr er, This New Oc ean rry Julian Allen . Charles G, Alex and 1966) fo r a dis cussion of Ha .: NASA, (Washington, D. C of the escribes the di scovery 29 Anderton, op. c it., p. 35, d area rule. 154 30 -third Annual Re port, loc. cit. See NACA's Thirt y A. Van n was H. Guyford Stever. James 31 e's chairma empsey, William H. The Committe lauser, James R. D O. C von Braun, Milt on lph Lovelace were chainnen Allen, Wernher nd William Rando Pickering, Hend rick W. Bode, a nder this commi ttee. ttees u of the subcommi ther very little com petition from o 32 d arch During the 1920s NACA ha e nd after World Wa r II, small res nizations. Durin g a oratory and MIT R adiation research orga Propulsion Lab t ' s research laboratories, su ch as the Jet en nent part of the federal governm e a perma rovided an enviro nment Laboratory, beca m structure. Thes e laboratories p pment el regulations a nd pay and develo t avoided the pe rsonn Peck, op. cit. , imilar to NACA's bu S NACA during thi s period. plagued deral establishm ent limitations whic h so s in the fe ee, op. cit., dis cuss the change and Dupr for research. story of Super-G rade 33 HiSee Braithwaite to Shapley, " es, for 3, 1968, NASA Hi story Office Fil SA," April 2 t., Chapter 11, Positions: NACA /NA op. ci f NACA's pay prob lems. Roland, n o blems in the 195 0s. a discussio ACA's funding and personnel pro discusses N 4 ort for 1956. 3 NACA's Annual Re p n Swenson, op. c it., and Edwin 35 on relies heavily Research Center This sectio istory of Ames an, Adventures in Research: A H P. Hartm SA, 1970). :.240-1965 (Washi ngton, D.C . : NA l 36 p. 8 5. Swenson, op. cit ., 6 37 op. cit., p. 8 . Becker, 38 Shortal, op. cit ., p. 159. ACA's Rules and 39 fically state d in N f, since Although not spe ci af arently also exte nded to the st s, this rule was app chairman of one of the Regulation gley, was also nittees and Reid, the Direct or of Lan listing of all c orrn A complete s subcommittees. it ., Appendix B. Aerodynamic c in Roland, op . their chairman i s given 6 1. 40 . 1 Shortal, op. cit ., p 155 created in 1947 to provide 41 of Defense was nt. A separate The Department tablishme es with a unifi ed military es tional Securitl Na the United Stat ime. The reated at that t Air Force withi n DOD was c aw 253, 80th Co ng.). t of 1947 (Publ ic L A_c 's space 42 e Director o f the Army Wernher van Bra un was th te 22. listic Missile C enter. See no rmy ' s Bal Program at the A . ndustry ranked 43 f World War II t he aircraft i nning o he end it was f irst. At the begi es. At t 4 lar output in t he United Stat stry in dol The American Aircraft Indu , 4th ss: the hn B. Rae , Clim b To Greatne litical power o f lS ee Jo he MIT Press, 1 968). The po use -1960 (Mass.: T is best eviden ced in the Ho 920 ar period 949. industry during the post-w ct of 1 he Unitary Wind Tunnel Plan A Report accompan ying t be purpose of the facilities to primary necessary Inasmuch as the ovide wind tunn els pr the NACA is to er development allocated to nd guided missi les und testing aircraf t a committee that strong for of the by industry, it is the sense bill which will hould be incorp orated in the the language s es, although al located to insure that the se faciliti ts eeping basis an d staffed by i led housek try's NACA on a so-ca l e to satisfy in dus bl personnel, sha ll be availa erimental model s in testing of exp . requirements fo r the iles ent of new airc raft and miss elopm d and the course of d ev schedule tely essential that tests be absolu s requirements and It is ' d in accordance with industry conducte d with proper e mphasis e be allocate that laboratory tim e various contr actors engaged on the requirem ents of th r up types of milita ry aircraft fo in the developm ent of new ng., the services. 1376, 81st Co mittee on Armed Services, H.R. U.s. Congress, House, Com ber 4, 1949, p. 4. 1st sess., Octo 44 Roland, loc. ci t. ce and Director the Air For 45 m retired Lieuten ant General fro ies As a ger military an d industrial t n Company, he had stro rman of NACA. His of the Shell O il hai sly been accept able for the c f events from t he early than had previo u string o was the final b low in a long g industry mem bers intment nappo A's tradition o f not appointi NAC 1940s which. beg an ittee. to the Advisory Comm 156 46 Roland, op. cit., p. 332, describes what turned into a personal feud between Thomas and Hunsaker and at times other NACA leaders. Arthur L. Levine, "United States Aeronautical Policy, 1915-1958: A Study of the Major Policy Decisions of the National Advisory Connnittee for Aeronautics," Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1963, argued that whatever NACA's disagreements with Congress prior to this time, it had enjoyed a very friendly relationship with Congress and had escaped much of the Congressional oversight inflicted on other government organizations for this reason. can 47 The General Accounting Office Reports for 1953 and 1955 be reviewed at the Headquarters History Office, Washington, D.C. 48 See Appendix A for appropriations. 49 The reasons for this are difficult to determine. Thomas's lack of support as well as NACA's inability to justify its continued existence in light of the small private research organizations performin g similar work and the success of the large research and development organization which accomplished their work by letting contracts, all ~robably played a role. NACA's appropriations requests began to be l.IIlproved without any trouble again in 1956. 5o NACA's Annual Reports for 1935 through 1936 describe the various steps in this process. 51 Ames was approved in 1939 and staffed by Langley employees. Lewis was approved in 1940 and was supposed to be NACA's response to the need for propulsion research. It created problems for NACA in its early years, because of NACA's lack of experience in this t ype of ~esearch. George J. Mead, a retired aircraft executive and the first industry representative to be appointed to the Advisory Connnittee, was appointed because of these problems. The impact of this discovery was psychological as much as 52 anything else. Part of the reason for the U.S. ' s neutrality prior to ~ntering the war was based on the feeling of invincibility generated by its distance from Europe. Neither the German rocket or jet program had an impact on the outcome of the war, but they did result in deep criticism of the military services after the war. 157 Propulsion Labora tory began 53 dore von Karman at the Jet Theo n the belief that the es i rk on liquid-prope lled rocket engin eached the peak of its to wo had r engine propeller- driven airplane ronautics Piston and that further a dvancements in ae lopment ers dismissed technological deve 's lea d a different type of engine. NACA quire the Army's fundi ng a would re were doing and rec ommended against what they boratory in 1938. The request was r wind tunnels for the la o for tw o new request f NACA was trying to obtain approval made at the same time laboratories. f a Thesis by Arth ur 54 ntary o Ira H. Abbot, "A R eview and Comme 8 1 " ronautical Research Policy, 1915-195 .S. Ae planation ? for H. Levine entitled 'U ex cript, 1964, attemp ted to provide an anus stification for th e Unpublished M ju re, but admits the re was really no A's NACA failu d that part of the problem was NAC . cit., argue illingness to failure. Levine, op total unw at its methods wer e the best and a s the failure and feeling th s. Roland, op. ci t., also discusse acturers had listen to outsider ilitary services, a nd engine manuf the m e industry notes that NACA, eated to give priv at agreed shortly aft er NACA was cr been development and th at it would have ngine ven this responsibility for e esearch, gi for NACA to engag e in propulsion r 1956, was that ind ust r y difficult d in problem, as Hunsak er note radica l departure s agreement. The rdizing the airpla ne, not in ars of Was interested in standa unsaker, "Forty Yeerome C. H of the from the existing engine. J ts Annual Report of t he Board of Regen in eronautical Resear ch,'' hington, D.C.: GPO , 1956). A thsonian Institutio n, 1955 (Was ~mi he fo rmer engine 55 ae, op. cit., argu ed that some of t R the same directive s. t with manufacturers were me 56 See note 21. and Facilities ," 57 CA, "Guided Missil es, NACA Program .C. NA es, Record Group 2 55 , Washington, D 15, 1944. Nationa l Archiv December Roland, op. c?t , 58 to Condon, March 4 , 1947, cited i n l ? LeMay p, 373. oversy. 59 d Tunnel Act contr his occurred durin g the Unitary Win T the e, Special Committ ee Investigating 60 S. Cong ress, Sena t l Defense Program, U. ogram, Investigati on of the Nationamber 3 , 1946, National Defense P r 2d sess., Septe te Report 110, Par t 7, 79th Cong., Sena p , 147148. 158 D-558 d in the Bell X -1 and Douglas 61 resulte These proposals rograms discusse d above. P 62 Hallion, op. ci t. See s to: that its task wa 63 its 1941 Annual Report claimed as. This was a NACA in (2) develop and a pply new ide and doing any (1) furnish new ideas orts which denie d that it was change from its earlier rep development wor k. tes thority in 1943 . Minu 64 was given contr act approval au wis , 1943 and June 16, 1942. Le tive Committee M eeting, May 20 of the Execu during Industry also h ad difficulty 65 p. cit., p. 172 . t., Abbot, o d personnel. S ee Rae, op. ci this period obt aining qualifie PP. 149-157. on of this 66 . cit., p. 171, for a discussi See Abbot, op Problem. 67 allion, op. cit. See H 68 p . p. 36. ric e, op. cit., 69 Swenson, op. ci t., P? 25. 70 allion, op. cit. , p. 196. H 57. 71 ACA, Twelfth An nual Report, p. N 72 See note 53. 1940. Brooking s 73 ton to Vannevar Bush, June 3, G. Moul 2, published as Senate Harold esearch, Report 1 overnment, Institution for Government R Agencies of G e to Investigate the Executive 1937. Select Committe ong., 1st sess., Senate Report 1 275, 75th C 159 74 Moulton, ibid. 75 Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration 7 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1964), ch apter discusses Congress's attempts to control federal personn el prac~ices. It is easy to blame the agencies doing the enforcement, but many are only carrying out their mandates. Apparently, the Civil Service the 1950s was not the same organization it is today. In Commission of 1952 its Annual Report stated: The last few years have seen a growing tendency on the part of Congress to legislate on the details of personne l administration. The Commission believes that by going beyond statements of policy and legislative intent to spell out procedures of carrying them out, Congress often creates a rigidity of operation and administration that interferes with efficient personnel management in the executive branch. Administrative rules and regulations are flexible and easily altered to suit changing conditions. Personnel procedures set by law can be changed only by new legislation after a necessarily lengthy process. , p. 20. Cited U.S. Civil Service Commission, 69th Annual Report (1952) in Harris, p. 167. 76 The Bureau of the Budget and General A ccounting Office were Stat. 20). established through the General Accounting Act of 1921 ( 42 nsferred to BOB was relatively ineffective until 1939 when it was tra the Executive Office of the President by Executive Order 8248 signed September 8, 1939, and placed under the direction of Har old D. Smith. The General Accounting Office remained rather ineffectua l until the I 1 I ssage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, and the Bud get pa Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 made it responsible fo r providing er 1946 Congress with expenditure analysis of all federal agenci es. Aft as Congress began to use these reports. The Civil Service Commission w established by the Pendleton Civil Service Act of 1883 (1 6 Stat. 514). Until the 1940s it largely delegated its personnel respo nsibilities to the agencies. The Civil Service Classification Act of 19 49 extended its authority. 7 7 II Memorandum o f Di .s approva l" accompanyi.n g poc k et veto of the first bill to create a NACA- t ype s tructure (H.R. 5448, 79th C ong., 2nd sess.). This pla n was drafted by Bush and Vi ctory . The final NSF bil l ma nda t ed a d i r ector with a cons ul t ing board. It was passed i n 19 50 (PL 81-507). See Congress a nd the Nation, Vol. 1 , Congres sio nal Quart rly s rv?c (1965), pp . 1203-1204; pp. 1199-1200. The At omi c Ene r gy Commission , but these established in 1 946 wa s di r ect ed by a c ivi l i an commis s i o n 160 employees. Its pas sage, though, was e paid n or members were full-t im over whether there should be civilia an argument cular structure of Preceded by the parti control of the age ncy, not over on, ibid., p. 246. military and the Nati the organization. See Congress Staats, "Proposed 78 to ional Security Bran ch (W. H. Shapley) 49," May 11, 1949. Nat Regulations Submit ted February 7, 19 Amendments to NACA d in Roland, op. c it., p. 340. Cite together the variou s skills 40 to bring NDRC was created in 19 y scientific advanc ements to the war cessary to appl wrote the draft a~d facilities ne e model for its cre ation, and Victory created because effort. NACA was th shed it. OSRC was or the Executive O rder which establi cture with a singl e f NDRC. NDRC had a bureaucratic stru of deficiencies in r. It was success ful. directo . c?i 9 t, 1953, op t., p ?4. 7 GAO Repor 80 . Ib i d., pp. 9 a nd 1 1. 81 Ibid., p. 42. 82 955 , op. cit., pp. 11-12 . GAO Report, 1 ovement Program, F iscal 83 nagement Im pr NACA, Report on th e NACA Ma es, p. 2. gton, D.C., copy in NASA Hi s t or y Fil .!_ear 1953, Washin 84 8. Abbot, op. cit., p . 20 Chapter 4 IN THE LATE 1960 s NASA INTRODUCTION 1957 sent shock waves k I on October 4 , The launch of S putni Congress and the rom both th e nation and bro ught demands f rough th es. It also similar feat by the United Stat a American public for d internal ith an answer to their budget an ers w Provided NACA's lead ace program woul d Responsibility for the new sp management probl ems. or its continued existence and more than ample justification f Provide lessen at least some of the t would ases in its app ropriations. I incre strative changes. and admini demands for pers onnel n eaders proposed that it be give y of 1958, NACA 's l In Januar rovide the nat io n with a esearch necessar y to p e r responsibility f or tfi ole, according t o ssians. NACA's ru program equal to that of the R space research to that which i t filled in the milar the proposal, wo uld be si uld manage the p rogram . 1 ilitary services wo The m aircraft program . the results were ut their role, ver NACA's leade rs' feeling abo Whate into the visioned. NACA was transformed ey had en quite diffe r ent than th 2 y of 1958. Th e and Space Admin istration in Jul N t? a ional Aeronau tics strator responsi ble ni to be managed by a single admi new organization was e new space prog ram. esponsibility fo r th o the President with complete r t normous achievem ents . They rs of e NASA's first ten years were yea s came true. In A's leader orst fears of NA C also were years in which the w as appointed . B y 1965 9 non-technical a dmiPi5trator, w 1 61 James Webb, a f its in-house s cientists ny o lost the support of not only ma NASA had nization. ific g roups outs ide of the orga scient and engineers, b ut also many 161 162 s and personnel levels n tting its appro priatio ' 965 Congress be gan cu In 1 ich continues to wh had entered a d ecline nd by the end o f the 1960s it a the present tim e. to the late 1960s in an attempt amines NASA in This chapter ex e of scientists re to understand the importanc show how its le aders' failu cess, as well as the research and de velopment pro the and engineers t o ich would meet t he ent structure wh ortance of an in ternal managem imp st its decline by 1955. The fir uals, ended withvid needs of these indi the late 1960s . sted in f NASA as it ex i ion presents an examination o sect explain why it pt to there is no atte m is primarily de scriptive and It h tion examines th e factors whic s it did. The second sec had developed a ment of this or ganization. the develop Played a role i n 163 I NASA IN THE LA TE 1960.s OF THE ORGANIZATIO N change us periods, the most visible vio As with our tw o pre in size and co mplexity 1960s was the change 0s and the between the 19 5 thousand full - ti.me SA in 1968 emp loyed over 32 NA of the organiz ation. shortly d contract emp loyees. NACA, ver 200 thousan employees and o nly eight thous and mployed o ferred to NASA , e before it was trans nge was accompanie d by a cha 3 loyees . This growth in size full-time emp le. NASA had m ore than 4.5 ailab e level of app ropriations av in th est rations in 1968 . NACA' s high for its. ope bi.llion dollar s available ollars . The nu mber of slightly over 100 million d appropriation was Research Statio n and eased to nine, with one ad incr Research Cente rs h 4 under contrac t. one government- owned facility tly different t han ture in 1968 w as significan NASA's struc wn more c omple x o the headquarter s unit had gr 3 shows, NACA's. As Fi gure ctivities was n ot as port and resear ch a the distinctio n between sup and d former Direc tor of the n ned. James We bb, a lawyer a clearly defi try, had been rience in the a ircraft indus pe ureau of the B udget with ex sibility for its B ASA in 1961 wit h full respon or of N appointed Adm inistrat er e were more layers ittee was gone and th 5 0 rations. The Advisory Comm Pe of authority. how the actual division of h, does not s The chart, thou g on could t its simplest the organizati A sponsibilities within NASA. re ucture with a division of bed as having a two-tier str be descri een the Adviso r y to that betw r es pons i bil i t y similar when NACA exi s t ed . r tier a nd the La bora torie s tie ters Commit t ee / Hea dquar r N/\ '/'IONI\T, l\f;;HONI\IJ'l'JCS /\NO Sl'/\CF. l\DNINI8THI\TION OR - -- --7 AOM I Nl S'f'R/\T I 7 I Office of Aeros pnce r e r so 1111<'l N;il ln11;1 I Mnnn ge111r11 l /11 :1d0 111 I ,? ,, ASSOCIATE Special Ex,~c 11l I ve Mnnnge me n t Sa f e ty lnl c r Im Office of Assf s lnnts Sec.r<'tarlnt llea dq 11,1 rl ers \for k In g Gr n11 p Re v I cw Gene m l ADMINISTRATOR C:01111111111 l c: aLJnn s Dcve lopmC' n t Comm I t t 01? I Counse l CP lll , . .. I I I orr ice o f Of[lce o f rollr.y Program Pl ,111 s and An"J ys ls - --1 - - - ~ I AllM lN I STRATOR Assoc! a le llEPIITY Office o [ Deputy Ol'.gani:rnt ion Administrnlnr and Mnnagement --7 ,--- ___ l ,- - \ ----,- - -------i - Of[ice o (
s ,?nt c: h Ce 11l: cr f--' (J\ -P- F i.gu.Ji.e. 3 NASA Or ganization Chart , 1967 165 y was responsible f or general polic t The headquarters uni tegration and rev iew of program objec tives; in on decisions; determ inati izations; and ; relationships w ith other organ of agency program s and ning, contracting agency-wide, anagement functio ns s uch as plan m aboratories in t he 1950s, nters, as the NAC A l Ce budgeting. The NASA ay-to-day operati ons for the d with responsibil ity were semi-autonom ous ervised and direc ted the he Center staff s up of the organizat ion. T ideas for future programs, contracts, gene rated the implementation o f rs could personnel. Cent er Directo nd anaged and recru ited their own a m were responsible for They m funds within o ne program area. reprogra reassign them wh en s to specific pro jects and could assigning employ ee mewhat mitigated by as so division of res ponsibilities w desired. The implementation ility for reviewin g the Centers' nsib headquarter's re spo s, but even ere covered by fe deral regulation which w of those program s nly through perio dic 's functions were accomplished o r these headquarte ers should do. specification o f what the Cent reviews rather t han -tier structure s till remains a of a two The description re which roject managemen t structu fication because it ignores the p simpli r relationship an d cut across adquarters / centee overlay the two- tier h 6 Project d ? ctures. connnun ?1cat1ons stru a11 traditional auth ority an lished its resear c h which NASA accom p ement was the me chanism through manag quarters Program Offices had ead activities. The H and development ., Manned Space F light s (e.g specific program area responsibility f or ary to meet progr am cts (e.g., Apollo ) necess e Program) and the proj aried among the entation of proje ct management v Objectives. The implem es were responsi ble for resource ic Program offices , bu t all off urisdictio n, r ev iew of e various projec ts under their j allocation for t h 166 sional ion, contact with a pplicable Congres Project implementa t ous projects withi n their mittees, and integr ation of the vari com ch program office o meaningful progra ms . Although ea jurisdiction int l centers also perf ormed al ific centers under its jurisdiction, had spec assigned. er than the one to which they were ffices oth Work for program o ices and the variou s centers Program Off The link between t he ithin the Program O ffice w through the Program Manager located occurred ers. The relations hip er located at one o f the cent and the Project M anag tionship mirror image of t he rela between these two individuals was a was headquarters. The Project Manager en the centers and betwe ion of the xecution of the pr oject and supervis responsible for th e e al boundaries, the ojects crossed org anization contractors. Sinc e pr r supervising indiv iduals who responsible fo Project Manager co uld be stallation or direct control of another field in remained under the l If the project cros sed organizationa organizations outs ide of NASA. h final center was appointe d lead center wit boundaries , one ogram Offices in 1 968 were the total project . The Pr responsibility for their own contacts with arters and had autonomous units w ithin headqu Congressmen and co ntractors. ding how NASA was organized of understan Compounding the pr oblem etween the Adminis trator and the Was the fact that the connection b for the s with NACA, respo nsibility Program Offices wa s not direct. A arceled f the organization was p ministrative and te chnical aspects o ad tion and aanagemen t, the Deputy 0 en the Office of O rganiza ut betwe Deputy Administrat or. Associate Administrator and the ' 167 e integrated somewh at through the us e The various group s wer d panels which als o crossed ho~ committees an of Permanent and ad These connnittees hority and commu nications lines . traditional aut enter level, and t the headquarter s level and the c existed both a one composed of indiv iduals from only rpose were depending on thei r pu om the scientific as well as member s fr level or all thre e levels, ther government o rganizations . ommunity, private industry, and o c sed on the relatio nships largely focu This discussion h as NASA had also esta blished es of NASA, but between full-time employe of Defense and pr ivate industrial ips with the Depa rtment relationsh al boundaries . N ACA had ure any organizat ion obsc finns which tende d to stration and thus act admini olved in a minima l amount of contr been inv arch and he management of large- scale rese with t had little experi ence h its involvement ond what it had le arned throug bey development proje cts aft program. Usi ng its r itary services on the research airc With the mil NASA was able to est the use of mi litary personnel, authority to requ e of management which it lacked. Som in program Obtain the expert ise r for Apollo, were military he program manage its managers, inc luding t 7 elegated many of its porarily with NASA . NASA also d men stationed tem of tment of Defense. The Army Corps contract function s to the Depar ities at Marshall for the construc tion of facil cts Engineers let con tra e Corps SA provided the s pecifications, th gh. NA and Kennedy. Alt hou d responsibility d the constructio n. NASA retaine supervised and in specte ications, and app roval if of the contracts , technical spec for the terms 8 contract. of any changes in the 168 ips were established wi th private firms. Similar relationsh g such as the integration of subsystems, assurin , System engineering work t hardware, preparing reliability of all comp onents, checking ou g the Apollo program, w ere performed b.y specifications and eval uatin s, establish They were hired to defin e scientific objective contractors. es. Until 1967, they w ere future objectives, and operate test faciliti ta processing xtensively to perform s uch support work as da also used e 9 and maintenance. 169 GENERAL MANAGEMENT mittee witrr the as sistance of the NACA's Advisory C om general managemen t d made arters unit formu lated policies an headqu e primarily accom plished 968 these functio ns wer decisions for NAC A . By 1 the administratio n James Webb was responsible for by three individu als. d policy decision s. He d final research an of all of NASA's activities an duals, Dr. Homer vi ibilities to two i ndi ad delegated many of his respons h duals had a great . 10 hough other indiv i E l t ? Newell and Haro ld Finger. A d Newell who were t was Finger an l of power in the organization, i dea in 1967 and 1968 . g NASA effectively manag in ~adershi..E_ used its research trast to NACA, wh ich essentially In con h and any type of approving researc authorization pro cess both for ms for authoriza tion two separate sys te long-range planni ng, NASA had or of the Office dministrat . Harold Finger, the Associate A and planning to Webb and was t he nd Management, re ported directly of Organization a n by Webb ad been appointed to this positio A. He h operating head of NAS his search and Techno logy because of anced Re from the Office o f Adv ograms and workin g with other various NASA pr success at managi ng for approving al l programs, ations. He was r esponsible organiz . cts, and other su pport activities ntra allocating resour ces, major co who handled NASA 's , Associate Deput y Administrator, Willis Shapley , was responsible for assuring ships with other organizations relation 11 neral plan for th e organization. nger's ge that his activiti es fit Fi 170 on changes from 1958 through a dis~ussion of organ izati In e of Organization and 1968 Of fic , w?e1.uc_ b_ adverts to tne pow er of tne Management: his Office of Organiz ation and And we gave t r the system. Management police aut horities ove escribe the system, We say, 'You've got t o pr ot to monitor the syst em, you've got to you've g r it, and these fellow s udit performance unde 2 a go forward without yo u. 11 can't get the money t o the same relationship posed to have Finger, according to Webb, was sup he Bureau of the Budg et had with other NASA as. t W-ith other units with in ed to him rather than to am Offices report federal agencies. Al l Progr e was also ffices were directly u nder his control. H Webb. and support o h was composed of repr esentatives ber of the Management Council, whic a mem This ices at headquarters. from all the program and functional off tus meetings, was used to establish agency Council , along with monthly sta reas within the organ ization. All m a Policy and to review any proble nal unit were reviewe d izatio ograms which involved more than one organ Pr knew their status be fore problems il, so that its member s b.y the Counc n of top management. brought the programs to the attentio sponsible for long-ran ge planning and the Newell was re nters proposals for future programs from the ce egration of nmnerous int 13 long-range plan. N ewell had and Program Offices i nto an agency-wide to NACA's cormnittee ittee structure similar estab.lished a plannin g comm omposed 14 ted by wo rking panels c Structure. Program memoranda were draf centers, and major pro gram offices. of individuals from h eadquarters, ering Group, g panels were supervi sed by a Planning Ste These workin as to planners whose r espon sibility w composed of headquar ters-level an agency-wide plan. A hesize the various pr ogram memoranda into synt 171 well, the center Dir ectors , g Review Committee, composed of Ne Plannin ices and various Ass ociate th gram Offe Deputy Directors of the Pro all plans and provi ded guidance and ed Administrators, revi ew 15 ations to the Admin istrator. recommend r to in a manner simila he planning committe e structure worked T t was never effectiv e eno.ugh to echanism, but i NACA's subcommittee m l the y-wide long-range pl an acceptable to al Produce an agenc e Branch. and Congre ss, both of whom the Executiv Participants or to port with additional ask for new ideas w h.ich they could sup continued to fund 16 s. r source of ideas fo r new programs. SA also had one otheNA emy ademy of Sciences an d the National Acad c Members of the Nati onal A . In with regard to futur e NASA programs of Engineers acted as advisors the Lunar and Planet ary nized group was 1968 the only offic ially recog of members of the t wo Academies, ard. This Board, co mposed Mission Bo he University commu nity , was supposed from t as well as represen tatives ts members pollo planning, but conflict between i to advise NASA on po st-A om ontent of NASA progr ams prevented it fr he c and NASA's leaders over t stopped working objectiYe. By 1969 it had essentially fulfilling this 17 ded in 1970. and was formally dis ban 172 SEARCR AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES NASA'S RE ponsible not only for res In contrast to NACA, NASA was truction, testing research, but also "th e development, cons aeronautical es. 1118 h purpose of aeronaut ical and space vehicl and operation for res earc arily accomplished by acts, its work was pri m Although NACA let som e contr 90 percent of rchers in NACA's labo ratories. More than its own resea 19 y the 1960s. Perhap s more N tracts bASA's budget was devo ted to con nce in their objectiv es. NACA's work was important was the diff ere d, and reliability of he quality, spee directed toward impro ving t ientific. It SA's objective was as much political as sc airplanes. NA leadership in space. The in the nation's Was establis?hed to re ga am. 20 the Apollo progr echanism to accomplish this objective was m types of research to m eet its 68 NASA was engaged in three By 19 ontinued research previously pe rformed by NACA was c objectives. The low-cost projects with no numerous, continuing and generally involve d research were performe d es. The projects rela ted to this type of schedul NASA was letting cont racts ugh Primarily in NASA's ow n laboratories, altho the mid-1960s. This was for a great deal of a pplied research by ce pplied research requir ed by the manned spa Particularly the case for a evelopment groups. In most reseearch and d flight program and ot her ects involved only on e the ap plied and advanc ed engineering proj cases, center. o and development proje cts were divided int The large research The manned anned and unmanned spa ce flight programs. two types, the m . The d of the Apollo progra m space fl i ght program by 1968 consiste be directed toward th e o ned space program pro jects were supposed t unman 173 increasing the nation's. t of science, n ot toward advancemen ians as was the Russ bility or catchi ng up with the technological c apa manned space fl ight program . fferences research had som e important di NASA's three ty pes of 1 f . t h e organi zati.o n . Small d a 1 int h hich Playe roe e d eve opment o iv involved only o ne group of app1? y led research pr ojects generall red the he space flight programs requi enter . T researchers wit hin one c s organizations d the collabora tion of numerou ct an Production of a produ te sectors . The large riva nes, both in th e public and p in many discipl i ence of the var ious end izations require d, the interdep number of organ ls of quality an d performance e onents, as well as the high lev comp d. t i.o n " o f these . rati.o n an d coor inateg required meant that " precise in 21 h b d to e exerci ? sed not only ? Control a organl? Zations was re quired. umerous satellit e NASA, but also over the n s within over individual h certainty involv ed acts. Te un oroa ? ons with which NASA had contr b nizati ork meant that eir research and development w in the performance of th the e allowed some d iscretion, but i n d s had to bividual perform er ous components r equired a high the numer plexity and need to integrate com centralization. level of scale developme nt acteristics exis t in all large- These char tly. The Apollo elopment projec ts varied grea A's dev Projects, hut N AS t was attacked b .y tical purpose. I oject had a very distinct poli Pr s were being wa sted on resource ts who felt tha t the nation's Scientis 22 The unmanned spac e h a purely polit ical stunt. ~ at they considered ic and engineeri ng oriented towar d scientif fl? relght program was m o only engineerin g ad ob? lthough some of the projects h Jectives. A 174 space project were attempts ger ob? ? h e Voya ectives, such projects as t J pported by the strongly su bout the unive rse and were to learn more a tific connnunit y. scien constant scru tiny by ce flight prog ram was under The manned spa d milestones a nd Branch . Delay s in schedule e Executive Congress and t h ly programs of the n detail. Som e ear overruns were questioned i cost ns (OSSA) suff ered from the same Science and Ap plicatio Office of Spac e were as ess nor the Am erican public er Congr Visibility, bu t neith y were in the anned space pro grams as the unm nterested in t he scientific i anned space fli ght program. m of interest in l while generatin g a great dea The astronauts , more vulnerabl e to failure. ore complex and the projects m NASA, also mad e st priority of any ghe astronauts was given the hi fety of Assuring the s a e to d space projec t did not hav am. The unmann e pace progr aspect of the s ty . the same level of reliabili have n of a final p roduct, but o grams involved the producti Both pro one center or the projects involv ed more than not all of the unmanned shed within on e compli disciplines. Some were ac Collaboration of many latively small amount o f re d could be com pleted with a center an were less rger space pro grams. They the la eJ{penditures c ompared to onents, and cou ld be ed less integr ation of comp complex, requi r pared to the A pollo hort time fram e com omplished in a relatively s acc space flight differences in the unmanned oject. The re sult of these Pr lance to the m anned space ttle resemb ects meant tha t some had li Proj e Apollo proje ct by thers were very similar. Th flight project , while o ostly that it was d c iority and was so visible an pr 1968 had such a high rruns, or syste m failures 23 itself. Del ays, cost ove in a class by 175 r both the unmanned and ma nned programs, and brought investigations fo d operating procedures. and contracts, but when changes in standar agency- wide res occurred in the Apollo program, they brought failu organization changes. 176 EARCR AND DEVELOPMEN T THE MANAGEMENT OF RE S earchers a great dea l of NACA's leaders had a llowed their res uarters in the 1950s had no division at headq discretion. The res earch arch. What they did provide was a authority over the l aboratories' rese e d the Advisory Comm ittee of th mechanism for inform ing the Director an research and some i dea of d to aeronautical agency's progress w ith regar ency's programs. Th e rojects related to th e ag how the various NACA p porting devices nisms which were ado pted were simple re tracking mecha zation A ' s research authori just listed the rese arch underway. NAC Which n in the 1920s, but s was a great deal m ore formal tha Process in the 1950 ed information with regard to s general nature and lack of standardiz it de it formation, and manpo wer requirements ma ts, administrative i n cos n process tracking device. Si nce the authorizatio almost useless as a as given for general nually and authoriza tion w Was only accomplishe d an , not for specific p rojects, n) and programs categories (e.g., pr opulsio iscretion with regar d to how they l of d the centers had a gr eat dea ong projects. allocated their fund s am s, had developed an extensive tracking NASA, in contrast to thi s, while varied in t he ts program office and authorization sy stem. I e in NASA's research rol control they exerci sed, played a major amount of am. and development prog r ~gram Offices services, used a pr oject management following the milit ary NASA, rogram office was mplish its research activities. Each p system to acco r am ASA program a r eas. The prog given responsibility for one of four N 177 eneral link between the centers and the g offices provided the irectly to Finger. The They reported d management discus sed above. the integration ed roject management was tha t it allow p Philosophy behind hout required for NASA 's tasks wit of the many diffe rent skills / private relations hip which existed ditional public disturbing the tra o use individuals from many NASA was able t in the United Sta tes. members of the ions without makin g them permanent different organiz at to call on A it also allowed project managers NAS organization. W ithin into the n without bringing them viduals throughou t the organizatio indi anization permane ntly. Project org rested on informa l tire system The effectiveness of the en participants whic h crossed the ps between the va rious relationshi izations tion boundaries of the organ formal authority and communica d no formal autho rity ha a project. The p rograms' managers involved in agers e centers, nor did the project man 0 ver the project m anagers at th y project staff. Th e formal authorit ity over the have any formal a uthor or responsible for the between the Asso ciate Administrat link existed l relationship wit h r Director. The l ega Program office and the cente and private firms. r Directors ntractors existed between the cente co rity program manager b ased their autho the project mana ger and the Both oject, personal sk ills, and knowledge of the p r 0 tise, n their own exper 24 wanted done. A t hat they ability to persua de others to do w their each program e system was suppo sed to work, but least this was how th nagement. ed its own approac h to project ma office had develop eorge OMSF) was directed by G he Office of Manne d Space Flight ( T ineering contracto r. It ng r, a physicist and former systems e E. Muelle 178 of the e development and o perations efforts was responsible for th rganized around a fe w large and was o manned space flight program the late 1960s its Apollo, Mercury, an d Gemini), but by Projects (e.g., as the most centrali zed sis was on the Apoll o program. OMSF w major empha tures ts Director specifie d the formal struc es, and i of the program offi c r, and Kennedy) und er ned Spacecraft Cent e of the centers (Ma rshall, Man gram a reas and then divided into pro its jurisdiction. The office was Each center was res ponsible for one ded into program su bsystems. subdivi unch vehicle). The ct (e.g., spacecraf t or la major system of the proje headquarters had to correspond to the appropriat e centers' project of fices r th e nter had one individ ual responsible f o st ructure. Each ce jor s ystem, but the project nd performance of e ach ma Scheduling , costs, a headquarters. er for the Apollo s pacecraft came from manag onal (e.g., budgeti ng , procurement , eller had his own fu ncti Mu dquarte rs f unctiona l separate from the hea Personnel) staff wh o were t i ona l sta f f worked directly with the cente r s ' f unc sta ff. This staf f s staff . OMSF r ece ived over uarter d virtually ignored the regular hea dq a n f irst velopment budget wi thin i ts 67 percent of NASA 's research and de f ices "had t o a s k f or many 25 other program of ten years. Altho ugh the MSF ha d s tand i ng c l ea r a nc e fo r cts .?? O clearances for vari ous proje 26 Apollo." ist i cs whic h made it ve r y cter It also had a numbe r of chara e a n gram offices. Cont ract emp l oye e s wer ent from the other pro differ y i nvolved in OMSF organization. They were ac tivel integral part of th e s bu t and made not only t echnical decision i t s decision-ma king a ppa ratus Mueller to evaluat e the minis tra t ive ones . They were used by also ad 179 nical performance of the res?earch s,taff and to produce proposals tech ? :!;or long~term objectives. OMSF research.ers were engineers?, not scientists. En gi? neeri?n g consi?d erati?o? ns were P1a ced f irst and scientific obJ? ectiyes were only given token support. Its objective was to develop a technical capability. Determining how that capability was to be used was simply not its job, but a decision which was supposed to be made by ers. As van Braun, the Marshall Center Director, argued when asked 0th to justify a space station, Speaking of the space station, to justify a space station with what we will discover there, is a little b.it like asking that question b.efore you make a decision that you want to build a new research institute or a new university. If people have to spell out in advance what they are going to discover in a research institute, I don ' t think27 any research institute would ever have been built. More important, its major program, Apollo, had the top priority within NASA and its success was linked to the organization's survival. In negotiations with BOB, NASA showed itself committed to manned space flight ?? . gave up all Surveyor and Orbiter lall unmanned lunar e..."'{plorations] . ?? one-half of its sustaining university program, the request for 100 milli~8 for space station development ??? the NEWVAII. The Office of Space Science and Applications was responsib.le for the scientific program of NASA. Although most of its research and development programs (e.g., Voyager, Ranger) were unmanned, it was responsible for the scientific experiments on all space flights and had strong ties ~o the scientific community. Newell was the Associate Administrator of this office until 1967 when he was replaced by John Naugle . Newell's belief in the unmanned spac e program brought this 180 l conflict with OMSF. O SSA was responsive to office into continua the scientific community . Its staff, ideas from the centers and ew projects rly under Newell, believ ed that planning for n Particula t headquarters. uld come from the cente rs' research staffs, no sho We should promote lettin g ideas flush-up from roots within NASA and st op going the grass when a problem comes up . 