ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation:	MULTICULTURAL POLITICS AND NATIONAL BOUNDARY MAKING IN KOREA: MAPPING THE INTERSECTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF NATION, GENDER, CLASS, AND ETHNICITY IN STATE POLICY AND PRACTICE
	Sojin Yu, Doctor of Philosophy, 2019
Dissertation directed by:	Professor, Kris Marsh, Department of Sociology

This dissertation examines the conception and implementation of state multicultural policy to analyze how migrants are received and incorporated within South Korea, a newly emergent migrant receiving country in Asia. To this end, I conducted ethnographic research at two Centers established to enact governmental multicultural policy, focusing on the separate accounts and experiences of ground-level policy practitioners (Koreans) and targeted recipients (migrants) in relation to the policy implementation and its 'real world' effects. The results show the varied and conflicting perspectives of those involved, and how they are informed by the intersecting social constructs of nation, ethnicity, gender, family, and class. These intersectional workings and effects also contribute to the unequal social relations between Koreans and migrants, especially in shaping a particular national form of 'racism' against migrants, and helping to maintain the previously unchallenged

formation of national identity in Korea. Three thematically arranged analysis chapters discuss specifically how these social processes serve to form and naturalize social hierarchies and powers in Korea, with each chapter examining a specific intersectional circumstance: The intersection of gender inequality and nationalism; the intersection of class and nation(ality); and, the emphasis of joint Korean nationality and ethnicity in the multicultural policy. Each chapter illustrates the predominance of nationalism, as the critical mechanism and rationale behind Korea's contested multicultural politics, and the central axis to connect with other dimensions of power including gender, class, and ethnicity. The combined research outcomes reveal the complex ways in which the inter-group relations and hierarchies are organized, through the state policy, bureaucratic practice and individual agency.

MULTICULTURAL POLITICS AND NATIONAL BOUNDARY MAKING IN KOREA: MAPPING THE INTERSECTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF NATION, GENDER, CLASS, AND ETHNICITY IN STATE POLICY AND PRACTICE

by

Sojin Yu

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2019

Advisory Committee:
Professor Kris Marsh, Chair
Professor Feinian Chen
Professor Janelle Wong
Professor Patricia Hill Collins
Professor Rashawn Ray

© Copyright by
Sojin Yu
2019

Dedication

I thank Luke, my husband, who encouraged and supported me throughout this entire dissertation project. He was always there to help me not only with minding Bo, our little girl, so that I could have time and space to focus on this research, but also with giving me confidence and trust, which I needed the most. I also thank my parents and my sister for being supportive and dependable during the ethnography and writing up process.

Acknowledgements

I thank all my committee members for their support and encouragement during this dissertation project: Dr. Kris Marsh, my advisor, for her insightful feedback and patience through all these years; Dr. Feinian Chen, my second-year paper advisor and co-author, for her incredibly kind words and consistent support; Dr. Patricia Hill Collins, for giving me the inspiration for this work and my academic interests; Dr. Rashawn Ray, for providing me with many astute comments which I am sure will help me go further with this project; and Dr. Janelle Wong, for accepting my rather late request to be the dean's representative for my defense. Finally, this dissertation was only possible due to all the participants who shared their precious time and thoughts with me.

Table of Contents

Dedication ii
Acknowledgements iii
Table of Contents iv
List of Tables vi
List of Figures vii
List of Abbreviations and Terms viii
Chapter 1: Introduction 1
1.1 Ethnic nationalism and multiculturalism 1
1.2 Research questions 7
1.3 Theoretical grounds 8
1.4 Significance 12
1.5 The chapter outlines 14
Chapter 2: Background and Context 18
2.1 Korean ‘minjok’, others, and nation 18
2.2 An emerging ‘damunwha (multicultural)’ country 21
2.3 The phenomenon of marriage migration and the Korean state 24
2.4 Multicultural politics: the birth of the Multicultural Family Support Act (MFSA) 28
2.5 The Multicultural Family Support Centers 31
2.6 The discourse of ‘multicultural families’: gender, ethnicity, and nation 35
2.7 Is the Korean policy a ‘multicultural’ policy? 41
2.8 The debates on multiculturalism 44
2.9 Chapter summary 51
Chapter 3: Methods and Methodologies 52
3.1 Ethnography 52
3.2 Intersectionality as a methodological framework 54
3.3 Two research sites: The Multicultural Family Support Centers 56
3.3.1 Center I: Paddy Field 57
3.3.2 Center II: Overpass 59
3.3.3 Comparative Study of Paddy Field and Overpass 60
3.4 Access, building relationships, and methodological approaches 63
3.5 Sampling interviewees 66
3.6 My relationship to the topic 68
3.7 Data collection 72
3.8 Data analysis: Grounded Theory Methods (GTM) 74
3.9 Basic information of interviewees 77
Chapter 4: Gender Inequality and Nationalism 86
4.1 Korean Employees 86
4.1.1 Theme I: The reproductive role of migrants for the nation 86
4.1.2 Theme II: Performing gender roles for the nation 93
4.1.3 Theme III: Overlooking the migrants’ experience of patriarchy 101
4.2 Migrant Users 106

4.2.1 Theme I: The oppressive nature of Korean patriarchy 107
4.2.2 Theme II: Asserting rights through 'maternal citizenship' 114
4.2.3 Theme III: Migrant mothers and their language burdens 118
4.3 Migrant Non-users 123
4.3.1 Theme I: Centers are for migrant women and mothers only 123
4.4 Chapter summary 130
Chapter 5: Migrants as Social Beneficiaries: Class and Nation 140
5.1 Korean Employees 140
5.1.1 Theme I: Multicultural, but from which country? 140
5.1.2 Theme II: The conflicting image: social welfare recipients but actually wealthy? 144
5.2 Migrant Users... 153
5.2.1 Theme I: Class gaps in the evaluations of the Centers 153
5.2.2 Theme II: Migrants at the intersection.. 158
5.3 Migrant Non-users 166
5.3.1 Theme I: Opting out of the public services... 166
5.4 Chapter summary 170
Chapter 6: The Discriminating Effects of Multicultural Policy as a Nationalist Project 177
6.1 Korean Employees 177
6.1.1 Theme I: 'Difference, difference, and difference' 177
6.1.2 Theme II: Woori (we/us) at the center 182
6.1.3 Theme III: Bureaucracy as the root of the problems 191
6.2 Migrants (Users and Non-users) 197
6.2.1 Theme I: How difference is experienced 197
6.2.2 Theme II: The unfeasibility of becoming a 'Korean' 206
6.3 Chapter summary 214
Chapter 7: Conclusion.. 222
Appendices.. 232
Appendix A: List of Interview Questions... 233
Appendix B: Informed Consent Form 235
Appendix C: Advertisement Form.. 244
Appendix D: Final Codes.. 247
Bibliography 248

List of Tables

Table 1. Timeline of Multicultural Policy 33
Table 2. Timeline of Fieldwork 52
Table 3. Participant Demographic Information 80
Table 4. Brief Profiles of Respondents: Korean Employees (in alphabetical order).. 81
Table 5. Brief Profiles of Respondents: Migrants (in alphabetical order).................. 82

List of Figures

Figure 1. Viewpoints by Groups- Chapter 4: Gender and Nation 138
Figure 2. Viewpoints by Groups- Chapter 5: Class and Nation 175
Figure 3. Viewpoints by Groups- Chapter 6: A Nationalist Project 220

List of Abbreviations and Terms

Abbreviations

CERD	Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
MFSA	Multicultural Family Support Act
NAP	National Action Plan for the Promotion and the Protection of Human rights

Terms

Asian	Someone who comes from the continent of Asia, or a member of a group of people originally from Asia. In this thesis, Asian includes the East Asians such as Koreans, Japanese, and Chinese, but also the South East Asians such as Vietnamese, Cambodians, Filipinos, Thais, Indians etc.
damunwha	A Korean term literally translated as multiple cultures or multicultural. Originally used to move away from a few derogatory terms to refer to non-Korean people, this term is now commonly used to refer to the particular family type consisting of a Korean and his/her foreign spouse, often including their children. It also refers to the multicultural policy itself or those benefiting it.
hanminjok	A Korean term translatable to *uni-minjok*, or one *minjok*. This typically refers to a Korean *minjok* that is meant to be homogenous and unified. Along with the term *minjok*, *hanminjok* is interchangeably and commonly used to denote Korean people as a homogenous group.
Kulturnation	The German noun *Kultur* translates to civilization and culture. The notion of cultural nation describes a conception that understands a nation as a community of people who feel connected to one another through culture. Following Yuval-Davis (1997; 2003), it is a dimension of nationalist project based on the notion that people within a nation is culturally connected through language, traditions and others.

minjok — A Korean term that can be translated into people, nation, race, and ethnicity. It is an identity constructed based on the belief that a group of *minjok* shares the same history, culture, territory, and gene (blood).

Staatnation — It is a civic dimension of nationalist project defined by Yuval-Davis (1997; 2003), differentiated from the other two dimensions, *Volknation* and *Kulturnation*. A German term translated as 'state-defined' nation, *Staatnation* is based on a political history and a constitution recognized by its members (Kremer 2016)

sunhyul — A Korean term literally translated as pure blood. It is grounded on the idea that the Korean or any *minjok* shares the same blood. This term shows the genealogical and biological meanings attached to being a Korean.

Volknation — The German noun *Volk* translates to people, both uncountable in the sense of people as in a crowd, and countable (plural *Völker*) in the sense of a people as in an ethnic group or nation (compare the English term folk). Being one of the 'three major dimensions of nationalist projects' defined by Yuval-Davis (1997; 2003), *Volknation* is the genealogical dimension in which nation is believed to be constructed around the specific origin of the people (or their race).

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Ethnic nationalism and multiculturalism

Can racism be possible without a 'common sense' notion of 'race' in relation to skin color, as it exists in the West? What does it mean to have a multicultural policy in a country where there are no other 'races' per se to deal with? How might such policy be constructed and what would its aim be? How is the policy understood and experienced by those who are involved? This study aims to address precisely these ideas in the context of South Korea, a nation that has witnessed a tremendous increase in its migrant population over the last two decades, with a resultant rise in populist ideas of nationalism and ethnic essentialism, and state sponsored multiculturalism. As a country in transition from being ethnically 'homogenous' to a diverse 'globalized' nation, contemporary South Korea offers a complex social, political, and cultural setting, where the issues related to migration, the construction of race, nation, racism, and multiculturalism can be explored in a new light.

East Asian countries such as Korea have long been considered as racially and ethnically homogeneous. Scholars have attempted to debunk this 'myth' of Korean homogeneity, unveiling the historical, regional processes in which such myths of racial essentialism have been constructed and articulated (Em, 1999; Pai, 2000; Tikhonov, 2010; J.K. Kim, 2015). Yet the dominant perception has long remained that the East Asian nations including Korea consist of racially, and ethnically homogeneous populations. 'Koreans' themselves also have embraced the notion that

they share a common racial/ethnic identity based on the common 'blood' or ancestry (Shin, 2006).

In this context, the recent influx of migrants into Korea has significantly unsettled these deep-seated ideas of national ethnic homogeneity, even though in paradigmatic 'racial' terms most of these migrants to Korea would be defined as 'Asian'[1]. The number of 'foreign' residents inside South Korea, both temporary and permanent, reached one million in 2007, and has continued to dramatically increase at an average annual rate of almost 10% over the last ten years (Korea Immigration Service Statistics, 2007, 2014, 2016). In 2016, the number of 'foreign' residents reached over 2 millions. As of 2017 this figure represents over 4% of the entire population in South Korea, and is projected to pass 6% by the year 2030 (Korea Immigration Service Statistics, 2014, 2016, 2017). This estimated percentage of foreign population is perhaps likely to increase, given Korea's record-breaking low birth rates and aging population in recent years[2], as both these factors could lead to a labor shortage within the native-born population and a further influx of migrants.

This rapid upsurge of the migrant population, driven primarily by an increase in labor migrants from China and South East Asian countries (Korea Immigration

---

[1] Half of the foreign residents in Korea are Chinese (including Korean Chinese), followed by those from Vietnam (7.8%), Thailand (7.0%), America (6.6%), Uzbekistan (2.9%), the Philippines (2.7%), Japan (2.5%), Cambodian (2.2%), and Mongolia (2.1%), as of 2017(Korea Immigration Service Statistics, 2017). This composition changes year by year but it consistently remains that the majority of the migrants are from Asian countries.

[2] According to the United Nations, South Korea is one of the two countries (along with Cuba) to see the largest change in the proportion aged 60 years or over between 2015 and 2030, with increase of almost 13 percentage points, due to both sharp declines in fertility and gains in longevity (United Nations, 2015). South Korea's total fertility rate is the lowest out of 36 OECD member countries, with 1.052 in 2017 and 0.977 in 2018, well below the average fertility rate of 1.7 in 2016 (OECD, 2018; Statistics Korea, 2019).

Service Statistics, 2014, 2016, 2017), has created increased tension between the majority Koreans and ethnic/national minority groups within its borders. A decade ago, the UN for example, expressed concerns about the Korean ideas of racial superiority present in the state discourse in its '2007 Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD, 2007)':

> The Committee notes with concern that the emphasis placed on the ethnic homogeneity of the State party may represent an obstacle to the promotion of understanding, tolerance, and friendship among the different ethnic and national groups living on its territory. In this regard, while appreciating the explanation provided by the delegation that references to concepts such as "pure blood" and "mixed bloods" in paragraphs 43 to 46 of the report are to be intended as a mere description of a terminology still in use in the State party, the Committee is nonetheless concerned that such terminology, and the idea of racial superiority that it may entail, continues to be widespread in Korean society (arts. 2 and 7)

In spite of the UN CERD's criticism of the widespread incidents of racial discrimination in Korea and its recommendation that the state take on a more active role in the prevention of such (CERD, 2012), Korea has no separate laws for the punishment of criminal acts based on racial discrimination, nor legal measures such as the Discrimination Prohibition Act. As of 2018, the Mandatory Monitoring of Hate Speech Law is still pending in the Korean Parliament, and only recently the 3rd NAP

(2018-2022), the National Action Plan for the Promotion and the Protection of Human rights (Ministry of Justice, 2018), recommended that the enactment of the Basic Laws of Discrimination Prevention include a replacement of the term 'nationals' to simply 'people', to describe those entitled to legal protection and human rights. Given the divided opinion on the matter, it still remains to be seen whether any legal measures against discrimination will be carried out.

As such, considering the powerful legacy of ethnic nationalism, the country's relatively short history of receiving migrants, and the lack of legal protection measures for migrants, it is perhaps surprising that the Korean state created its own national multicultural policy a decade ago. Korea's multicultural policy was legally based on the Multicultural Family Support Act (MFSA) enacted in 2008, and included various social benefits and the nationwide establishment of the Multicultural Centers to help migrants settle in Korea. Semantically inspired by the Western discourse of multiculturalism, Korea's multicultural policy declares its objective as being to integrate the migrant population within Korean society (Jo and Seo, 2013; Han, 2007; Yoon, 2008). This is called the *Damunwha* 다문화 policy, literally translated as 'multiple cultures' or 'multicultural' policy.

However, the Korean national context specific to the formation of this multicultural policy deviates strongly from the other commonly studied examples of state multiculturalism, which tend to focus on Western countries.[3] First, unlike immigrant-receiving countries in Western Europe or North America, Korea does not

[3] North America and Western Europe are where the majority of academic literature on the topic of immigration and multiculturalism emerge (see Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 2001; Bloemraad et al., 2008).

officially promote a path to migrant citizenship, employing strict limits and conditions on permanent grants of residency and naturalization, particularly for groups who are not of Korean ethnicity (Hollifield et al., 2014; Hi Korea, 2019). The exception to this is the allowance granted to the migrants married to Korean citizens, who can legally acquire citizenship relatively readily.[4] This specific group consisting of those who are married to Koreans will be discussed in depth in this study, as it is the primary policy subject of the governmental efforts toward social integration, and is publically perceived as the embodiment of cultural diversity within the nation.

Second, the majority of both the temporary (labor migrants) and permanent migrants (marriage migrants) come from East Asia and South East Asia, ostensibly belonging to the same phenotypically defined 'racial group' as South Koreans. This clearly contrasts with Western countries whose multiculturalism policies since 1970s stem from their past contexts of colonialism, imperialism and the attendant 'scientifically' constructed notions of race, which were historically designed to support largely phenotypical notions of White racial superiority (Goldberg, 1994; Omi and Winant, 1994; Winant, 2000, 2001; Frederickson, 2002). The subsequent 'post-colonial' trajectories of migration and the segregation of racially and culturally differentiated groups in countries such as the UK, Canada, the US, and Australia have served to motivate the need for various multicultural policies of 'recognition' (Taylor, 1994; Bannerji, 2000; Kymlicka, 2001; Parekh, 2000; Grillo and Pratt, 2002; Pieterse, 2004). While the cultures to be 'recognized' in these cases are mostly non-Anglo-European and often linked to the host nation through a longstanding context of

[4] To naturalize, continuous residence of at least five years is required in general, and for migrant workers whose maximum allowance is less than 5 years are essentially excluded (Hi Korea, 2019 www.hikorea.go.kr)

colonial and post-colonial history, the Korean context does not involve such postcolonial racial relations.[5]

Lastly, Korea's now decade-old multicultural policy is largely limited to assist migrants who formed a family through marrying a Korean spouse, rather than considering the entire migrant population as subjects to be integrated. This makes the adaptation of 'multicultural' policy in Korea atypical and distinctive. Simply studying the dichotomous relations (between say migrants versus non-migrants, or non-Koreans versus Koreans) is insufficient to fully explain the social dynamics that the Korean policy represents. For instance, the combination of a Korean husband and a migrant wife in a typical 'multicultural family' group that the multicultural policy attends to indicates that not only ethnic and racial differences, but also gender relations are crucially important factors shaping the politics behind the policy.

Additionally, an essential dynamic in the construction of multicultural policy is class inequality, as most of the multicultural families are located in the bottom strata of income groups in Korea (Yu and Chen, 2018). Hence, the Korean multicultural policy requires an analysis not only in terms of ethnic or racial relations, but also from a perspective that accounts for the multiple, interrelated, social

[5] The Japanese colonial narrative in Korea also involved the formation of ideas about the natural racial order with the Japanese posited as the most superior within a rhetoric of 'Pan-Asianism'. These were also complicated by the parallel existence of influential Eurocentric, pseudo-scientific ideas about 'race' as propagated globally in relation to the influential discourses of 'modernist' industrial development and cultural production. For further discussion of racial narratives of the Japanese colonialism, see Hanscom et al., 2013; Saaler and Koschmann, 2007; Hotta, 2007. The main point here, however, is that since Korea was not a colonial power in the region, but colonially oppressed, its multicultural policy is considered as originating from a dissimilar circumstance to those that developed against the common contexts of the West, where multicultural policy involved the ordering of post-colonial subjects.

categories of nationalism, ethnicity, gender, family, and class. How these intersecting social formations operate in relation to the actual practices of the state policy is the question this thesis aims to address.

1.2 Research questions

Given the recent demographic changes via migration, and the resilient idea of racial homogeneity as the basis of Korean culture and society, this thesis poses the following interrelated questions. How is the Korean multicultural policy structured, and how is it received by different groups? How does the policy facilitate migrants' social integration? How does the idea of Korea as a homogenous society reflect in the policy organization and practice? What are some of the individual accounts of migrants and Koreans as regards their experience of multiculturalism? How do these perspectives either contribute to, or serve to combat the various forms of racism in Korea? Finally, how do other social dynamics (nation, gender, class, and family) intersect with and impact upon all these outcomes? Explaining how the differences and commonalities in these accounts and experiences produce stable and shared notions of 'Koreans' and 'migrant others' in relation to the multicultural policy is therefore one of the tasks of this work.

To analyze the question of how Korea's multicultural policy is organized, practiced, and experienced by different individuals and groups in Korea, I conducted an ethnographic fieldwork including participant observation and in-depth interviews. The spaces chosen as my research sites, the selecting process of which is discussed

later in detail, are the state-sponsored centers for long-term migrants, commonly known as the 'Multicultural Family Support Centers' in Korea. On-site research within these Multicultural Centers has allowed me to observe Korea's multicultural policy in practice, participate in the social processes that occur in the settings, and created the opportunity for me to interact with informants to gather various accounts and experiences. I focused on analyzing the accounts and practices of Koreans and migrants separately in order to be able to qualify both groups' positionings. The framing of these groups in terms of nationality/ethnicity allows an investigation of how racism works and is formed, while also enabling me to consider intersecting cultural and structural dynamics such as nation, ethnicity, gender, class and family.

1.3 Theoretical grounds

The specific point characterizing Korea's multicultural policy –the interrelatedness of multiple social categories and inequalities- provides important theoretical grounds of analysis. I largely draw on two theoretical bodies of literature: Critical Race Theory and Intersectionality Theory. These two lines of research overlap and complement each other, rather than exist as separate fields. They have usefully informed my study on how racism works in and through Korea's multicultural policy, allowing spaces to investigate other intersecting social inequalities and operations of power in wider Korean society.

Critical Race Theory, also known as CRT, has its origins in the 1970s' legal activism and scholarship that critically examined the centrality of white supremacy in

influencing the direction of the American civil rights movement. This concern, to identify the pernicious nature of White supremacy as a hidden social discourse, was further advanced in the 1990s by progressive intellectuals of color who challenged the ways in which race is constructed and represented in American society (Crenshaw et al., 1996). CRT has continuously developed and extended to include various topics concerning the construction of race in different social contexts and locations to realize social justice. Delgado and Stefancic (2017, p.3) in their influential book, define Critical Race Theory (CRT) succinctly as "a collection of activists and scholars engaged in studying and transforming the relationship among race, racism, and power".

Following the tradition of CRT, which pays particular attention to the relationship among race, power and politics, I investigate how racism operates within Korean multicultural policy. Whilst Korean policy deals with minority groups of different ethnic and national origins rather than phenotypically different 'races' per se, I employ racism as its function of power control, in terms of hierarchizing of human bodies (Frederickson, 2002; Foucault, 2003[1975, 1976]), instead of a more constrained version of it referring strictly to discrimination against other 'races'. In this sense, this thesis is aligned with the scholarship that refuses race as a category fundamentally different from that of ethnicity (Anthias, 1992; Banton, 2003; Wimmer, 2008).[6] Such an approach is considered necessary here to achieve a

---

[6] It is also related to the debate of what 'race' itself means. As Miles and Brown (2003) point out, the body of literature on race and ethnicity has an absence of any generally agreed conceptual tools or even an agreement about the common parameters of what constitutes race and racism (see also Bulmer and Solomos, 1999; Solomos and Collins, 2010). It is extremely challenging, if not impossible, to even define the term 'race' as it is the product of social construction with no actual biological basis (Fields, 1990; Gilroy, 2000; Graves, 2001).

"historically-concrete and sociologically-specific account of [the] distinctive racial aspects" of discrimination under specific discussion (Hall, 1996 [1980], p. 336).

Nationalism, or nationalist ideology, is considered centrally important in understanding the specific form of racism in South Korea, and the question of how discrimination against non-Korean migrants is organized and perceived within the national context. Researchers have demonstrated that the strong national belief in the homogeneity of the Korean people relates to the ongoing process of nation building and the ensuing dominance of a nationalist discourse throughout modern Korean history (Shin, 2006; Pai, 2000; Tikhonov, 2010). This is why CRT research on how racism is articulated within the workings of nation-states and nationalist ideologies (e.g. Bauman, 1989; Goldberg, 2002) is pertinent to the Korean context, which informs my focus on the relationship between racism, nation, and nationalism, as represented and reflected in Korea's on-going multicultural policy.

Often discussed together with CRT, intersectionality has been used by many scholars globally since the late 1980s to expose "how single-axis thinking undermines legal thinking, disciplinary knowledge production, and struggles for social justice" (Cho et al., 2013, p. 787). I chose the intersectional framework as my key theoretical basis, in the understanding that it would help to illuminate multiple axes of power and inequality and demonstrate how these intersecting oppressions are organized, through what Collins (2000, p.18) terms "the matrix of domination."

By paying attention to an intersectionality that can be analyzed through "multiple, uneven and contradictory social patterns of identity and belonging" (Anthias, 2010, p. 244), I delve into the unequal power relations set by the state, but

more crucially between those who practice the policy (Koreans) and those who experience it (migrants) through the actual workings of the policy. This inquiry is realized through a qualitative analysis that carefully reflects the agency of those involved, as well as the historically and locally specific national settings that frame their actions and interactions.

As suggested by the approach of considering various social categories and axes, this research employs intersectionality as a methodological framework as well as theoretical one. Intersectionality helps us to examine the relationship between state policy, wider cultural and social structure, and individual experience in relation to the Multicultural Centers and Korea's multicultural (*damunwha*) policy, considering the multiple interrelated categories of ethnicity, nation, class, gender, and others (Crenshaw, 1991; Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992; Knapp, 2005; Yuval-Davis, 2006; Cho et al., 2013; Collins, 2015).

Employing intersectionality as a consistent analytical strategy at all levels, this study aims to tease out different, relational experiences for people, and uncover how these are shaped by their social positions within power relations and social structures (Yuval-Davis, 2006; Collins, 2015). It is understood that numerous differential axes serve to foster social hierarchies through the differential experiences and positioning of subjects, but also the certain commonalities that could arise. In the fieldwork, I also considered the possibility that other social identities or axes previously unrecognized would emerge as prominent, shaping different experiences (Winker and Degele, 2011).

Beyond CRT and Intersectionality, this research also is built on the wide bodies of literature on migration and multiculturalism, ranging from those specifically focusing on Korean context to those referencing on other national settings.

1.4 Significance

The research site chosen as the major representative component of Korea's multicultural policy is the 'Multicultural Family Support Centers'. These are viewed as a crucial social and political space in which ethnic and national minorities are received within contemporary Korean society (in the Korean state's own terms 'integrated'). The Centers are also where migrants and Koreans concur with, challenge, and contest the largely top-down conceptualizations of 'multiculturalism' and its notion of migrants' 'social integration'. Thus, the Centers represent a means to examine the dynamic processes between those who implement and exert the state policies, and those who are the targets of these policies. Importantly, the Centers provide a potential point to explore how social inequalities are exposed and reproduced through state policy, bureaucratic operations and individual agency.

This examination introduces a new and unexplored context of migration and state multicultural policy into the wider frame of international scholarship. My research, via the Korean case, will enlarge academic knowledge on multiculturalism through analyzing the actual workings of Korean state multicultural policy, building on, but in clear difference to, the primarily theoretical discussion on migration, multiculturalism, and social integration that dominates the current academic debate

(see a review by Bloemraad et al., 2008). Rather than defining multiculturalism as simply 'good' or 'bad' for migrant integration, this research takes into account the various individual and group perspectives of those involved to achieve more nuanced, detailed understanding of the effects of multicultural policy.

By doing so, the current project will unpack the divergent connotations of 'multiculturalism', the policy's consequences for 'integration', and the contextualized political and social processes, in which the state's aim is or is not achieved from the perspectives of migrants and non-migrants. In this endeavor, it takes account of the significance of state authority, while being careful not to pre-determine state power as absolute. Also the accounts of Korean policy practitioners are received not as a unanimous, agreed, harmonious voice on behalf of the state, but rather as a set of uneven, conflicting, and diverse perspectives.

This thesis intends to move toward a qualitative understanding of how state policy structurally impacts migrants lives, in terms of their lived experience, and their desire to co-exist within a host society, while paying attention to their agency and power. It also takes into account the potentially varied perspectives of 'native' Koreans (non-migrants), the policy implementers, to better comprehend the workings of the policy, social relations, and the power dynamics in play. I examine the processes of intersection at the specific, state-run, institutional site of the Multicultural Centers, to reflect the importance of locating the concrete social relations and hierarchies within particular spatial and temporal contexts (Anthias, 2012).

The intersectional analysis of how this relationality is formed under specific structural and institutional conditions is designed to enable a comprehensive understanding of structured subject positions (Knapp, 2005; Dill and Zambrana, 2009). As Yuval-Davis (2006, p. 198) puts it, “Social divisions are about macro axes of social power but also involve actual, concrete people.” As such, state policy has real and critical implications on not only for migrant groups in Korea, but also for Koreans and Korean society in general. As a Korean myself, advocating for policies that are more responsive to a progressive sense of national social justice is therefore a strong motivation for this study.

1.5 The chapter outlines

In terms of the theoretical rationale and frameworks of the study, the emergent context of South Korea as an immigrant receiving country and the subsequent introduction of ‘multiculturalism’ (*damunwha*) policy over the last decade will be first contextualized. This is achieved through an examination of the long-term as well as more recent historical, political, and social processes that have shaped the Korean state, nationalism, and its strong ideas of ethnic homogeneity. The next chapter [Chapter 2: Background and Context] lays out this historical circumstance as the background to the current study. Chapter 2 includes an account of the long-term historical formation of Korean ethnic/national homogeneity through modern nation building, and the contemporary social environments that led to the introduction of the multicultural policy primarily inspired by the phenomenon of marriage migration.

This chapter builds on a critical contemplation of the relevant bodies of literature, drawn from subjects including critical race scholarship, multiculturalism, nationalism, and intersectionality, leading to the key research questions of the study.

The subsequent Chapter 3 describes the methods and methodologies that contain the detailed reports of my ethnographic fieldwork and the entire process of data collection and analysis.

Chapter 4, 5, and 6 are the results of the research analyses, which are thematically assembled based on the research questions and theoretical connections. Chapter 4 examines gender inequality and nationalism. It discusses gender roles, patriarchy, and nationalism as implicated within multicultural policy, which are differently approached and experienced by Koreans and migrants. In particular, this chapter demonstrates how the Korean employees stress migrants' gender roles as a critical reason for the multicultural policy, while conversely showing how migrant users and non-users of the Centers then re-assess the dominant Korean discourse.

Chapter 5 looks at the intersection of class and nation, taking both as important social categories in the practice of Korean multicultural policy. It focuses on the divergent accounts offered by informants to illustrate how Korean multicultural policy effectively constructs migrant wives and mothers within multicultural families as impoverished social beneficiaries at the bottom of the class strata. It also shows how class and nation (and/or nationality) together shape the perspectives about multicultural policy in complicated, different ways for migrants and Koreans.

Chapter 6, the last chapter on analysis, examines the discriminating effects of multicultural policy as a nationalist project. It demonstrates the ways in which the Korean multicultural policy separates, hierarchizes, and discriminates against those who do not (and cannot) belong to the dominant limited notion of Korean ethnic/national homogeneity and therefore claim membership of the nation. Deconstructing nationalist ideology, this chapter illustrates how multicultural policy emphasizes the differences amongst cultures to work against its stated aims to encourage social integration and migrants' stable settlement. This chapter highlights the narratives of migrants who have managed to utilize policy programs to their own ends and needs, and simultaneously argued for a more equal, participatory, and inclusive multicultural policy.

Throughout these analyses chapters (4 through 6), the accounts and experiences of Korean employees at the Centers and migrants are separately analyzed, to scrutinize their varied positions and discursive logic. With the exception of chapter 6, chapter 4 and 5 also divide data analysis of the migrant users from non-users of the Centers to echo their significant group differences on the main research questions. Chapter 6 merges data of migrant users and migrant non-users, as there was no significant gap between the two on the topic it discusses.

In conclusion, chapter 7 reviews the relational experiences of the multicultural policy and examines how these relate to social inequality and the formation of power in Korea more generally. It includes an analysis of the current policy implications as well as how we could move forward given the critical information revealed in this thesis.

Finally, my appendices include the lists of interview questions, consent forms, advertisement forms, and the final codes used for the study. The list of abbreviations and terms section (p.viii) presented earlier includes several abbreviations, terms and their definitions, particularly Korean terms, for clarifying their meanings used in this thesis.

Chapter 2: Background and Context

2.1 Korean 'minjok', others, and nation

To understand the construction of Korea's multicultural policy and the processes of 'racism' that this policy might entail, it is essential to contextualize the specific long-term historical, political, and social processes that have shaped the Korean state, nationalism, and its strong ideas of ethnic/national homogeneity. In particular, the modern history of South Korea discloses the critical importance of nation and nationalism as factors contributing to how ideas analogous to Western notions of 'race' and 'ethnicity', and consequent racism, are internally organized and perceived. The racialized, resilient ideas of the Korean '*minjok*' not only help situate the unique conception of 'multicultural family' within Korea, but also explain the different understandings and experiences that Koreans and migrants have about Korean multicultural policy, the topic this dissertation investigates.

In Korea, minjok has been, and continues to be a primary category of social identification. The Korean term minjok is not directly translatable in English, but includes the meanings of race, ethnicity, nation and people. Minjok basically denotes a group of people with the same 'race', history, nation, language, customs, and citizenship. The strict criteria that inform this idea of Korean minjok within the realm of everyday language have rarely been challenged in Korea. For example, the term minjok is used in the mandatory school national history textbooks to refer to 'us', Koreans, in explaining the long and linear trajectory of national history extending

back 5,000 years. Minjok is also frequently used in media and colloquial dialogue to indicate the unity of the Korean people and national cultural traditions. Scholars have pointed out that such a strong belief in the homogeneity of Korean people based on historical ideas of common blood (*sunhyul*) and ancestry closely relates to the process of nation building throughout modern Korean history (Shin, 2006; Pai, 2000; Tikhonov, 2010).

Frequently noted as one of the most powerful sources of 'distinctive Koreanness' or *hanminjok* (uni-ethnicity) is the colonial experience of Korea under Japan, which began in the late 19th century, before leading into an official period of colonial occupation from 1910 to 1945. This period arguably played a crucial role in developing the ideas of being 'Korean', as separated from the other 'Asian races' (such as Chinese and Vietnamese) who now form the majority of Korea's migrant population. Em (1999) claims that the construction of 'Korean' as a unique 'ethnic' or 'racial' group emerged within nationalist movements and historiography as a political reaction to Japanese colonial discourses depicting Koreans as 'racially' inferior.[7] Emphasizing Korean *minjok* identity positively and differently was therefore an act of resistance against Japanese colonial occupation for some nationalist Korean intellectuals (Hanscom et al., 2013).

This influence of Japan relative to the construction of 'race' in Korea continued throughout recent history. Following Korea's independence in 1945 and the Korean civil war in 1950, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in state discourses continually reinforced the idea of the single-blood ancestry of Korean minjok,

---

[7] See Fanon (1963) and Puri (2004) for the relationship between colonialism and racism.

encouraged by successive authoritarian military regimes between 1961 and 1987. Korean sociologist Shin terms this mode of state supported identity formation in Korea as ‘ethnic nationalism’ (Shin, 2006). The right-wing nationalist governmental effort to identify (construct) Korean history, minjok’, and culture as separate from that of (Communist) China and (local rival and ex-colonizer) Japan was extremely powerful during the period of military rule in Korea until 1987, and this tradition arguably continues today. As Pai (2000, p.1) points out, the nationalist Korean studies’ “patriotic goal was to write a new racial history of Korean independence.”

From archeology to historiography, and including measures such as the establishment of folk towns and national museums, and the popularization of racial (ethnic) myths in educational contexts, the notion of a pure and unique ‘Korean’ national origin was actively constructed by the State (Pai, 2000; Anderson, 1991). According to Shin (2006), this tradition of ‘ethnic nationalism’ has become an oppressive force in Korean society, severely hindering the forming of cultural and social diversity beyond ethnic homogeneity.

In this respect of national construction, theories focusing on the intersection of nation/nationalism and race/ethnicity are especially useful in explaining the ongoing discrimination against migrants in Korea who apparently have the same phenotypical, ‘racial’ background as Koreans (e.g., Balibar, 1991a, 1991b; Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992; Foucault, 2003; Puri, 2004). For instance, Balibar (1991b) eloquently demonstrates the validity of his argument that nationalism is the determining condition behind the production of racism. Through identifying the increase in neo-racism in the midst of increasing immigrant populations from the colonized to the ex-

colonies, and scrutinizing the historical examples of Anti-Semitism, segregation, and apartheid, Balibar (1991b, p.53) theorizes “the cycle of historical reciprocity of nationalism and racism” and contends that the specific articulation of racism exists within nationalism. Puri (2004, p.2) similarly argues that nationalism, and the beliefs that “individuals in a nation are essentially similar and equal, but each nation and its people are distinct from others”, is significant in creating boundaries of ‘us’ and ‘them’, which could lead to racism. The psychological bond that differentiates one group of people from another, which Connor (1994) calls ‘the essence of a nation’, caused numerous writers of the 19th and the early twentieth century to employ ‘race’ a as a synonym for nation, such as a German race and an English race.

The historical and global trajectory of white supremacy has certainly influenced racial ideas within South Korea since the late 19th century (Park, 2002; Han, 2012; J.K. Kim, 2015), and skin color/phenotype based theories of racial classification have encouraged Koreans to locate themselves somewhere between the racial categories of Black and White (H.S. Kim, 2008). Yet, inside Korea common everyday practices of racial discrimination are often committed against other ‘Asians’ of a similar phenotype but different ethnicity/nationality, a sharp contrast to Western contexts where different Asian ethnicities are often reduced to an idea of single race, at least in ‘common-sense’ terms.

2.2 An emerging ‘damunwha (multicultural)’ country

Korea, a nation that had long been considered itself as monoethnic, encountered a massive influx of migrant population over a relatively short period of time at the turn of the 21st century. As contemporary Korean society still uniformly uses the concept of minjok to refer to the homogeneity of the Korean people, relative to their shared pure blood line (*sunhyul*), it is perhaps not surprising that discrimination against recent migrants who do not belong to the Korean minjok is on the rise. It is thus interesting and crucial to note that it was the Korean state that developed a national multicultural policy a decade ago, amidst this context of increasing migrant population and robust ethnic nationalism.

Before the Korean state formally initiated a multicultural policy, there was a concerted governmental and civil effort to tackle the prevalent negative attitudes toward the resident non-Korean/migrant population. The term 'damunwha', directly translated as multicultural, is one of the prime examples. This term has become a buzzword in state and media discourses, and is still officially used to refer to the migrant population and the cultural diversity they bring to Korea (Jo and Seo, 2013; H.S. Kim, 2014; Han, 2007; Yoon, 2008). It is believed that the term originally was coined in an effort in the early 2000s within civil society to negate the existing negative terms to refer the increasing migrant and 'foreign' population (H.M. Kim, 2007). It was essentially a way to replace the common derogatory terms with a more positive one for those who did not 'belong' as normative 'Koreans' within the ethnic national frame (H.M. Kim, 2007; H.S. Kim, 2008; C.S. Kim, 2011).

This term '*damunwha*' (multicultural) was later specifically adapted to denote 'multicultural' marriage migrants (foreigners who married to Korean spouses), a

group that has received significant societal attention since the mid 2000s. *Damunwha* quickly became the word used to signify specifically 'multicultural' families and their 'multicultural' children, along with the state's newly established 'multicultural' policies.

Despite the fact that marriage migrants constitute less than 10% of the entire foreign resident population (Korean Immigration Service Statistics, 2014), Korea's immigration related policies since mid 2000s primarily have considered multicultural families as their central focus (H.S. Kim, 2008; Jo and Seo, 2013). The enactment of '*the Multicultural Family Support Act (MFSA) (2008)*' is a good example to show the disproportionate attention given to these 'multicultural families'. This law requires specifically designated state policies and legal support for marriage migrants, their Korean spouses and children. While policy issues regarding all other foreigners in Korea are generally handled under 'the Basic Plans for the Foreigners', the marriage migrants are dealt with as a separate (important) group of migrants thanks to the MFSA (2008).

The selective attention given to the multicultural family is, however, far from a unanimous decision agreed by all the state agencies. The second edition of 'the Basic Plans for the Foreigners' (2013, p.10), the state's more general plan for the foreign population produced by the Ministry of Justice, for example, explicitly criticizes the disproportionately large budgets allocated to marriage migrants and their families compared with those for other types of migrants. Yet, the multicultural policy focusing on multicultural families has continued for a decade, albeit with some modifications along the way.

2.3 The phenomenon of marriage migration and the Korean state

It is important to note that in Korea, the term 'damunwha' (multicultural), as the titles of the above legal Act and the Centers suggest, usually accompanies *'gajok/gajeong'* (family). This fact demonstrates that, unlike more general usage of multicultural and/or multiculturalism in dealing with the matters of migrant integration into the host society, 'damunwha (multicultural)' policy in Korea intends to focus on migrants who settled in Korea to form a family through the marriage system and possibly have offspring. The adaptation of the term 'damunwha' and the establishment of a related policy concern are thus essentially a reaction of the state to the phenomenon of marriage migration and the consequent formation of families in Korea.

To briefly outline, the contemporary phenomenon of marriage migration in Korea started in the 1980s with Japanese women marrying Korean men through a religious organization (the Unification Church). It later increased largely through Chinese brides marrying low income, rurally based Korean grooms, which was followed by a surge of brides from various nations in South East Asia, expanding the rate of marriage migration into the 1990s and onwards (Seol, 2006; Lee, 2012). Recent statistics suggest that about 10% of marriages in South Korea could be categorized as 'cross-border marriages' since 2003, although this figure was recently lowered to 8% especially after the introduction of state's tougher regulations on

marriage migration in 2014 (Statistics Korea, 2012, 2016, 2017a; Korea Immigration Service Statistics, 2014).[8]

The marriage migrants and their Korean spouses settled as multicultural families are now firmly positioned as a major subgroup in a nation that is increasingly becoming 'multicultural'. Eight or nine out of ten times these 'cross-border marriages' in Korea have occurred between Korean grooms and foreign brides migrating from China, Vietnam, Philippines, Cambodia, and Thailand (Korea Immigration Service Statistics, 2016). This is the main reason why the public almost always perceives the 'multicultural families' as those with Korean husbands and foreign wives, and not Korean wives and foreign husbands. The number of babies born into 'multicultural families' accounts for between 4 and 5% of the entire birthrate every year, a percentage that is expected to grow (Statistics Korea, 2016). As of 2015, over 300,000 marriage migrants (including those who are naturalized as Korean citizens) are currently estimated as residing in Korea (Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs, 2015).

As many academics have identified, marriage migration is a paradigmatic example of gendered migration (or what some call 'the Feminization of Migration') (Pedraza, 1991; Pessar and Mahler, 2003; Mahler and Pessar, 2006; Donato et al., 2006). One of the structural factors frequently noted as crucial in the increase of marriage migration is the unbalanced sex ratio between marriageable men and women, which other Asian countries such as Japan, Taiwan, and Hong Kong have similarly experienced (Constable, 2005; Hsia, 2004; Suzuki, 2005; Nakamatsu, 2003;

---

[8] The recent statistics suggest a slight increase of cross-border marriages in Korea again (Statistics Korea, 2017).

