ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND REPRESENTATION:
                             THE EFFECTS OF DISTRICT MAGNITUDE

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        District magnitude (the number of representatives elected from a district)

influences the strategies legislators adopt to build and maintain electoral security. In

comparison to single member districts (SMDs), representatives in multimember districts

(MMDs) compete for votes alongside a large set of candidates, and often share a party

affiliation with other candidates competing for one of many available seats in the same

district. This project sheds new light on the effects of district magnitude on the political

careers of elected representatives and the nature of representation provided by a

legislature. Utilizing a unique data set of campaign and legislative behavior in

conjunction with personal interviews of current state legislators in four states, I find that

those elected in MMDs build and maintain electoral support differently from those in

SMDs. Specifically, I find that district magnitude influences the way candidates interact

on the campaign trail, attention to local governments and organized interests, the degree

to which representatives specialize, and the balance of power in the legislative chamber.

The results have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between

electoral systems and democratic representation, and suggest that many long-standing

assumptions regarding the influence of district magnitude on elite political behavior may

be in need of revision.

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND REPRESENTATION:

THE EFFECTS OF DISTRICT MAGNITUDE

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Table of Contents

Appendix Tables

List of Figures

Chapter 1: Introduction

In November 2010, voters in Vermont's Chittenden County faced a difficult decision. Six state senate seats were up for grabs, and sixteen candidates (six Democrats, six Republicans, and four minor party politicians) appeared on the ballot. The local news network held a debate, but rather than risk crowding the stage and confusing viewers with a single large event, the producers split the candidates into four separate groups and staged separate discussions so that only a few candidates participated at a time (Goodman 2011). In the same election, in Vermont's much smaller neighboring Grand Isle County, State Senator Richard Mazza (D) ran for reelection unopposed for a single seat, appearing alone on the ballot; in comparison to Chittenden, there was little chance for voter confusion.

The procedures used to elect representatives have important and often unforeseen consequences. Electoral systems have been shown to influence the basic functioning of government, altering how politicians campaign for office and represent their constituents (e.g., Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984; Carey and Hix 2011; Riker 1980; Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Snyder and Ueda 2007). The number of representatives elected from a district (the district magnitude) is one of the most important aspects of an electoral system. Although the residents of Chittenden and Grande Isle Counties receive roughly equal numbers of representatives proportionate to population, it is unclear whether they receive the same quality of representation. How does the number of representatives elected from a district (the district magnitude) influence representation? Do six legislators who share a district represent constituents the same as if they were from separate districts?

1

This project addresses these and related questions. In the following chapters, I will add to this dialogue and present new analyses to help improve our understanding of a key aspect of electoral systems. Although scholars have studied the effects of district magnitude for some time, many of the results are seemingly contradictory, and for that reason, the analyses in this study are often presented as a debate among opposing perspectives. I draw on both personal interviews and unique data sets of campaign and legislative behavior of U.S. state legislators elected in both single member districts (SMDs) and multimember districts (MMDs).

This chapter begins with a brief history of MMDs in the U.S. MMDs were the predominant electoral design of the early United States, but most MMDs were replaced by SMDs in the latter half of the 20th century. As the following section describes, mid-20th century scholars and politicians were predominantly opposed to MMDs for a variety of reasons, the most important being the apparent association between district magnitude and suppression of racial and ethnic minorities. However, in recent years, some leading scholars have noted some key advantages multimember district design. For example, John Carey and Simon Hix, two leading comparative political scientists, conclude in a 2011 study,

> With the spread of democracy across the world in the last few decades and with more and more established democracies tinkering with their electoral systems, we can identify a trade-off between inclusive representation of citizens' preferences and accountable government… Practitioners who seek to design an electoral system that maximizes these competing objectives are best served by choosing multimember districts of moderate magnitudes.[1] (2011)

Another recent study notes that the familiar single member district design used to elect members of the U.S. House of Representatives may be more flexible than many assume.

As Snyder and Ueda (2007) note, although single member districts currently dominate the U.S. electoral landscape, change is not impossible.

> Today there are proposals in the U.S. Congress to allow the use of MMDs in congressional elections. Several members of Congress… have supported legislation in recent Congresses that would allow states to use MMDs, proportional voting, instant-runoff voting, and other methods to elect their congressional delegations. So far these proposals have gone nowhere. But someday they might.

One piece of recent congressional legislation Snyder and Ueda reference calls for a commission to study the impact of the electoral procedures used to select members congressional delegations on the quality of representation provided by the U.S. House and Senate, citing, among other electoral procedures, cumulative voting, proportional representation, and multimember districts.[2] With electoral design on the minds of scholars and politicians, and possible change on the horizon, developing a clear understanding of the effects of district magnitude is as important now as it has ever been.

MMDs in the United States

The choice of electoral procedure is perhaps the most important decision faced by an emerging democracy. Prior to the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, the Framers discussed at length the importance of the frequency of elections; the size of the congressional delegation elected from each state; and the overall size of the House and Senate (Hamilton, Jay, and Madison 1788). The size, shape, and number of representatives elected from U.S. House and state legislative districts, however, were in large part absent from the debate. As a result, when the Constitution was ratified, the decision to elect U.S. House of Representatives, state legislators, and local officials from individual SMDs or at-large MMDs was left entirely up to the states.