29 outside for help onsiderations above scie ntific Newell and Naugle also placed engineering c end of the hen NASA's appropriation s were reduced. By the experiments w cientific community.JO 19 pport of the s 60s, OSSA had also lost the su ght responsible for both la rge and small space fli OSSA was ion Laboratory and Godd ard s, the Jet Propuls Programs . Two of the c enter ' s projects were assigned had a strong in-house re search capability. It and the old NACA cente rs. oth the centers under it s jurisdiction to b t was within SA was known for its pro gram management, but i NA r of the m of management was mos t evident. The Directo OSSA that this for OSSA's h the project was assign ed was responsible to center to whic ect. The project manage r worked e proj Associate Administrator for th m manager on an almost daily basis for most informally with the prog ra e contractors responsible for th Projects and worked dire ctly with the l program office within NASA ost powerfu Project. It was the sec ond m rch and received 18 . 8 percent of NASA's funds for resea headquarters and 31 elopment in its first te n years. dev arch a nd Technology (OAR T) was The Office of Advanced R ese ell as any NASA research from responsible for the old NACA programs, as w 1 ? ? ts activities differed f rom OSSA's bas? o engineering app icatio ns. I le t ed research for numerous small appli and OMSF's in that it w as responsible 181 and advanced was supposed to do the applied Projects. In th eory, OART zation, but OMSF and OSSA organi neering research for the entire engi engineering stu dies contractors for their advanced generally relied on e center Directo rs ders including t h er than OART. S ince NASA's lea rath , operations acti vities separate ch, development, and kept their resea r the individuals d little contact with th ps hae advanced resea rch grou elopment project s. arch and dev involved in the large rese is, Flight Resea rch Center) mes, Langley, Le w The OART centers (A any large-scale m unwillingness t o engage in too ir Were known for the d s between the pr ogram office an The relationships. contractor proje ct . Generally the al ost cases inform al and person the centers was in m he center Direc tor, and tablished a rela tionship with t Program office e s any, contact be tween tle, if roject was large , there was lit unless the p ' ject manager. T he OART centers ram manager and the pro the prog to office was simil ar in many ways OART program relationship wit h the nters in the 195 0s. between headqua rters and the ce that which exist ed h was given to t he OSSA and the priority wh ic not given Its projects wer e probably best ev idenced by the this is 0MSF projects. The impact of tors between 196 2 and 1968. fact that OART h ad five direc of Tracking and Data ice, Office The fourth progr am off offices in that it ther program tion (OTDA) diffe red from the o Acquisi work and existed to provide its support contrac tors for all of Used sible for NASA's program offices. It was respon support to the o ther processing data and ing stations and receiving Worldwide networ k of track of Defense's pro grams. nt NASA's and some of the Departme for all of 182 arch Authorizati on ~se process in the 19 50s was a great 's research autho rization NACA al nature and lac k of in the 1920s, b ut its gener than deal more formal ve ith regard to cos ts, administrati st rdized informatio n w anda useless as a ower requirements made it almost information, and manp been standardized had , ject approval pro cess tracking device. NASA's pro olved a number o f , and inv ed a great deal more information requir d the difference s between the l stages. It als o reflecte approva ilar s. While OMSF an d OSSA used sim m office activities of th e progra it different. ART's procedures were quite a b Procedures, O lished through th e or OSSA and OMSF was accomp f Project approval ed a broad AD) which contain f a Project Appr oval Document (P use o e ical objectives; its place in th of the project; techn description ts; schedule of m ajor e arrangemen -wide program; i ts administrativ agency rogress; estimate s of sure p etion which could be used to mea task compl mber of personne l required facilit ies; and the nu costs; a descrip tion of by the ect. The docume nt was prepared te the proj required to comp le roposed ich worked with t he center that p h appropriate prog ram office w ice and the func tional by the program o ff the project. Af ter a review whose approval w as required Finger, ffices, the PAD w as submitted to o was similar to a he PAD ebb for approval. T before it was su bmitted to W ate firm and was en a government o ffice and a priv contract betwe gram offices wer e fficials. The pr o considered as su ch by NASA o e project o nce i t personnel to th onsible for alloc ating funds and resp ~as approved. 183 he cument in th.e appro val process, but t l do The PAD was the fin a on the ubmit a project pla n before starting ed to s centers were requir on of the PAD which was si The project plan wa s a detailed ver PAD. ces ion of the PAD. On ly the program offi red prior to the pr eparat Prepa in either of these pprove the project plan. Any change had to a proval from the sam e after they were ap proved required ap documents which had original ly approved it. level of authority ect approval by NAS A ne-step process, pr oj In contrast to NACA 's o nary analysis, the has?e A, the prelimi W'as required at fou r phases. In p echnical objective for meeting a t center examined var ious alternatives is step was generall y started at the he resources requir ed. Th and t olved. In phase B v e program office wa s also in appropriate center, but th D approval process. as formally establis hed through the PA the project w sis, and preliminary y, comparative anal y It involved "detail ed stud 32 program managers w ere selected and s design." Proje ct and system were he project team. A ll centers which Personnel were assig ned to t r esponsibilities ject were selected a nd assigned their involved in the pro ject involved space flights, the ith regard to the pr oject. If the pro W' hnical raft were selected. Tec specific launch veh icle and spacec d funds were alloca ted; the ten; personnel an specifications were writ y and tracking requ irements eveloped; and facil it management plan was d inger and Webb gave that F etermined. It was during this phase W'ere d ogram office were allocated to the appropriate pr their approval and funds sible fo r rs. The center Dir ectors were respon and then to the cen te hase c, the ious project manage rs. In p alloca ting the fund s to the var ere made. All cente rs iled design and int egration studies w deta 184 se. Requests for proposals ook part in this? pha roject t involved in the p esign ed by- contractors . In phase D, d ork requir were sent out fo r any w 33 The purpose of th is d s completed. an development, the project wa vels to tenninate the le process was to a llow any of the four-step .. itment was too hig h Project before th e fund comm re simple. oval process was a great deal mo pr The OART project ap thorizing document was used as an annual au al The project appro v or the larger pro jects. given f nt and did not co ntain th.e detail docume y rough a Research and Technolog al reporting was accomplished th Form approach, TOP). It include d the technical ument (R Objective and Pla n doc not prepared for source requireme nts. RTOPs were contracting plan and re reas (e.g., subso nic but for broader t echnical a specific projects , ion below the pro ject level and ot include inform at aircraft). They did n g costs or techn ical progress. in thus not very use ful for monitor Were . ds between separa te RTOP projects ram fun Center directors could reprog !E"acking Devices was inimal tracking m echanisms, NASA trast to NACA's mIn con porting mentation requirem ents, but the re y docu known for its hea v ents ram offices, with OMSF's requirem he prog requirements vari ed among t reporting require ments in F had a number of the heaviest. OS SA and OMS 34 cormnon. They included: all financial da ta ting Plan on whic h ere 1. The Project Op era llars w s or items above five thousand do on project . The plan was s ubmitted reported down the working level office which tra nsferred it to onthly to the pro gram m under Finger wher e the inistration the Office of Ad m budget was prepar ed. 185 rt which was pre pared by agement Repo least 2. The Project Man irector at roject manager f or the center D ressed. It was the p e project prog monthly, but we ekly as th Control the Management I nformation and used to prepare offices, but wa s given to for the programSystem data rectly if the re lationship ager di the program man managers was etween the proje ct and program b successful. Control System which nd nt Information a ancial 3. The Managem e a on the fin ovided top mana gement with dat pr hedule of t he- ils, technical p rogress, and sc deta ocument provided the program project. This d g of any problem s and stin manager with a li nges. It was su bmitted for cha recommendations monthly. meetings on ised through the use of formal as exerc Additional cont rol w mal s of the project s. These for he status, d e sig n, and progres t ect manager/ cen ter Direc tor , the systems, pro j at meetings wer e h eld were also ls. nformal meeting s office and top m anagement leve I Program r, the OMSF Dire ctor , problems arose. M uelle held at a ll lev els when uent intervals. the major contr actors at freq met with the di rectors of used private co ntracting on Mueller, Fin ger, and Webb In additi them track mm, Boeing, and G.E.) to he lp g ., Belco organizations ( e. t organizations provided ities. The cont rac manned space fli ght activ e necessary to e valuate the nt with the tech nical expertis top manageme 35 ns about technic al ma tter s . make decisio Work of the cen ters and o s ubmit ters? were origin ally r equired t Al though the OA RT cen ects (4,000 in 1 969) heer volume of t heir proj the s Similar documen ts, willing to r evie w. than anyone was they were gener ating more data meant d monthly repor ts on costs lved in OART pro jects s ubmitte Centers invo were recognized r research items . The reports a nd expenditure s for majo s. The OART cen ters, except ontrol purpose as useless for tracking a nd c ied on the t e l e phone t o an OSSA project, primarily rel \vh e n involved in 186 lems which they might cal progress or any prob i communicate the ir techn shing a project. mpli encounter when a cco ~Procurem-ent Office of Industry located in the The procurement division, ordinated NASA's co er, established general rules, g Affairs under F in try ndations to the O ffice of Indus t matters, and m ade recomme Procuremen would sions as whether the contract rs. The centers made such deci Affai ding up the procurem ent plans inclu rew r competitive; d be sole-source o the Requests fo r ed for preparingth e technical spe cifications us dquarters with e st imates rovided hea contractors; and p Proposals sent to of costs. ole-source cont racts were authorized to negotiate s The centers p to $5 million. 36 A contracts u to $2.5 million and competitive up and rank Board was used to evaluate headquarters So urce Evaluation ebb and Finger m ade the final e a certain amo unt. W ov contract sources ab of center Director s were members e sions on large c ontracts. Sinc deci ce in the decisi on luen id have some inf Source Evaluatio n Board, they d the s when the contr act n to this method wa making. The on ly exceptio over one hundred pport contracts d support contr actors. All su involve . 37 e approve d b Y Fi nger. th ousand dollars had to b Management--An A ssessment ~ogram e exercising an Os claimed to b Although Webb in the late 196 t ization, this cla im is difficul rol over the org an f cont enormous amount o horizing and tra cking devices some of his ma jor aut to substantiate when 38 a ely. re examined clos 187 Apollo nd the high. prio ricy given the a The power of OM SF jects was given almost pproval of mos:t of its pro hat a Program meant t nly used as an a nnual e fact that OAR T's PADs were o automatically. Th n about specific ittle informatio orizing device and provided l auth t a regular basi s. The projec eless for tracki ng on em us Projects made th th OSSA's projec ts where they oubtedly worked best wi approval proces s und ocess offered The Phase Proje ct Planning pr Were most exten sively used. ld intervene and stop a ich headquarters cou wh a mechanism thro ugh imbalance of po wer limited by the t, but even this authority was Projec ranch A was told by th e Executive B hen NAS of the vari?o us partici pants. W made to OSSA an d s, cuts were mo re likely to be to cut their ex penditure ortion of NASA' s jor p OMSF projects to which the ma OART projects t han to funds was alloc ated. east effective . which were the l was the trackin g mechanisms It onthly lists of costs and RT projects onl y required m Since OA re lly out-of-date before they we were genera expenditures, t he reports eeting most of OSSA's reporting , although m submitted to he adquarters. lties. The repo rts were not from some diffic u ered the requirement s, suff ent of the proje cts, since both or managem used by the pro ject managers f rmal interperso nal agers relied on info the project and program man informal visits. For this hone or through by telep contacts either little incentiv e to te. There was they were not al ways up-to-da reason, provided necessary so th at the reports bsolutely report problems until a Perhaps more ual problems wi th the project. ct little indicatio n of a ent with e managers to in undate managem som important, they were used by OART had been allowed t o is was one of th e reasons that data. Since th 188 o tem, the centers ha d some incentive t rting sys drop out of the rep o do the same. primarily used to provide top orting systems wereThe rep research and when problems occur red with the large management with da ta SF was daily oversight. OM velopment projects, not as a tool for de trolled through the documentation ps the most effecti vely con Perha e Apollo project ata generated by th Process, but the en ormous amount of d actually going on . As track what was made it difficult f or anyone to Webb noted, NASA ? ?? At one of our devel opment Centers in ata are twenty-two railroad boxcars of d of rated in one year, and for the whole gene something on the or der of our Apollo program have been required will 300,000 tons of dat a 39 e time of its comp letion. by th dysfunctional aspec ts. They their The reports also ha d ement relationships and program manag interfered with the informal project roject management s ystem. If this ucial to the succes s of the p so cr s a ous levels kept eac h other informed a e vari relationship was go od, th between the rse. If there were no informal ties matter of cou the formal reporti ng ay except through Participants, there was no w was goin g on or to ow what tem for the various levels to even kn sys orting er the project. NA SA's increased rep ov es tablish any contr ol ausing distrust at all levels re c quirements by the e nd of the 1960s we re ystem to the project mana gement s and made the inform al ties necessary 40 ry difficult to est ablish. ve engthened the decis ion-making process reporting requireme nts l The . Innovation and the various partie s very risk-averse and made t. This problem wa s ifficul eativity were incre asingly becoming d cr 189 l projects were inv olved. acute where smalParticularly ts are especially he managers of sma ll in-house projec T process. Harry of sensitive to the l onger decision ompleted in less th an two years. these projects are c l t the project appro va These managers obs erve tha on uently takes longe r than the executi process freq . This, they belie ve, tends to of the project vative research ide as being developed inhibit inno s, because research ers in the field insta llation ed to fight an ext ended battle become less inclin chances for success with the bureaucra cy when the seem slim.41 king process may ha ve given n of the decision- ma The gradual centra lizatio olling the decision s a feeling they w ere contr headquarter's lead er sions on individua l lso meant that they were making deci making, but it a licies. Webb recog nized r po and not on agency -wide objectives o Projects nto to turn the upper - l evel connnittees i th d e Problem and trie ps, but he was not grou aking, not project decision- making, Policy-m 42 essful in this effo rt. succ jected to the contr actor oversight. larly ob The centers partic u e centers' lack of appreciation for contractors compla ined of th Even the ing. th ffe r e assistance they were o General Electric sa id: 'The f Edwards. Miller o m. Frankly, ctor role in Housto n was not very fir contra st us ant us. There were two things again they didn't w act, and No. 1, it was a He adquarters contr down there . use GE for certain it was decreed tha t the centers ers [No. 2] they conside red us Headquart things; and ward, just For some time after the contract a spies. 1 o was not exactly xactlz what Genera l Electric would d e clear. 3 ---- 190 N AND DIRECTION OF R ESEARCH COORDINATIO ganization had controlled the a ctivities of the or NACA's leaders of discretion, whi le at rchers with a great deal by Providing the res ea t in which there was a men th me time providing t hem with an environ e sa rs produce as they desi red. The researche great deal of incen tive to authority of their A's values and accep ted the had internalized NA C NASA's isions about their r esearch projects. c superiors to make d e pted many more track ing ado ers, as discussed ab ove, had not only lead n the incentives wh ich s i s, they had also mad e important change device centives ir subordinates' com pliance. NACA's in he Were used to ensure t in this section ? and NASA's use of th em are discussed !E,ternalization of V alues . alified work force b y recruiting had established a hi ghly qu NACA ice regulations; and oring many civil ser v f rom top colleges; ign al training for its research staff. oviding both in-hous e and form Pr ing and recruiting s was having trouble both retain NASA in the late 19 60 The Bureau of the Bu dget required a ghly qualified indiv iduals. hi 967 and the sonnel after 1965 an d between July of 1 reduction in its pe r 2850 permanent posit ions. ar of 1969, NASA abo lished end of the fiscal y e dget to the Bureau of the Bu To accomplish this i t was required by an ctions-in-force. Th ese reductions had edu Undergo a number of r o provide any of the impact on the organ ization's ability t enormous centives used by NAC A . in ting college gradua tes, echanisms fo= recrui It had established m to hire new personn el. As one staff but did not have the positions budget review with W ebb: a member pointed out in 191 .?? One point about cuts ... yo u get int o the position of being unable to recruit. One of the most serious things that we have to deal with is the ability to recruit college graduates. Yo u see , that is the secre t of eternal you th, .. . to be bringing in college graduates some way o r a nother and we , at one time, before the space e..""<:pansion, we even invented a plan that was never executed where we could bring boys in and train them for a period without ke eping them, that sort of thing . But this ?.. , the ability to bring in college graduates and continuing our r elationships with colleges, is a very seriou s matter a nd once yo u break the chain, it is very hard t o es tabl i sh it again ?.. 44 The informal in-house training used by NACA to socialize its recruits into NACATs way of accomplishing its research, as well as attrac ting new recruits, was also dif ficu l t tJ provide within NASA. The average age of NASA's scientific and engin e ring workforce was 37 . 5 in 45 1968. The individuals in the mid-level grades who would normally provide this training were also the ones who could find employment elsewhere when NASA began to have bud getary difficulties. As the Personnel Management Review Committee pained out, the reductions-in- force often caused the most highl y qualified researchers to leave despite the fact that they were und e r no danger of being deprived of their positions. The experience at Marshall, where thE RIF procedures were religiously applied , wa s that t~e RIF not only paralyzed the on- going pro jec t s bu inflict e d irreparable damage on the e ngineering, scientific, and management talent up o n which r~rshall depends for its s uccess and its future . The mo s t promising and recently acquired young e nginee r s anci scientists were the first to leave the or ganization . .? even though the scientists and engineers wer e no t inc luded in the planned reduction; and it i s believed that Marshall will similarly continue t o lose its nost promising a nd prod uctive per sonnel long after the formal reduction- in-force has been concluded . Fur he nnore the i mmediate task of rec ruitin g replacenent ;ersonnel of 192 re may now prove to he virtually equal statu omplishment. The long-term impossible of acc orce are, cts of the Marsha ll reduction-in-f effe 46 calcula6le. at the present ti me, in ment to the organ ization which ense of community and commit The s thin its history also did not exist wi out existed within NA CA through for either its hig h. morale or its not known NASA. NASA's sta ff was 60s. The staff's s in the late 19 nnnitment to agenc y-wide objective co r to which they w ere attached , irst with the cen te identification wa s f last of all with the agency. ffice, and then with the pro gram o and, willing to move to another center were un Scientists and en gineers were considered "pape r pushers," they the headquarters staff were since When the Personne l ng to move to hea dquarters. Particularly unw illi regard to mobilit y, it ee reviewed Lewis 's attitude with Review Committ found ility ??? NASA must ??? no real incent ive for mob d t at the present time, people hire realize tha witg eld identify and relate primarily in the fi enerally. 7 field center and not with NASA g the enters, such as L ewis and Ames, l of the research c The personne be primarily MSF development c enters' work to considered the O , ne Lewis staff me mber pointed out As o administrative in nature. s. I only contractors are the janitor ??? our eople, I want a n a cademic elieve in growing p b not a vironment, a work ing environment, en . t env. 48 transien iron ment . ch other, they s had similar atti tudes toward ea Although NACA's t wo group between the advan ced enginee ring ntinued to commu nicate. The gap co had grown to the s pment groups duri ng the late 1960 groups and the de velo velopment centers ittle communicatio n. The de Point where there was l eds and at times simply e acts for their ap plied research n let contr 193 t only might in-house group e xisted which no ignored the fact that an in some cases wa s? already research, but ave been able to accomplish the h en centers, but also 49 This situation o ccurred betwe accomplishing it . e kept physicall y separate e development gr oups wer her W-ithin centers w vanced research groups. from the ad e development of nagement system a lso hindered th The project ma ward the objecti ves as directed to on. The project groups' work w Cohesi rs' objectives or agency-wide projects, not t oward the cente of bled, completed, the te am was disassem ject was objectives. Whe n the pro anizations. Thi s e sent back to t heir parent org and its members wer but when it had lasted s of short durat ion, worked when the project wa ad an attachment r h ct members no lon ge ore than a few y ears, the proje m advantage of the ir d many simply to ok to the parent or ganization an te industry and left NASA.so services and pr iva military contacts with th e had no mechanism projects simply centers with a number of large Those i c projects. beyond the comp letion of specif esion for sustaining g roup coh jectives a nd the lack of con sensus about ob Webb was aware o f pl an, but a l s o o n A's a bility to ized its impact not only on NAS recogn y to control the organization. his own abilit t o supervise them e nough So we just didn 't really one concept across to them, a nd each get the broad u kn o w, ve around him hi s own people, yo egan to ha ngs his own w a y , b tended to be auto nomous, run thi who e up when he had a problem and lnotJ ??. reti cent to com top. get help at the ith a Senator or Congressman to w ions d them very read y to make decis But you foun p without bearin g in mi nd that did affect the to that 1 nd talk a bout th at, too. 5 they should come up a 194 e OART centers were r ec gnized as having t ighter Although th cohesion tha n the r es of NA SA, they also had changed a organizational e, great deal from what they were in the 1950 The OART program offic gth of as suggested above, was not able to r etain a director for any len had left the or g !lization. Personnel cei lings time and many r e searchers had forced them to let con tracts fo r a g e a t deal of their work. The separation of development work f r om th r e search activities of the centers made cohesion difficult to achi vc and left the centers a s a centers reporting to whole reporting to OART, and some g r o up s w i thin the OSSA. SZ Research Environment NACA's r esearchers were very pro ud of thei r creativity and innovation and the ir ability to e n ga e in r.ew and sometimes radical d to be accomplished with the projects. Although some of this r esearch ha pproval of top management, t he leaders oC NACA were recognized for their a willingness to try most of their s ta f ' s p roposals for resea rch. This ent among NASA's leaders. support of new research ideas was not as e vid Advanced studies which looked like the y we re the first steps to a large-scale development project wer nol a pproved because of Congress's arters and the OMSF objections to new programs . Demand s f r~n headqu s researc h o lS: ,\.SA's missions meant that i t centers that OART relate it was difficult to obtain f unding fo r no n-m L3sion r ela ted resear c h. As , Finger, one of those who didn ' t a g re e wi I this policy, a rgued Any effort to define the c::?pcrimental e ngi nee r i n g as mission research and technolo ? . .. weakens the entire basis for OART a nd fo r he OART ngram . It makes that program susceptible to dssessment of the missions nd dates defined r a t he r than to t he basic advances in a capability to be genera tee! by Iw t work. 53 195 ls 's leaders to a ccept proposa lt for NASA It was also di fficu 11 ? ? in g existi ?n g programs w hich h h ey were cance for any n proJ ? ects went ew er pointed out in emb been ed for many ye ars. As one staff m had support utting the Voy ager roposed c scussion with Webb when he p a budget di Program: ld be very nk the cumulat ive effect wou thi so much ??? I e has been so m uch talk and h serious ?.? Ther c the past 2 to J ye ars and so mu anticipation f or is allowed it at t h isappointment, that if we sw d ell, we are goi ng to defer n time and sai d, w point i number of yea rs, this it again for a n indefinite people who re ally ould be tantamo unt to telling w really have the courage at we don ' t p believe in it th s thing ma y sli s, and that thi ly of our convict ion will lose an im portant, fair indefinitely. So we could community in a way that we he large chunk of t than we could sily get them b ack any more not ea 54 y resurrect Vo yager. easil research idea s. incentives for proposing new NASA's researc hers had few oval process st opped some appr ed above, the time-consuming As discuss for OMSF, whi ch ideas. Resea rchers working new People from pr oposing d little busy with Apol lo and thus ha e have more sla ck funds, wer did They were also engineers new programs. e to generate new ideas for tim rating ideas fo r new e problems, not g en hose work invol ved solving w to produce th e new ideas searchers, who were supposed Projects. OAR T re re unaware of w hat t with it and t hus we for OMSF, had little contac A's management AS they were willi ng, N rch was requir ed. Even if resea staff's. The acceptance ore the ccept contract ors' ideas bef tended to a coupled with the 69 actor, long-ran re plan in 19 of Relcornm's, a NASA contr gro up only con firmed ced by Newell's planning plan produ rejection of a 55 taff's ideas. by NASAfs lead ers of its s the rejection 196 ACA's leaders in t he 1950 s h 3d provided their researchers N with the opportunity to publish t heir research results as NACA repo r ts under their own name, contacts with other exper t s in thei r fields, a nd the excitement of being invo lved with projects which were making radical changes in the nature of the airplane. NASA continued to o f fe r t he latter incentive to some of it s esearch and devel o pment groups had the opportunity to work staff. Its r on some of the most exciting pr oject s in existence at tha t time. Th e individuals working on some of the major projects, particu larly Apollo, were known for their c ommitment a nd dedication to the pro ject. They h demand had the opportunity to learn management skills which were in hig during this period, a nd their cont ac :s with numerous othe r gr oups provided them with c a reer op por t unitLes unavailable to mo st government employees, but there wer e c os t s invo lved. Their attachme nt to a project nt they often lost c ontac t with their professional colleag ues team mea and research advances in the ir fie lds . These researchers involved in long- term projects had troubl e r e turning to any position i nvolving actual research . Even those individuals wh o remained active researchers we re not contacts wi th provided with similar incentive s . They could keep up the ir profe ssional collea g ues by going t o c onfe rences in their r esp e ct i v e fields, but there wa s no permane nt group established withi n NASA which pt s brought outside r e searche r s into c o ntact with NASA researc hers. Att em to establish permanent sc i e nt ific a nd engineering groups e nded in frustration for both pa rt ies . NASA 's commitment t o th e m ann e d s pa c e flig h t pr og r a m a nd t he developme nt of a t e chnica l capabil i ty in space was n o t a cc e pted by ma n y o u ts ide sc Lentis t s a nd e ng ineer s . Ma ny f e lt 197 program was a waste of resources the. entire manned spa ce ,flight that ents. fficiently spent on s cientific advancem whicn would have bee n more e visory groups refused to have cientific ad By the late 1960s, m ost s SA. anything to do with NA also no longer existe d. NACA's e incentive for publi shing Th as esearc ers to pu bl"i s t eir results first their r h h h ? d leaders had require ? d NACA's uals outside of the o rganiza tion evaluate a NACA report. Indivi d s evaluated on the su ccess reports. NASA wa performance by readin g these e launch resulted in a c space missions. Fa ilure of a major spa of its , whatever the estigation or a cut i n its appropriations Congressional inv n did not efforts. Advancemen t i n the organiza tio quality of its resea rch r ecord. Since publis hing the researchers' publ ishing depend therefore on in their f ields, the ined a method of adva ncing professionally rema o publish, but prof e s sional journals were res ear c hers continued t us by the end of the port system. It was obv i o Preferred over NASA' s re As on e Lewis n the oART center manage rs had cha nged . 1960s that eve t, manager so succinctl y pointed ou t er the runs into some staf f problems because af ..? he pa rt the y esearchers have done the 'hard' creative r joy the 'easy ' pa rt-- writi ng en want to sit back and ut Abe ournal articles, givi ng lectures , etc.--b j irector] does not l e t D fSilverstein, Lewis C enter them. 56 Control of Output one important a sp ec t . antly f rom tTACA in NASA dif f ered signif i c e pr omot ions olled by scientists o r engineer s , nor wer I t was not contr ositions were held by ' s l eade r ship p based on technical ex pertise . NACA their fields a nd had been uals who had e s t a blis hed a r eputa t ion in ind ivid -- 198 elected many years. Even D ryden, who was s for With the organizat ion een a NACA COilllilitt ee member before the organization, h ad b from outside of or their technical nt . Its researche rs were promoted f his appointme a bit different. es were quite erformance. NASA' s promotion polici P th a law degree, no t a scientist or s an administrator wi Webb wa er organizations an d le from oth gineer, He brough t in his own peop en eers. Promotion to cientists and engin these individuals also were not s ividual's managemen t capabilities. rades was based on an ind the top g the individual wa s not go unrecogniz ed, but if Technical competen ce did grades. he could not be pro moted to the top not a good manager , the ers, particularly t hose involved in Individual researc h ith regard to three projects, were ev aluated w research and develo pment specified time fram e; : (1) producing a product within a Criteria l cost estimates; a nd duct within the or igina (2) producing the pro t and le producing a bad produc (3) the quality of the product. Whi the first two crite ria was not acceptable , ia meeting the first two criter 57 valuated above the last. were e having trouble pro moting anyone A, as NACA in the 1 950s, was NAS re simply not s. Individuals in the top grades we by the end of the 1960 l bers which occurred in the mid-leve leaving the organi zation in the num ng trouble promotin g individuals rs were havi grades. All of th e cente above GS-15. in NASA's appropri ations, which and cuts The personnel ceili ngs to them . Webb was forced e after 1965, did h ave a positive sid occurred the top positions. Both Finger promoting his in-h ouse staff to to begin ter s , headquarters positi ons from the cen to and Newell were pr omoted in 199 inistrative ir promotions were b ased on their adm not from outside, b ut the their technical com petence. capabilities, not ent in NACA system of cont rol were still evid Vestiges of the old m managers and the th lationships between project and progra e re ct dividuals establishe d with. their proje hese in relationships which t ir projects. Since the who worked on the teams and the contr actors of the individuals t nager had no legal authority over mos Project ma sure rely on his person al expertise to en s, he had to involved in project e of the project di rector's tives. The acceptan c compliance with his direc al and administrativ e) because of his expe rtise (both technic authority of NACA's leaders i n the rity imilar to the accep tance of the autho Was s ship tise. It was also a relation 195 r 0s because of their personal expe f authority which a re based on hich ignored the for mal lines o W al expertise. Position more than technic ese relationships w as becoming lishing and maintain ing th Estab sed above, the ifficult in the late 1960s. As discus increasingly more d f did follow the form al lines o formal reporting re quirements, which ships ve an ir:pact on the informal relation ning to ha authority, were beg in am. This situation was management te established by the project contrast to NACA's , had in ated by the fact th at NASA's lea[ers, exacerb il Service Commissi on. requirements of th e Civ accepted the person nel which ent Information Syst em, They had adopted a Personnel Managem s, occupations, and kinds of computerized data on grade supplied did not s uppl y ough this system wa s ruiimentary and appointment, Alth n, its by the Civil Servic e Commissio a11 the information desired s who made a concer t ed r entation was support ed by NASA' s lecde implem 200 l nel procedures and relate personne dize their person effort to standar anagement Review the work l oad . 58 lis h.ed a Personnel M to Webb had estab ractices and Comm ? agency-wide perso nnel management p ittee to evaluate 59 ies. make ions with regard t o personnel polic recommendat ntain a formal str ucture rs had wanted to m ai Even if NASA's le ade gs established by the e ceilin based l and grad on expertise, the personne ery difficult. Th e fact that t after 1965 made this v ge Bureau of the Bud R 1 ti.o ns 1 ef t NASA's th ? hi Ci ? vi? 1 Se rvi. u a n ce e g ese c ei? 1 i?n gs had to be met wit their with regard to th e management of discretion leaders with litt le ver non-veterans, 60 terans had to be g iven preference o Personnel. Ve hose position had s w Whate competence of the veteran. Individual Ver the osition from more highly qualified lished could take a lower p been abo y could dividuals not perf orming adequatel nt of in Personnel. Retire me nt. individual's con se Only be accomplis hed with the because of the re porting s NASA, both By the end of the 1960 on it by ders and the requ irements imposed lea requirements of i ts the relationships ming an organizat ion in which external actors, was beco the project teams, which had ject managers and between program a nd pro aeronautics and s pace program, cessful for manag ing its Proven so suc ifficult to mainta in. singly more d Were becoming inc rea 201 NASA AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS NACA's transformation into NASA brought a change in the organization's relationships with all the groups in its environment. NACA provided technical assistance to the Department of Defense. NASA continued to provide this assistance, but the military services also provided manpower, technical assistance, and facilities for NASA's use. The relationship between the two was not as simple. A formal committee, the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board with representatives from the two groups, had the authority to negotiate any conflicts between the two organizations and to establish the regulations necessary to coordinate their programs. 61 Facilities or services were exchanged through formal, not verbal agreements. NASA was no longer in a subordinate position. M.any of the research organizations (e.g., Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Navy Research Laboratory) which the military services had established after World War II to meet their research needs had been transferred to NASA, and the military serv:Lc es were again dependent on NASA for development in space technology. The change in this relationship was accompanied by a change in the relationship between private firms and the organization . NACA's reJ.ationship with private industry was one of two research groups working together to provide technical support for the Department of Defense. NACA assisted industry and provided them with research assistance when necessary. NASA's policy of using contractors for all its products a nd services changed that relationship to a contractual one. Although NASA's researchers continued to work closely with ind?stry's researchers, the nature of this relationship had changed. The contacts between the 202 nent regulations. The high visibility of tWQ were defined hy goverm the at technical failures could result in space program meant th or nvestigations and demands f rom NASA that the contract Congressional i amounts of money change The larg e 1? t enti. s re management structu re. p was not as straightforwar d as it lved meant that the relatio nshi invo highly dependent had been in the 1950s. It also left s ome companies 62 on NASA for th ei. r conti.n ued exi. stence. 1950s had to meet demands fo r the standardization NACA in the ? h agenc?i es, as we 11 as f rom of its methods o f operation f rom oversig t was The list of agencies whose rer;ulations affected NASA Congress. sts assigned full impressive. The Bureau of the Budget had three analy ot only to t. tivities. !TASA was required n lme to review its budgetary ac rogram memoranda and specia l subm ? p i t budgetary information, b ut also uired by st dies for the Planning-Progra nnning-Budgeting System req u racting also increased Pre si?c t ent Johnson. NASA's heavy reliance on cont ? ? ? the b General Accounting Office investigations into its num er of procurement activities had to comply with Equal activities. Its tion regulations, Employment Opportunity and Small Business Administra the Work Hours the Buy American Act, the F air Labor Standards Act, 63 S Copeland Anti-Kickback Act. In addition, andards Act of 2 , and th e t 196 to NASA th vil Service Commission cont inued its investigations in e Ci Person ne 1 management activities. shed his own staff to help h im Th.e President had also esta bli s A Science Advisor had be en lllake d ram? ecisions on space policy an d prog 's Science Advisory appointed and was responsib le for the President ogy, a nd the Office ollllnittee, the Federal Counc il for Science and Technol C 2Q3 of Science and Technology, all of which provided the President with information on NASA's space activities. In contrast to NACA, which. only faced an annual appropriations connnittee, NASA faced both appropriations and authorizations committees. 64 These committees were familiar with every aspect of their technical program and budget. The connnittees visited contractors, talked to astronauts and NASA scientists and engineers, and held their own investigations into technical problems, cost overruns, and delays in schedules. Congress questioned NACA's expenditures. It asked questions about NASA's program decisions and made its own choices about which programs it would fund. It also had a Science Policy Research Division in the Library of Congress which could be used to provide it with any additional assistance it might require to evaluate NASA's activities. 65 NACA's Annual Report was simple, straightforward, and except for the researchers' reports which were included, could be understood by any layman. Its focus was on what the agency had accomplished. NASA's reports to Congress provided detailed explanations of the programs in progress and those which were being proposed. Justification for each expenditure was required. Estimates of costs and the details of proposed programs had to be provided. NASA's environment in the late 1960s was neither a simple one nor a very friendly one. It had to compete with the Department of Defense and the Great Society Programs for funds during a period in which there were "balance-of-payments deficits, [and] an overheated II 66 economy ??? The drop in its appropriations and personnel levels from 1965 on showed that it was slowly losing ground in the competition. 