Lee, 2006; Davin, 2007; Williams, 2010). According to these studies, the female tendency to 'marry-up' within the destination countries forces ignored lower-strata bachelors to seek spouses from abroad, generating the migration of female brides.

In Korea, national economic development and rapid industrialization caused mass rural-to-urban migration, urbanization, and a subsequent increase in women's education and labor force participation, which led to a decrease in the marriage rate, fertility rate, and a change in family patterns (A.E. Kim, 2009; Lee, 2012). Similar to the studies on other Asian countries that experienced marriage migration, Lee (2012) emphasizes that increased woman's education and labor participation in Korea contributed to a shortage of women in the marriage market. Her argument is that the limited chances for particularly low-income Korean men to find 'domestic' wives resulted in an increasing search for foreign brides from economically less developed countries (Lee, 2012).

Beyond the social structures and demographic changes that are recognized as the primary causes of this gendered phenomenon, however, systematic assistance from the state and other social institutions was essential in enabling marriage migration as a solution to this structural, 'national' 'problem'. Indeed, for instance, local governments and agricultural associations were actively engaged in recruiting Korean bachelors to participate in marriage tours to China in 1990s (C.S. Kim, 2011). The central government joined these efforts by allowing foreign brides to enter its borders, and tacitly letting private marriage-brokering agencies to flourish without imposing strict regulations (Lee, 2008). By claiming 'caring' (for the elderly, the infirm, and children) as an individual responsibility and not of welfare state, the state

had taken part in forcing many low-income families in Korea to seek for 'carers' through marriage migration (Lee, 2012).

This is why some studies argue that cross-border marriages should be located within an increasing body of research on female reproductive labor, directly equating them with domestic workers and maids (eg. Parreñas, 2000; Parreñas, 2001; Andall, 2000; Dalla Costa, 2006; Anthias & Lazaridis, 2000; Constable, 1997). For instance, Kojima (2001) views the cross-national transfer of what she calls 'Mail-Order Brides' as equivalent to the flow of 'reproductive migrant workers' laboring under conjugal contact. According to her, the 'private' setting of reproduction within the household renders women's work even more disguised, leaving migrant brides undervalued and exploited (Kojima, 2001).

A similar argument was put forward in Lan's (2008b) study on the case of Taiwan. Lan opposes the classification of 'Mail-Order-Brides' as subjects of research separate to migrant maids. She contends that unpaid and paid domestic labor should not be treated dichotomously, but as the feminization of reproductive labor across public and private spheres (Lan, 2008a). In these studies, both migrant maids and migrant wives are commonly understood as those performing reproductive labor abroad, facilitated by increased globalization and income inequality amongst countries.

Marriage migration, however, is not achieved solely by the host society and the Korean bachelors' 'needs', as most such studies presume. While the above studies have revealed important macro structural factors behind the phenomenon of marriage migration, women's decision-making in these studies is tacitly assumed as simply

driven by ‘upward economic mobility’, which perpetuates the stereotype of ’mail-order-brides’, and the idea of them as women ‘being commercially bought’. This stereotyping is also visible in the previous research that assumes commercial brokering as the sole channel of the marriage migration, while ignoring the fact that migrants used social networks more than brokering services in Korea, for example (Yu and Chen, 2018). As much as the host society’s structural circumstances play an important role in enabling the marriage migration process, migrants make their own decision to marry and migrate, and not simply ‘ordered’. Without taking into account migrants’ agency, the victimizing discourse of marriage migration risks worsening the migrants’ marginalized position rather than improving it.

The same rationale should apply to the multicultural policy and its effects. The state agency obviously defines and subject migrants in certain ways through specifically designed policy, but migrants also have their own will power and agency to agree, contest, or reject it. This is why the migrants’ personal accounts of Korean multicultural policy needs to be considered as important as those of the state and its practitioners.

2.4 Multicultural politics: the birth of the Multicultural Family Support Act (MFSA)

The MFSA and the subsequent governmental policies specifically targeting marriage migrants and their families emerged due to several political factors. In fact, up until the mid 2000s, the few relevant state policies on the issues of migrants in Korea were centered on labor migrants, not marriage migrants (Lee, 2011). The

governmental policy focus, however, swiftly altered to address marriage migrants around the mid 2000s (Ahn, 2012; Hong, 2018). This was after some particularly high-profile cases of domestic violence and homicide occurred within these marriages, leading to various condemnatory discourses within civil society and the national media, which served to make this specific migrant group more visible (Hong, 2018).

This moment of shifted attention to marriage migrants coincided with the emergence of the low birth rate and aging population as urgent national problems in Korea. In 2006, a statewide grand strategy, The First National Plans for the Low Fertility and Aging (2006) was devised, with two subsequent five-year plans published in 2010 and 2015 respectively. These National Plans officially recognized low fertility and aging as issues detrimental to the very existence of the nation, and using this rationale allocated sizeable budgets across multiple ministries to tackle the problem of population more comprehensively. The mainstream media discourse depicting marriage migrants as a solution for the low birth rate in Korea also started roughly around the same period (Jo and Seo, 2013).

Additionally, the mid 2000s was also a period when the relatively liberal government of president Roh paid considerably more attention to issues of social inequality in general. Under the direction of this government, many marriage migrants, who were categorized as members of low- income families, became targeted within the state's general endeavor to reduce poverty and income disparity in Korea.

Simultaneously, the increasing migrant population quickly arose as an urgent policy subject for the state. This new policy field of immigration was, for government agencies, a new political battlefield for their power and control, with the Ministry of Gender and Equality being the most high-profile stakeholder. After 'the Ministry of Gender Equality' was expanded to become 'the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family' in 2005, the bulk of the 'family' policies that the Ministry of Health and Welfare had previously managed single-handedly were gradually handed over to this new Ministry. This meant the power and status of 'the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family' was substantially enhanced within government.

Now pressured to create more family related policies to maintain its power, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family became increasingly active in the state's decision-making processes with regard to marriage migrant women and their 'families' (Hong, 2018). One clear example occurred in 2006, when the Special Committee of Wealth Inequality and Discrimination confirmed to create the first report of 'Social Integration Support Policy for Marriage Migrant Women and Their Families', with the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family being the principal agency to provide the relevant policy guidance.

In order to preserve its improved governmental status, it became politically imperative for the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family to retain their hold over the 'family' policy field, against the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and also to gain control over the new 'immigration' field against the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family thus began to strategically emphasize 'multicultural families' including marriage migrants, their Korean families, and their potential social

problems, as component of domestic ‘family’, worthy of separate policy attention, instead of being a concern in relation to general immigration matters (Hong, 2018). This positioned the Ministry of Justice, who had traditionally handled policy for national borders and the migrant population, in competition against the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family on this key issue of immigration.

By successfully arguing that marriage migrants were part of national ‘family’ issues, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family prevailed within this fierce ministry-level political competition for finance and influence. The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family became in charge of the MFSA in 2008, as well as the related multicultural policies soon after, making itself highly visible in the policy arena of immigration in Korea. The ministry-level power struggles and strategies essentially made the combined group of marriage migrants and their family more visible in the policy arena, under the new official term of ‘multicultural family’.

2.5 The Multicultural Family Support Centers

Based on The Social Integration Support Policies for Marriage Migrant Women and Their Family (2006), the government created 21 ‘Marriage Migrant and Family Support Centers’ across the country. These Centers were explicitly established to support various needs of the increasing numbers of marriage migrants and their families. With the enactment of the MFSA (2008), these Centers were renamed as ‘Multicultural Family Support Centers’, and the number of these Centers increased considerably from 80 in 2008 to 217 in 2018. As the fulcrum of policy

implementation and practice, these Multicultural Centers continue to work as a fixed space to offer public services to the migrants and their multicultural families living across the country.

The MFSA (2008) states its major aims as being to “help the multicultural families have a stable family life, and increase the quality of their lives and contribute to their social integration” (Article 1). As the major segment of the Act (Article 12), the nationwide Multicultural Centers are legally designated as major agencies to offer various activities and programs to achieve these aims (The Center for Multicultural Family Support, 2014, 2016).

The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family has been responsible for the overarching strategy regarding the Multicultural Centers. Each local government, following the plans of the national central government, organizes and designates various agencies including NGOs and private foundations to run each separate Center on behalf of it. While constantly changing, the Centers’ major programs are relatively stabilized to include: a family oriented focus, such as family relations and spouse relations training; counseling services; language programs; the organizing of cultural diversity and multiculturalism events; workshops to help with job searching; volunteering and co-ethnic gathering support; and more educational programs to assist the growing number of children born into multicultural families.

While the remit of the Multicultural Centers has increasingly expanded to include other long-term ‘foreign’ populations and families, such as unskilled labor migrants and their families, foreign students, and even North Korean refugees, the actual users of the Centers tend to remain the original target group, the marriage

migrants and their families (The Center for Multicultural Family Support, 2014, 2016). This is despite the fact that any 'foreign' residents in Korea are in theory eligible to use most of the services and programs that the Centers offer. In this respect, it is no coincidence that most of the Centers' programs state their policy subjects specifically as 'marriage migrant women' by default (The Center for Multicultural Family Support, 2014, 2016). This focus on marriage migrants and their families remains consistent even in the programs that could easily cover other migrant groups (i.e. workers or students), such as the volunteering and organizing of co-ethnic gatherings. The Centers, whether intentionally or not, therefore still operated with migrant women as the main participants and users.

The table below (Table 1) is a timeline of Korea's multicultural policy, which includes the major policy initiatives and outcomes of each of these policy implementations.

Table 1. Timeline of Multicultural Policy

Year	Policy	Outcome
2006	'The Social Integration Support Policy for Marriage Migrant Women and Their Families' announced	The comprehensive intra-governmental report based on the current status and issues of marriage migrants and their families became the basis of the state's future policy developments 21 'Marriage Migrants and Family Support Centers' were created
2007	'The Treatment of Foreigners Residing in Korea Act' enacted	This general law on foreign residents in Korea separated marriage migrants and their families (children) from general foreign populations

2008	‘The Multicultural Family Support Act' enacted	This law specified concrete social services and benefits for multicultural families including population surveys, multilingual manuals, and the Multicultural Family Support Centers (renamed from the Marriage Migrants and Family Support Centers)
2008	‘The Strategies for Supporting Multicultural Families Over the Life Course' announced	This document by the Ministry of Health and Welfare outlined the comprehensive policy strategies for multicultural families
2009	‘The Multicultural Family Policy Committee’ formed	This committee consisted of multiple ministries and a task force was established as the core agency to make state policy decisions on social integration issues of multicultural families
2009	‘The 1st Multicultural Family Survey’ conducted	The first population survey (every 3 years) results of multicultural families and their demographic information revealed
2010	‘The 1st Basic Plans for Multicultural Family Policy (2010-2012)' published	Combining multicultural family policies within multiple ministries, the document set out a vision for Korea to "become a mature global society through open multiculturalism". The plans included stricter state-level control of marriage brokerages, supports for marriage migrants through life course, educational assistance for multicultural children, and improved social understanding of multiculturalism including diversity education at schools
2011	‘The Basic Plans for Multicultural Family Policy' inserted in the revision of 'the Multicultural Family Support Act'	The Basic Plans for Multicultural Family Policy' became legally bounded, now expected to be published every five years
2012	‘The 2nd Multicultural Family Survey' conducted	The second population survey results of multicultural families announced
2012	‘The 2nd Basic Plans for Multicultural Family Policy (2013-2017)' published	Recognizing the problems of negative stereotyping of migrants as a consequence of the multicultural policy, it suggested as future objectives to 'increase the capability of multicultural families', and 'create a multicultural society through respected diversity'
2015	‘The 3rd Multicultural Family Survey' conducted	The third comprehensive survey results of multicultural families announced

2017	The Korean Institute for Healthy Family (KIHS) incorporated some of the Multicultural Family Support Centers	Out of 217 Multicultural Family Support Centers, 99 Centers as of 2017 were merged with KIHS Centers. KIHS now is the major agency to carry out state-devised multicultural policies

2.6 The discourse of 'multicultural families': gender, ethnicity, and nation

An increasing body of research on the construction of multicultural family within Korean governmental discourse has documented the gendered, ethnicized, and nationalistic processes incurred in the policy orientations and ambitions. For example, in a discourse analysis of earlier multicultural policies from media to the state, Hye-Soon Kim (2008) asserts that Korean national patrilineal and patriarchal family-centeredness, and the political convenience demonstrated by including migrant women as policy beneficiaries, are together responsible for the particular trajectory of Korean multicultural policy. According to her, it is the Korean state's (and other social agents') assumption that Koreans are much more easily persuaded to 'give away' tax money to support foreign women married to Korean men, compared with the general public intolerance for other foreign migrants with no direct 'connection' to the Korean people or nation (Kim, 2008). The fact that these women are married to Koreans, form a family, and that they are (presumably) the mothers or potential mothers of the children who then will become 'Koreans', brings them necessarily closer to the heart of a Korean identity.

This explanation shows why Korea's multicultural policy is inherently a nationalist project, created in relation to the racialized conception of Korean national identity, which is then reformulated through gender. In her influential work theorizing the intersection of gender and nation, Yuval-Davis (1997, 2003) differentiates 'three major dimensions of nationalist projects': the genealogical dimension, the cultural dimension and the civic dimension, with varied aspects of gender relations playing an important role in each. The genealogical dimension, which is constructed around the specific origin of the people (or their race) (Volknation) is the most exclusionary vision of the nation in terms of who can be included as members of the national collectives, compared with the other two dimensions: the cultural dimension (Kulturnation) and the civic dimension (Staatnation) (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.21).

The multicultural policy specifically targeting the migrants with the direct 'connection' to Korean people (with specific Korean origin) through familial bonds illustrates the predominance of the 'Volknation' perspective in Korea. The focus on marriage and the attendant function of reproduction, as the rational logic behind the founding of the multicultural policy, demonstrates that women are primarily viewed by the state as the biological producers of children/people. Migrant brides are also, then, considered as important within the construction of nationalist boundaries that continue to highlight its 'Volknation' as consisting only of people with the Korean origin (Yuval Davis, 1997).

Family as a notion often represents the genetic links and biology among related individuals, a term which can also be extended to constitute the national collective as 'national family' (Collins, 1998b). Through starting a family with

‘Korean’ nationals, the migrant women have then ‘naturally’ become legitimate subjects of the national body, and need to be recognized by the state as members of ‘Korean’ multicultural families. Hence, the policy and social concentration on marriage migrant women within the ‘multicultural family’ discourse is directly related to the strong notion of Korean ethnic/national identity, which is perceived to be only obtainable through the direct biological ties to the Korean blood line.

While these marriage migrants do not possess that direct ‘blood’ connection, through their marital/familial relationships they stray across any racially determinate, constructed biological notions of family. This starkly contrasts with other migrants who do not have any familial associations with Koreans, and the absence of such ‘natural’ link automatically excludes them from becoming potential members of a national body constructed as a ‘Volknation’.

In this sense, intermarriage, often the only way “outsiders can conceivably join the national collectivity” (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.27), does seem to place the marriage migrants as a high priority over other ‘non-Koreans’ within the policy that set to draw the boundaries of its envisioned national citizenry. As Ahn (2013) argues, the Korean multicultural policy takes part in the institutional discriminations against labor migrants who lack the essential instrument of intermarriage, while offering a much more inclusive policy towards marriage migrants and their families.

Yet, whilst Korea’s multicultural policy seemingly attempts to incorporate marriage migrants within its nationalist project, the migrant women have only achieved national membership through their gendered roles (as mothers, wives, carers) within ‘multicultural’ families, and not as ‘full’ Korean nationals relative to

their individual discrete bodies. This is due to the unresolvable difference in ethnic/national origin that is reflected in their individual identity. In her examination of Korean multicultural policy, Korean feminist scholar Kim Hyun Mee calls this limited membership an “ethno-centric governance model of citizenship” (C.S. Kim, 2011) and an “ethnicized maternal citizenship”(H.M. Kim, 2013a), in which the migrant women’s gender roles as wives and mothers become the crucial criteria to determine their citizenship status. Cheng (2011) similarly makes the point that multicultural policy functions to regulate women’s bodies, through its focus on reproduction and gender ideals for these migrants in Korea.

A study by Jo and Seo (2013) offers another explanation as to why the multicultural policy does not reflect the inclusion of the marriage migrants within the national minjok, but on the contrary their peripheral exclusion. In their study of mainstream media discourses, they found a change of discourse from an initial ‘multiculturalism’ focusing on marriage migrant women as a solution to the nation’s low birth rate crisis, to a positioning of ‘multiculturalism’ after 2009 where the same migrants are idealized as a pool of global talents and resources for Korea to tap into (Jo and Seo, 2013). The study illuminates how the ‘multicultural policy’ inherently hinges upon the shifting dominant notions of nation and nationalism in Korea, with no intent to accept the marriage migrants as members of a newly imagined ‘multicultural’ national collective.

Whether described as a possible answer to the low birth rate problem (as gendered bodies), or as acquirable global human talents, marriage migrants in Korea are assessed through their values to the (existing) collective, ethnically Korean

national body. The focus of various positive 'functions' of the women within the state discourse paradoxically discloses the women's insecure position in the new 'multicultural' nation, part of wider neoliberal strategy of Foucauldian 'governmentality' as detailed in the authors' major argument in the study (Jo and Seo, 2013).

Unlike those who are automatically assumed to be Koreans (Korean *minjok*) obtained through blood (*Volknation*), for the women belonging to the multicultural families, the very reason for their existence requires the approval of a majority of Koreans, just like other immigrants. A backlash against Korean multicultural policy by those who essentially oppose any state welfare policy in support of the migrant population (Kang, 2012) validates this. Rather than evidencing their acceptance as members of a contemporary multicultural Korea, the state's 'special' treatment of migrant women within the 'multicultural' family units serves to frame them as 'inferior others' (Bélanger et al., 2010, p.1125).

Much research has also criticized Korean multicultural policy for its racialization (Ahn, 2013), cultural paternalism (J.K. Kim, 2011), and exclusive framing of racial and ethnic nationalism (Watson, 2012). These and most other studies on the topic commonly focus on the textual analysis of the governmental policy documentations and related discourse of the state, media, and NGOs (e.g., Jo and Seo, 2013; Ahn, 2011; H.M. Kim, 2013b; Park, 2014). Such analyses of the policy and discourse circulating downward 'from the top' have usefully exposed social inequalities directly spurred from Korea's recent experience of migration at a

macro level, especially in terms of pinpointing migrants' precarious position in a supposedly 'multicultural' Korea.

With a few exceptions (e.g. H.M. Kim, 2013a), however, what is crucially lacking in this previous research on Korea's multicultural policy is a requisite attention given to the agency of the migrants as well as the people's accounts and experiences at the ground level of the policy practice. An important omission in the study of multicultural policy is thus the inclusion of different positions and practices in relation to the seemingly singular stance of the state discourse and policy. This criticism parallels the Foucauldian conception that the state has no inherent propensities or essence per se, but can only be usefully comprehended through its practices that interconnect with issues of power (Foucault et al., 1991). In this regard, from Foucault's perspective social or institutional "[d]iscourse is not a place into which the subjectivity irrupts; it is a space of differentiated subject-positions and subject-functions." (Foucault, 1991, p.58)

Therefore, to grasp the Korean state's multicultural policy more comprehensively and de-constructively in its analysis, the current research pays significant attention to the multiple forms of positions and function by foregrounding the importance of individual agency in its practice, experience and effects. The accounts of the actual individuals involved in the policy practices are therefore here viewed as important sources of the government policy analysis, filling the gaps in the existing literature.

2.7 Is the Korean policy a 'multicultural' policy?

> *"There has never been a 'multicultural' policy in Korea, but only a 'multicultural family' policy."*

The above was a comment made on my presentation at a conference in Seoul in 2018, by a celebrated professor and key figure in devising Korean immigration policy. The presentation of my research on that day included a comparative analysis that linked Korean multicultural family policy with the more general academic discussions of multiculturalism and multicultural policies in other parts of the world. He was clearly in disagreement with my argument that Korea's multicultural policy could ever be compared with other more typical, established, well-known 'multicultural policies' in the West. Presumably, this professor meant that Korean multicultural policy should be understood as a localized, partial policy specifically targeted on marriage migrant women and their families, and as such, something entirely dissimilar to other multicultural policies which engaged with far broader segments of the population. And, to highlight the pervasive nature of this perspective within the bureaucratically influential structures of Korean academia, this professor was not the only senior figure that day who expressed skepticism toward the notion that Korean 'multicultural' policy could, or should be considered inclusively in terms of all the migrants living within the nation.

According to the official document of the Basic Plans for the Foreigners' Policy (Ministry of Justice, 2008, 2013), the government clearly states, "what we call

‘multicultural (*damunwha*)’ refers to the descriptive characteristics of Korea becoming increasingly multi-ethnic and multi-cultural, rather than multiculturalism as a set of national values or a philosophy that we desire to enact” (2008, p.7). This distinction is equivalent to how Parekh (2000, p.6) conceptualizes the difference between the term ‘multicultural’ (“the fact of cultural diversity”) and the term ‘multiculturalism’ (“a normative response to that fact”).

However, throughout the Basic Plans for the Foreigners Policy documents (Ministry of Justice, 2008, 2013), terms such as ‘building the capacity for multicultural understanding’ and ‘cultural diversity’, which are closer to the Western conception of ‘multiculturalism’, recurrently emerge. In contrast to the state’s assertion that they are not concerned to enact a multicultural ‘philosophy’ or ‘values’, these terms are undoubtedly used to describe societal values that the Korean government considers as desirable. These major state documents basically argue that as Korea becomes increasingly ‘multicultural’ with immigration, ‘multiculturalism’ is necessary in order to counter the hostility and discrimination targeted against its new cultural minorities.

‘Multiculturalism’ also seems to be actively employed in Korean policies that go beyond the mere descriptive ‘multicultural’ standing. For example, ranges of cultural events celebrating multicultural diversity in Korea, led by governmental agencies, are one form of the ‘normative response’ encouraged by the state *damunwha* multicultural policy on behalf of Korean society. The family programs that aim to enhance the mutual cultural understandings between conjugal partners, educational and campaigning programs to promote cultural diversity and

multiculturalism, and the various one-off programs of the Centers that celebrate cultural diversity all serve to reflect that in refiguring its self as multicultural state, Korea was indeed influenced and inspired by the multicultural policies commonly practiced in other countries. The Korean policy, in this regard, parallels an emphasis on ethnocultural recognition (intimately linked to the 'racial' difference) in approaching migrant integration, which has been the general tendency of state multiculturalism as practiced in European countries since the 1990s (Grillo and Pratt, 2002).

In contrast to the state denial of Korean policy as 'multicultural' in the same sense as that used in Western nations, I argue that it can be considered as a 'true' multicultural policy, and be worth the subject of the comparative analysis, on the basis that its approach relates to the incorporation of immigrants in the host society. I feel justified in taking this approach, not least as scholars of multiculturalism seem to consistently recognize the difficulties of precisely defining the term, beyond its description as "a broad set of mutually reinforcing approaches or methodologies concerning the incorporation and participation of immigrants and ethnic minorities and their modes of cultural/religions differences" (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.4). My research focus here on how government multicultural policy affects the newly arrived migrants and how they experience the policy would seem to easily fit within this scheme. The Korean case is also consistent with previous research that shows the significant national and cultural differences in state responses to migrant incorporation, even within the single typology of 'multiculturalism' (Brubaker, 1992; Freeman, 2004; Koopmans, 2005)

Therefore, this thesis on Korea's multicultural policy is understood as part of a continuum of research globally, which critically interrogates the interethnic/racial relationships and the social integration of minority populations within contemporary nation states. At the very least, the deliberate decision of the Korean government to create and implement a policy specifically for the incorporation of multicultural families into the nation state reflects a key issue for the field of academic research on multicultural policy, as regards the creation of local boundaries toward the attainment of national citizenship. In the case of Korea and others, the purpose is always implicitly or explicitly inflicted upon migrant minorities as the common aim of all bureaucratic multicultural policy discourses.

2.8 The debates on multiculturalism

Western theories of 'multiculturalism' stress the role of state in the creation of policies that recognize and include cultural minorities in order to support their involvement in society (Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995, 2001). However, the answer to the question of whether these models of 'multiculturalism' actually promote migrant integration within a given society is far from conclusive and lacks empirical evidence (Bloemraad et al., 2008).

Some critics argue that multicultural policy negatively affects minority groups by stigmatizing their separate cultural heritage. Bannerji (2000) in her work on the Canadian example of state- sponsored multiculturalism asserts that the recognition of 'diversity' and 'plurality' is only applicable in a limited way and at a superficial level,

whereas the underlying ideas of 'the community' and 'the nation' that only exclusively include the majority 'native' cultural and racial group remain intact. Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) similarly view 'ethnic grouping' as a process of racialization, which under the multiculturalist notion becomes "a pathological deviation" (p.163). Following Goldberg (1994, p.7), multiculturalism often is "glibly celebrated in the name of a standard pluralism that not only leaves groups constituted as givens but entrenches the boundaries fixing group demarcations as unalterable."

Recent scholarship on the construction of Korean *damunwha* multiculturalism in policy and media discourse echoes a similar idea of the combined use of state, media, and civil society power to specifically and deliberately construct a notion of the 'others' within the nation's borders (Jo and Seo, 2014; H.S. Kim, 2014; Han, 2007; Yoon, 2008). This preoccupation with political and cultural homogeneity, which according to Parekh (2000, p.185) an inherent limitation of the modern nation state, tends to cause the state to become "an instrument of injustice and oppression" against minority communities. This criticism indicates the challenging reality of multiculturalism in practice, where an emphasis on the existence of 'multiple' cultures becomes a political tool to separate and disempower minority populations such as immigrants, rather than integrate them.

Theories of critical race scholarship are also relevant to this debate on multiculturalism, as they focus in more general terms on the significance of the state's role in excluding subordinated groups and segregating them. For instance, Goldberg (2002) theorizes how the modern nation-state constitutes a crucial site for organizing racial inequality, making such fundamentally 'Racial States'. For him, 'race' is an

integral part of the inception, development, and transformation of the modern state, articulated alongside other identities such as class and gender in order to determine national identity, population, and labor. While Goldberg (2002) is concerned mostly with ‘racial’ nation-states based on notions of ‘white’ identity regulating and controlling non-Whites, non-European, and other post-colonial bodies in his discussion, I argue that his focus on the intimate connection between state and racialization/racism is also relevant in the context of Korean multicultural policy.

Bauman’s study (1989) of the Jewish Holocaust, on the other hand, suggests that anti-Semitism as a form of racism is closely linked to the processes of modern bureaucracy. Following his argument, the way that the state functions bureaucratically is crucially connected to group-based social inequality, exclusion, and racism. His work, through an extreme example, suggests the crucial role of state bureaucracy itself as well as the role of practitioners positioned in the bureaucratic system in influencing social inequalities. Building on such work, the modern Korean bureaucratic state and those involved in the processes of bureaucracy, as the sites for the creation of a national multicultural policy, are considered as crucial elements in organizing racial inequality within the nation.

Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) stress not only ethnic and racial divisions but also those of class and gender as the main boundaries that a society constructs in relation to the arena of its citizenry. Their arguments underscore a notion that the national project of state formation can only be unrepresentative of the equal interests of all members of the nation. This perspective, alongside that of other similar works (e.g., Yuval-Davis, 1997; Puri, 2004; Anthias, 2010), is highly relevant to our

discussion of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism in this sense is a discourse that negotiates group boundaries (Pieterse, 2004) and offers "a mode of the workings of the state...a site for struggle... for a kind of tug-of war of social forces." (Bannerji, 2000, p.120).

Critical studies on the forms and mechanisms of institutional racism call for the need to understand migrants' incorporation or integration not in individual terms but as structural and institutional effects. Sara Ahmed (2012) examines emerging diversity centers within colleges to critically understand the meaning of institutionally sponsored 'diversity', its discourses and practices. She argues that institutional racism is converted into an expression of pride through 'diversity', where the very structural arrangement of diversity centers makes "an act of inclusion to maintain the form of exclusion" (2012, p.43). Faist, a more sympathetic commentator on organized diversity, views diversity as a potential 'new mode of incorporation', but he even acknowledges that, "one of the greatest challenges of diversity - social inequality- goes unchallenged" (Faist, 2009, p.173).

In the corporate world, the rhetoric of diversity as positive, efficient, and empowering has been widely introduced. In response to this, a group of scholars under 'critical diversity studies' started to reassess this discourse on diversity, as it emerged in the 1990s (for a review, see Zanoni et al., 2010). They point out that the emphasis on diversity in business actually obscures the unequal power relations within organization, and reinforces essentialized identities. They further problematize the fact that often marginal 'others' are compared with the reference group of white, heterosexual, western, middle/upper class men.

These and many other empirical studies have revealed how institutional settings and cultures negatively impact on the assimilation or integration processes through various ways of separating and excluding (for example, Valenzuela 2000; Tyson, 2011 on the U.S. school contexts). All indicate the need to investigate intersectional social inequalities as they are created within and through nodal forms and points of institutional power, not least that exercised by the state (Foucault, 2003[1975, 1976]).

In contrast to the research mentioned above, which is overwhelmingly critical of state sponsored 'multiculturalism', others have contended a positive relationship between state's explicit support and resources for 'multiculturalism' and the immigrants' incorporation within the host society. For instance, Bloemraad (2006) compares the divergent patterns of political incorporation for immigrants between Canada and the U.S., and asserts that the higher political incorporation of immigrants in Canada is due to the higher level of governmental resources and support given to 'multicultural' policy. In defending multiculturalism, she states, "Critiques of multiculturalism as a ghettoizing force overlook the fact that the alternative to coethnic help might be no help at all" (2006, p.240).

It is difficult to know whether her comparative study was successfully able to tease out the 'true' effects of multiculturalism on political incorporation. This is because numerous other possible structural variations between the two countries of the USA and Canada (such as demographic patterns, laws, policies, political contexts, social systems, incentives for political participation, to name a few) could also significantly shape the divergent patterns that she observed. But her analysis raises

the important question of if, and how, multiculturalism and state policy might actually benefit migrants' incorporation (measured specifically as 'political' incorporation in her study), and through what processes and mechanisms.

Another vitally important point to consider in the multiculturalism debate is, can multiculturalism be understood as a singular type that is either 'good' or 'bad'? This line of questioning is hinted at by Koopmans and others (2005), who argue that societies juggle and simultaneously practice multiculturalism, assimilation, segregation, and universalism along a diverse spectrum of actions and intentions rather than being singularly anchored in a specific type. Goldberg (1994) similarly cautions against any reductively defined concept of multiculturalism and the extreme sway of either praise or dismissal. Instead he suggests that multiculturalism, or what he calls the 'multicultural condition', should be understood and specified 'phenomenologically' (1994, p.1).

Although the existing academic studies on Korea's multicultural policy seem to predominantly lean towards negative assessment, it is therefore possible that migrants and policy practitioners think differently, particularly as this possibility has rarely been investigated through ethnographic research. And, if we allow a more fluid and complex conceptualization of multiculturalism and migrants' integration or incorporation, the practices and impacts of Korean state's policies might also be understood and interpreted differently. Thus, the questions "in what ways do multicultural policies and Multicultural Centers in particular help migrants to become integrated, and in what ways they homogenize or marginalize the migrants?", or "who benefits from the policy and who doesn't?" become more useful.

Additionally, serious attention needs to be given to the ways and the extent in which migrants themselves utilize and experience Korea's multicultural policies for their own ends, separate from the state's intention and plans. As Bloemraad (2006) alludes to, quite aside from the state's 'real' intention, the practical benefits of the financial and physical resources and educational and social programs that are committed to new migrant arrivals and their communities under the name of 'multiculturalism' may be useful for them.

The question still remains, however, as to whether gaps exist, between what the state contends is important and beneficial for the migrants within its version of 'multiculturalism', and what migrants actually want and need. Contrasting the way in which Bloemraad (2006) analyzes multicultural integration, it could be considered that migrants would construct their 'needs' toward satisfactory social 'integration', against and within existing structures and social contexts.

Moreover, how the 'normative' members of the host society, Koreans in this study, conceptualize the contested conception of multiculturalism and social integration requires attention, to better comprehend the processes of the politics surrounding multicultural policy. Given the importance of nationalism in Korean society, how do the migrant groups and the majority Koreans of those involved in the actual practice of the policy conceptually grasp this Korean version of multiculturalism? And what effects might the policy practices bring for all those living in this newly-emerged immigrant-receiving country?

2.9 Chapter summary

To sum up, my analysis of the recent demographic changes via migration, the resilient idea of racial/ethnic/national homogeneity as the basis of Korean culture and history, and the academic debates about multiculturalism and state policy for migrants all lead to the following interrelated questions: How is Korean multicultural policy structured, and how is it received by different groups? How does the idea of Korea as a homogenous society reflect in the policy organization and practice? What are some of the individual accounts given by migrants and Koreans as regards their experience of multicultural policy? How do these perspectives either contribute to, or serve to challenge the forms of racism in circulating within Korea? Finally, how do other social dynamics (nation, gender, class, and family) intersect with and impact upon all these outcomes? By analyzing the differences and commonalities in the accounts and experiences of those involved in the multicultural policy, this thesis aims to examine the power relations and social inequalities bound up in within the Korean context of multiculturalism, in more comprehensive, nuanced, and multi-faceted way.

Chapter 3: Methods and Methodologies

3.1 Ethnography

To analyze the question of how the Korea's multicultural policy is organized, practiced, and experienced by different individuals and groups in Korea, I conducted a project of ethnographic fieldwork that consisted of participant observation and in-depth interviews (Lofland et al., 2006). The ethnography was conducted between March 2016 and August 2017, in the period of roughly a year and a half (see Table 2).

Table 2. Timeline of Fieldwork

Time	Fieldwork
March 2016 - June 2016	Participant Observation at Paddy Field
June 2016 - September 2016	Participant Observation at Overpass
June 2016 - October 2016	Interviews with migrant users
January 2017- July 2017	Interviews with workers and migrant users
April 2017- August 2017	Interviews with non-users
August 2017	Follow-up interviews

The spaces chosen as research sites for participant observation were the state-sponsored centers, commonly known as 'Multicultural Family Support Centers' (hereafter Multicultural Centers or Centers) in Korea. These official institutions offer fixed centers for activities and programs, mostly government funded, for long-term migrants, particularly those who are married to Koreans. The MFSA *(2008)* explicitly states the kinds of support that multicultural families are entitled to, including

provision of information, social services in multiple languages, Korean language learning programs, health services, and protection from domestic violence. Whilst there are other products of the state's multicultural policies including regular surveys of migrants and call centers for support following the MFSA, Multicultural Centers act as the major, most well-known and well-used platforms that carry out state services to migrants.

Multicultural Centers here are therefore viewed as the crucial social and political space in which ethnic/national minorities are received within contemporary Korean society through its 'multicultural' policy. The Centers represent a means to examine the dynamic processes between those who implement and exert the state policies, and those who are the targets of these policies. The state also classifies and draws boundaries between the 'multicultural 'members and non-members here. During my ethnography, I paid special attention to examining how group boundaries are shaped by institutionalized definitions of cultural membership (Lamont and Molnar, 2002), with a particular focus on how boundaries work in social relations between Koreans and migrants. Through researching the workings of the Centers and accounts of the people involved, I delved into the relational experiences of multicultural policy and its boundary-making processes across ethnic, national, class and gender lines.

'Agency' is considered crucial in this study of multicultural policy. The Centers are where, at an individual level, migrants and Koreans concur with, challenge, and contest the largely top-down conceptualizations of multiculturalism and 'multicultural policy' and attendant notions of migrants' social integration.

Through the research method of ethnography, I tried to capture a breadth of contested policy practices and varied perspectives. These are then analyzed to unearth the implications of Korea's multicultural policy.

3.2 Intersectionality as a methodological framework

Intersectionality is employed as a main analytical and methodological framework throughout this project. In examining the multicultural policy in Korea intersectionally, I follow the many scholars who suggest intersectional analyses that are non-additive, process-centered, context-specific, and multi-leveled, all being attempts to move away from the essentialist model of studying multiple categories as fixed and additive identities (Yuval-Davis, 2006; Choo and Ferree, 2010; Winker and Degele, 2011; Anthias, 2012). Ultimately, this intersectional approach proposes to consider social categories not as fixed entities to delineate groups or as tools of identity politics (Hancock, 2007), but as primarily structural processes that are related to the practices of power and social hierarchies. Such structural processes can be analyzed through focusing on "the particular ways in which the different divisions are intermeshed" (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 200), "the dynamic forces more than categories (Choo and Ferree, 2010, p.134)", and "concrete relations of positionality and hierarchisation (Anthias, 2012, p.10)".

In advancing a multilevel intersectional analysis, scholars have highlighted the shared, integrated terrains where various categories interact through power and structural processes. Collins (2000) identifies the hegemonic (ideas, cultures),

structural (social institutions), disciplinary (bureaucratic hierarchies), and interpersonal (routinized interactions) as major fields that social categories interact. Yuval-Davis (2006) similarly conceptualizes four different levels for intersectional analysis: organizational, intersubjective, experiential and representational forms. A multilevel analysis posited by Winker and Degele (2011) stresses the interactions between social structures, symbolic representations, and identity construction. All these scholars of intersectionality, despite their different labels and slight differences in detailed description of what each of the domains consist of, commonly advocate for a multilevel intersectional analysis to investigate the integrated domains of power.

Through a qualitative analysis on the Centers and the people involved in these spaces, I conducted a multilevel intersectional analysis in the mode advanced by the researchers above. This was done through separately focusing on the Centers' specific program organization and the ways in which the programs are exercised (structural/organizational); power relations and their roles within the Centers (disciplinary/intersubjective); the accounts of inclusion and exclusion made by those connected to the Centers, and their experiences of racism in social relations etc. (interpersonal/experiential); alongside images and ideologies of multiculturalism as expressed in the Centers (hegemonic/representational). Ultimately, conscious efforts to delineate and consider multiple terrains through intersectional analyses have helped divulge the multifaceted processes of power and social inequality.

The balanced investigation of structure and agency is another important element of any multilevel intersectional analyses (Choo and Ferree, 2010). In this research, this was enabled through research methodologies capturing the agency of

individuals exercising and receiving the multicultural policy, and through the field research to observe powers that enable and restrict their agency. Korea's multiculturalism or multicultural policy in this social process is understood as a contested process within power relations (Ken, 2008; Staunaes, 2003).

While gender, ethnicity, nationality, and class have been identified in the previous literature as possible intersecting categories, the category of 'multicultural family' is another that is specific to Korea's multicultural policy and that simultaneously combines all these interrelated social categories. This specifically contextual, locally constructed category facilitated by the state policy is assumed as primarily determining the status of migrants, allocating them into different social locations, and directing the stabilized notion of being Korean in the controlled space of the nation. I tried to focus on the structural process of these key categories within the limited boundaries of the multicultural policy and related arena, acknowledging the fact that the same categories can be differently conceptualized and understood in other social arenas or relations (Anthias, 2012).

3.3 Two research sites: The Multicultural Family Support Centers

Out of over 200 Multicultural Centers across the country, I conducted participant observation in two sites, for approximately 4 months per each Center. The two sites are: one I visited during the pilot study[9] in 2015 (Convenience Sampling)

[9] The proposed research design is built on the results of the pilot study, conducted from May to June in 2015, in South Korea. In this I interviewed 6 migrants, 2 government officials, 1 teacher from a 'multicultural high school' (a separate school for those who belong to 'multicultural families'), and 2 Corporate Social Responsibility managers, for roughly one

(hereafter Paddy Field), and the other (Overpass) selected through Systematic Random Sampling (Bryman, 2012)[10]. The two Centers have comparable annual user numbers, and both are in urban districts, although Overpass to a larger degree than Paddy Field.

3.3.1 Center I: Paddy Field

As noted above, Paddy Field I visited during my pilot study in June 2015 was selected because I had already managed to establish connections with migrant users of the Center. I found Paddy Field through the first migrant interviewee for my pilot study. I met this first interviewee, a Chinese migrant, through a social contact. After the interview had been initiated, she took me to Paddy Field and introduced other migrants she knew. At the 'Multicultural Café' (a 'social responsibility entrepreneur

---

hour each, to understand their perspectives on multicultural policy in Korea. The results revealed the central importance of the notion of Korean ethnic/national homogeneity and the influence of the state in Korea's multicultural policy and migrants' lives. The informants, in various responses, indicated that the Multicultural Centers were vital to the success of state multicultural policy. This led me to consider the Centers as appropriate sites for the long-term ethnography. My pilot study also highlighted the need to attend to an analysis of the agency of those involved, and to critically unpack how contentious concepts such as 'multiculturalism' and 'integration' are differently interpreted, depending on differential social positionings (as informed by variant contexts of ethnicity, nationality, gender, and class etc.).

[10] Before randomly selecting the second Center, I first limited my sample to those who met the three important criteria for comparability with the first Center (non-extreme annual user numbers; urban; different administrative district). Following the criteria, I first eliminated the extreme cases in terms of the annual user numbers (the top 10% and the bottom 10%, considering the Centers' numbers ranging from 41 to 2,172 (Multicultural Family Policy Evaluation 2015), and then excluded those in the rural and/or in the same district as the first Center. Changing the order (excluding rural and same district first before extreme user numbers) makes the working sample only 6 fewer. Of the working samples of 93 Centers, I deleted all the Centers in the odd numbers from the list, and repeated this process 6 times to get the second Center.

project' that hires migrant women staff) attached to this particular Center, I conducted the rest of the interview with her and scheduled interviews with other migrants of different ethnic/national backgrounds.

Although I was not involved in any of the formal programs of Paddy Field at that point, I had the chance to survey and familiarize myself with the space itself multiple times. I observed various program advertisements, witnessed on-going classes and events, and migrant women interacting each other in Korean and other languages. Thus, choosing Paddy Field for this research was not because I had prior knowledge about how this particular Center worked, but because I believed that the prior connections with migrants would help me engage at the Center more readily and create opportunities to extend my networks.