At the time, all thirteen states chose to elect at least a portion of their representatives to Congress and the state legislature from MMDs (Klain 1955). There is little evidence that the citizens of the newly established states gave the decision to elect representatives from MMDs serious thought. Rather, they adopted the well known "if it isn't broken, don't fix it" approach: MMDs were a historic holdover from England, where two or three members would collectively represent a shire, town, or borough in Parliament. Because additional representatives could be added to an MMD to account for population growth, MMDs were easy to design to respect local political boundaries, a feature that made them a particularly good fit for New England, where the town was considered the fundamental unit of democracy (Klain 1955). Similar to their English counterparts, MMDs in the early states were designed to follow existing geographic and political boundaries. MMDs were the rule and SMDs were the exception among state legislatures in the early 19th century, and they were used to elect members of the House of Representatives until 1967, when Congress eliminated all exceptions to the Apportionment Act of 1842 (Calabrese 2000).

Until the Civil Rights Era, MMDs continued to dominate the American political landscape. The overall number of MMDs in the U.S. declined significantly, however, following the 1965 Voting Rights Act and court decisions that limited population deviations in legislative districts, notably *Baker v. Carr* (1962) and *Reynolds v. Sims* (1964). In 1962, 41 state houses elected at least some representatives from MMDs; by 1980, only 15 continued to do so (Niemi, Jackman, and Winsky 1991). In the courts, several key decisions expressed a clear preference for SMDs over MMDs. The Supreme Court generally regarded MMDs as a districting scheme that diluted minority voting

strength and provided for representatives that were less responsive to constituent concerns, leading many states to abolish MMDs rather than risk court intervention (e.g., *Connor v. Johnson* 1971). States subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act were required to submit reapportionment plans to the Department of Justice; federal officials, citing court decisions that MMDs were used to suppress minority voting rights, compelled most southern state legislatures to convert to SMDs (O'Rourke 1998). Many states were also pressured by the courts to prioritize equal-population districts over the preservation of existing political boundaries, favoring SMDs (O'Rourke 1998).[3]

Political scientists in the mid-20th century weighed in, offering their own analyses and opinions of the effects of district magnitude. In one of the first political science studies of MMDs in the U.S., Klain (1955) speculated that MMD representatives are less likely to be preoccupied with local concerns because they have a weaker personal connection to their home district, and Silva (1964) agreed. Silva (1964) also notes that the movement to convert MMDs to SMDs was driven in part by the belief that MMDs facilitate gerrymandering, although she finds no evidence that gerrymandering is directly related to district magnitude. Hamilton (1967) argued that MMDs increase political parties' control over the nominations process and encourage straight-ticket voting.

In New Hampshire, the debate over district magnitude spilled from the courts into the political arena. Although the general trend among state legislatures during the 20th century was toward SMDs and away from MMDs, following the 2000 redistricting New Hampshire adopted larger MMDs than ever before in the state's history, electing as many as thirteen representatives from a single district. Several members of the state legislature in New Hampshire have expressed their discontent with the new design, arguing that

larger districts make campaigns more expensive and result in unfair advantages for the majority party (Love 2002).

Political goals also motivated representatives and party officials in certain states to change districts from MMDs to SMDs or reduce the size of larger MMDs. Republican state representatives in Ohio, for example, eliminated MMDs in 1960 in Cuyahoga County (which includes the city of Cleveland) because they believed that subdividing urban MMDs would reduce Democratic one-party sweeps in these districts and the overall Democratic seat share in the legislature (O'Rourke 1998; Snyder and Ueda 2007, 657). Subsequently, Ohio Republicans managed to pick up seven of the twenty-three Senate and House seats available in the county in 1966 (Jewell 1969). Moreover, rural legislators from SMDs have complained in the past that legislators from urban MMDs enjoy a disproportionate influence over legislative outcomes. Representatives from rural counties in Florida in the mid-1960s, for example, tried to divide the Dade County MMD (which includes the city of Miami) into several SMDs in an attempt to reduce the collective roll call voting power of the urban MMD representatives (Dauer 1966; Snyder and Ueda 2007).

More recently, some politicians have supported converting MMDs to SMDs out of a concern that MMDs result in greater incentives for corruption and representatives that are less responsive to their constituents. Sponsors of a 2011 bill before the West Virginia Legislature argue that candidates must spend more money to campaign in MMDs, leading to corruption and a bias towards moneyed interests (*H.B. 2367* 2011). The text of the West Virginia bill goes on to argue that SMD representatives tend to be more attentive to constituent concerns than MMD legislators. Party leaders in the New

Hampshire General Court share many of the same concerns, complaining that campaigns in large MMDs will be more expensive and difficult than in smaller SMDs (Love 2002). However, political scientists argue that low-magnitude MMDs provide several normative advantages over SMDs because they offer more viable alternatives to voters and represent more diverse interests in the legislature (e.g. Schiller 2000; Carey and Hix 2011). Some voting rights activists also contend that MMDs allow legislatures to represent more "natural" constituencies based on existing political boundaries (such as cities or counties) rather than have their constituency defined for them by the redistricting process (Novoselic and Richie 2011).

As of 2012, 10 states elect at least some members of the state legislature from MMDs, and at-large MMDs continue to be the predominant method used to elect officials in U.S. municipal government (Snyder and Ueda 2007, 667).[4] States that currently elect at least some representatives from MMDs can be divided into two categories. Pure MMD legislatures elect all members in a chamber from MMDs; the contemporary pure MMD states are Arizona, North Dakota, South Dakota, and New Jersey. Each of the pure MMD states elects two members from each district to the lower chamber of the legislature, and one member from each district to the upper chamber. Mixed MMD systems elect only some members in one or both chambers from MMDs, and district magnitudes vary. The mixed MMD legislature with the most variance in district magnitude within a single chamber is the New Hampshire General Court, where districts in the lower chamber range from 1 to 13 members. District magnitudes in the other mixed MMD legislatures are smaller; among districts in lower chambers of the state legislature, Maryland's range from 1 to 3 members, Vermont's from 1 to 2, and West Virginia's from 1 to 7. Vermont's

upper chamber is comprised of districts of magnitudes 1, 2, 3, and 6. All current MMD

elections in U.S. state legislatures allow for partial abstention, meaning that voters may

choose to cast as many or fewer votes as there are seats in the district.