204 II THE DEVELOPMENT OF NASA NACA had retained its unique structure despite pressures from oversight agencies that it comply with federal regulations and s tandardize its operations. NASA by the end of the 196O.s displayed many signs of an aging bureaucracy. Research activities were heavily monitored and a time-consuming approval process was stifling innovation. NACA's leaders' support of in- house applied and advanced engineering research activities was not duplicated within NASA. Its leaders gave their highest priority to development programs and placed pressures on the centers to let contracts for their research activities. Its leaders ' promotion policies and their allocation of resources all provided e vidence that the management of research and development projects, not in-house research, was the primary objective of the organization. Despite these changes, NASA's accomplishments continued to be impressive. Its lunar landing in 1969 was one of a long list of accomplishments in the 196Os which showed the world that the nation had surpassed the Soviets in space. These accomplishments, though, did not stop the cuts in its appropriations or personnel levels which started in 1965 and continue till the present tine. What the above does not show is how the organization changed during its first ten years or why it took the path that it did. The latter question is perhaps most important because it was obvious that NASA by the e nd of the 1960s had somehow chosen the wrong path. There are obviously no absolute a nswer s to these questions, but a review of the years between our last 205 examination of 1968 and the end of the 1960s and some of the factors which played a role in the development of NASA provides some insight into its development. 206 THE CREATION OF NASA f NASA provided NAS A's leaders with The legislative his tory o the Executive Branch ideas of what Congr ess and some very definitiv e 67 mbiguity about what they did want. did want and a great de al of a not both Congress and the h cceptable to W 1? 1 e NACA was the one orga nization a thod of operating an d Executive Branch , there were features of its me nacceptable to both. u the of its research act ivities which were nature nnnittee structure fr om the beginning. oth rejected NACA's co B ecessary to manage a large lt did e pow er n not provide the exe cutiv ctively with the resear h elopment organization or "to deal effe c and dev ach with its specia l ups, e Powerful m?1? ro i itary and industr ial g ation, te for a research or ganiz interests,'' 68 It may have been a dequa NACA's argument tha t its . but not f ization or a large operatin g organ lity of its struct s one of the reason s for the high qua ure wa justification for k eeping the Perf 0 rmance was simply n ot an adequate structure ording to some Cong ressmen. , acc that also quite certain Congress and the A dministration were ugh military-related space activities the agency should be ci vilian. Altho to manage efense's domain, it was not Would remain in the Department of D ects for which the m ilitary the ? Any space proj civilian space prog ram. NASA could had to be transferr ed to NASA. Seri,? ices had responsib ility manpower, but it had to epartment of Defens e's facilities and Use the D manage . its own projects. ranch was willing to maintain tive B Neither Congress no r the Execu NACA's NASA was gi?ven resp onsibility for NACA' s r esearch tradition. arch was not suppose d to be its b t r ese aerona . , uutica l research pro gram 207 major activity. NACA's claim that it was an operating agency, not only a research organization, was not believed by Congress: NACA, as now constituted, is a research agency, with the traditions of a research agency. It has acted through the years as a sort of extraordinarily valuable problem solver for the services and for civil aviation. But all the problems it has solved have been technical . Although NACA is very definitely, as Dr. Dryden put it, an operating or ganization, its operating traditions have all been consultive, advisory, mediatory ? ??? But the lack of any tradition of direction and coordination could be very serious. This is a problem by itself. Without drastic sweeping changes, it is no mean feat to inculcate a spirit of decision-making in an organization that has lived and thrived on a tradition of peaceful advice-giving . And any space agency, by the urgent nature of its mission, by the inevitable commingling of civilian and military in many fields 6, 9 will have to know how to rap knuckles. What the new organization was supposed to do was not quite as c lear. It was obviously supposed to demonstrate the nation's technical capabilities in space in a manner which would show the world that America was technically superior to the Russians. It was also obvious that having the technical capability was not enough. When Dryden rejected von Braun's suggestion for a manned space flight by pointing out that "such a flight has about the same technical value as the circus stunt of shooting a young lady from a cannon," Congress refused to 70 c onsider him for an appointment as the new NASA Administrator. How exactly NASA was supposed to regain the nation's prestige beyond producing and launching spacecraft was left to the new agency to decide. Before leaving this discussion of NASA's creation, some note s hould b e mad e of the role of Congress in the establishment o f NASA. Congress, f r om the time Sputnik I was l a unched, was the lea ding a dvo ca t e f or a new spa c e a genc y . President Eisenhower submitte d the f ir s t dra f t , 208 but this was only under Congressional pressure and after attempts to launch a test satellite by the Navy in December of 1957 ended in what 71 Senator Lyndon B. Johnson called a "humiliating" failure. Johnson began an inquiry into the nation's technical capability shortly after news of Sputnik I reached the United States and continued to play a major role in its establishment and early development. NASA thus came into existence with a new mandated structure which was opposed by the organization which was supposed to be the nucleus of the new agency; a research and development management responsibility which many individuals on NACA's staff including Dryden didn't want; responsibility for a program directed toward political objectives which NACA's applied research group felt would destroy their applied research activities; and a Congress which was fascinated with its new creation and prepared to become intensely involved in its activities. , 209 NASA'S EARLY YEARS 1958-1961 On October 1, 1958, the National Advisory Connnittee for Aeronautics officially became the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Thomas Keith Glennan was appointed the first Administrator of NASA on August 19, and Dr. Dryden became the Deputy Administrator. Glennan's tenure lasted until January of 1961, when he was replaced by Webb. Although he failed to satisfy Congress's desire for a major space achievement, he did turn NASA into a functioning organization. Various organizations were transferred to NASA and organized into distinct program groups. New facilities were added and three new centers were created. Glennan established new management devices and documented what all the new units were doing and the contracts which had been let, He started NASA's policy of separating its research and development groups and established what became its policy of letting contracts for most of its work. He also established two new standar~ operating practices by hiring management consultants to evaluate NASA's organization and procedures and bringing in individuals whose sole job was to improve NASA's management. What he did not change was the methods by which NACA or the other new components were controlled, nor did he accomplish the objective assigned to him by Congress. 210 The Growth of NASA NASA's growth in its first few years largely occurred through the transfer of a number of existing organizations to its jurisdiction. 72 The Project Vanguard team from the Navy Research Laboratory was transferred intact and became the core group of the new Robert H. Goddard Space Flight Center established in March of 1961. Jurisdiction over the Air Force's and Army's lunar probes, as well as some engine development projects, was given to the new organization. But the major organizational components added to NASA were the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the Development Operations Division of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency near Huntsville, Alabama. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena, which had been working under contract for the Army, was transferred to NASA in December of 1958 as a government-owned facility directed by the California Institute of Technology. It had been involved in the Explorer I project, which produced the first successful American satellite, and the Vanguard Project, which produced the second. As NACA had earned a solid reputation for its aeronautical research, JPL enjoyed an equally strong reputation for its intellectual and professional competence in rocketry, earth satellites, a nd advanc e d research in these fields. Its staff were researchers and academicians, not contract administrators. Its work was conducted in-house with only minor participation of industry in the construction of facilities. Promotion was based on advancements made in the individual's f ield and, as NACA ' s appl i ed research g roup, there was little interest amon g it s 211 staff in becoming contract managers. Since the Army administered all of its contracts, including the construction and design of its facilities, JPL had even less experience than NACA in contract a m.i n.i d strati .o n. 73 Although all the former NACA centers had a great deal of operating freedom, JPL established, through its contract with NASA, legal operating freedom. Any work undertaken by JPL required the mutual agreement of both parties before it was assigned. The technical reputation of JPL, the fight which occurred between the Army and NASA over its transfer to NASA, and the success of two of its major projects contributed to a feeling of elitism within the organization probably unmatched by the other organizational components. The other major group, the Army Ballistic Missile division headed by Wernher von Braun, had also participated in the successful Explorer project. Its 4000 member staff became the Marshall Space Flight Ce nter in 1961 after two years of sometimes bitter arguments between the Army and NASA over the transfer. In 1962 part of this group, under Dr. Kurt Debus, was transferred to the newly created Kennedy Space Center in Florida. The von Braun group, although technically remaining under the control of the Army until 1961, had worked with NASA from its creation and supplied many of the launch vehicles used by NASA in its first years . Its staff was composed of civil service personnel and, as such, was used to the procedures and operations of federal organizations. It diffe red from NACA in that it engaged in both research and development, but this work including some fabrication was largely accomplished in-house. Marshall, which was responsible for the development of launch vehicles, and Kennedy, which was responsible for the launch management 212 of satellites, were joined by the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston in 1961. The three groups formed the nucleus of the NASA manned space program. The latter center differed from t he other two in that its staff and management was drawn largely from a Langley-Lewis Space Task group which had been responsible for NACA ' s supersonic research and development activities with the military services. This group originally had been scheduled for the Goddard Space Flight Center, but 74 it was placed in Houston in 1961. Whatever the difference in origin of the new Centers, they did have a number of characteristics in common. All had achieved excellent reputations in their area of expertise, had primarily engaged in in-house research and believed in its importance, and were managed by ? leaders who had achieved worldwide recognition in their fields. The NACA laboratories and JPL were known for their academic research environment. This was less so in the case of Marshall, but this group prized its a utonomy and its right to accomplish its research in-house. The only group with ex tensive experience in operations was the Goddard group. All of the centers' activities had involved working in some type of close relationship with the military services and private industry. None had ex tensive experience with contract administration, nor the management of large-scale research and development projec ts. The Development of Program Areas By the end of Glennan's teilllre, the various groups had been organized into specific research areas. Marshall and Kennedy had become responsible fo r launch vehicles. The Manned Spacecraf t Center , JPL , 213 Goddard, and Wallops were made responsible for the spaceflight activities of NASA. The former NACA centers, as well as the Flight Research Center, became responsible for the aeronautical research and development programs and the in-house research required to support the other two groups. This division, while it reflected the different types of research and development activities, also provided a solution to an entire group of problems which faced Glennan when he attempted to assimilate the various groups into a single organization. NACA's applied research groups remained strongly opposed to NASA's new development responsibility. They believed that exposure to this type of research would only result in the group's being coopted by the development group. Dryden and Glennan concurred with this assessment, but they also believed that the NACA centers would not accept the controls necessary to manage the new research and development activities. Perhaps more important was the reality of the separation of these individuals from the organization. From 1955 to 1960, the organization had lost 250 of NACA's GS-11 through GS-16 researchers to private industry. Th ei. r me d"ia n tenure was 11 years. 75 NASA's leaders during this period felt they needed an in-house research capability to provide ideas for new research projects and to handle development problems on their major projects. They also recognized that they would have to have some mechanism for keeping their staff trained, and placing the development group back into a research environment for retraining after the completion of a project was one method of ensuring that the organization could provide technical direction to its contractors. 214 The NACA centers were theoretically supposed to continue performing the same type of work as they always had except that they would provide a service to other NASA centers rather than to the Department of Defense. Since NASA had more than adequate funds, it was possible to simply create new centers which were development centers from the beginning and thus could accept the controls which most observers felt would be necessary to manage the new space program. The NACA centers would remain research organizations and be allowed to retain their research autonomy. NASA's Contracting Philosophy NASA's change to a contracting organization happened in a similar fashion except that there was no grand design with regard to contracting. As with the division into research groups, the decision to let contracts for most of its work was made in an environment which contained few alternatives. Congress and the Executive Branch, as they had for years, assumed that industry would do as much of the development and production of hardware as possible. This alone meant that the organization would have to let some contracts, but additional complications existed. Some of the projects which were transferred to NASA from the Department of Defense were already underway and contracts had already been processed f or their performance. For these projects, unless NASA' s leaders wished to break the contracts, the decision with regard to contracting had a lrea d y been made. But NASA's leaders also had few alternatives on projects initia t e d by their own staff. NASA wa s e..xpected to develop a 215 technical ca pability and build the hardware as fast as possible to regain the nation's prestige. Its civil service complement was technically very capable, but its researchers had little experience in managing larg e research and development projects or developing and building hardware. Unless its leaders were willing to increase the size of NASA's in-house staff tremendously, and the Bureau of the Budget's personnel ceilings precluded this, contracts had to be let for the development and production part of these projects. P e rhaps more important to the final division of labor on NASA's contracts was the previous experience of NASA's development groups. All had worked on projects with the military services and industry. Each of the groups had specific roles in this relationship and, while the exact working relationships varied on the project, in that the Air Force allowed contractors to handle all the activities and the Army did a g ood portion of the development work in-house, they all involved a division of l a bor among the three. This was standard operating practice f or the military services' projects, and any change would have meant a major chang e in the new organizations' operating procedures. The result of the above f actors was the development of a r e lationship which lasted until the end of the 1960s. NASA's project management was a combination of the Army's a nd Air Forc e 's manag ement, but beca use of its strong in-house research capability it provided more technical direction than the Air Force group. The relationships which developed were a lso very similar to that which NACA had proposed for i t s elf i n 1 9 58 . Industry was responsible for development, fa br i cation, a nd systems en g ineering . The Depa rtment o f Def ense was r espons ibl e fo r 216 total stems managemen t, but NASA had Provid? ing personnel f or sy product. responsibility for the final Glenn , --....::.:: ans Manag ement acts on dministrator had two major imp t A Glennan as NASA 's firs above. He form alized f se d iscussed its uture developme nt beyond tho proced t ures, an d he took of the f;nanc~; a l rogram manageme n many a nd p~ f of what was a n ew philosophy o the f? irst steps in t he adoption came together to form NASA. gement for all the comp onents which mana und, it was obv ious ckgro ugh Glennan had a technical ba Altho different from his management philosophy was from the beginning tha t n f.i rmed , h e con tacted a b ei.n g co f NACA's leader s. Shor1ty a f ter that o d on nsey & c any, f or recommen atio ns cKi omp management consulting fi rm, M ed NASA's 0, 1958, this co mpany was award orga . October 1nizing NASA. O n mmendations mad e by McKinsey epted the reco irst contract. 76 Glennan acc f epared a NACA's leaders had also pr & Company despite the fact that n NASA's hich they felt s hould be made i g changes w report describin 77 manage ment structure. report in Decem ber, ission of the Mc Kinsey Following the s ubm res of the nificant changes in the structu g Glennan made som e si osition new Associate A dministrator p d a headquarters un it. He create or NASA and adde d an Office of o appoint a Gen eral Manager f in ?rder t ial e the increase i n NASA's financ to handl Business Admin istration panied by change s in om . . . 78 The ch anges were acc manag ement activitie s. e agement. The ne w managers wer t the top levels of NASA's man Personnel a nment agencies. . and other l arge gover draivu from the . i. mil tary servic es 217 Many of the appointments were based on recommendations submitted by 79 McKinsey & Company. Glennan continued to use NACA's financial and program management mechanisms until 1960 when he made significant changes in both. In May of that year, a new program management system was established with the objective of tracking exactly what projects were being accomplished, as well as the status of each. As part of this system, a new project approval plan was established. To obtain approval for a project, the centers had to submit a Project Development Plan which described the project and its history; the technical and management plan; resources required; and some justification for the project. These plans had to be submitted to the appropriate program office which in turn sent them to the Associate Administrator for approval. They had to be reviewed and approved annually or whenever significant changes were made. The Project Approval Plans were used to prepare a Master Program Management Plan which contained a list of all NASA projects and expected milestones. This document was issued monthly and was NASA's first effort to establish schedules for its projects. Project status reports, which listed the status of each project, were issued bi-weekly. Glennan also held bi-weekly status meetings in which any problems with projects were discussed. In August of 1960 he implemented a Financial Operating Plan system which required the centers to submit a plan for all resources allocated to them. This plan became the basis for all future alloc3tions. Although Glennan asked McKinsey & Company to prepare a report o n NASA ' s contracting procedures, he took no steps prior to hi s 218 departure to standardize its procurement practices, beyond preparing a 11. st o f a 11 exi. sti.n g contracts. 80 Contracts continued to be let in any manner desired by the centers, including verbal agreements. As one of his fina l actions, Glennan issued a Project Management Manual which explained project approval and planning and 81 provided NASA with its first formal project approval process. What Glennan did not do was provide a strong central headquarters unit for managing projects or the administrative facets of the centers. With one exception the early technical developments in the space programs were accomplished within the centers with little interference from headquarters. It was two years before such projects as the Surveyor program were even assigned a headquarters program officer, and it was only because of complaints from the centers that 82 headquarters finally established a project approval form. The only exception to this situation was the manned space flight program. Since these centers were all created after 1958, headquarters played a n ac tive role in the technical decision making and coordination of this pro g ram from the beginning . 219 THE NEW NASA By 1961 NASA's project managers, with the exception of the manned space flight program, had established their own methods of operating, and were used to having total control over their own projects. The centers were responsible for the projects assigned to them, personnel management, procurement, and other administrative functions. The problem was that NASA was being heavily criticized for its management of the s ,pace program and its failure to produce even a plan for that major achievement which would re-establish the nation's prestige. Its critics had ample evidence to substantiate their criticisms. From 1958 to 1960, NASA had launched 25 spacecraft. Only 83 eight were successfui. The Soviets continued to increase their lead, and by January of 1961 they had photographed the moon and launched two . 84 d ogs into space. Its critics and friends agreed on one thing. NASA had a major management problem. Internal evaluators, NASA-sponsored groups, and the Bureau of the Budget all agreed that NASA needed to make significant 85 changes in its structure. It was the Wiesner Report prepared by Jerome Wiesner of MIT for the newly elected President Kennedy which was t h e most cri.t.ic a l . 86 The report not only criticized NASA's lack of technical progress, it also criticized NASA's entire management structure. NASA's problem was not technical capability, but "lack of 'efficient and effective leadership' together with 'organizational and management 87 deficiencies ' and problems of staffing and direction.'" It had over-emphasized in-house research capability and facilities; g iven too 220 high a priority to the manned space flight program; and not enough priority to space applications. NASA was also being criticized by many of the nation's top scientists for its failure to establish an adequate scientific program. It was in this environment that President Kennedy appointed James E. Webb as NASA's second Administrator. Shortly after his appointment Yuri Gagarin became the first man to orbit the earth, and NASA was given what became its primary objective--landing a man on the moon w.i t hi. n ten years. 88 To accomplish this objective, its personnel complement and appropriations were to be increased as necessary. Congress strongly supported both Webb's appointment and the new objective. Webb's appointment represented a major change in NASA's management philosophy and the priority given to its different research activities. Glennan had hired outside consultants and appointed individuals whose specialty was management, but he continued to work with NACA's former leaders and made no attempt to interfere with research activities. From the beginning Webb emphasized the need for greater headquarters control and direction over both the administrative and technical facets of the organization. His tenure was characterized by a slow, but steady, centralization of the organization and increases in the amount of controls exercised over the activities of the organization. If NASA failed to produce at some acceptable level, it was because management had failed to somehow implement adequate controls. The response to e ach problem was a shifting of divisions of work, a d option of new c ontrol mec hanisms, or removal of the individuals 221 responsible for the particular problem area. It also was the period in which NASA's chan ge to an organization whose primary objective was the manned space fligh t was made. Formal Or ganiza tion Webb ' s tenure was marked by frequent reorganizations which were made both in response to some technical failure a nd studies which recommend ed changes in the management of the organization. He a nnounced his first reorganization in November of 1961. Its objective was to improve NASA's leaders' control of the organization and to stop the drift toward semi-a utonomous program off ices. In contrast to Gl e nnan, Webb argued that his firs t reorganization was produced by in-house efforts. This is largel y an internal effort based on staff paper s prepared by Al Siepert and Young and their associa tes, examined by others in the organization, discu ssed with Dryden and with me, but basically it was my application of what I learned in the Bureau of the Budget, and with the experience in industry, beginning with the Sperry Gyroscope problem of large organized effort. 89 This in-house effort, though, did not include NACA's former leaders. It was based on a s tudy by Jack Youn g , Deputy Director of Adminis tration, who had been recruited f rom McKinsey & Company, and Alfred Siepert, who had been recruited f r om the Nat ional Institutes of Health a t the recommendation of McKinsey & Company. 90 Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr. was retained as the Associate Administrato r a nd general manage r, but he was given direct a uthority over the c e nters. 91 The four program offices to which the centers had 222 ~ATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND S?AC~ ADMINISTRATION Chi------.--.-___ ADMINISTRATOR ,~;c~t1~, I - ~ --- . . - ---- - . - - - - -- i-- - - - -- - ---- --- ? - --DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR 1 !@tary Office of Office of Plans I , I Office of Office of Office of Redearcn Legisiati"e Affairs and Program Assistant I Executive General International Advisory Director Evaluation Administrator Assistant Counsel Programa Co111111ittees Director for Pui>lic Director Affairs I Office of Office of Public Technical Information Informatj on Director and Educacion Director ASSOCIATE AD~INISTRATOR DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR Office of Safety __ Office of Program Officer Administration Director ! I I Director of Director of Office of .ludit Division Finan' cial Administra- Procurement Teclmical Resource _ Tracking and &irector Haaagemen t : tive Services and Supp l y Programs Programming Data Acqui!li- Division I Division Divisioo cion Directo r Director I Direct.or i)irect tor Director of Director of - - 1 1-'.anagement Director of Facilities Reliability !'ersonnel Security and Hanage,ment Reports Coordination and Quality Division Inspections Analysis Assurance Director ::>1vision Division Director O~f f t1e~l - --------------.- -- -- Dirt!ctor Ot:l~~~:ons Technical Office of J~=-- - --- 1- 1tt0t Program Advanced __ __ AEC-NASA jI ~ i~~ Of iice of OfficJ of Scientist _ ___ Space Manned Space Coordination Research and Office I Sciences Flight Director '------- ----7 Technology / Director Director I Ot I I ttt ; ! ?t tot f ' h 10t 0l O ' Director of Director of / Director of Space Scienct! 1 ' teii, ogical --I-- Program Review Nuclear __L Program Revie Steering I aud Resources Syste1DS 1? and Resources I Comm.ittet! Management Management ' . ' Director of l Director of Director of Director of I. I Grants and Program Review Systems_--+--_Program Review I Research ---and ilesourc<"s Engint!t!ring and Resou rces ?1anagemenc Con tracts Management ------ - -- ----Director of Director of Director of Director of Direc' tor of Dire'c tor oi Aeronautical Space Launch Vehi- Lunar and Aerospace ___ Launch Research Vehicles cles' and - - - Planetary Hedici~e Vehicles and Propulsion Programs Propulsion Programs Director of Director of Propulsion & Electronics Directo r of Director of Director of Force _ __. ._ & Control Geophysics &- Bioscience Spacecraft & Generation As tronomy Programs Fiigilt Missions Program" Director of --~-es-e-a-rc-h-- -,-- -1-------1 western Operation s Lewis Flight Goddard Space Jet Pr~pulsion wallop" Langley Manned Research Office Dirt!c Lor Research Flight Center Laborato r y Station Research Spacecraft Center Center Director Director Director Center Center Director Director Director Director Fi g U/t e. ./ NASA Organi zation Char t , 1961 223 reported prior to the reorganization were replaced with six new program offices. The program offices were responsible for working with the center Directors to execute their programs, but the center Directors reported to the Associate Administrator for all other matters. The second major change was the addition of an Office of Plans and Program Evaluation which was "intended to be a self-policing, 92 exam.i ni. ng acti. vi. ty , as we 11 as a f orwar d - 1 oo k i?n g acti? vi? ty. " The 1961 reorganization effort failed, and in 1963 the organization r everted back to the centers reporting directly to the program offices. The major reason for this change was that the OMSF Director had complained that he could not be responsible for Apollo without adequate control of resources. The other centers had also complained that they did not know who was responsible for their programs, the Associa t e Administrator or the hea ds of the program offices. The 1963 reorganization was an attempt to provide the centers with more responsibility fo r their programs. A lead center for each pro ject was appointed and given responsibility for the management of an entire projec t. The program offices were supposed to work directly with Webb a nd Seamans to ensure the control of the organization. The practice of h oldin g Management Committee meetings was established. Monthly status reviews in which the program of f ices presented their programs, planned a nd ac tual manpower, schedules, and expenditures were implemented. Each program was to be given an extensive review each year. Al though the centers reverted back to reporting to the program offices, they neve r regained the control of their ac t ivi t ies which exis t ed prior to the 1961 reorganization. As Webb noted, ~ NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINI STRATION ADMINISTRATOR Deputy Administra tor As : sistant Deputy Legisl I Administrator a t i ve International Gen~ral ?1 - .. I Af I fa i rs Programs Counsel Executive Executive Techno- Public I Policy Space Officer Secretary l ogy Affairs Planning Sc ience Utili- Board Board of zation NAS & Policy Planning ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR In Id -u -stry Pro -gr -am ??m 7i ng Deputy Af fairs Defense Administration Affairs Wester In North Opera- Eastern Tracking & tions Office Data Ac- Office quisition Manned Space . -- -~-------i Flight Space Science and I A A dp vp al ni cc ea dt i Ron es se arch and Technology George C. 1 Manned Space- G I . ?7 o Marshall ddard Spc ar ca ef t Cente , r Jet Propulsion Ames Resea ?1 r ch Fli S gp ha tc e R FlighD t i Cre ec nt to err 1 Laborat e o sr ey a rch Di Center Director CeF nl teig r h Dt iC ret cr t, o\ r ector r Di rec tor I Pacific Launch IW allops Station I La Lu an ? g 7 nch leO yp e Rr eations Operations search D Li er wec ist o Rr esearch Center Director Office C D ei nre tec rt o Dr irector Center Director hgMe5 NASA Organization Qillrt, 1963 N N +' 1' 225 And so it was in a sense of yielding on the part of senior offices to pressures generating in the organization, but yielding in the direction of certain things that we thought were important, and some of those were continuing from the past and some of those were introduced as a result of experience. 93 It was not until 1967 that Webb again made major changes in the organization in an attempt to gain more control over its activities . The Apollo fire and the investigations by Congress which followed the fire were the catalyst for these changes . Seamans was replaced with Finger and Newell was moved into the position he held in 1968 . Finger was given the necessary authority to manage the organization. Other Administrative Changes In contrast to the reorganizations, the changes in program and financial management mechanisms were accomplished incrementally. The stimulus for the changes appeared to be management studies by headquarters staff members . The project approval system implemented by Glennan was changed in 1962 to provide Seamans with a less detailed and more comprehensive summary of all proposed projects. The programs offices after receiving project proposals from the centers submitted a two - page summary to the Assoc iate Administrator. This summary was used to prepare the authorizing document (PAD) for all projects. The Financial Operating 94 Plan submitted by the centers had to concur with the PAD. In 1961 NASA also adopted a new management tool called Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) which allowed project managers to track the progress of a ll subsystems of a project and the impact of any . . 95 d e 1 ay on t h e entire proJect. The integration of PERT with the 226 F inancial Management Reporting System was supposed to provide NASA's managers with a mechanism for tracking planned and actual costs and schedules. In 1964 Webb implemented a recommendation of a staff report by Jack Young and his staff by creating an Executive Secretariat position 96 to provide him with additional information on the activities of NASA. This office implemented a Critical Reports and Correspondence Review Sy stem which summarized all the significant matters covered in any reports produced by NASA and codified all of NASA's directives . In 1965 Webb created the Office of Administrator and appointed Willis Shapley, the Bureau of the Budget analyst who had monitored NACA's budget, been so critical of NACA's structure, and helped draft the Act which created 97 NASA's structure, as his Chief of Staff. This office was also 98 created at the recommendation of another staff paper by Jack Young. The Office of Organization and Management was created in 1967 shortly before the Apollo fire. Finger, who had written the report reconnnending its establishment, was appointed the new Associate Administrator of this Of ...c. i? ce. 99 Phased Project Planning, NASA's four-step approval process, was initiated in 1965 after a schedule and cost study by headquarters found slippages in all of NASA's programs and increases in costs because of . 00 t h ese s 1 ippages. 1 Since Apollo was one of the programs falling behind, Webb felt that more control should be exercised over program planning. It was not fully implemented until after the Apollo fire in 1967. r 227 Webb and In-House Research Webb's changes in the formal structure and reporting mechanisms were accompanied by an increase in the pressures to let contracts for research activities whenever possible. The assignment of two major research and development space projects to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, while at the same time placing manpower ceilings, forced this organization into more contracting.lOl By 1965 even Ames had been forced to resort to letting contracts for maintenance, computing services, and operation of one of its wind tunnels. Private firms became responsible for the design a nd construction of research instruments ?.. the planning and execution of research projects; [and] the analysis of the resulting data and the writing of research reports. l0 2 Ames, along with the other NACA centers, simply could not handle the volume of work assigned to it by headquarters within the manpower restrictions imposed by headquarters. The OART programs had been given the lowest priority in terms of resources and manpower from the beginning, and the c e nters under its jurisdiction moved into project management partially to increase their share of the organization's total resources and to provide their staffs with new ideas for research. The r eaction at Ames and the other centers which had previously engaged only in in-house research was not positive. From the standpoint of the Center [Ames], whose interest lay mainly in basic research, such contracting was in many respects debilitating. It would, of course, inhibit the full d evelopment of the Ce nte r and would dilute the quality and r e duce t he mora l e o f the staff. It would render more difficult the problem of acquiring and retaining 228 research men of the highest quality and would be I particularly harmful if it reduced the Centers best research men to mere contract monitors-- 103 assuming they would accept such a role. Perhaps more important, the cost of letting contracts for more and more of its work was costly in terms of in-house morale and technical capabilities. These problems, while affecting the various groups differently, hurt all of them. As Gilruth, the Director of the Manned Space Flight Center, argued in 1969, We have agreed with the 'surge tank' philosophy and have recognized that an adequate in-house manning of Civil Service Personnel was out of the question. However, we think that this in-house capability should have been greater and have, from time to time, requested a larger in-house manning ??. We have been very weak in systems engineering, analysis, and trajectory work. We have developed practically no engineering competence in the field of Reliability and Quality Assurance. We have probably been too dependent on Philco, IBM, and TRW in the operation of the Mission Control Center and in operations generally ..? We are studying intensely what we can do to reduce our dependence on engineering support contractors ??? We are sure that it will not be practical to eliminate outside engineering support for several years. However, we do plan stronger program level systems groups and well defined tasks for the outside engineering support.104 229 NASA AND FEDERAL MANAGEMENT POLICIES Webb was not the only decision maker with regard to NASA's affairs. Both its structure and research activities were heavily influenced by oversight organizations. NASA's relationships with these organizations were quite different than those which existed during NACA's existence. This occurred partially because of the difference in the level of appropriations between the two organizations and the fact that oversight agencies continued to expand their authority over government agencies, but it also occurred because Webb's reaction to the demands of oversight organizations differed quite a bit from NACA's leaders' responses. NACA's leaders fought fo r their unique structure and the right to engage in the t ype of research they felt was necessary to advance aviation. Webb accepted the authority of outsiders to make decisions about NASA's internal management and the specific technical projects which were necessary to advance aeronautical and space research. Oversight Agencies Three organizations played a role in NACA's activities during its history, but the changes which they effected were largely of an administrative nature. The oversight of NASA's activities was more invasive and involved the performance of NASA's technical work. The Civil Service Commission investigated NASA's personnel management activities in 1962 and 1967. lOS In the 1962 investigation the Civil Service Connnission found some irregularities, but it did not carry its investigations any furthe r or report them to Congress. Webb responded by directing the headquarters Personnel Office to inspect and 230 a regular evalua ters' ersonnel manageme nt activities on te the cen p pancies including basis. tion found a n umber of discre The 1967 investiga bb's response f rsonnel managemen t practices. We a lack 0 uniformity in pe ? h h e Personne 1 Review Committe e to this inve s t 1? t gat1? on was to est ablis . 106 practices. In contrast to the to ev 1 a uate all centers ' personnel reported , the new committe e Personnel Office which repo rted to Finger directly to Webb. ed NASA's activit ies ng Office also in vestigat The General Accou nti t these t ears, but it was n ot until 1965 tha throughout 1?ts fi" rs ten y function se was partially a invest. rnest. The increa l..gations began in ea ccounting urement activities . The General A of the 's procincrease in NASA tion of ce sponsibility for its own investiga Offi not only had re from contractors a bout oc had to respond t o complaints Pr urement, it also ation of Planning, ement NASA' t awards. It revi ewed NASA's impl s contrac . ogram. Cost annn? geting and the equ al opportunity pr Progr J..ng and Bud . N igate d . ot only ules were invest overruns d slippages in sc hed an o sent the Civil ss on these inves tigations, it als did ? ? l..t report to Co ngre eports on practice s i t ations r Serv? ni z l..ce Commission an d other orga that ivil Service Comm ission ruled Con . ..dered questionabl e. In 1967 the C SJ G ount i ng as illegal after t h e eneral Acc NASA 's use of support co ntracts w 107 Webb r e spond ed by Office nv estigations. sent it a report on its i mit all support co ntracts sub e centers and pro gram offices to directing th f 1 In 1964 a f t e r dollars to Finger or approva ? over and one hundred thous report to the ontracting activit ies and sent its rd's c it revie~ed Godda dard ' s Commission decla re d that God Ci vil Service Comm i ssion, the by es t ablishing sp ecific ed iolated f ederal l a w. Webb r espond ac tivitie s v 231 criteria f or Ale ft teti rn 1g 9 6c 7ontracts. 