Paddy Field is in a mid-sized suburban city in Korea.[11] Except for the Seoul metropolitan area, this wider regional area has the largest numbers of foreign residents in Korea. With about 8,000 manufacturing factories, mostly small to medium sized, this previously rural, but now sizable suburban city started to attract migrant workers from 1990s. Paddy Field had been located in the middle of a market when I conducted the pilot study, but later moved to a larger size building near the busy terminal area by the time I started conducting the ethnography. Paddy Field is located on the upper floors of the building and directly connected to the bustling intercity bus terminal.

Both in the market where Paddy Field had been located in, and in its new location at the bus terminal, many migrants were readily visible. As one of the

[11] Official statistics divide South Korea into 17 regions. Paddy Field is in the region with the third largest number of registered marriage migrants (The Center for Multicultural Family Support, 2015).

migrant women in the pilot study commented, “this area is full of migrants, and during the weekend this market street especially becomes really full of migrants! You will see.” This region’s market street is commonly known by the locals as the ‘foreigners’ street’. With the mounting reputation of the street as a space defined by retailers of exotic goods and replete with foreign shoppers, the market was selected by the central government for a regeneration project in 2017, part of a grand state project that aimed to change the traditional Korean market space into a ‘multicultural global market’.

3.3.2 Center II: Overpass

Overpass is in a larger-sized, more urbanized city,[12] situated in a tall office building at the crossroads of two ground level arterial streets, and under two major elevated thoroughfares. The building stands alone with no other office buildings or shops/cafes in the immediate vicinity. With only few pedestrians, the building faces a busy main road, with large apartment complexes and social housings behind. Compared with the surrounding area of Paddy Field, Overpass was less conspicuous as a space for migrants, since there hardly existed pedestrians, except for a few occasions when passengers of local buses got off at the bus stop in front of Paddy Field. Overpass occupied three floors but shared the rest of the building with other organizations and companies.

[12] Overpass is in the region with the 7th largest number of registered marriage migrants out of the 17 regions (The Center for Multicultural Family Support, 2015).

Although in arriving at the main floor of Overpass, you could feel a hint of vibrant atmosphere particularly immediately before and after a program, the building and the surrounding area generally lacked the lively vibrancy created by migrants that Paddy Field had. The scarcity of cafes or restaurants in the vicinity of Overpass also meant fewer chances for private social gatherings for migrants using the Center. The migrant users of Overpass, perhaps partly due to such locational characteristics, seemed to have more loose social relations amongst them, compared to Paddy Field. More squarely functioning as a strict policy venue, Overpass had a higher turnover rate where new users constantly arrived and old users stopped using it regularly, except for big annual events (e.g. the end of the year party) when old and new members were all invited. This contrasted to a larger number of long-term users at Paddy Field.

3.3.3 Comparative Study of Paddy Field and Overpass

Despite the differences in geographic locations, neighborhoods, and user characteristics to some extent, both Paddy Field and Overpass had considerable similarities between them. They both had layouts with a separate office room with staff working, and several differently sized rooms for their various programs. The main office with the employees had desks and chairs, with a bigger table to have meetings and receive guests. They both had 'baby care room' attached. On the walls, in the elevators, and inside the main office, there were many posters showing the upcoming events or programs. Often, there were some notes in other languages such

as Chinese or Vietnamese. Next to the door of the main office, there were racks with various kinds of pamphlets presenting the programs of the Centers and other government's benefits for migrants. While the corridors and elevators were usually quiet, immediately before and after the programs, both Centers tended to become lively with the users greeting and talking in various languages.

The study of two Multicultural Centers was initially designed to support the possibility of a comparative study, to create a nuanced analysis of the divergent workings of the policy. By researching two Centers instead of one, I intended to reflect some of the possible variations amongst the Multicultural Centers. I expected that local variations of demographic composition and urban environments might affect the characteristics and dynamics of each Multicultural Center and the people using them. I considered researching two sites to be appropriate to address these issues of comparability and variation. I decided that attempting to examine three or more sites would restrict my ability to analyze the Multicultural Centers comprehensively, particularly in terms of the lack of time to build a useful rapport with informants.

However, as I was finalizing the participant observation in the two Centers, it became increasingly obvious that there was no significant difference between the two in terms of the programs as well as the experiences and accounts of the people within. Both strictly followed the manuals distributed by the central government, and the organizational process and program contents were almost identical between them. They both started with a regular Monday morning staff meeting, where each staff was assigned with confirmed duties and tasks for the week already scheduled a month

ahead. With mostly determined programs and detailed descriptions of how to run each program, there were very few occasions staff were asked to generate new ideas. When these occurred, it was normally related to small additional details for programs that had already been set in specific ways.

More often than not, the target number of participants, budget, program objectives, and program outlines provided for a given program were fully designed at the Ministry level. Once implemented, one of the staff would put on the detailed numbers and outlined outcomes on the database, for the central organization to evaluate their performance based on them. The fixed formats were applied across the Centers, allowing easier comparisons and evaluations through such number crack-downs.

Many of the Korean employees that I interviewed complained about the highly restricted, bureaucratic system that the Centers and the staff had to closely follow, which apparently would not allow staff any significant level of autonomy to design and implement their own programs. All the programs at both Centers were created under the annual grand strategy of the government, and were monitored and evaluated by detailed numbers and criteria, making all the Centers essentially uniform platforms to run the specified state policy.

Migrant interviewees also expressed a similar opinion in that all the Multicultural Centers were essentially the same. For example, many migrant informants from Paddy Field and Overpass had experiences of using more than one center, often when their residential locations changed. Both those who used more than one center and those who only used one considered all the Centers across the country

as very similar and basically interchangeable. Thus, the strong homogeneity of the Centers in structure and program implementation led me not to focus on comparative analysis of the two centers as proposed initially. Data for this research, however, came from both Centers: Paddy Field and Overpass.

3.4 Access, building relationships, and methodological approaches

After deciding which two Multicultural Centers to study, I first obtained permission to volunteer at the Centers and started with participant observation. I expressed my desire to do volunteer work and my interest as a student researching migrants' lives, in order to ensure that my motive was not perceived as a threatening intrusion to the Centers (for a letter to ask for a permission, see Appendix C). Both Paddy Field and Overpass welcomed volunteers, but Overpass allowed a wider arrange of programs for volunteers than Paddy Field. The programs that I participated in included Korean language classes, new family welcoming events, co-nationality gatherings, volunteering activities, end-of-year party, child-caring services, instrument playing groups, picnics, educational programs, family relationships programs, sports events, and Korean speaking contests. My volunteering activities included contacting participants and letting them know about the details of the programs, writing the reports, preparing the room and snacks, cleaning, and teaching.

Particularly at Overpass, I was given an opportunity to volunteer as a regular teacher at the weekly classes for citizenship test. The weekly classes helped migrants to prepare for the citizenship test in Korea, for which they needed to learn Korean

history, traditions, and culture. This particular activity was especially valuable for my research, as I could regularly meet the participating migrants and sometimes speak informally about their lives and experiences of the Centers in Korea.

Paddy Field and Overpass were similarly organized around monthly schedules with multiple programs assigned on specific dates. There were regular programs such as Korean language classes and citizenship test classes, but also many irregular classes and one-off programs including educational programs and counseling services, and special events like outdoor activities, contests, and cultural events. When a monthly schedule was announced in advance, the Centers promoted their various events through notices on bulletin boards, doors, elevators, online, telephone, and text messages. Most of them were on a 'first come first serve' basis and free of charge. While there were many registered migrant users at both Centers, those who regularly attended were much smaller in numbers, and more conspicuous for Overpass. For this reason, the Korean employees often decided whom to receive given services and contacted the selected migrants individually.

My involvement as a volunteer at the Centers enabled me to participate in 'natural' social interaction and conversation within the spaces. By being physically present in Paddy Field and Overpass, I was able to analyze the settings more closely, and observe how they were organized, operated, and how their programs were actually executed. My observation of this range of interactions, relationships, and the relational 'reality' provided contextual evidence for what to focus on and whom to interview next.

Once I established trust and rapport within each Multicultural Center, I started to seek participants for in-depth interviews. All the initial Interviews were 'semi-structured', incorporating structured questions but retaining a level of flexible openness to let subjects talk about their concerns (Bryman, 2012), taking approximately one-hour per interview, The sets of the interview questions were separately used for Korean workers, migrant users and non-users (see Appendix A). A consent form (see Appendix B) was given to each participant prior to interviewing, and all the interviews were recorded.

I conducted follow-up interviews with the selected informants when necessary, with the subsequent interviews being more focused and less structured (questions created based on the initial interviews). The decision to conduct follow-up interviews was made, when certain concepts or themes arose as significant and provoke the need to expand on what had been said. For example, one of the migrant interviewees talked about her feelings of alienation at her first visit to the Center as a married woman with no children. I wanted to further expand this point, given the theme of gender and reproductive role repeatedly occurred with other interviews. At the follow-up interview, possibly because she felt more comfortable with me on the second meeting, the informant discussed her being not fertile was the main reason behind her decision to stop using the Centers.

The interviews were conducted in neutral public spaces such as cafes. For a few cases, however, I used excerpts from informal conversations that occurred at the Centers that were not recorded. I wrote the excerpts on the day the conversations occurred to be as accurate as possible. Most interviews were in Korean, but when

interviewees, from the Philippines for example, preferred and asked for English, I conducted interviews in English. And I interviewed one Japanese participant using both Korean and Japanese.

3.5 Sampling interviewees

In this research, I considered three primary groups involved in relation to these Centers and the state policy: the Koreans who work for the Centers, the migrants who use the Centers, and migrants who do not use the Centers. All these services of the Centers are free of charge, and attending the Centers is also not set out as a mandatory activity for all migrants in Korea. Thus, migrants in Korea have a 'choice' of whether to participate in the Centers or not, as well as the ability to selectively use programs or services from what's available. My decision to include both the migrants who choose to use the Centers and the migrants who do not in the study is due to this 'selectivity', rendering the need to conceptually distinguish between these two groups. Even for those migrants who use the Centers, analyzing how and why this selection occurs was regarded important in order to understand the workings of the policy and possible intersecting mechanisms at play.

In addition to accounting for the 'selectivity' of the Center users, there was another rationale for considering non-migrant users. According to the official statistics (National Multicultural Family Survey) on marriage migrants, about 71.4% of the marriage migrants are aware of the Centers, and 46.2% of them have experiences of actually using them (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 2012).

The percentage of those who have ever experienced the Center services has increased in the next survey cycle (54.9%), but roughly 45% still answered that they had never used any of the services (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 2015). These figures point to the possibility that some, even amongst the primary targets of the policy (marriage migrants), decide not to use the Centers despite that they know of their existence. This legitimatizes the choice to also include those who do not use the Centers in research.

I used theoretical sampling in determining my interviewees, that is, the sample is chosen with the explicit intention of examining exiting theoretical frameworks (e.g. Koreans versus non-Korean identity), and to inform theoretical insights in later analysis (as regards the importance of other social categories or characteristics) (Bryman, 2012). After participant observation, I decided whom to interview within each of the three groups, based on the data gathered. In choosing interviewees of migrant users, I used the criteria of the choice of programs, demographic differences, and personal opinions on the Centers. All the migrant user interviewees at the Centers that I chose willingly approved my requests for an interview.

Migrants who do not use Centers were found through snowballing sampling, from those who used one of the Centers and knew migrants who had not use them. I also advertised at the online regional migrant communities to solicit potential migrant non-users (see Appendix C). Some of the migrant interviewees helped this process by translating my writing into their language and uploading the advert onto the Internet on my behalf. The non-user migrants include those who had never used the Centers by the time of interview and those who had an experience of using the Centers once,

or briefly, but quickly decided not to use them. The migrants falling in the latter were considered as having too limited individual experience at the Centers to be categorized as users. These migrants offered me their specific reasons as to why they opted out of the services.

Interviewing the Korean employees turned out to be much more challenging than the migrant groups. By the time my volunteering had ended, I had asked individually the Korean employees of both Centers for possible interviews for my research. The Korean staff working for Paddy Field rejected my request, reasoning that it was recently decided that the Center's formal position was that all interview requests from non-governmental institutions and individuals be rejected. This was also posted in Paddy Field's website to prevent any future requests of interviews. Due to this unexpected circumstance, my data gathered from Korean employees were limited to the staff from Overpass.

3.6 My relationship to the topic

My full participation in the Centers implies that my presence could have influence on the dynamics of relationships and interactions within the Centers. From Korean employees' perspective, I was a student volunteer who was interested in 'helping' and 'understanding' migrants and multicultural families. I could perhaps be considered as someone sympathetic towards both migrants and those who would like to help this group, such as themselves. Indeed, this was the case for the Korean

employee interviewees, all of whom expressed their deep sympathy and concern for the migrants, which they presumed that I commonly shared.

All of the employees also knew about my status as belonging to a 'multicultural' family. Perhaps this personal biography, combined with the fact that I was volunteering for them during my pregnancy, made my relationship with the Korean employees amicable. They understood my intention to research on the multicultural policy and the Centers as personal and benign, and hoped that my research would potentially be helpful for the migrant population in Korea.

My status within the Centers was both an insider and an outsider. The Korean employees generally perceived me as a fellow Korean with the shared group identity, different from the migrants. On many occasions during my fieldwork, they used the term 'we' to refer to us (myself and them), and 'they' to refer migrants. There was an implicit, assumed underlying tone that I, as a Korean, would comprehend and obviously share the feelings of the Korean employees. My Korean identity, therefore, allowed me to get access to the employees' rather 'honest' and 'unfiltered' opinions. My presence did not seem to alter the Koreans' attitudes or interactions with the migrants during my participant observation. For instance, I witnessed several times that the Korean employees were being authoritative towards the migrant users, and heard their complaints and discontented remarks in office, despite my physical presence.

As an outsider volunteer and not as staff, I was limited in terms of my involvement within the Centers. I was given specific directions and had only partial access to information compared with full time workers. As an exception, there was an

employee who quit her job immediately after my participant observation, and she provided me with detailed, and possibly confidential information that she would not have had shared with if she had continued her job. Her apparent dissatisfaction with the job and the Centers influenced her to express more negative opinions, making her accounts rather distinctive and dissonant from the dominant opinions shared by other staff. I incorporated her seemingly separate accounts in my analysis, while also observing fundamentally common ideas. While evidently constrained as an outsider, the volunteering activities at Paddy Field and Overpass offered me substantial information and knowledge about how the Centers generally work, which otherwise would be difficult to obtain.

Likewise, my relationship with the migrants was with both in terms of an inside and an outside status. I had a more sympathetic political position toward them, and migrants understood me as an assistant for the Centers, there to ‘support’ multicultural families. Being a volunteer also positioned me differently from the regular Korean employees for them. When they were asked about the Centers, they knew that I was just a volunteer who did not officially ‘belong’ to the Centers. This assisted my attempts to gather their unbiased opinions regarding the Centers, including some of the criticisms of the Centers they might not necessarily discuss with other regular employees.

I felt most accepted and connected to the migrants when I introduced myself as a fellow member of a ‘multicultural family’. This was the case when migrant women welcomed my background of having a foreign husband, becoming more active in participating in the interview after I mentioned it as a cause of my interest.

In multiple occasions, they said a phrase such as "you must understand because you also are a multicultural family". More importantly, given the negative social connotations of the term 'multicultural family' that many migrants were aware of, my shared background was able to help the migrant interviewees speak of the meanings of it more openly without being offended.

Yet, I do not share a migrant status or ethnic/national identity, and thus could be considered dissimilar from them. For instance, I could not speak the languages of their countries and cultures of origin, and communicating in Korean, not their own languages might have prevented them from expressing what they really meant. From migrants' perspective, I could be perceived as part of the Korean majority group.

Also, even with my shared background as a 'multicultural family', they still might not necessarily consider me as one of them, due to my educational qualifications and class position, exposed in the interview process. However, because some of the interview questions included their negative experiences of the policy and life in Korea, many migrants took this as a sign of my allied interest in the discrimination and inequality against them. For instance, one of the migrants who helped me find other migrant non-user interviewees first introduced me as "an unusual Korean, who does not get offended if you say any negative things about Korea".

As such, I was consistently aware of the necessity to remain reflexive about my own identity and social location, and in analyzing my fieldwork I carefully considered the questions of insider and outsider knowledge and power relations (Twine et al., 2000; Jagger, 2008). From the outset, I concurred that there is no way

to ‘truthfully represent reality’ through ethnographic research (Hammersley, 1990), and so I tried to seek contextual relevance, through my subjects’ perspectives, rather than ‘objective’ validity. My reconstruction based on ethnography is undertaken ‘reflexively’ (Altheide and Johnson, 1998), understanding that since the world is interpreted and contingently constructed, my perspective must be specified along with the subjects of research. In terms of the relationship between what is observed and the larger cultural historical setting, and the relationship between the observer and the observed, setting the issue of perspective is used to render and transmit the interpretation within an ‘ethnographic imagination’ (Brewer, 1994; Atkinson, 1990). In this study, this was achieved through both my effort to seek contextual ‘reality’ through participant observation and a series of in-depth interviews in which each subject’s perspective was the given priority.

3.7 Data collection

Throughout the fieldwork, I collected various field notes, analytic memo writing, and interview write-ups (Saldaña, 2013). Field notes from participant observation involved any notes or data from direct experience, social actions of what people actually did, what people said, and archival records on policies, brochures, and program handouts. My volunteer status meant that I had limited access to some of the confidential materials and documents, including the state database where only the regular employees were granted access. However, my observations were generally

not prevented. I was allowed to attend regular and ad-hoc staff meetings, as well as a variety of programs from beginning to end.

My memos mainly consisted of recalled information, analytical ideas and hunches, and personal impressions and reflections from both the participant observation at various programs at the Centers and formal interviews. I wrote memos during the actual time of volunteering if I could, and after each participant observation and interview. This memo writing became “a critical analytical heuristic” for coding (Saldaña, 2013, p.59).

Interview write-ups were collected from both formal and informal interviews, which I audio-recorded and transcribed within two days of the interviews at the latest. When audio recoding was not plausible (especially in informal interviews), I jotted down as much as I could and wrote up that day. At the end of each fieldwork day, I used the evening time to write up all the collected data and saved them on a ‘password-protected’ computer with pseudo names for confidentiality, and took personal time to reflect on the interviews and field notes.

In this process, I largely followed the Grounded Theory Methods (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1992; Straus, 1987; LaRossa, 2005). On a weekly basis, I checked whether any analytical ideas or themes emerged from the data (through reading, coding, rereading, recoding), and reminded myself of what other data was necessary or missing. This way, I ensured that any regularly reflected points were incorporated in the subsequent interviews or as future points to observe. Following the Grounded Theory Methods, I stopped collecting data when I reached the

‘theoretical saturation’, a point where no new information was obtained from further data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1992; Straus, 1987).

3.8 Data analysis: Grounded Theory Methods (GTM)

As Emerson and others (1995, p.144) rightly point out, “analysis pervades all phases of research enterprise”. I constantly engaged with data analysis in making observations, writing field notes, memoing, and coding. For the data analysis, which involved large volumes of data and files, I used the software NVivo version 11 for Mac. I found it useful for particularly the convenient coding processes and its ability to categorize the same files in multiple ways (For example, I could put together files by date, file type, and theme, in which one file can be in multiple ‘systems’ simultaneously). Every piece of written material that was saved as a word file in the password-protected computer would have the exact date and the type (memo, interview scripts, field note etc.) on its individual file name. These files were moved and saved to the NVivo 11 for coding and my analytical comments throughout the analysis process.

Using the NVivo software, I largely followed coding processes inspired by the Grounded Theory Methods (GTM), involving open coding (or initial coding, Charmaz, 2006; Corbin and Strauss, 2008) and focused coding (Emerson et al., 1995), or more refined three coding phases: open coding, axial coding, and selective coding (LaRossa, 2005). Open coding is basically doing “constant comparison” (LaRossa, 2005, p.841) from ‘a line-by-line coding of texts’ commonly emphasized

in the initial practice of the GTM. In this initial phase, the concepts or indicators emerge through repeated comparisons. At this 'first cycle', I utilized and combined coding methods of attribute coding, structural coding, descriptive coding, in-vivo coding and versus coding, following the useful description by Saldaña (2013).

For attribute coding, I created a separate Excel file to list all the attributes for each interviewee. The attributes included in the research are: age group, gender, educational level, original nationality, migrant status, citizenship status, Center user status, length of stay (years of working at the Centers for Koreans), Korean diaspora, and whether or not they are a member of multicultural family. At the NVIVO, I utilized the 'case classification' functions to do this, which was used to conduct various group comparisons. Due to the semi-structured nature of my interview questions, I applied structural coding on the segments of data that relate to specific questions. For example, major codes emerged through structural coding include Centers' organization, Centers' operation, Contexts of the Centers, and Centers' ongoing changes, all of which were based on my prepared interview questions on the Centers. These are aggregated codes with more specific codes as sub-codes. Descriptive coding, which enables summarization of data into a word or short phrase, was employed comprehensively throughout the data. The basic codes from the structural coding and descriptive coding were particularly useful for developing 'categories', prior to theorization (Saldaña, 2013).

While less frequently applied than the above-mentioned coding methods, I also used in-vivo coding and versus coding when necessary and appropriate. In-vivo coding uses "a word or short phrase from the actual language found in the qualitative

data record" (Saldaña, 2013, p.91), which is apt for prioritizing the participant's voice. Versus codes "identify in dichotomous or binary terms the individuals, groups, social systems, organizations, phenomena, processes, concepts, etc., in direct conflict with each other" (Saldaña, 2013, p.115). My choice of versus coding was due to the research design that distinguishes Koreans' perspectives from migrants' ones and vice versa (also non-users versus users). Versus coding was also useful for the comparisons of other social categories including gender, class, nationality and ethnicity. The mixing of the several coding methods at the initial cycle created different explorative analysis results, which became much clearer and narrower at the next cycle.

The second cycle, Axial coding, according to LaRossa (2005), is what the previous GTM theorists term variously 'paradigm items', 'a process of relating categories to their subcategories', and 'theoretical coding'. LaRossa develops these earlier notions to aim for more analytical clarity, arguing, "in essence, axial coding is about developing hypotheses or propositions... about the relationship between or among variables" (2005, p.848). The previously unexplored aspects of interrelationships were explicitly examined in this stage, before finally moving into the selective coding. At the selective coding, the core variables were identified to essentially make a study's narrative or story line (LaRossa, 2005). The 82 final codes were used to write up the analyses (see Appendix D for the list of top final codes).

Through this coding process of GTM, I gathered that migrants and Koreans had distinctive understandings of multiculturalism, programs, and experiences within the Centers. As my focus was largely on the processes and mechanisms of racism that

are articulated in relation to nationalism and ethnic homogeneity through Korea's multicultural policy, concepts that emerge from the coding also reflected this particular concern. While the literature review strongly alluded to and anticipated the intersection of key multiple categories and the power and social hierarchies in the practice of multicultural policy, the exact processes of these intersections were divulged through the GTM and its repetitive codings in this analysis stage.

3.9 Basic information of interviewees

I first interviewed 9 Korean employees, 18 migrant users, and 11 migrant non-users. I conducted 4 follow-up interviews with 3 migrant users and 1 migrant non-user. The total number of interviews was 42 (from 9 Korean employees, 21 migrant users from both Centers, 12 migrant non-users) (see table 3 for participant demographic information). This number is regarded sufficient as my purpose of interviewing is not to generalize the population, but to understand in-depth their experiences and accounts, whether they use the Centers or not, and for what reasons.

All the Korean employees working at Overpass were women, aged between 20 and 60 years old. The years of working for them varied from 2 years to 10 years. The majority of the employee interviewees were in their 30s and 40s, except for one employee in her 50s. Their duties within the Center varied, from organizing various events to teaching Korean languages, and to offering personal counseling services to migrants. Two interviewees were mid-manager positions, and the rest were regular contracted employees, with no top ranked manager positions participated. They held

university degrees specializing in social welfare, family studies, family psychology, and Korean language, with most of them holding the official certificate of 'social welfare workers' (see Table 4 for the brief profile of each respondent from the Korean employees group).

The migrant users at Paddy Field and Overpass whom I interviewed were all women, aged between 20 and 60. The years of living in Korea were significantly mixed, from the minimum 2 years to as long as over 20 years. Their original nationalities include Chinese, Vietnamese, Japanese, Cambodian, Filipina, Thai, and Uzbekistani. They were all members of a multicultural family, meaning that they had married a Korean man, and two of them were divorced by the time I interviewed. They also had at least one child from their marriage to the Korean spouses. There were more users currently employed than not employed. Except for six interviewees who had no job, other migrant users had either part time or irregular jobs. Those who were currently unemployed also expressed their desire to get employed as soon as possible. About the half of the user interviewees already had acquired the Korean citizenship, and some planned to get this in the near future. There were six participants who had no plans to apply for the Korean citizenship, five of them currently having Japanese citizenship and one with Chinese.

The migrant non-users of the Centers that I interviewed include 3 males and 8 females. They belonged to the age group of 20s, 30s, and 40s. The years of living in Korea ranged from minimum 2 years to over 20 years. Their original nationalities included Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Uzbekistani, Indian and Iranian. Whereas no Center user interviewee included those with Korean ethnicity (Korean diaspora),

there were three interviewees who identified themselves with the Korean ethnic background (Korean Japanese, Korean Chinese, and Korean Uzbekistani). Half of the non-users were members of the multicultural family, whereas the rest half were not married to Korean spouses. All non-users were employed as either part time or full time, except for two who were full time housewives. Apart from two non-user interviewees who acquired the Korean citizenship, most non-users still maintained their original citizenships. The non-user interviewees tended to be more educated, and with higher economic status and family backgrounds than the users that I interviewed (see Table 5 for the brief profile of each respondent from the migrant group).

.

Table 3. Participant Demographic Information

Group	Name *	Age	Gen-der	Original Nationality	Years of working /living	Having a Korean Spouse	Having children	Korean citizen	Education Level **
Workers	Jungyun	45	F	Korean	4	-	-	-	T
	Suyeon	35	F	Korean	3	-	-	-	T
	Jiyeon	37	F	Korean	5	-	-	-	T
	Youngsun	42	F	Korean	10	-	-	-	T
	Joohee	45	F	Korean	10	-	-	-	T
	Heejeong	45	F	Korean	10	-	-	-	T
	Misuk	57	F	Korean	10	-	-	-	T
	Kyunghee	40	F	Korean	2	-	-	-	T
	Haemin	33	F	Korean	7	-	-	-	T
Users	Mayumi	34	F	Japanese	8	Yes	Yes	No	S
	Mieko	44	F	Japanese	18	Yes	Yes	No	T
	Sachiko	48	F	Japanese	25	Yes	Yes	No	S
	Yumi	43	F	Japanese	20	Yes	Yes	No	S
	Aoi	32	F	Japanese	7	Yes	Yes	No	T
	Phuong	32	F	Vietnamese	9	Yes	Yes	Yes	S
	Hyesoo	33	F	Vietnamese	7	Yes	Yes	Yes	S
	Nhung	28	F	Vietnamese	6	Yes	Yes	No	S
	Hoang	31	F	Vietnamese	2	Yes	Yes	Yes	S
	Zhang	32	F	Chinese	3	Yes	Yes	No	T
	Zhou	46	F	Chinese	5	Yes	Yes	Yes	T
	Rachany	27	F	Cambodian	5	Yes	Yes	No	S
	Chhean	27	F	Cambodian	5	Yes	Yes	No	S
	Sofia	44	F	Filipina	17	Yes	Yes	Yes	T
	Nora	51	F	Filipina	17	Yes	Yes	Yes	T
	Lea	29	F	Filipina	10	Yes	Yes	Yes	T
	Daria	33	F	Uzbekistani	6	Yes	Yes	No	S
	Nam	36	F	Thai	13	Yes	Yes	Yes	S
Non-users	Sanjay	32	M	Indian	4	No	No	No	T
	Suhani	30	F	Indian	2	No	No	No	T
	Angela	41	F	Filipina	10	No	No	No	T
	Kevin	47	M	Filipino	23	No	No	No	S
	Ben	43	M	Iranian	9	No	No	No	T
	Jessica	23	F	Uzbekistani	5	No	No	No	T
	Yan	36	F	Chinese	12	Yes	Yes	Yes	T
	Keiko	42	F	Japanese	6	Yes	No	No	T
	Haruka	32	F	Japanese	3	Yes	No	No	T
	Yuri	35	F	Japanese	5	Yes	Yes	No	T

Shiho	45	F	Japanese	20	Yes	Yes	Yes	S

*All names appearing in this paper are pseudonyms
** Education Level refers to the highest level of education a respondent has obtained. T refers to tertiary education (university or higher), S refers to secondary education (middle or secondary school), and P refers to primary education (elementary or primary school).

Table 4. Brief Profiles of Respondents: Korean Employees (in alphabetical order)

Name (pseudonym)	Age	Profile
Haemin	33	Haemin, a mother of one child, has been working for the Center for the last five years. She usually deals with the Center's administrative and communication related tasks.
Heejeong	45	Previously worked as a counselor for troubled youth groups, Heejeong has been working for the Center for the last ten years. She is a mother of two children.
Jiyeon	37	Jiyeon, a mother of one child, has been teaching Korean language and involved in visiting programs of multicultural families for the last five years.
Joohee	45	Joohee, a mother of two children, has been working for the Center for the last ten years, mainly participating in visiting and education programs.
Jungyun	45	Jungyun, a mother of three children, is a middle manager with a master's degree in social welfare. She quitted her job at the Center immediately after my participant observation.
Kyunghee	40	Kyunghee, a mother of two children, started working for the Center two years ago, with her previous work experience as a social worker.
Misuk	57	Misuk, a mother of two children, has been working for the Center for the last ten years. She is involved in visiting and education programs.
Suyeon	35	Suyeon, a single woman, has been working at the Center for the last three years. Counseling with troubled multicultural migrant women is one of her major responsibilities.
Youngsun	42	Youngsun, a mother of two children, joined the Center ten years ago, after her volunteering experience with a Thai-Korean multicultural family.

Table 5. Brief Profiles of Respondents: Migrants (in alphabetical order)

Name (pseudonym)	Age	Center User	Profile
Angela	41	No	Angela, a single woman from the Philippines, first came to Korea to take care of her ill sister who got married to a Korean man. She works as an office worker, and is actively involved in Filipino communities and a local environmental volunteering group.
Aoi	32	Yes	Aoi, originally from Japan, met her Korean husband during her undergraduate program in a Korean university. They have one child. Extremely fluent in Korean, she works for a cosmetic company as a salesperson.
Ben	43	No	Ben, an Iranian businessman, initially came to Korea 9 years ago to set up his own business, later married to a Korean woman. They have no child. He is an entrepreneur and semi-professional photographer.
Chhean	27	Yes	Chhean, originally from Cambodia, is married to a Korean man and has twin children. She has lived in Korea for five years and has been a homemaker. Her sister is also living in Korea with her Korean husband.
Daria	33	Yes	Daria is originally from Uzbekistan, and got married to a Korean man 6 years ago. Her husband and his family own a big peach orchard. She has one son.
Haruka	32	No	Haruka, originally from Okinawa, Japan, met her Korean husband in Korea while traveling. They have no children but are planning to have one soon. She just completed a graduate degree in public policy and now is working as a Japanese language teacher.
Hoang	31	Yes	Hoang, from Vietnam, met her Korean husband in Vietnam. They moved to Korea two years ago. She has a girl with her husband, but also lives with her husband's son from the previous marriage. She is working at a fast food restaurant for part-time.
Hyesoo	33	Yes	Hyesoo came to Korea 7 years ago to get married to her Korean husband. She has one school-age son. She works full time at a local government office and is enrolled in online college courses. She got her Korean citizenship three years ago, along with her new name now in Korean.
Jessica	24	No	Jessica, a third generation Koryoin, moved to Korea from Uzbekistan to study in a Korean university and join her parents already working and living in Korea. She works as a translator at the Western Union

			remittance service for a part time job.
Keiko	42	No	Keiko, from Japan, met her Korean husband in Korea and has lived in Korea for the last 6 years. She has no child and works as a Japanese language teacher in Korea.
Kevin	47	No	Kevin, a Filipino, initially came to Korea as a factory worker 23 years ago, and 13 years later met his Korean wife. They have no child. He was undocumented for a few years before marriage, and due to this history, got rejected to obtain permanent residency multiple times. He works for an organization to support migrant workers' rights.
Lea	29	Yes	She moved from the Philippines to get married to her Korean husband ten years ago. They have two children. She has volunteering experience at the Center and a migrant community organization, as well as paid job experience as an English teacher.
Mayumi	34	Yes	Mayumi, originally from Tokyo, Japan, got married to her Korean husband through the Unification Church. She is no longer connected to the religion. They have one daughter. She has been living in Korea for 8 years as a homemaker, with occasional part-time jobs.
Mieko	44	Yes	Mieko, a Japanese, has been living in Korea for the last 18 years with her Korean husband. They have one child. She has been working as an English teacher, Japanese teacher, and doing freelance translations.
Nam	36	Yes	Nam got married to her Korean husband and has been living in Korea for the last 13 years as a homemaker. She gave up her Thai citizenship to obtain the Korean citizenship after 5 years of living in Korea. They have one son.
Nhung	28	Yes	Nhung, originally from Vietnam, got married to her Korean husband through a commercial brokerage 6 years ago, and has three children including one she is pregnant with. Her husband is a construction worker, but is temporally out of work due to his back problem. She lives with her mother-in-law.
Nora	51	Yes	Nora, originally from the Philippines, got married to her Korean husband through the Unification Church. They have one teenage boy. Now a Korean citizen, she has lived in Korea for 17 years. She has several part time jobs.
Phuong	32	Yes	Phuong came from Vietnam to get married to her Korean husband 9 years ago through a brokerage but divorced after a few years. She lives alone with her son. She works full time at a factory in weekdays and

			has a part time job in weekends.
Rachany	27	Yes	Rachany, originally from Cambodia, moved to Korea 5 years ago to get married to her Korean husband. Her older sister who got married to a Korean husband first, introduced her current husband. They have one child. She helped her parents' farm back in Cambodia and is now a homemaker.
Sachiko	48	Yes	Sachiko, a Japanese, came to Korea 25 years ago to get married to her Korean husband through the Unification Church. They have three sons. She is a homemaker.
Sanjay	32	No	Sanjay, from India, came to Korea 4 years ago, and has been working as a researcher in a Korean university. He is married to an Indian woman, and has no child.
Shiho	45	No	Shiho, originally from Japan, came to Korea to be with her Korean husband, and has been living in Korea for 20 years. Now divorced, she lives with her only son. She works for a factory.
Sofia	44	Yes	Sofia, originally from the Philippines, met her husband in the Philippines and moved to Korea 17 years ago. She is a mother of four children and a breadwinner for the household.
Suhani	30	No	Suhani came to Korea from India 2 years ago to join her husband who got a job in Korea. She works as a professional engineer.
Yan	36	No	Yan, a joseonjok (Korean Chinese), came to Korea 12 years ago to get married to her Korean husband. As a homemaker, she minds their two children. Now a Korean citizen she speaks with a perfect Korean accent.
Yumi	43	Yes	Yumi, a Japanese, got married to her Korean husband 20 years ago, but got divorced a year ago. Because she has no permanent residency and her only child now becoming an adult, she will soon lose her right to continue living in Korea.
Yuri	35	No	Yuri, a third generation Korean Japanese, came to Korea to learn Korean language. She met her current Korean husband during her stay in Korea. She is a homemaker and has two children.
Zhang	32	Yes	Zhang, a mother of one son, is married to a Korean man who she met in China. They moved to Korea 3 years ago. A college graduate, she is looking for a permanent job.
Zhou	46	Yes	Zhou met her Korean husband in China and has two children with him. They moved to Korea 5 years ago.

			She is working for a trade company in Korea and teaching Chinese to low-income students regularly as a volunteer.

Chapter 4: Gender Inequality and Nationalism

Chapter 4 focuses on how gender, nationalism, and the interlinking of the two dominate the varied accounts of those involved in the Korea's multicultural policy practice. The migrants' gender roles for the nation, reiterated by the Korean employees, were assessed differently for migrant users and non-users of the Centers, showing the complicated social dynamics and power relations the policy entails.

4.1 Korean Employees

In this section on the Korean employees, three interrelated themes emerged: theme I, the reproductive role of migrant for the nation; theme II, performing gender roles for the nation; and theme III, undermining the migrants' experience of patriarchy. Theme I deals with the emphasis of migrants' ability to reproduce for the nation and its benefits captured by the various employee narratives. Theme II discusses the Korean employees' assumptions about migrants' gender roles including caring, following Korean traditions, and avoiding divorce, all of which serve to naturalize the hierarchical social relations of gender and ethnicity/nationality between Koreans and migrants. Theme III illustrates how the Korean staff obscure the migrants' experience of gender inequality through rationalizing national hierarchy and global hegemony as unavoidable determinate circumstances.

4.1.1 Theme I: The reproductive role of migrants for the nation

The Korean employees that I interviewed all expressed a personal interest in the matter of migrants, and for some of them, this was the chief reason to start working at the Center. They believed their work through the Center would benefit marriage migrants living in Korea, although many of them also considered that the Centers could be improved. They all expressed a great sympathy for marriage migrants within multicultural families and hence the existence of social support for them, in the form of multicultural state policy and the Centers. The 'feelings of sympathy', 'feeling sorry for', 'desire to help', and 'their difficult situations' were the phrases that Korean employees commonly used in explaining their decision to work for the Centers.

For example, for Misuk, one of the employees in her 50s, the migrants' situations in Korea reminded her of the 'yanggongju'[13] story she had read while at college. This story concerned a young woman who left Korea for an unhappy marriage in America after working as a comfort woman near a U.S. Army base in Korea immediately after the Korean War, and was broadly reflective of a life path that many young, impoverished Korean women took in the 1950s. For Misuk, the situation for marriage migrants in Korea directly echoed the pity she remembered feeling for the 1950s' 'yanggongju' who were known to have had tough lives as immigrants in the U.S. Other employees were less dramatic, most starting their engagement through voluntary experiences helping marriage migrants, before deciding to work at the Center as regular employees.

---

[13] Yanggongju is a term to refer to women who used to work near the U.S. Military Base in Korea as sex workers, during the U.S. occupation immediately after the Korean War occurred in 1950.

But, behind their commonly held, seemingly personal sentiments of empathy and compassion for the migrants in Korea, a strong sense of nationalism powerfully rationalized the Korean employees' emotional sentiment. The bulk of their comments and understandings of multicultural policy and migrants' lives closely related to ideas of 'society' and the 'nation', and more precisely how the migrants affected Korea as a whole. Even in descriptions of their personal emotions and feelings about the migrants, the Koreans attributed these to matters of nation, more so than their individual opinions or decisions. For the Korean employees, as the individual agents who implement the multicultural policy, the issue of what the migrants could contribute to the nation was key in their accounts of the policy and their own attitudes.

In this, gender was crucial in informing the rhetoric of nationalism presented in the accounts of the Korean employees. It was not just broad notions of nation and nationalism that they reiterated in their rationalizations, but nation and nationalism in direct relation to gender. In other words, the question of how the migrants' in their *gender* specific roles, as wives and mothers, would contribute to the *nation* dominated their explanations and comments about the state multicultural policy.

Misuk had worked for marriage migrants at the Center for the last ten years, since the Centers first emerged. When I asked her how she generally felt about working for the Center, she started talking about how she felt about the migrants:

> *When I see them, I feel that they are very patriotic. Because they came all the way here to get married, to a family with very difficult situations... To be*

frank, they (the Korean men) are the ones who would not be able to get married otherwise here. The important thing is that they have a baby. One, two, three (babies)… I think they are really patriotic, and I think it is a great thing.

The popular discourse of the low birth rate as a pressing national problem in Korea obviously affected Misuk's perception of the migrants. According to her, Korea was a nation that desperately needed 'babies', and the marriage migrants were foreign gendered bodies that had helpfully arrived to meet the demands of the nation. For her, it was not the personal wellbeing of the migrants that mattered, but how they had come all the way to get married to otherwise unmarriageable Korean men, and most crucially had babies with them.

Misuk was not at all shy when telling me about her opinion that 'a migrant having a baby' was "a great thing". She was praising the migrants as "patriotic", a perspective in which the migrants' viewpoints were never incorporated. This was clear from her acknowledgement that the migrants were the only kinds of women that the men could afford to get married to. These migrants were regarded patriotic because they responded to the nation's vital demands, a task which many Korean women would not be willing to undertake. In her comments about the patriotism of the migrants, there was no recognition of the presence of agency or will within these migrant women, as individual women in Korea they were entirely subsumable to the needs of the state.

Additionally, for her, whilst the Korean bachelors might not be the most desirable grooms, they were still considered as useful fertile members of the nation. It is "important" and "a great thing" that migrants have come to Korea to reproduce with these lower-class Korean men, whose only worth still lies in their ability to expand the national population during this national low birth rate crisis. In the current national emergency, while Korean women simply do not produce enough babies, the fact that the migrant women were taking this important role, to produce offspring with at least some kind of Korean lineage, was considered something to be appreciated.

Suyeon, another employee in the middle manager position, was in her 30s and had worked for the Center for the last three years, before which she used to work at an adolescent welfare center. She told me that her decision to change her job had turned out to be good for her as she enjoyed working for migrants at the Center. She was enthusiastic in responding to my questions about her feelings on the multicultural policy and the establishment of the Centers.

Suyeon's main complaint as a worker at the Center was about the low budget allocated to the Centers and how this hindered the fundamental process of improving the wellbeing of the migrants. In our conversation, I mentioned the rarity of such a state policy in other countries, and she was very surprised to hear my comments. She asked me, "where do migrants get help then (in these other countries)?" For her, helping these marriage migrants was naturally the state's responsibility, as they directly connected to the nation's wellbeing.

If they (migrants) get well adjusted and settle in the country, the society will be calm. Otherwise, if they just run away, divorce, or have many difficulties, this becomes a social problem. You know, these days, people don't get married and don't have babies. The state needs to support the marriage migrants as part of the immigration policy, to prevent social issues, immigration issues…

Like Misuk, Suyeon's explanations about the multicultural policy also tied the migrant women to the issues of low marriage rate and birth rate in contemporary Korea. For her, the aim of the policy was not directly to attend to the wellbeing of these migrants, but more crucially to maintain the health of the society and the nation. For Suyeon, migrants were primarily deemed as potential threats to the society being "calm", so the state level controlling of their potential "running away", "divorce" and "social problems" was simply necessary. This is why she never questioned the existence of the multicultural policy and the Centers, assuming all other societies would approach migrant issues in the same way.