Table 1-1: State Legislative Chambers Electing Members from Multimember Districts, 2012

	Chamber	District Magnitudes
Pure MMD Chambers		
Arizona	Lower	2
New Jersey	Lower	2
North Dakota	Lower	2
South Dakota	Lower	2
Mixed MMD Chambers		
Maryland	Lower	1 to 3
Vermont	Lower and Upper	1, 2, 3, or 6
New Hampshire	Lower	1 to 11
West Virginia	Lower	1 to 7
Seat Designate Chambers		
Idaho	Lower and Upper	2
Washington	Lower	2

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL).

Notes: Pure MMD chambers elect all members from MMDs. Mixed MMD chambers elect a portion of members from MMDs and a portion from SMDs. Seat designate chambers allow candidates to run for a single designated seat within the district. Voters in Pure and Mixed MMD state are allowed to vote for as many candidates as there are seats available. Voters in Seat Designate states cast only one vote for a single candidate, depending on where they live in the district.

Idaho and Washington also elect multiple members from certain districts, but

rather than conducting a single at large election for each MMD, these states require

candidates to run for a specific seat within the district. Contests in these types of districts,

known as "seat designate," more closely approximate a series of SMD elections because

candidates run for only one available seat and voters cast only one vote for each available

seat. For this reason these states are typically excluded from studies that analyze the effects of district magnitude.

Contemporary state legislatures that use MMDs are typically designed to maintain a specific political and geographic constituency while providing roughly equal population representation. States that currently elect all or some members in a chamber from MMDs often use this districting design because the constitutions of these states require district maps to maintain existing political boundaries. In mixed MMD legislatures (those that elect members from both SMDs and MMDs), such as Maryland and West Virginia, apportionment schemes are required to maintain county lines wherever possible. In some systems that elect all members in one chamber from MMDs, such as Arizona and New Jersey, house districts are congruent with senate districts, and all house districts elect the same number of representatives.

MMDs are also the most common districting design for city governments in the U.S. (the two most common forms of city government in the U.S. are at-large MMDs, electing all representatives from a single district, and mixed MMD systems, electing representatives from both MMDs and SMDs) (Snyder and Ueda 2007, 667). Many special governments, such as school boards, also elect members from MMDs; for example, in Maryland, members of seven county school boards are elected at-large.[5]

Project overview

The goal of this project is to improve our understanding of the effects district, and apply those findings to a broad variety of electoral and legislative settings. With this in mind, I conducted interviews with 25 elected officials in Maryland, Vermont, Arizona, and New Jersey. These states were chosen not only because they elect at least some state

legislators from MMDs, but also because they are diverse in terms of political competition and the rules that govern campaigning and legislating. In terms of political competition, a recently compiled study places Maryland and Arizona consistently on the less competitive side of the scale, rating 31 and 33.9 on a scale ranging to 57, whereas Vermont and New Jersey are more competitive, rating 49.2 and 51.8, respectively (Holbrook and Dunk 1993). [6]

The laws that govern campaigns and elections in these states are also representative of many states in the U.S. They are similar to most states in that they limit contributions to candidates for the state legislature. Maryland, Vermont and New Jersey each place limits on the total contributions from individual contributors, businesses, and political action committees (PAC) to candidates that are close to the national average for all states. Arizona's campaign finance regulations are more strict than most; contributions limits for individuals, businesses, and PACs are much lower in Arizona than other states, and contributions from unions and corporations to candidates for the state legislature are prohibited entirely.

Institutional rules and procedures also influence legislators' ability to produce legislation. Among the most influential rules are mandated session limits and legislative professionalism. Session limits determine the overall amount of time that legislators have to develop and pass legislation. Professionalism is commonly measured using the Squire Index (Squire 2007) that takes into account session length but also factors in the legislator's salaries, as well as staff and resources. Representatives in less professional legislatures with session limits face greater time and resource constraints and may be more likely to collaborate with district mates (i.e., representatives who share a district) to

overcome these constraints. Arizona and Maryland place mandated limits on the length of

the legislative session, whereas Vermont and New Jersey have no session limits. Arizona

and New Jersey are typically classified as more professional legislatures, ranking

eleventh and ninth out of the fifty states, respectively. Maryland and Vermont are

moderately professional, ranking eighteenth and twenty-eighth, respectively. Term limits

can also influence how politicians build electoral coalitions. If a member is term limited,

they may face an incentive to build a broader constituency base if they hope to move up

to a state-level position, for example. Among these states, Arizona alone imposes term

limits on state legislators (set at 8 years).

This project explores the influence of district magnitude on both campaign and

legislative behavior. Not all state legislative chambers are well suited for all analyses;

therefore, I draw upon data from different sets of states throughout. The first analysis

evaluates the influence of district magnitude on the competitive environment and

campaign strategy. For the campaign analysis, I utilize election returns from the

Maryland House of Delegates, the Vermont State House, and the New Jersey General

Assembly. Maryland and Vermont were chosen because they are two of only a handful of

states that elect members from both SMDs and MMDs, allowing for direct comparisons

between MMD and SMD candidates serving in the same chamber. New Jersey is also

included in the campaign analysis because elections for the New Jersey state house are

held in odd years, allowing for an analysis of campaign dynamics in MMD elections that

do not appear on the ballot at the same time as more high-profile contests.