108 and following a steady increase in t h e General Accounting Office investigations, Webb issued a directive ordering the submission of all responses to the Office's invest?i gations to Finger for approval. The activities of these two organizations had an enormous impact on NASA, but the Bureau of the Budget played a larger role. Webb 'as early as 1961, went to President Kennedy because of cuts in NASA' s requests. The establishment of NASA's lunar landing objective only e i1 . m inated the problem for a short period of time. By 1963 its request s were again being challenged by the Bureau of the Budget. Not only we re some of its appropriations requests being cut, but also entire programs were eliminated. As Levine noted, It was the action of the Bureau, not Congress, that led to the cancellation of (or caused NASA to cancel) the last two Apollo flights; to the reduction of Surveyor flights from 17 to 10; to the freezing of NASA-excepted positions at 425; and to the elimination of certain programs before reaching the development stage, such as the Advanced Orbiting Solar observatory cancelled by NASA in December 1965. 9 l0 The adoption of the Planning, programroing and Budgeting System NASA's programs were not amenable to 0 nly added to NASA's problems. cost-benefit analysis, and it had difficulty showing that its programs ~ere contributing to the Great Society objective of President Johnson. Perhaps more hard to J?ustifY some of the la i rm gp eo rtant, it was research and ams which essentially had political development progr Using the gap between the obJ? ectives that were no longer in vogue. Russia thei?r J?ustification worked well unt il ns and the United States as 232 1965 when "the United States caught up with and surpassed the Russian manned space accomplishments." llO The three organizations not only played a role in standardizing NASA's activities to fit federal guidelines and reducing their appropriations, they also limited NASA's discretion with regard to handling the cuts in appropriations and personnel. Lower appropriations could be dealt with by performing more work in-house, but this alternative was of little value after personnel ceilings were lowered. Personnel ceilings could be handled by cuts in programs and / or letting contracts, but the Civil Service Commission's decision to disallow NASA's support contract practices made this alternative less desirable. The Bureau of the Budget's increasingly restrictive personnel ceilings finally forced NASA into reductions-in-force. This NASA could accomplish, but reductions-in-force had their drawbacks. As Julius Allen, the Director of Ames, argued, I would like to say again what I said before, that when it comes to reduction in personnel and that may be required, to please give advance notice so that we can back down gracefully on this thing because the civil service methods of backing down are not acceptable. They just leave you a torn messy, shred of a place when you get through. 11 1 Even ignoring the impact on morale of reductions-in-force , they did not a lways produce the desired results. As suggested above, Civil Service regulations gave employees rights which prevented NASA's leaders from s imply dismissing employees as they desired. At Marshall "from 1 to lO personnel actions were required per release of an employee during re d ucti.o ns-i.n - f orce. II 112 I 233 Congress That NASA's relationship with Congress was going to be different than the one which had evolved between Congress and NACA was evident in its first few years. Congress was fascinated with NASA and showed its fascination by bringing in experts to testify on even the most technical aspects of the space program. The Johnson Rider to NASA's first 113 Appropriations Bill in 1959 made Congress's role fonnal. NASA not only had to obtain Congressional approval for its appropriations, but also annual authorization of each program. In contrast to Congress's oversight of NACA's activities, its oversight of NASA's activities was such that some of its members became experts on even the technical aspects of each program. The various committees placed limitations on how NASA spent its appropriations; determined the conditions under which it could reprogram its funds and specified the percent of funds which could be reprogrammed; held detailed hearings on NASA's administration of its programs, any cost overruns or slips in schedules, and technical failures; and made decisions about which programs NASA would accomplish and the actual execution of those programs. The average Congressional committee would have received testimony from the responsible top officials, and tried to resolve any disputes at the very top. The Science and Astronautics Connnittee and its subcommittees, given free rein by Chairman Miller, went out to the contractors, the NASA centers throughout the country, sought the advice of independent experts, talked to the workers in the plants and their foremen, and had a real understanding of what was going on in every program. 114 234 The actual impact of Congress on NASA, though, occurred not through direct1.?ves from Congress, but Webb's actions following investigat i.o ns or hearings on NASA's programs. For example, the Survey or lunar roving vehicle experiment proposed by NASA was dropped after Co ngress objected. The last six scheduled missions for the Ranger Progr am d e signed to examine the surface of the moon were dropped because of pressures from Congress. One of the Mariner space probe missions was cancelled after Congress recommended a fifteen million dollar reduction in its funding. 115 Webb responded to investigations of NASA's technical failures, C.Ost overruns and delay s in schedules by increasing the documentation req u1? .rements for all NASA programs. In 1962 the Subcommittee on Space Sc.i. enc.e and Astronautics made the first serious evaluation of NASA's Progr ams when it investigated the Centaur program whic h was supposed to Provide the launch vehicle for the Ranger and Surveyor spacecraft. The Commi. ttee concluded that: Puttino out fires is no substitute for effective progra: management. The subconrmittee is forced to dc onclude that management of the Ck eanntda uirn effecti.v e evelopment program has been wea nd both at NASA headquarters and firno mth ea df~1.effluds,1 _d .o an of tha t the program has ~uf. f :re ll6 authority and respons1b1.l1.ty, 'NA.SA' s am from Marshall to Lewis leaders transferred the Centaur progr shortly f In l964 its investigation of the Ranger a ter the investigation. Project found that the Jet Propulsion Laboratory had not provided supervision of the program and adequate management nor technical upervise, not just management rec. Otnmend ed that NASA S "overs a ec et ? o r 11 117 Ws ba bh s we 11 , e r e spond ed Pr ices at JPL , but t echnical approac e 235 by forcing JPL to accept a genera1 manager, Ai? r Fo rce Major General Alvin R ? Lu edecke; i.n creasa.:lthe number of staff supervising the contra ctor; and changed the contract with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory to provi? de NASA with more say in the selection and execution of its Programs. After these hearings NASA adopted an unwritten rule of "no failures." In 1965 the same subcommittee investigated NASA's Surveyor Program because its first launch was two and a half years late. The commi? ttee again faulted NASA for lack of adequate management control of JPL and JPL of inadequate supervision of its contractors. JPL was again required to increase the number of individuals supervising the prime contractors. Despite these investigations, Congress supported NASA for most From 1965 on, it began t o of ct uh te NASA's period preceding 1965, appropriati?ons After 1967 Con r ge rq eu sse is ot ns a, l support of NASA steadily declined. The decline in the agency'? appropriation s began shortly after the successful Mercury flights which showed NASA's Attempts by Webb to stop the cuts abili ty to launch a man into space. ~ere not as successful as they had been in earlier years. As he argued, . h ? titution of the Now we are dealing with P t re e ~ ii nd se ncy and a lot of probleJm vs1 hoa nds a~id e , aire amn ot d ealing with the gu. y 1 [JO h nsot n there and f'i g ht your c. hampion, I w?1i1l go ou your battles, I wi t ge K ennedy an d this He is sayin C go , ngress to give you the moneYd? b fellows are Y Go d , I have got pro blems an yo n t ld u hav . e reduced o cooperatin g wi. th me ? Yoau ndco uh elped us out, your expenditur . e s ' last year b lutely right you didn t dh o i . t, S 0 you are a , so h ha radical change wen you say that s t b e~ er ne _ a hich v1e have got to of the environment within w work . 118 236 Two events, though, changed NASA's relation Cs oh n.ip g rew1 s? st .h The f inir S 1966w a ts o t W pr e eb sb e's n tf a thil eu r Ce o mmittee with his reconnn endations for future space obJ r ' ee qc uti ev se ts s a ff rote mr repeated the . Webb c reo sm pom ni dtt ee de tf oo r t ht eh e rs ee q uo eb sj te c byti ves. arguing, Because of the difficult budgetary situation resulting from the war in Vietnam and other factors, we are uncertain at this time as to what the President will approve for our fiscal year 1968 budget. Even in the absence of these uncertainties, of course, we would be precluded by the regular budgetary procedures from presenting specific119 statements on our future plans at this time. The Ho use Connnittee refused to accept this explanation, but despite add ? prel s.t si uo rn ea sl Webb would not propose a program without the consent of the Executive Branch. 120 The Apollo fire on January 27, 1967 was qually disruptive to NASA, relationship with congress. Webb refused to8 turn over to either the Ho use or Senate Connnittees a memo sent by General Phillips, the Apo11 project manager, to Nor ~h American Aviation, 0 on the management defl? .c.i encies which he had uncovered in a 1965 investigation. Congressman Fuq ua noted that: I think the committee has gone out of its way to cooperate with NA 1S A in every way. am getting the feeling that maybe you haven't reall~ cinofo perate. d with us in noft phro vidminagn augse mwenitt hp rtohbe o l e r mm sa tion about some o t ese at you have 1 2w 1i th th the various contractors. Although Webb responded to congress's questions about the fire by letting a contract to Boeing for an evaluation of the Apollo project and implement? changes discussed a bove, Congress's support ing the management Of NASA was as 1? t had been prior to the fire. never as s trong 237 Congress's actual impact on NASA is difficult to assess. Many of the changes made were changes which were made voluntarily by NASA 's leaders. On the other hand, it also seems fairly evident tha t Co n gress 's " actions in the oversight area helped to shape NASA's 11 122 management. The problem, from NASA's perspective, was that this oversight left no margin for error on its part. As Webb pointed out, I am not sure that they [center Directors] fully realize that whereas weapon systems and atomic developments of comparable or lesser difficulty can be and are carried out under rigid security restrictions which effectively limit public understa nding and discussion of program development details, including failures to meet milestones and costs, our whole program is being conducted under the fullest public scrutiny and we must defend every step that we take without the advantage of letting the final result be our record of performance. I still feel absolutely convinced that our final results will be good, but the image is now most vulnerable to distortion and misrepresentation by everyone who wan ts to jump on us or just wants a headline. 12 3 238 THE NEW PHILOSOPHY It is tempting to explain the changes in NASA by arguing that they were simply the result of a political decision to stop supporting the exploration of space and pressures from Congress and other oversight agencies to conform to federal standards and implement better control mechanisms, but this ignores NASA's role in its own decline, as well as the fact that NACA was able to withstand the pressures placed on it by external organizations at least until 1958. Granted it had less pressures, but it was also a great deal less powerful than NASA and thus theoretically less able to resist the pressures from external organizations. The changes NACA did make in response to these organizations were in most cases surface changes with little impact on the actual functioning of the organization. It was only those demands, such as pay scales, which they could not ignore that had a real impact on the organization. It was evident by the mid-1950s that NACA was losing it s battle to retain its unique structure, and the decision to a sk for a role in the new space program was in hindsight fatal, but until this time it was able to give its researchers an environment which was conducive to their research efforts. NASA, in contrast to this, appeared to react to every demand made upon it. The ten years which we examined above contained four major reorganizations and cont ? inu I al changes in the organizations financial and administrative management mechanisms. The organization reacted to every pressure from outside with little indication that t here was a n y control being exercised over the r esponses made to these 239 demands. The reactions were generally in one direction--the adoption of more control mechanisms. Failures occurred and additional controls were added with little concern about the impact of the controls on the work of the organization. Pressures to let contracts resulted in an almost total reliance on contracting for its work, despite complaints from its staff that some mechanism had to be developed for providing the researchers enough training to supervise the work of contractors . Congress's commitment to the manned space program was translated into total corrnnitment to this program. The BOB's reductions in its budget and refusal to allow it to present new programs to Congress were simply accepted. The adoption of new control mechanisms continued relentlessly despite growing evidence that they were pushing highly qualified scientists and engineers out of the organization and creating morale problems. What then made NASA so vulnerable to pressures from external organizations? To answer this, it is necessary to look closer at one major difference between NACA and NASA. NACA ' s history was in some ways the story of the working out of a conflict between two philosophies of how organizations should be managed and what types of research they should accomplish. NACA's creators believed that if the nation was to make advances in aeronautics, it would have to establish a laboratory in which scientific research was performed. They also believed that research had to be accomplished in an environment in which controls were minimal and evaluation of the work of the staff was accomplished by other scientist s and engineers. Scientists had to have adequate freedom to chang e d i r ec tion when necessary. 240 This philosophy of management was attacked by various groups who believed that government agencies should be directed and controlled by a single administrator appointed by the President. They used terms such as control, efficiency, and sound management practices. In contrast to NACA's leaders, they believed that NACA's task should be applied research or engineering and that the staff's work could be directed toward a specified objective. Although NACA's leaders never achieved its creators' ideal structure or engaged in the scientific research they felt was necessary, their ideas about what the organization should do and look like served as a standard from which to judge all suggested changes. It was these ideas which guided NACA's leaders when they were faced with pressures from outside organizations to bring their structure into conformance with other government agencies. In practice, they were far from achieving their ideal organization, but they were also far from the organization envisioned by many of the groups which controlled their destiny. By the 1950s NACA was rapidly losing ground in the fight. Federal regulations and investigations by oversight agencies, coupled with declining resources, made it more and more difficult to continue offering the incentives necessary to maintain its leaders' ideal organization in the manner necessary to recruit and retain highly qualified scientists and engineers. NACA's transfonnation to NASA was more than an enlargement of NACA's research activities or the size of the organization; it r 241 represented a change to a new philosophy of management. NASA's creators believed in the ideology of those individuals who had opposed NACA' s structure for so long. They justified the change to more , ? controls by arguing that the new research and development task required an Administrator with adequate authority to control and coordinate the large research and development projects. They, whether intentionally or not, appointed individuals to manage the organization who also believed this management philosophy, and these individuals in turn produced reports recommending the implementation of more controls. Webb believed that NASA should look at its budget requests "under the same cri. teri. a t ha t t h ey [BOB ana l 1y 11s 2t 4s ] and the President have to look at. NASA could present alternatives to the Executive Branch and Congress, but the final decision was made b y them, whatever the long-term impact on the organization. He also believed, as they did, that if NASA was somehow failing to perform at a level that was judged adequate by their standards, it was because of poor management and that was defined as not enough control by top management over the organization. Webb's response to the Apollo fire was to implement additional controls throughout the organization, despite the fact that there was little evidence that the r e st of the organization was performing i. nadequately . 125 And here is where it became clear after the Apollo fire in January and the traumatic experiences that we went through there that our organizational system had lost its self-policing features that we thought were built into it. It's clear that the alternatives being brought up to top management had been screened too much, that you were in effect getting one reconnnendation or you were get ting two reconnnendations, one of which was clearly good and one which wasn't worth a damn, so 242 you in effect were chained to either agree or disagree with one recommendation, and the emphasis on administration as well as program was declining, and that we ought to begin to build a real capability and train someone who would take on the real responsibility as the man who would institute a permanent office as strong as the Director of the Budget is in the United States Government. 1 6 Webb's unwillingness to accept NACA's view of the world and its leaders' belief that research required an environment different than that of other government agencies is perhaps best represented in his response to questions about why individual names were taken off NASA's organization charts after 1961. Well, we left them out only because we wanted to emphasize the function and not the individual. Then NACA had been an organization that operated by individuals, ??? They have working habits among individuals, and we wanted to begin to emphasize that that wasn't the way you could organize something as big as NASA had to be. 127 NACA's leaders did not want to classify their employees because they felt this would inhibit their creativity. NASA's management dealt in classifications. NOTES 1 Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, January 16, 1958. The p r o posal was written by the staff and titled, " A National Research Program for Space Technology ." NACA ' s decision to propose its inclusion in the new space organization is discussed in detail in Alex Roland, Research by Committee: A History of the National Adviso ry Connnittee for Aer onautics: 1915-1958, Comment Edition, April, 1980. 2 Public Law 85-568, 85th Cong., R.R. 12575. July 29, 1958. 72 Stat. 426. 3 Appendix A contains a description of NACA's and NASA's employment and appropriations history. 4 The NACA laboratories were renamed centers when transferred to NASA . AppendL~ B provides a map with the location of all NASA cent e rs. 5 NASA's first Administrator was T. Keith Glennan, former President of Cleveland's Case Institute of Technology and sound systems engineer for the motion picture industry. Webb at the time of his nomination was Director of Kerr- McGee Oil Industries and McDonnell Aircraft & Chairman of Municipal Manpower Commission. Prior to this, he had been Under Secretary of State. He was the Director of the Bureau of the Budget from 1946 to 1949. He was appointed by President Kennedy on February 14, 1961. 6 See Richard L. Chapman, Project Management in NASA : The System and the Men (Washington, D.C .: NASA, 1973) for a description of NASA ' s project management system. A program is a "related series of undertakings which continue over a period of time (normally years), and which are designated to accomplish a broad scientific or technical goal in the NASA Long-Range Plan ... " A project is one of the undertakings of a program " with a scheduled beginning and ending, ... " General Management Instruction 4-1- 1, March 8, 1963. 7 See Adm. W. Fred Boone, NASA Office of Defense Affairs (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1970) ~or a discussion of the relationships which developed between the Department of Defense and NASA . General Phillips was the Program Manager for the Apollo program. After reviewing the situation at NASA, he requested additional detailees to fill t op and mid-level management positions on the Apollo proj ec t. 243 244 8 Arnold E. Levine, An Administrative History of NASA, 1963-1969, Comment Edition, August 23, 1977, NASA History Office, pp. 172-173. DOD in 1967 had r espo nsibility for 11.7 billion dollars' wor th of NASA co ntracts (1700 individual contracts) . NASA's total budget for this pe riod (1958-1968) was $32 billion. 9 The Civil Service Commission ruled that NASA 's support contracts were illegal after the General Accounting Office reported its f indings to the Commission . U.S. Comptroller General, "Report on Po tential Savings Available through Use of Civil Service Rather than Contractor-Furnis hed Employees for Certain Support Services, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, " June 1967. The systems engineering t asks were performed primarily by three companies: Belcomrn (NASw-147), a subsidiary of American Telephone and Telegraph Co.; Gener al Electric (NASw-410); a nd a Boeing subsidiary (NASw-1650). lO Uebb discussed the various organizational c hanges which he had made in "Transc ript of Proceedings, Na tional Aeronautics a nd Space Administration," Management Advisory Panel Meeting, Washington, D.C., April 19, 1968 . Copy in NASA Headquarters History Office Files. 11 Willis Shapley was the Bureau of the Bud ge t analyst responsible for NACA ' s budge t during the 1950s. He had also been one of the individuals responsible for the draft of President Eisenhower ' s bill to establ ish NASA. 12 Ma nageme nt Advisory Panel Mee ting, op . ci t., p . 41 . 13 Newell had been transfe rred to NASA with the Naval Research Labo rat or y g r oup in 1958. He had been employed by NRL f r om 1944 to 1958 . 14 Newell's Office was originally established in response to the Bureau of the Bud ge t's Planning, Programming a nd Budge ting program memorandum a nd spec i al studies requirements. 15 See Raymond A. Bauer, et al., NA .S A ? Planning a nd Decision Making, 2 vols ., Contract NGR 22-000 7-163 and NGL 22 - 007 - 124, 1970, for an eva lua tion of NASA ' s long-range planning . r 245 16 The planning process, which had been established to obtain more consensus on agency-wide objectives, ended with. the acceptance of a plan in 1969 written by Belconnn under an Office of Manned Space Flight contract. Bauer, ibid., discusses the other program offices and centers' reaction to the rejection of their plan and acceptance of Belcorrnn' s . 17 Barry Rutzer, "The Lunar and Planetary Missions Board,'' HHN-138, August 30, 1976. The scientific community disagreed with NASA's emphasis on improving the nation's technical capability and the political nature of the lunar landing mission. They wanted more emphasis on scientific research. NASA's cancellation of what were considered scientific missions to save the Apollo program essentially cost them the support of much of the scientific corrnnunity. 18 42 u.s.c. 2452. 19 The percentage of contractors to total employees ranged from a low of 77 percent in 1961 to a high of 92 percent in 1964 and 1965. By 1979 it had dropped to 82 percent. NASA, This Is NASA (Washington, D.C., U.S . Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 13. 20 President Kennedy announced the lunar landing on Mary 25, 1961. The Goett Committee appointed on April 1, 1959 and composed of representatives from NASA's centers, recommended the lunar landing as a logical next step after Mercury. 1970 was set as the target date. On July 9, 1960, headquarters gave approval for the contracts for feasibility studies. On July 28, 1960, the project was officially named Apollo. See Courtney G. Brooks, et al., Chariots for Apollo: A History of Manned Lunar Spacecraft (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1979). 21 Leonard R. Sayles and Margaret K. Chandler, Manag?i ng La rge Ssystems Organizations ?or the Future (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), p. 19. This description of research and development organizations relies heavily on this study. ?2 - See Amitai Etzioni, The Moon-Doggle: Domestic and International Implications of the Space Race (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1964) and Rutzer, loc. cit., for a discussion of this belief. 23 Apollo was taking three-fourths of NASA's research a nd development budget in 1967 a nd one-third of its personnel . See Brooks, loc . cit., a nd Jane Van Nimmen and Leonard C. Bruno with Robert L. Rosholt, NASA Histor i cal Data Book, 1958-1968, Vol . 1: NASA Resources (Washing ton, D.C .: NASA , 1976) . 246 24 See Chapman, loc. cit . 25 Brooks, loc. ci t., and Nirnmen, l oc. cit. 26 Emmette S. Redford a nd Or i on F . White, "What Manned Space Program After Reaching the Moon: Go vernm ent Attempts to Decide: 1962-1968." NASA Research Gran t NGL JJ - 022 -099. Syracuse/ NASA Program, December, 1971, p . 53 . 27 . NASA, . Transcript of Proceedings , "Budget Change-Over: Webb, Seamans and all Center Direct or s , 9/ 28 / 66 , " NASA Headquarters History Office files, pp. 25 - 26 . Wernher v n Br a un was trying to explain why it was so difficult to j ust ify this pr ogr am to Congress and the Bureau of the Budget. 28 Redford, op. ci t . , p . 193 . 29 Memorandum for the Record, Fe brua ry 14, 1968, Subject: Int erview with Dr. Homer E. Newell on Feb rua ry 13, 1968. NASA Headquarters History Of f ice files . JO Newell's explana t ion wa that th scientific community just did not understand that Congress would not s upport a scientific program. See Rutzer, lac. cit . 31 rN l.i llffien, la c . cit . 32 Chapman, op . ci t., p . 14 . 33 The four-phase app r ova l pr oc ess 1v:1s formerly known as Phase d Project Planning. 34 . . This section inc l ud es a descr i ption of only some of the agency-wide tracking mecha nisms . The sp c i f i c reporting requirements varied among the projects particular l y in NA S~'s early years. For examples of the forms required for one projec t see Erasmus H. Kloman, "Surveyor and Lunar Orbit er: Case Studie s o [ Project Management," June 30, 1970. NASA Headq uart ers His t or y Of [ ice files, Washing ton, D.C. 247 35 elp et up in 1962 at the request of Webb to h s s he Belcomm wa make technical decisi ons. t fice Manned Space Flight P rogram Of 6 were 3 light Research Center , and Wallops Station not . Kennedy, F ation. The headquart ers Contract Division z co 1 include d in this authori e contracts up to $1 million. u d 0 nly negotiat 37 tion of Congressional invest iga NAs , This step was taken after a eronautics tracts. House Commit tee on Science and A ' S bA s support conm? Support Services Con tracting by the NASA, u com t, 90th lttee on NASA Oversigh p. 5, 7-8, 19, 23-25. Cong., 2d sess. (Apr il 1968), p 38 dvisory Panel Meeting, op. cit. See Management A ge Scale Approach 39 es E. Webb, Space Age M anagement: The Lar (New Jam 145. York: McGraw-Hill Bo ok Co., 1969), p. 4? . cit., discusses this problem in detai l. Chapman, op 41 Ibid. , p. 102. 42 Levine, op. cit., Ch apter 3. 43 119 Both the cente rs and other co Brooks, op . cit., p. ? r's contractors. G.E. was under headquarte o ntractors resisted these t manager not to do an ything unless llo projec hrders from Houston's Apo h" e had rk order directly from im. a wo cit., pp. 51-52. NA SA in 1966 ,, p 44 11 er ... , o. 1970 it hi red 200. ge-Ov hired Budget Ch an 92 n 5 scientists and eng ineers. I port to Management," N ASA kf rce. A Re Office 45 e In-House W01; ~ASA. H eadquarters History Of:f ice f NASA, "Th to _ by 1975. Fo r O tiles Personnel, 1975. ~opy in 42 1 ? The average age ha d increased no 43 n-sc? engineers it was ? lentists and ASA's Staff," p blems in Reducing N 46 o History Office fil es. Nicks Nicks, "Current r . . }fay 2 Oran W. ? NASA Headquarters fr Space Science App lications. w 6, 1969 as the ? Copy in istrator 0 Deputy Associate Adm in 248 47 Memorandum for the Record, February 5, 1968, Subject; Trip to Lewis Research Center on January 26, 1968. Copy in NASA Headquarters History Office files. The interview was part of a Personnel Management Review Committee evaluation of NASA's personnel problems. 48 Bauer, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. B-84. Interview with Lewis staff member. 49 This problem was discussed in Edwin P. Hartman, Adventures in Research, A History of Ames Research Center: 1940-1965 (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1970). There was a great deal of animosity between the various groups because of the fact that the applied research group felt that any time they came into competition with OMS?F or OSSA development projects fo r funds, they would not receive funding. 50 Chapman, loc. cit. 51 Management Advisory Panel Meeting, op. cit., p. 29. 5? - Hartman, op. cit., p. 491. 53 Finger to Ray Romatowski, Director Organization and Management Planning Division, Subject: OART Management and Control System. May 22, 1967. Cit e d in Levine, op. cit., p. 325. 54 "Budget Change-Over ... ," op. cit., pp. 7-8. 55 See note 16. 56 Bauer, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. B-83. Interview with Lewis s taff member. 57 See Chapman, loc. cit. 58 See U.S. Civil Service Commission, "Evaluation of Personnel Management NASA Nationwide, August, 1967," NASA Headquarters History Office files; NASA, Personnel Management Review Committee, "First Report," March, 1968, NASA Headquarters History Office files; and "Co nsiderations in the Management of Manpower in NASA," September 8, 1966, NASA He a dquarters History Office files . The l a tt e r r eport wa s known as the Hjornevik Report. 249 59 26, January 3, 1968. Th e connnittee was first estabi? NMI 1152. and then made a permanen t part of nittee NASA' lshed as an ad hoc conn s personnel organization . 60 Administration Foundatio n lic "R See National Academy of Pub ' Ad H n Attracting New Staff and Retaining epobr?it ? of the apa _ OC Pan el o r Ceilings," June, 1973. C ASA ~ ity dun.ng a Perio d of Declining Manpowe N ry Office files. The re port discusses the impa eadquarters Histo ulations on NASA's abilit y to recruit and reta ~t 0 : Civil Service reg gineers. in highly qualified scie ntists and en 61 cription of NASA's relati onship with the D For a detaile d des d p. cit. epartment o f Defense, see Boone, l oc. cit., an Levine, o ationship with industry, see 62 SA's rel U.s For a discussion of N A ence and Applications of on Space Sci th ? Congress, House Su bcommittee nd Technology, United St ates Civilian Space e Committee on Sci~nce a Schact, Science Policy Pr ort prepared by Wendy H. Reo rams: 1958-1978, R ep Congress, ion, Congressional Resea rch Service, Library of Vo;earch Divis Government Printing Offi ce, 1981), pp. 923-973. ? 1 (Washington: 08 Levine noted that i t took 420 days 63 ? 2 p Levi . ne, op. ci t., p. . dquarters to rocurement plan contract and 3 months for a hea r ev?rocess a p iew of a negotiated con tract. Redford, op. cit . , 64 For a discussion of t his amendment, see ory of the Committee on ad st n_ U.s. House Toward the Endles s Frontier, Hi. (r.r s h a i ?n gton, D.C.: Sc ien nd Tec , hnology, 1959-1979, Com mittee Print w ~a 49 5 , 1980), PP? - o. ? Government Printing O ffice it tee on Aeronautical and Space mm 65 s CoU S C Senate d . ee ? ? ongress, , 2 ~es~., Doc1;1111ent Sc i ces, Tenth Anniversary: 1958-1 968, 90th Cong., o en 1nt1n~ Office , N July , (Washingto n, D.C.: Government P~ 116, 19 1968 rch Division was establis hed in 1963. 1968). The Science Policy R esea 66 Levine, op . cit., p. 383 . Toward the h creation of NASA, see . 6 7 . . f 1 For a discussion o t Alei . Th ? son Griffi th, e Na tiona Aeronautics End ~~ - ?t . ~ss Frnnr t of Public Polic ( Washington ~nd ~-? ?, op . ci ?' en R Ki"llian J r _S_.p_ u tnik ' e o Jm . ' ___ , D.c . D a ce Ac t A Stud of the b . 1962 v)e.l ames . ' 977) ? ? . p ffai rs Press, . ' M . The MIT Press 1 ie A as s.. i' ' Sci.e . u l (C mbridge National Aeronaut cs an d Space n ntist . 'Th :::.i::::::::..~ ~ich s a nd Eisenhow er a John Trento, ~-~~~e~r~s::_::.:~1~9~ 7~3~)~.-----~==- Ad~ia:d Hirsch a nd Josep h ' (New Yo r k : Praeger Publ is 250 68 U.S. Civilian Space Programs ... , op. cit., P? 52. 69 U.S. Congress, S p Hac oe u sE e,x p Sl eo lr ea ct ti o Cn o, nnT nh ie tt eN e a ot nio Ana s C l t o ron n Sg p. a au , c e tics 2 d P ro se g an r s a d s m ., , M Ha oy u se1 2 R, e1 p9 o5 rt8 , 1 7p 5p 8. , 1 82 5- t1 h4 . 70 -U-'-.~S:....:. ...::C=-=i=v:.i.:.l..i..~a-:n:;: .::S:..:p::.a_:c:_eP ~r~o~g~r~a~m .?. , op. cit., P? 53 ? . 71 The test of the Vi 1 k9 i5 n7 g~ Ti en stf r Vo en ht i co lef a 3 n e xploded o R inu ts esi ra nn as t i n o n Da el c eg mro ber 5, 1 offer to u p p oro f v nid ewe s te rec ph on ri tc ea rl s . The.n ot dh i~ dl p the situ aa st si io sn ta. n ceS e ae ftG ee ro r tg he e Relationsh ip N e . xpC lh os to aU t i h oa nm nite ,d "S Ht ia st te os r yS of NAPr po ag cr ea m P SA o l ai nc d Its ??? , yo ,p " . inc i ut. .s, . p Cp. i v2 il9 ia-6 n8 . S pace 72 NASA was given c aiv uti hli oa rn it yp e tr os o tn rn ae nl s, f ea rn d a nf yu "r r ne ds s e . c oto rpon ds si th , prope~ b ei li Nt Ai Se As a ty, u sn d re er q ut ih ree d to carry out itsT he Va n Ag cu ta . rd Sp er co . je 302 247 ct w (aa )s at nUn h d i e 203, 4 t ed f irS st ta 2 s a ut .e sl .l ci .t e p h tes. See He role jn e ct undertakenKareg Te . an Wne es ll, s ,O Sri u _ g s b i a y n t e ns Ho . f WN hA iS tA e ley, a N ad m e as n d( W Cescrip a a s rtio h r i in eg n o t E o . f n , a l Dl .CNA .:S A Np Ar So Ag , 7 r 6 a 1m 9s a )n d f oc re nters. 73 NACA designed its o r we nq u fi ar ced il itto ie s and administered tb huild them. t Labo Fr oa r to a ry d, i e cont r ac s scse ue s sM ioc nK i on fs ey & th e JC et Propo e o mo pf a nyt ul I sn ic o. n R 1 he We ste ' ' "N nd rn A SC Ao -Jo Pr Ld i Rna et li ao tn io nO sf hips Administration," fM ica er ,c a National ?A e and Space h, f i 1le 95s 9. . K Cl o r p oy n ain u tiN cA sS aman, lac A . . c Hi et a. d quN aA rtS ersmemos on A 's HH is~ory Office the isr te ol ra yt i Oon ffs ih ci ep fw ilh ei sc h c ow na ts a il ne y s n s u mear th erous s a. n ideal in NASA t 's firS ten 7 4 Fo .r a di .s c C ue ssn it oe nr, os fe e t hT e e . hom sta as b lP i. s hM mu er np th y o M f the e d a Sn pn a cecraft (Ma . ss . ,: ScD i. e nC c. e nd H Gea et oh p a on liGr d tics i m Cw oo .o , an d, 1 d Fe 9a 7n 1d ) d a en raCh d l a r L S le l p o e s y dC i . S n A . l Se wxa enn sd oe n, Jr., James~-Mercur ry , T(W hia s sh Ni en wg t Oo cn e, a nD : .C A.: HiU st.S o. r yG oo fv e Prn rm oJen et c tP rinting O 19ff 6i 6ce, )? 75 Le vi. ne, op. cit. 76 NASw-1. The report " O prr og da un ci ez din fg r oH me a td hq isu a crt oe nr ts r aF cu t n wct ai so ns, NASA," December, 1958. 251 77 port was known as the Ab6ot R eport. See Robert L. Roh The NACA re f NASA, 1958-1963 (Washington, D.c.: NA~ olt, An Administrative H istory o A, l966), Chapter 3. 78 bbot Report re Both of these chan ges were contrary to the A f an Office of Financial Ma commendations. It recommend ed the placement o higher level in the organiza tion. Many of NACA's leaders fe~agement at a fere with the centers?' contac t ~it~ that a general manager w ould inter top management. 79 Administration, the c The Director of the Office of Business tments made ~mptroller, and Assistant to the Administrator were appoin a cKinsey. Many o f t h e m?1 of M i i ? tary d etai? lees were as t. he r ecommendation he Procurement Office because of their experience with r signed t o t esear c h and development contractin g. 80 insey & co. was hired to produ ce a ''M anagement Study c McK rial g the Appraisal of NASA's Co ntracting Policies and Indust nov rin,,ela et. lonships. 11 NASA contract NA Sw-144. t Instruction, No. 4-1-1, Janu ary 18, 1961. Bl General Managemen 82 See Klaman, lac. cit. 83 Rosholt, op. cit., p. 175. to the President give a descri ption of a11 84 NASA's Annual Rep orts space flights. ontracting Policies, Organizat ion 85 ? f NASA, C 8 1960 11 2 An Evaluation o s b y and Co., Oc to er , , u nder and cKinsePerforma II ? ed b M member NASA ont nee, subm~tt f. ton Report prepared by a seven-c Chancellor of the University of i~p Commit ract NASw-144, The port of the Advisory Chic tee chaired by Lawrence Kimpto~, & Co "Re ? b McKinsey Att?a'h c hment B "Suggested o w ? C ag ssistance Y , 0 .~,. ,._. lt staff a 1 960 . s uuittee . . II O t ber ain on Organization! c o , f r NASA," July 15, 1960, cont Organ. . 0 the izational and Operating Pattern~ Bureau of the Budget recomme ndations. 11 t of the Ad Hoc. Committee on Spac e, 86 1 11 Report to President E ec ?t p 186. Ja nuary 12, 1961. Cited in Ro sholt, op. ci ., . 8 7 Ibid. 252 88 ebruary 14 1961 The G . d Webb was appointed on F ' ? agarin fligh t occurre K on April 14 196 1 F , ? or a discussion of the events ennedy, s d . . hn Logsdon, The Decision To Go To surrounding ~ect A ~cision, see J o dge, Mass.: theIT MPoroens: s , 1970). po lo and the N ational Interest (Cambri M 8 9 t Advisory Panel Meeting, op. cit., p. 22. Managemen 90 cKinsey reports discussed bYoung was one of the authors of the M a ove. 91 been a proJ?ect manager at MIT. He ~'as ap S. e amans came f rom RCA and had w ointed General Manager by Glennan in 1960. p 92 cit., p. 19. Management Advisory Panel Meeting, op. 93 Ibid., p. 26. 4 ject: Planning and Implem entation 9 ~ASA Circular No. 219, Su b of NASA 1962. Copy in NASA Head ProJects--Interim Changes To, May 7, quarters History Office f iles. ram 95 l Management Instruction 4 -1-5, Subject: NASA Prog Evaluat? Genera w Technique--PERT System, September 1, 1961. PERT in . ion and Revie ject management too 1 wh i. ch allows the estalb.t s . s:u? nP1 est form is a p ro m and the critical oi lishment of major mil estones for each subsyste P e completed to finish the proJ?ect ust b Gennts when the subsystem s m l subsystems ? ~ al and the eprao1? 1 Y computerized, it allows managers to t:ac e. lnts where their completi on dates must coincid 96 eeping the Members of Gene ral Management More Full "Plan for K 3. Copy in NASA Headquarte rs History Of _Y Info rmed," October 2 , 196 f1ce t?i 1 es. Ad . . " mber 29 97 emo from Webb "Office of the ministrator, Dece 196 M tory Office files. Shaple y was ' ~arters His a1 5 ? Cop y in NASA Head q dent Eisenhower of the authors of a draf t bill presented by Presi on so one April 4, 1958 to Congress to create NASA. Concepts a nd 98 "The Office of the Adm inistrator: Evolving :Pt December, 1965 . a ctices, " pr e pa red by Jac k Young a nd staff, 253 99 NMI 1130.1, "Roles and Responsibilities--The Associate Administrator for Organization and .Management," March 14, 1968. Finger was appointed in 1967. The Office was not officially created until 1968. lOO Phased Project Planning was initially proposed in 1965, but formal guidelines were not issued until 1968. Levine, loc. cit., discussed the problems surrounding the implementation of this system. NMI 7100.4, "Authorization and Control of Research and Development Programs, Projects, Other Activities, and Resources Related Thereto," August 15, 1968. 101 See Klaman, loc. cit. JPL was given responsibility for the Surveyor and Ranger unmanned space flight programs. 102 Hartman, op. cit., p. 411. l03 Ibid., pp. 411-412. Ames was the most conservative and academic of the OART Centers. Lewis, although recognized as just as independent, was more willing to change its research direction when its leaders felt it was necessary. l04 Gi" l ruth to Mue 11 er, January 9, 1969. Copy in NASA Headquarters History Office files. Gilruth was Director of the Manned Space Flight Center. 105 See Rosholt, op. cit., pp. 268-269, for a discussion of the 1962 Evaluation. The results were never made public. "Eva luation of Personnel .Management ?.? ," loc. cit. 106 See note 59. 107 P e 11 erzi. De ci. si.o n, October, 1967. See House, Support Services Contracting ?.. , loc. cit. 108 NPC 401, "Criteria for Contracting Out," in NASA Policy a nd Pro c edures for Use of Contracts for Non-Personal Services, April, 1964. Copy in NASA Headquarters History Office files. 109 L evi. ne, op. cit., p. 368, 254 llO Marcia S. Smith, "Manned Spaceflight Through 1975," in U.S. Civilian Space Programs, op. cit., p. 366. 111 "Budget Change-Over ..? ," op. cit., p. 49. 112 N"l C k S, loc. cit. 113 See note 64. 