Her linking of the idea of migrants to the national problems of low birth and marriage rates obviously limited her discussion to marriage migrants only, ignoring all other types of migrants. The examples of the potential social problems Suyeon mentioned such as "running away" and "divorce" made it clear that the marriage migrants' specific gendered roles relative to marriage were the key reason why they should justifiably receive state funding.

This tendency to view Centers' users through their gendered role as potential mothers instead of directly relative to their personal welfare appeared again during my participant observation. This incident occurred when the Center users had to take a Korean language test, so that they could be allocated to different classes for the rest of the semester, depending on their proficiency. As a volunteer, I was taking care of the babies with other staff in the children's playroom in the building. This specific room was prepared so that the migrants could leave their babies and attend classes, or like this particular day, take the language level test in the separate classrooms. The head of the Center, a woman in her 50s, was occasionally checking and supervising what we were doing. There were dozens of babies in the room, all under 2 years old. It was organized so that when a baby cried, we would call the mother to come down and soothe the baby before returning to the exam.

A migrant woman entered the room because she had been called to mind her crying baby. The Head of the Center saw this woman trying to go back to the classroom to finish her exam. With a cold voice, the Head scolded her by saying, "what is more important, you or baby?" This migrant said she had to take the exam today, or she could miss the entire Korean language classes for the whole semester. The migrant woman looked desperate, asking us to hold the baby if she started to cry again. In response, the Head just shrugged, saying "No, we can't respond to all the personal demands by the mothers". The migrant woman stayed in the room with her baby, and had to miss the test.

This incident between the Head of the Center and migrant woman was just one example of many occasions that showed some tension between the Korean staff

and the migrant users. It might be an overstatement, but the sneering remark from the Head indicating that she prioritized the babies over migrants largely corresponded with the general attitudes held by other employees, who viewed the migrant users primarily in terms of their ability to reproduce babies and as mothers, rather than individuals.

4.1.2 Theme II: Performing gender roles for the nation

While migrant women were principally regarded as a solution to the low birth rate problem, they were also perceived as performers of assumed gender roles in maintaining the wider familial institutions and following Korean traditions, responsibilities framed as their dutiful contribution to the nation. This thinking was particularly apparent when I asked Korean employees about anti-multiculturalism in Korea and what they thought about this. In many responses, I observed that the employees tried to defend migrants and opposed the anti-multicultural perspective, but used the example of migrants' undertaking of the traditional gendered duties in Korea as the logical defense of why they needed to be supported through state-sponsored multiculturalism.

Heejeong, in her 40s, came up with a story about one of the migrants she knew, to demonstrate that she would stand against the negative stereotypes about migrants and anti-multiculturalists' discourse.

> *I know a migrant woman who maintains her role by cooking every meal for her mother-in-law and father-in-law just as if they are her own parents. We*

are living at a time when even the eldest (Korean) daughter-in-laws do not take care of their parents-in-law and keep their distance from them.

Another employee, Kyunghee, used a similar example in her attempt to endorse marriage migrant women in relation to multicultural policy.

I know a case… This Korean woman is a bit old and has a job. During the national holidays, her migrant sister-in-law comes to the mother-in-law's house and prepares all the food and she (the Korean woman) just turns up at night with some fruits bought from a shop. The migrant woman is really good. She laughs and says "I am really good at even making tuiguim (Various fried vegetables and meats typically made during the holidays). It is the eldest daughter-in-law's role of course. I feel like the Korean daughter-in-law should have done this work. As this case proves, they (migrants) are better than us.

Misuk, who emphasized the migrant women's role of having babies, adds another of their assumed roles, caring for the elderly parents-in-laws, to describe the positive aspects of the migrants:

You know better-positioned sons move out (from the parents) after getting married. A bit less able sons continue to live with their parents and get

married to the multicultural migrants. These migrants all take care of the parents-in-law, even if they are (married to) the youngest.

In all of the three anecdotes above, the Korean employees used examples of migrant women who would take care of the parents-in-laws and cook for the family. From the Korean employees' perspective, these gendered duties are traditionally considered as married women's responsibilities in Korea, and they are being sustained in many cases thanks to the work of migrant women. The migrants they showcased all took on these traditions that Korean women had failed to preserve.

Even though the Korean employees were all women and married themselves (apart from one), they considered the continued maintenance of the tradition of gendered family responsibility and patriarchy through migrants' domestic labor as positive. The fact that these migrants perform the gender roles that originally belonged to the eldest Korean daughter-in-laws was applauded, becoming a legitimate reason to defend them from the anti-multiculturalism discourse.

They disagreed with the arguments of the anti-multiculturalism side voicing against any social benefits given to groups of immigrants, but again using a nationalistic rationale. Because the migrants served the nation through family duties and maintenance of traditions, the nation should offer the social support to help them. Their defending arguments for migrants were fundamentally based on their effects on the nation, whether through reproducing or keeping family traditions. The Korean employees believed that the core of family values in Korea had been and was being

maintained through the migrant women's work, and that this gender role needed to be socially recognized.

It is also interesting to note how the Korean employees depicted the migrant women as happy to take over these roles, rather than as those who involuntarily became burdened with the gendered duties. The migrant woman in Kyunghee's account, for instance, seemed almost proud to take over the Korean family obligations, cheerfully chatting about her cooking skills newly acquired in Korea. As Heejeong acknowledged in her comments, this contrasted with the stance of Korean daughters-in-laws who would not follow these responsibilities and intentionally keep "the distance from them (parents-in-laws)". As Misuk explicitly said, the migrant women, despite the fact that they got married to "less able sons" or "the youngest", took on these caring responsibilities, which most young Korean women would have shunned. Grasping the gendered Korean tradition as inescapable, these Koreans seemed relieved by the fact that there existed migrants who could 'willingly' take the gendered roles.

Suyeon compared the migrant wives to Koreans in a similar manner to the three employees above, describing how migrants had far more positive attitudes towards family. She was talking about a migrant Center user she knew personally who had now became a good friend of hers, when I asked about any migrant users she particularly remembered. This migrant friend of Suyeon was portrayed as a woman who sacrificed herself to keep the family intact but who still found happiness in the extremely harsh conditions. She commented, "If she were a Korean, it would have

definitely ended up in divorce, but she tried to keep her marriage and family to the end, to raise children…it was amazing."

Again, Koreans and migrants were distinctly viewed as separate groups, with different expectations and attitudes towards gendered familial obligations. While it seems that migrants were viewed more positively compared with Koreans in all of the interview excerpts, the positive assessments by the Korean staff were essentially grounded in the rhetoric of how they diligently stuck to maintaining family institutions despite the patriarchy, an endeavor that ultimately would benefit the nation. The migrant women's work, labor, and even sacrifices within family were appreciated and even glorified, because they helped to keep the dying traditions of Korean society, care for the elderly members of the nation, and maintain intact marriages and hence stabilize the society. These responsibilities undertaken by migrant women were all considered as something that most of their Koreans contemporaries would try hard to avoid. This is precisely the point why, ironically, the positive assessments of the migrants by the Korean staff were inherently discriminatory. A double standard of expectations as regards gender roles and relations was applied to Koreans and migrants separately, subsequently naturalizing the hierarchical social positions (based on national/ethnic) between the two groups.

The topic of 'divorce' was repeatedly brought up within the accounts given by the Korean staff, another example that showed how the hierarchical group positions were naturalized and maintained. Although in their idealized accounts it was often the migrant woman, as in the case of Suyeon's friend, who prevented a potential divorce, conversely, multicultural families, and migrant women more precisely, were

imagined as being at a higher risk of divorce, when compared to their Korean counterparts. Their allegedly high divorce rate was apparently one of the negative stereotypes about the marriage migrants held by many Koreans. Joohee talked about the stereotype of multicultural family related to the divorce, which was gradually disappearing. "Multicultural family basically meant divorce. These families just getting divorced left, right and center. Nowadays, not so much!"

Since these migrants were only able to cross national borders through legal rights derived from the social contract of marriage in the first place, their 'intention' to keep the marriage intact was central to how these Koreans employees assessed the migrants. This is perhaps why the Korean interviewees constantly brought up the 'divorce issue' when talking about migrant wives. Suyeon said,

> *People who are opposing the multicultural policy believe that these migrants came to Korea with the marriage visa but actually their intention is to get a job here. There is a stereotype of these women that they would just get divorced and run away.*

While divorce in general is still often considered as taboo in Korea, the idea of divorce within multicultural families is particularly problematic for many Koreans. This is because divorce within a multicultural family often testifies to the migrants' presumed real intentions of coming to Korea for their own benefit. Firmly fixed in their gendered roles and family obligations, migrant women were constantly perceived and gauged through the traditional values of marriage and family. Divorce

was, therefore, something that these migrants were not expected to countenance, despite the overt admission of the often difficult familial circumstances these women encountered in their marriages. Discussion of divorce among multicultural families appeared frequently and critically during the interviews with the Korean employees, because divorce was mainly seen as migrants' attempt to run away from their assumed gender roles within family, while retaining the advantage of their new and elevated citizenship status.

Just as the state support for the migrant women was conditioned upon their fulfillment of gendered roles to support their immediate Korean family and wider nation, conversely, the 'high' chance of divorce and breakdown for multicultural 'families' was universally considered among my Korean respondents as socially important due to its potentially detrimental effects on the nation. This demonstrates that many Koreans' understanding of these 'family' issues involving the migrants, whether concerning reproducing, caring, or divorcing, is not just individual problem, but directly linked to the sustenance of the fabric of the nation.

This explains why some Korean employees called for more attention from the state regarding the issue of divorce within multicultural families. And while some employees, such as Suyeon and Joohee discussed the high chance of divorce as one of the main negative stereotypes applied to multicultural families, others, such as Misuk, firmly believed that this was a genuine trend. Assuming the high divorce rate amongst multicultural families as the proven truth, despite the statistics suggesting otherwise,[14]

[14] According to the Marriage and Divorce Statistics of 2017, the rate of divorce for multicultural families (if calculated as marriage between a Korean and a foreign spouse) compared with all divorces in Korea is 6.7% (4.9% of which is the divorces amongst migrant women and Korean husbands). Given the marriage rate amongst multicultural families

Misuk further argued that the Centers' remit should include directly dealing with this apocryphal high divorce rate issue.

> *It is told that the divorce rate (amongst the multicultural families) is very high. If we continue the counseling service, I think this divorce rate could be reduced a lot. If the Multicultural Center got involved in this management from the very early stage with all the members of the families, I am sure the divorce rate would decrease.*

Misuk not only considered the divorce rate amongst multicultural family as a general societal concern, but also perceived the matter of divorce among multicultural families as something that the state should intervene with and control. It is not certain whether her main worry was to do with the impact of the divorce on the family members themselves, the nation or both. Yet, given her repeated use of the word 'divorce rate' not 'divorce', she seemed to be more concerned about the societal consequences of the divorce rate itself, whatever that would mean.

This focus on the divorce issue is inherently related to the perceived inferior social position of the migrants, who are constantly framed as those who might potentially "get divorced and run away". The wider issue of unequal gender relations formed through such marriages and families were left ignored and let un-problematized in this dominant framing, whereas the focus was often on whether multicultural families divorce or not.

---

compared with all the marriages in Korea is around 7.9%, it doesn't appear that the divorce rate is particularly high amongst the multicultural families. (Statistics Korea 2017)

As Suyeon's comment that many of "these women… just get divorced and run away" indicates, the responsibility for divorce fell usually on the migrant women's shoulders by default, and hardly ever on their Korean husbands'. Implied here was that the divorce issue amongst multicultural families was something that needed to be controlled by the state, mainly due to the specific nature (different to Koreans) of the migrant members and their mischief.

The underlying idea that migrant women, not Korean husbands, were responsible for their potential or actual divorces, and the preoccupation that these women would consequently run away regardless of who had caused the divorce, demonstrated the Korean workers' gendered and nationalist conception of the migrant population. The framing of the divorce issue amongst multicultural families as a national concern, and primarily the migrant women's responsibility, further functioned to buttress the hierarchical relations of Koreans and non-Korean migrants.

4.1.3 Theme III: Overlooking the migrants' experience of patriarchy

Only one Korean employee explicitly argued against this general trend to assume a nationalist viewpoint regarding the migrants and the policy benefiting them. This middle manager of the Center was outspoken about the multicultural policy and the problem it perpetuated in framing the migrants through gendered and nationalistic lenses.

Jungyun, in her 40s, had just quit her job at the Center after working for the past four years. She had coordinated the Korean citizenship test class that I was volunteering for, but left her job immediately after I finished my participant

observation in the Center. Possibly because of her changed position at the time of interview, her comments about the Centers and the multicultural policy were far more critical and negative than others. For instance, when I asked why the government was running the Centers, she stated:

> *It's for Korean men. That's for sure. They (the government) are talking as if it is for the population policy, but no! The primary reason is to save the Korean men who cannot get married… I do not understand why the government is dividing separately into the marriage migrant group and the labor migrant group. This is because of the Korean family (men), not for foreigners. It is just their pretty excuse!*

She continued talking about Korea's low birth rate. Unlike other Korean employees who viewed this as a pressing national problem that needed correction, Jungyun saw the linking of the multicultural policy to the low birth rate issue as the state's deliberate, strategic, and gendered maneuver. Jungyun pointed out the hidden, nationalistic assumption behind the multicultural policy, which she argued was ultimately "for Korean men". For this reason, she found the multicultural policy generally problematic and uncomfortable. She was suspicious of the intention behind the multicultural policy as a means to frame her work with the migrant women, and this combined with the monotonous character of her work led her to eventually leave the job.

Throughout the interview, Jungyun repetitively stressed the patriarchy and power imbalance frequently observed within multicultural families, while taking the side of the migrant women. For example, she raised her voice when talking about the subject of high divorce rate amongst the multicultural families. Jungyun said she always got upset whenever she heard Korean people saying that the divorce rate among multicultural families was high, as if this was the migrants' fault. She listed the problems of the Korean husbands including domestic violence and sexual abuse, and argued that these were the major causes of the divorce, not the attitude of the migrant women. Jungyun also mockingly spoke about the patriarchal Korean families with whom the marriage migrants had to deal with on a daily basis.

> *When I casually had asked "what are your difficulties these days?" They (the migrant women) said, "My mother-in-law demands that I make kimchi (Korean fermented cabbage). My Korean sister-in-laws cannot make it, so why should I?" Another funny example, the husband scolded the wife for being rude because she put down her spoon before him at the dinner table…. Mother-in-laws are the same. 100 out of 100 times, they said the migrant daughter-in-laws wouldn't cook. But they meant that they didn't cook Korean food!*

Contrary to the other Korean employees who preferred to consider the migrant women as welcoming their familial duties and Korean patriarchal traditions, she was

critical of the unequal gender relations within these families, seeing the gendered roles imposed on the migrant women as unjust.

However, what was common in the Korean employees' accounts including that of Jungyun as an outlier, was the fact that migrant women were performing gender roles that younger contemporary Korean women did not do, and more importantly, would not do. Migrant women were subject to supposedly more 'traditional' gender familial relations (regardless of whether it was viewed as good or bad), while non-migrant members of the nation could pursue their lives in relation to a more egalitarian (if still unequal) national framework of gender relations. Even to Jungyun, the most skeptical of all, the privilege of being a non-migrant was assumed uncritically and as a 'natural right' of the 'native' members of the nation. Koreans simply do not and need not suffer from gender inequality to the same degree as migrants.

Therefore, although Jungyun perceived the migrant women's experience of unequal gender relations and patriarchy much more sympathetically than others, she still regarded such inequality as inevitable, and as stemming from the circumstance of wider global inequality:

> *The problem of the multicultural family… It is all about money, because they come for money. It was difficult for me. How could they follow (get married to) the men of their father's age. But if you listen to their stories about back home (in their countries), they said on rainy days they always thought of their mothers. Because they were now living in a house without leaks while their*

mothers still lived in a leaking house. If you visit their houses, they are awful, from our perspectives. They really needed the money… They literally come for money. It is all about money.

For Jungyun, the gender inequality within multicultural family was explained away through the global income disparity (financial motivation) that primarily had attracted these women to come to Korea in the first place. Jungyun argued that all of the problems that the migrants were experiencing, whether it was domestic violence or unequal gender relations, were reducible to an economic rationale.

Since the unequal gender relations and patriarchy that the migrants suffered were either ignored (as in most of the Koreans' accounts) or considered unavoidable (as they related to 'money', in Jungyun's case), migrants were constantly viewed distinctively as separate to Koreans, and without agency. The separation of Koreans and migrants in terms of their tolerance to gender hierarchy and patriarchy served to obscure the basic context of inequality between the migrants and non-migrants. The Koreans employees' common tendency to view the two groups as distinctively unbridgeable, in terms of their consequent unequal experiences of patriarchy, ultimately helped to maintain the migrants' marginalized group position within the multicultural policy.

The taken-for-granted idea of the migrants' experiences of patriarchy and gender relations, whether rationalized as stemming from economic factors or hierarchical national status, also served to render the consistent issue of gender inequality and patriarchy in Korea as unproblematized. The patriarchal system in

Korea could continue unchallenged in this account, with the only difference to the previous nationally circumscribed system being that it now subordinated young migrant women instead of, or as well as, Korean women.

In summary, the three themes that emerge through these accounts given by the Korean practitioners of multicultural policy demonstrated how nationalist ideologies help to construct and formulate gender relations in Korea, and vice versa. Through stressing the roles of migrants including their reproduction, caring, and keeping the marriage institution and traditional family values, all for the benefits of the nation, and by ignoring the migrants' experience of patriarchy, the Koreans contributed to the strengthening of the unequal relations of both the ethnicity/nationality and gender dimensions. By so doing, the Korean employees ended up defending their own privilege at the cost of the subjugated position of migrant women.

4.2 Migrant Users

In this section on the migrant users of the Centers, three interrelated themes concerning gender and nationalism emerged: Theme I, the oppressive nature of Korean Patriarchy; Theme II, asserting rights through 'maternal citizenship'; and Theme III, migrant mothers and their language burdens. Theme I focuses on migrants' own accounts of the patriarchy they experience, while Theme 2 discusses how the migrant users articulate their status as 'mothers' to negate their inferior ethnic/national position. Theme 3 shows how the Centers' emphasis of Korean language ability affects the migrants' social positions along the gender and ethnicity/nationality lines.

4.2.1 Theme I: The oppressive nature of Korean patriarchy

The migrant users that I met were all generally happy with the Centers and the programs they offered, despite their diversity of viewpoints and experiences as regards living in Korea as immigrants. Simultaneously, many of these migrant users also shared common opinions about the traditional institution of the 'Korean family' and their presumed roles and responsibilities within it.

Unlike the predominant viewpoints offered by the Korean interviewees that regarded migrant women as those who willingly followed the gendered traditions and hierarchy within family (in exchange for financial gain), many migrant users told me that the Korean patriarchy was the main source of trouble in their otherwise satisfactory lives. Particularly the authoritarian attitudes held by their mother-in-laws, the power structures which originated from the traditions of paternalistic patriarchy and Confucianism in Korea, were regularly identified as the hardest challenges for these migrant women. Taking care of the parents-in-law and cooking Korean food were also not accepted as eagerly and joyfully for the migrants as the Korean employees often assumed.

Daria, an Uzbekistani woman in her 30s, talked about her life as a foreigner, when I asked about the pros and cons of her life in Korea.

> *There are many good things, you know, but some bad. Haha. I used to live with my parents-in-law at first for about 6 months. It was difficult. When I cooked, they didn't like it. They said it was not salty enough. Back home, we*

eat a lot of bread. When I asked my husband to get some bread for me, my parents-in-law said 'don't buy'. They said if I wanted to eat, go back to my country.

Rachany, a Cambodian woman who had lived in Korea for the last five years, continually told me how happy she was with her marriage and life in Korea. Yet, she picked the mother-in-law as an exception and the most difficult aspect of her life in Korea.

Mother in law. Very uncomfortable! It would be great if we could live apart from her. Well, there is nothing we can do I guess. But what the mother-in-laws say, hearing from my friends, they are all the same. They don't like the fact that we are from the poor country. They don't like that we can't cook Korean dishes. It is just difficult. We're constantly fighting.

As opposed to the Korean employee who exemplified the case of the migrant woman who was boasting about being able to make Korean dishes, cooking Korean food was a source of stress for Rachany and Daria. Cooking Korean food, a strong element of Korean culture and tradition, could become a burden for foreign wives with different backgrounds of culinary culture.

Hyesoo, a Vietnamese woman, shared a similar opinion. She had lived in Korea for 7 years, and had her citizenship changed along with her new Korean name. She was an outgoing and very active user of the Center. With a very proficient level

of Korean language ability, Hyesoo spoke insightfully about her mother-in-law as well as the authoritarian gender hierarchy particular to the Korea society.

> *I feel like I am the 'success case'. I don't live with my mother-in-law but only with my husband…Before I came to Korea, I never knew how difficult and complex it was to cook Korean food. Lots of side dishes to cook and very strong spices! Back in Vietnam, men do some cooking. It is just too much here. Hahaha. I think most Vietnamese people coming to Korea to get married, they don't realize this. And this is the origin of their conflicts.*

For Hyesoo, the fact that she did not live with the parents-in-law itself was considered fortunate, and a "success case", just like the typical Korean women these days who tried to avoid the caring duty. While she was laughing about the severity of gender inequality in Korea, where men would do very little cooking, she recognized it as the major source of the struggles amongst many multicultural families that she knew.

Besides, the complaints of patriarchy and highly divided gendered roles from the migrants did not solely come from the migrant women who were 'bought' and exchanged for 'money' –namely through commercial brokering services- as many Korean employees tended to typify.

Zhang, a Chinese woman in her 30s, met her Korean husband in China. Her husband lived and worked in China for many years before they met. She was trying to learn Korean language for a hobby while working for a company after university, and

the man who taught her Korean language became her husband. She compared Korean culture with Chinese culture in relation to gender inequality, feeling strongly about the unfairness of the patriarchy she experienced in Korea.

> *Chinese men really help with a lot of house chores. Initially my husband did some house chores and cooking. My mother-in-law saw it and said this shouldn't continue. My husband is the youngest with three older sisters. In Chuseok (Korean thanksgiving holidays), all the families were there and I had a baby too. I said he needed to help. And she (mother-in-law) said no. I was so angry. Also I wanted to go back to my hometown for the holidays and my mother-in-law said I should stay. I was really upset. China also celebrates Chuseok you know. I just cannot understand this. Never! This kind of thing is really difficult. [To] Keep talking about such things reminds me of bad memories. Hahaha. But anyway, this is the most difficult thing!*

Zhang, with a middle class family background both in China and in Korea could not reconcile herself to the extent of gender inequality in Korea, where men were not supposed to help the house chores, and the national holidays were celebrated mainly with the husband's family members. Similar to other migrant women, she considered this level of patriarchy particular to the Korean society and the most challenging side of life in Korea.

Apart from the Japanese interviewees whose national culture entailed a strict gender division similar to that of Korea, it would seem that all the migrant women

from other national backgrounds found Korean patriarchy hard to get used to. These migrant women obviously all considered the various familial duties, such as living with parents-in-law, cooking, and unequal division of house chores problematic and stressful. Unlike the Korean employees' tendency to separate Koreans from migrants as distinctive groups with different attitudes and thresholds about gendered roles, migrant women in their subordinated gendered position shared comparable (if not more critical) attitudes about the gendered hierarchy and division of labor as Korean women.

Migrant users of the Centers during their interviews and participant observation often made jokes about 'the typical Korean husband' who would not do the housework and "act like the king". Even for the migrant users of the Centers who generally expressed satisfaction with their marriage and life in Korea, the Korean patriarchy that forced women to take the subordinate position within family was the singularly major problem, something they had to deal with.

For the migrants who were at risk of divorce or in a relatively unsatisfied relationship, authoritarian husbands and their parents-in-law were even more detrimental. Nhung, a Vietnamese woman in her 20s, occasionally turned up in the Center, and I had a chance to talk with her casually one day. I asked her how she had been doing and why she hadn't been to the Center for a while, and she said, "My mother-in-law and husband get suspicious if I say I will go outside to the Center or go shopping in the market. It is hard to get out." She said she enjoyed being at the Center, learning Korean language and chatting with other migrant women, but her Korean family members did not allow her to take more regular visits to the Center.

She was not restricted to the degree that she could not step out of the house, but her position within family obviously made it difficult for her to go outside more freely.

Such severe controls by the family members might be more prevalently occurring to migrant wives than the average Korean woman, in which case migrants' ethnic/national difference significantly affected one's degree of patriarchal experiences. The Korean patriarchal system where men and older members of the family are entitled with most power rendered few options for Nhung, due to her position in terms of gender and nationality/ethnicity. Nhung is not an exceptional case. There seemed many migrants who were not permitted to go out and attend the Centers' programs, according to the migrant users of the Centers. Hyesoo personally knew about other migrant women who had never been to the Centers specifically due to their mother-in-laws and husbands who "fear that the women would make 'bad friends' and learn 'bad things'".

The explanation by Sofia, a Filipina woman, is suggestive of what these 'bad friends' and 'bad things' might mean.

> *For those who don't go to the Centers… Some of the in-laws didn't allow them to go. There were some bad experiences, like they go to the Centers and they learn their rights. They learn to stand by themselves. The in-laws were afraid. Not all I think though. Some mother-in-laws are really the ones who encourage them to go. It is a case by case.*

Another Filipina woman, Lea, who had an experience of volunteering at one of the Centers also told me that it was mostly their family members who didn't allow some of the migrants to attend the Centers. Such examples of non-users of the Centers paralleled the negative stories that the Korean employee (Jungyun) told me about the Korean members of multicultural families. Compared with most users of the Centers who could assert themselves in using the Centers or at least have some freedom to go out, some non-users apparently experience extreme inequalities at the hands of their own family members.

According to these anecdotes about the migrant non-users, the exemplary migrant women taking care of the parents-in-laws and domestic chores, so complimented by the Korean employees as deserving of state support, in reality might not even be able to take advantage of the Centers. Without acknowledging such unequal power relations and the patriarchal system that migrants might experience based on their gender and national/ethnic backgrounds, many Koreans simplistically judged the value of migrant women in terms of their performance of gender roles in the service of the nation. The context of gender inequality, and even in some cases the violation of human rights, which framed these duties were greatly overlooked or treated as a trade-off (for the economic remuneration of living in an 'advanced' country).

Because of the power imbalance that existed within some of the multicultural families, migrant users said the programs staged at the Centers that would tend to fix the specific gender roles were actually practical and helpful. The program of 'cooking Korean food', a popular program for the Center users, is a good example. Many

migrant users, based on their experience of living in patriarchal Korea for some time, now realized how important it was to cook Korean food, and thus the ability to cook Korean food for their husband and parents-in-law was considered as a 'survival strategy'. Therefore, the seemingly enthusiastic attitudes towards the cooking Korean food that the Korean employees gathered from the migrant wives might have been, rather than the evidence of them enjoying the gendered labor, the migrants' strategic move to enhance their positioning within their family and wider society.

4.2.2 Theme II: Asserting rights through 'maternal citizenship'

The migrant users were well aware of their subjugated social positions as both women and non-Koreans in Korea. At the same time, they also realized how their gender specific contributions to the nation, particularly as being mothers, were emphasized in the multicultural policy and Centers. For this reason, some migrant users of the Centers referred this same rationale to assert their gendered value as members of Korean society. The discourse of migrants' values measured via the nationalist logic was apparently too ubiquitous for migrants not to recognize it. Sofia from the Philippines had lived in Korea for almost 17 years, and she described the changes in the treatment of the 'multicultural' family in Korea over the years through her own recent experience of this gendered and nationalistic social discourse.

> *The term damunwha (multicultural) I don't like it. In the beginning people looked at you as different. People still don't look at you as being part of this*

community. But things have changed. For example, Korea experiences a low birth rate. People would ask how many children you have, and I say four, and they say "Wow you must be very nationalist, patriotic (laugh)". (I: When did the low birth rate talk start?) I think it was about five years ago. Last year I won an essay-writing contest about the life in Korea and I was asked to do a speech at our district office, 'gucheong'. And I said I am a mom with four children and all the Korean audiences clapped. Even after the program, when I took the elevator, (they said) "wow you are a mother of four children" and they gave me what they had, "this is for your children" (laugh). I find it funny and I find it interesting that people are amazed to see people who have the guts to have four children in this kind of economic situation. The low birth rate is one factor that puts me into the position of acceptance (laugh). We will treat you well because you will be helping the country.

For Sofia, her 'direct' encountering of the Koreans' preoccupation with the low birth rate was indicative of changes in Korea in terms of to what degree Korean people accept migrants. The nationalism shaping many Koreans' perspective was epitomized in her comment that "we will treat you well because you will be helping the country", as something that ultimately helped her to feel like she was being accepted. Being a mother of four children in Korea, she was valorized as someone who deserved a round of applause. Sofia understood the fact that for many Koreans, the female migrants' ability to reproduce was a valued quality in Korea, realizing its benefits as a non-Korean migrant.

Other migrant users also comprehended the importance of having babies, and the reality that the implications of this for the nation's future were the principal reason why the Centers and the multicultural policy existed in Korea. Rachany from Cambodia plainly stated when I asked her why she thought that the Centers decided to offer free services to the migrants. "Because we give birth to a baby or two. Without them (the Centers), these babies can't talk and it is hard. It is good for Korea. They will be able to speak. It is good for the companies." In Rachany's explanation, the Centers' major program, Korean language class, was there specifically as a measure to alleviate any potential problems caused by these new members of the nation. For Rachany, the children justified the social benefits she and other migrants were entitled to receive, since the state's major motivation lay in enabling these children to become fully Korean (in terms of linguistic ability in this case).

Mayumi, a Japanese woman, similarly responded to my question about the rationale behind the multicultural policy, arguing that it was due to the "problems related to children's education". She brought up an example of her migrant friend who tried hard to help her children speak Korean language fluently but received no help from her Korean husband. From her perspective, the Centers existed to mitigate the problem of the children's education, and particularly their language acquisition, which could potentially become a problem to the nation.

Zhang from China explicitly said the existence of the Centers was related to the issue of educating multicultural babies and the future of the Korean society.

> *I think there are many migrants in Korea, and if these migrants can't speak Korean, what's going to happen to their babies? The future for Koreans is basically a country full of fools. They can't speak Korean. (Korea is) worried about the future of Korea. Babies are the future. How would the nation be developed?*

For these migrant users, babies and their language ability specifically were addressed as the central reasons why the Korean government had initiated the multicultural policy and the Centers. Consistent with the birth rate discourse that the state and the Korean staff constantly brought up, they were conscious of the fact that it was not themselves, but their reproductive roles and their babies (as the critical object) that were considered most important by the state.

The migrant users that realized their limited status within the state discourse of nationalism – existing as gendered bodies to fulfill urgent need of population growth for the nation- employed the exact same logic to assert their rights as respected members of the nation. For instance, the migrant users argued that the fact that they had (Korean) babies differentiated them from other labor migrants in Korea, and justified the treatment and advantages provided by the government.

For many migrants with children, their gendered national membership achieved through their reproductive role, therefore enabled them to proclaim their right to national inclusion, in far more logical and deserving sense than might be asserted by labor migrants.

Migrant women benefiting from the services of the multicultural policy were constantly reminded of their value as mothers at the Centers through the programs and discourse. Familiar with such discourse within the Centers as well as the popular media, the migrants echoed the state's nationalistic logic of why the migrants of the multicultural families should be prioritized. Given the hailing of migrants' reproductive roles in such national crisis of low birth rate, and the gesture of increased acceptance Koreans expressed, asserting their rights through 'maternal citizenship' was thus the most natural and effective way to emphasize their worth, and to negate their subjugated position as immigrants.

4.2.3 Theme III: Migrant mothers and their language burdens

Another noticeable point here was how the multicultural children's potential lack of Korean language proficiency was repeatedly discussed as important in this topic for migrants. On the one hand, this reflected a social preoccupation with the perpetuation of Korean mono-ethnic culture, within which the Korean language was one of the major elements to be shared and continued. On the other hand, the implication was that the migrant women as mothers were deemed responsible for their children's ability to speak Korean fluently, even though the fathers were also there to teach them Korean. These migrant women were very apprehensive about their children being able to speak the father's native language fluently, but not about their own native language. For many migrant users, it was not an expectation that

their children would achieve bilingualism in both parents' languages, but simply that their inability to speak Korean was framed as a burden.

The migrants' constant apprehension about their children's Korean language ability, as reflected in the interviews, revealed another side of intersecting gender and ethnic/national inequality, which assigned the migrant mother as the sole person in charge of the children's education and specifically the language acquisition. In the Korean family system built through rigid patriarchy and the gender division of labor, women are more frequently subject to criticism when any learning problems arise for their children. Men are traditionally consigned as those who work 'outside' of the family and engage only in paid work, sustaining the duality of labor between paid work for men and unpaid domestic work for women.

Among multicultural families, this pattern of gender inequality adds an extra layer, in which migrant mothers mainly take responsibilities of assuring their mastering of Korean language, despite it being father's native language. This is despite the fact that the majority of the migrant women that I interviewed also had paid jobs to support their family economy, or even were employed as breadwinners, apart from a few exceptions of those who currently had infant babies. Nevertheless, the notion of gender division of labor in a traditional sense remained strong for migrant mothers within multicultural families.

I argue that this can be partially explained by the Centers' nationalistic and gender-biased approach with the constant emphasis on the children's language (dis)ability and the mothers' responsibility. In fact, various programs to encourage bilingualism were increasingly visible in the Centers' brochures as the Centers' focus

had been gradually moving towards encouraging bilingualism. However, the Centers were more engaged with the programs that primarily concentrated on how to improve the Korean language proficiency of the mothers and children.

At the Centers, programs variously named as ‘language development treatment’, ‘language therapy’, ‘language support programs’ and ‘classes for children with language development delay’ were promoted, waiting for the participants. The Centers hired ‘language development specialists’ to specifically support improve children’s level of language proficiency, where ‘language’ only referred to Korean language. These programs were all intended to assist the increasing number of children from the multicultural family, commonly called ‘multicultural children’, who apparently had serious problems in developing their Korean language ability. Zhang, one of the mothers who applied for the ‘language development treatment’ in the Center, explained her decision to join the program.

> *I just have a feeling that my kid is a little bit late on Korean language. If his language development gets delayed, I worry that it would be my fault. My son speaks Korean at home. Because he goes to childcare everyday. Because if he speaks Chinese they wouldn’t understand there. Singing and everything is in Korean. This program teaches babies Korean, twice a week for six months. It’s great that it is free!*

According to my interviews, many multicultural children were actually speaking only Korean at home and not encouraged as being bilingual, just like

Zhang's four-year old. This observation corresponds to the recent survey results on multicultural children reporting that there are more monolingual children (58.4%) than bilingual (41.6%) (Korean Institute for Healthy Family 2016). Additionally, it is said that the multicultural children tend to speak Korean only when the mother's native language was not that "of [a] powerful country", or considered one of the "worthwhile languages" in Korea, to borrow one of the Korean employees' words. According to them, bilingualism is promoted amongst a few 'major' languages (e.g. English, Chinese, and Japanese), but not for other languages.

Since many of the multicultural children did not speak their mothers' language, mothers, as non-native speakers of Korean, were not able to accurately grasp their children's level of Korean language acquisition. Additionally, because it was almost exclusively the migrant mothers who were meant to use the Centers' programs and were presumed in charge of rearing their children, their children's Korean language ability frequently became the major worry for many mothers. This is why the migrant users welcomed the Centers' free programs that were designed to at least appease this situation.

Yet, such programs could also contribute to constructing and maintaining the stereotypes of multicultural children with 'learning deficiency' urging to be 'treated' or requiring the necessary use of 'therapy', as the titles of the Centers' programs reminded them. This could function to intensify the separation between Korean children and multicultural children, and generate the image of multicultural children as less able.

Not only that, encouraged as specifically a mother's role, many of the programs for 'teaching Korean language' for multicultural children at the Centers could also adversely add extra burden to many migrant mothers. Through the multicultural policy and the Centers, migrant mothers were again forced to focus on their gendered role of taking care of the children, or else risk the stereotypical assertion of their child's presumed lack of language ability, and their ultimate responsibility for such circumstance. This situation was a specific type of burden limited to migrant mothers in Korea, and directly derived from their ethnic/nationality minority status and gendered position.

The Centers' intensive focus on Korean language programs for multicultural children therefore exhibited their nationalist and gender stereotype approaches to the context of family, early learning and parenthood. This approach not only reinforces a gendered bias particularly challenging for migrant mothers as non-native speakers, but also more importantly serves to separate the multicultural children as problematic, less capable, and less genuine Koreans.

In summary, the accounts of the migrant users of the Centers revealed the complex ways in which multicultural policy's gendered and nationalistic approaches impact on migrants' experiences of policy and their social positions. Migrant users found the unequal gender relations in Korea extremely challenging, contrasting to the Koreans' more positive perspective, but their subjugated position of ethnicity/nationality largely prevented them from directly fighting against the patriarchy. To avoid the experience of discrimination as non-Koreans, they opted to partake in stressing their gendered roles for the nation, particularly as mothers of

'Korean' children, although this contained the risks of intensifying their gender roles and consequent disenfranchisement.

4.3 Migrant Non-users

In this section on the migrant non-users of the Centers, one theme emerged: Centers are for migrant women and mothers only. Dissatisfied with this policy orientation and target group, this section examines how relatively well-educated, higher class migrants often sought for alternative ways to help them settle in Korea.

4.3.1 Theme I: Centers are for migrant women and mothers only

The migrant non-users interviewed include both those who had never used the Centers and those who had visited the Centers before deciding that they were not for them. Unlike the migrant users of the Centers who were unanimously female members of the multicultural family, the non-user interviewees include men and women, multicultural family as well as non-multicultural family members. I sought specifically for migrants who were eligible to use the Centers but opted out, which resulted in a wide diversity of characteristics across this migrant non-user group, compared with the more homogeneous user group, in terms of gender and family characteristics.

As their title suggests, the Centers were originally meant to be for 'multicultural families', who were legally defined as 'a family with a marriage migrant and a Korean citizen' (The MFSA 2018). However, this doesn't mean that

other migrants are entirely excluded. As the official annual report of the Centers even shows, there are a small number of 'other families' who used the Centers, including 'labor migrants family', 'foreign students family' and 'North Korean family' (Multicultural Family Support Centers Evaluation Report 2015). Apart from the one-to-one visiting programs implemented only for multicultural families, most of the Centers' programs are in fact open to any foreigners/migrants who desire to use the services. Yet, the demography of the actual users is mostly limited to migrant women of multicultural families, as my field research shows.

The major reason for this is the predominantly large number of female migrant women categorized as marriage migrants and members of multicultural families, compared with their male counterparts in Korea (Korea Immigration Service 2007; 2014; 2016). However, my interviews with male migrants of multicultural families demonstrate that it is not simply about the gender difference in numbers. These male migrants I spoke to who had married to Korean women understood that they also belonged to a multicultural family in Korea, and thus were eligible for the Centers' free services. Their choice of not attending the Centers, despite this, was based on their understanding of the Korea's multicultural policy and the highly gender specific nature of the programs within the Centers.

Kevin, a Filipino in his 40s, had lived in Korea for more than 20 years. He initially came to the country as a young migrant worker at a manufacturing company in the 90s' before getting married to a Korean woman. As "both a labor migrant and marriage migrant of the multicultural family", he said he had no reason for using the Centers, because they were "not going for" him. Kevin brought up one of his direct

experiences with a Center, the first and the only time he had tried to use the Center's program.

> *There was a program at the Center in the XXX region before and it was the cooking lesson. Korean cooking. I thought it sounded good. I like cooking. I applied, and they told me no, it is only for damunwha (multicultural). And I said I am damunwha. And they couldn't answer me. What they meant was that it was only for women. (Laughing) What is this? You put damunwha and I am trying to join and I can't. You have to change the name then. I really complained and they changed the name (of the program). They said I couldn't join because I was the man but after I complained, the next day they called me and said I could come. But I never went because I was embarrassed. (Laughing) You know, they think only that damunwha is only women. Not the men. We belong also to that.*

Although Kevin was a member of 'damunwha' (multicultural family) and thus entitled to use any of the Centers' services, he was first denied access based on his gender. This was because of the term 'damunwha' that was so commonly associated with women only, and perhaps the Centers not being used to receive any male participants. It was also possibly because of the subconscious gendered idea that the Korean employees might have had, that is, Korean cooking classes were for women only, not for men. Regardless of the actual reasons, Kevin's one and only incident

with the Center essentially put him off from using the Centers altogether. He realized that the Centers were meant to be for "multicultural" families but "not the men".

Similarly, Ben, an Iranian married to a Korean wife, differentiated himself from "marriage migrant women" who would typically use the Centers. Even though he realized that he could learn Korean through the language programs at the Centers for free, he sought for different organizations to learn the language. The strong image of the Centers existing for the marriage migrant women from economically disadvantaged countries discouraged him from taking advantage of the services at the Centers. A businessman and semi-professional photographer, he called himself "not someone who needs money" but who "can do (it) by myself".

Not all the women migrants within multicultural families found the Centers useful either. Keiko, a Japanese woman in her 40s, shared her brief experience at a Center and how her having no children was the major reason for her to stop attending there. She initially commented that there were too many programs at the Center related to mothers and children, which were irrelevant for her. Keiko in her second interview became more honest with me and confessed how her personal circumstance of being infertile was the "real reason" behind her not attending the Center.

> *I was in the middle of medical treatment, trying to become pregnant...At the Center, because there were women from multiple different countries and their names being difficult to pronounce perhaps, the Korean staff were calling them 'eomeoni (mothers)'. I was not a mother and I was so desperate at that time to become a mother, it (calling everybody a mother) just became a*

burden and personally hurtful. I think the Centers are really great for the mothers though.

Related to the low birth rate discourse and its influence in the multicultural policy, Centers increasingly created programs specifically for mothers with children. Consistent with the narratives of the Korean employees viewing the migrants as those reproducing future members of the nation, there was the habitual behavior of calling the migrants "mothers" within the Center, which discouraged Keiko and made her feel uncomfortable. Despite the '*eomeoni* (mother)' being the common (yet sexist) Korean term to refer any women at marriageable ages in general, the application within the Center does reflect the societal attitude towards the migrant users, generalizing them as potential or actual mothers.