Another set of analyses explores the effects of district magnitude on legislative

behavior and representation. For these, I again rely on data from the Maryland and

Vermont state houses, but conduct statistical analyses on the Arizona State House instead of the New Jersey General Assembly. Arizona provides an opportunity to examine the impact of sharing an MMD with a member of the same or a different party; typically, only members of the same party share MMDs in New Jersey (from 2007 to 2010, for example, only one of the forty New Jersey General Assembly districts elected members from opposing parties).[7] What is more, the party in control of the legislature may influence how district mates work together. The Democrats have typically been in the majority in the Maryland, Vermont, and New Jersey state legislatures; Arizona allows for an examination of the influence of MMDs on legislative behavior in a Republican-dominated chamber.

Chapter Overview

A diverse literature already describes many facets of the relationship between district magnitude and representation. Chapter 2 describes the predominant theories and unsettled debates in detail. The discussion focuses primarily on the political calculus from the MMD candidate and legislator's perspective. How does a politician build a career differently in an MMD than an SMD, and what does this mean for representation? The chapter concludes with a list of general expectations to be addressed in later chapters.

The first step in a hopeful politician's career is to run for office; campaigns, therefore, are a natural starting point for the analysis of district magnitude. Chapter 3 begins the analysis with a study of the effects of district magnitude on campaigns and elections, with a particular focus on the interaction between candidates competing for the same office in the same district. As the example that begins this chapter suggests, candidates in MMDs face a crowded field politicians competing for multiple seats. These

fellow politicians are often potential allies; for example, groups of same-party MMD candidates may have a significant advantage because they are able to coordinate their campaign efforts and share electoral support.

The empirical analysis in Chapter 3 draws upon general election returns from Maryland, Vermont, and New Jersey. The timing of elections in these states provides a propitious opportunity to examine MMD electoral dynamics in different electoral environments. Holding elections in odd or even years and during midterm versus presidential election years changes the number of high-profile national races on the ballot, resulting in a different political environment and voting population on Election Day. Vermont holds elections for the MMD state house every two even-numbered years; recall that the New Jersey General Assembly also holds elections every two years, but in odd years. Maryland holds elections for the General Assembly every four years, coinciding with the Congressional mid-term elections.

Chapters 4 and 5 consider the effects of district magnitude on agenda setting and the representation of constituent interests. Earlier studies (e.g., Klain 1955; Silva 1964) speculate that greater district magnitudes weaken the link between representatives and their home districts, reducing the effort legislators put in to representing local concerns. Chapter 4 draws upon a unique data set of legislative sponsorships and cosponsorships in Maryland, Vermont, and Arizona to evaluate the relationship between district magnitude and attention to local issues. These three states provide an opportunity to examine both the effects of district magnitude, as well as the influence of sharing an MMD with a copartisan or a member of an opposing party.[8] Chapter 5 delves more deeply into the relationships between representatives who share an MMD. Building upon earlier studies

that find that MMD representatives seek to build careers that are unique from their district-mates (e.g., Schiller 2000), this chapter draws upon the same data set of bill introductions and cosponsorships to analyze the extent to which district magnitude influences the issues representatives address as they introduce and cosponsor legislation.

Chapter 6 explores the influence of district magnitude on legislative influence and productivity. Because MMDs present an opportunity for legislators who share a district to ally with one another and rely on their district mates for help to draft and promote legislation, district magnitude may alter agenda setting and the balance of power. Similar to chapters 4 and 5, I draw upon the data set of legislative actions in Maryland, Vermont, and Arizona, to take advantage of the variation in the number of copartisans with which a legislator shares an MMD, and exclude New Jersey. The results suggest that MMD representatives are able to rely on powerful district mates to enhance their influence over the agenda and policy outcomes.

The final chapter reviews the findings from a broad perspective. I consider the implications for constituents currently represented by MMD delegations, and whether they receive the same quality of representation as those represented by a single SMD representative. Finally, I speculate about what changes from MMDs to SMDs (or vice versa) may mean for representation in the future, and the effects of district magnitude on the quality of representation provided by state legislatures that elect members from both SMDs and MMDs.

Chapter 2: Elections, Representation, and District Magnitude

Electoral rules and procedures are important to democratic representation; among other things, they affect how elected officials campaign for office, interact with constituents, and craft policy (e.g., Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Pitkin 1967; Riker 1980; Shepsle and Weingast 1994). However, our understanding of contemporary campaigns and representation in the U.S. is dominated by a focus on the single-member district. One of the most widely recognized scholars of legislative behavior, Richard Fenno (1978), notes that a typical member of Congress spends a great deal of time interacting with his geographic constituency, and carefully crafts a "home style," or the way he interacts with constituents and presents himself as their representative in the House. What if the geographic constituency is shared among several legislators serving in the same chamber? How well does our understanding of legislative elections and representation, which are largely based on SMDs, apply to MMDs?

From the politician's perspective, building a career in a multimember district is significantly different from in a single-member district. Recent studies show that district magnitude encourages candidates to coordinate on the campaign trail (Carey and Hix 2011; Carey and Shugart 1995; Crisp, Jensen, and Shomer 2007; Zittel and Gschwend 2008); alters the types of groups and individuals that make up candidate electoral coalitions (Gerber, Morton, and Rietz 1998; Jewell 1982; Trounstine and Valdini 2008); and influences legislative responsiveness and attention to issues (Bertelli and Richardson 2008; Cox 1990; Myerson 1993).