114 NASA's budget and programs were reviewed by the Senate and House Authorization C0111l11ittees (The House Committee on Science and Technology, formerly House Committee on Science and Astronautics, and the Senate Committee on Connnerce, Science, and Transportation's Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, formerly the Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences C01lllilittee, abolished 1976). Its appropriations requests were reviewed by the appropriate House and Senate Appropriations subcommittees. Ibid., p. 113. 115 Le vi. ne, op. cit., p. 389. 116 Toward the Endless Frontier .?. , op. cit., p. 115. 117 Ibid., p. 120. See also U.S. Congress, House, Science and Astronautics Committee, Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, Investigation of Project Ranger, 88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964, pp. 215-226. Cited in R. Cargill Hall, Lunar Impact: A History of Project Ranger (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1977), p. 253. 118 "B u d get Ch ange-Ov er ..? , " op. c?i t., p. 35 . Webb was meeting with the center Directors. NASA's strongest supporter for many years was President Johnson. 119 Toward the Endless Frontier ??. , op. cit., p. 191. 120 This will be discussed further below, but apparently Webb's Bureau of the Budget experiences both made him aware of the difficulties facing Johnson during this period and prevented him from challenging directives from BOB or the President. 1 21 Toward the Endless Frontier ... , p. 199. 255 122 Ibid., p. 121. 123 Memorandum from James Webb to Dr. Seamans. Not dated, but prior to budget fiscal year 1966. Copy in NASA Headquarters History Office files. 124 "Budget Change-Over .?? ," p. 40. 125 In 1966 NASA launched 100 space craft. Of these, only 13 were failures. Its Gemini program was enormously successful and NASA was outperforming the Russians for the first time. The Surveyor space craft had landed on the moon. The two lunar Orbiter missions had sent back pictures which enabled the selection of sites for the Apollo landing. 1965 and 1966 were two of NASA's most successful years with respect to its space programs, and are recognized as the years when NASA achieved its objective of beating the Russians. 126 Management Advisory Panel Meeting, op. cit., pp. 39-40. 127 Ibid., p. 24. Section II NASA'S DECLINE The preceding chapters have largely been devoted to a descriptive examination of NACA and NASA. This section discusses the findings from the case study, my interpretation of NASA's decline, and the relationship between my argument and existing theories of organizations. Chapter 5 will attempt to provide an alternative explanation of NASA's decline to those discussed in Chapter 1. The focus is on the executive function and NASA's leaders' failure with regard to this function. Chapter 6 discusses other explanations of NASA's decline. Chapter 7 examines the relationship between my argument and existing theories of organizations. Chapter 8 concludes the study with an examination of the policy implications of the study. 256 Chapter 5 NASA AND THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION I suggested in Chapter 1 that an adequate explanation of NASA's failure would require not only an examination of its internal management, but also those relationships which the organization established with external actors. The case study thus included a discussion of NASA's internal management and its external management. This, as I shall try to show in this chapter, has proven to be very fruitful in that even a cursory review of the case study shows that NASA's situation in the late 1960s was not totally a function of its leaders' failure to manage the organization properly . Before trying to justify this assertion with concrete examples, it might be worthwhile to briefly describe the general feaures of the argument which guides the analysis presented in this chapter. First, I might note that such difficulties as NASA's low morale, difficulties with retaining and attracting highly qualified scientists and engineers, and the aging of its staff, are by the late 1960s probably best attribut ed to the personnel ceiling, appropriations cuts, and the restrictions placed on its discretion to handle these problems by oversight agencies. They are, in short, only symptoms exhibited by an organization in decline, not the cause of the decline. Second, the decline itself is probably best explained in terms of NASA's failure to generate those ideas for new technical projects which would provide Congress with some incentive to at least maintain its 1965 appropriations in the following years. Without these new research 257 r 258 ideas, NASA's continued high level of funding could not be justified when competition for funds became high in the mid-1960s. It is this failure which has to be explained, not the impact of the cuts in resources which occurred as a result of this failure. Third, and central to the argument, is the assertion that it was the lack of acceptable authority structure and organizational goal beyond the manned space flight program which was crucial in NASA ' s decline. Those individuals who in most research organizations were responsible for producing ideas for new research directions were never willing to accept NASA's leaders' authority to make decisions about their technical projects. NASA's leaders after they lost the support of its scientists a nd engineers were left without a mechanism for providing the organization with ideas about new technologies. They had, either because of their own unwillingness to accept the ideas of scientists and engineers or because the researchers themselves had given up trying to convince them, no group which could provide the stimulus for a change in research and development activities. Fourth, this failure is in turn explained by NASA's leaders' failure to properly perform their executive function of establishing some equil ibrium between the demands being made by the scientists and engineers within the organization and demands being made by external actors for accountability for public funds and the establishment of authrity structur es based upon position. It was this failure which started the chain of events leading to NASA's situation in the late 1960s and which requires further explanation . 259 suffice at this point to outline the gen eral form of the It will argument. orld War II began Congress and the Executive Branch followi ng W to mak for e i ? ncreasingly heavy demands on federal or ganizations countability of public funds and the es tablishment of bureaucratic ac structures y felt was the most efficient method of ensuring , which the this accountability. The change in the mana gement of all federal orga ? ade establishing or nizations which followed these demands m maintain? ficult , if ing any t ype of structure based on expe rtise very dif not ? t ? 1 y became impossi?ble. Organizations within t h e f e d era 1 governmen simp rnore al organizations and more bureaucratic after World War II. Most feder h ? h ill be tvere able to cope with these demands, but NAS A f or reasons w ic w ct? lscussed below was not successful in th e transition from an authority structure based on expertise to one based on position, and it was this ed the vicious circle which led to its d ecline. failur e which start apter discusses each of these claims. W hen appropriate, The ch ni. za t i.o d NA.CA s to show how another orga n cope w .i t h I experiences are used Sirnil ?th an examination of th e federal ar Problems. It starts wi changed the environment in which management policy changes which radical ly NAcA and NA SA existed. 260 THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION Before beginning the explanation of NASA's decline some note should be made of the term 'executive function.' It will be used in this study to refer to the responsibility of executives to maintain an equilibrium between demands being made upon them by external actors and those being made b y their subordinates in a manner which will ensure the organization's survival. In general this involves providing their clientele with some type of product which will satisfy the clients and ensure that its suppliers, whether they be a political body such as Congress or the clients themselves, as in the case of most private organizations, will provide adequate funds to meet the needs of the organization. To accomplish this, executives must either through n e gative o r po s itive inducements convince their employee s to produce at the level necessary to ensure that they receive adequate funds. Consequently , there is a very direct link between an organization's external environment and its internal management which cannot be ignored. Public organizations present a special case because the link is more f ormal in that other organizations can require it to meet certain demands which have little to do with the actual objective of the organization. Per s onnel regulations are only one of the many examples of these t y pes th o f demands. An executive in a public organization is not only faced wi finding some equilibrium between the demands from external and internal actors, but also establishing this equilibrium with a set of rules and regulations which might make doing so even more difficult. 261 As I suggested above, this is the function NASA's leaders failed to f ulfill, a nd it is this failure which led to NASA's decline . To understand this, it is first necessary to review the changes in the management of fe d eral organizations which occurred after World War II a nd what they mea nt to organizations such as NASA. - --- 262 THE MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL ORGANIZATIONS The management of all federal organizations changed dramatically between the creation of NACA and the late l960s . l Prior to World War II, federal organizations were managed primarily through the appropriations process in Congress. The various agencies had to submit budget requests and expenditure information to Congress, as well as some evidence they were performing as Congress desired, but they had a great deal of discretion regarding the internal allocation of funds once appropriated, the specific projects which were accomplished, and the organization's i. nterna 1 management. 2 After World War II increasingly heavy demands from Congress a nd the Executive Branch for accountability led to a number of changes in this situation. The President, by requiring that all federal agencies submit expenditure plans to the Bureau of the Budget, began centralizing his control over the federal bureaucracy in 1939. By the 1950s the Bureau of the Budget was evaluating many of the internal acti? vi? ties of federal agencies and reporting these evaluations to the President and Congress. Perhaps more important, it was given the authority to set ceilings. Its use of this authority as a budgeting mechanism played an important role in its control over the federal establishment. This change was accompanied by an increase in the power o tf h e General Accounting Office, which was responsible for auditing all fi?n anci? a 1 transacti?o ns an d a d m?i n?i strati?v e prac t i? ces o f f e deral agencies? It reported to Congress on the legality, efficienc ey c, o and nomy of each agency' s f inancial administrative practices. 263 The Civil Service Commission was responsible for the selection, c lassification, promotion, and dismissal of federal employees, but until the 1 940s had largely delegated this responsibility to the agencie s. The Civil Service Classification Act of 1949 coupled with the Bureau of the Budget personnel ceilings had an enormous impact on all government a gencies. Their discretion and flexibility with respect to personnel management was severely limited, and the salary and position limitations made it difficult for the federal government to attract and retain highly skillled individuals. Until the 1950s these oversight activities were largely related to the a g encie s ' administrative activities, but in the late 1950s Congress began to require f ederal agencies not only to obtain annual approval of their budget reque sts, but also annual authorizations for all of their activities. 3 Congress and the Executive Branch began playing an active role in all federal agencies' administrative and technical management. This role extended to decisions about such details as which launch vehicle would be sele cted for a specific space shot. By the 1 960s the rela tionship had c han ged from one in which outsiders evaluated only the o utput to one in which they selected the methods of obtaining tha t output a nd the internal management structures which would be used to a ccomplish t he organization's work activitie s. These changes might not have had the impact they did if they ha d no t been guided by a belief that a single administrator appointed b y the Pr es ident and responsible for a centralized hierarchical bureaucracy wa s t he bes t me t ho d o f ensuring accountability for public fund s . All fe de r a l agenc ies were thus r equir e d to adopt structure s r e sembling a centra l ized 264 hierar h. cy with a single admin istrator, with standardized c ical bureaucra dures and numerous Personnel ncial pr oce , administrative, and fina It was these requirem ents which impersonal rules and regulations. al bureaucracy. changed h e fed er t e underlying charact er of th R&D o . l Case ~ rganizations -A S pecia bviously in the management of f ederal organizations o The changes ederal agencies, but th e impact had an i.m pact on the operatio ns of all f eral research organizat ions. Was respect to fedquite noticeable with d the small research Privat e i. ndustry could provi de higher salaries, an rovide a . eloped after and during World War II could p org nizations which dev ? n d engineers. By an en ? ent which was more acce ptable to scientists a vironm h ? t. g trou bl ea tt racing an d th avine 195Os the federal government was ? rs f or i?ts e government reta;n? ? ine ~ i ng highly qualified scientists and eng ible for research 0 d . 4 The organizations respons Perate laboratories ontracts f h letting c or many o f t e activities resp nded to this problem byO ouse in-house. After World War II the small in-h Previously performed primarily arch organizations who se specific output had government rese slowly replaced by lar ge . d engineers were been determi?ned by scientists an bjectives and ons whose primary job was to set technical o organizati s which were desired to meet manage the research an d development project these objectives. ies were taken over by search activit The in-house governmen t re versities, . . d . ? stered a nd operated by uni small h organizations a mini researc ? most cases their ent ire source of but ho was in owned by the governmen t w h government organizat ions to su PPort. This arrangeme nt allowed t e 265 obtain the ideas of scientists and engineers without subjecting them to either the salary limitations of government agencies or the government's increasingly bureaucratic environment which so many of these individuals found unacceptable. Private industry remained responsible for producing the product desired by government, but the relationship changed from one in which it sold finished commercial products to the government to one in which the government initiated a request for a particular product, paid the development costs, and provided the facilities and equipment to manufacture the product. The changes in the relationships among the various participants i n the federal research and development process not only solved many of the proble ms presented by the changes in the management of the federal bureaucracy , they also were supported by Congress and the Executive Bra nch, who even prior to World War II had not been particularly supportive of in-house research of any kind and particularly the basic research required to produce ideas for research and deve lopment advances. NASA's Development NASA, when it was created in 1958, was also required to accomplish its R&D activities within the constraints of the federal management requirements, but its leaders, in contrast to other research and development organizations, did not establish permanent ties with small research orga niza tions nor did they establish relationships with ex t e rnal scientifi c or e n g ineering groups which allowed them to us e these gr oup s 5 as a so urc e of ideas for future projects. NASA's l eader s wer e l eft - 266 with only two sources for ideas for new research directions-- their own staff and private industry. NASA's leaders argued that the organization was set up in a manner which allowed them to use their own staff to produce new ideas. NASA was divided into three major groups--an advanced research gro up (OART), an unmanned space science and applications group (OSSA), and the manned space flight group (OMSF). In theory, OART was the group which would engage in the basic and advanced engineering research which would provide the basis for future research directions. The Centers under the direction of this office would be kept separate from those Centers engaged in development work. The rationale underlying this separation was the belief on the part of individuals engaged in basic and applied research that exposure to development work would inhibit the performance of basic or applied research. OSSA, in contrast to this, was supposed to be responsible for the unmanned space flight program. It was supposed to establish contractual relationships with scientific groups to produce those scientific experiments which were the major objective of the unmanned space flight program. OMSF's objective was quite simply to produce and launch the manned space flight projects. It had no underlying scientific objective beyond the production of these projects and was supposed to rely on OART for any applied or basic research which its staff required. The OMSF staff according to this plan would have the advantage of having an i n-house rese a rch group, and an organization which t h e C()l1ly d return to for retrai~Lng wh e n they had completed a major R&D project. 267 This division of responsibilities within the organization was supposed to provide all the ingredients necessary for producing (OART) and testing (OSSA) new ideas and using (OMSF and OSSA) the technologies developed by NASA's own staff. The only outside groups which were needed were private contractors to manufacture the various products required for the launches and the scientific groups to produce the experiments. The problem, as was shown in the case study, was that it didn't work quite as NASA's leaders argued it did. OMSF did not use the OART cen ters for pure and applied research, but instead let contracts for any research they needed. OSSA lost the support of scientific groups when the scientists discovered that their experiments were placed second to the completion of a major space launch and thus could be cancelled at any time. But more important for our purposes was the fact that NASA's leaders, when justifying the division of labor within the organization, ignored the reason behind the shift from reliance on in-house research g roups to reliance on external groups for research in the first place. They assumed that their scientists and engineers would continue working and producing within the new bureaucratic structure imposed by external actors a nd ignored the fact that these changes had an enormous impact on NASA's ability to produce new research ideas. To understand what happened to NASA it is thus necessary to return to its early years and review the impact of the changes on the organization. 268 NASA AND IN-HOUSE RESEARCH GROUPS NASA was not a new organization, but a conglomerate of organizations similar to NACA which had been in existence since World War II. Most of these organizations had a number of similarities which set them apart from other research and development organizations; they were primarily small in-house research organizations which were very independent, well respected and administered by individuals who had a great deal of expertise in their respective fields. Technical competence was the basis for promotion, and those individuals responsible for making decisions about technical proposals and performance were individuals who had previously attained some measure of success in their technical fields. The researchers were given a great deal of discretion and were evaluated by their own colleagues after the completion of a project. Although there was a defined superior /subordinate relationship within the organizations, this relationship was based on expertise rather than position. The leadership of the different organizations could therefore use their own expertise to legitimize their authority and obtain acceptance for their decisions about the allocation of resources for proposed projects. NACA's committee structure was a perfect example of the t ype of authorit y which was being exercised over the scientists and engineers within these organizations. The committees of experts were important not because they provided the agency with a shield from ext e rnal interference--a function they did fill--but because they provided Lewis a nd l a t e r Dry den with a group of individuals whose reputations in their di f f e r e nt fie lds ma de decisions by NACA's leaders more a cce pt a ble to 269 both NACA's staff and Congress. The committees, composed as they were of experts in numerous fields, legitimized any decision by their very existence. The authority relationship between the Committees and the agency was duplicated within the agency. Research achievement was the basis for advancement in the organization and the reason that subordinates accepted the authority of individuals in higher positions. This type of authority relationship (i.e., one based on expertise not position) existed within all the major groups which were brought together to form NASA, and it was the change in this relationship which created such enormous problems for NASA's leaders. NASA did not have a committee to mediate between external actors and its researchers and it, as other federal organizations, had to accept the civil service regulations which made establishing any type of authority structure based on expertise difficult. To base promotions on tenure without allowing some mechanism for the advancement of individuals whose research accomplishments merited promotion to a leadership position, made maintaining any type of authority structure except one based on position difficult. The impact of this change was not observable in the first few years for the simple reason that NASA's leaders had a reservoir of ideas from which they could propose projects. Their resources were more than adequate to meet the needs of the various coalitions within the organization, and choices about which projects should be funded did not have to be made. The leaders of the various Centers held their positions 270 use of the1.? r rtise, and these individ uals' authority was beca expe accepted mate by the researchers . as legiti Webb--an administrator, not a ientist It was the appointment of sc ganization. or en . r g1.neer--which had the g reatest impact on the o l research only Soc? d into accepting author ity over their technica 1.alize ackgrounds, the from ? d .. and engineering b in 1.v1.duals with scient ific ? d ? ?d 1 w1? .t h no tee h nical researchers 1. ua were f orced to accept an 1.n 1.v e affected the organizat ion background. His appointment might n ot hav nt ideology th it did, if he had not b elieved in the manageme in e manner n the s in federal management i Which had been the basi s for the change without first Webb's appointment of many other individuals Place. and his placement of tech ? hip positio ns n1.ca1 backgrounds to le aders al expertise for promoti on purposes only management skills over technic rchers about the ability of a confirmed the suspicion s of NASA's resea ge a tee h ? a n1.ca 1 organ1.? za t 1? .on. Success non - t h nical administrator to man ec in research, but on the evements at NASA was based not o n personal achi nt project. Without the ch and developme ability to manage a maj or resear a uarantee promotions past latt er, major research achievements did not g h t of contracting, the al location of so muc certain level. , Webbs suppor program which to the manned space fligh t of th organization's resource s e ?neers reJ?ected, his dem ands for so ma ny of the scientists c:i.n d cngJ. occurred, and his use of add? arch failures 1.tional controls when r ese a non-scientist's onsultants only served a s further evidence of outside c and ce of basic or applied r esearch inabil? y to understand the imp ortan 1.t sals. to make decisions about their research propo 271 NASA's researchers had few choices when faced with the new authority structure. They could either leave; avoid the problems created by the authority structure by remaining within the confines of their own Center~ many of which retained authority structures based on expertise; give up trying to convince NASA's leadership of new ideas; or simply join other groups and become involved in development work. The departure of many highly qualified scientists and engineers; the unwillingness of many of the researchers to transfer among the Centers; the growing involvement of the OART research Centers in R&D projects; the acceptance of contracting; and the acceptance of OMSF's control over decisions about future projects all provide evidence that NASA was losing the support of individuals who in most research organizations provide the stimulus for new research direction. The Role of New Ideas in NASA's Decline The unwillingness of scientists and engineers within NASA to accept the new authority coupled with its failure to establish any t ype of satisfactory relationship with external groups which could replace these individuals as a source of ideas played a very important role in NASA's decline. This is best understood by comparing NACA's reaction to a threatening environment in the 1940s and 1950s and NASA's in the mid-1960s when faced with a similar situation. During the period following World War II, NACA was faced with demands from external actors for some justification of its continued existence in light of its failure to keep abreast of the German advancements in jet and rocket propulsion and the success of the large research and development organizations during the war. It responded to 272 this threatening environment by establishing numerous committees in an a ttempt to gain a place for itself in the post-World War II aeronautical r e search environment. Its efforts were not successful until it proposed the research aircraft program. The success of this program allowed NACA to regain the support of Congress and the military services and to e stablish a role for itself in the supersonic research and development a ctivities. The history of this program provides us with some evidence of the importance of new ideas in the development of a research organization. John Stack, a Langley employee, initially proposed the research aircraft p rogram in 1941, but was turned down by Lewis, the Director of NACA at that time. NACA's leaders did not accept the proposal until demands for some type of supersonic program from external actors (Congress and the military services) coincided with continued demands from John Stack's group . The actual inclusion of NACA in the research aircraft program only occurred after NACA's leadership had changed and the organization was being threatened by its environment. What is important for our purposes is that it was the research aircraft group headed by John Stack whose ideas provided the stimulus for the changes necessary to satisfy the demands from external actors. In the process a whole new group of leaders took over NACA and main t ained it until Sputnik again changed the direction of aeronautical research. The same t ype of process occurred after Sputnik. Those individuals within NACA who had worked with the military services and industry on the large research and development projects fo u ght for NACA's inclusion in the new space program despite Dryden's initial rejection of the change to more development work. It was also these individuals 273 whose research and planning provided some justification for NACA's inclusion and led to the launching of Mercury, the nation's first manned space flight. In both cases NACA's leaders were able to respond with the ideas underly ing the research aircraft program and the manned space flight program, because of the work of their researchers and the researchers' unwillingness to accept the leaders' initial rejection of their ideas. It was the researchers whose ideas laid the groundwork necessary for the organization to make the changes required by events in its environment. NASA in the mid-1960s faced demands from Congress for new research ideas and threats from both Congress and the Executive Branch to cut its appropriations and personnel levels. Its leaders' resolution of these problems did not follow the same process which NACA's followed. They were unable to come up with the research proposals necessary to maintain or increase NASA's appropriations level. At a crucial period in its development NASA was unable to generate those ideas necessar y to re gain the support of external actors. What it did not have was an in-hous e g roup which was lobby ing for a radical change in the rese arch dire ction o f the organization. The formal planning mechanism set up by Webb was indicative of the problems facing the organization. In contrast to NACA' s l e aders, who c ould respond to the demands from outsiders with concre t e proposals, NASA's leaders had to establish committees to search for these ideas, and these committees suffered from the same problems which ha d l e d to their esta blishment in the first place. They were unable to gen e r a t e p r o po sal s fo r n ew re search directions either be cause the s cientist s a nd en g ineers we r e unwilling to offer them or because NASA' s lead e r s were 274 unwilling to listen to the ideas of its researchers. NASA's leaders were, in short, left without an in-house mechanism for generating new ideas. Webb's Role in NASA's Decline It is difficult not to conclude when reviewing NASA's historical development that the groups responsible for NASA's decline were Congress and other oversight agencies . It was Congress which was responsible for NASA's continual focus on the manned space flight program and its failure to maintain an adequate basic and applied research program. It was also Congress which cancelled so many of the scientific applications programs, the loss of which caused NASA to lose so many of its supporters in the scientific connnunity. It was oversight agencies which directed NASA to accept those regulations which led to the adoption of an authority structure based on position. It was also Congress and the Executive Branch which failed to understand the importance of basic research in the accomplishment of research and development projects. This conclusion though ignores Webb's role in the decline and the adoption of an authority structure based on position. Webb could have followed the example set by other research and development organizations and established private research organizations to supply him with ideas for new research projects. He could have been more supportive of in-house basic and applied research or even given tecnnical competence more importance when evaluating his technical staff and making belections for leadership positions. 275 NACA's responses to similar requirements in the 1950s demonstrate that an organization's leadership can avoid some of the impact of federal management requirements. Faced with the new personnel regulations, NACA's leaders made cosmetic changes, such as the creation of personnel offices with little actual power, which had no effect on the actual management of the organization. Perhaps more important, they diluted the impact of the regulations which would have destroyed their authority structure by continuing to base promotions on technical competence. This policy, while not preventing the establishment of an authority structure based on promotion, at least mitigated the impact on the relationships within the organization by underlying the required position structure with one based on expertise. NACA's leaders also continued to support basic and applied research in the face of Congressional unwillingness to support this type of research. Their support provided NACA's researchers with solid evidence that whatever the change in federal management policies and Congressional research policies, their research proposals were still being seriously considered. NACA's leaders were thus able to maintain a research environment which met most of the minimum requirements of its research staff. Although it was obvious during the 1950s that their inability to compete with the salaries offered by private industry was making it increasingly difficult for them to retain highly qualified scientists and engineers and undoubtedly forced them to propose NACA's inclusion in the new space organization, it is not clear thzt their inclusion required the massive changes which followed in the ten years after NASA's creation. 276 NASA's leaders, in contrast to this, did not appear to have a commitment to providing either an environment which would meet the demands of their scientists or engineers, or a commitment to the accomplishment of basic or applied research. The latter is best evidenced by the pressures they applied on Centers which continued to engage in basic or applied research, to let contracts for this work, by refusing to provide funds and setting personnel ceilings for the Centers. It was also evident in the continual acceptance of BOB and Congress's cancellation of the scientific research program and the rejection by NASA's leadership of many proposals for in-house research activities. The result was that most OART Centers had shifted to almost complete c ontracting for their research efforts by 1965. The lack of commitment to providing a satisfactory research environment was evident in the appointment of individuals without technical competence to positions over individuals with technical expertise. It was also evident in Webb's interpretation of normal researc h failures as performance failures and his continual demands for the implementation of control devices which went beyond what was acceptable to the performers of NASA's research tasks. The unwill i n gness on his part to recognize the importance of individual technical c ompetence and evalua tion by peers to those individual s involved in research al so indicated that Webb strongly supported a n a uthority structure based on position. Webb a ccepted the Civil Service Commission's regulations, and c reated his own personnel management commi tte e for r eviewing Ce nter-wide personnel management policies, which r eported directly to him. Webb not only accepted the r 277 management philosophy behind many of the oversight agencies' requirements, he apparently agreed with it. 278 THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION FAILURE I suggested in the opening chapter that if any organization was to survive, its leaders had to fulfill their executive function of establishing some equilibrium between external and internal demands in a manner which allowed it to obtain those contributions necessary to meet the demands of its clientele and obtain the necessary resources to in turn ensure that the members of the organization produced adequate contributions. I also said that NASA's leaders failed in their executive function because they were not able to meet the demands of one of the more important groups in the organization. They failed to do this in two ways. First, the bureaucratic rules and regulations imposed by NASA's leaders were not acceptable to those engaged in research. Second, the scientists and engineers never accepted the authority of non-technical superiors to make decisions about their technical proposals. They either left the organization or simply stopped contributing their ideas because they felt they would not be seriously considered. The real issue then becomes why NASA's leaders did not make those changes necessary to obtain the new ideas. This failure appeared to stem from their acceptance of the management philosophy underlying the changes in federal management policies. They not only believed in the bureaucratic control mechanisms which external actors demanded they accept; they also adopted their own mechanisms. But it also followed from NASA's leaders' failure to understand the nature of research and development activities and the importance of basic and applied research 279 in Ath lt hough it is alme o sp t ro imce ps os s. s ible to separate the two failur se is n ce t, h e failure to establish the necessary research t e ac o un ers e tn av nJ? d.r io nn gm e on ft to hc ec u nr ae td u rb ee cause of h 1 k f d t e e ie int e m of a nr ae gs ee ma er nc t h p ha is l om souc ph h ya ,s it did h b 1? f ? h it i. s also not entirely clear that Webb or any of the external actors emanding t w hh eo aw de or pe t id o n of a bureaucratic structure ever that there was r e aa l riz ee lad t ionship between an organization's na management and i n tt he er ty1 p e of work it performed. This lack of an is best illustrated in u n ad e statemrs et na tn d o i'n tg h e President of f Brookings in 1937 . ... whatever might be the efficiency with which N.A.C . A. has been conducted as an independent agency, its independent status could hardly be justified in terms of effective permanent organization. The problem was studied solelg in terms - of general principles of organization. It appears that most of those individuals advocating the changes in federal management procedures believed tha t t h ere was one i d eal management structure whate??er the nature of the task, and it was this belief that made it possible for them to demand that all federal agencies accept the new federal regulations despite the impact of the regulations on the performance of the organizations. ?11?ng to argue that NASA's leaders' 1 Consequently, while I am wi failure to . f t rY research environment ocurred because establish t h ae y s ad t' i s ac o d h nature of the research and development it id d not fully understan t e ding the nature of the research and ' oes not follow sth tat und d ee rve al n voided the establishment of a opment proces b su r wea ou u ld have a The best approach to this problem might be to c rat ic structure. 280 s? wow i im chpl y say tha t it was the combination le do f toth e N At SA's h" to d decline ' but b se of wor ie n g h ow ? thih s occurred ' Nr ASA' s leaders' failure ully the resea pr rc oh c ea sn sd nd ee ev de sl u tn op o m e br es tand f ent d1" this re .s qc uus irs eed s aa nn d e xamination of what is involved in the research and development process. -Res earc_h _an.; ...d..=_ .:::D~e:..':'.v~e:.::l~o:'...lp~m~e~n~t Producing a product such as NASA was expected to produce involves four steps: Scientific (basic research) 1 re. search directeth de toad wv aa rn dc ement of knowledge. It involves the testing and verification of theories. Applied (engineering) researc 2 h. directed toward thp er actical use of the new theories and involvi t ne gc hnology beyond the state of the art, but not s tho elu tion of problems associated with a specific p roject. Theories, devices, or techniques are created or tested. Advanced engineering or development resea 3 r. c h directed toward the solution of problems associat s ep d e wci if ti hc projects- It involves new e x ai ps pti ln icg a to ior nt se s ot fe d theories, devices, or techniques; and Development (product engineering) resea 4 r. ch directed toward the modification of exis c tio nm gp o pn re on dt us c tc sr e oa rt ed by the engineer in the previous type of research.7 ast two steps differ fro T mh e t h1 e previous steps in that they involve most cases the p in r oduction of a product and thus entail management ems as much as technical problems- Pro Ab ll l four steps are required in research and developm t eh ne t process, but a project such as Apollo may y involve the fourth n stl e p,. bec0 ause when the decision is made to make product the . three steps have t ah le r eady been , a ccompr pe liv si ho eu ds ? 281 This was the case with the Apollo program in 1961 when the decision to go to the moon was made. The technology existed to produce Apollo, but the actual production work still remained to be done. It presented, as Webb suggested, more of a management problem than a scientific problem, in 1961. But the Apollo project was only possible because the other three steps had already been taken. It was Webb's lack of consideration of these other three steps which brought him so many problems when trying to select future objectives, because the objective of the organization became to develop manned space vehicles rather than NASA's mandated objective--to advance aeronautical and space science and applications. Webb quite simply made one of the methods (i.e., manned space flight) of obtaining his actual objective, the objective of the organization. He was thus left without any underlying objective or goal. This is best understood by returning to NACA's experiences. NACA's leaders' commitment to maintain their rather unique research environment was based not only on their belief that this environment was necessary for the performance of research, but also on a very clear understanding of the purpose of the organization. The purpose of the organization was to advance aviation, and the best method of obtaining this objective was basic and applied research. Faced with demands in its early years for applied research both from the military services and private industry and recognizing Congressional support for basic research was virtually non-existent, its leaders gave up their commitment to basic research and allowed NACA's researchers to focus on applied r esearch, an activity which accomplished their objective of advancing aviation. 