Another non-user, Yuri from Japan, complained about the Centers not having programs for fathers and children to attend together, but only mothers and children. This verifies the Centers' programs disproportionately orientated towards migrants' mothering roles without encouraging any significant fathering roles of the Korean husbands in the multicultural family. These fathers were deemed as outside of the domestic duties and child-caring responsibilities.

Migrants without Korean spouses were even more estranged from the multicultural policy and the Centers. Suhani and Sanjay, a married couple from India who had lived in Korea for 2 and 4 years respectively, had not even heard about the Centers. They were desperately looking for classes to learn Korean to ease their process of settling here, since the information about the Centers' signature program

was apparently not spread to the population not directly 'related' to Korean families. Angela, a Filipina who lived in Korea for more than 10 years as an office worker, was well aware of the Centers as part of the multicultural family policy, and described the fact that she was not eligible to use the Centers as "unfair". Angela obviously did not realize the changed position of the policy that would allow those who did not belong to multicultural families to use most of the Centers' services.

Although migrant non-users admitted some of the benefits of the multicultural policy that could potentially be helpful for migrants in Korea, some of them were highly critical of the Centers and their often patriarchal and nationalistic intentions. Kevin was the most outspoken of all.

> *For example, they (the Centers) call women to do this and do that and counseling. Why they never call men? For example, he's married to a Filipina. I mean the cross-cultural. Not only that the one is adjusting, but both must be adjusted… I mean, teaching Korean, also the culture teaching is ok. For those people who have no ideas. But my problem is why do they only teach women? It's multicultural. Koreans also need to go there.*

For Kevin, the tendency of the Centers to offer services for migrant women but not Korean men, not to mention the fact that migrant men were not welcome, was problematic. This departs from the semantic meaning of 'multicultural' or 'cross-cultural' as he saw it, and reflected the Centers' discriminatory practices on migrant women based on their gender and non-Korean background. Other non-users of the

Centers commonly stated that the Korea's multicultural policy and the Centers were severely limited in their scope, being highly gender specific and assimilative.

Most of the non-user interviewees, who tended to have higher educational levels and be from wealthier family backgrounds compared with the Center users, were equipped with alternative sources and means for successful adjustment in the foreign society. For example, they used private channels to improve their Korean language skills, and managed to establish social groups through other outlets rather than the Centers. This contrasts with the users of the Centers who said their major social connections were established through the Centers, and that without the Centers they would have been socially isolated. Korea's multicultural policy and the Centers, despite their emphasis on the 'cultural diversity', failed to embrace the many migrants who did not belong to the stereotypical image of marriage migrants, namely 'poor migrant mothers who had children with their Korean husbands'.

In summary, the migrant non-users commonly pointed to the gendered assumption inherent in the Centers' practices as their reasons for not using them. The non-users who did not meet the fixed image of migrant mothers, such as childless women, men of multicultural family, and married couples of non-Korean backgrounds, sought for alternative channels to help their settlements and incorporation into the society. They were dissatisfied with the state project attempting to assimilate them, only through the certain constructed image attached to migrants.

4.4 Chapter summary

Through the multicultural policy and its establishment of the Centers across the country, the Korean state has constructed marriage migrants as potential members of the nation, legitimatizing its support based on the fact that one of the spouses is Korean and they would potentially have ‘Korean’ descendants. This shows the emphasis of the ‘Volknation’ dimension of the Korean multicultural policy as a nationalist project (Yuval-Davis 1997), underscoring its orientation toward a genealogical continuity of the national boundaries. This chapter has demonstrated how within this nationalist discourse and narrative materialized through the multicultural policy gender plays a crucial role.

The various possible roles that Yuval-Davis (2003) attributes to gender relations within the nationalist project can all be seen within the Centers: Constructing notions of femininity and masculinity; naturalizing power relations; and reproducing biologically, culturally, and symbolically national collectives. Importantly, what this chapter reveals is how the Centers have established such roles of gender relations through a nationalist logics, heavily inflected by the social process of hierarchical ordering of the various ethnic/national groups, particularly in terms of the binary Korean/non-Korean. Also, while gender relations play a crucial role in the formation and operation of Korean multicultural policy, the gendered effects implicated do not carry equal meaning for migrants compared with Koreans.

According to the ethnographic data, the organization of the Centers and the programs largely followed the normative national division of labor along the gender

line, and by so doing implicitly constructed femininity and masculinity. They also worked to approve the unequal gender relations and patriarchy for migrants. For example, the Centers offered programs for migrant women including Korean cooking classes, special training to learn 'how to tidy up the house', and education programs to tutor mothers 'how to teach children' who would supposedly suffer from inadequate learning support. The Centers also created 'therapy' programs for multicultural children who were assumed incompetent in their Korean language ability. These programs all presumed the highly gendered roles of migrant women in the multicultural family households, but also importantly what necessary skills they lacked as foreign mothers.

At the structural, organizational level (Collins 2000; Yuval-Davis 2006), the Centers were prepared in such a way that the new members of the nation were positioned in their gender specific roles in their respective family, and as important biological producers for the nation. These results are basically consistent with the previous research on the Korean multicultural policy and discourse at the macro level, which have criticized the state and its policy as limiting the migrants' citizenship status through the gender ideals and gender roles (Kim 2011; Cheng 2011).

However, multicultural policy does not just represent the migrants' precarious citizenship as controlled by the state, but something much more extensive and complex, including the popular nationalist ideologies held by the state agents that powerfully govern the social position of migrants and naturalize their gender as well as ethnic/nationality relations. Here, as the intermediaries of state policy who carry out the programs and personally interact with the migrants, the Korean practitioners'

roles and accounts of the policy are considered significant. As it is through these practices that the state-generated gendered ideal is transferred and materialized in the disciplinary/intersubjective dimension (Collins 2000; Yuval-Davis 2006).

Also equally crucial but often missing in previous research on this subject is the agency of migrants, in terms of their own accounts of the policy, including their social position and judgments regarding the policy, and their strategic reactions to its structure and practice. The analysis in this chapter has exposed the striking disparity between the narratives of the Korean staff and the migrant groups on the questions related to motivations and impacts of the multicultural policy, which intimately relate to ideas of gender and nation.

Firstly, the Korean practitioners of the policy viewed the Centers and their migrant users consistently through a lens of gender norms, patriarchy and the value of traditional family that intersects with the strong nationalist sentiment they held. For Koreans professionally involved in the Centers, societal support for the marriage migrant women, the typical users of the Centers, was mainly vindicated on the condition that they produced value for the nation through their gendered bodies and labor. They primarily conceived of the migrant women as those who usefully performed their gender specific roles of giving birth, caring for family members, and keeping the traditional family values and institution of marriage intact, all in terms of the benefits to the nation and the national collective.

These perspectives of the Korean employees were coherent with the powerful state discourse of the low birth rate crisis in Korea, which they tended to agree with, without criticizing. In determining the 'values' of the new population for the nation,

how successfully the migrants, specifically the female migrants, performed their gender roles became essential from the Koreans' standpoints. Although the Korean staff self-located themselves as in firm opposition to the 'anti-multiculturalist' sections of Korean society, the rationale behind their defense of the migrant women remarkably resembled that of their supposed 'racist' opposition. That is, in terms of common use of conservative nationalist logic, they both prioritized 'nation' as the primary category to evaluate and (de)value the new migrant population.

Such Korean employees' nationalist logic elucidates the multifaceted, specific ways in which the power relations are naturalized within and through the policy practice, particularly relating to ideas of gender and nation. In the context of unequal relations based on ethnicity and nationality, gender simultaneously works differently for differently positioned groups. For instance, the Korean employees' more privileged ethnic/national position within the policy and the society made them apparently oblivious about the migrants' suffering from the gendered hierarchy. Or, at least this encouraged them to view the patriarchy observed in the migrants' family as natural and unavoidable.

This naturalized perspective helped to stabilize any consideration of the unequal power relations based on ethnic/national background, legitimatizing a stratified gender hierarchy depending on one's ethnic/national background. The double standard of gender relations for migrants and Koreans separately serves to worsen not only the ethnic/national hierarchy at the Centers, but also the migrant group's position and gender inequality in their own 'multicultural' family. This is

despite the Centers' and the Korean employees' general assertion that the policy and its services were beneficial for the migrant recipients.

As opposed to the Korean employees who tended to ignore the significance of the unequal gender relations and patriarchy experienced by the migrants, many migrant women pointed out that the patriarchal Korean family system offered one of the biggest challenges in their lives. The users of the Centers showed a substantial level of intolerance and dissatisfaction regarding the unequal gender relations and patriarchal family systems epitomized by the actions of authoritarian mother-in-laws. They were just as discontent about the patriarchy, as the average Korean women whom the Korean employees characterize as, if not more severely. And the specific anecdotes about the non-users who were not even allowed out of their homes further suggests a larger body of marriage migrants even more marginalized through this discourse.

However, the gendered and nationalistic assumptions implicated in the programs of the Centers were not critically received (or rejected) by all migrant groups but often welcomed for their practical value. Compared with the migrant non-users, the migrant users of the Centers who tended to belong to low-income families greatly appreciated the programs and the state support, and were largely satisfied with the Centers' programs that in many ways served to fix them in their gender specific roles for the nation. These migrant users were well aware of the dominant discourse that viewed them essentially as the gendered bodies, particularly in their ability to reproduce the national population. They realized this discourse as the societal rationale behind the social support offered to them.

Yet, instead of denying and criticizing this discourse, the migrant users at the Centers seemed to utilize the very same logic that justified the unequal gender relations to assert their agency and rights as deserving citizens. They actively employed the rationale of their mothering roles in defending their entitlements of the state benefits, and in justifying their privileged position compared with labor migrants. This is not to say that the migrants uncritically accepted their inferior position under national patriarchy, but rather, given their circumstances, they understood it as a necessary and available strategy to use the possible resources and opportunities for their 'happiness' or even 'survival'. This contrasted to the common circumstances of migrant non-users equipped with alternative resources and channels, and thus the option to opt out of the controlled programs at the Centers.

Generally, the migrant non-users found the Centers' programs not fitting, nor useful for them. Their non-typical (in terms of the state discourse) gender (male) or maternal status (non-mothers) principally discouraged them from participating, as one of the major reasons for not using the Centers was their exclusive attention given to 'migrant women' and 'mothers'. This alienated migrants who did not belong to these fixed categories. Some of them actively voiced their concerns over the gendered assumptions that the policy entailed as well as the overtly nationalistic approach of the multicultural policy towards migrants. This was particularly more pronounced for migrant non-users who were more educated, and/or with more financial resources. Having options not to use the Centers, they criticized the wider implications of the multicultural policy on gender and ethnic/national inequality.

In summary, I have demonstrated in this chapter that it is the divergent participants' accounts and experiences of the policy that show vividly how gender relations became crucial in the rhetoric of nationalism, with different policy implications and effects for people depending on their social positions. The Korean employees, as a more privileged group, tended to fully embrace the nationalist logic in treating the migrant population, based on the highly gendered norms and relations, which also consolidated their privileged position as ethnic/national majority group.

While most migrants grasped the gendered nationalist logic of the policy, their varied social positions influenced their different responses to it. Those with a higher educational level and class tended to criticize the gender-specific and assimilative nature of the policy, but those with lower class perceived the direct benefits they received from the multicultural policy as useful, even if they largely constrained them as gendered bodies within a nationalist patriarchy. This reinforces the important role gender plays in the drawing of national boundaries and nationalism, but also the crucial fact that those involved in this specific nationalist project have diverse opinions and experiences, largely driven by their unequal social positions.

Finally, Figure 1 below shows a graph to visualize the main points of the analysis. At the end of each analysis chapter (including this chapter and the two subsequent chatters), I include such graphs, with a brief explanation for each point. The three graphs in total intend to show how the major groups investigated in this dissertation differently account for Korea's multicultural policy and the related issues.

These graphs are mainly to demonstrate the divergent perspectives by groups and to recap the main arguments addressed in each of the analysis chapters.[15]

[15] These graphs (Graph 1,2,3) are mainly to demonstrate the divergent perspectives by groups and to recap the main arguments of each of the analysis chapters. They are not intended for statistical analyses, nor the samples were aimed to be representatives of the demographics.

Figure 1. Viewpoints by Groups- Chapter 4: Gender and Nation



According to Graph 1, the majority of the Korean employees agreed that the migrants' gender roles contributed to the values for the nation. The gender roles here included reproduction, caring family members, cooking, keeping family intact, and other household chores that women were deemed mainly responsible for in their accounts. 78% of the Korean workers linked these gendered roles performed by migrants in Korea to the possible benefits for the nation as a whole.

About half the Korean worker respondents (55.6%) also assumed that migrant women were willing to perform these gender roles within their families, if not voluntarily. Either from a perspective of a tradeoff for gaining upward mobility for these migrants (marriage as the tool for upgrading status), or as genuine willingness,

these Korean employees tended to describe the migrants' gender roles in positive or neutral ways, rather than as unjust burdens or aspects of gender inequality.

This contrasted with the half of the migrant users (50%) who argued that the gender roles imposed on them or patriarchy they experienced within their households were the most challenging part of their lives in Korea.

Both migrants and Koreans found the rationale behind the existence of the Centers as stemming from the presumption of a migrant women's reproductive role and childrearing responsibilities. Almost all the respondents of Korean workers and non-user migrants (88.89% respectively) recognized that, with a slightly lower percentage of Center users (72.22%) mentioning this as a reason behind establishing the Centers.

Chapter 5: Migrants as Social Beneficiaries: Class and Nation

Chapter 5 scrutinizes the construction of the multicultural family as low-income social beneficiaries backed by the Korean policy practitioners, and how it feeds into racism against migrants based on class and nationality. The centrality of class and nationality informs the primary differences in the migrants' viewpoints and experience of the policy, depending on their social locations along these two categories.

5.1 Korean Employees

This section on the accounts of Korean employees grapples with the two interconnected themes: Theme I, Multicultural but from which country?; and Theme II, The conflicting image: social welfare recipients but actually wealthy? Theme I illustrates the negative social meanings attached to the multicultural family, which intimately relate to the hierarchies of class and nation in Korea. Theme II, by examining the employees' contradictory narratives on the migrants' class positioning, discusses the entrenched ideas of national boundary and who can qualify as a Korean.

5.1.1 Theme I: Multicultural, but from which country?

For the Korean employees of the Centers, migrants of multicultural families were essentially divided into one of two types: Migrants from 'poorer' countries

(compared to Korea) and those from 'richer' countries. Most employees considered that a 'real' multicultural family consisted of migrants from the former category, and that such families and migrants were the main target of the multicultural policy they practiced. Kyunghee compared the Korean term 'international marriage (*gukje gyeolhon*)' with 'multicultural family (*damunwha gajok*)' to explain the different connotations attached to these two similar, but apparently distinctive terms.

> *When we were young we called it 'gukje gyeolhon (international marriage)', but then since the josunjok*[16] *and Vietnamese started to come in, the term 'damunwha (multicultural)' took off. There was no specific term to call them, and (they were) not Koreans… Previously if you were married to an American, it was called an'international marriage'. And it sounds fancy, but if you say multicultural… I think it depends on the countries. It is an international marriage if (married to) an American or a U.K. national, but if Vietnamese, then it becomes multicultural.*

Both the families formed through international marriages and marriage migration have the commonality of having one of the spouses being non-Korean. According to Kyunghee, the difference between multicultural and international marriage was determined mainly by the migrants' original nationality, with national economic status as a singularly important factor. Koreans believed that coming from a poorer country meant that migrants in question had come to Korea through

[16] Josunjok is a typical term to refer to the Korean Chinese diaspora who consist of the large percentage of the marriage migrant and labor migrant population.

commercial brokering services, whilst the background of the richer country always meant that the migrants would be affluent enough to marry without using brokerages, and thus bound to be *jayu-yeonae* (free dating/relationship). Following this formula, Koreans perceived that the economic status of the migrants' home country would give definite clues to her individual economic background as well as the channel she had used to find her Korean spouse.

Therefore, it's not the skin color or the occupational status of the individual in question, but the nationality that a migrant originally held that primarily determines whether they belong to multicultural families and thus his/her hierarchically positioned status for Koreans. Jungyun said "multicultural but from which country?" was the first question that she would ask, when she wanted to decide whether somebody was a 'multicultural'. She elaborated this by saying,

> *You know the strong image of multicultural family and the associated (negative) stereotypes, so it always starts from (the question of) which country they are from, and then it is decided whether they are multicultural or not.*

Whilst all the Korean interviewees agreed that the stereotype of poor marriage migrants had been declining over time, the notion of a "multicultural family being economically inferior", as Youngsun called it, continued to endure in Korea. This image of the multicultural family coming from economically poor countries was, as will be presented through the migrants' accounts, the major rationale behind discrimination and racism against the newly arrived population. It points to the

intricate working of racism based on racialized nationality/ethnicity and its associated class in Korea.

The tendency to reductively consider that the 'real' multicultural family and users of the Centers should be those from the economically poorer countries placed migrants from Japan in an ambiguous location. As a neighboring economically 'advanced' country that is 'richer' than Korea, Japanese spousal migrants were one of the major national groups who regularly used the Centers.

One day during my volunteering/fieldwork, I heard one conversation at the 'Japanese co-ethnic gathering', a regular program the Center in which the same ethnic/national people gather and socialize. One of the Japanese migrant users was talking about the Korean language textbook that the Centers used in class, and bringing up the fact that it had Chinese and English translations at the end pages of it but not Japanese. She was wondering why that would be the case, given the large numbers of Japanese people who would belong to multicultural families and as users of the Centers. Then, a Korean member of staff intervened casually and said with a smile, "Well, Japanese people are not really multicultural, you know."

Another staff member at the Center, Suyeon, similarly commented in her interview, when talking about the "two types of multicultural families" and "the Japanese as a different kettle of fish". She added, "Why would a Japanese woman bother coming to Korea to get married to a poor and old Korean man?" This implies that Japanese migrants were considered as an outlier or exception to the typical construction of the multicultural migrant members, understood as coming from a poor country married to a poor Korean man. Applying the comparable low economic status

as a required condition for any multicultural marriages, Suyeon confirmed that the marriages among 'real' multicultural families should exclude those with Japanese nationals for their higher status.

As the discourse at the Centers surrounding Japanese migrants elucidates, an individual migrant's class position is basically predetermined by the economic status of his/her nationality in Korea. Any dissonance between the two (individual class position and nationality status) observed by the Korean employees was regarded simply as an exceptional case. The status of one's nationality was the only information Koreans would use to judge migrants' individual class and their belonging to the category of multicultural family. With Koreans working at the Centers having such stable notions of who can constitute a 'multicultural family', the constructed image of the migrants of the multicultural family as being economically poor strongly remains intact within the practices of the policy.

5.1.2 Theme II: The conflicting image: social welfare recipients but actually wealthy?

Due to the general tendency to view the multicultural family as in need of economic assistance, the multicultural policy was often considered as comparable to a low-income family welfare policy. Indeed, the Korean staff at the Centers explicitly compared their own jobs with the work of other social welfare policy institutions, but with even "lower status" in terms of prestige and salary. While the Korean employees frequently emphasized during the interviews that the Centers were 'educational institutions' offering various learning programs to support multicultural families, their

comments about the work at the Centers often revolved around “helping them” and “giving away some free stuff”. This suggested that the Centers were understood as a specific organization that would handle social welfare policies for economically disadvantaged multicultural families.

Considering the Centers as a part of social welfare policy institutions was not only a sentiment that the Korean employees had towards their work. Jungyun, the middle manager who had quit her job at the Center just prior to interview, shared the insiders information with me that the Centers would soon be incorporated into larger body of “the Healthy Family Support Center”. A public institution responsible for matters of the ‘family’ in Korea, the Healthy Family Support Center locally delivers various public services to ‘families in crisis’ including low-income families and single parent families, although there also are programs dealing with general family issues. Jungyun, agreeing with this change of policy direction, stated:

> *I think it is good. There was a protest against this movement (the merging) by the staff at the Multicultural Centers, but it is because of their own interest and not because they are concerned about the migrants…The rumor was there even before I started working. There is just too much talk about the justification of keeping the Centers… I think it is appropriate that it (the multicultural policy) is treated as social welfare policy.*

In 2018, soon after I finished my interview collection, the Healthy Family Support Center did indeed become designated as the focal agency that would carry

out the incorporation of the services between Multicultural Centers and their existing services (The Healthy Family Support Center Website 2018). The top-level decision makers evidently shared the general perception of multicultural family as low-income beneficiaries of the social welfare policy, and recognized the fact that the two centers' programs often overlapped, or should be incorporated with each other. Of course, the public pressure to cut the budget for migrants-related policies could have driven this change as well. But for whatever reason, the Centers are now officially part of the national welfare social policies, therefore identified as being for 'poor' multicultural families, justifying any perception of them as welfare policy organizations previously.

However, paradoxically, 'in fact many multicultural families are not poor, and some of them are actually well-off' was a common perspective often raised by the Korean employees, particularly when discussing whether the state support for the Centers was justified. "Too much talk about the justification of keeping the Centers", as Jungyun put it, existed even amongst the staff themselves, contributing to the precarious status of the Centers in Korea. Despite the feelings of sympathy they openly expressed for marriage migrant women, the Korean employees also understood, if not agreed with, the nationalist rationale used by some of the anti-multiculturalists.

Heejeong carefully specified why she thought some Koreans would feel uncomfortable about the social benefits given to multicultural families, whilst maintaining her relatively neutral position on this matter.

> *Actually there are multicultural families who are far more well-off than Koreans. Although there are many multicultural families who have no economic problems, the multicultural policy tends to consider all of the multicultural family as one group and offer services for free. I believe that there is this line of thought that there are many more Koreans who are in much worse situations.*

Jiyeon, who worked for the Center for five years, explained why some Koreans would justifiably oppose the multicultural policy in a similar manner.

> *I think they might want to complain about the multicultural family benefits given to them regardless of them being well-off or poor, whilst the Koreans whose equivalent benefits could only be granted if they are officially categorized as in poverty or low income family.*

While the overtone of 'the poor and low income multicultural family' predominated the interview conversations, both of them now briefly brought up the same point that many of the multicultural families were in fact economically better off than low income Korean families.

This, what I call the 'reverse discrimination discourse' apparently evidenced by the existence of some relatively wealthy multicultural families verifies the Koreans' construction of a clear separation between Koreans and non-Koreans. For Koreans, the multicultural family was considered 'different' from the normative

Korean family, because of the single fact that one of the spouses in the family was not the original member of the national group (regardless of the current 'naturalized' citizenship). Due to this primary notion of group division stressing the genealogical element of the Korean national membership, the class category of 'low income family' only applied to the normative Korean family, not the multicultural family, the majority of whom were also low income.

Here, the Korean husbands of the multicultural family who would likely to be 'low income' and 'Korean' became invisible, while the migrant wives from the other countries were marked as the sole recipients of the multicultural policy and the Centers' benefits. This suggests Koreans' preoccupation with the distinctiveness of the 'non-Korean' status, prior to any other social categories including social class. The multicultural family was, before being generally a low-class family, perceived as a non-normative Korean family first and foremost.

The unique mixture of 'migrant' policy and 'family' policy characters presented in the Korea's multicultural policy was, I argue, one of the chief factors that contributed 'the reverse discrimination discourse'. As Chapter 2 elaborated, the multicultural policy was initially introduced to support the emerging number of Korean families who had the special circumstances of being based on a marriage to a non-Korean migrant. However, 'the reverse discrimination discourse' raised by the Korean employees made it clear that the 'migrant' policy was now converted to being more of a welfare 'family' policy for generally poor, disadvantaged families.

Yet, this does not mean that the initial emphasis that these multicultural families have a migrant family member became completely disappeared. With the

strong ethnic nationalism that precluded outsiders, this gradual shifting of the multicultural policy as a policy for 'low income multicultural families' actually triggered the uneasiness for many Koreans who felt that the low-income Korean families –the authentic members of the nation- were unjustifiably left behind. The multicultural families were increasingly perceived as those who stole the opportunities of "many more Koreans who are in much worse situations".

While most Korean interviewees underlined the fact that they were just speculating about such anti-multiculturalists' points of view on this matter, some Korean employees at the Center were more explicit in their sympathy for those opposing the multicultural policy. Jiyeon, for example, uttered her own negative opinions about the multicultural policy. Jiyeon was complaining about the fact that in addition to the Centers there existed too many ad-hoc events and programs offered by various governmental agencies for multicultural families. Regarding such "excessive benefits offered to multicultural families", she remarked, "This is why the migrant women don't appreciate the benefits offered to them and they just take it for granted".

Jungyun shared Jiyeon's opinion of migrants 'not appreciating'. When I asked if there was any complaint that the migrant users made about the Center, Jungyun, who had been mostly critical of the state's motivation for the multicultural policy and the gender inequality inherent in the policy, was in this case highly critical of the migrant users' attitudes.

> *They complained about strange things. When there are programs like free trips to home countries or monetary aids, they complained about why they*

were not chosen as the recipients. The fact that they just want free services all the time is the biggest stereotype of the multicultural family, which they themselves to some extent contribute to create. Anti-multiculturalists do have a point. They say, 'they are not disabled, apart from the fact that they can't speak Korean; they even have husbands and family. Why should we give our tax money to these people?' These words are not wrong really.

Suyeon, sharing her own previous thoughts, commented about the reasons why some Koreans would understandably criticize the multicultural policy.

Before I worked for the Center, I thought: our tax money is wasted again; can our tax go this far? There are so many difficult lives in every corner of the society other than them.

Both Jungyun and Jiyeon condemned migrants for not appreciating the multicultural policy, and Suyeon confessed her own previous opinions about the multicultural benefits that paralleled the anti-multiculturalists, but they also seemed to ignore that these benefits were not solely given to the migrants. The free services, "our tax money", that the migrants apparently "take for granted" were arguably to help their Korean husbands as much as the migrants, if not more. Giving free stuff including money, rice and kimchi, and even teaching them Korean language for free were assistances for the migrants as well as the entire family that they belonged to. It is ironic that Korean husbands or family members were removed from the list of the

benefit recipients from the Korean employees' perspective here, particularly given that the multicultural policy was only established because of the existence of these Korean husbands.

Again, the separate construction of 'Korean low income family' versus 'multicultural family' was only possible because of the Koreans' preoccupation with the migrants' alien identity. The tendency to concentrate on the migrant members' non-Koreanness and 'foreignness' was apparent in their comparing multicultural family with the Koreans in "much worse situations" as well as their comments of "Why should we give our tax money to these people?" Despite the policy that was meant to benefit the whole 'multicultural family', the blame for the debatable nature of the policy evidently was placed only on those "who can't speak Korean".

I argue that the nationalistic ideas inherent in the multicultural policy are deeply ingrained in the accounts of the Korean policy practitioners, shown by their conflicting feelings towards migrants and the policies designed to help them. On the one hand, migrants are praised as valuable additions to the nation for alleviating the nation's low birth rate problem and keeping the traditional gender roles and family values intact, despite them often being economically disadvantaged (See Chapter 4). On the other hand, migrants are considered as un-deserving social beneficiaries of the multicultural policy, receiving support at the cost of the low-income Korean families. In this framing, marriage migrants within the multicultural family are for the most part qualified as low-class social beneficiaries from the economically disadvantaged countries, but also at times depicted as wealthier than impoverished Koreans.

Such opposing categorical appraisals of the migrants and multicultural families by the Centers' employees are conceivable because of the rigid divide between Koreans and non-Koreans that seems to be centrally important for Koreans. The employees' nationalist attitudes towards the policy placed migrants and Korean members of the multicultural family as features to be separately valued and assessed. The group hierarchy is generated based on this conceptual divide, which has led to the Koreans' inconsistent and biased image of the migrants.

This is rooted essentially in the resilient ideas of 'who can be Korean', a commonsense notion of national identity which cannot be facilitated either by the migrants' formal Korean citizenship status, nor them being official members of a Korean multicultural family. Even for those more sympathetic members towards migrants, this notion of national belonging, based on deep-rooted semi-mythological idea of the Korean nation and bloodline, comes as paramount in governing their understanding of the multicultural policy and who can be considered Korean.

In summary, the employees' shared, implicit understanding of the migrants women within multicultural families as being only those from poorer countries paralleled the Centers' semi-functioning as a social welfare policy institution. However, whereas the typical multicultural family was most often portrayed as low class, there existed certain times when the same multicultural family was also imagined by the Korean workers as wealthy and higher class, mainly as a rationale to preserve their restricted national membership. It is this underlying nationalism held by the Korean practitioners, the belief that only the original members of the nation

should deserve social benefits that explained their conflicting descriptions of the multicultural family.

5.2 Migrant Users

This section on the migrant users presents the two themes relating to the significance of class and nationality in Korea's multicultural policy. Theme 1, Class gaps in the evaluations of the Centers, details the migrant users' different assessments on multicultural policy depending on their individual class. Theme 2, Migrants at the intersection, further investigates this class gap, revealing the prevailing class bias against multicultural families and the framing of a pernicious hierarchical ethnic order in Korea based on nationality.

5.2.1 Theme I: Class gaps in the evaluations of the Centers

As opposed to the Koreans' criticisms that the migrants 'take for granted' the help the policy provided for them, all the migrant users of the Centers that I interviewed expressed their appreciation for the services and programs that the Centers offered for multicultural families. They specifically said that two benefits they received from the Centers were most helpful: the free Korean language classes and the opportunities for social networking. For them, the fact that the government was offering free language classes for migrants was "unimaginable" in their home

countries, and praised the easily accessible and convenient nature of the Centers around Korea for such "high quality" services.

Regardless of their social/national/economic backgrounds, the migrant users unanimously agreed that understanding the local language was fundamental in order to be "adjusting life as an immigrant". Apart from general living purposes and to communicate with Korean family members, learning Korean was also considered essential for their various plans for the future, from getting a better job, making friends, assisting their children's study, to just feeling confident about lives. The migrant users, all of whom well aware of the importance of learning Korean, therefore were particularly content with the Centers for the free language program.

With regards to the social networks, the migrant users commonly perceived the Centers as a great space to make friends with people from similar circumstances, and mostly those of co-ethnic backgrounds. They were able to make useful initial co-ethnic social networks at the Center they regularly used, and expanded their originally limited pool of friends from there. As Sachiko, a Japanese who had lived in Korea for the last two decades, said: "it is hard to make friends as a foreigner in Korea other than through something like the Centers". About half of the migrant user interviewees also managed to make friends from different countries, of not their own home country through Centers' programs.

Hyesoo, a Vietnamese who had lived in Korea for 7 years, was especially grateful for the Centers for providing social connections. Currently enrolled in an online university course in Korea, she said she could not imagine her life in Korea

without the Centers. She commented that all her current friends from Vietnam as well as of other nationalities in Korea were only possible thanks to the Center.

However, there was no single migrant respondent who made Korean friends at the Centers. The Centers apparently were valued as the central point for migrant users to establish their social networks, but only amongst the migrants of the multicultural family. Beyond that, the chance to mingle with Koreans was almost non-existent in the Centers. This is despite the fact that the relevant legal statement and the official report of the Centers list the 'social integration' as the major objective of the multicultural policy.[17] There were some ad-hoc events to include both Koreans (who do not belong to a multicultural family) and migrants, but these temporary programs did not lead to any meaningful social networks for the migrant users. One of my interviewees even mentioned that I was the first and only Korean, outside from her family, with whom she had more than a thirty-minute meaningful conversation with in Korea.

Additionally, despite the overall positive evaluations on the Centers and their programs, some migrant users who were more educated and with middle class backgrounds tended to bring up the negative consequences of the Centers and the multicultural policy, alongside their mostly positive assessments. The continuing

[17] Obviously, the meanings of 'social integration' and the approaches to achieve that can vary. The Centers categorize the six separate areas for their programs (Family, Gender Equality, Human Rights, Social Integration, Counseling, and Promotion/Resource). Under the social integration category, the programs such as migrants' employment support, volunteering activities, co-ethnic gathering, and changing the perception of multicultural family in Korea are included. This suggests that the Korea's multicultural policy is constructed around a particular understanding of social integration, which does not necessarily prioritize social meetings between Koreans and migrants.

stereotype of the multicultural family as being poor and in need was the major drawback, which Mieko saw was derived mainly from the multicultural policy.

> *I mean I speak two languages really well, and am of a respectable class background. I feel very upset when people look down on everyone (from a multicultural family). The multicultural policy is too heavily leaning towards 'helping us because we are all poor and desperate'. My husband really hates the multicultural policy. We are doing fine without the governmental support...I understand that it was a sudden change for Korea which had long been far from multicultural, and it is not that the government is doing all wrong, but I think the policy definitely needs to move towards treating multicultural members of the country more respectfully as proud national citizens.*

Other migrants that I met at a ukulele class at the Center reacted similarly when I asked them to evaluate the Centers. This was a group of migrants from diverse national backgrounds who met weekly to practice playing the musical instrument and do regular volunteering performance at care homes in the local area. Sachiko, Nam, and Yumi, all active in this group, said while they deeply appreciated the existence of the multicultural policy and the Centers, they also considered that the policy did help to create stereotypes of the multicultural family. As Nam, a Thai woman, said, the term and the policy specifically targeting them tended to "discriminate against us" and rouse the feelings that "we are looked down upon".

Yumi more explicitly traced back the reason for this prevalent negative stereotype from the programs of the Centers and how they had been operated. She tried to explain more specifically why this occurred.

> *We are always the ones who are getting help, always being the passive recipients…Everyone has skills, but because the multicultural policy defines us as 'receivers', there is no chance to demonstrate our skills. With this in mind, I hope that the policy changes to one that would encourage us to use our skills to help (Korea). It is such a waste of energy and talent. I do regret that. That's why we practice hard and do volunteering here.*

For Yumi, the fundamental problem was in the way that the Centers were organized. She reflected that the multicultural policy firmly setting the migrants only as benefit recipients had generated the image of them being poor, helpless and passive. She lamented the perception of migrants as those who just 'receive and take for granted the excessive benefits', just as the Korean staff typified. She stressed the potential "skills" and "energy" that the migrants possessed, which was unfortunately wasted within the current paradigm of the policy, in her opinion.

Essentially, Yumi wished that the policy could change to incorporate different, and positive aspects of the migrants, who were currently involuntarily imposed as acting to be mere 'recipients' in the policy frame. Meanwhile, her way of correcting this was to personally "volunteer" to help the local poor Korean community through the Center. This was almost a form of resistance for Yumi to let

Korean people who were biased against migrants know how misconceived their assumption about her class position was, and show her own active agency.

The stereotype of the multicultural family being poor and perhaps more importantly passive beneficiaries with no ability to 'give back' was apparently the biggest complaint that some of the more educated, higher-class migrant users had about the Centers. This noticeably contrasted to the perspective of the less educated, economically more disadvantaged migrant users who had almost no complaints at all about the Centers and their programs.

5.2.2 Theme II: Migrants at the intersection

While the dominant stereotype of multicultural family, which depicted migrants as impoverished benefit recipients might be slowly disappearing, the notion of the 'real' multicultural family still primarily referred to migrants from countries economically less developed than Korea. This was clearly reflected in the Korean employees' so clear differentiation of 'multicultural marriage' from 'international marriage'. Through interviewing migrants from multiple nationalities, it became evident that one's nationality, and specifically whether one was from an economically poorer or richer country than Korea, was the most important benchmark that determined the migrant's status and experience of discrimination in Korea.

Regardless of their actual individual socioeconomic backgrounds or skin colors, those from the economically less developed countries than Korea had more experiences of unambiguous discrimination and racism based on their non-Korean

identity than those from economically more advanced countries. The kind of discrimination these migrants were subject to was usually based on the fact that they were thought of as 'poor' for coming from 'poor countries'.[18] Therefore, while all users of the Centers were identified as non-Koreans and multicultural (to different extent), their experiences as migrants significantly differed mainly depending on their original national background.

The stark contrast between the migrants from Japan and those from other (less affluent) countries in their experience of discrimination was notable. For example, Japanese migrant interviewees were unable to recall any direct experience of discrimination based on their original nationality, apart from the general stereotype of the multicultural family that mostly did not include them anyway. Yet, those from Cambodia, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, and China were apparently all equally patronized as poor and less capable based on their nationality backgrounds and specifically their countries being less economically developed. In this respect, even being 'White' might not prevent discrimination based on the stereotype of being poor. For instance, Daria from Uzbekistan frequently had to deal with Koreans who stereotyped her as a poor White prostitute, after they realized that she was not from one of the wealthy European countries or America.

The Korean tendency to use overall national economic status to qualify their discriminatory attitudes triggered many migrants' distinctive experience of multicultural policy and their wider life as immigrants. The most notable examples included the cases of lower-class Japanese and upper-middle class Chinese migrant

[18] Incidents such as the comments migrants receive by a restaurant waiter and a taxi driver asking if you had enough money (to use the services); comments insulting their home countries' poor environments.

interviewees, whose individual class status did not match the perception of their national economic status forced onto migrants in Korea. Mayumi, the respondent who wondered why there was no Japanese translation available in the Center's language textbook mentioned earlier, was uncomfortable with the Korean staff's comment that the Japanese would not be considered as 'multicultural'. Identifying herself as lower class, she objected to this arbitrary divide of multicultural family by nationality.

> *They (Koreans) don't consider any Japanese people as multicultural. They consider only those from the economically poorer countries as multicultural. I mean my family is actually not wealthy at all. Just because I am Japanese doesn't meant that I am well-off or even middle class.*

Sachiko, with scant family income and no wealth to speak of, grasped that her coming from Japan circumvented her from being subject to the stereotype of multicultural family as being poor who received welfare benefits. She argued, "Japan is treated separately. I don't agree with this divide. They differentiate Japan from other poor countries, even though we are all multicultural."

Both Sachiko and Mayumi, because of their low individual class status that apparently did not correspond with their high nationality status and accordingly predetermined high individual class in Korea, had not been directly affected by the major negative stereotypes given to multicultural families. By separating the multicultural family from the normative Korean family, and by separating the

Japanese again from the normative multicultural family, the multicultural policy created, or at least reflected, a clear hierarchy based on nationality.

Yet, instead of feeling relieved, these Japanese migrants were critical of the fixed construction of the multicultural family in relation to nationality, viewing it as discriminatory and unjust. Their unique position within the multicultural policy actually enabled them to grasp the intersecting social categories (of nationality and class in particular) and their varying consequences, through their own and other fellow migrants' experience of the policy. Even though they were aware of how being from a poor multicultural family carried many negative connotations in Korea, they asserted to partake in belonging to a multicultural family. Against the discrimination generated by the Centers and the multicultural policy, these Japanese respondents exerted their agency through arguing their solidarity with other migrants, reclaiming their identity as the multicultural family.

Zhou, a wealthy Chinese migrant with a college degree, was at the opposite end. With an outgoing personality, she seemed to know virtually everyone at the Center including the Korean employees. Thus, I was surprised to hear her negative accounts about the Center. In the two interviews I had with her, Zhou appreciated the chances that the Centers offered, particularly the opportunity to make friendships with other migrants from all around the world. However, she was personally dissatisfied with the Centers' orientation that heavily focused on low-income families only. This, she had identified, was the reason for her less frequent participations in the Center's program recently.

Multicultural policy is for poor and desperate people. The Centers can be helpful for the poor migrants, but I begin to realize that they are not for me… I don't mind being called 'multicultural' because I don't care about the associated stereotype. But I noticed that all my Chinese friends seemed to hide their Chinese nationality because if known, they worried that their children could get discriminated against or something. It did make me sad, but I never understood that. It's maybe because I am just that kind of person, or because my family is actually wealthier than most Koreans. I am not poor as they think I am.

Unlike her co-ethnic/national migrant friends who feared the potential discrimination based on their nationality (and its associated poor economic status), Zhou could not care less. She reasoned this was because her family's wealthy class position dissonant with the stereotype constructed around the multicultural family and those from 'poor' countries in particular. The discrepancy between her nationality status and her actual class position to some extent permitted her ability to just shrug off about the negative social image forced on her, as opposed to her friends who tried to hide their national background to avoid discriminatory attitudes. Zhou's 'abnormal' wealthy status and her being "not poor as they think I am" apparently gave her immunity not to be affected by the stereotype, at least in her own mind.

Her account was suggestive of the reality that many migrants faced, that is, having to deal with discrimination based on their non-Korean national background and its accompanying low class status. This context of class-based discrimination and

inequality, along with racism based on the axis of nationality/ethnicity, together engendered diverse experiences and attitudes towards the Centers for migrants at the varying intersecting positions.

Because the multicultural policy in Korea was so powerfully perceived as a social welfare policy for poor marriage migrants, which was believed to exacerbate the stereotype of them, some migrants even asserted the scrapping of the policy altogether. Lea from the Philippines was one of them. She wondered whether the policy should continue:

> *Instead of multicultural centers, can we not just say cultural centers? "Damunwha"(multicultural) means multiple cultures but why don't they include Koreans in it? I kind of understand the anti-multiculturalist' side, saying the multicultural policy is the reverse discrimination against Koreans, because there are indeed poor Korean families and wealthy multicultural families… But they shouldn't blame us. It's the people who made the laws that need to be blamed, not us. We didn't ask for the help; we just received what the government had offered.*

Lea believed that establishing a separate policy for multicultural families itself was the fundamental source of the problems. Even though she did acknowledge the benefits of the policy particularly for the newly arrived migrants, the negative consequences of the policy, including the strengthened stereotype of poor migrants and issues of reverse discrimination against Koreans, outweighed the positives from

her perspective. Lea also pointed out the class variations amongst multicultural families, despite the state policy falsely framing them as universally low class. She believed that, by identifying and categorizing different groups of people as homogeneous, the state's multicultural policy that aimed to support migrants ended up intensifying the group inequality and creating unnecessary discontent from the majority group. "We are all humans and equal" was what she continuously stressed throughout the interview.

She rightly criticized the irony of omitting Koreans in the multicultural policy, which ostensibly and deliberately separated migrant groups from the majority group and deepened the stereotypical of marriage migrants as economically disenfranchised. Yet, simultaneously, it should be noted that her class position might have been key in explaining her attitudes towards the multicultural policy and her expressed desire for the universal citizenship and human rights, which she believed scrapping of the policy for migrants all together would attain.