MMD elections present unique challenges and opportunities for candidates. Politicians in MMDs appear on the ballot among a larger field of candidates than those in

SMDs, and elected officials represent a constituency as a member of a delegation. The crowded field contains both potential allies and adversaries, and the way district mates interact influences campaigns and legislation. How is substantive representation influenced by district magnitude? How do elected officials behave in MMDs? What effect does it have on the common election-motivated activities, such as credit claiming, advertising, and position-taking (Mayhew 1974b)?

Drawing on examples from the literature and conversations with contemporary elected officials, this chapter describes the strategies career-motivated politicians adopt to cope with these unique circumstances, both when they are on the campaign trail and in office, and lays out expectations that will serve as the bases for subsequent analyses. The first section discusses the relationship between district magnitude and campaigns and elections, and shows that, because MMDs place unique demands on candidates, they may have a strong incentive to collaborate on the campaign trail. A related implication is that MMDs may advantage those who share a district with more experienced or better-known candidates. The sections that follow consider the effects of district magnitude on agenda setting and policy output, and how these might impact representation.

Campaigns and Multimember Districts

The electoral environment in an MMD is different from the now more common SMD from the perspective of both voters and candidates. In an SMD election, voters face the challenging task of gathering enough information about the candidates to make an informed decision. Ballots in MMDs are longer and more confusing; the section that lists MMD candidates contains a different set of instructions than the rest of the ballot, asking voters to cast "up to" a certain amount of votes, rather than the familiar single vote

(Niemi and Herrnson 2003). Voters in MMD elections, therefore, must learn about a broader range of candidates to become fully informed.

When there are a large number of candidates, voters tend to rely more heavily on cues such as the party affiliation as information shortcuts to learn about the candidates (Downs 1957; Lupia 1994). MMD general elections are similar to SMD primary elections because multiple same-party candidates often compete for the same office, meaning that voters are not able to rely on party to distinguish between all candidates. This requires them to rely more heavily on personal information about the candidates to make their vote choice (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Carey and Shugart 1995). Voters in MMDs, for example, often select candidates from different parties, responding to the individual characteristics of candidates rather than their party affiliation (Niemi, Jackman, and Winsky 1991).

From the candidate and campaign manager's perspective, multimember districts present a number of challenges. They contain larger populations than single member districts, which may make it more difficult to reach enough potential voters to win election. Three member districts in the Maryland House of Delegates, for example, contain an average of over 111,000 constituents, compared to only 38,000 in single member districts.[1] Another challenge is to raise campaign funds among a set of same-party candidates; in larger MMDs, more candidates compete for campaign resources (Curry, Herrnson, and Taylor 2013). MMD candidates have a more difficult time raising campaign funds than those in SMDs, forcing them to be more entrepreneurial in their efforts to raise money. In Maryland, for example, candidates competing in MMDs raise fewer funds on average than those running in SMDs (Curry, Herrnson, and Taylor 2013).

How do candidates adapt to these challenges? In an attempt to reach more people within a larger geographic constituency, candidates in MMDs tend to focus more on the concerns of organized interests compared to those competing in SMDs, spending more of their time attending organized events as opposed to going door to door (Jewell 1982). To raise campaign funds, MMD candidates raise more funds from out of state than those in SMDs, and receive contributions from more diverse sets of organized interests (Curry, Herrnson, and Taylor 2013). The scarcity of campaign funds may even encourage MMD candidates to operate outside the law; internationally, MMD candidates are more likely than those in SMDs to turn to corruption (Chang and Golden 2007).

Coordination among candidates competing in the same district is also an essential component of many MMD campaigns. Legislative candidates frequently coordinate with other candidates and political groups such as party organizations, political action committees (PACs), and legislative campaign committees (LCCs) (Gierzynski 1992; Shea 1995). Groups of same-party officials represent the same constituents, providing them with a unique opportunity to run a coordinated campaign. Although little research has been devoted to studying collaboration among district mates, preliminary interviews conducted for this study indicate that many coordinate in a number of ways. They form joint campaign committees to combine finances and share costs; they coordinate campaign visits and promote other team members at events; and they distribute joint campaign materials, such as door knockers and mailers to promote each member of the team. These efforts may impart an advantage on those who coordinate, helping them to ward off challengers and reduce the cost of campaigning. MMD statehouse candidates often share campaign costs, and some create formal joint campaign committees to raise

and spend money on behalf of all of the same-party members of the home district. Joint committees host fundraisers, and design and distribute joint campaign material such as mailers and door hangers. By combining their resources, they reach many more recipients than the typical candidate campaign. MMD candidates for the Maryland House of Delegates and New Jersey General Assembly often combine finances during the electoral cycle, particularly when faced with multiple challengers.[2]

For example, during the 2010 election cycle, the Democratic delegates seeking reelection in Maryland's three-member district 21 formed a joint campaign committee, known in the state as a "slate," together contributing over $96,000 from their candidate accounts and raising another $68,000 from individual contributors, PACs, businesses, and other Maryland slates to fund the "Team 21 Slate." In the months before Election Day, the Team 21 spent over $68,000 on printing and other campaign materials and another $33,000 on direct mail to promote the 21st district Democrats.[3] The coordinated effort contributed to Team 21's decisive victory over three Republican challengers. As a member of another district slate organized among the District 15 Democrats, Delegate Brian Feldman (D-MD) believes that MMDs enhance the incumbency advantage because of the opportunity to conduct coordinated, or "team," campaigns.