282 The decision to engage in advanced engineering in the 1940s was also made reluctantly, but NACA's leaders were able to argue that it was necessitated by the need to advance aviation and the failure of wind tunnel technology to keep up with the development of the airplane. In the 1950s, when faced with the decision of whether to join the new space program or not, the realization that it was the only way to maintain aeronautical research, given the changes in federal regulations, allowed them to make the necessary change. These major decisions at important turning points in the organization's history were accepted by the researchers because the researchers accepted the goal of the organization and the authority of its leaders to make decisions about what changes were necessary to achieve this objective. The leadership could use the objective to evaluate the changes they were being asked to make both in research activities and internal management. For example, advanced engineering was necessary to advance aviation, but many of the new federal regulations of the 1940s and 1950s were not acceptable and were to be avoided because they would have made performing applied research difficult. NASA's leaders, in contrast to thi. s, never appeare d to commit themselves to any type of unifying purpose which could guide the organization's decision making and make these decisions acceptable to the various coalitions. Without this underlying purpose, they had no accepted criteria which could be used to evaluate either technical proposals or the types of internal management mec h . anis wm hs i ch would be used. They did not have a committee of experts who the researcher s 283 felt were qualified to judge their research proposals, nor did they have a history of funding projects devoted strictly to the advancement of space science and development. NACA's leaders when pressured by the Executive Branch or Congress could argue that some of the nation's top scientists and engineers supported the projects and their contribution to the advancement of aviation. NASA's leaders had no criteria accepted by all its internal coalitions or by external actors to make these types of decisions. What they used from the beginning to evaluate various research proposals was their acceptance by Congress or the Executive Branch. Rather than making decisions in terms of the o rganization's underlying objective, they simp I ly reacted to Congress s decisions. It was Congress, not NASA's leaders, who ended up mediating the conflicts among the various coalitions. The Impact of the Failure of the Executive Function The lack of underlying purpose coupled with the belief that a bureaucratic structure was the best organizational structure had an enormous impact on the organization's ability to cope with the increase in competition for funds in the 1960s and the cuts in its appropriations and personnel. NASA's leaders, by accepting the manned space flight program as the objective of the organization, had no response to the argument that they had succeeded in attaining their objective by the Em xid ce-1 p9 6 t 0s. for the Apollo program there was no reason for continuing their high level of funding or even in reality for continuing their exiS t ence. NASA's leaders were unable or unwilling to present a convincing argument 284 that the advancement of aeronautical and space research necessitated at least maintaining their appropriations and personnel level. Once the cuts began they had no what might be called a maintenance objective. NASA's leaders could have accepted the cuts, but made the argument that redistribution of the funds among the various programs was necessary to ensure that the basic and applied research necessary for the nation's leadership in space in the future was accomplished. This would have enabled them to at least maintain the organization and a group of highly qualified scientists and engineers to generate ideas for future projects when funds were more available. Instead they chose to remain committed to the manned space flight program. The result was that they lost the support of external scientific groups, as well as many of the internal scientists a nd engineers and the opportunity to change their research direction in the future. They also had no criteria by which they could judge technical proposals and their relationship to the agency's future or one which was accepted by the various coalitions within NASA. Thus, when technical proposals were submitted to them, they could not argue, at leaS t not convincingly, that the decisions were based on any type of criteria. Wernher von Braun's complaint in the late 1960s that all of NASA's problems would be solved if the agency had some type of objective is more understandable in this light. To accept NASA's leaders' decisions as legitimate required that they have this objective. The result was that they simply allowed external actors to ma k et h de cis e is oe n s and furth e r a lie nated those individuals engaged in basic and applie d 285 NASA's leaders w ould search. d that re The latter group just assume of to judge the impo rtance not listen r be able to their proposa ls o them. hy and the lack o f underlying anagement philosopBoth Webb's m emen t pro bl ems t h ey were 0 bJ? ect ? ed a rol e i?n th lay e m anag ive p riteria NASA's leaders ha d no c expe ? cuts. riencing before and after the h type o f . e intern a l management ut t by Which to J? ud ge decisions abo the management de vices d set up. The fa ct that l mechanisms they shou no o certain groups had Which h id adopt were not satisfactory t t ey d was no recognitio n act sion to adopt the m because there imp on the deci were the first place. After 1965 they th eeded in at the group was n ions, he civil service regulat left . ndin g to t without any way of respo e creating so man y morale get cuts which we r Personnel ceiling s and bud forced him to ac cept bb's management p hilosophy almost Problems. We requi? ? the first rs as legitimate rements in de toci? sions of extern al ac he importance of scientists and ailure to underst and t Place. His f upled with his search and develo pment process co engineers in the re ividuals attached to nd the importance these ind inability to und ersta argue convincing ly about ade it difficult to evaluations by c olleagues m these individual s. b g exercised o ver i ?n the growing number o f contra1 s e to stop the ted NASA's leade rs had no way . Once the decline star , d not produce the ource for new ide as, they coul decline. Withou t a s ities to respond activ . tion's research ne cessary changes in the organiza nt. to the new enviro nme NOTES es l ersight organizations in this study reli discussion of ov ashington on J The ngressional Control o f Administration (W . _Harris, Co Presidential Spendin i D.c oseph P isher, Br~okings Institutio n, 1964); Louis F Po ?? on University Press, 1975); Richard E ceton, N.J.: Prince t rin rship (New York: ? ~ (Pst sidential Power: The Poli tics of Leade t, Pre he GAO: Untapp ed T~u ad rican Library, 1964); Richard E. Brown, T nnessee So e New Ame Power (Knoxville: T he University of Te nal ~e of Congressio C. Mosher, The GAO: The Quest for ss, Aress, 1970); Frede rick iew Pre erican Government (Bo ulder, Colo.: Westv ~tability in A m Office of Management and Budget and the d Larry Berman, The an versity Press, p ~? 21-1979 (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton Uni ~ency, 19 2 enditur e data in broad NACA submitted budge t requests and exp cal orts to Congress incl uded all the techni nual rep ir categories. Their a n year. Once they rece ived the reports written in t he previous ut anization made the de cision abo appropriations, the leaders of the org. the all ithin the organizati .o n. ocation w eral agencies 3 restingly one of the first fed NASA was rather inte ization. See chapter 4 for a discussion r equ. l author Bill. ired to obtain annua priations of th n Rider to NASA's first Appro e 1959 Johnso overnment: A 4 H D ree Scien ce in (t he Fe l G s A , . dde ra M unter up arnbri ge, ass.: The B. ee . 40 C of Policies and Ac tivities to 19 ~ 195?); and Don K. Price, ~ s elknap Press of Harv ard University Pres . University Press, 196 5) The Scientific Estat e (London: Oxford gh small k i?s primarily accom plished throu 5 r DOD resear ch wor esearch rgan.i o zati .o ns. to Vannevar Bush, Jun e 3, 1940. 6 Harold G. Moulton btained from Merton were o . difications s Acquisition Proces s 7 pon Peck These steps w ith some rnoThe Wea . . H J, . k M Scherer, - dm . inistration, arvard d ? f Busine ss A (B0 a n d Fre eric 1 0 st0n Mass.: Graduate Schoo Univers~ty, 1962), p. 28. 286 Chapter 6 OTHER EXPLANATIONS OF NASA'S DECLINE hapter, there have been a I noted in the in troductory c As ' Some theorists hav e ine. number of 1 decl exp anations given for NASAs power of the manne d st 's decline occurred because the A sugge ed that NA S t of agency-wide g oals. 1 en ight group preclud ed the establishm space fl t? apparatus Oth ve ue d tha t t h ex t ensi?v e b ureaucra 1 c e er analysts ha arg difficult for the nd made it st lished by Webb sti fled innovation a e ab . 2 d engineers. NASA's leaders, in organ? . ization to retain scientists an leading up to the events rast to this, virt ually ignored the cont coping with external actors pre vented them from t decline and argued tha e purpose of dget cuts in any e ff ecti?v e manner. Th the p ersonnel and bu t of ese explanations in the ligh th? ls chapter is to e xamine each of th the analysts, as ed in the previous chapter. Since the argument present ow onclusions on thei r perceptions of h 1 did, based their c ptions underlying m perate, I will also discuss the assu organizations o the? ir examinations of NASA. 28 7 288 THE COMPETING GROUPS ARGUMENT The most popular explanation of NASA's decline, as well as the explanation given for many public organizations ' failure to cope effectively with cuts in their resources is what I shall call the competing groups argument. 3 Organizations are composed of coalitions with different objectives. The organization's objectives are developed through bargaining over side payments (i.e., money, authority, power, promotions) among these coalitions. The coalitions vary in the amount of power which they have, and the most powerful group plays the major role in determining the agency's objective. Power is defined as the obverse of dependency. An organization or an individual has power relative to another "(l) in proportion to the organization's [or individual's] need for resources or performances which that element can provide and (2) in inverse proportion to the ability of other elements to provide the same resource or performance." 4 NASA According to the Competing Groups Argument In NASA's case, OMSF's (the manned space flight group) objectives became the organization's objectives, because the leadership was dependent on it for the performance of its most important objective, the Apollo program. Its leaders could not turn to any other group for the performance of this research activity, and the lunar landing was considered essential to the organization's survival. OMSF's control over the allocation of resources within NASA was such that its share of the organ i zation's resources allowed it to determine what the 289 organization's future objectives would be. Its strong ties to Congressmen and contractors only improved its power position because they could be called upon whenever NASA's leaders challenged OMSF's authority. A perfect example of this is OMSF's control over the decision about NASA's future objectives. It could hire a private organization, have the proposal packaged so that it appealed to non-technical decision makers, and submit it to both NASA's leaders and Congressmen. Since private contractors gained more from its projects than, say, an advanced engineering project, it could also bring in its supporters from industry. Other NASA coalitions, from the Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA) down to the Office of Advanced Research (OART), while varying in the amount of power they exercised over NASA's decision making and the share of the organization's resources they received, never were able to gain enough power to overcome OMSF's control of the decision making process. Competing groups' theorists argued that the problem from NASA's perspective was that the objective of the manned space flight program was only to increase the nation's technical capability or perhaps more accurately, to beat the Russians. Once this had been accomplished with the Mercury program in 1965, there was little, if any, justification for the organization's existence. Once NASA's resources began to be cut, the imbalance of power within NASA began to have a very noticeable impact on its ability to cope with the decline, according to this group. Its supporters in Congress were asking the agency to provide them with a comprehensive set of future objectives which they could use to justify approval of NASA's 290 appropriations requests and override the Executive Branch's cuts; NASA's leaders could give them little more than ideas for increasingly more expensive manned space flight programs. The other coalitions within NASA simply never had enough power to obtain a hearing for their ideas, some of which may have been more acceptable to Congress. Competing Gr oups and the Executive Function Argument Although the findings from the case study support this explanation of NASA's failure to develop future objectives beyond the manned space program which Congress was no longer willing to support at the levels it did prior to 1965, I cannot agree that the control of OMSF over NASA's objectives necessarily followed from the dependence of NASA's leaders on OMSF's completion of the Apollo project. Webb could have avoided this relationship if he had established an authority structure and underlying agency goal which were accepted as legitimate by the staff and which could have been used as criteria for evaluating the technical proposals of the entire agency. It was the lack of these c riteria which made NASA's leaders so vulnerable to the pressures from OMSF and Congress. NASA's leaders could not mediate the claims made by the various coalitions either by arguing that their decisions would result in a mix of programs which would advance aeronautical and space research and development, nor could they argue that they had the expertise to judge the relationship between the technical projects and this objective. In short, I am not saying that the argument is wrong, but that it fails to go far enough in explaining why NASA declined, nor d o es it a dequa tely explain why the dependency r e l a tionship develope d i n 291 Pace. This can be seen by looking first at NACA's the first 1 e mp 1cations o the argument experi? ences and then by di'scussi?ng th i 1? ? f for o rgan.i zations trying to change. ~CA's Experiences If we argue that organizations such as NACA and NASA are e of competing groups, one of which might control the objectives compos d organization and make it impossible for any other group to of the its objectives or the organization to change research direction ' obtain have had similar problems, and this is difficult to NACA should substantiate. The applied aerodynamical research group who accomplished their using wind tunnels controlled NACA f rom 1 927 through World research It was their failure to understand the need to change to jet War II. oc et propulsion which led to NACA s crisis perio d following the and r k , iscovery of the German research achievements. Their performance ct? ure coupled with the inability to use wind tunnels for testing fa1? 1 supersonic airplanes changed NACA's entire mode of operations. The success of the research aircraft program led to NACA's change from an applied research group to an advanced engineering group despite the Power of the applied research group and the reluctance of its leaders to engage in advanced engineering. NACA's leaders though did not lose the support of the applied research group even after the agency began to engage in advanced engineering research. Its leaders were able to maintain an environment which met the demands of both groups and could allocate their funds in a manner which satisfied the two. This was 292 a ccomplished despite the fact that NACA, as did NASA after 1965, e xper ienced financial problems. NACA's experiences in the 1950s were very similar . The po t ential creation of a new space agency was threatening to NACA in that it would have come into competition with NACA for funds and would have given Congress even more justification for ending NACA's existence. NACA's leaders again responded in a manner which allowed it to at least maintain the organization at some level . It proposed its inclusion in the space organization and justified this inclusion with ideas for a space fl ight program. In neither period did NACA's leaders lose the support of the s t aff, some of whom strongly disagreed with the changes in research direction. They were able to make the changes when it became necessary to do so both because their authority was accepted and because the c h a nges wer e seen as necessary to advance aviation. If we compare NASA's experiences with NACA's, there are some importa nt differences. First, NASA's leaders were not able to make the necessary changes. OMSF, the most powerful group, was able to prevent the organization from changing its research direction despite the fact that whatever the success of the manned space flight program, Congress apparently was not willing to support continuation of the pro gram or to s upport the rest of the agency's programs if it was c ontinued. NACA's leaders' ability to control its decision making and chan ge the objectives of the organization even in the face of entr enche d power group s should not have been possible if the competing group s ' theorists are correct in their assessment, for the simple reason that 293 P anation leaves no room for a change in coalitions once they the ex 1 ained power and taken over the decision making of the have g ? nization. I am suggesting that in an organization in which the orga ? rs authority is accepted as legitimate and where the leaders leade , have provided the agency with an agreed-upon purpose, change is e ecause the leaders can, whatever the power of the leading Possibl b group, change the direction of the organization. It was the lack of acceptable authority structure or goal which made NASA ' s leaders dependent on OMSF, not the fact that they were performing such an important research activity . .?9mpeting Groups and Chan~ The major problem with viewing organizations from a competing groups perspective is that the theory allows no way for an organization to change. once a group, such as OMSF, takes control of the decision ing process of the organization, no other group would have the mak' resources or power to change the direction of the organization when necessitated by changes in the environment.s It does not provide us ~ith any answer as to whY NASA's leaders were never able to take the inal step and present other alternatives to Congress when it was clear f. at additional manned space flight projects would not stop the budget th ? that the reason NASA's leaders could not and personnel. My argument i s make the not the power of OMSF, but the lack of necessary changes was criteria to evaluate the alternatives presented to them. The manned space fl;ght the obJ?ective of the organization, not a method ... program was of ach? . . d once it was completed the organization ieving an obJective, an 294 could not present other alternatives to justify its existence. This occurred not because of the power of OMSF, but because of a failure of the executive function. 295 NASA AS A BUREAUCRACY explain he competing groups argument has primarily been used to T inability to go beyond the manned space flight proposals after NASA's i was no onger wi ing to meet S ' s bu dget NA A Congress indicated ? t 1 ? 11 ? second argument which I will discuss has been u sed to The requests. ? ~ ~ genera e i eas or a erna ive projects in lt t? explain NASA's ;nab;l;ty to t "d f irst place. Analysts making this argument do not assume that the f? 6 s were available. The problem for these theori sts native idea alter . etermine why NASA's scientists and engineers w ere unable to is t 0 d ea response to the search for new ideas--a que stion the generat argument does not address. They argue that NASA 's e ing groups comp t. ure was one of not establishing an appropriate structure for fail ratus which cientists and engineers. The extensive bureau cratic appa s . rs established was not accepted by the organiza tion's s leade NASA' cientists and engineers because it did not prov ide the discretion s . Before discussing rc . neces sary for them to accompl?i sh t h ei? r resea h the argument in more detail, some note should be ma d e o f the assumpt? rt;o ns ions underlying its proponents ' ass e ? ? Organization theorists argue some activities of a n organization e uncertainty surrounding their performance requ ire that because of th individuals accomplishing the activitY be given m ore discretion than nd those individuals engaged in routine work and wh ose performance a If an organization develops a out come can be specified in advance. 7 structure which is inappropriate for its assigne d wark, either because 296 too much or too little discretion is allowed, subordinates are not able to perform their work, or at least not able to perform their work at the same level as they could under a more appropriate structure. As discussed in the case study, scientific and applied research are examples of work whose outcome and methods of achieving that outcome are difficult, if not impossible, to specify in advance. NACA's leaders thus argued that the agency's research activities required a great deal of discretion and could not be accomplished within the bureaucratic structure which so many external actors wished it to adopt. NASA's scientists and engineers argued that the organization's bureaucratic structure made it difficult for those engaged in scientific and applied research to accomplish their work because it did not allow enough discretion. The result was that NASA had difficulty retaining and recruiting highly qualified scientists and engineers who were unwilling to accept the numerous rules and regulations governing their performance. In 1965 when NASA's leaders needed new research directions, it was unable to generate new ideas because those individuals responsible for producing the ideas were either no longer willing to propose new projects or had left the organization in frustration. NASA According to the Bureaucratic Argument NASA, according to the proponents of this theory, failed to establish an internal management system which allowed enough discretion to its scientists and engineers. They offer as evidence the extensive authorizing and reporting requirements, the lengthy decision-making process as well as the centralization of this process. NASA's 297 decision-making process made innovation and creativity very difficult to accomplish and did not allow the discretion necessary to start or engage in scientific or applied research for which it was difficult to specify the outcome and methods of achieving that outcome prior to the execution of the project. The researchers did not have the discretion to follow interesting leads, but had to obtain approval before engaging in any type of research activity. By the time this approval was obtained, the researcher had already lost interest. The development group also suffered from the increased documentation requirements because the necessity of reporting all activities promoted distrust and an environment in which the interpersonal relationships seen as so necessary for the success of project management were no longer possible. The cuts in personnel and recruitment, according to these theorists, only exacerbated the situation. NASA's leaders no longer were able to provide those incentives such as promotions, training, and interesting new projects, which are so important in any organization and made it possible in NASA's early years to preserve some semblance of an integrated organization. The result was that NASA was not able to recruit or retain those individuals who were normally responsible for producing the ideas for new directions in a research organization. Scientists and engineers did not feel that the environment which was provided to them was acceptable in terms of the incentives being offered to them or the amount of discretion they were given to accomplish their research. When NASA's leaders were faced with demands for new research directions, they were unable to respond to those demands because the individuals 298 responsible for generating them were no longer available or were unwilling or unable to bring their ideas to the attention of NASA's leaders. Inappropriate Structures and the Executive Function Argument As with the competing groups explanation, this explanation of NASA's decline provides us with a great deal of insight into NASA's problems. What it does not provide is a complete explanation of NASA's decline nor any justification for NASA's leaders' continued adoption o f mechanisms which were so unacceptable to its scientists and e ngineers. The claim that NASA's leaders were not controlling their s ubordinates in a manner which was conducive to the generation of new ideas is similar to my argument. Where the two arguments differ, and it is an important difference, is why the control was wrong. While I would not disagree with the assertion that the incentives being offered after 1965 were inadequate nor that the reporting requirement was inhibiting creativity, tue problem I would suggest was much more pervasive than simply heavy documentation requirements or inadequate incentives. NASA's leaders had not established an authority structure which was considered legitimate by its scientists and engineers nor had they provided the organization with an underlying goal which could guide decisions about management devices. The many bureaucratic mechanisms adopted by NASA's leaders only followed from this lack of a cceptable authority structure. The decline after 1965 was exacerbated by the h e avy documentation requirements and the poor incentives . The decl i ne i t self occurred because of a fa ilure of the executive f un c t ion, 299 not because the researchers were not given enough discretion. This can best be seen by showing that NASA, whatever the claims of these theorists, did allow adequate discretion for the performance of their assigned research activities. The Need for Discretion NASA was responsible for the performance of a number of different research activities. It continued to be responsible for applied and advanced engineering and these activities placed similar constraints on NASA's leaders as they had on NACA's leaders. Since NASA's leaders did not know the specific outcome desired or the method of achieving that outcome, they had to allow the researchers a great deal of discretion. NASA was also responsible for the management of large research and development projects and these projects, while requiring some discretion, also required a great deal of control and coordination if the various subsystems were to be integrated into a final product. NASA's leaders knew what outcome (i.e., lunar landing) they desired and the method (specific spacecraft and launch vehicle) of obtaining that outcome prior to the start of the development phase of any project. 8 In most cases they knew the major technical problems which might arise and thus could allocate additional resources to expected problem areas. While they could not specify exactly how their staff should respond to unexpected technical and management problems, they could establish performance criteri? and evaluate the progress of their researchers much more effectively than NACA's leaders could. 300 The major differences between the applied and advanced engineering research activities and the development projects was the complexity, high costs, and long time-span required for the latter's completion. The major problem which they presented to the organization was not technical, but managerial. Their high costs and long-time frame meant that any commitment to them required intensive study, particularly after 1965 when any commitment to one project meant that other projects could not be funded. Their complexity and the need to integrate the various subsystems made detailed planning and documentation of previous work a necessity if changes were to be made when one subsystem did not perform as expected. This need for control coupled with the fact that the projects required less discretion made NASA's adoption of so many bureaucratic control mechanisms more understandable. NASA's leaders not only had less reason to allow discretion, they also were forced to provide the additional control mechanisms if a final product was to be produced. It would be difficult to follow the same type of logic with NASA's other two tasks (i.e., applied and basic research) except for one factor. The two tasks were no longer performed in-house at the level they had been during the NACA years. Although the organizations performing these tasks continued to require a great deal of disc r e tion, those individuals within NASA whose task it was to administer the contracts did not require the same amount of discretion. The smallness of these projects both in costs and the amount of time required to perform them, as well as the fact that they were l ess complex meant they required less rigorous control s than the larger r esearch and development 301 projects, but it is hard to argue that the individuals involved in contract administration of applied or advanced engineering projects required more discretion or that NASA's leaders could not require them to follow certain set procedures when letting contracts or evaluating the performance of these contracts. The argument that NASA's three research activities required less discretion than these theorists would like us to believe they required is not as convincing as the fact that whatever the discretion required by NASA's research activities, NASA's leaders did recognize the differences among them when establishing control mechanisms. The Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF) was highly centralized. The Office of Space Science and Application (OSSA) which was responsible for the unmanned space program, while less centralized than OMSF, was a great deal more centralized than the Office of Advanced Research and Technology (OART), which was responsible for the small applied and advanced engineering research projects. OART essentially gave responsibility for its projects to the Center Directors. The differences were particularly evident in the research authorization process. The procedures required for OART projects were less extensive and did not require the detail necessitated by OMSF and OSSA procedures. The fact that OART project managers only had to obtain approval for research areas, not specific projects, made tracking their progress more difficult than for the OMSF and OSSA projects. The tracking mechanisms followed a similar pattern. OART submitted monthly reports on major research areas. OMSF and OSSA projects were tracked down to the working lev el. 302 The project management system adopted by NASA actually allowed a great deal of discretion to individuals working with contractors. The tracking and authorization mechanisms provided the control and coordination necessary for the large research and development projects, but NASA's staff was given a great deal of discretion to handle problems which arose. They had to document their solution to the problems, but they were allowed to handle them as they saw fit. NASA's method of directing its research activities toward the agency's objectives, while perhaps requiring more paperwork than was really necessitated by the activities because of Congressional and Executive Branch demands, did not restrict the staff's discretion to the level where they could not perform their jobs, and this is perhaps best indicated by the success of the Apollo project and other maj or research and development projects after 1965. Finally, and most important, the heavy documentation demanded by NASA's leaders was not as extensive in the years before 1965 as it was in the following years. Much of it including NASA's centralization in fact was required by Webb after 1965 and in particular following the Apollo fire, before which even Webb admitted the organization was not tightly controlled. The heavy documentation, as were the inadequate incentives, was very much a function of NASA's decline, not the cause of it. The complaints of OART researchers about the lengthy decision making process were undoubtedly valid, but also understandable, given NASA's resource situation. 303 Lack of Discretion and the Executive Function Argument The claim that NASA's researchers were not allowed enough discretion suffers from two major problems. First, it is not entirely clear that the researchers were not given enough discretion to perform their assigned responsibilities. Second, many of the heavy documentation requirements and inadequate incentives which its staff complained about were both required by the nature of their work and were implemented after the decline started, not before. Consequently, it is difficult to attribute NASA's failure to generate new ideas to these factors. If instead it is suggested that NASA's authority structure and lack of agency goal led to the first cuts in NASA's budget and personnel levels and that this failure of the executive function started in 1961, not after 1965, NASA's decline is more easily understood. There is some evidence to support this claim. The fact that the cuts in NASA's budget started in 1965 indicates that it had problems with obtaining new ideas prior to 1965 as well as after. The fact that there were five directors of the Office of Advanced Research and Technology between 1962 and 1968 indicates that its activities were given a lower priority than other Offices and that there was some dissatisfaction about this lack of priority. The complaints of OART Center employees about the low priority of their projects and the requirement that they contract-out more of their work is evidence that there was dissatisfaction among those individuals involved in applied and advanced engineering research activities prior to 1965. 304 Webb's unsuccessful attempt to centralize NASA in 1961 as well as his appointment of so many non-technical managers shows his lack of understanding of the importance of evaluation by colleagues to scientists and engineers. His unwillingness to place former NACA employees in leadership positions during the first years of his tenure and his dismissal of their method of managing through personal expertise demonstrates that Webb was connnitted to the change to a new approach to management whatever his scientists and engineers might feel about the change. His lack of understanding of the importance of applied and basic research in the development process is evident in the relatively small increase in personnel and resources at those centers involved in this type of research even during those years when NASA had adequate resources to meet the needs of all of its coalitions. The unwillingness of researchers to move from their own Centers, many of which continued to be managed in a manner similar to that used prior to Webb's appointment and the inability of NASA's leaders to integrate the various Centers into a unified organization provide evidence that NASA's leaders had problems which were simply ignored during the years its funds were increasing rapidly. Arguing that the decline was brought about by NASA's leaders' inability to provide a proper authority structure and agency goal not only gives us an explanation of why the decline started in the first place, but also why the heavy documentation continued despite NASA's staff's complaints about it. NASA lost the support of its scientists and e n g ineers before 1965 and thus was unable to generate ideas to mainta in its high level of fu~ding. Its leaders' inability to r e spond 305 to the complaints or to Congress's demand for new research directions occurred because they believed in their method of management and did not understand the importance of this group to the entire research and development process. Even if they had been presented with new ideas, they would have had difficulty determining which to select because they had no criteria which could be used to evaluate the ideas and their contribution to the organization's future. Arguing that they did not have adequate discretion ignores the fact that NASA's leaders were not even willing to support the in-house research for which that discretion was required and the researchers' unwillingness to accept the authority of non-technica l d ec ision make rs wha t ever the discretion they were g iven. 306 NASA AND EXTERNAL ACTORS NASA's leaders, in contrast to the previous two explanations, argued that they were not given enough discretion to cope with the budget and personnel cuts. Bureau of the Budget personnel ceilings coupled with the Civil Service Commission regulations prevented them f r om developing a ny type of rational personnel management policies directed toward retaining highly qualified scientists and e ngineers. Congress and the Bureau of the Budget made decisions about which projects would be supported or completed, not NASA's lea ders. Consequently, the poor morale and dissatisfaction of NASA's staff, as well as the loss of support of scientific groups because of decisions about technical projects, was not something NASA's leaders could have prevented. NASA's leaders' claims are worth addressing because they are indicative of a very genuine problem which faced NASA's leaders during its first ten years, and that is the role of external actors in both its technical a nd administrative management. The argument that ex ternal actors were largely responsible for NASA's continuing decline is not easily dismissed. While NASA's leaders primarily focus on the years following the initial c uts, an argument can be made using the findings from the case study that external actors also played a strong role in the start of the decline. Since the argument places the major blame for the decline on external actors, while mine places it on a failur e of the executive function b y NASA's l eaders as well as the external actors, it is a n a r gumen t worth a ddressing. Before discussing the r e lationship 307 the evidenc e worthwhile to examine s bettveen the ts, it i ttvo argumen tvh l?. ch support s i. t. rs in NASA's Decline The R l o e of Extern al Act increasingl y ~ e ies had to c ope with th enc lthough all federal ag A tive and tec hnical their admin istra al actors in larger of extern er of ways. role er unique in a numb on was rath activit? ies, NASA's situati idea of as fascinate d with the st place, C ongress w r le not only In the fi oemanding a r d its fascin ation by d showe n e~Ploring s pace and nical decisi o s tech but also in it n NASA's internal m anagement, larly i organization s, particu ment r research a nd develop aking. er majo ere able to m Oth ment of Def ense, w f the Depar t those e auspic es oth b c l aiming under ? a l a ff ai. rs ei . t h er y their intern oid thi?s in interferenc e ngress was s imply not av s or because Co curity probl em that t h ere would b e se n which NAS A's leaders e amount of discretio Th as ? interested in them. s. sibility of its program imited . by t he high vi as thus l as that Con gress had W ed, w as NASA wa s concern The impact, as far to er organiza tions had airs than o th rger role i n its aff act on its Played a la d a major im p ich ha is large ro le wh that nd s thure, and it wa s. Its lead ers argued e rease its re source or inc bility to m aintain ? anagemen t was 1 argely a h eir m rding proje cts and t a reau of the its d i? scretion r eg u roved both b y the B had to be ap p rta?1 ecause proj ects all cu b ity to repro gram a sm i ed le NASA had the author Whi efore Bud Congress. justified b get and rogramming had to be ny rep ge of its f unds, a reas, not to the Per~enta cified fund a ted for spe s. Funds w ere alloca ry ongres Congress p layed a ve C desired. spend as its leaders rganization to o 308 NASA's en in the selection of specific launch vehicles . ev act?i ve rol e ot ignore Congress s opinion nor their support o f the n leaders could ' manned space flight program and their lack of s upport of scientific ny type of in-house research. programs and a Congress's role in NASA's affairs included inve stigations of ical failures, cost overruns, and schedule slip pages. It was not techn? o bringing in technical experts, private contra ctors, or se t adver nizations such as the General Accounting Office whenever its members orga ? felt they needed other sources than NASA to hel p them make decisions. NASA's leaders argued that they not only had to contend with decision making, but Congressional demands to be included in technic al demands for improvements in the management of these projects. also their nical failure was followed by an investigation and strong Tech ? chnical suggestions about the deficiencies in NASA manage ment of its te congressional interests and demands required the adoption activ..;. t?i es. of extensive authorization and tracking mechanism s, if NASA's leaders were t o have the capability to just1? f y t h e1. r b u d ge t reques t s or explain the technical failures which occurred. reater NASA's leaders not onlY faced what they claimed w as a g ce in their internal affairs than other research and interferen development organizations, they also had to respo nd to these demands With an organization which had a rather unique h istorical background. d ? ati' on but a conglomeration of lt wa snot a newly create organ1z , great deal of technical existing small research organizations which had a This situation, but very little managerial capabilities. experti? se, d was resolved by bringing in individuals w ith accord;ng t . ... o its 1 ea ers, 309 proven management capabilities and using their own staff to provide technical assistance to contractors and accomplish the necessary applied and advanced engineering research. Its leaders argued that the use of private small research organizations to generate new ideas was not necessary because of this in-house expertise. Management had to be emphasized both because of the nature of research and development work and because NASA was weak in this area, but also because of Congressional demands. Relying on personal expertise, as NACA's leaders had, was not possible in an organization the size of NASA nor in one in which there were research and development management responsibilities. Although NASA's leaders appeared to assume that they were effectively managing the organization, given the external and internal demands being made upon them up to 1965, they admitted to being unable to cope with the requirements and demands of external actors after 1965. As discussed in the case study, oversight agencies had a major impact on their ability to cope with the organization's declining resource base. It was difficult for the organization to plan for the future when Congress or the Bureau of the Budget could arbitrarily refuse their requests for projects or cancel those projects already underway. The Bureau of the Budget's personnel ceilings and the Civil Service Commission's regulations which had to be followed when attempting to meet these personnel ceilings made any type of rational personnel management impossible and played a major role in the dissatisfaction of many of NASA's employees as well as the departure of many hig hly qualif i e d s cientists and engineers. The General Accounting Off i ce ' s 310 investigations of its activities eliminated the alternative of using contracts to cope with the personnel ceilings. External Actors and the Executive Function Argument I have suggested that whatever the role of external actors in NASA's decline, and I do not wish to minimize the importance of this role, the responsibility for NASA's decline still remains with its leaders. It was their responsibility to maintain some type of equilibrium between the demands being made upon them from external actors and the demands being made by their staff, and this they did not do. To confirm that my explanation is more adequate than NASA's leaders' is difficult since any argument making the claim that NASA's leaders had other alternatives whose selection might have prevented the decline is, as NASA's leaders might point out, a counterfactual one and in principle incapable of confirmation. Having made this statement, it does not necessarily follow that making the argument is a wasted effort if for no other reason than the fact that NASA's leaders' argument leaves us in the position of arguing that the leadership of any organization or at least a public organization plays no role in its success or failure. The organization is simply a s ponge which reacts to any demand made upon it with little consideration of its impact on the future of the organization. To avoid this conclusion, it is worthwhile to review the executive function argument from NASA's leaders' perspective to determine if there were other alternatives available to NASA's l eaders. 