This was evident from her experiences of discrimination in Korea, which she considered was based on the assumption that "we Filipinos are poor". She spoke of one of the incidents of racism that she experienced at the hands of a Korean woman (the mother of her daughter's classmate), whose attitude changed as soon as Lea told her that she was living in the same apartment block as her (signifying to the Korean woman that Lea's class was similar to her own).

Like Zhou, the rich Chinese woman, who was able to react to Koreans' discriminatory attitudes so casually via employing her higher class status, Lea admitted that her class status safeguarded her from some incidents of racism in Korea

that were essentially class-based. Her hinted comfortable economic circumstance meant that she would not desperately need any social benefits from the Centers, unlike some economically disadvantaged migrant users who regarded the Centers as an irreplaceable source of support. Hence, removing the multicultural policy, ignoring its positive sides, would have potentially little impact on her, due to her middle class background.

In summary, the migrant users of the Centers largely agreed that the Korea's multicultural policy offered a great deal of assistance for migrants, particularly through free language classes and as helpful space for social networking with other migrant. Depending on the migrants' social positions, however, the Centers were also heavily criticized or even considered as better off not existing.

Migrant users from higher class and wealthier backgrounds tended to problematize the negative consequences of the policy and the Centers. For them, the ways that the Centers and their programs were organized facilitated the negative image of multicultural family as poor social beneficiaries, failing to reflect their own social status. These migrant users could afford to envision a more inclusive social policy that essentially would treat migrants as equal to Koreans. This was because of the belief that any discrimination against migrants was fundamentally related to the class-based inequality, and the perception of nationality being the benchmark to determine one's class status.

This contrasted from the migrant users from economically disadvantaged family backgrounds, who viewed the multicultural policy and the social services from the Centers as extremely helpful. The negative stereotype as a result of the policy was

a relatively marginal issue for those who really needed to take full advantage of the state social support and without it would likely to encounter much more significant problems in their livelihoods. For these disadvantaged migrants, Koreans considering them as ‘poor’ was just a fact they were unable to deny, but the discrimination based on them being poor was what they would want to eliminate. For them, the complete removal of the policy would not guarantee the elimination of such discrimination, since the logic behind the discrimination was based firmly on their ethnicity/nationality and its associated low status.

5.3 Migrant Non-users

This section contains one theme that summarizes the backgrounds of the migrant non-users’ negative accounts of the Centers, and their consequent decisions not to use the Centers, which relate to their class and nationality.

5.3.1 Theme I: Opting out of the public services

The migrant non-users of the Centers were even more explicitly uncomfortable with the views of them as the poor social beneficiaries, compared to the users who discussed the downsides of the Centers always together with the positives. For the non-users, the Centers were responsible for creating the image of them being “poor people needing aids” and like “beggars”, as Angela from the Philippines repeatedly said. In common, these non-users were from educated middle

class backgrounds, and did not correspond to the enforced image in Korea. These non-user interviewees directly criticized the Centers for creating an image of the multicultural family as being passive recipients. Kevin found the Centers' programs, based on migrants' supposed culture of dependency personally insulting.

> *They always think that the women are from poor countries and they belong to a low income family. Koreans always think of that. I am certain of that. That's why those programs giving rice, giving something, you know. If I was there, I would be offended. What do you take of me for? Yes, maybe some people like it because they don't really have it, but I would have been offended I think. I don't like it. I can live (without the help).*

Similar to some of the Center users who were unsatisfied with how the stereotype deviated from their own status, Kevin emphasized the fact that he was unlike those who "don't really have" and that he "can live" without such patronizing support. This was a direct opposite of the low-income users of the Centers who valued the state-offered 'free' services.

The popular media discourse seemed to play an important role in creating the image of the multicultural family and the Centers' users as low-income. Ben, from Iran, raised his voice when talking about the image of the typical users of the Centers in Korea, which he believed was heavily influenced by the media and their dominant narratives. According to him, how the average multicultural family was depicted in

the media went hand in hand with the overall direction of the Centers and the multicultural policy.

> *One thing that I hate is the broadcasting in Korea. They go for these desperate marriage migrant women in the village and they take them back to their poor home country. You should show their value to the society, not the fact that they are poor. You shouldn't compare the money a person has. In Korea, every TV program is like that.*

Other aspects also brought up as reasons for not using the Centers included the hierarchies produced within the Centers, the Centers being not useful for creating Korean friends, and simply not having useful programs matching their own needs. For example, Yan, who came originally from China, was discontent with the formality of the Centers and the systemic discrimination within them.

> *To be honest, the multicultural policy is a bit superficial. I had a non-Korean friend who used to work for one of the Centers. She told me how her salary and work conditions were different from those of the Korean staff. She quit her job at the Center after realizing that she had been discriminated against in that way. I was really angry to hear that. Even the Centers that are meant to exist for us discriminate against us. I suspect that the policy is actually responsible for the status of the multicultural family given this circumstance.*

Yan was pointing out the internal problems of inequality at the Centers, essentially their treatments towards migrants differently from Koreans. While explaining her very different reason, Yuri, from Japan, discussed the creation of a firm boundary between the Koreans and migrants as the reason why she decided not to use the Centers. She initially had gone to the Center hoping to make Korean friends, but soon realized that there was no way to meet Korean people there. She instead joined a sports club to meet and make Korean friends, and never felt the need to visit the Centers. This was the case for Keiko also, who wanted to meet Korean people but found the Centers only useful for meeting co-ethnic people or making friends who commonly belonged to multicultural families.

Despite the varied explanations behind their decision not to use the Centers, all the non-user migrants ultimately found the Centers' programs not suitable for their own individual needs. Also common was the availability of alternative sources of social networking and learning, allowing these non-users to opt out of the otherwise "not bad" services. In that sense, the majority of non-users were similar to the minority of users who also had means and resources to navigate alternative support systems.

The account of the multicultural policy made by Haruka, a Japanese woman with a graduate level degree, captured the totally different circumstances these non-users were situated in, compared with the users in the lower class positions.

> *When I first came to Korea, I didn't understand why the Korean government was doing such an excessive support system for migrants. I thought, 'why is*

the government offering this policy even though the migrants had come to Korea to test their own ability or to try a different adventure in their lives'. Well, I also thought that it was nice of Korea to do such a thing at the state level, but at the same time I couldn't help feeling that it was just too much.

For elite migrants like Haruka, life in Korea as an immigrant was closer to an "adventure" to "test their ability", rather than simply surviving. Thus, it is not surprising that she regarded the multicultural policy as "excessive", just as many Korean anti-multiculturalists would argue. For the non-users of the Centers, the multicultural policy was only one of many options that they could easily find to make their lives more settled in Korea, and this distinguished them from many of the users with no such extra resources. The non-users could thus afford to opt out of the public services that did not fit in with their perspectives, and they did.

5.4 Chapter summary

This chapter has shown how the Koreans and migrants separately account for the benefits and downsides of the multicultural policy and the Centers' programs, and especially in terms of the role and impact of such on the migrants. Nationality and class were important social categories for the Korean employees in their discussion of the policy and their perspectives on the migrant users. These two categories were also critical contextual determinants for migrants whose experiences and evaluations of

the multicultural policy significantly differed depending on their social location along the axis of nation and class.

Generally, both Koreans and migrants were well aware of, and appreciated the benefits of the Centers for the migrants and the multicultural family. However, their hierarchical positions established within the organization- as 'givers' and 'takers' – resulted in distinct perspectives on the Centers and the multicultural policy for Koreans, users, and non-users. The power relations and their roles within the Centers (disciplinary/intersubjective) (Collins 2000; Yuval-Davis 2006) helped to locate the migrants of the multicultural family as an ethnically and nationally distinct group from the Koreans, but also in hierarchically different class positions.

The Korean staff at the Centers, as 'givers', tended to perceive their work as like those at social welfare policy institutions, specifically when describing their roles as being to 'help and give away stuff' to the poor migrants. Their assigned roles as givers put the Korean practitioners in a position to view the migrants as helpless low class benefit recipients that needed 'our' help. The Korean employees' accounts of the Centers consequently revolved around the issue of whether the migrant users appreciated the services, and whether they deserved the benefits or not, as the Centers essentially represented 'our' help for 'them'.

The Korean employees' ambivalence on the matter of the justification of the multicultural policy and 'the reverse racism discourse' revealed a powerful nationalist bias, based on the resilient national/ethnic identity that primarily divided 'us' from 'them'. However, as opposed to the Koreans' dominant tendency to homogenize the migrants as lower class benefit recipients, there existed some occasions when the

same migrants were imagined as more middle class than the Koreans. For even the Koreans who were supposedly more sympathetic towards the migrants, the multicultural policy was interpreted as a form of social support offered to non-Koreans at the cost of other more deserving Korean families (individuals with shared Korean blood and ancestors and of the same original nationality background).

The existence of apparently wealthy multicultural families, normally disregarded in staff members' accounts about the multicultural families, was then highlighted as to why the policy could be unfair for 'us' (Koreans and the Korean family). By squarely counterpointing the Korean family and the multicultural family, the 'excessive benefits' given to the latter through the state policies were identified as the proof of the reverse discrimination. In this, the Korean practitioners of the Centers overlooked the existence of the Korean husbands and parents-in-law within the multicultural family, and by so doing constantly framed the migrant users as the only social beneficiaries who received the state's generous benefits, at the expense of other Korean families.

However, unlike the Koreans' apprehension of the possibility that affluent migrants would unfairly receive the state benefits, the actual users of the Centers were mostly limited to the low-income families and rarely middle-class or economically wealthy ones. Beside, the migrants' own accounts testified that the programs at the Centers were strongly geared towards helping low-income classes, disallowing institutionally any possible 'unfair state benefits to the wealthy migrants'.

For migrants, the Centers were differently understood and evaluated, depending primarily on their own class position. First, there was a clear class-gap

between the migrant users (mostly low class with occasional middle class) and non-users of the Centers (mostly middle class). The non-users confirmed the prevailing image that the Centers were generally understood and used as the institutions for the low-income multicultural family. The negative stereotype of the term multicultural family itself and the policy that treated this specific group merely as poor benefit recipients alienated those who did not want to identify themselves as such. They viewed that the organization and the programs of the Centers, geared towards 'helping low class migrants', were partially responsible for maintaining the negative separate image of the multicultural family in Korea. Other common reasons behind the non-users' decision not to use the Centers included them not finding most of the programs suitable for their needs, and crucially that they had other alternative sources of support.

On the other hand, most migrant users who belonged to more economically disadvantaged backgrounds evaluated the Centers positively. The free language classes and the chance to socially network, which the higher-class migrants sought from other sources, were considered as extremely helpful and irreplaceable for those with tighter finances and limited opportunities. Due to the invaluable social support the Centers provided, the negative stereotype as a result of it was never a prime concern for these low class migrants.

Whilst a migrant's class difference was what mainly separated the users from the non-users of the Centers and their overall opinions, the nationality –or the economic status of the nationality, to be more exact- was the key category in explaining their diverging experiences as migrants in Korea

(interpersonal/experiential) (Collins 2000; Yuval-Davis 2006). Irrespective of their actual individual class status, migrants were more likely to experience discrimination if their original nationality was what was considered in Korea as lower economic status. This corresponded with the Korean employees' sharp conceptual distinction between '*gukje gyeolhon* (international marriage)' and multicultural family, or the tendency to view multicultural families as those from the poorer countries only.

Cases of low class Japanese migrants and middle class Chinese migrants exposed the ways in which different bodies were hierarchized in Korea primarily along the lines of nationality, regardless of their individual class levels. The societal construction of the multicultural family as poor social beneficiaries ironically appeared to enable the migrants at the class/nationality intersection to be more aware of the injustice and varying social positions amongst themselves, despite them all belonging to the unified category of 'multicultural family'. The Korean version of racism, shown through the experiences of the migrants of the multicultural family, was essentially based on economic hierarchies (class inequality), complicated by Koreans' preoccupation with nationality as a primary group category (discrimination based on nationality).

Figure 2. Viewpoints by Groups- Chapter 5: Class and Nation



Figure 2 reviews the discrete group perspectives shown in Chapter 5. Both Koreans and migrant users found the Centers as generally useful for migrants with varying degrees, whilst much lower percentage of the migrant non-users (33.3%) felt that the Centers were useful for them. Both the Korean employees (100%) and non-user migrants (61.11%) comprehended the Centers' major target group as low income multicultural families, whereas only 33.33% of the migrant users were conscious of this image of the Centers.

Some migrant users (38.89%) and non-users (44.44%), who shared more educated and middle class backgrounds, pointed to the responsibility of the Centers for strengthening the stereotype of the multicultural family. This starkly contrasted with the 0% response rate from the Korean workers, who did not see any association between the Centers and the negative social image of the multicultural family.

Regardless of their Center user status, the majority of the migrants, both over 80%, argued that the discrimination they experienced was based on their poor economic status of home countries.

Chapter 6: The Discriminating Effects of Multicultural Policy as a Nationalist Project

Chapter 6 grapples in more depth with the effects of multicultural policy on migrants, particularly in relation to its nationalistic intentions and approaches, differently understood and evaluated by Koreans and migrants.

6.1 Korean Employees

This section on Korean employees at the Centers examines the practices of multiculturalism at the Centers that essentially frame multicultural as the opposite of anything Korean. Theme I, Difference, difference, and difference, and Theme II, Woori at the Center, together focus on this issue of cultural difference and the consequent homogenizing of the Korean national culture. Theme III, Bureaucracy as the root of the problems, foregrounds the Korean employees' accounts of their own policy work and the state bureaucracy, and an account to their wider implications for migrants' social location in Korea.

6.1.1 Theme I: 'Difference, difference, and difference'

Although the term *damunwha* (multicultural) is most often used in Korea to specifically refer to a type of family with a non-Korean migrant spouse, multicultural policy in Korea also follows a generic focus on different cultures and diversity,

corresponding to the common practice of the term ‘multicultural’ in the international policy arena. The embracing of the idea of ‘multiculturalism’ can be witnessed through some of the programs at the Centers, such as the ‘diversity recognition programs’, and ‘global festivals’, which showcase different cultures through food, costumes, and festivals.

In fact, this focus on a celebration of multiple cultures was not the path originally chosen for the Korean state policy. According to the employees, the Centers had an initial approach of ‘assimilation’, which has now apparently changed to an approach of ‘multicultural’ inclusion over the years. The change of the Centers’ title itself indicates this development. Before being renamed as ‘Multicultural Family Support Centers’, the Centers were first titled as ‘Marriage Migrants and Their Family Support Centers’. As the initial name suggests, the state emphasis then was on supporting Korean families with newly joined marriage migrants. However, once the new word ‘multicultural’ was attached, the Centers began to more actively embrace the ideas of diversity, globalism, and the encouragement of a multicultural Korean society as their central premise.

Scholars in Korea generally are suspicious of the intentions and effects of the rising number of these ‘multicultural’ programs (Watson 2010; Kim, J.K 2011; Ahn 2013). Kim (2011), for example, criticizes the abundance of such state sponsored programs that focus cultural difference and diversity as ‘cultural fetishism’, due to their superficial, obsessive treatment of culture and failure to touch upon the complex issues of social inequality.

However, Korean staff at the Centers demonstrated mixed opinions regarding the practice of multiculturalism at the Centers. Some found them appropriate, given the emergence of Korea as “a global society”, while others felt skeptical due to the superficial treatment of different cultures they invariably included. Suyeon, for instance, observed the Centers’ shift from assimilation to multiculturalism positively, as a correction to the previous approach that apparently didn’t work.

> *Initially, the Centers used to focus on teaching our (Korean) culture. Many programs were like making ddeokguk (Korean traditional rice cake soup) at New Year’s and stuff like that. It was the assimilation approach making migrants absorb our culture. After a while, we realized that this wasn’t working. Instead of forcing the migrants to follow our culture, it was considered better that the different cultures are enjoyed and experienced. You know, the programs that allow various cultures to coexist and be shared openly. For example, our New Year’s program this time focused on experiencing different ways of the New Year’s celebration from around the world.*

Another employee, Youngsun, viewed the change of the Centers’ direction towards multiculturalism in a more neutral manner, as simply inevitable. She said, “We used to feel so proud of monoethnic Korea but it has changed a lot, I mean, to now becoming a global society.” She explained that the Centers had to reflect the new ethnic composition that had made maintaining the notion of monoethnic Korea

practically impossible. She added, “There still are some people who don’t want to accept this change but they will gradually have to accept it.” Youngsun believed that the acceptance of different cultures would be in order, regardless of whether Koreans thought of it as good or bad. For her, incorporating multiculturalism in the Centers was unavoidable given that Korea aspired to be part of contemporary global society.

Compared to Suyeon and Youngsun, Jungyun was more critical in gauging the Centers’ new approach to multiculturalism.

> *We used to call the policy ‘assimilation’. Well, it is now called multiculturalism, but it still is based on the assimilation approach… The Centers say multicultural, multicultural, and do superficial events like wearing different traditional costumes, but I think it is all just a show.*

Like the majority of scholarly critics in Korea, Jungyun saw the newly coined ‘multicultural’ approach as essentially a rewording of the policy of assimilation and a superficial “show”.

Notwithstanding their mixed opinions concerning the Centers’ current multiculturalism approach, the Korean employees all commonly assumed ‘multicultural’ as an idea and practice that was essentially not Korean. For Suyeon, ‘multicultural’ was the different New Year’s celebrations that were *not Korean*; for Youngsun, it was the realization that Korea was no longer monoethnic, but consisting of *other minority cultures*; and for Jungyun, it stood as a euphemism for assimilation, signifying only the pretense to accept *other cultures*. Multiculturalism, as many

critics have argued (Bannerji 2000; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; Golberg 1994), was here limitedly understood as representative of minority cultures in Korea. In this new version of multicultural migrant integration, the Korean culture was not an element to be incorporated, as multiculturalism only signified those that were *not* part of Korean culture.

Thus, within the present narrative of multicultural policy, the focus on diversity and the stressing of differences at the Centers, whether considered as good, bad, or simply unavoidable, only ended up making the division between Korean culture and other cultures more conspicuous. It was Heejeong who at one point during the interview equated the Korean word '*damunwha*' (multicultural) with the similarly pronounced word '*tamunwha*' (other cultures), which captured poignantly the way Koreans perceived the notion of multiculturalism, as representative of 'other cultures'.

> *Back in 2008, migrants of the multicultural family were considered inferior to the Korean. Now, it has changed. Now they are damunwha (multicultural), well, I would say (instead) tamunwha (other cultures) really, meaning just a marriage between our culture and other cultures.*

Heejeong was intending to argue for the current neutrality of the word *damunwha* nowadays through the similarly pronounced word *tamunwha*, comparing it with the previously derogatory meaning attached to *damunwha*. However, her explanation ironically exposed the ongoing Korean perception of multicultural as

'other cultures', even if not viewing it in such obviously disparaging terms. As Heejeong's remark indicated, multiculturalism was understood as simply the culture of others (*tamunwha*), and different from "our" Korean culture, for those who were working at the Centers.

Given the power inequality that existed between the migrant groups and the Korean staff at the Centers, and their overwhelming perspective of Korea as essentially monoethnic, the idea of multiculturalism as represented by, and practiced within the Centers was far from any notion of the meaningful integration of different cultures in Korea. The multiculturalism at the Centers embodies migrant cultures only as 'tamunwha', without incorporating Korean culture as part of it.

6.1.2 Theme II: Woori (we/us) at the center

Recognition of cultural difference is one thing, but the way in which such difference is articulated, or allowed to be in the state policy, is another matter. The problem particularly emerges when the attention given to 't*amunwha*'(other cultures) often accompanies the stressing of the homogeneity of Korean culture, which intensifies the distinction between Korean and non-Korean cultures. My fieldwork and the interviews with the Korean employees revealed that within the multicultural policy, all the non-Korean migrants were clustered as 'multicultural', whilst the Korean national culture was located firmly at the opposite end, as homogeneous, constant, unvarying reference point.

During my participant observation, in what was called the 'Welcoming the New Family' event at the Center, I witnessed clearly the separation between the 'other' migrant cultures and the homogenized Korean national culture. This semi-annual event was to invite relatively new multicultural family members, including the migrants, their Korean spouses, and parents-in-law to the Centers. The program was intended to attract these new multicultural families as potential long-term users of the Centers, by introducing and promoting the Centers' various programs and services.

After a brief introduction of the Center's programs, there was a main session called 'knowing the wives' cultures'. It started with a Chinese migrant woman doing a presentation of how the Chinese culture was different from that of Korean, followed by a Vietnamese and a Filipina woman doing a similar format of presentation. They were all wearing their respective traditional clothing, explaining the different food, different habits, and different ways of thinking that existed in their home countries, all as opposed to that of the Koreans.

The message was consistent throughout: The migrant wives' cultures are different from that of Korean husbands', and these differences need to be embraced (particularly by the Korean family members), reflecting the reality that such embracing in fact rarely occurs. It is clear how the Centers, in an attempt to defy the criticism of being assimilative, began to incorporate an emphasis of difference in their narrative of multicultural families and their diverse cultures at the organizational level.

However, without addressing any problems of the power inequality within the families themselves, the antagonistic and dualistic framing of Korean culture against

all the other cultures inevitably left the wives' cultures as marginalized. Implied is that the cultural difference that exists in a multicultural family is viewed as a challenge that a normative Korean family would never have to deal with, as their cultural homogeneity is assumed as a default.

The presentations also gave a faulty impression that cultural difference only applied at the level of 'national' cultures. While I acknowledge the existence of nationally distinctive cultures, the presentations also reflect the predominant Korean conceptualization of migrants' cultures, that is, the focus always is on their national differences. Other countries consisting of various ethnic cultures, for example, were described through the simplified version of single national culture, in parallel to the common perception of Korean culture as singular, homogenous, unified and without internal variations. Without specifying any internal cultural differences within countries, these presentations of the wives' cultures only emphasized simplistic versions of their national cultures, be they Vietnamese, Chinese, Indonesian or Thai, ignoring the power issues this might entail.

Again, this construction of cultural difference in terms of national culture extended to imply that no 'cultural difference' as a potential cause of trouble was possible within normative Korean families, since they consisted of members who uniformly embodied the homogeneous national culture.

I highlight this not to argue that cultural differences do not exist in 'multicultural' families nor that there is no distinguishable traits of different national cultures, but to demonstrate the troubling fact that the wives' presentations were there to convey the identical message that any problems of inter-familial relations in this

specific type of family should be attributed exclusively to the cultural difference of the migrant spouse. Consequently, the cultural difference attributable to the Korean spouse was never framed as the possible root of any familial conflict.

Even though the presentations were done through the voice of the migrant wives, this implicitly contained message and narrative therefore served to disable the meaningful inclusion of their agency. The presentations' framing of the 'cultural difference' unmistakably demonstrated the migrants' marginalized cultural position relative to the dominant notion of Korean multiculturalism and its practices.

After this main session, staff at the Center played an educational video titled 'When difference meets understanding', an official clip approved and distributed by the government, for newly joined multicultural family participants. This short clip presented several examples of the difference in small cultural habits between Korea and other countries, such as the meaning of certain hand gestures. It ended with the final grand comment saying that 'if you start to understand these differences, Korea will be a better place, a true multicultural society'.

The basic argument of this optimistic video was that the Koreans' stereotypes and biases against others existed primarily due to their lack of understanding about 'other' cultures and cultural difference. Similar to the presentations by the migrant wives, the video considered the understanding of cultural difference as the key to solving the problems related to stereotypes and discrimination against people from different ethnic/national backgrounds.

Yet, by emphasizing the importance of a cognitive understanding of 'differences', the video limited the grounds of any discrimination against migrants in

Korea to the individual ignorance of cultural difference. The video in consequence failed to acknowledge any of the systematic discriminations that were socially, legally and institutionally embedded, ignoring the complicated nature of the issue in which individual understanding of cultural difference alone could not easily and necessarily lead to "a better place, a true multicultural society".

More germane to the topic, however, is that both the presentations by the migrant wives and the educational video stressed a difference in cultures, but only in terms of the variance between Korean and non-Korean cultures. It was always presumed that the Korean national culture within the multicultural policy was the reference point, the norm and the locus. This tendency to define Korean in opposite distinction to the rest cluster of 'multicultural' was ubiquitous, epitomized in the policy's initial conceptualization of the multicultural family as consisting of a Korean married to a non-Korean spouse.

In this, the notion of non-Korean cultures existed as a conglomerate mass of other cultures that were essentially not Korean. Following this formula, any cultural differences –ethnic, national- amongst the lumped group of multicultural families was rarely addressed at the Centers. The cultural variance across the 'non-Korean' multicultural migrants was of little or no significance, due to the strongly constructed notion of Korean national culture versus all the other minority cultures that underpinned the 'multicultural' category.

The emphasis on differences in this fixed arrangement also worked to discount any cultural similarities. By overlooking any such similarities amongst cultures, multiculturalism was representative of simply a superficial understanding of

non-Korean minority cultures, framing such primarily as different while rendering them peripheral. Through contributing to this process, the focus on different cultures in the Centers in effect widened the gap between the Korean culture and the migrants' cultures rather than closing it.

As a reflection of the sharp divide between Korean and non-Korean cultures, any commonalities or similarities that the Korean employees observed between Korean families and multicultural families were, thus described as unexpected or surprising. For Koreans, the commonalities were unexpected because of the strong stereotypes they had about migrants, who were meant to be culturally 'different'. Equally, because of the established ideas of the cultural difference and the one-sided narratives constructed through the discourse of multiculturalism, this realizing of similarities between Koreans and migrants did not readily lead to dismantling of the hierarchical social positions between the two groups.

For example, Kyunghee, based on her work experience at the Center, told me how amazed she was when she found out the similarities (or even as she perceived it superiority) of multicultural families in contrast with a hypothetically normative, and homogeneous Korean model.

> *Some households, when we visit for the program, they are really well off and clean, compared with our Korean households. It is almost to the degree that I would say 'your house is tidier than mine!'*

Despite her intention to illustrate some positive aspects of new multicultural families she had personally witnessed, Kyunghee's comment disclosed the discriminating effect of the multicultural policy and the discourse of separating Korean culture from that of the migrant 'others'. In this, even the extent of how one tidied her house was thought of as part of this web of cultural difference, a perspective going far beyond the typical perception of 'cultural' difference as being representative of food, language and customs. In her description, 'our Korean households' as a homogeneous group were the ones that were supposed to be 'well off and clean', but instead she found the extraordinary cases contrary to her conception.

Kyunghee did not even bother mentioning specifically which type of multicultural family was the one that she was referring to. For her, the nationality or ethnicity of the spouse in her story hardly mattered. What counts was the fact that they were not a normative Korean family. The habitual linguistic custom of the Korean word 'woori (we, us, our)' was used to imply that no internal 'cultural' differences could possibly exist between Korean families. 'We', the Korean family, are all tidy to roughly the same degree.

The simplified and stereotyped understanding of cultural difference, always put as Korean versus non-Korean, was easily noticeable when the Korean interviewees compared the two groups in any ways. Misuk believed that the parents of multicultural families had little or no competence in helping with their children's education, compared to their much more competent Korean counterparts. Mentioning a few times during the interview how worried she was about the 'learning

development of multicultural family children', she generalized Korean parents of homogenous Korean family as better and more competent parental figures, grounded on the 'evidence' that they prepared more books at home for their children.

> *You know in the Korean family, there are lots of books at home even before the kids go to school. In the houses of multicultural families, there are no books even if the kids go to the kindergarten…in the Korean family with Korean parents they try their best to raise their children even they conflict sometimes. Fathers and mothers of the multicultural family, they are just not capable as parents.*

Like Kuynghee who generalized Korean families as supposedly wealthier and tidier in comparison with multicultural families, Misuk also oversimplified that the parents of the Korean family would be far more competent. This she reasoned relative to her firsthand experience of witnessing the disparity between Korean families having many books and multicultural families who appeared to lack books in their homes.

In describing this observed difference, she never acknowledged the possible class gap between Korean and multicultural families that might have caused the disparity, despite the fact that in many other discussions in the interview with her, multicultural families were frequently assumed as economically disadvantaged. Instead, the parents (and implicitly the mothers as responsible for early years education) within the multicultural family were typified by her as merely incapable

(and 'culturally' inadequate) people who would not make their efforts in developing children's literacy, apparently contrasting with a standard "Korean family with Korean parents" who "try their best to raise their children even they conflict sometimes."

While she was pointing out that both the "fathers and mothers of the multicultural family", not just the mothers were incapable, the clear divide between Korean families and multicultural families in her account was suggestive of Misuk's contrasting attitudes and her assumption of the inferiority of the migrant's alien culture. Because Misuk assumed the multicultural family as different and inferior, it was possible for her to assert migrants' alien culture as at root placing much less value on education, in comparison to the Korean.

She expected her generalized characterization of the normative Korean family as something shared and mutually understood by other fellow Koreans including myself. She initiated her comments with "you know", as if I, a Korean, should be well aware of the difference between the Korean family culture and multicultural family culture, ignoring any ideas of heterogeneity in both cases.

For Kyunghee and Misuk, the idea of the multicultural family meant those that were not Korean who were apparently superior. When laid out in opposing and hierarchical ways –Korean versus multicultural, superior versus inferior- any discussions of diversity and difference at the Centers only helped in constructing the notion of separation and inequality between Koreans and non-Korean others. The narrative of cultural difference, which included food and costume, but also factors such as cleaning habits and the number of books at home, were all considered in

direct relation to the idea of multiculturalism to assist in the production of a homogenized notion of the Korea culture, while discriminating against the migrant population. This discriminating tendency was deeply ingrained at the organizational level of the Centers, but also prevalent in the individual perception of the policy practitioners working at the ground level, maintaining the stable and unequal power relations between the two groups on a daily basis.

6.1.3 Theme III: Bureaucracy as the root of the problems

The Korean employees all acknowledged the widespread discrimination that would exist against multicultural families and migrants in Korea, and found it significant and problematic. They talked about the migrants' experiences of discrimination including everyday incidents at schools, on the streets, and in the markets, which some migrant users had shared with them. As the welcoming event above illustrated, the Centers at the organizational level also acknowledged the Koreans' biases and stereotypes against non-Korean migrants, and took part in efforts to reduce them through the recognition of the cultural differences and the value of diversity.

However, alleviating the extent of widespread discrimination against the migrants was not considered as one of the priorities at the Centers. The majority of the Centers' programs were focused on building the capacity of the migrant users to survive in the new country, through improving their language skills, employability, and familial relations. This was also related to the Centers' organizational target

emphasis, in which their programs scarcely engaged with the general Korean population, who as the majority population could benefit from potential programs if they existed, by possibly educating them about the problems of discrimination against ethnic and national minorities, and the significance of the consequential social inequality.

Whilst the employees were well aware of the negative connotations attached to the term *damunwha* (multicultural), the term itself –which the policy is named after- was not recognized as potentially discriminatory by them. Kyunghee for instance understood the discursively constructive nature of the group names used to refer to various minority groups in Korea including the term 'multicultural family'. Nevertheless, she saw it neither as problematic nor in need of change. For her, such group terminologies were practically necessary as functional titles to reflect the existence of more specific minority groups. As she plainly added, "we can't just call them Koreans, can we?"

Youngsun, on the other hand, saw the possibility of the current term 'damunwha' being altered to reflect a more positive conception of migrants living in Korea.

> *If there emerges a better word, it would eventually change. We used to call the North Korean refugees 'talbukja (those who escaped from the North)' and then later called them 'saeteomin (new settlers)'. The North Korean refugees really hate the term saeteomin. It's the same as the disabled people. They used*

to be called 'jangaein' (people with disability) and then later the term was changed to 'jangaewoo' (friends with disability), which they hated.

Here, Youngsun compared the term for multicultural family with those that referred to North Korean refugees and disabled people in Korea. She recognized that the different minority groups themselves did not necessarily appreciate the Korean terms generated to specifically identify them. Yet, similar to Kyunghee, Youngsun believed that the social processes behind the discursively constructive terms for the minority groups were part of a natural course of the social change, rather than contributing factors to group-based discrimination, or an indication of inequality and power imbalance.

Although they did not directly ascribe to the use of minority group names, or the framing of group-based government policies as contributory to the social construction of group hierarchies, the Korean employees certainly viewed them as the result of the functional workings of state bureaucracy. In fact, one of the most common criticisms of the multicultural policy that Korean employees themselves spoke of was its top-down rigidity and the attention given to presentation and visibility only. In other words, they argued that the bureaucratic policy approach rendered multiculturalism as primarily a 'show'.

Jungyun, the most critical of all the Korean respondents, considered the multicultural policy as typical of Korean state bureaucratic policies.

Wearing cultural clothing and doing multicultural policies to exhibit, to display! This is so typical of Korea. Do this show and pat yourselves on the back. It's the same in the policies for disabled people and the elderly. It's what they consider the performance-based system. But multicultural policy is the worst one. Nothing specific has been properly done but just do some events to show. I guess the multicultural related events do sell in the media!

Jungyun believed that Korea's multicultural policy was there to be 'exhibited' and to 'show', without giving serious thought to the practical implications or actual assistance of those receiving it. She argued that "the performance-based system" was not a special characteristic of the multicultural policy but a universal trait of the government policies across the board in Korea. She pointed out the multicultural policy's propensity to "sell in the media" as particularly making it "the worst one" of state policies. She believed that this was why the Korean state could continue such bureaucratically extensive but not effective multicultural policy.

Other Korean employees at the Center agreed with Jungyun's opinion that the multicultural policy would often function as primarily a 'show'. As one of the many policies targeted at minority groups, Korea's multicultural policy conformed to the regularly identified characterization of the state bureaucracy. Joohee considered that the frequent changes in policy direction and substance, and the performance-based system were typical of not only the multicultural policy, but all the Korean state policies. The employees commonly contended that the bureaucratic system inherently

reflected in all state policies disallowed any meaningfully constructive efforts to support minority groups including the multicultural family.

This criticism was backed by another shared notion by the staff that the programs that the Centers run were based on what the state believed multicultural families wanted, without reflecting what they really wanted. For instance, according to Suyeon, the current format of questionnaires for multicultural family used at the Centers was yet another fragment of this pointless bureaucratic administration, in which the act of handing out the surveys itself was a 'performance' of multicultural policy. She asserted that the surveys would only question the extent of satisfaction on each of the programs to the migrant participants, as a formality, and any feedback about what they said or wanted would never change the actual direction of the program.

From the employees' perspective, there seemed no specific effort to bridge the gap between what multicultural families want and what the state wanted to provide. Jungyun said the state's central manual, which all the Centers followed, controlled the one-way stream of the multicultural policy, showing what the state wanted the multicultural family to look like.

> *Guess what the manual by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family looks like? The mother and the father keep on smiling, and baby keeps on smiling! You know no one can always smile. There could be some problems or divorce. It is not realistic to present them as those smiling every day. But the*

government is trying to embellish the family as one happy family. Many events and programs are basically like that.

To her, valorizing the positive image of the multicultural family as "one happy family" and presenting this to the public was essentially what the state aimed to achieve through its multicultural policy, not migrants' welfare. Implied here was the superficiality of the policy and its bureaucratic management style.

However, none of the Korean employees who criticized the state's bureaucracy suggested any ways to fix this problem, maintaining that their role was in fact minimal. By stressing any problems they identified about the policy and the Centers as part of the chronic wider problem of Korean state bureaucracy, they avoided specifying their own responsibilities for implementing the policy at the ground level on a daily basis.

Suyeon was an exception amongst the staff who touched upon the incorporating of migrants' agency as a way to move forward. Suyeon suggested the need to move forward from the current rigid institutional arrangement and neoliberal performance based management, a notion generally shared by the employees. She asserted that a thorough survey of what the service recipients really wanted would be the first step forward to move away from the policy being just a 'show'.

From her perspective, the current unilateral, rigid, and bureaucratic multicultural policy was unable to successfully promote the building capacity of the multicultural families it aimed to provide, to say nothing of the policy's inability to tackle the problems of discrimination against minority groups and the related

problems of social inequality. Yet, she also contended that this approach was merely a hypothetical pipe dream, impossible given the current organizational arrangement and her lack of individual power within it.

In summary, the Korean employees, by locating multicultural in opposition to the Korean culture, endorsed maintaining the continuing notions of Korean national homogeneity. Without realizing or acknowledging the substantive negative effects (in propagating the group hierarchy in particular) of the state and their own nationalist ideas on migrants, the Korean employees tended to underscore the inefficiency of the state bureaucracy as the primary single problematic of multicultural policy at hand.

6.2 Migrants (Users and Non-users)

This section on migrants covers the two interrelated themes. Theme I, How difference is experienced, focuses on the migrants' own experience of multicultural policy, particularly on the separating term of damunwha and the emphasis on cultural difference. Theme II, The unfeasibility of becoming a 'Korean', illuminates the imperative conditions of nationality and ethnicity needed for the authentic Korean identity, and the multicultural policy's role in this social process.

6.2.1 Theme I: How difference is experienced

Different from the Korean employees who did not problematize the term '*damunwha*' as discriminatory, migrants who were directly subject to the title strongly felt the use of the term, including that used in the '*damunwha*' multicultural

policy, as a discriminatory practice. Many users and non-users of the Centers shared this opinion, regardless of their respective original nationality/ethnicity, indicating the term's powerful signifying presence and application in Korea, in comparison to the discourses circulating regarding their specific individual ethnic/national backgrounds.

Zhou, a Chinese migrant user of the Center, described 'multicultural' as, "a term that lost its original meaning [as in] the coexistence of multiple cultures, but is left to refer to poor and desperate people." Mayumi from Japan was not happy to be called 'multicultural' at the Centers and elsewhere by Koreans, because it gave her an impression that she was "different from, and inferior to Koreans". Sofia from the Philippines emphasized the permanent effect of this group name to her, which constantly reminded her of being a separate presence in Korea in even the most mundane parts of her everyday life.

> *Multicultural means that you are not Korean but you are multicultural till the end, forever! I think it is not good. Even at the Centers, they would ask you, 'how's your life?' Upon my answers, they would say, "you must be a successful multicultural case!" (laugh). The term is so overused!*

Some migrants further argued that the discriminatory tendency was not only in the everyday use of the term itself, but also strongly ingrained within the multicultural policy, and this was one of the causes of the widespread discrimination against them in Korea.

Yan from China talked about her opinion of the multicultural policy, including specifically in relation to the Centers and other policies implemented particularly for the children of multicultural families in Korea, and how they helped to construct an inferior group position for migrants, as 'multicultural' people.

> *I feel that when the policies are meant to be for diversity, or for multicultural families, what they are really doing is to make everybody feel that the society needs to help migrants in a condescending way. Poor people, disadvantaged people, and the children are [seen as] difficult to be assimilated… Particularly at schools, they do have a lot of multicultural policies. It's ok to support the multicultural kids maybe if they encounter some specific problems, but from the very start, they categorize the multicultural kids as separate and already begin treating them differently. I think it is a kind of discrimination.*

As a parent of two school-aged children, she was concerned about the ramifications of social separation that the multicultural policies often lead to, particularly for her children. She spoke of an episode in which a schoolteacher asked for any multicultural children to come forward during one of her children's classes, as part of a 'survey', and upon that her child raised his hand before class. The teacher contacted her later that day, saying "I didn't know he was a multicultural! Is this true?" Yan expressed her concerns about her child being separated as a 'multicultural child' to the teacher and the teacher agreed.

Yan was not sure how to react to her child who knew the literal meaning of the term as something that referred to him belonging to a family with a 'non-Korean' parent, but without any understanding of the negative social implications or biases behind that. She found it tricky to explain to her children about the clear social hierarchy in Korea and the wider meanings that this group name 'multicultural' involved.

Unlike the Korean employees who considered the separate group name 'multicultural' as an inevitable course of social process, Yan viewed it as more than just a word. For her, it represented institutional discrimination against a specific group and their children, notwithstanding that it was ostensibly designed to 'help' them. She criticized the multicultural policy for enforcing the group divide and for assuming the uniform nature of 'multicultural' group needs, in often-condescending ways.

Related to the constant separation of 'multicultural' families and their children, the emphasis on cultural difference and the way it was addressed were other points that many migrants found problematic with regard to Korea's multicultural policy. Nora from the Philippines, a regular user and part-time worker at a Center[19], spoke of the Centers' programs, which she believed were tending to designate only migrants as subjects of 'education', but not the Korean members of the family. For her, the Centers' focus was one-directional, always on teaching the migrants, without considering the migrants' own culture and agency.

---

[19] The Centers hire migrants who are members of multicultural families as part of the community service, designed to help disadvantaged people in the local area. As temporary part time workers, the hired migrant workers through this scheme take part in various tasks at the Centers including cleaning, child caring, and miscellaneous work.

The migrant users always say, "Don't educate us just because we have a different culture." What about Koreans? Let them also understand whatever the Centers are trying to teach us. The Centers must educate the Korean husbands and in-laws.

She admitted that migrants were the ones who 'moved to Korea to live', and she did not deny the benefits of some of the programs that the Centers offered to help the migrants (such as the Korean language class or the Centers' practical support given to the users such as help with the application for a bank account or in the use of health services). What Nora specifically touched upon here was related to the assumption that the Centers propagated within their programs: viewing migrants' alien cultural background as the major reason for the need of the Centers' to "teach" them. Some family counseling programs were the typical examples where Nora's criticism would be readily applicable. In the family counseling programs, the Korean employees at the Centers, as a mediator between the family members, repeatedly became a representative of the Korean members' side. The programs would end up advising migrants to change their behaviors to solve the domestic problems at hand, not Koreans.

The target of 'education' for any family problems was therefore often primarily the migrant members, due to their assumed cultural difference and the operational arrangement of the policy where the migrants were the ones who 'received' the 'education' of the counseling programs. Although it is unquestionable

that the number of programs designed to educate Korean family members of multicultural families has increased in recent years, the Centers still mainly consider migrants as those who need to be educated in the majority of the programs.

Migrants in general felt that this way of dealing with the migrant issues in the Centers fed into the general negative construction of cultural difference in wider society, notably through the media. Mayumi talked about the typical representation of the multicultural family in Korean popular television shows. Her comment demonstrated that the heavy focus on the national cultural difference, often tending to be one-directional from the Koreans' perspective only, was omnipresent in the Korean society.