> I think candidates that tend to work together like that have an advantage for various reasons. First of all, the amount of money you would need to raise is reduced. You can do your own individual literature and things of that nature, but if you do that in conjunction with or you do that as a team with the slate, it significantly reduces the amount of money that you need...[4]

On the campaign trail, candidates advertise themselves to potential voters, highlighting their personality, background, and accomplishments (Mayhew 1974b). Advertising may work differently in MMDs than SMDs. MMD candidates spend

proportionally more time visiting and communicating with organized interests than those running in SMDs (Jewell 1982). The time spent with interest groups may encourage MMD candidates to spend more time focusing on the issues championed by these organized groups than those in SMDs. For example, in a recent survey, 87.5 percent of candidates competing for the Arizona House of Representatives, composed entirely of two-member MMDs, responded that their issue positions were a major focus of their campaign, compared to only 44.4 percent competing for a seat in the Arizona Senate, composed entirely of SMDs.[5]

MMD candidates coordinate to extend the reach of their advertising efforts; they often divide up the issues that matter to the constituency, and one member of the delegation then serves as the "lead" on that issue, attending to the public concerns and events. Two incentives encourage MMD candidates to coordinate campaign visits: the need to build a personal reputation and appear unique from one's district-mates, and the need to extend name recognition and build support across a larger and often more diverse constituency. Those who coordinate with other district representatives enjoy an advantage in this regard. By dividing up visits with interest groups with the other members of the coordinated campaign, they are able to build a personal reputation and extend support to a broader range of interests through their district allies (Ames 1995b; Carey and Shugart 1995). Coordinated campaign visits are particularly common in the New Jersey's two-member General Assembly districts, where incumbents frequently divide up campaign visits and extend their collective influence across the district. Assemblyman Gary Chiusano, for example, describes the advantage of working as a team on the campaign trail.

> Oftentimes we divide and conquer. Oftentimes there are three county fairs a weekend, and some nights there are so many events we say you know, you go to that one, I'm going to this one, and we all say we're here to represent my colleague as well.[6]

MMD teams are likely to form early in the election cycle, and candidates often begin to coordinate during the primary election. As I describe in the following chapter, when an MMD incumbent retires or decides to run for another office, the remaining team member(s) often decide to select a candidate to fill the open seat. There are a number of advantages to this strategy. Because a large field of candidates competes for several available seats, challengers may have an easier time picking off weak incumbents during the nominations process (Cox and Morgenstern 1995). An open seat draws even more hopeful challengers. Therefore, by coordinating and forming a team early in the election process, MMD incumbents may be able to reduce this vulnerability by discouraging potential challengers. Early coordination also allows them to get a head start on coordinated campaign visits and fundraising.

MMDs, and the coordinated campaigns they encourage, may also make it easier for one party to dominate an MMD because same-party candidates may be more likely to work together. Longer ballots may encourage voters to vote a straight party line, or assume that same-party candidates are "teamed up," making them more likely to support all members of the same party (Hamilton 1967). This expectation, however, is open to challenge. Party dominance of MMDs may be influenced by the political culture, history, and party organization of each particular state. Districts that elect members from both parties were quite common among state legislative MMDs in the 1980s, but some states were home to far more one-party MMDs than others (Niemi, Hill, and Grofman 1985).

New Jersey, for example, is home to an MMD state legislature that consistently elects district delegations composed of members from the same political party. Following the 2009 elections, for example, thirty-nine of the forty New Jersey General Assembly MMDs elected assemblymen from the same party. District dominance, however, may be unique to New Jersey, which elects members of the state house in odd years. In Vermont, Maryland, and Arizona, for example, members of different parties more frequently share MMDs. Following the 2010 elections, for example, members of the same party represented only twenty-six of the forty-two Vermont statehouse two-member districts.

Are career politicians able to overcome the challenges associated with campaigning in an MMD and build sufficient electoral security? The evidence is mixed. Because MMD legislators don't have a monopoly over the distribution of district and constituent services, they tend to have fewer opportunities to perform constituent casework and extend name recognition, which may reduce the incumbency advantage (Cox and Morgenstern 1995). Indeed, incumbents are slightly less likely to win reelection in states that use MMDs compared to those that elect representatives exclusively from SMDs (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000). When comparing MMD and SMD candidates that share a state, Hirano and Snyder (2009) find that the sophomore surge tends to be larger among those elected from MMDs. These findings suggest that MMD candidates may have found a way to increase their electoral security beyond that of comparable SMD candidates, possibly through teamwork. An international study of Colombian senate candidates (elected from one national at-large district), for example, found that candidates coordinated in an explicit attempt to "protect their joint (electoral) survival" (Crisp and Desposato 2004, 152). To improve our understanding of the competitive

environment of the MMD, Chapter 3 will analyze the prevalence and advantages gained by coordination among MMD candidates.

District Magnitude and Representation

What is representation? Representatives both "stand for" and "act for" their constituents (often referred to as "descriptive" and "substantive" representation, respectively) (Pitkin 1967). MMDs were controversial during the mid to late 20th century largely because of a concern that they limited descriptive representation by preventing racial and ethnic minorities from winning office. The general scholarly consensus is that minority representation in state legislatures improved following the switch from MMDs to SMDs in the South (Bullock and Gaddie 1993; Grofman and Handley 1991); however, it is not clear whether district magnitude itself reduces minority representation, rather than other factors such as gerrymandering (e.g., Richardson Jr. and Cooper 2003). In her seminal study of representation, Pitkin (1967) argues that constituents should be more concerned with substantive representation because the most important quality of a representative is that they act in the interest of their constituents. What is the effect of district magnitude on substantive representation? Do MMD representatives "act for" their constituents differently from those in SMDs?