311 I argue that all research and development organizations faced similar demands, and that these organizations had managed to cope with the requirements in a manner which allowed them to survive. The creation of small research organizations owned by the federal government but managed by universities filled the vacuum left by the government's inability to maintain an in-house research staff. These organizations were not only able to provide the research environment which the government was no longer able to provide, but they also met the need for a source of ideas for new research directions so necessary to the research and development organizations. If these organizations could cope with the changes in federal management, NASA's leaders should have been able to respond to them as effectively. This conclusion from NASA's perspective ignores the unique technical capabilities of its staff which made letting contracts or relying on small research organizations unnecessary. The problem with this claim, I suggest, is that it ignores the fact that NASA's leaders by setting personnel and resource ceilings on Centers engaged in in-house research forced these Centers to let contracts for their research work. Those scientists and engineers who were unwilling to become contract administrators were forced either to leave or if they remained, to begin to let contracts. Although NASA's leaders argued that letting contracts for research work was necessitated by Congress's and the Executive Branch's lack of support for in-house research, this constraint only meant that they should have examined other alternatives 9 for meeting their applied and advanced engineering needs. 312 Even if we accept NASA's leaders' argument that it did make an effort to maintain an in-house technical staff, we must ask ourselves why they were unwilling to follow NACA's approach to maintaining an acceptable research environment by making sure that its staff was promoted for technical competence and thus ensuring that its staff's demands for evaluations by colleagues was met at some minimal level. Their claim that this was impossible because of the size and responsibilities of NASA's research and development activities seems rather implausible for two reasons. First, NASA's project management system was largely based on the personal expertise of the project managers. This was less true in the case of its program managers, but even at this level personal expertise was an important method of controlling the various groups which were required for the research and development projects. Since neither the project nor program managers had legal authority over the various groups, they had to rely on their own expertise, not their position, to manage the projects. It was at the headquarters level where position and management expertise became so important, but this situation affected the entire organization because it was at the headquarters level that the major technical decisions were being made. NASA's engineers and scientists were thus working under an authority structure based on expertise, but had to depend on the upper levels of NASA's hierarchy at headquarters to make cecisions about technical projects, and it was at this level that the authority structure broke down. NASA's leaders' claims that they could not follow either NACA' s or other research and development organizations' examples because of 313 the unique nature of their staff does not appear to be substantiated either by their own actions or by the changes which actually did occur in the organization. Their second claim that Congress's role in their affairs made their situation different is also difficult to substantiate. Congress only suggested that NASA tighten up its management; it did not direct Webb to make specific changes. While it obviously would have been difficult for Webb to ignore these suggestions completely, as the case study demonstrates, Webb was willing to ignore even specific demands (e.g., Congress's demand for the Phillips Reports after the Apollo fire) when he decided it was in the best interest of the organization to do so. Congress's strong support of NASA at least until 1965 implied that NASA's leaders probably had a great deal more discretion than other organizations as long as they kept Congress aware of what the y were doing. Even if we accept Webb's claim, the fact that Congress was primarily interested in the space flight program meant that Webb had a great deal more discretion to deal with the demands of scientists and engineers in other areas. Since these were the individuals from whom the major complaints were coming, Congressional interference is not an a dequate explanation for their dissatisfaction. Perhaps more important, Webb clearly believed that technical failures could be prevented through better management controls. His reaction to the Apollo fire and the centralization throughout the organization following the fire provides evidence of this belief, as does his unsuccessful atte~pt to centralize the organization in 1961. His distrust of NACA's management style a nd its focus on personal 314 expertise was evident in his own remarks and his efforts after 1961 to remove the organization from their influence. NASA's argument that Congress's support of the manned space flight program and lack of support for in-house research prevented them from supporting basic or applied research and forced them to allocate most of their funds to the manned space flight program is also not completely supported by the findings from the case study. Prior to 1965 Congress met NASA's budget requests for new projects with few questions. Their interest was primarily in the space projects, leaving NASA a great deal of discretion with regard to its other projects. Even in decisions involving the manned space flight program, NASA was the one presenting the alternative approaches to them and could set the agenda in the manner it desired. What does seem obvious is that NASA's leaders were the ones who made some of the ~ajor decisions which played a role in the projects which the organization would support. The decision to set personnel and resource limitations on the OART Centers was a NASA decision, not a Congressional decision. Congress in the late 1960s even went as far as to question this decision and demand that NASA's leaders provide more funds at least to aeronautical research. The decision to remain committed to the manned space flight program whatever the costs to other programs was also made by NASA's leaders. While this decision was obviously made with Congress in mind, the selection of OMSF's proposal in the late 1960s over proposals submitted by the other program offices and centers was made by NASA's leaders, not Congress. While the findings from the case study do confirm that the Bureau of the Budget personnel ceilings, Civil Service Commission 315 regulations, and project decisions of both the Bureau of the Budget and Congress did play a major role in NASA's decline after 1965, this must be said with some caution. As I pointed out in my explanation, it was because of previous executive function failures that NASA's leaders were unable to cope with the demands from external actors after 1965. 316 SUMMARY The three explanations of NASA's decline discussed in this chapter were found to be inadequate for various reasons. The competing groups argument provided no explanation of NASA's continued dependence on the manned space flight program office after Congress continued to cut NASA's budget. It was suggested that a more complete explanation could be provided if OMSF's power is explained as one of the problems created by NASA's leaders' failure to establish any acceptable authority structure or agency goal. This failure left them with no criteria for evaluating technical proposals or any type of proposed change for the agency. NASA's leaders, thus, were left in the position of simply reacting to demands from outsiders, and since the manned space flight program office had the most outside support and resources to present its views, it continued to control the decision-making process. The argument that NASA's scientists and engineers were not provided with enough discretion to accomplish their research nor offered enough incentives to accept this lack of discretion was found to be incomplete because it ignored the change to contracting, which required less discretion, as well as the high level of discretion given to NASA 's staff. Since NASA's problems started before the decline when many of the extensive documentation requirements had not been adopted, it does not explain NASA's initial failure to produce ideas which would have prevented the decline in the first place. These deficiencies in the a rgument are avoided if the decline is explained as a failure of the execut ive f unction. NASA's scientists a nd e n gineers fo und the authority 317 s tructure unacceptable and were not willing to accept their leaders' decisions about technical proposals or the manned space flight program as the major objective of the organization. NASA's leaders' argument that external actors and internal constraints prevented them from coping with the decline effectively as well as precluded some of the alternatives chosen by other organizations to cope with the change in federal management was found to be inadequate both because it ignores NASA's leaders' role in the decline and because the findings from the case study do not support the claims. While external actors did play an important role in NASA's decline, NASA's leaders had other alternatives which might have made it possible to both prevent the decline and cope with it once the cuts started. More importantly, if NASA's leaders would have performed their executive functions more satisfactorily, they could have avoided some of the more dysfunctional effects of the demands being made by external actors after 1965. NOTES 1 These studies are discussed in Chapter 1 of this study. 2 Ibid. 3 The competing groups explanation of NASA's decline is made by Emmette S. Redford and Orion F. White, "What Manned Space Flight Program after Reaching the Moon? Government Attempts to Decide: 1962-1968." NASA Research Grant NGL 33-022-090. Syracuse/ NASA Program, December, 1971; and Raymond A. Bauer, e;t al.. , NASA Planning and Decision Making, Final Report, 2 vols. Con tract NGR 22-007-163, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, 1970. The explanation of it which follows is derived both from these studies and the theoretical literature which underlies the assertions made by these authors. The conception of organizations as composed of competing coalitions is drawn from Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Process in Adminis t rative Organization, 2nd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1957) and Richard Cyert and James March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Ha11-:- Inc., 1963). The definition of power and its use in the competing groups argument is derived from Michael Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963); James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 196 7); Sol Levine and Paul E . White, "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relationships,"!::_ Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations, 2nd ed., Amitai Etzioni (ed.) (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1969); Richard M. Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations," American Sociological Review 27 (1962), pp. 31-41; and David Jacobs, "Dependence and Vulnerability : An Exchange Approach to the Control of Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 19 (1974), pp. 45-59. A number of theorists have made a similar argument about competing groups in other declining organizations. See Richard M. Cyert, "The Management of Universities of Constant or Decreasing Size," Public Administrative Review, Vol. 38, No. 4 (July/ August 1978), pp. 344-350; Irene Rubin, "Politics and Retrenchment in the City: A Case Study," Paper presented at the Mid West Political Science Meetings, April 1979; and John Freeman and Michael T. Hannan, "Growth and Decline Processes in Organizations," American Sociological Review 40 (1975), pp. 215-228. 4 Thompson, op. cit., p. 30. This conception is based on Emerson, op. cit. 318 319 5 See Cyert and March, op. cit., for a discussion of problemistic search. This will be discussed further in the next chapter. 6 Richard L. Chapman, Project Management in NASA : The System and the Men (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1973). 7 See Thompson, op. cit., and Crozier, op. cit. 8 See Merton J. Peck and Frederic H. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis (Boston: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1962). They specifically discuss some of NASA's research and development projects and argue that some of them were more closely related to industrial planning projects than to scientific projects. 9 I might note here that the Jet Propulsion Laboratory was such an organization, but the relationship between it and Headquarters was so poor that any communication from it about new research directions might have been ignored simply because it was coming from JPL. One of the reasons Webb might have been unwilling to establish relationships with other government-owned laboratories is because of his experiences with JPL. See Erasmus H. Klaman, "Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter: Case Studies of Project Management," National Academy of Public Administration, June 30, 1970, and NASA History Office files. Chapter 7 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS In the preceding chapter I discussed a number of explanations given for NASA's decline. Although the discussion included the relevant theories when appropriate, its primary purpose was to show the inadequacies of existing accounts of NASA's decline. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how my explanation of what happened within NASA fits into the existing theoretical literature. Its organization follows the major threads of the argument starting with the focus on the executive function. This is followed by a discussion of the conception of change used in the argument and its relationship to two other explanations of change. 320 321 THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION My argument rests on the assumption that executives, whatever certain responsi 1 1ties which they must meet if the organization, have ? ?b?1? anization is to surviv t eh e o ro r ag t le. ast not decline as NASA did. This assumpt?i on has a long history in the organization theories , starting 1 w? ith Che1 s. tt ee rr a Itu . r Bes a rnard s formulation in 1938. ' 1 Barnard argued that the major function of any executive was to the organization by finding some type of fit between the maintain environment and the internal management of the organization. external focused on private organizations, his conception of executive Although he function ? s appropriate for public organ?i zati?o ns as we 11 1? f we assume 1 management regulations ar t eh a st i mply another feature of an nization's environment, which must be taken into consideration when orga . executive attempts to maintain the organization t .h e Thus, the executives of research and development organizations responded to the changes in federal management by establishing government-owned small resear c h organizations which did not have to f o 11 ow the regu1 atory c1es which were unacceptable to so manY scientists and engineers. Pol1? ? NACA I s leaders responded to the same change by ma i nta1.n.1n g an authority Structure based on expertise, while at the same time overlaying this authority structure with one based on position- Both responses allowed the org . meeti?ng their objectives within the new an1.zations to continue federal management structure, oes, argued that the responsibility of d arnard, as my argument execut? B h. the establishment of a ives inc luded, among other tings, legiti d underlying goal, or what Barnard mate au thority structure an 322 call I td is only e w itp hu arp n o as ce c. epted purpose that specific or a c it nio n Ns A SA's case projects, can be agreed upon or evaluated. ' to N eA sS tA a's b lf isa hil u a re p urpose for the organization made it d1" obta . if nf ic c. ou nl st e nto su s on the specific projects which the or 1g .za an t? i on should perform and to provide Congress with an adequate continuing j iu tsst i hf ii gc ha t li eo vn el f oo fr funding. It also made evaluate a i nt y d mi af nf ai gc eu ml et n t to m echanisms which might be gai p nr o cp oo ns se ed n sa un sd onto those which were adopted. It is at this point that our two arguments begin to diverge. said with s T omhi es ci as u tion because the extent of the divergence is a function of l wa hr ag t el I y c onsidered important for understanding s decline. N BA aS rA n' a rd places a great deal of importance on what he, followed by Simon, called the inducements/ contributions contract which ines w d he af t? subordinates will receive for their contributions to the r discuss the inducements or inc o enrg tia vn ei sz a pt ri oo v id2 e d both by n. leaders in the case N sA tuC dA Y and in the presentationa n od f mN yA SA's ument, but my a r ag r gument does not focus on NASA's leaders' failure to The reason for this deficiency, if it may Provid e adequate incentives. called that, i b se that the type of incentives provided NASA's staff did not b ecome a large problem until after 1965 when its d ec 1 i? ne had already t arguments though is one of started. The difference between the wo NASA's leaders' failure to provide e t an np h aa ds e? quate research is, since . . d y fruitfullY by NACA' s leaders e )n vl?. ronment (an incentive use ver obviously . . d line but not, I would suggest, the p layed a role in its de et ce rmin ' ? f . e to understand that NASA was a 1 .ng ro t le es .e arc I. th was th 1 e ai ur d velopment organization which led to organization as well as a e 323 its f ailure to establish an authority structure based on expertise and projects which were so important to those individuals to support those ere resp W oh no sible for w p roducing ideas in most research organizations. NASA' s leaders had adequate funds and Congressional support to provide its staff with a high lev m elo s ot f o if n c. e ntives, and in most cases incentives were provided. From the resea t rh ce hs ee r s'? perspective this was not enough. They could not depend on NASA's leaders to make de ci? sions in their best interest. The second difference involves the importance attached to ity structures and the source of authority. Barnard noted tha a tu thor? ere are at least two sou t rh ces of authority--position and personal experti? se--but he argued that individuals if they wis h to exercise auth or1? ty must have responsibility or position, an d tha t it is the inducements/ contributions contract which defines what is acceptable I have taken a slightly different tack, primarily because authori? ty. 3 e findings from the case study show a relationship between expertis t eh and authority among scientists and engineers that transcends position and has - the incentives offered. This is not to 1ittle relationship to say th t / contributions contract do not at position and the inducemen s Play a t ble authority, but that the scientists and ro1e in what is accep a engineers in the case study were more willing to accept the authori t y of individuals who had achieved some major breakthrough in their field than they . who had no technical competence, were the authority of a superior This attitude toward authority \vhat ever the incentives offered to them- \va,s a i?n the development of NACA and NASA and was Part? n important fac tor . , ?on of government contracts by many 1 icularly evident in the reJec 324 scientists and engineers prior to World War II. NACA's continued rejection of the idea that a non-technical administrator could manage a research organization only mirrored the rejection of many scientists and engineers of this idea. Whatever the validity of this belief, scientists' and engineers' strong belief in it defined what was acceptable authority to them, not the position of the individual trying to exercise the authority or the type of incentives offered. Webb's lack of technical competence meant that whatever he attempted to accomplish, he would have had difficulty establishing an acceptable authority structure. This is not to say that Webb's lack of technical competence precluded the establishment of an acceptable authority structure, but that it set the stage. His own belief in position authority, his inability to understand the importance of evaluation by colleagues or the nature of the research and development process, and his failure to provide the organization with a purpose beyond the manned space flight program confirmed the belief and led to the scientists' and engineers' unwillingness to accept his authority. It is only when this, which might be best called an ideology, is taken into consideration that some understanding of NASA's decline can be gained. To summarize, my argument uses the executive function perspective to lay the groundwork for locating the source of NASA's decline. It s departure from this theory is largely a matter of emphasis and is considered necessary to take into account the nature of research organizations. Having said this, it is necessary to note that using this perspective left me in the position of concluding that NASA 325 declined because its leaders had failed in their executive function of providing an organization purpose and thus were not able to establish an acceptable authority structure or obtain consensus about the projects which the organization should accomplish. To provide a link between this failure and the decline, it is necessary to turn to two other theoretical perspectives. 326 CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONS s ec ine occurred because N A iS tA ' wasd un1 a? b le to provide any . o ong j ru ess st ?f f or continuing its high level of funding in 1. ication t C competing demands on the nation's resources in the t mhe id -f 1a 9c 6e 0 so . f Ravin g succeeded in surpassing the Russians by 1965, it was unable to e any g e in de er aa st for new research directions which might either or maintain its resource levels b i en yc or ne da s pe r oposing new manned programs, despite the fact that Congress had indicated its space flight ingnessto support a continuation of these program U sn W oi1 r] _? a t least was ing to provide funds for both the manned space flight program and 11n. Will ? programs s O poth ne sr o red by NASA- NASA's problem, I argue, was at its s? inability to change when itS environment demanded it. Its 1.mplest an change occurred because it did not h f aa v? e1 an aut or1. itu yr e s tt ro u cture h was acceptable to its scie "t nvh ti ic sh t s and engineers or any accepted er?i teria to evaluate solutions to its threatening environment in the s. These deficiencies which arose because its leaders had not late 1960 a lished an . . goal or purpose beyond the manned space est b organizationa1 program left the organization's leaders subject to the p f ol wig erh t o f the mann e d space flight program group,? hoW NACA had made changes in a I r gument by showing support my e which I use is very g the Th h e 9 c4 onception o f can l 0s a a ndr t 1o 9 5t 0h sa . t f organization theorists. yert a S nim d il used by one group o C , wh . . f hat i?s called problemistic search, March 0 were the originators o w argued th de-"'nd or supply equilibrium established by orga a. t any change in the u= . a search for a new equilibrium the nizat i on's leaders will trigger 327 4 will satisfy the various participants. Leaders and other which ? ion makers within the organization do not review all alternatives decis? selecting a response, but only a limited set of alternatives from when 5 select that response which meets their minimum criteria. which they is constrained not only by clients, suppliers, and the The search . nization's staff, but also the leaders' own cognitive and language orga . ions. The organization, according to Cyert and March, follows a limitat. r of simple rules in this search. It attempts to find a solution numbe standard operating procedures and the department generally by using nsible for the problem area- Thus NACA responded to the crisis respo . and after world war II by establishing committees, and NASA during responded to the decline in its resources by establishing a number of If this is not successful, the organization will turn Planning groups. to other groups or departments which are engaged i?n re 1 ate d wokr . The organ i? zati?o n, if neither of these two steps i? s success f u 1 'wi? 1 1 1 ook in as which are normally not responsible for the problem. If the third are Step is successful, the coalition responsible for the success will increase its bargaining position relative to those coalitions which failed. The success of the research aircraft group following World War II "bl for it a major power in the made the group respons1 e ?n the first two steps, but unless a end 1 organ i. zation. Most searches standard can be invoked, some form of change will operating procedure occur in all the steps. Employment of the third step, since it . coalition agreements, implies the rep the b asic resents a change in oes not occur unle ss the organization d large r change. Radical change Perce. (i?ts survival is at stake) by the ives itself as threatened cha nges i?n its environment- 328 environmental My conception of how NACA and NASA responded to similar to Cyert and March's explanation in that I agree that changes is organizations when faced with threatening environments began to both or some type of solution to the problem. In NACA's case the search f environment was perceive as t reatening was a radical change wh en the ? ? d h ? NASA began the search process, but did not make any radical one. changes. Cyert and March argued that what an organization accepts as an uate solution to the problems in its environment will depend on its adeq ion of the severity of the situation, its goals and decision Percept? criteria by which decisions are made), and the order of rules ( . i eration of alternative solutions- I argue that NACA's successful cons?d involved a group of researchers lobbying for a change in research search . ion, demands from the environment which could be satisfied by the direct? archers' ideas, and a threatening environment. The change itself rese accompanied by a change in the leadership of the organization. \vas NACA after world war II had a group of engineers lobbying for a Their initial the research aircraft program. Project similar to been turned down by NACA's 1eadershiP and it was not until Prop osals had NACA ? s leadership changed, its environment became t h reateni?n g, and the itary services began to demand programs similar to what the ntil? researchers d that their proposal was accepted . had originally propose, The su ACA ?th a new coalition in power. As ccess of the project left N 1ewadi ershiP of NACA first looked to Postul Marc h , the ated by Cyert and spond to the threatening environment ? the ? group to re and iri t applied research h ,.Tas unsuccessful that they were was only when this approac w 329 Willin g to change research directions. The solution met NACA's goal, aeronautical research. It was only adopted after the advancement of NACA' s leaders had established numerous committees in an attempt to ea part of the new supersonic research community and were unable becom funding for a new supersonic research laboratory. to obtain I differ from Cyert and March only in the fact that I emphasize nature of research advancements in the pr t oh ce e ss. I suggest that part e success of the search process is the existence of that group of of th engineers ~ich is lobbyin?pr1or tote start of the Scientists and . h process, for a change in research direction- Th? environment search ? role in that it defines when the change will be made or at least Plays e leadership will accept it and what c W hah ne gn e th w il be considered 1 In short, it force? the roost powerful coalition to accept acceptable. the ideas of the weaker coalition. I also argue that th? change involves the replacement of one group whose ideas had been accepted prior to th? change with another group whose ideas had become th? accepted id???? In the process, there Was a change in the group who?? authoritY would be accepted. The technologi?cal . lved a change in research, but also a change not onlY 1nvo change i?n be accepted within the organization. whose authority would Perhaps more important, I link th? change process to NASA's Its failure to establish an organization executi? ve function failure. Purpose left table authority structure or any ?rit it without any acceP 1 It did not have in-place eria for evaluating technical proposa s. before the those mechanisms which would start of the search process ?llow . f search- It? leadership's ideas 1 it to carry through a success u 330 een accepted in th h ea d f in ro st t b p lace, and it had no group lobbying This link is important and for a change in the research direction. rep resents the major difference between my argument and Cyert and I am not as much M ina tr ech re's s ted in how the decision making I , but the structure of rel o ac tc iou nrr se hd i ps in which it occurred . t e c ange process in a researc organiza ~ to ioul nd ha ar sg u te o that h h ? h ve a change in the i n inv do il v iduals whose authority is accepted as gitimate l e a n? d that this authority is based on the success of the ideas This would appear to be essential because if it of that coalition. not occur there is no individ d uo ae ls in power who is responsible for ing and nurturing the new research P r do it re ec ct t? i on. NASA since its ~ authority was based on position, not expertise, and not l eadersh;p's as legitimate by N ac Ac Se Ap 'st e sd c ientists and engineers, could not . essential replacement of one group with another . m Tak he e t wh ee a ker ions, even if they were willing to sub c mo ia t l ti ht' e ir ideas, had no ringing their ideas ~ a ty o o tf h e attentib o n of NASAs leaders, nor even ' ey had, no way of obtaining a change becaus i ef oth f the lack of the Even assuming the criteria with which to judge technical proposa 1 s. were successful, they had no guarantee that t i hd ee a ls e adership would u cont in e to support them after the initial acceptance. Most important, my emphasis is on the structure of I am not as relat?i onships within which the search process occurred. erested in how specific decisio i nn st or changes were made, but in that ucture of relationships which m S at dr e the search process successful or uns uccessf u 1 . 331 ORGANIZATIONS AND CHANGE: A STRUCTURALIST PERSPECTIVE Although the focus of my argument is on the executive function I rely on one other perspective to demonstrate that NASA had other , , but ives. My use of this pers a plt ee cr tin va et ? i s primarily illustrative a number of im I pl~ ich it assump tions about organizations and their respo nses to environmental changes even for this limited use. equen C tlo yn ,s it will be worthwhile to note some of the similarities the argument of th b ee tw ste re un c turalist perspective and my own. Before discussing NASA's decline I describe the change in management policies and the responses which other organ fe izd ae tr ia ol n s ~de to these changes h , a wd ith the assumption that any differences ween NASA structure and other research a b ne dt devel9pment organizations' uctures might be related to NASA's decline, The S at sr s umption that there optimal organizational form and organizations without th i is s o fon re m ecline is similar to the argument made by theorists who e W xai mll i nd e nization o srg a o ver t. i me and focus on the economic and technical ions which determ;ine the appropriate organizational form for each Condit ? ironmental variation.6 TheY e an rv g? u e that "in each distinguishable ironmental . . f' ds 1?n equilibrium only that env? configuration, one in , ? organ i? zational form optimally adapted to the deman d so f t h e environment." 7 e configuration of organization forms is isomorphic to the config th uration of the environment. Within anY historical period, then, organizations Will develop . h cific environmental characteristics of according tote spe that period. 332 According to this theory, the change process involves three occurrence of variation--some typ S et a oge f s.8 In the first stage--the The change in change ( planned or unplanned) occurs in the environment. the e rf ae ld management policies represents such a change. It is these ions which a v cta r ai sa t s? timuli for organizational change and establish the c ri. teria which determine which organizational form (or structure) ~ T? h1 e second stage involves a process of selection of thi a1 t evolve. o izrg aa tin o. nal form which will "fit" the environment and survive as the major o rgan.i zational form of that historical period. NACA was resentati r ve ep of the type of organization which was created around 1915. research and development organizations whic T hh e d el va er lg oe p ed during ar II and the government-o W wo nr eld d researcW h laboratories which ace ompanied and followed their establishment replaced the small Whether and how governm ent research laboratories after world War II. " (1) the carryi .n g capac.i ty" rnany organization forms persist depends on: (2) the rate of expansion of the other organizations of th e environment?' and (3) whether other ~hich by the ea nr ve i rs ou np mp eo nr tt ; ed organ i. zations have the same resource source or structura1 char acteristics.9 This is not to saY that onlY one type o f structure can ex; ? d for various reasons, ~st during any one historica 1 perio ? includ? and the efficiency of ing lack of competition for resources ructure f h organization's task, organizations with st or accomplishing t e ructures f . d remain in exis tence. These theorists st rom a pervious perio do appe whi'le remaining in existence, the older ar to be arguing r tu hc at tu res . d thus face decline if resources st are no longer optimal an become . petition with the new scarce or if they come into com Oroo anizati?o ns. 10 333 efined ramework for thei r analysis have d Theorists using this f e authority relati onships th orga ? rding to nizational form or structu re acco 12 (e.g., 11 the formal structu re (bureau . ratic and profess ional); size; c 13 and national and ? and procedu res); orga nizational tabl e, forma l rules not examined 14 l , s. Internal de cision making is cultur a cnaracteristic ch structure will fit the termine whi becau ental constraints de se environm nothing ructure chosen wi ll fail. There is en ? ther st vironment and any o that decision ma king does not n th gument to sug gest i ese theorists' ar 1 h ose t h rong members can obviou s y c o e w occur since organizational of the organizatio n has . leadership structure They only argue that the environment. The o alt as to which struc ture will fit the n ernative becomes unintere sting hen ss by ich the structure is decided upon t Proce wh evelopment of NACA's and NA SA's historical d to them.ls An examination conel usi ? ing ons: he follow from th? us to t is perspective le ades ncy structure and its leaders' ittee/ age First, NACA's com m h tput o f h u t e staff to control t e o relian ce on evaluation by colleagues ? d ? wh i? h it during the perio in c tvere ? ternal management structures used in ed after the Briti sh aeronautical model tvas ted. NACA in fac t was crea rch organizations , s and was one of a number of resea rie research laborato and the Army Medi cal reau of Mines, ch as the Bureau of Standards, Bu su roblems which priv ate d research to solv e p Corps , whi"ch engaged in applie nagement policies during this 16 Federal ma ind ust ry was not add ressing. ? t? s with enou gh aniza ion Peri the leaders of t hese research org od Provided the scientists h env;ronment acce ptable to discret? researc ~~ ion to establish a ation ' s product and its cre . f r NACA and en o gineers. There w as a need h ties with the s cientif ic bl" allowed to eS t a is the federal gover nment 334 ea y unwi ing to wor or non-technical connnu n1. .t y which was gen r 11 ?11? k f governme nt groups. Second, during and after World War II, its environmental guration began to change in a manner which made maintaining NACA's confi er government research laboratories' research environment and oth The development of the large research and increa si.n gly more difficult. organizations which accomplished their research through development nt-owned, but university-managed, laboratories, as well as the governme in procurement regulations which made scientists willing to changes . contracts from non-technical government agents, made the need for accept nizations s uch as NACA increasingly less necessary . NACA by the orga . finding it more and more difficult not onlY to justify its 19SOs was ence , but also to provide the research environment its staff felt ex1? st necessary . Quite simply, the fit between NACA and its environmental \.las 1.guration was no longer ideal, whereas the fit between the new conf. arch and development organizations and their environmental rese conf1? .gurat1.? on was more optimal. Third, NACA' s transformation into a large research and npment organization fo llowed a pattern set by other organizations S orical studies similar to this one that this finding could be Other h. t confirmed would be valuable is The second area in which further research The structuralist org 1.onal change and how it is accomplished. anizat? provides a description of changes in organization, while the approach ion-making or problemistic search theory provides a framework from decis? describe or predict the process which the organization will go "lvhich to Although the latter does describe those factors (e.g., decision through. Which play a role in the search process, its focus on decision rules) ing makes it more useful for examining single decisions. What is tnak? if NASA ? ? d" ti?on 1?s an understanding of the needed , 1s any in 1ca , tionships within the organization which provide an eairoment re1a . he findings from this study i ndica t e or examP le t conduciv e , to change. F 347 t hat NASA ' s bureaucratic structure was one of the relationships which mad e it d i ff icult f or it to change research directions. This finding, t houg h, may only be r e levant to NASA or research organizations. If the s t aff of a n o r ganization accepts its bureaucratic structure as legitimate, the fact that it is a bureaucratic one may have no bearing on t he o r gani za tion' s a bility to change. Add i tional a ttempts to integrate some of our existing theories a lso seem t o be indicate d by the study. Even if these attempts consist of examin ing t he data within different theoretical frameworks, it would seem a worthwhile venture . This seems particularly true in those cases whe r e one ' s a r gument leads to more questions than it answers . The compet ing g r o ups theory is particularly relevant here. Concluding that t he manne d spa ce fli ght g roup's power prevented a change in research dire c t ion l eads on e t o ask immediately why in an organization supposedly known f or i t s mana g ement did this occur, or why d i d it continue to occur af t e r t he dec line sta rted a nd the organization' s per f ormance wa s in quest ion. This is not to s ay that relying on one framework will provide on e with the wr o n g a nswe r, but that examining data with mor e tha n on e f r a mework might provid e a more complete explanation as well a s g ive o the r s mor e confidence in the results. r 348 ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT The findings from the case study, while only tentative and perhaps most applicable to research organizations, do indicate that there are certain minimum requirements if an organization is to maintain itself or at least not decline. First, its executive should establish some type of general goal for the organization which can be used to evaluate its internal management, selection of projects, and to justify its existence to its suppliers. NACA's leaders' strong conviction that, whatever the project they performed, their goal was to advance aviation, guided them through a number of crisis periods. NASA's leaders' failure to do so left them not only in the situation of not being able to justify their technical proposals, but also unable to understand the importance of maintaining a management system acceptable to scientists and engineers. If NACA's experiences are any indication, both external and internal actors must accept the legitimacy of the goal. NACA used it to justify decisions about projects to its staff and requests for funds, but also to justify its unwillingness to accept demands for changes in its internal management. NASA, in contrast to this, had difficulty justifying its request for funds and its internal technical and management decisions because it had no goal beyond the manned space flight program. Rather interestingly, the establishment of this goal seems to be a function in which external actors can and should play a role. NACA's goal was in its legisla tive mandate. NASA, while its leaders failed to use it, was also g iven a general goal, which could have been used to guide the o r ganizatio n' s decision making. 