> *When Koreans are speaking of cultural difference, it always is concluded as 'a gap that cannot be closed'. You know the popular TV program called 'Love in Asia'? That program always follows this path. The migrant wife tries her best to learn and do the Korean way, but because of the cultural differences, the Korean family members cannot understand her completely. Always this is the story.*

Mayumi's argument was that the cultural difference within multicultural families was too often depicted as unbridgeable in the media, and almost always from the Koreans perspective only. From the migrant point of view, the typical, dominant discourse of cultural differences shown through these intimate familial relationships

marginalized the foreign family members, by barely taking into account their own subjugated position.

Not only limited to the matter of cultural differences, migrants also sensed that the multicultural policy and the Centers were generally conducted and operated through the Korean perspective without taking into account migrants' demands. Mieko candidly shared her opinion on how the Centers seemed to be operated from a migrant user's point of view.

> *Everything (at the Centers) seems to be operating from the perspective of the Korean people. They are run without considering the migrants within the Centers, but through imagining what the migrants want or are worried about. They do surveys but as a mere procedure…I can see some programs that are not planned at all, looking like a waste of money.*

Mayumi's experience of the Centers was similar. She specifically brought up a program at the Center that she participated in, as an example to explain why she felt the programs at the Centers were not taking into account the desires of the migrant users.

> *I recently started to realize that the Centers did not survey what demands were there and what kind of programs or gatherings the migrants actually wanted. For example, they devised a 'reading program' for the multicultural children, assuming this would be good. This program targeted 5 to 8 year old*

children, and with this 3-year gap, it was difficult to meet every child's different learning level. My daughter didn't understand much in the program, not to mention that she hardly enjoyed it. We complained, and that's it! There was no change after that.

Zhou also pointed out a problem of some temporarily implemented programs at the Centers, which she argued were not worthwhile as they did not provide any help for the migrants.

There are some programs like 'speech practice' and 'leadership training'. I mean they sounded nice and if properly done could be helpful. But they just do it for a few times and that's it. They obviously spent some money on them but they were not useful for us at all.

Alienated from the reality of migrant users, these temporary programs, as the names themselves suggested, would have been better suited for people working at corporations rather than migrants. Zhou believed that such ineffective programs would not have been carried out, if proper research on what migrants actually wanted preceded their implementation.

For all migrants, and particularly for the users, the general consensus was that the Centers appeared to operate only through 'their' way. They made no significant effort to search for and understand the migrant users' opinions, and consequently failed to engage with what migrants actually wanted or needed. Similar to the

accounts of the Korean employees who criticized the problems of the bureaucracy, they pointed to the problem of the survey conducted at the Centers, as being a “mere procedure”, with “no change” in mind for the future. Even though the migrants did not use more technical terms such as ‘the state’s bureaucracy’, ‘the performance-based system’, and ‘top-down rigidity’ that the Korean staff used during their interviews, the focus of the migrants’ critique was essentially identical to that of the Korean workers: the policy’s failure to research and incorporate what migrants might actually want or need.

While the migrants and the Korean employees commonly recognized the Centers’ failure to incorporate what migrants wanted, there was an important difference between the accounts of the migrants and those of the Korean practitioners, that is, whether the Korean practitioners were partially responsible for this pattern of ‘one-directional multiculturalism’. The Korean interviewees were clear in denying their own accountability by emphasizing the highly centralized top-down state bureaucracy, as external to their own capability. They highlighted the limited power of their positions within the state hierarchy, having to follow the manual-led system that the central government devised and organized.

For the migrant users, however, the distinction between the state and the Korean staff was neither discernible nor significant. Whoever was responsible for and to what extent, the Centers essentially reflected ‘their’ (Koreans) perspective only, making it difficult to be considered as inclusive or effective. For migrants, the Korean employees at the Centers were believed to be important part of the policy, whose positions could possibly make changes within the policy. That’s why Mayumi was

disappointed when “there was no change after” her complaints to the Korean staff about the program of the Center.

The migrants in Korea, as targets of the multicultural policy as well as quotidian subjects to be labeled as multicultural, were generally much more critical in their stance on the constructive meaning and use of the term, compared with the Korean interviewees. Some expressed only a slightly uncomfortable feeling towards the term, while others desired its complete removal. Most of them, however, did see a possible connection between the term, the policy, and the discrimination they experienced as migrants in Korea.

While most migrant interviewees perceived the benefits of the policy, they clearly realized the negative consequences of the policy, intended or not intended - constructing them as others and as marginal beings- a social framing which had crucially impacted upon them and their children. Regardless of the source of the problem, if believed to be derived from the state bureaucracy or something else, for migrants, this current circumstance of one-directional multiculturalism that did not value migrants’ own agency was a fundamental issue of the multicultural policy that needed to be dealt with.

6.2.2 Theme II: The unfeasibility of becoming a ‘Korean’

About half of the migrant interviewees had acquired a Korean citizenship, and of the other half, many were planning to apply for it in the near future.[20] They stated that the obvious benefits of having a Korean citizenship included increased employability and stability, such as a reduced risk of losing children in case of divorce. Having a proper "genuine" Korean name instead of a foreign name in the Korean alphabet was an additional practical reason behind applying for the Korean citizenship, which would make paperwork in Korea significantly easier. Changing their name, some migrants argued, also made their 'foreigner' status less conspicuous in various social settings, such as at schools of their children.

Apart from the Japanese interviewees who commonly felt no obvious incentives to changing their citizenship status,[21] other nationality groups with the Korean citizenship or in the process of acquiring it understood the citizenship as necessary in order to ease their lives and even survive in some cases. As Sofia put it, by obtaining the Korean citizenship, "I can assert that I am Korean legally at least".

Even with the list of benefits attached to Korean citizenship, however, the migrants contended that their legal citizenship alone did not, or would not grant them an equal social status as 'Koreans'. In response to my question of whether the Korean

---

[20] Because the countries that most migrants come originally from do not allow a dual citizenship, the migrants are often in position to choose one over others. Thus, the migrant interviewees had a good understanding of weighted advantages and disadvantages of acquiring a Korean citizenship.

[21] In fact, many Japanese interviewees said it would actually be more advantageous for them to keep their Japanese citizenship. The benefits of Japanese citizenship mentioned include the convenience in travelling and cases of possibly moving back to Japan in the future, but the 'prestige' of the Japanese passport compared with the Korean passport was also listed as one of them. This parallels the significance of 'national status' and the exceptionality of being Japanese in the multicultural policy discourse examined at Chapter 5.

citizenship would decrease the chance of one being discriminated against in Korea, Kevin related the experience of his migrant friend, to support his negative response.

> *My Pakistani friend has a Korean citizenship. He applied for a job at a company. The company told him "we need Koreans, not foreigners". And he showed his passport, saying "I am Korean". They said, "You are not Korean". Next time, he saw another job advertisement looking for a foreign worker. He applied and in the interview they asked, "what kind of visa do you have?" And he said he got a Korean citizenship. And they said, "No, you are Korean, not a foreigner". Korean in paper but not real Korean! He was so frustrated, saying, "where can I go"?*

The Pakistani friend of Kevin, a naturalized Korean citizen, was in a contradictory situation where he was considered as neither a Korean nor a foreigner. The passport showed that he was "Korean in paper" but he was told as not being Korean, or as Kevin put it, not a "real Korean". The Korean citizenship in his case put him in a challenging situation where he no longer could apply for 'foreigners-only' jobs, but would have to compete with "real" Koreans for a job for Koreans, equally difficult to attain.

This example demonstrates the kind of common-sense societal understanding of who can be a 'real' Korean that clearly exists in Korea. What, then, are the criteria that one needs to be fulfilling as a Korean, and how does this affect the migrants who

do not meet the criteria? And how does the multicultural policy contribute to maintaining the strict social criteria set for 'real' Koreans?

The migrant interviewees unanimously agreed that it would basically be impossible for them to be considered as 'Koreans' in Korea for various reasons, from their imperfect Korean language ability (Lea, Sofia, Hoang), to their distinctive appearance including their different skin color and facial features (Daria, Kevin, Nora, Nhung, Chhean, Angela). Even those with a phenotypically indistinguishable look from Koreans also considered themselves unable to ever be properly accepted (Mayumi, Aoi, Phuong, Zhou, Yan, Mieko, Hyesoo). Most migrant interviewees in Korea argued that they experienced discrimination based on one of these or combined grounds.

Those who could not easily be superficially identified as 'foreigners' in Korea due to their phenotypically similar look also added that some Koreans would start treating them differently as soon as their original ethnic/national backgrounds were revealed. The migrant participants claimed that you would basically need to be "born as Korean" to be free from any of their experiences of racism. This implies that the Korean identity, for migrants, is understood as genealogically oriented, and based on a biological and geographical connection to Korea that one can only be born with.

From this perspective, some of the migrants of Korean ethnic backgrounds (Korean diaspora groups) could be regarded as Koreans, given their genealogically and biologically qualified Korean ethnicity, or being "born as Korean", like other migrants pointed out. My interviews with a Korean Japanese (*jaeilgyopo*), a Korean Chinese (*josunjok*), and a Korean Uzbekistani (*koryoin*) did reveal the advantaged

status of these diaspora groups in Korea. For one, they were eligible for the special visa status for being ethnically Korean (titled as "*dongpo*", meaning diaspora groups).[22] The diaspora interviewees commented that they felt lucky to be able to go through visa issuing processes, its extension, as well as acquiring of the Korean citizenship relatively easily, compared with other 'non-Korean ethnic' migrants, thanks to their state-recognized Korean ethnic status.

An additional common advantage perceived by these ethnically Korean migrants was the feeling of intimacy they had received from Koreans. Yan, a Korean Chinese, moved to Korea 12 years ago to get married to a Korean husband, and she admitted her astonishment when she discovered the importance of her biological connection to Korean blood and being part of Korean 'minjok' for 'native' Koreans, only after she settled in Korea.

> *I had lived and been educated in China before moving to Korea, and in China I was always Chinese. I never knew about 'the Korean blood', because I was constantly told in school that I was part of an ethnic group that belonged to the Chinese. I had been living like proud Chinese. But my husband told me that he felt very close to me from the start of our meeting because I had a Korean blood. It was apparently a critical reason for him to decide to get married to me in the end… And now I know the different history taught in Korea and felt some kind of intimacy to Koreans.*

[22] H-2 visa, for example, allows ethnically Korean migrants including joseonjok (Chinese Korean) and koryoin (the Korean diaspora in the former Soviet Union) to get employment in Korea. Through this visa, Korean diaspora groups receive preferential treatments in not only immigration control processes but also in terms of higher salary and more lenient regulations in workplaces, compared with non-Korean migrants (Lee et al. 2014)

Yuri, a Korean Japanese, had a comparable experience. Her Korean husband once told her that he would have not been married her if she were "a complete Japanese, and not a Korean Japanese with the same blood as us". In both cases, Yan and Yuri had not comprehended the significance of 'having the Korean blood' and what this would mean for Koreans in associating with each other, prior to their arrivals in Korea. Although not always the case, Yan and Yuri confessed that sometimes their Korean ethnic background – the fact that they shared the Korean blood- frequently proved to appease the hostility that some Koreans initially had displayed against them.

Those migrants with the Korean ethnicity, however, still believed that they were not perceived as 'real Koreans' due to their respective original nationality, apparently a critical element in determining their undeniable 'foreignness'. I asked Jessica, a third generation *Koryoin*[23] and a university student from Uzbekistan, about whether she felt that Koreans viewed her (of Korean ethnicity) any different from other non-Korean migrants. She replied, "I think in Korea it is always divided as Korean versus non-Korean. For Koreans, Koryoin is part of foreigners, not Koreans." The original nationality was an especially more sensitive issue for Yan, being Korean Chinese, mainly due to the widespread stereotype of the Korean Chinese as criminals in Korea.[24] Knowing the prime importance of the original nationality for Koreans as a

---

[23] The term Koryoin, or Koryo Saram, refers to ethnic Koreans in the post-Soviet states.

[24] A recent newspaper article titled "joseonjok viewed as parasite, not as the same minjok' for instance, discussed the common hatred towards joseonjok and how the ungrounded criminalization of them had originated within popular media discourse. Source: http://www.segye.com/newsView/20180906006285

decisive factor of a migrants' identity, Yan confessed that she was always careful not to reveal her original nationality to Koreans. With an impeccable Korean accent, she said:

> *If I say first that I come from China, Koreans, well how should I put it? They become a little bit more different, more cautious and distant. That's why I tried not to say that I am from China, and still now, especially when meeting Koreans for the first time. I can't stop feeling very alienated, thinking maybe it is because I am from China.*

Yuri, Korean Japanese, also said she was always careful when speaking to Koreans, trying not to reveal her 'non-Koreanness'. For example, she pretended to be a 'Korean' at first meetings with Koreans, an attempt that because of her "foreign name" always failed. The ethnic Korean migrants commonly felt that their original nationality fundamentally decided their foreign status in Korea, and for this reason alone, had an immediate impulse to hide their original nationality in social interactions with Koreans.

Obviously, being Korean is not entirely about how they are defined by other people and the society, but also about whether they self-identify themselves as such. Indeed, the Korean diaspora migrants I interviewed identified themselves as specifically Korean Japanese, Korean Chinese, and Korean Uzbekistani respectively, articulating their complicated feelings of belonging both here and there. The 'common blood', similar appearance to other Koreans, or their identification of

Korean language as mother tongue, was not sufficient enough for them to declare their individual identity as just Korean. They discussed their individual biographies and family histories in detail, which had influenced the ways and the extent they felt about being ethnic Korean but simultaneously distinctive from non-migrant Koreans.

Now having lived and settled in Korea, however, they all exhibited a strong desire to be incorporated into Korean society as equal and respected members. Whilst their self-identification obviously mattered, in these 'social' terms equally important was how the majority population and the host society would perceive and treat them as immigrants.

For those with Korean ethnicity but not of Korean nationality originally, Korea's multicultural policy was a contradictory entity. They agreed with the usefulness of the Centers and some of the services, but like other migrant interviewees, they were apprehensive about the social implications of being part of the multicultural family, as a de facto non-Korean and low-status group. Despite their special status and numerous associated benefits gained from being Korean diaspora, the multicultural policy ultimately helped serve to confirm them also as 'multicultural families' who were thus not Korean. At the Centers, both officially and informally, their ethnic advantage or emotional closeness to Koreanness became less significant.

For example, they were categorized as Chinese, Japanese, and Uzbekistani, just like the other non-ethnic migrants, and essentially positioned as members of the diverse national cultures the Centers aimed to encourage through its multiculturalism. As the earlier analysis in this chapter addressed, the cultural diversity and differences at the Centers were characterized through various 'national' cultures. The Korean

diaspora groups were not an exception, as it was their non-Korean nationality, not their diasporic ethnicity, which primarily framed them within the multicultural policy.

In summary, the accounts of migrants as the target recipients exposed their own experience regarding the policy's discriminatory practices and outcomes. The ubiquitous application of the problematic term 'multicultural', the distorted emphasis of cultural difference and diversity, and the resistant notion of Korean membership limited to those with combined Korean ethnic and national backgrounds, all demonstrated the negative effects of the multicultural policy and its nationalistic approach on migrants.

6.3 Chapter summary

This chapter has juxtaposed the separate accounts of the Korean employees and the migrant interviewees regarding the ways in which Korean multicultural policy operates within the Centers. One of the most notable differences was found in their understandings of the Centers' focus on cultural difference and the implications of such. For example, the Korean employees, except for one, comprehended the emphasis of cultural difference presented in the Centers and their programs as something inevitable and appropriate, and certainly not as potentially discriminatory or problematic for migrants. This contrasted with the migrants' critical stance on this matter. For them, the Centers' exclusion of their perspective and possible agency served to consolidate the group's minority position and inequality.

The Korean staff's relaxed attitude towards the policy could be explained by their personally detached position as both 'policy practitioners' and 'the ethnic/national majority', as opposed to the migrants' status as 'receivers' and 'the ethnic/national minority' directly influenced by the policy outcomes. The myopic, rigid operation of the Centers and practice of the staff in adhering to government direction, alongside the clear difference of social positioning between the migrants and Korean employees, were likely the main causes of these separate group accounts.

However, I would further contend that the divide between the two groups' perspectives also derived from the deep-rooted ideas of Korean cultural homogeneity that the Korean staff and the state commonly assumed and actively embraced in pursuing the multicultural policy. Nationalism was articulated within the ideologies and images of multiculturalism throughout the Centers' programs, and visibly manifested by the Korean employees' thoughts on multiculturalism and cultural diversity, powerfully affecting the migrants' experiences of exclusion and racism.

Nationalism was pronounced in the emphasis of cultural difference at the Centers, especially in contrasting Korean culture against all others. Under the ethos of multiculturalism, migrants' diverse cultural backgrounds were assumed as 'non-Korean' and alien, a 'difference' that was repeatedly stressed through the actual practices of the Centers. Implicit in the activities and perspectives of the Centers and the policy practitioners was the standpoint that the Korean national culture, outside the purview of 'multiculturalism', was set as the unvarying reference point, and often framed as superior to the other cultures that were frequently subsumed within the multicultural family framework.

The homogenizing idea of 'multicultural family' as a unified and a direct opposite to the cultural and social edifice of 'the Korean family' and 'Korea' was the most common and dominant idea that shaped the Korean employees' understanding of cultural difference. This was despite the existence of Korean family members in most multicultural families, suggesting their rooted stance as being to reject the notion of possible hybrid cultures in their conception of Korean national culture.

It appeared to hardly ever occur to the Korean employees that their taken-for-granted notions of culture and cultural difference stemmed from their own positioning within a Korean nationalist perspective, and that this perspective itself could have possibly worked to contribute to the widespread discrimination and social inequality against migrants in Korea. This led them to identify state bureaucracy as almost exclusively accountable for any problems related to the Centers and their undesirable social consequences (if they conceded any existed).

For the Korean employees, their individual efforts to better support the migrants and multicultural families were discouraged by the state's intentions and the rigid bureaucracy. The recognized problems of inflexible top-down driven bureaucracy addressed by the Korean staff were largely limited to issues of inefficiency and ineffectiveness, and not grounded relative to the wider processes of nation making and the creation of group hierarchies within. Thus, for the Korean interviewees, the state's nationalism (not to mention their own) was never considered as a source of the social inequality and racism.

In contrast, migrants were explicit in their criticisms of how the cultural difference was tackled in the multicultural policy and how it related to Korea's strong

nationalism. First, both migrant users and non-users easily detected the nationalistic approach of the multicultural policy in its one-directional operation style and problematic framing of the discourse of cultural difference. Because the policy tended to reflect the Koreans' perspective without incorporating the migrants' perspective, migrants felt that many of the Centers' programs ended up being assimilative and nationalistic, forcing them to be the sole subjects to 'be educated' or 'dealt with'. The Centers frequently ignored the actual demands of the migrants, and operated based on the state's speculative assumptions of the migrants' demands and desires.

For migrants, the multicultural policy therefore became a further conduit of Korean nationalism, in which only Korean culture and people would retain any cultural authenticity and socially normative significance. Others were firmly rendered as marginalized, excluded from the homogenized Korean national culture and any form of entitlement to national cultural membership or inclusion.

Secondly, from the migrants' point of view, the policy reiterated the dominant societal understanding (also held by the Korean interviews) that only those fulfilling both the criteria of Korean nationality and ethnicity could be accepted as 'Koreans'. The anecdotes from migrants with diverse ethnic backgrounds and especially the diaspora groups (ethnically Korean but with different original nationalities) testified to how meeting just one category (either Korean ethnicity or nationality) was not sufficient for being granted the full national membership and equal rights as an 'authentic' citizen.

In particular, by allocating the Korean diaspora as part of the 'multicultural' group and not Korean, the multicultural policy helped to uphold the more

exclusionary version of the nation, against its expressed celebration of multiculturalism. As far as the multicultural policy was concerned, and for the Korean staff working on the ground level of the policy, even with the biological 'Korean blood' one would always be considered separate multicultural due to their non-Korean original nationality. The significance of nationality was present in the Centers' emphasis of cultural difference also, in considering nationality as the primary basis to discern group variances, and the measure to decide whether one was considered 'multicultural' or 'Korean'.

Lee and others (2014) view the preferential treatment towards ethnic Korean migrants within the state immigration system as the result of the Korean nationalism. They contend that the unprecedented influx of ethnic Koreans through migration forced the state to choose and redefine what constituted the Korean community: between nationality or ethnicity, a notion previously unchallenged due to the presumed ethnically and nationally homogenous populace and the rarity of immigration (Lee et al. 2014). Hence, the ethnicized immigration policy, including the advantages given to the diaspora groups, points to the state's somewhat compromised position towards national boundaries, as it partially incorporates groups of ethnic Korean migrants (although not fulfilling nationality criteria) as new members of the nation.

Yet, the accounts of both Koreans and migrants in this chapter have combined to indicate that robust and 'uncompromised' traditional national boundaries persist. They expose that both the original nationality and ethnicity are equally powerful conditions to determine one's social status and experience of discrimination. The

orientation of the state's multicultural policy and the attitudes of its practitioners verify the robust national boundaries in which only those with the combined criteria of both Korean ethnicity and nationality were allowed not to be 'multicultural' and granted the authentic national membership, or normative social status in contemporary Korea.

While offering a hollow message of multiculturalism and the superficial celebration of the different cultures within its borders, Korea's multicultural policy therefore still served to transmit and maintain the robustness of the nation's idealized monoethnic culture. The accounts contained in this chapter reflect the continuing strong state and individual resistance to update national boundaries and group hierarchies, against the continuing influx of new migrant populations and their determinant aspirations to be accepted as equal citizens.

Figure 3. Viewpoints by Groups - Ch 6: A Nationalist Project



Figure 3 recaps the points of the Chapter 6, including the varied opinions of the Centers' practice of multiculturalism and the potential effects of discriminations against migrants. Half of the migrant users (50%) and more than half of the migrant non-users (66.7%) viewed the term 'damunwha' as discriminatory. This was significantly different from the Korean staff's response, in which none of the group perceived the term as discriminatory as such.

Secondly, a higher percentage of migrant users (33.33%) and migrant non-users (44.44%) argued that the emphasis on cultural difference in the multicultural policy and the Centers was discriminatory, compared with the Korean workers, of

whom only one (11.11%) saw the possible negative consequences of the present multicultural discourse.

Similarly, a higher percentage of the migrants (50% of users and 55.56% of non-users) criticized the Centers for not taking the migrants' own demands seriously, compared with a minority of the Korean workers (11.11%) who felt this way.

All of the informants including Koreans and migrants viewed that both the Korean original nationality and Korean ethnicity are mandatory for one to be considered as a 'real' Korean.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

This study has examined Korea's multicultural policy through ethnographic research, revealing the relational experiences of the policy practice and how they relate to social inequality and the articulation of power in Korean society. Taking into account the agency of those involved in the Multicultural Center as policy practitioners and receivers (and non-receivers), the analysis has divulged how the group-based inequalities in Korea, particularly those against migrants, are formed and contested within and through the policy.

Prominent in the qualitative analysis results was the central role of nation and nationalist ideologies in the discourse and practice of multicultural policy at both the organizational and the individual levels. The powerful social construction of 'multicultural family' as an idea grounded in the categories of ethnicity and nationality was entirely supported by the policy, reflecting the primacy of the nationalist discourse by functioning to squarely separate 'multicultural' migrants from 'authentic' Koreans. Nationalism is not only fundamental to the basis of Korea's particular form of racism against the marriage migrants and other migrants enforced under the term 'multicultural', but also one of the major forces that shaped the participants' divergent experiences of the policy.

For the Korean employees at the Centers, nationalism was invoked not only as a rationale to justify the existence of the multicultural policy, but also to explain their personal emotions and attitudes towards the migrants. The Korean practitioners' stance towards those who they interacted with on a daily basis frequently revolved

around naturalized notions of Korean national/ethnic homogeneity. They consistently viewed migrants as members of a separate, distinctive, and unbridgeable social group, in contrast to their own national/ethnic group of 'Korean'. This was evident in the various double standards of social rules imposed on migrants, the 'reverse discrimination discourse ' (viewing multicultural policy as discriminatory against Koreans, for migrants receive the benefits regardless of their class status) described as reasonable if not agreed upon, and their understanding of difference as centered on the migrants' supposed possession of cultural traits distinct to the Korean norms.

While the Korean employees commonly attributed the problems of multicultural policy to the flawed practices of state bureaucracy, they failed to recognize their own direct role in the social hierarchizing of migrants as secondary citizens linked to their own prejudiced nationalist perspectives. This nationalist mind-set was omnipresent to the extent that the Koreans workers at the Centers rarely recognized the fact that it drove their individual judgment and policy implementation in critical ways. Equally, these ingrained ideas of national homogeneity continually functioned to solidify and naturalize the workers' adherence to a prejudice of group hierarchies based on ethnic and national background. As Billing (1995) put it, nationalism for all the Korean employees was "the endemic condition" (p.6) that "appear as a 'natural', moral order" (p.10).

Migrants, the receivers of the policy, on the other hand, tended to be more mindful of the role of Korean nationalism as a formative influence within multicultural policy, and were especially sensitive about its consequential implications as regards their own social locations. While some of the services at the

Centers were understood generally as useful for migrants, the Centers were simultaneously perceived as largely responsible for constructing migrants as poor, passive, gendered and inferior others. From the perspective of some migrants, the patronizing and limiting conception of 'multiculturalism' evident in the policy was clear, alongside its role in informing the dominant public discourse on the low status of migrants in Korea. In this respect, the multicultural policy was clearly seen as not oriented to combat or contradict the overriding discourse that excluded migrants as part of the national citizenry. The points of critique that were consistently offered by the migrant subjects of this study illustrate how this policy practice, based on a rigid conception of nation and national belonging, caused them to suffer discrimination.

The nationalist ideology influencing the discriminatory orientation of Korean multicultural policy is also observable as closely enmeshed with other social divisions, notably gender, class, ethnicity, and nationality. Firstly, the category of gender interacts with nation and nationalism within multicultural policy in two major ways: by enforcing the hegemonic gender roles and norms in relation to the discourse of nation; and by imposing unequal gender relations and patriarchy differently for different ethnic/national groups. Both the programs at the Centers and the perceptions of those working for the Centers strongly assume Korean national 'traditional' gender roles for migrant women, the Centers' majority users, including child-rearing, cooking, caring, doing domestic work, and the smooth maintenance of inter-familial relations. For many of the Korean respondents, how these gender specific roles and norms are fulfilled in 'multicultural' families was the primary concern, as the undertaking of these roles was seen as contributing to serving the national interest

and/or alleviating a national burden, in terms of sustaining of the 'traditional' Korean family unit.

Beyond this location of the migrants in the traditional Korean notion of family, the Korean staff also maintained different gender standards for migrants and Koreans. For instance, it was frequently assumed that the migrant wives belonging to multicultural families would have a higher tolerance for the patriarchal system than the average Korean woman, as many members of staff considered that these migrants had accepted their supposed new higher economic and/or national status as a trade-off. The regular adherence to this conception not only intensified the existence of a pervasive hierarchy based on ethnicity and nationality within the framework of the Centers' operations, but also left the wider issue of gender inequality in Korea unchallenged. As a result, the Korean staff at the Centers, all of whom were women themselves, implicitly sanctioned their own subordinated positioning under the patriarchy, while at the same time exerting their privilege and power as the dominant ethnicity/nationality group.

Secondly, with regard to the category of class, Korea's multicultural policy helped to strengthen the general social image of migrant wives of multicultural families as low class welfare recipients, through their programs focusing on 'giving help' rather than engaging migrants as equal and active participants. Both migrants and staff agreed that the Centers mainly existed to aid migrants of economically disadvantaged 'multicultural families', who were frequently perceived as from economically less developed countries. The strong tendency to determine a person's class position primarily in relation to their nationality in Korea generated distinctive

experiences for migrants depending on their class and nationality, and especially for those who did not belong to the typically perceived class-nationality compositions. While the low class migrants appreciated the free services that the Centers offered, migrants with relatively middle class status commonly criticized the demeaning attitude towards migrants inherent in the policy, a fact which caused some not to participate in the Centers altogether.

Most experiences of discrimination that the migrant informants said they had in Korea were based on the assumption of their 'low class' status, as a presumed consequence of their original national background, signifying the intimate connection constructed between the two social categories. Yet the Korean employees' contradictory comments about the same migrants being 'wealthier than Koreans' and multicultural policy thus being a type of 'reverse discrimination' made explicit the malleability of this link between class and the nation/nationality. By constantly modifying and maneuvering the form and substance of the social discourse and relative positioning informed by a wide range of social categories, the Korean employees as the dominant group managed to maintain the existing systems of power and their ethnic/national group privilege. The consistency of this process further enabled the continuity of discrimination and stereotypes against the migrant wives as a group formed in relation to the operations of the Centers, as being poor and in desperate need.

Finally, the categories of ethnicity and nationality determined the unequal status and experience of discrimination for migrants as well as their cultural validity in Korea. This point is demonstrated by the Centers' emphasis on multiculturalism

and cultural diversity through foregrounding non-Korean migrant cultures, while viewing the Korean culture and people as non-heterogeneous, non-problematic, and the absolute reference point. The category of nationality was particularly critical in the differentiation of 'cultures' and cultural hierarchy, and the external conception of the migrants' 'non-Korean' identities, as confirmed in the cases of the Korean ethnic diaspora. The diaspora groups with Korean ethnicity found themselves fixed, as part of multicultural families, and never fully incorporated in a national framework constituted of only Koreans of the same ethnicity and nationality.

Considering the interlinking of class, gender, ethnicity, and nationality as components informing the context of Korea's multicultural policy has helped to reveal the specific ways in which these social categories are used to construct boundaries and support group hierarchies. Yuval-Davis (2006:199) asserts that these categorical attributes construct boundaries "that differentiate between self and other, determining what is 'normal' and what is not, who is entitled to certain resource and who is not". The analysis in this dissertation suggests that Korea's multicultural policy and those involved in its operational practice together contribute to this exact process by naturalizing the boundaries between Koreans and non-Koreans ('multicultural' individuals), always relative to multiple other social categories and their assumed homogenized attributes.

Multicultural policy in Korea, as a project informed by the wider patriarchal nationalist tendencies of the state bureaucracy and government, while not solely responsible for the marginalization of migrants, has failed to successfully incorporate them as part of the national community. This contrasts to a more positive version of

multicultural policy as an inclusive 'nation-making project' that extends national boundaries to embrace civic citizenship, argued through a study of the Australian case (Moran 2011).

However, the range of different evaluations of the Centers' activities on the part of the migrants cautions us against condemning Korean multicultural policy entirely. Most informants, despite their criticisms, agreed that the Centers were useful for migrants' lives in ways, consistent with what Bloemraad (2006) has previously argued in her examination of Canadian multicultural policy. For instance, the chance to engage with new social networks is one such example. Although the Centers were not helpful in generating meaningful social relations between migrants and Koreans, and they were potentially not the only source for social networking, they did act as open and easily accessible spaces for migrants to start forming relations with their peers.

The free service of Korean language classes, which most migrants appraised as positive, is another example that illustrates the benefits of the state-sponsored multicultural policy in Korea. Of course, given the social discourse and political motivation behind the multicultural policy, it could be argued that these language classes were intended to ease the difficulties of the Korean family members more so than the migrants themselves, and aid the assimilation of these migrants into Korean culture and society. The Centers' ongoing preoccupation with the acquisition of Korean language for migrant mothers and their children indicates the assimilative perspective of the state bureaucracy in this respect.

Regardless of the state intention, however, migrant users of the Centers often managed to make use of the free language classes for their own ends, whether to get a job, make friends, do volunteering, learn different cultures, enable their voice within the family and wider society, and simply boost their confidence level and a sense of being alive. The widespread levels of appreciation and satisfaction expressed, particularly by low- class migrant users regarding the Centers' language service, demonstrate the positive aspects of this highly nationalist project.

In conclusion, it is therefore important to discuss how the negative aspects of the policy discussed in this dissertation can be tackled without completely abandoning the benefits that the state is willing to offer for migrants. Following the analysis and evidence offered here, to transform the existing multicultural policy to a more inclusive one, what is primarily required is to change the ways in which the programs are arranged and implemented. The migrant interviewees strongly felt that the state offered no space for their own demands to be heard, but insisted on 'giving' only the helps that the state considered important. This problem of one-directional decision-making process in the state bureaucracy was also a common critique offered by Korean employees. The remarkable similarity amongst the Centers that I found in this research similarly reveals the lack of autonomy or freedom each Center has and the strong bureaucratic system installed.

To solve this issue of policy implementation, migrants should not be framed as the mere recipients of state benefit, but be enabled to join in the decision-making processes on the issues of policy contents, program direction, and methods of organization. This I believe is only obtainable through giving significant authority to

migrants within the policy and the Centers. Currently, the government officially hires migrant staff at the Centers mainly for the tasks of translation and administration, and also uses the regional social welfare budget to employee part-time migrant staff for various miscellaneous work. These low level positions do not permit the substantial engaging of migrant populations in the policy construction, or even implementation, and arguably reinforce the hierarchy within the organization and the unequal power relations between the two groups. Going further, a substantive role for migrants as decision-makers within the policy construction would also help alleviating the fixed image of them being passive recipients and solving the chronic bureaucratic problems of one-directional communication.

To create more equal, participatory, inclusive practice of the policy, devising and offering anti-discrimination training programs for Korean personnel would offer another essential step toward less discrimination and inequality for migrants. The accounts of the Korean staff in the interviews demonstrated the pervasive notions of Korean superiority, and discriminatory and patronizing views of the migrant population generally held by staff, justified in relation to the dominant nationalist discourse. Nationalism, often disguised as benign patriotism, remained an elevated value for most staff members. This was despite their genuine intention to support migrants and their generally sympathetic views about the migrant population in Korea. This largely positive attitude might perhaps mean that staff would be quick to change their mindsets, if informed about how their attitudes and comments could result in discrimination against migrants, and offer an effective way to improve the current policy practice.

The most important issues ahead are the growing numbers of children born from migrant and multicultural families, who, under the present policy paradigm, would only be separated and discriminated against based on their 'multicultural' ethnic and national backgrounds. For this young generation, revealing the discriminatory practices and biases that underlie the apparently benign dominant nationalist discourse might be the first and the most urgent step to move forward in contemporary Korean society and its social justice. In sum, the creation of a more participatory state policy formation and practice based on foregrounding the input and perspectives of the migrants and their families would certainly provide a useful impetus toward a more equitable and more inclusive Korean society. In terms of semantics, if not the idealized notion of national cultural diversity, it maybe that the pejorative connotations adherent to the term 'multicultural' mean that it should be abandoned within the creation of this new approach.

Appendices

Appendix A: List of Interview Questions

Appendix B: Informed Consent Form

Appendix C: Advertisement Form

Appendix D: Final Codes

Appendix A: List of Interview Questions

For Korean employees of the Centers

- How long have you been working for the Center?
- Why did you decide to work for the Center?
- Tell me about your typical day at work.
- How do you feel about working in here?
- What do you think functions well in the Center and what do not?
- What surprises you?
- If you have worked here for some time, could you describe what you have seen as changes in the Center over the years?
- What do you think of multiculturalism?
- How does the Center help or not help migrants' social integration?

For migrants who use the Centers

- How did you find out about the Center?
- Why did you decide to use the Center?
- What do you like about the Center?
- What are the benefits of coming to the Center?
- If you have a child, do you bring him/her to the Center? Why or why not?
- Why do you use the particular programs or services but not others?
- Would you like to visit the Center more often?
- Do you feel welcome in the Center? Why or why not?
- Do you feel that the Center understands what you want?
- What kind of programs or services do you want if they are not already available?
- Have you heard of Korea's multiculturalism? What do you think of it?

For migrants who do not use the Centers

- Have you heard about the Center?
- Do you know what the Centers are for?
- What are your understandings of the Centers' work?
- If you are aware of the Centers, why do you decided not to use the Center?
- What are the alternative sources of support?
- If you do not know of the Centers, to whom do you go to when you need support?

- Have you heard of multiculturalism? What do you think of it?

Potential follow up questions (for Korean employees, migrant users, migrant non-users when applicable)

- What made your experience within the Center particularly different from other participants?
- Why do you feel so strongly about certain aspects of the Centers or the programs?
- What aspects of multicultural policy need to be changed and why?
- Why do you think certain social identity of yours so critical in explaining your experiences within the Center?