When elected officials participate in the activities commonly associated with representation, such as drafting legislation, visiting constituents, and participating in roll call votes, many are working to prepare themselves for reelection. Because the electoral environment of MMDs changes how legislators run for reelection, it also changes how they use their time in office to maintain support. District magnitude, therefore, may influence many of the activities we commonly associate with legislative career building,

including advertising, position taking, and credit claiming (Arnold 1990; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1979, 1987; Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974b).

MMDs create a number of challenges for representatives, meaning that coordination is as important in office as it is on the campaign trail. Because the larger constituencies of MMDs tend to have more diverse interests and place greater demands on legislators, district mates may coordinate to meet their demands. Time and resource constraints also encourage coordination, particularly among less professional state legislatures; many state legislators must operate with only one or two full time staff members, and legislative sessions in 39 states (and 9 of the 11 states with MMDs) are time-limited, reducing the amount of time they have to introduce, promote, and vote on legislation (National Conference of State Legislatures 2010).

State legislators elected from MMDs may coordinate in two ways: first, they may have an incentive to work together to accomplish specific goals for local interests, such as securing funding for a project; second, previous studies suggest that they divide up salient issues and develop their own areas of expertise, relying on their district-mates to cover some of the issues outside of their specialty (Jung, Kenny, and Lott 1994; Schiller 2000). Coordination on the campaign trail may encourage teamwork in office. District mates who coordinated on the campaign trail and worked together during prior sessions may have developed bonds of trust and respect that encourage them to draft legislation together or consult one another, particularly on controversial or close votes (Kingdon 1989, 88).

Several institutional and political factors have been shown to influence legislator's tendency to focus on local or national issues. For example, state legislators in

one party states, those who draw larger salaries, and those who represent districts that cover smaller geographic areas tend to focus on particularistic at the expense of statewide policies (Gamm and Kousser 2010). Another institutional factor that may influence the legislator's attention to local issues is the interaction between state legislators and the governor. States that grant more budgetary authority to the governor, for example, tend to focus more on statewide policy than local concerns (Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003), and legislative sponsorships may be influenced by whether the legislator shares the party of the governor. Other factors, such as political history and culture, are difficult to account for when comparing legislators across states.

Earlier studies predicted that representatives in larger magnitude districts would pay less attention to the needs and concerns of their local constituents than those in SMDs. These studies painted single member district representatives as over-attentive to the needs of their districts at the expense of the needs of the state or nation (Duverger 1951; Hamilton 1967; Klain 1955). This is open to challenge because, as later scholars point out, local issues present an excellent opportunity for MMD representatives to coordinate. Securing local funding is an essential part of the reelection strategy; it builds and reinforces ties to the personal electoral coalition, and it creates opportunities for legislators to claim credit (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984; Ferejohn 1974; Lancaster 1986). MMDs are more likely to follow city or county political boundaries. Municipal or county level interests, therefore, often align well with the MMD representative's geographic constituency, encouraging him or her to work for local interests (Jewell 1982, 131). By working together, district teams are able to secure more benefits for their constituents and claim credit for more accomplishments during the next election. Studies

that compare resource distribution find that sharing a constituency actually encourages them to work together to cosponsor and promote legislation requesting funding for local projects (Kirkland 2012). Representatives in MMD legislatures spend more time drafting and supporting distributive policies that benefit distinct minority groups within the constituency, and a larger percentage of bills introduced in MMD compared to SMD legislatures concern locally-oriented pork barrel projects (Ames 1995a; Carey and Shugart 1995; Cox 1990; Myerson 1993). What is more, larger district magnitudes in open-list proportional representation (PR) systems tend to encourage candidates to rely more heavily on the personal vote to win reelection (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Carey and Shugart 1995), encouraging candidates to build and advertise a list of personal accomplishments that are salient to district voters.

The evidence so far supports the perspective adopted by more recent studies of MMDs. Because representatives coordinate to demand and receive more local funding, MMD legislatures on average distribute more money overall than those elected by SMDs, and constituents received more funding when represented by MMDs than SMDs (Edwards and Thames 2007). Metropolitan areas in Florida, for example, received more local funding when represented by an MMD state legislative district than when divided into sets of SMDs (Dauer 1966), and counties that switched from MMD to SMD statehouse representation from 1968 to 1989 on average received a higher percentage of state funds prior to the switch (Snyder and Ueda 2007). Constituents represented by MMDs also benefit. MMD representatives that collaborate accomplish more, creating more credit claiming opportunities for themselves and bringing home more resources to their district (Kirkland 2012).