349 it seems particularly important to establish a Second ' the organization's goal and to mana gement syS t em which is related to perception of what is an acceptable method of controlling the staff's For example, in NASA's case its mandated goal was aeronautical them. This goal required the performance ands pace research and development. applied research, and individuals involved in this type of b asic and This be unwilling to accept a bureaucratic structure. of research may into consideration when establishing an internal should be taken gement system. If an organization's leaders cannot establish an lllana authori ty structure, as does seem to be the case within most acce Ptable e federal government at this time, then some consideration of of th ive methods of performing the activitY should be made, alternat? Third, the goal should be used as a general guide to evaluate nical proposals or the resources the organ.i zati.o n i. s goi.n g to tech . I want to be careful here because I am commi? t to specific projects. that an organization's leaders should engage in any not recommending cost/ benefit or planning, programming and budgeting, but that type of leaders should NACA's leaders divided use the goal as a guideline. 1.r projects 1.?nto . t tural and aerodynamical research and the? engine, s rue cated d h Together the projects a11 a certain percentage of funs to eac ? 0 to provide the necessary research to Und er each category were supposed was determined by the main The percentage necess advance a vi. ation. d arYf the particular time period. 0 comm? dependent on the nee s the l.ttee and was ?ective, but it was accepted by 1'he SubJallocat?1 .on was undoubtedly ?t1.?mate because both the goal of ?Sdtvaaff leg1. nca? nd external actors as . h the decisions were made 1.ng avia tion and the structure in wh1.C 've.i:-e accepted as legitimate by the participants- 350 Fourth, executives should recognize the need to maintain an equilibrium between the demands being made upon them by external and internal actors. NASA 's leaders' inability or unwillingness to understand that federal management requirements made establishing an authority structure acceptable by scientists and engineers almost impossible not only precluded any effective response to the problem of maintaining the support of their in-house staff, but also prevented them from seeking an external source which would fill the void left by the loss of support of these individuals. Fifth, and perhaps most important, some recognition should be given to the fact that there is no ideal management structure for all o rganizations. Different groups of individuals have different perceptions of what is acceptable authority. They are also motivated by different incentives. The applied and advanced engineering group s within NACA were a perfect example of this. Publishing NACA reports under their own name was a very effective control mechanism for the applied research group . It was not a very effective incentive for the advanced engineering group who were more interested in working on state-of-the-art projects. This would seem t o be a self-evident observation, but that apparently isn 't the case, if NACA's and NASA's history is any indication . Management systems are evaluated according to their efficiency as a management tool, not according to how they will help the organization perform its technical ac tivities. This seems particularly to be the case with regard to administrative management tools, which appear to be adopted with little consideration of their impact on the internal management of the organization or the performance of the technical task. The most striking 351 example of this is, of course, the personnel regulations which made it so difficult for NASA 's leaders to maintain their authority structure. It is also true fo r management s ys tems which have worked in the past. Thus, NACA's method of controlling its staff worked very well, but to s ugges t that it might work equally well for a g roup of individuals i nvolved in an activity such as putting tomatoes into cans just because it worked for NACA's leaders is ludicrous. 352 ORGANIZATIONS AND EXTERNAL ACTORS I attempted in the case study to show not only the internal management of the two organizations, but also their relationships with external actors . What came out of this approach was a rather fascinating history of the changes in federal management policies. Two aspects of these policies are worth discussing this point--the growth in power and number of oversight agencies, and the growing role of Congress in the day-to-day operations of federal organizations. Oversight Agencies Anyone who becomes familiar with the history of NACA and NASA begins to question the management policies of the federal government. The achievements of the two organizations are to even a non-technical person quite impressive. NACA's committee structure provided a mechanism for obtaining the advice of numerous experts without any cost to the taxpayer. Some of the changes introduced by its researchers remain in use today. Even the General Accounting Office, whose task it is to find performance problems, found the commitment of its staff rather remarkable. The only reasonable argument for the adoption of managemen t policies which essentially ended its existence would seem to be that its product was no longer needed. If NASA's failure to generate new ideas is indeed the reason for its decline, this alone is evidence of a need for an organization such as NACA. Similar observations can be made about NASA. Although its leaders accepted the management structure which NACA's leaders had tried to avoid, its activities after 1965 became subject to increasingly 353 numerous investigations by various organizations which had regulatory power over federal agencies. The rules and regulations which governed personnel regulations were particularly burdensome . If NASA's various coalitions were in agreement over nothing else, it was that the reductions-in-force were devastating to the organization and its ability to retain highly qualified researchers and managers. The enormous increase in personnel which occurred during its early years suggests that given a great deal of flexibility, its leaders could have brought its personnel complement down to a more acceptable level without the high costs associated with its actual reduction. The organization's inability to plan for what became almost arbitrarily set personnel ceilings, coupled with the Civil Service Commission ' s regulations concerning who could and could not be fired, made the rapid drop in the s taff's morale and the loss of many of its top scientists and engineers almost a certainty. Very few individuals are willing to remain in an organization in which they cannot obtain promotions or are uncertain about their future when they have other alternatives. The conclusion that NASA's decline occurred because of a failure of the executive function does not preclude the questioning of those management policies which so limited the alternatives open to NASA's l eaders and made it s o difficult for even an organization as committed to maintaining a research environment as NACA was, to continue in existence. One hesitates to conclude that it is impossible for a federal agency to engage in in-house research activities, but that does s e em to be the conclusion that naturally arises from the case study. The continual de mands for more and more controls by the oversight 354 agencies coupled with the belief that a bureaucratic structure is more efficient imply that it will become increasingly difficult to attract and retain highly qualified scientists and engineers or any individual who is responsible for an activity which requires a great deal of discretion. What does seem evident is that there needs to be some considera tion of the impact o f administrative requirements on the structur e of organizations and their capability to accomplish their objec tives. The fact that current management policies were adopted with t he assumption that there is an ideal structure for all organizations i ndicat es that there is very little understanding of the relationship between tasks and structures--a relationship which is accepted by most individuals who study organizations . The impact of this belief is evident even in the literature. Competing groups, dependency relationships, and other dysfunctional aspects of organizations whose s tructures do not f it their tasks are ac cepted not as dysfunctions, but as characteristics common to all organizations. The issue of whether they are a necessary part or only the r esult of an attempt to control the activities of the federal government should be addressed. Congress and the Executive Branch One of the issues which has surfaced repeatedly in the lite ratur e on public organizations has been the question of how to justify policy making by non-elected public officials in a democratic nation. The findings from the case study suggest that it may be necessary to address just the opposite issue: Whether it is desirable or necessary for 355 political decision makers to play such a large role in the execution of their own policies or in the internal management of the federal government to ensure accountability. The answer to the latter issue depends on how one feels about the responsibility of federal administrators toward political decision makers' objectives. Is it necessary in order to make sure that administrators perform as desired to develop as many rules and regulations as NACA and NASA faced? Is it necessary in a democratic nation for Congress and other outside evaluators to not only develop policies , but also the specific means of achieving those policies? Must it be assumed that public administrators will not carry out the objec tives set b y political decision makers? The case study would suggest that this assumption of irresponsibility on the part of public administrators is not entirely warranted . NACA 's leaders made mistakes, but a review of their records reveals individuals who strongly believed that the advancement of aviation r equired basic and applied research, a recognition of their limi t a tions in supplying this research, and a rather impressive commitment to providing Congress with full value fo r the funds they were given. NACA was criticized for its independence and unwillingness to respo nd to every demand made upon it, not for its lack of performance or its misuse of federal funds. The same might be noted for NASA, although perhaps less so. Evaluators including ~ongress blamed Webb for accepting the Executive Branch's decision about NASA's future objectives, not for his fai lur e to implement their demands. Rather interestingly then, and in contrast to r 356 NACA, NASA's leaders were blamed fo r their not being independent enough . The case s tudy in many ways points to a different conclusion abou t organizations a nd responsibility . NASA and NACA were rather ironically placed i n the position of having, if they wished to carry ou t their objectives, t o ac tua lly re f use to obey directives of outside eval uators . NACA ' s leaders spent a great deal of time try ing to co nvin ce Congr ess of the need for basic and applied research. That they were able to continue their applied research efforts at any level was undoubtedly due to their decision to provide the military services with the research results t hey wanted. This enabled them to convince Congress that they were generating practical results. The amount of discretion they were given allowed them to continue their appl ied research efforts while provi ding support to the military services. Even i f it is assumed that public employees must be controlle d to en sure that public f unds a re protected, it is not entirely clear tha t this is che result of current management practices. NACA's a nd NASA ' s inability to retain the resea rch environment demanded by highly qualified scientists and engineers meant that the work was either not performed o r performed by private parties. In NACA's case the agency ' s inability to perform scienti fic research meant that the research had to be performed by outsiders. One of the results of this was of course t hat the nation fell behind other nations in propulsion research. In o t her research and development organizations the work was ei ther performed by small research organizations or by private industry. This implies that either an objective set by Congress was not accomplished 357 or that it was performed under the a uspices of organizations which Congress had very little control over. The size of research and development contracts, the small number of sources for the type of work which organizations such as NASA require, and the difficulty of changing contractors once the work starts even if they perform poorly means that Congress may have even less control than it did over the researchers who worked for NACA. Although it is possible to argue that the agency which is responsible for letting the contracts can provide adequate control, this assumes that individuals who have ei ther not had any training in technical areas or who have become managers and therefore have not engaged in research on a continuous basis can adequately evaluate the work of individuals who are engaged in these tasks. What is more likely to occur is that the organization will become dependent on the good will of the contractors for the performance of the work. NASA's attempts to retain its in-house research group so that individuals responsible for research and development projects would not lose contact with what was being accomplished in their fields indicate its unwillingness to accept the assumption that non-technical individuals can oversee the work of technicians. Perhaps more important, one wonders whether the additional controls have not made federal agencies even less responsible for their work. There was very little incentive for NASA after 1965 to perform well. Its performance made little difference when its budget requests were evaluat ed. Civil Service regulations implied that individuals who performed poorly could be protected from being fired . NASA's inability 358 to funding level made setting any type of long-term predict its ob? There was little incentive to propose . Jectives very difficult. lnterest.i ng projects or even start them if funding could not be i they were subject to cancellation. obtained for them or f org . so ar has only dealt with the impact on federal The discussion f a 1 ity to do their jobs, but some note should be made anizat.i ons' b ? 1 at Congress's ability to make policy decisions might also Of th e fac t th be ? by its concentration on administrative and technical impaired NASA's history is one of continuous discussion in Congress lllatte rs tYPe of sp o av ce er vehicle or launch vehicle the nation should what very little discussion about what the nation's space policies Ptodu ce and Its refusal to continue a high level of funding for NASA can should be considered a policY decision, but it is not clear that it Perha ps be Congress continues today teco gnized e impact of this decision on NASA. th average age of NASA's researchers and the to raise the i?s sue of the high . of the aging staff on the organization's abilitY to accomplish effect There is little discussion of its role in the lts research activities. Discussion about the 1ack of a national space agin g of the staff. is carried on throughout NASA's authorization and appropriation Policy N t on the enormous need for hearl?. ngs. umerous agencies produce repor s e t ype of policy, and little is accomplished- Th? discussion is left som hearings continue on the technical aspects of NASA's program- and the ? technical decision making might not l.' lhile ro 1 e 1n e1i?t mhei nating Congress's . ld save the moneY spent on 1 l.1tt Prove situation it certa1n~Y wou ? s 1egis l a tive and executive tech . ' by NASA and the var1ou n1.ca1 reports both th agencl? .es responsible for producing effi? 359 What seems more important is that Congress's non-decision making has meant that the nation has begun, as it did in periods of previous radical technical changes, to fall behind other nations in space research and development. During the 1920s and 1940s this type of decision making was easy to remedy. 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Gregory, William H., "NASA Analyzes Shuttle Economics," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 99 (September 24, 1973), pp. 73-79. Grinold, Richard C., David S. P . Hopkins and William F. Massy, "A Model for Long-Range University Budget Planning Uncertainty," The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Autumn 1978), pp. 396-420. "House-Senate Conferees Order NASA to Maintain Fifth Orbiter Option," Aerospace Daily (July 1, 1980), pp. 3-4. "An Interview with Robert Gilruth," Phi Delta Kappan. 51 (September 1969), pp. 8-12. Jacobs, David. "Dependence and Vulnerability : An Exchange Approach to the Control of Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterl y , 19 (1974), pp . 45 - 59. Lakoff, Sanford A., "Congress and National Science Power," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Fall 1974), pp. 589-611. Lambright, W. Henry and Laurin L. Henry, "Using Universities: The NASA Experience," Public Policy, 20 (Winter 1972), pp. 61-82. 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"NASA's Goal: Keeping the US Number One in Aeronautics," Air Force Magazine, 59 (February 1976), pp. 36-40. Marcson, Simon. "Technical Men in Government," Science and Technology, January 1968, pp. 62-66. Mazlish, Bruce. "Following the Sun," The Wilson Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 4 (Autumn 1980), pp. 90-93. McDougall. Walter G. "The Scramble for Space," The Wilson Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 4 (Autumn 1980), pp. 71-82. Mendelbaum, Leonard. "Apollo: How the United States Decided to Go to the Moon," Science, 63 (February 14, 1969), pp. 649-653. Murphy, Thomas P. "Congressional Liaison: The NASA Case," Western Political Quarterly, 25 (June 1972), pp. 192-214. "NACA - The Force Behind Air Supremacy," Aviation (Ja nuary 1944). "NASA in Troule with Congress, Executive, Scientists," Nature, 231 (June 11, 1971), pp. 346-348. "NASA Set to Brief Congress on Fund Cut Program Damage," Aviation Week & Space Technology (March 24, 1980). "The Next Decade in Space," Nature, 225 (March 21, 1970), pp. 1085-1087. Oates, Stephen B. "NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center at Houston, Texas," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 67 (January 1964), pp. 350-375. "Potential Budget Cutbacks Threaten Space Programs," Aviation Week & Space Technology (March 10, 1980), p. 20. 373 Prager, Denis J. and Gilbert S. Omenn. "Research, Innovation, and University-Industry Linkages," Science, 207 (January 1980), pp. 379-384. Roland, Alex F. "The National Advisory Connnittee for Aeronautics," Prologue: The Journal of the National Archives (Summer 1978), pp. 68-81. "Returns to Earth," The Wilson Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 4 (Autumn 1980), pp. 83-89. Rouson, Brigette. "Space Shuttle Funds Increased: $5.6 Billion NASA Authorization Passed," Congressional Quarterly (June 21, 1980), p. 1723. Schulman, Paul R. "Nonincremental Policy Making: Notes Toward an Alternative Paradigm," The American Political Science Review, 69 (December 1975), pp. 1354-1370. 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"Space Agency Torn by Feuds in Uncertainty over Its Future, " The New York Times, November 11, 1969, p. 1 . D. NACA Materials The following documents are stored at the National Archives, Record Group 255, Washington, D.C. 37 6 377 1. Memoranda Memorandum from David W. Taylor to William F. Durand, February 13, 1913. Memorandum from Richard MacLaurin to Senator W. Murray Crane, February 14, 1913. Memorandum from John F. Victory to William F. Durand, August 31, 1918. Memorandum from Leigh M. Griffith to Executive Committee, September 4, 1918. Memorandum from Robert A. Millikan to George Ellery Hale, July 31, 1918. Memorandum f rom E. B. Wilson to George :llery Hale, July 31, 1918. Memorandum fo r Executive Officer from Assis tant Secretary . Subject: Conditions at Committee's Field Station, Langley Field; Recommendations. February 16, 1920. Memorandum from Dr. Joseph Ames to William F. Durand, August 19, 1918. Memorandum from Leigh M. Griffith to Executive Committee, April 8, 1919. Memorandum from George W. Lewis to Staff, February 11, 1922 . Memorandum to Executive Officer and Assistant Secretary from Research Laboratory, Leigh W. Griffith, March 31, 1922. Memorandum from George W. Lewis to Langley, November 11, 1926. Memorandum from George W. Lewis to Henry J . E. Reid, February 15, 1926. Memorandum from Dr. Joseph Ames to the Committee on Personnel, Buildings, and Equipment, June 28 , 1927. Memorandum from George Mead to Vannevar Bush, May 20, 1940. Memorandum from Harold G. Moulton to Vannevar Bush, June 3, 1940 . Memorandum from W. R. Sears to Jerome Hunsaker, March 30 , 1948. 378 Memorandum from Hugh Dryden to W. R. Sears, April 13, 1948. Memorandum from Hugh Dryden to Jerome Hunsaker, April 13, 1948. Memorandum from Jerome Hunsaker to Harry S. Truman, February 7, 1949. Memorandum for the Director, NACA, "Final Report of Ad Hoc Committee on NASA Organization Based on the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958," Chairman Ira H. Abbot, August 1958. 379 2. Reports Ames, Joseph S. "Importance of Scientific Investigation in a General Aeronautical Program." Paper presented at National Aeronautical Association, October 11-14, 1922, Detroit, Michigan. Documentary History of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics." Typescript, n.d. Dryden, Hugh L. "The Aeronautical Research Scene -- Goals, Methods and Accomplishments," Thirty-Seventh Annual Wilbur Wright Lecture, April 28, 1949, London, England. "Functions and Responsibilities of Standing Committees and Subcommittees of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics." January 1, 1950. Griffith, Leigh M. "Final Report of Engineer-in-Charge to the National Committee for Aeronautics Covering the Period Ending December 31, 1925." Hinkle, Captain Wayne K. "An Administrative Survey of NACA, 1949." NASA History Office files, Washington, D.C. Hunsaker, Jerome C. "Aeronautical Research Policy." Prepared for Appearance before House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy on January 26, 1945. Kolcum, Harry. "The History of NACA." Reprints of a series of 12 articles on "The History and Accomplishments o f NACA," published during April and May 1958 in The Times-Herald, Newport News, Virginia. NASA History Office files, Washington, D.C. I NACA. "Guided Missiles, NACA Program .:ind Facilities." December 15, 1944. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. Annual Report on the NACA Management Improvement Program, Fiscal Year 1952, September 1952. Annual Report on th_~ NACA Management Improvement Program, Fiscal Year 1953, September 1953. Special Committee on Spa ce Te chno l o gy . Recommenda tion Regarding a National Civilian Spac e Pr ogram, 1 958 . 380 Special Committee on Space Technology. A National Integrated Missile and Space Vehicle Development Program, 1958. "Minutes of Executive and Full Committee," 1915-1958. Annual Report of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. Published Annually, 1916-1959. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. "Report of Director of Aeronautical Research," Submitted to the National Advisory Committee of Aeronautics at its Annual Meeting, October 23, 1947. E. NASA Documents Unless otherwise specified the following documents can be found at the NASA History Office, Washington, D. C. 381 382 1. Memoranda Memorandum to Messrs. Dryden, Horner, Siepert, Johnson, Silverstein, Stewart, Hjovnivik, from T. Keith Glennan. Subject: JPL-NASA Rela t ionship. n.d., but approximately October 1959. Memorandum fo r the Administrator from Homer J . St ewart, Director, Office of Program Planning and Evaluation. Subject: The Spacecraf t Procur ement Problem, February 19, 1960. Memorandum from T. Keith Glennan to Participants a t the Will iamsburg Co nfer e nc e. Sub jec t: Staff Paper on Project Management, October 14, 1960. Memo r andum to Director of Business Administration from B. Valentine, Management Analysis, via Director of Management Analysis . Subject: Proposed Establishment of a n Office to Perform Headquarters Procurement, May 3, 1961. Memorandum to Assistant Administrator, through Director of Administration from Walter Hahn. Subject: Ina d e quate a nd Conflicting Management Syst ems, September 28, 1 962 . Letter t o Mr . Robert Rosholt from Al Siepert, December 23, 1964 . Memorandum to Dr. Eugene Emme, NASA Historian, f rom Dr. Carl Schreike, Assistant to the Director of Procurement. Subject: Administra tive History of NASA by Robert Rosholt, J a nuary 8, 1965. Memo randum from James E. Webb to Staff, "Office of the Administrator," December 29, 1965. Memorandum to Dr. Seamans from Mr. Webb. Subject: FY 1966 Budget Submission to BOB, n.d. Memorandum from the Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications . Subject: Functions and Authorities of Program Managers and Project Managers o n OSSA Flight Progr ams, J une 26, 1967. Memorandum to Mr . Romatowski from James[ . Webb, October 27, 1967. Memorandum for the Record, January 9, 1968 . Subject : Discussion of Personnel Management Review Committee with Mr. Webb on January 8, 1968 . 383 Memorandum for the Record, January 29, 1968. Subject: Interview with Mr. Boyd Meyers on January 29, 1968. Memorandum for the Record, January 30, 1968. Subject: Discussion with OSSA Top Management on January 29, 1968. Memorandum for the Record, February 2, 1968. Subject: Personnel Management Review Committee Discussion with Mr. William Lilly on January 30, 1968. Memorandum for the Record, February 5, 1968. Subject: Field Trip of Personnel Management Review Committee to Langley Research Center on January 23, 1968 . Memorandum for the Record, February 5, 1968. Subject: Trip to Marshall Space Flight Center on January 25 , 1968. Memorandum for the Record, February 5, 1968. Subject: Trip to Lewis Research Center on January 26, 1968. Memorandum for the Record, February 14, 1968. Subject: Interview with Dr. Homer E. Newell on February 13, 1968. Memorandum to All Committee Members, Personnel Management Review Committee, from Executive Secretary Ray Kline. Subject: Consolidation of Comments on Items in the CSC Inspection Report, February 21, 1968. Memorandum from Braithwaite to Shapley, "History of Super-Grade Positions: NACA / NASA," April 23, 1968. Excerpt from letter to the Honorable Charles J. Zwick, Director, BOB, from Dr. Thomas O. Paine, Acting Administrator, NASA, October 14, 1968. Memorandum to Planning Steering Group from Marshall Space Flight Center (van Braun) in Response to Questions Left by Dr. Newell, November 14, 1968. Memorandum from Robert R. Gilruth, Director, Manned Space Flight Center, to George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, January 9, 1969. Xemorandum to Dr. T . 0. Paine, Administrator, from Wernher van Braun, Director, Marshall Space Flight Center . Subject: MSFC Comments to Report of NASA Personnel Management Review Committee, August 16, 1969 . 384 Memorandum from C. E. Weakley, Assistant Administrator for Management Development, to Dr. Paine, NASA Administrator, September 19, 1969. Memorandum to Mr . Paul E. Cotton, Associate Administrator for Center Operations from Director of Administration, Lewis Research Center, September 24, 1976. Memorandum to the Honorable Edmund S. Muskie, Chairman, and the Honorable Henry Bellman, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on the Budget, U.S. Senate, from Elmer B. Staats, Comptrolle r General of the United States. Subject: NASA's 1979 supplemental request, March 16, 1979. 385 2. Internal Documents NASA Special Committee on Space Technology. "Recommendations Regarding a National Civil Space Program." (Interior Committee Report), October 28, 1958. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Personnel Division. Project and Program Management, September 1960. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Report of the Advisory Committee on Organization (Kimpton Report), October 12, 1960. Dryden, Hugh L. "The Utilization of Technical Personnel in the Space Age." Address at Engineering Manpower Conference, Rocky Mountain Region, Denver, Colorado, May 8, 1961. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Statement on Patterns of Management of Research. Prepared for the Federal Council for Science and Technology, Panel on Methods for Improving the Management of Federally Financed Research in Accordance with Outline Prepared by Panel, June 1961. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Management Analysis Division. "Organizing to Ac hieve the Objective of an Accelerating Civilian Space Program," Draft Staff Study, August 7, 1961. NASA General Management Instruction 4-1-5. 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NASA History Office files, Washington, D.C. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics f or the Fis Y ce aa lr Ended June 30, 1955, July 26, 1956. NASA Headquarters History Office files, Washington, D.C. "Potential Savings Available through the Use of Civil Service Rather than Contractor-Furnished Employees tor Certai S nu pport Services, NASA," June, 1967. NASA History Office files, Washington, D.C. U.S. President (Johnson). _R_e~p_o_r_t _t_ o_t_h_e_C_o_n~g~r_e_s_s_f_-_r_o_m_t_h_e_P_r_e_s_i_d_e_n o =tf the United States. United States Aeronautics and Space Activities, 1963, Janua-ry- -27-, -1-96-4-. --NA-S-A -H-e-ad-q-ua-r-te"rs- H-i-story Office, Washington, D.C. Wiesner, Jerome B. e;t ai... "Report to the President-Elect of the Ad H C oco . mmittee on Space," January 10, 1961. NASA History Office files, Washington, D.C. G. Unpublished Work 401 402 Abbot, Ira H. "A Review and Commentary of a Thesis by Arthur L. Levine entitled 'U.S. Aeronautical Research Policy, 1915-1958' ," Unpublished manuscript, April 1964. Ambrose, Mary Stone. "The National Space Program, Phase I: Passage of the 'National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958'." Unpublished Masters Thesis, American University, Washington, D.C., 1960. Bok, Enid Curtis. "The Establishment of NASA: The Political Role of Advisory Scientists." Paper to Be Presented at the Philadelphia Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, December 27, 1962, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Crocker, J. Allen. "The National Aeronautics and Space Administration: A Study of Organization." Unpublished Masters Thesis, The George Washington University, June 1962. Grossbard, Stephen Ira. "The Civilian Space Program: A Case Study in Civilian - Hili tary Relations." Unpublished Doc tor al Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1968. Jahnige, Thomas P. "Congress and Space." Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1965. Keller, Michael D. "From Kitty Hawk to Muroc: A History of the NACA Langley Laboratory, 1917-1947." Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Arizona, 1968. Kerr, James R. "Congressmen as Overseers: Surveillance of the Space Program." Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Stanford University, 1963. Levine, Arthur S. "United States Aeronautical Research Policy, 1915 - 1958: A Study of the Major Policy Decisions of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics." Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Columbia University , 1963. Luczak, B. R. "A Management and Procedural Analysis of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics." Unpublished paper submitted to the Stanford University Graduat e School of Business Administration, 1950. Reingold, Nathan. "The National Advisor y Committee for Aeronaut ics ." Unpublished Masters Thesis , Study undertaken for National Sc ience Foundation, n.d., vi.Aca 1953. National Science Foundation f iles, Washington, D.C. 403 Rubin, Irene. "Politics and Retrenchment in the City: A Case Study." Paper presented at the Mid West Political Science Meetings, April 1979. Schoet tle, Enid Curtis Bok. "Space and the Policy-Making Process." Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1967. Victory, John F. " A Half Century of Aeronautical Research." Speech given at Norwich University, April 30 , 1956, Northfield, Vermont. Wojtalik, Fred F. "NASA Space Program Planning." Unpublished Masters Thesis, Massachusetts Inst itute of Technology, June 1969. APPENDIX A Personnel and Appropriations Breakdown for NACA and NASA 404 NACA PERSONNEL DATA He .adq UM.t e.!1,6 FJ ..e.fd Tota.?. Tota.?. Sa.?.cvue/2 ($) 7975 1 0 1 1,200 7976 1 0 1 1,200 7977 5 0 5 5,500 1918 37 3 40 62,220 7979 33 11 44 86,650 7920 36 27 63 125,380 7927 22 44 66 123,967 7922 13 56 69 7923 8 75 83 7924 23 77 100 204,436 7925 23 107 130 270,192 7926 24 131 145 302,648 7927 24 141 165 341,574 7928 29 156 185 307,372 7929 21 177 198 7930 38 202 240 532,265 7937 43 240 283 624,931 7932 44 268 312 675,176 7933 44 268 312 671,321 1934 41 266 307 668,640 7935 38 250 288 655,860 79 36 so 343 393 861,719 7937 48 398 446 950,415 405 NACA PERSONNEL DATA (continued) He .adq u.aJU:e.M Fie.ld To.ta.?. To .ta-e sa-ea.JUe/2 ($) 7938 50 430 480 1,042,510 7939 53 447 500 1940 64 598 662 1,418,385 1941 80 797 877 1,875,414 1942 132 1,642 1,774 3,492, 210 1943 131 2,634 2,765 5,702,099 1944 124 4,37 0 4,494 9,748,786 1945 119 5,958 6,077 13,999,593 1946 117 5,336 5,453 15,549,016 1947 157 5,773 5,930 19,322,625 1948 125 6,138 6,263 21,438,303 7949 141 6,915 7,056 7950 157 7,129 7,286 29,061,389 7957 172 7,533 7,705 32,682,192 7952 168 5,540 7,708 35,426,912 7953 168 7,487 7,655 36,365,275 7954 157 7,000 7,157 36,708 ,193 7955 155 7,415 7,570 39,505,216 7956 163 7,765 7,928 44,586,938 7957 258 7,889 8,147 49,250,032 7958 276 7,765 8,041 SoWLc.e.: Alex Roland,Research by Committee: A History of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1915-1958, Comment Edition, NASA History Office, April, 1980. 4C6 NACA APPROPRIATIONS GENERAL PURPOSES CONSTRUCTION TOTAL 1915 5,000.00 5,000.00 1916 5,000.00 5,000.00 1917 18,515.70 69,000.00 87,515.70 191 8 82,000.00 40,000.00 112,000.00 7979 167,000.00 38,000.00 205,000.00 7920 169,600.00 5,400.00 175,000.00 7927 192,000.00 8,000.00 200,000.00 7922 197,000.00 3,000.00 200,000.00 7923 215,600.00 10,000.00 225,600.00 7924 307,000.00 307,000.00 7925 470,000.00 470,000.00 7926 494,000.00 40,000.00 534,000.00 7927 513,000.00 513,000.00 7928 525,000.00 25,000.00 550,000.00 7929 623,770.00 213,000.00 836,770.00 1930 745,000.00 555,000.00 1,300,000.00 7937 886,000.00 435,000.00 1,321,000.00 7932 1,051,070.00 1,051,070.00 7933 920,000.00 920,000.00 193d 705,701.06 247,944.00 953,645.06 7935 777, 478.93 47 8 ,300.00 1, 255 ,778.93 7936 1 ,17 6 , 884 . 35 1, 776 , 889 .35 407 NACA APPROPRIATIONS (Continued) GENERAL PURPOSES CONSTRUCTION TOTAL 7937 ],277,550.00 1,720,000.00 2,997,550.00 1938 1,280,850.00 1,280,850.00 7939 1,723,980.00 2,340,000.00 4,063,980.00 1940 1,849,020.00 2,330,980.00 4,180.000.00 1941 2,800,000.00 8,400,000.00 11,200,000.00 1942 6,220,465.00 13,645,445.00 19,865,910.00 1943 13,113,736.00 12,315,000.00 25,428,736.00 1944 19,635,415.00 18,756,800.00 38,892,215.00 a 1945 26,557,330.00 14,385,000.00 40,942,330.00 7946 24,014,393.00 37,267.63 24,051,660.63 b 7947 27,615,000.00 3,098,000.00 30,713,000.00 1948 33,570,000.00 9,879,000.00 43,449,000.00 7949 38,652,000.00 10,000,000.00 48,652,000.00 1950 43,000,000.00 85,000.000.00 128 ,000,000.00 7957 45,750,000.00 17,318,000.00 63,068,000.00 7952 50,650,000.00 18,350,000.00 69,000,000.00 7953 48,586,100.00 17,700,000.00 66,296,100.00 19 54 51,000,000.00 11,439,000.00 62,439,000.00 7955 51,240,000.00 4,620,000.00 55 ,860,000.00 7956 60,135,000.00 12,565,000.00 72,700,000.00 7957 62,676,500.00 14,000,000.00 76,676,500.00 1958 76,076,209.00 41,200,000.00 117,276,209.00 7959 78,100,000.00 23,000,000.00 101,100,000.00 408 NACA APPROPRIATIONS (Continued) a $4,611,330 transferred from the Navy and the Federal Works Administration. b $110,872 transferred from the Navy. Source: Alex Roland, Research by Committee: A History of the National Advisory Cormnittee for Aeronautics: 1915-1958, Comment Edition, NASA Headquarters History Office, April, 1980. 409 tlACA Al'i'l(Ol'RlAT IONS llv ,1, /q1111 ?, t ~, 4 latt!Jl~!J At11M 1940 Ll.'JUi.& 157,946 W?Uopl 1,61,1,150 IISl'S 101, ,020 1'1-11 I 96,935 2,091,1189 19-12 229,307 328,979 4,215,736 94j 828,9 2) 1 421,798 371,353 6,002 ,1,1,7 1,601, ,651 1944 4,559,693 l1JC, ,'.i86 7,f.67,517 2,535,)86 19,15 7,972,1,2) 1,07, BOG 10,8)2,226 3,050,071 1946 10,455,750 764, 200 13,616,625 ,17 4, 92 l, 6 60 19 13, 9)0, 7 lJ (,23,612 11,826,)15 356 1948 3,% 2, 12,3511,4)8 l,3'!2,862 13,691,, 187 1949 5,1) 1,,140 12,708,420 7U8,)5G 15,327,202 6,126,2)0 19~0 11,, 315, )Ol (:i/13,)76 095, 121, 26,920 16,705,71.8 ) 1951 6,990 ,9) 2 16,0liJ,756 1,001,1142 466,407 0 17,631,971, 685,07 1952 7,5)5,) 10 16,416,)86 J, 200,6)7 80),'} ()l, 19,280 l'.1,692, 928 9 1953 8,277,495 18,381,205 1, l37, 088 777,545 60 19,261,787 1,208,1 1954 1,7911,5]1 17,292,736 1,31,0,524 591,, 371 , J(,8 ,ooo 19,503,862 1 1955 7,980,951 17,598,976 1,))8,752 756,09) 0,117,456 1,4 37,)00 2 1956 8,498,0ll 1,5111 ,237 18,207,519 687,925 22,08),125 1,705,100 ll,269,561 1957 21,996,"15 1,62),981 910,217 27,796,270 1,91),100 lJ,267,350 1958 25,662,580 1,958,201. 1,001 ,00'; 12,771,, 912 2,117,600 20,312,089 30, 1,6 1, 111,0 S01111ce 1: 2,32),465 0 l'll10- l'J55, !!~ _fl?!~ ll?!; 2,565,)0 l956 - J95U, NACA ~~ j ~e f'~_!: ; Alex Rollind , ~ c.!!_J~ C',011u11ltt~ ~ 1--' a -~ Personnel Summary Onboard at End of Fiscal Year* HISTAUJ..TJON FY 1978 FY 1971 FY 1976 FY 1975 FY 1974 FY 197 3 FY 1972 FY 1911 FY 1970 NASA lleadquarters 1,606 1,619 1,708 1,673 1,734 1,747 1,755 1,894 2,187 Ames Research Center 1,691 1,645 1,724 1,754 1,776 1,740 1,844 1,968 2,033 Dryden Flight Center 514 546 566 544 531 509 539 579 583 Goddard Sp. Flt, Ctr. J,641 J,666 J,808 3,871 J,936 3,852 4,178 4,459 4,487 Kennedy Space Center 2,234 2,270 2,404 2,377 2,408 2,516 2,568 2,704 2,895 Longley Research Ctr. 3,167 3,207 3,407 J,472 3,504 3,389 3,592 3,830 3,970 Lewis Research Center 2,964 J,061 3,168 3,181 3,172 3,368 3,866 4,083 4,240 Johnson Space Center J,617 3,640 3,796 3,877 3,886 3,896 3,935 4,298 4,539 Marshall Sp. Flt. Ctr. 3,808 4,014 4,336 4,337 4,574 5,287 5,555 6,060 6,325 Space Nuclear Sys. Off. -- -- -- -- -- -- 45 89 103 NASA Pasadena Off.(N/\PO) -- -- -- 35 39 39 40 44 72 Wallops Flight Center 429 t,26 437 441 447 434 465 497 522 Natl . Space Tech . Lab . 108 94 72 76 NASA TOTAL 23, 779 8 34,188 25,426 25,638 26,007 26,777 ? 28,382 JO, 506 32,548b Inc ludes temporary per sonnel a Excludes 859 employees in the youth programs b Includes 592 of ERC which closed 6/30/70 SotVle ~: U.S . Congress, House. Committee on Science and Technolo A gyp , pl Si uc ba ct oio mn ms. i ttee onU n Si pt ae cd e S St ca it ee ns c eC i av ni dl ian Seace.Program P sr :i n 1t 9. 58W -1a 9s 7h 8i .n gt 9o 7n t, h D C. oC n. g: ., lat SG eo sv ae .,r n Cm oe mnt m iP ttr ei en ting Office, 1981. ..,.. f-' f-' NASA PERSONNEL SUMMARY OnboarJ at End of Fi11cal Year ? INSTAUATION FY 1969 FY 1968 FY 1967 FY 1966 FY 1965 FY 1964 FY 196 3 FY 1962 FY 1961 FY 1960 FY 1959 NASA Headquarters 2,293 2,310 2,336 2,135 2,135 2,158 2,001 1,477 735 587 492 Amee Research Ctr. 2,117 2,197 2,264 2,310 2,270 2,204 2,116 1,658 1,471 1,421 1,464 Electronics R.Ctr. 9H 950 791 555 250 33~_/ 25~/ Dryden Flt. R.Ctr. 601 622 642 662 669 619 616 539 447 408 340 Goddard Sp.nt.Ctr. 4,295 4,073 3,997 3,958 3,774 3,675 3,487 2,755 1,599 1,255 398 Kennedy Sp. Ctr. 3,058 3,044 2,867 2,669 2,464 1,625 1,181 339 Langley R. Ctr. 4,087 4,219 4,405 4,485 4,371 4,330 4,220 3,894 3,338 3,203 3,624 Lewis ll. Ctr. 4,339 4,583 4,956 8,047 4,897 4,859 4,697 3,800 2,773 2,722 3,809 Johnson Sp. Ctr. 4,751 4,956 5,407 4,487 4,859 4,277 3,345 l,786 794 In GSi'C MarshallSp.Flt.Ctr. 6,639 6,935 7,602 7,740 7,719 7,679 7,322 6,843 5,948 370 Pacific Launch Ope. -- -- -- M 2l 22 17 Sp.Nuclear Sys. Ofc. 104 108 113 115 116 112 96 39 4 Western Support Ofc. -- 5:../ 119 294 377 376 308 136 60 37 NASA Pasadena Ofc. 80 79 91 85 376 ~ Wallops Station 554 565 - 5- 7(> --- - 563 --- 55- 4 -- - 5- 30 - --- 493 421 3- 2- 2 -- -- 220 - 17- 1 -NASA TOTAL 23,929 - -34 - -,64 -1 35,860 35,708 34,049 32,499 29,934 23,686 17,471 10,232 9,235 - ------------------------ !_/ Prior years figures included in WSO. ? Includes tew b/ p orary personnel. - figures for North Eastern Office. ~/ Effective in 1966 PLOD activity was wei-geJ with l