Appendix B: Informed Consent Form

Consent Form for Korean Employees at the Centers

Project Title	Between Ethnic Essentialism and Multiculturalism: An examination of migrant community centers in contemporary South Korea
Purpose of the Study	*This research is being conducted by* ***Sojin Yu*** *at the University of Maryland, College Park. We are inviting you to participate in this research project because you can share your valued experiences as an employee working for the Multicultural Family Support Center. The purpose of this research project is to understand various perspectives of those involved in the Centers established across the country under the Korea's current multicultural policy. This study will investigate the workings of the Centers as well as the broader social meanings and understandings of social identities in contemporary Korean society in relation to the multicultural policy.*
Procedures	*The procedures involve your participation in an individual interview. The interview will take about 1 hour for each visit. I will conduct one interview with you but following the initial interview, I may ask you to meet for an additional interview if there is further information is needed. The follow-up interview will take about one hour and is not mandatory.* *You can select the place where you prefer to be interviewed. Prior to beginning the interview, I will ask whether I can record your interview by audio-recording or not. I will audio-record your interview if your provide consent to do so. If you do not wish to be audio-recorded, you can still participate and I will only take notes during your interview. Examples of the questions I will ask for employees of the Centers include: "How long have you been working for the Center?", "Why did you decide to work for the Center?" "Tell me about your typical day at work.", "How do you feel about working in here?", "What do you think functions well in the Center and what do not?", "What surprises you?", "If you have worked here for some time, could you describe what you have seen as changes in the Center over the years?", "What do you think of multiculturalism?", and "How does the Center help or not help migrants' social integration?"*
Potential Risks and Discomforts	*You could feel uncomfortable answering some of the questions because you feel that the questions are personal or difficult to answer, although this is unlikely. To minimize this possibility, all participation is completely voluntary. Also, you can skip any questions you wish, stop participating or withdraw at any time. In the event that you choose to withdraw from the interview process, all of your interview data (written and audio-recorded) will be securely disposed of and not used in the research process.*

Potential Benefits	*This research is not designed to help you personally. However, the results may help the investigator learn more about the Korea's multicultural policy and the workings of the Centers established for the increasing number of immigrants. We hope that, in the future, other people might benefit from this study through improved understanding of the Centers and immigrant-related policies in general.*
Confidentiality	*Any potential loss of confidentiality will be minimized by storing data in a secure location in a locked cabinet in the researcher's office and on a password-protected computer and hard drive. In order to protect privacy, the identities of participants will remain confidential* *Except for the cases where a participant refers to another participant, where the initial participant can identify the other participant, the identities of participants will remain confidential. To ensure confidentiality, the student investigator will assign pseudonyms to each participant. Actual names will not appear on any interview data. The key linking the real participants to the pseudonyms will be kept in a separate document on the student investigator's computer in a separate folder away from the folder with the interview data. Only the student investigator can access all the collected data. Information identifying the participant will be disclosed only if the participant gives his/her consent to provide such information.* *Data including audio recordings will be securely stored on the student investigator's computer and hard disk. Computer and hard disk will be secured with passwords to protect participants. Hard copies of data will remain in the student investigator's office in a locked location. After transcription, all the interviews will be destroyed. This eliminates the risk of identification through voices but allows me to keep their interviews without any identifiers linked to them. Hard copies of data and audio-recorded data will be destroyed when their data is no longer required for the study, but not before a minimum of ten years after data collection.* *If we write a report or article about this research project, your identity will be protected to the maximum extent possible. Your information may be shared with representatives of the University of Maryland, College Park or governmental authorities if you or someone else is in danger or if we are required to do so by law.*
Right to Withdraw and Questions	*Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to participate in this research, you may stop participating at any time. If you decide not to participate in this study or if you stop participating at any time, you will not be penalized or lose any benefits to which you otherwise qualify.* *If you decide to stop taking part in the study, if you have questions, concerns, or complaints, or if you need to report an injury related to the research, please contact my advisors:* ***Dr. Patricia Hill Collins** or **Dr. Kris Marsh*** *collinph@umd.edu kmarsh1@umd.edu*

	301-405-6392 *301-405-6395*	
Participant Rights	*If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or wish to report a research-related injury, please contact:* **University of Maryland College Park** **Institutional Review Board Office** **1204 Marie Mount Hall** **College Park, Maryland, 20742** **E-mail: irb@umd.edu** **Telephone: 301-405-0678** *This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects.*	
Statement of Consent	*Your signature indicates that you are at least 18 years of age; you have read this consent form or have had it read to you; your questions have been answered to your satisfaction and you voluntarily agree to participate in this research study. You will receive a copy of this signed consent form.* *_I agree to be audio recorded.* *_I do not agree to be audio recorded.* *If you agree to participate, please sign your name below.*	
Name and Date	**NAME OF PARTICIPANT** **[Please Print]**	
Statement of Consent	**SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT**	
Signature and Date	**DATE**	

Consent Form for Migrants who use the Centers

Project Title	Between Ethnic Essentialism and Multiculturalism: An examination of migrant community centers in contemporary South Korea
Purpose of the Study	*This research is being conducted by **Sojin Yu** at the University of Maryland, College Park. We are inviting you to participate in this research project because you can share your valued experiences as a migrant using the Multicultural Family Support Center. The purpose of this research project is to understand different opinions of the migrants in the Centers in the country under the Korea's current multicultural policy. This study will look at the workings of the Centers as well as the*

	broader social meanings and understandings of social identities in contemporary Korean society in relation to the multicultural policy.
Procedures	*I would like to do an individual interview. The interview will take about 1 hour for each visit. I will do one interview with you but following the initial interview, I may ask you to meet for an additional interview if there is further information is needed. The follow-up interview will take about one hour and is not mandatory.* *You can select the place where you want to be interviewed. Before the interview, I will ask whether I can record your interview by audio-recording or not. I will audio-record your interview if you agree to do so. If you do not wish to be audio-recorded, you can still participate and I will only take notes during your interview. Examples of the questions I will ask for migrant users of the Centers include: "How did you find out about the Center?", "Why did you decide to use the Center?", "What do you like about the Center?" "What are the benefits of coming to the Center?", "If you have a child, do you bring him/her to the Center? Why or why not?", "Why do you use the particular programs or services but not others?", "Would you like to visit the Center more often?", "Do you feel welcome in the Center? Why or why not?", "Do you feel that the Center understands what you want?", "What kind of programs or services do you want if they are not already available?", and "Have you heard of Korea's multiculturalism? What do you think of it?"*
Potential Risks and Discomforts	*You could feel uncomfortable answering some of the questions because you feel that the questions are personal or difficult to answer. To avoid this, you can choose whether you want to participate or not. Also, you can skip any questions you wish, stop participating or withdraw at any time. In the event that you choose to withdraw from the interview process, all of your interview data (written and audio-recorded) will be removed safely and not used in the research process.*
Potential Benefits	*This research will not help you personally. However, the results may help researcher learn more about the Korea's multicultural policy and the workings of the Centers for the increasing number of immigrants. We hope that, in the future, other people might get help from this study through the knowledge that gain from you.*

Confidentiality	*Interview data will be safely saved in a locked cabinet in the researcher's office and on a password-protected computer and hard drive. To protect privacy, any information of participants will be kept secret.* *Except for the cases where a participant talks about another participant, where the initial participant can identify the other participant, the identities of participants will stay confidential. The student investigator will assign pseudonyms (fake names) to each participant. Actual names will not appear on any interview data. The key linking the real participants to the fake names will be kept in a separate document on the student investigator's computer in a separate folder away from the folder with the interview data. Only the student investigator can access all the collected data. Information identifying the participant will be available only if the participant agrees to such information.* *Data including audio recordings will be securely stored on the student investigator's computer and hard disk. Computer and hard disk will be secured with passwords to protect participants. Hard copies of data will remain in the student investigator's office in a locked location. After transcription, all the interviews will be destroyed. This eliminates the risk of identification through voices but allows me to keep their interviews without any identifiers linked to them. Hard copies of data and audio-recorded data will be destroyed when their data is no longer needed for the study, but not before a minimum of ten years after data collection.* *If we write a report or article about this research project, your identity will be protected as much as possible. Your information may be shared with representatives of the University of Maryland, College Park or governmental people if you or someone else is in danger or if we are required to do so by law.*
Right to Withdraw and Questions	*Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to participate in this research, you may stop participating at any time. If you decide not to participate in this study or if you stop participating at any time, you will not be have any problems or lose any possible benefits.* *If you decide to stop being interviewed for the study, if you have questions, concerns, or complaints, or if you need to report an injury regarding research, please contact my advisors:* ***Dr. Patricia Hill Collins** or **Dr. Kris Marsh*** *collinph@umd.edu kmarsh1@umd.edu* *301-405-6392 301-405-6395*
Participant Rights	*If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or wish to report a research-related injury, please contact:* **University of Maryland College Park** **Institutional Review Board Office** **1204 Marie Mount Hall**

	College Park, Maryland, 20742 **E-mail: irb@umd.edu** **Telephone: 301-405-0678** *This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects.*	
Statement of Consent	*Your signature indicates that you are at least 18 years of age; you have read this consent form or have had it read to you; your questions have been answered to your satisfaction and you voluntarily agree to participate in this research study. You will receive a copy of this signed consent form.* *_I agree to be audio recorded.* *_I do not agree to be audio recorded.* *If you agree to participate, please sign your name below.*	
Name and Date	**NAME OF PARTICIPANT** **[Please Print]**	
Statement of Consent	**SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT**	
Signature and Date	**DATE**	

Consent Form for Migrants who do not use the Centers

Project Title	Between Ethnic Essentialism and Multiculturalism: An examination of migrant community centers in contemporary South Korea
Purpose of the Study	*This research is being conducted by **Sojin Yu** at the University of Maryland, College Park. We are inviting you to participate in this research project because you can share your valued experiences as a migrant using the Multicultural Family Support Center. The purpose of this research project is to understand different opinions of the migrants in the Centers in the country under the Korea's current multicultural policy. This study will look at the workings of the Centers as well as the broader social meanings and understandings of social identities in contemporary Korean society in relation to the multicultural policy.*
Procedures	*I would like to do an individual interview. The interview will take about 1 hour for each visit. I will do one interview with you but following the initial interview, I may ask you to meet for an additional interview if there is further information is needed. The follow-up interview will take about one hour and is not mandatory.*

	You can select the place where you want to be interviewed. Before the interview, I will ask whether I can record your interview by audio-recording or not. I will audio-record your interview if you agree to do so. If you do not wish to be audio-recorded, you can still participate and I will only take notes during your interview. Examples of the questions I will ask for migrant non-users of the Centers include: "Have you heard about the Center?" "Do you know what the Centers are for? What are your understandings of the Centers' work?", "If you are aware of the Centers, why do you decided not to use the Center?", "What are the alternative sources of support?", "If you do not know of the Centers, to whom do you go to when you need support?", and "Have you heard of multiculturalism? What do you think of it?"
Potential Risks and Discomforts	*You could feel uncomfortable answering some of the questions because you feel that the questions are personal or difficult to answer. To avoid this, you can choose whether you want to participate or not. Also, you can skip any questions you wish, stop participating or withdraw at any time. In the event that you choose to withdraw from the interview process, all of your interview data (written and audio-recorded) will be removed safely and not used in the research process.*
Potential Benefits	*This research will not help you personally. However, the results may help researcher learn more about the Korea's multicultural policy and the workings of the Centers for the increasing number of immigrants. We hope that, in the future, other people might get help from this study through the knowledge that gain from you.*
Confidentiality	*Interview data will be safely saved in a locked cabinet in the researcher's office and on a password-protected computer and hard drive. To protect privacy, any information of participants will be kept secret.* *Except for the cases where a participant talks about another participant, where the initial participant can identify the other participant, the identities of participants will stay confidential. The student investigator will assign pseudonyms (fake names) to each participant. Actual names will not appear on any interview data. The key linking the real participants to the fake names will be kept in a separate document on the student investigator's computer in a separate folder away from the folder with the interview data. Only the student investigator can access all the collected data. Information identifying the participant will be available only if the participant agrees to such information.* *Data including audio recordings will be securely stored on the student investigator's computer and hard disk. Computer and hard disk will be secured with passwords to protect participants. Hard copies of data will remain in the student investigator's office in a locked location. After transcription, all the interviews will be destroyed. This eliminates the risk of identification through voices but allows me to keep their interviews without any identifiers linked to them. Hard copies of data and audio-recorded data will be destroyed when their data is no longer needed for the study, but not before a minimum of ten years after data collection.*

	If we write a report or article about this research project, your identity will be protected as much as possible. Your information may be shared with representatives of the University of Maryland, College Park or governmental people if you or someone else is in danger or if we are required to do so by law.
Right to Withdraw and Questions	*Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to participate in this research, you may stop participating at any time. If you decide not to participate in this study or if you stop participating at any time, you will not be have any problems or lose any possible benefits.* *If you decide to stop being interviewed for the study, if you have questions, concerns, or complaints, or if you need to report an injury regarding research, please contact my advisors:* ***Dr. Patricia Hill Collins*** *or* ***Dr. Kris Marsh*** *collinph@umd.edu kmarsh1@umd.edu* *301-405-6392 301-405-6395*
Participant Rights	*If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or wish to report a research-related injury, please contact:* **University of Maryland College Park** **Institutional Review Board Office** **1204 Marie Mount Hall** **College Park, Maryland, 20742** **E-mail: irb@umd.edu** **Telephone: 301-405-0678** *This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects.*
Statement of Consent	*Your signature indicates that you are at least 18 years of age; you have read this consent form or have had it read to you; your questions have been answered to your satisfaction and you voluntarily agree to participate in this research study. You will receive a copy of this signed consent form.* *_I agree to be audio recorded.* *_I do not agree to be audio recorded.* *If you agree to participate, please sign your name below.*
Name and Date	**NAME OF PARTICIPANT** **[Please Print]**
Statement of	**SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT**

Consent		
Signature and Date	**DATE**	

Appendix C: Advertisement Form

A copy of advertisements (e-mail)

Dear Mr./Ms. _____

I am writing this email to ask you about the possibility of volunteering for the Multicultural Family Support Center and interviewing some of the participants in the Center. My name is Sojin Yu and I am a PhD student at the University of Maryland, College Park. I am planning to conduct a research project on migrants and multicultural policy in South Korea, and specifically on gathering various perspectives and experiences within the Multicultural Family Support Centers. I understand your Center is one of these state-sponsored 'Multicultural Family Support Centers' in South Korea, and I believe that people in your Center have knowledge and experience that would be essential for my study.

While this research is not designed to benefit you and your Center specifically, the results may help me learn more about the Korea's multicultural policy and immigrant policy as well as state's social integration efforts. I hope that, in the future, other people might benefit from this study through improved understanding of the migrants and immigrant-related policies in general.

I am requesting your permission to let me do volunteer work at the Center for three months and have a chance to meet up with the people in the Center and potentially interview some of them regarding their experiences while doing the volunteering work.

If you are interested in letting me do a voluntary work and research in the Center, please reply to me through this email (sojinyu@umd.edu), or text/call me via phone (010-2807-1797). I would really appreciate your help and I look forward to hearing from you.

Sojin Yu
PhD student
Sociology Department
University of Maryland-College Park
sojinyu@umd.edu

Recruitment approach (in person)

• Hello Mr./Ms. _____, to remind you who I am, my name is Sojin Yu and I am a PhD student at the University of Maryland, College Park. As you may know, my research is about the Multicultural Family Support Center and the varied experiences of both migrants and Koreans on the Centers as well as the multicultural policy in South Korea. I would like to conduct individual one-hour interview with you personally as I believe you have knowledge and experience that will help understand the Center and the multicultural policy, and request if you are interested in participating in the interview for my research.

If you agree to do an interview with me, you can set a time and a meeting place that work best for you, when and where you feel comfortable. It is completely voluntary and you can withdraw anytime you want even if you agreed to do an interview earlier. This research is not designed to benefit you personally, but the results may help me learn more about the Korea's multicultural policy and immigrant policy as well as state's social integration efforts. I hope that, in the future, other people might benefit from this study through improved understanding of the migrants and immigrant-related policies in general.

Recruitment approach (online community)

• Hello, my name is Sojin Yu and I am a PhD student at the University of Maryland, College Park. I am writing my dissertation research about Multicultural Family Support Center and the varied experiences of both migrants and Koreans on the Centers as well as the multicultural policy in South Korea. I am particularly looking for migrants who have never used one of the Centers before to hear the reasons for not using the services available to you. I am also interested in interviewing migrants who had visited the Centers before but quickly decided not to use the Centers. If you are one of these two types that I am looking for, I would very much like to meet you and hear your stories. I would like to conduct individual one-hour interview with you personally as I believe you have knowledge and experience that will help understand the Center and the multicultural policy, and request if you are interested in participating in the interview for my research.

If you agree to do an interview with me, you can set a time and a meeting place that work best for you, when and where you feel comfortable. It is completely voluntary and you can withdraw anytime you want even if you agreed to do an interview earlier. This research is not designed to benefit you personally, but the results may help me learn more about the Korea's multicultural policy and immigrant policy as well as state's social integration efforts. I hope that, in the future, other people might benefit

from this study through improved understanding of the migrants and immigrant-related policies in general.

Please send me a text message (010-8705-1797) if you are interested in participating in my study.

Appendix D: Final Codes

The following table presents the top 20 codes out of the final 82 codes.

No.	Codes	Number of references
1	Multiculturalism as separation	29
2	Criticisms on Centers	27
3	Gender roles for the nation	27
4	Migrants as social beneficiaries	25
5	Stereotypes of marriage migrants	25
6	Ethnic national solidarity	18
7	Experience of racism	18
8	Benefits of the Centers	17
9	Centers' non-users characteristics	17
10	Changes of Centers over time	16
11	State's motivation behind	16
12	Globalization discourse	14
13	Two types of the multicultural family	14
14	Social integration of migrants	13
15	Migrants’ observed difficulties	13
16	The meanings of multiculturalism	13
17	Changed image of migrants	13
18	Sympathy for Koreans	13
19	Comparison to Koreans	12
20	Rigid programs of the Centers	12

Bibliography

Ahn, J. H. (2012). Transforming Korea into a multicultural society: Reception of multiculturalism discourse and its discursive disposition in Korea. *Asian Ethnicity*, *13*(1), 97-109.

Ahn, J. H. (2013). Global migration and the racial project in transition: Institutionalizing racial difference through the discourse of multiculturalism in South Korea. *Journal of Multicultural Discourses*, *8*(1), 29-47.

Ahmed, S. (2012). *On being included: Racism and diversity in institutional life*. Duke University

Altheide D. and Johnson M. (1998). Criteria for assessing interpretative validity in qualitative research, In Denzin N. and Lincoln Y. (eds). *Collecting and interpreting Qualitative Material*. London: Sage.

Andall, J. (2000). *Gender, migration and domestic service*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Anthias, F. and Yuval-Davis, N. (1992). *Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour and Class and the Anti-Racist Struggle*. New York: Routledge.

Anthias, F. (1992). Connecting "Race" and Ethnic Phenomena. *Sociology,* 26: 421–38.

Anthias, F. (2010). Nation and Post-Nation: Nationalism, Transnationalism and Intersections of Belonging. In Collins, P.H. & Solomos, J. (Eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Race and Ethnic Studies* (pp.221-248). London: Sage.

Anthias, F. (2013). Intersectional what? Social divisions, intersectionality and levels of analysis. *Ethnicities*, *13*(1), 3-19.

Anthias, F., & Lazaridis, G. (Eds.). (2000). *Gender and migration in Southern Europe: Women on the move*. Berg Publishers.

Atkinson P. (1990). *The Ethnographic Imagination*. London: Routledge.

Balibar, E. (1991a). Is There a 'Neo-Racism'?. Pp. 17-28. In E. Balibar & I. Wallerstein. (Eds.) *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (pp.17-28). New York: Verso.

Balibar, E. (1991b). Racism and Nationalism. Pp. 37-67. In E. Balibar & I. Wallerstein. (Eds.) *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (pp.17-28). New York: Verso.

Bannerji, H. (2000). *The Dark Side of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism, Nationalism and Gender*. Toronto, Canada: Canadian Scholars' Press.

Banton, M. (2002). *Racial theories* (2nd ed., Transferred to digital printing). Cambridge u.a: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Banton, M. (2003). Teaching ethnic and racial studies. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *26*(3), 488-502.

Bauman, Z. (1989). *Modernity and the Holocaust*. Cornell University Press.

Bélanger, D., Lee, H.-K., & Wang, H.-Z. (2010). Ethnic diversity and statistics in East Asia: 'foreign brides' surveys in Taiwan and South Korea. *Ethnic And Racial Studies*, *33*(6), 1108-1130.

Billig, M. (1995). *Banal nationalism*. London: Sage.

Bloemraad, I. (2006). *Becoming a citizen: Incorporating immigrants and refugees in the United States and Canada*. Univ of California Press.

Bloemraad, I., Korteweg, A., & Yurdakul, G. (2008). Citizenship and immigration: Multiculturalism, assimilation, and challenges to the nation-state. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *34*(1), 153.

Brewer J.D. (1994). The Ethnographic Critique of Ethnography: Sectarianism in the RUC. *Sociology*, 28, 231-244

Brubaker, R. (1992). *Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany* (Vol. 21). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bryman, A. (2012). *Social research methods*, 4th Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bulmer, M. & Solomos, J. (eds) 1999. *Ethnic and Racial Studies Today*. London: Routledge.

Caldwell, K. L. (2007). *Negras in Brazil: Re-envisioning Black Women, Citizenship, and the Politics of Identity*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Calhoun, C. (1993). Nationalism and Ethnicity. *Annual Review of Sociology* 19:211-239.

CERD. (2007). *Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination*. Retrieved from http://tb.ohchr.org/default.aspx?ConvType=17&docType=36

CERD. (2012). *Implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination : list of themes to be taken up in connection with the consideration of the 15th to 16th periodic reports of Republic of Korea (CERD/C/KOR/15-16)*. Retrieved from https://www.refworld.org/publisher,CERD,,KOR,506402c12,0.html

Charmaz, K. (2006). *Constructing grounded theory : A practical guide through qualitative analysis.* London: Sage Publications.

Chatterjee, P. (1993). *The nation and its fragments: Colonial and postcolonial histories*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Cheng, S. (2011). Sexual protection, citizenship and nationhood: Prostituted women and migrant wives in South Korea. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *37*(10), 1627-1648.

Cho, S., Crenshaw, K. W., & McCall, L. (2013). Toward a field of intersectionality studies: Theory, applications, and praxis. *Signs*, *38*(4), 785-810.

Choo, H. Y., & Ferree, M. M. (2010). Practicing intersectionality in sociological research: A critical analysis of inclusions, interactions, and institutions in the study of inequalities. *Sociological theory*, *28*(2), 129-149.

Collins, P. H. (1998a). *Fighting Words*. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Collins, P. H. (1998b). It's all in the family: Intersections of gender, race, and nation. *Hypatia*, *13*(3), 62-82.

Collins, P. H. (1999). "Will the Real Mother Please Stand Up?" In A.E. Clarke and V.Olsen. *Revisioning Women, Health and Healing: Feminist, Cultural, and Technoscience Perspectives* (pp.266-282). New York: Routledge.

Collins, P. H. (2000). *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment*. New York: Routledge Press.

Collins, P. H. (2015). Intersectionality's Definitional Dilemmas. *Annual Review Of Sociology*, *41*(1), 1-20.

Collins, P. H. (2016). Toward a new vision: Race, class, and gender as categories of analysis and connection. In M. Adams, W. J. Blumenfeld, R. Castaneda, H.W. Hackman, M.L. Peters & X. Zuniga (Eds.) *Readings for diversity and social justice: An anthology on racism, sexism, heterosexism, albeism, and classism* (pp.457-462). New York: Routledge.

Connell, R. (2007). *Southern theory: The global dynamics of knowledge in social science*. Cambridge: Polity.

Connor, W. (1994). *Ethnonationalism: The quest for understanding*. Princeton University Press.

Constable, N. (1997). *Maid to order in Hong Kong: Stories of Filipina workers*. Cornell University Press.

Constable, N. (Ed.) (2005). *Cross-Border Marriages: Gender and Mobility in Transnational Asia*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Corbin, J. M., & Strauss, A. L. (2008). *Basics of qualitative research : Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory*(3rd ed.). Los Angeles, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Cornell, S., & Hartmann, D. (2007). *Ethnicity and race: Making identities in a changing world.* Sage Publications.

Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color. *Stanford Law Review*, *43*(6), 1241-1299.

Crenshaw, K., Gotanda, N., Peller, G., & Thomas, K. eds. (1996). (Eds.) *Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the Movement*. New York: The New Press.

Dalla Costa, Mariarosa. (2006). "*Women's Autonomy and Remuneration for Care Work in New Emergencies*." Retrieved from http://www.commoner.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/ dallacosta_mexico_paper2.pdf

Darder, A., & Torres, R. D. (2004). *After race: Racism after multiculturalism*. New York: New York University Press.

Davin, D. (2007). Marriage Migration in China and East Asia. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 16(50), 83-95.

Delgado, R., & Stefancic, J. (2017). *Critical Race Theory: An Introduction*. New York: New York University Press.

Dill, B. T., & Zambrana, R. E. (2009). Critical Thinking about Inequality: An Emerging Lens. In *Emerging Intersections: Race, Class, and Gender in Theory, Policy, and Debate* (pp. 1-21). New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Donato, K. M., Gabaccia, D., Holdaway, J., Manalansan, M., & Pessar, P. R. (2006). A Glass Half Full? Gender in Migration Studies1. *International Migration Review*, *40*(1), 3-26.

Em, H. (1999). *Minjok as a Modern and Democratic Construct: Sin Ch'aeho's Historgraphy of Korea*. In Shin, G.W.& Robinson, M. (Eds.) Colonial Modernity in Korea, (pp.336-61). Cambridge, MAL Harvard University Asia Center.

Emerson, R. M., Fretz, R. I., & Shaw, L. L. (1995). *Writing ethnographic fieldnotes*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Faist, T. (2009). Diversity - a new mode of incorporation? *Ethnic And Racial Studies*, *32*(1), 171-190.

Fanon, F. (1963). *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove.

Fields, B. (1990). Slavery, Race, and Ideology in the United States of America. *New Left Review* 181: 95-188.

Foucault, M. (1977). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings by Michel Foucault* , ed. Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon.

Foucault, M., Burchell, G., Gordon, C., & Miller, P. (1991). *The foucault effect : Studies in governmentality : With two lectures by and an interview with michel foucault*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Foucault, M. (1991). “Politics and the study of discourse”. In Foucualt, M. Burchell, G., Gordon, C., & Miller, P. (Eds.) *The Foucault Effect: Studies in governmentality: With two lectures by and an interview with michel foucault*, (Pp. 53-72). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Foucault, M. (2003). *" Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976*. New York: Picador.

Fox, C. (2012). *Three Worlds of Relief: Race, Immigration, and the American Welfare State from the Progressive Era to the New Deal.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Fredrickson, G. M. (2002). *Racism: A Short History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Freeman, G. P. (2004). Immigrant incorporation in Western democracies.*International migration review*, 945-969.

Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Geschiere, P. (2009). *The perils of belonging: autochthony, citizenship, and exclusion in Africa and Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gilroy, P. (1987). "*There ain't no black in the Union Jack": The cultural politics of race and nation*. London: Hutchinson.

Gilroy, P. (2000). *Against race: Imagining political culture beyond the color line*. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Glaser, B. G. (1992). *Basics of grounded theory analysis*. Mill Valley, CA: Sociology Press.

Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). *The discovery of grounded theory : Strategies for qualitative research*. Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co.

Glenn, E. N. (2002). *Unequal Freedom: How Race and Gender Shaped American Citizenship and Labor*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

Goldberg, D. T. (1994). (Ed.) *Multiculturalism : A critical reader*. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers.

Goldberg, D. T. (2002). *The Racial State*. Massachusetts: Blackwell.

Goldberg, D. T., & Giroux, S. S. (2014). *Sites of race: Conversations with Susan Searls Giroux*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Graves, J. L. (2001). *The Emperor's new clothes: Biological theories of race at the millennium*. New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press.

Grillo, R. D., & Pratt, J. C. (2002). *The politics of recognizing difference : Multiculturalism Italian-style*. Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate.

Hall, S., Morley, D., & Chen, K.-H. (1996). *Stuart Hall : Critical dialogues in cultural studies*(Comedia; Comedia). London: Routledge.

Hammersley M. (1990). *Reading Ethnographic Research*. London: Longman.

Han, G. S. (2007). "Multicultural Korea: Celebration or Challenge of Multiethnic Shift in Contemporary Korea." *Korea Journal* 47:32-63.

Han, J. N. (2012). *An imperial path to modernity: Yoshino Sakuzō and a new liberal order in East Asia, 1905-1937*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center.

Hancock, A. M. (2007). When multiplication doesn't equal quick addition: Examining intersectionality as a research paradigm. *Perspectives on politics*, *5*(1), 63-79.

Hanscom, C. Walter K. L., & Youngju R. (eds) (2013). *Imperatives of Culture : Selected essays on korean history, literature, and society from the japanese colonial era* (Korean classics library. historical materials). Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press.

Heng, G., & Devan, J. (1992). "State Fatherhood: The Politics of Nationalism, Sexuality and Race in Singapore." Pp. 343-364 in *Nationalisms and Sexualities*, edited by A. Parker, M. Russo, D. Sommer, and P. Yaeger. New York: Routledge.

Hi Korea (2019). *Immigration Guide –Naturalization (General, Simplified, Special).* Retrieved from https://www.hikorea.go.kr/pt/InfoDetailR_en.pt

Hollifield, J., Martin, P., & Orrenius, P. (2014). *Controlling immigration: A global perspective*. Stanford University Press.

Hong, G.H. (2018). Jeongchaekhyeongseonggwanjeongeul tonghaebon damunwhagajokjiwonbeopeui teukseonggwa hangyee gwanhan yeongu. [The characteristics and limitations of Multicultural Family Support Act through policy formation process]. *Hangukyimihakheo. [Korea International Migration Studies Association Annual Conference]*. 17-40.

Hotta, E. (2007). *Pan-Asianism and japan's war 1931-1945* (1st ed. ed., The palgrave macmillan series in transnational history). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hsia, H. (2004). *Internationalization of capital and the trade in Asian women: the case of "foreign brides" in Taiwan*. In Delia D. Aguilar & Anne E. Lacsamana (Eds.), Women and globalization, 181-229. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books.

Jaggar, A. M. (2008). *Just methods : An interdisciplinary feminist reader.*Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

Jo, J. and Seo, J. (2013). Nuga damunwhasahoereulnoraehaneunga? : Shinjayujueuijeok tongchisulroseoeui hanguk damunwhadamrongwa geu hyogwa [Who Sing the Multicultural Society? : Multiculturalism discourse as a neoliberal tool and its impacts], *Hanguk sahoehak* [*Korean Sociology]*. 47(5):101-137.

Kang, J.G. (2012). "Hanguksaheoeui bandamunwha damron gochal [Anti-multiculturalism discourses in Korean society]". *Yinmungwahak Yeongu [Human Science Research]*. 32: 5-34.

Kasinitz, P., John H. M., Mary C. W. & Holdaway, J. (2008). *Inheriting the City: The Children of Immigrants Come of Age*. Harvard University Press.

Ken, I. (2008). Beyond the intersection: A new culinary metaphor for race-class-gender studies. *Sociological Theory*, *26*(2), 152-172.

Kim, A. E. (2009). Global migration and South Korea: foreign workers, foreign brides and the making of a multicultural society. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*,*32*(1), 70-92.

Kim, C. S. (2011). *Voices of Foreign Brides: The Roots and Development of Multiculturalism in Korea*. AltaMira Press.

Kim, H. M. (2007). "The State and Migrant Women: Diverging Hopes in the Making of 'Multicultural Families' in Contemporary Korea," *Korea Journal* 47:100-22.

Kim, H. M. (2011). The emergence of the 'multicultural family'and genderized citizenship in South Korea. Contested citizenship in East Asia: Developmental politics, national unity, and globalization. 147-160.

Kim, H. M. (2013a). Citizenship projects for marriage migrants in South Korea: intersecting motherhood with ethnicity and class. *Social Politics*, *20*(4), 455-481.

Kim, H. M. (2013b). *The State and Migrant Women.* In Chang, K.S. (Eds.), South Korea in Transition: Politics and Culture of Citizenship. Pp. 147-160. Routeledge.

Kim, H. S. (2008). Gyeolhon yijuyeoseonggwa hangukeui damunwhasahoe sireom: Choigeun damunwhadamroneui sahoeihak [Migrant Brides and Making a Multicultural Society: Sociological Approach to Recent Discourse on 'Multicultural Korea']. *Hanguk sahoehak* [*Korean Sociology]*. 42(2): 36-71.

Kim, H. S. (2014). Gyeolhonyiminyeoseongeui yihongwa damunwha jeongchaek: gwanryojeok hwakjangae ttareun hajokjeongchaekgwa yeoseongjeongchaekeui molyiminjeok, molseongjeok gyeolhap. [Female Marriage Immigrants' Divorce and 'Damunhwa Policy': Immigration- and Gender-Blind Union of Family and Women Policies]. *Hanguk sahoehak* [*Korean Sociology*]. 48 (1): 229-344.
Kim, J. K. (2015). Yellow over black: History of race in Korea and the new study of race and empire. *Critical Sociology*, *41*(2), 205-217.
Kim, J. K. (2011). The politics of culture in multicultural Korea. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *37*(10), 1583-1604.
Kim, M. (2013). Citizenship projects for marriage migrants in South Korea: intersecting motherhood with ethnicity and class. *Social Politics*, *20*(4), 455-481.
Kim, N. (2008). *Imperial citizens: Koreans and race from Seoul to LA*. Stanford University Press.
Kim-Puri, H. J. (2005). "Conceptualizing Gender-Sexuality-State-Nation: An Introduction." *Gender & Society* 19:137-159.
King, D. (2009). *Making Americans: Immigration, race, and the origins of the diverse democracy*. Harvard University Press.
Knapp, G. A. (2005). Race, class, gender reclaiming baggage in fast travelling theories. *European Journal of Women's Studies*, *12*(3), 249-265.
Kofman, E. (1999). Female'birds of passage'a decade later: Gender and immigration in the European Union. *International Migration Review*, 269-299.
Kojima, Y. (2001) 'In the Business of Cultural Reproduction: Theoretical Implications of the Mail-Order Bride Phenomenon', *Women's Studies International Forum*, vol.24, no. 2, pp.199-210.
Koopmans, R., & Statham, P. (Eds.)(2000). *Challenging immigration and ethnic relations politics : Comparative European perspectives.*Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Koopmans, R. (Ed.). (2005). *Contested citizenship: Immigration and cultural diversity in Europe* (Vol. 25). U of Minnesota Press.
Korea Immigration Service Statistics. (2007). *Annual Statistics Report*. Retrieved from http://www.immigration.go.kr
Korea Immigration Service Statistics (2013). *Monthly Statistics Report*. Retrieved from http://www.immigration.go.kr
Korea Immigration Service Statistics (2014). *Annual Statistics Report*. Retrieved from http://www.immigration.go.kr
Korea Immigration Service Statistics (2016). *Annual Statistics Report*. Retrieved from http://www.immigration.go.kr
Korea Immigration Service Statistics (2017). *Annual Statistics Report*. Retrieved from http://www.immigration.go.kr
Korea Immigration Service Statistics (2018). *Annual Statistics Report*. Retrieved from http://www.immigration.go.kr
Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights*(p. 174). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kymlicka, W. (2001). *Politics in the vernacular: Nationalism, multiculturalism, and citizenship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lamont, M., & Molnár, V. (2002). The study of boundaries in the social sciences. *Annual review of sociology*, *28*(1), 167-195.

Lan, Pei-Chia (2008a). Migrant Women's Bodies as Boundary Markers: Reproductive Crisis and Sexual Control in the Ethnic Frontiers of Taiwan. *Signs,* Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 833-861.

Lan, Pei-Cia (2008b). New global politics of reproductive labor: Gendered labor and marriage migration. *Sociology Compass*, 2(6), 1801-1815.

LaRossa, R. (2005). Grounded theory methods and qualitative family research. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 67(4), 837-857.

Lee, H. K. (2006). 'International marriage and the State in South Korea', paper presented at the conference '*International marriage, right and State in Southeast and East Asia*', National University of Singapore, 21-22 September 2006.

Lee, H. K. (2008). International marriage and the state in South Korea: focusing on governmental policy. *Citizenship Studies*, *12*(1), 107-123.

Lee, B. H. (2011). "HangukImingwanryeon jeongchaekeui ipbeopgwajeonge gwanhan yeongu [Research on the Legistlation Process of Immigration Related Policy in Korea]". *Euijeong Yeongu [Parliamentary Politics Research]*, 32: 71–104.

Lee, H. (2012). "Political Economy of Cross-Border Marriage: Economic Development and Social Reproduction in Korea.". *Feminist Economics*, 18(2): 177–200.

Lim, T. (2010). Rethinking belongingness in Korea: Transnational migration,"migrant marriages" and the politics of multiculturalism. *Pacific Affairs*, *83*(1), 51-71.

Lister, R. (2003). *Citizenship: feminist perspectives*. NYU Press.

Lofland, J., Snow, D.A., Anderson, L., & Lofland, L.H. (2006). *Analyzing social settings : A guide to qualitative observation and analysis*(4th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/ThomLearning.

Mahler, S. J., & Pessar, P. R. (2006). Gender Matters: Ethnographers Bring Gender from the Periphery toward the Core of Migration Studies. *International Migration Review*, *40*(1), 27-63.

Modood, T. and Salt, J. (2011). *Global Migration, Ethnicity and Britishness*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Miles, R. & Brown, M. (2003). *Racism*. 2nd edition. London: Routledge.

Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (2012). *National Multicultural Family Survey*. Retrieved from http://www.mogef.go.kr/nw/enw/nw_enw_s001d.do;jsessionid=lWP3-JwtL5ZS5ULrTmq0Rr7k.mogef10?mid=mda700&bbtSn=699108

Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (2015). *National Multicultural Family Survey*. Retrieved from http://www.mogef.go.kr/mp/pcd/mp_pcd_s001d.do;jsessionid=YLSEhMnQ1BRSKGzhxx48Eins.mogef10?mid=plc503&bbtSn=63

Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (2015). *Foreign Residents Statistics*. Retrieved from http://www.mospa.go.kr/frt/bbs/type001/commonSelectBoardArticle.do?bbsId=BBSMSTR_000000000014&nttId=42492

Ministry of Justice (2008). The Basic Plans for the Foreigners (1st). Retrieved from http://archives.go.kr/next/search/showDetailPopup.do?rc_code=1310377&rc_rfile_no=200902592947&rc_ritem_no=000000000001#viewer

Ministry of Justice (2013). *The Basic Plans for the Foreigners (2nd)*. Retrieved from http://overseas.mofa.go.kr/in-mumbai-ko/brd/m_2041/view.do?seq=995825&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWor

d=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=

Ministry of Justice (2018). *National Action Plan for the Promotion and the Protection of Human rights*. Retrieved from http://www.moj.go.kr/

Mohanty, C. T. (2003). *Feminism without borders: Decolonizing theory, practicing solidarity*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Mosse, G. L. (1985). *Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-class Morality and Seual Norms in Modern Europe*. New York: H. Fertig.

Nagel, J. (1998). Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of Nations. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21:242-269.

Nakamatsu, T. (2003). *International marriage through introduction agencies: Social and legal realities of "Asian" wives of Japanese men.* In Piper, N., & Roces, M. (Eds.), Wife or worker? : Asian women and migration (Pp. 181-201). Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

OECD (2018). Fertility rates (indicator). doi: 10.1787/8272fb01-en (Accessed on 04 September 2018)

Omi, M., & Winant, H. (1994). *Racial formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*. New York: Routledge.

Ordover, N. (2003). *American Eugenics: Race, Queer Anatomy, and the Science of Nationalism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Pai, H. I. (2000). *Constructing "Korean" Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-Formation Theories*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Asia Center.

Parekh, B. C. (2000). *Rethinking multiculturalism : Cultural diversity and political theory*.Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Park, N. (2002). Hangukjeok Geundaemandeulgi: Woorisahoeeui injongjueuineun eotteokhae jeongchakdoeetneunga. [*Korean Modern Construction: How did racism originated in Korea?]. Wolgan Inmulgwa Sasang [*Monthly The Person and Theory]. January. 158-172.

Park, K. (2014). Foreigners or multicultural citizens? Press media's construction of immigrants in South Korea. *Ethnic and racial studies*, *37*(9), 1565-1586.

Parreñas, R. (2000). "Migrant Filipina Domestic Workers and the Interna- tional Division of Reproductive Labor." *Gender and Society* 14(4): 560–80.

Parreñas, R. (2001). *Servants of globalization: Women, migration, and domestic work*. Stanford University Press.

Pedraza S. (1991). Women and migration: the social consequences of gender. *Annual Review Of Sociology*, *17*, 303-25.

Però, D., & Solomos, J. (2010). Introduction: Migrant Politics and Mobilization: Exclusion, Engagements, Incorporation. *Ethnic And Racial Studies*, *33*(1), 1-18.

Pessar, P. R., & Mahler, S. J. (2003). Transnational Migration: Bringing Gender In. *International Migration Review*, *37*(3), 812-846.

Pieterse, J. N. (2004). "Ethnicities and Multiculturalisms: Politics of Boundaries." Pp. 27-49 in *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Minority Rights*, edited by S. May, T. Madood, and J. Squires. London: Cambridge University Press.

Poliakov, L. (1974). *The Aryan myth: A history of racist and nationalist ideas in Europe*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers.

Puri, J. (2004). *Encountering Nationalism.* Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing.

Ramos-Zayas. A.Y. (2003). *National Performances, The Politics of Class, Race, and Space in Puerto Rican Chicago*. University of Chicago Press.

Ryan, L., Erel, U., & D'Angelo, A. (2015). *Migrant capital : Networks, identities and strategies*(Migration, diasporas and citizenship; Migration, diasporas and citizenship). Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Saaler, S, & Koschmann, J.V. (2007). *Pan-Asianism in modern Japanese history: colonialism, regionalism and borders*. London: Routledge.

Saldaña, J. (2013). *The coding manual for qualitative researchers* (2nd ed.). Los Angeles i.e. Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications.

Schrover, M., & Schinkel, W. (2013). Introduction: the language of inclusion and exclusion in the context of immigration and integration. *Ethnic And Racial Studies*, *36*(7), 1123-1141.

Seol, D. H. (2006). Women marriage immigrants in Korea: Immigration process and adaptation. In *Asia-Pacific Forum* (Vol. 33, pp. 32-59).

Seol, D. H., & Skrentny, J. D. (2009). Ethnic return migration and hierarchical nationhood: Korean Chinese foreign workers in South Korea. *Ethnicities*, *9*(2), 147-174.

Sharma, A., & Gupta, A. (2006). *The anthropology of the state : A reader* (Blackwell readers in anthropology, 9). Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.

Shin, G. W. (2006). *Ethnic nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, politics, and legacy*. Stanford University Press.

Silliman, J. & Bhattacharjee, A. (2002). *Policing the National Body: Race, Gender, and Criminalization*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.

Singh, N. P. (2004). *Black Is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Solomos, J. & Collins, P. H. (Eds.). (2010). *The Sage handbook of race and ethnic studies*. SAGE Publications.

Statistics Korea (2012). *Vital Statistics of Immigrants in 2011*. Retrieved from http://kostat.go.kr/portal/english/news/1/16/3/index.board?bmode=read&bSeq=&aSeq=273071&pageNo=1&rowNum=10&navCount=10&currPg=&sTarget=title&sTxt=

Statistics Korea (2016). *Multicultural Population Dynamics Statistics*. Retrieved from http://eiec.kdi.re.kr/policy/material/view.jsp?num=170877

Statistics Korea (2017a). *Multicultural Population Dynamics Statistics*. Retrieved from http://www.kostat.go.kr/portal/korea/kor_nw/1/2/1/index.board?bmode=read&aSeq=371776

Statistics Korea (2017b). *Marriage and Divorce Statistics of 2017*. Retrieved from http://kosis.kr

Statistics Korea (2019). *Birth and Death Statistics in 2018*. Retrieved from http://kostat.go.kr/portal/korea/kor_nw/1/2/1/index.board?bmode=read&aSeq=373361

Staunæs, D. (2003). Where have all the subjects gone? Bringing together the concepts of intersectionality and subjectification. *NORA: Nordic journal of women's studies*, *11*(2), 101-110.

Strauss, A. (1987). *Qualitative analysis for social scientists*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Suzuki, N. (2005). *Tripartite desires: Filipina-Japanese marriages and fantasies of transnational traversal*. In Nicole Constable (Ed.). Cross-border marriages: gender and mobility in transnational Asia, 124-144. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Taylor, C. (1994). *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*. Princeton University Press, 41 William St., Princeton, NJ.

Terriquez, V. (2015). Intersectional Mobilization, Social Movement Spillover, and Queer Youth Leadership in the Immigrant Rights Movement. *Social Problems*, *62*(3), 343-362.

The Center for Multicultural Family Support. (2014). *Multicultural Families Policy Evaluation Report*. Retrieved from www.kihf.or.kr

The Center for Multicultural Family Support. (2015). *Multicultural Families Policy Evaluation Report*. Retrieved from www.kihf.or.kr

The Center for Multicultural Family Support. (2016). *Multicultural Families Policy Evaluation Report*. Retrieved from www.kihf.or.kr

Tikhonov, V. M. (2010). *Social Darwinism and nationalism in Korea: The beginnings (1880s-1910s) : "survival" as an ideology of Korean modernity*. Leiden: Brill.

Tomlinson B. (2013). To tell the truth and not get trapped: Desire, distance, and intersectionality at the scene of argument. *Signs*, *38*(4), 993-1017.

Twine, F. W., & Warren, J. W. (Eds.). (2000). *Racing research, researching race : Methodological dilemmas in critical race studies*. New York: New York University Press.

Tyson, K. (Ed.). (2011). *Integration interrupted: Tracking, Black students, and acting White after Brown*. Oxford University Press.

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015). World Population Ageing 2015 (ST/ESA/SER.A/390).

Yoon, I. J. (2008). The Development and Characteristics of Multiculturalism in South Korea: With a Focus on the Relationship of the State and Civil Society *Korean Sociology*. 42(2):72-103. [in Korean]

Yu, S., & Chen, F. (2018). Life Satisfaction of Cross-Border Marriage Migrants in South Korea: Exploring the Social Network Effects. *International Migration Review*, *52*(2), 597–634.

Yuval-Davis, N. (1997). *Gender and Nation*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.

Yuval-Davis, N. (1997). "Women, Citizenship and Difference." *Feminist Review* 57: 4-27.

Yuval-Davis, N. (2003). Nationalist projects and gender relations. *Narodna umjetnost*, *40*(1), 9-36.

Yuval-Davis, N. (2006). Intersectionality and feminist politics. *European Journal of Women's Studies*, *13*(3), 193-209.

Valenzuela, A. (2010). *Subtractive schooling: US-Mexican youth and the politics of caring*. Suny Press.

Vertovec, S., & Wessendorf, S. (2010). "Introduction: Assessing the backlash against multiculturalism in Europe". In *The Multiculturalism Backlash. European Discourses, Policies and Practices* (Ed). S Vertovec, S Wessendorf, pp. 1-32. London; New York: Routledge.

Waters, M. (1999). *Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities.* Russell Sage Foundation and Harvard University Press.

Watson, I. (2012). Paradoxical Multiculturalism in South Korea. *Asian Politics & Policy*, 4(2). 233-258.

Weiss, R. S. (1994). *Learning from strangers : The art and method of qualitative interview studies.*New York: Free Press.

Williams, L. (2010). *Global marriage: cross-border marriage migration in global context*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Wimmer, A. (2008). "The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 113(4):970–1022.

Wimmer, A. (2009). Herder's Heritage and the Boudary-Making Approach: Studying Ethnicity in Immigrant Societies. *Sociological Theory*, 27(3), 244-270.

Winant, H. (2000). Race and Race Theory. *Annual Review of Sociology, 26,*169-440.

Winant, H. (2001). *The World Is a Ghetto: Race and Democracy Since World War II*. New York: Basic Books.

Winker, G., & Degele, N. (2011). Intersectionality as multi-level analysis: Dealing with social inequality. *European Journal of Women's Studies*, *18*(1), 51-66.

Zanoni, P., Janssens, M., Benschop, Y., & Nkomo, S. (2010). Unpacking diversity, grasping inequality: Rethinking difference through critical perspectives. *Organization*, *17*(1), 9-29.