Particularly at the state and local level, the needs of the home district often transcend party lines, and may even compel some unexpected alliances; in the Vermont House of Representatives, for example, members of opposing parties who share an MMD often have a standing agreement to cooperate on issues or projects that concern the home district. Republican Representative Anne Donahue, for example, shares a district with Democratic Representative Maxine Grad. The district mates almost never coordinate on the campaign trail, and rarely do they agree on issues that come before the House. However, when it comes to advocating for local concerns, Donahue says,

> Putting aside the campaign issue, we from the very beginning said that we wanted to work together when there are local district issues. So you know, everything else, we're on totally different wavelengths. But when its local issues, we will sometimes, if a question comes to just one of us, we will flip it over to the other if that's more their area of expertise, and vice versa. Or it's somebody that, I might happen to be really backed up with stuff at the time, and I'll ask [Representative] Maxine [Grad], is this something that you will cover?[7]

Roll-call voting records also suggest that district-mates coordinate in office. When MMDs were converted to SMDs in the Ohio General Assembly, for example, roll-call voting cohesion among representatives from the same city or county dropped substantially (Jewell 1969); following a similar change, cohesion among representatives from county delegations in Texas and South Carolina also declined (Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson 1981). The subject matter of the legislation, however, may affect whether district mates choose to vote the same way. Local issues in particular are often likely to inspire district delegations to vote in harmony. U.S. Senators from the same state sometimes vote differently in an effort to distinguish themselves from one another (Jung, Kenny, and Lott 1994); however, according to roll-call data from 1991 and 1992, U.S. senators who represent the same state (including those from different political parties)

voted in agreement on 81 percent of distributive bills that stood to benefit their home state (Schiller 2000, 41).

The more legislators cosponsor and promote a bill, the greater its chance of success (Browne 1985). Just as teamwork may advantage candidates on the campaign trail, coordination may help elected officials achieve their goals in office. Hence, legislators who coordinate with their district mates may be able to accomplish more during a short session, and they may be able to wield greater influence over the legislative process and claim credit for more accomplishments. Working together may also provide electoral benefits. By voting as a bloc, MMD representatives magnify their bargaining power and are better able to advocate (and claim credit) for local projects (Snyder and Ueda 2007). Voting with their district-mates also allows legislators from MMDs to better explain their votes to constituents. Members of Congress, for example, avoid being singled out for public embarrassment by voting the same as their colleagues from the state delegation (Kingdon 1989, 89). The ability of the MMD representative to use their the decisions of their district mates as an explanation for unpopular votes may be one explanation for their enhanced ability to act as trustees as opposed to delegates (Cooper and Richardson 2006; Scholl 1986).

Maintaining Personal Reputations

Coordination brings risks as well as rewards. Working together as a team may put representatives in a precarious situation should one or more members decide to retire or pursue a run for higher office, if redistricting breaks up the team, or if a successful primary challenger manages to win the nomination over an incumbent. Working together makes it more difficult for legislators to distinguish themselves and takes time away from

developing individual accomplishments, which may put them at a disadvantage in a contest without their traditional allies.

Additionally, the more representatives claim credit for the same accomplishments, the more the electoral benefit for the individual team member is diluted. Some point out that MMDs present a dilemma because they encourage district-mates to free-ride, sharing in the benefit of legislation but contributing little to the legislative effort (Ashworth and Bueno De Mesquita 2006; Schiller 2000). Furthermore, when a bill contains one or more cosponsors, the benefits (the right to claim credit) are divided up between cosponsors, reducing the benefit earned by the primary sponsor (Ashworth and Bueno De Mesquita 2006). A large number of legislators free-riding on the efforts of their colleagues reduces the incentive to spend time and resources drafting and introducing legislation, and may inhibit overall policy output and legislative responsiveness (Ashworth and Bueno De Mesquita 2006). Because credit for local projects is shared among the members of the delegation, representatives in MMDs have an incentive to free ride on the efforts of their district-mates, rather than contribute to the effort to secure pork (Ashworth and Bueno De Mesquita 2006; Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005). Legislators that work together on local projects, therefore, risk devoting a significant amount of time to a project and receiving only a small share of the benefit.

Whether free-riding means that district magnitude truly discourages legislative production, however, is open to challenge, because those who coordinate may avoid the free-riding dilemma by "paying back" their colleagues. They may coordinate by drafting their own legislation and offering to include the rest of the delegation as cosponsors. They rely on their district mates in the long term, and they can punish free-riders by

withholding support in the future, either by refusing to share information or advice, or refusing to promote them on the campaign trail. Recall that bills that concern a large segment of the constituency, such as those that bring resources to the home district, are likely encourage coordination and draw cosponsorships from multiple district mates.

Although coordination imparts a number of advantages, it also means that teammates are dependent upon one another for electoral survival. Legislators often retire, decide to run for higher office, or are forced to resign. Redistricting can change the district magnitude, forcing candidates to quickly adapt to a very different competitive environment. Incumbents who rely on a district team are particularly vulnerable to these changes. Former team members are not as well rounded as members with experience representing a district alone, and do not have the same electoral support without their teammates. For example, when the Florida House of Representatives converted all MMDs to SMDs in 1982, Representative Charlie Hall (D), representing Dade County, enjoyed widespread support as a labor leader, but did not work with many of the other diverse interests in the newly drawn SMD. As former Florida Representative Arthur Simon, the challenger who unseated Hall, describes, Hall lost his seat in large part because he did not spend enough time developing personal support within the constituency to compete effectively in a SMD.

> He was a labor leader…The major thing that was different is as a labor leader most of his support came from organized labor, and in the democratic primary that's important, and they could turn out a lot of people over a broad area to help in campaigning. But in the immediate area, the single member district, more grassroots campaigning from people who were active in homeowners associations and more community based associations became increasingly important.[8]

As a member of a MMD team, the incumbent relied on his teammates for support, and in return he supported the team effort with campaign volunteers through his

connections to organized labor; when forced to campaign alone, however, he had not

built a personal record based on issues that mattered to a large segment of the

constituency, or developed grassroots support among community organizations. Although

an experienced legislator, the incumbent was unable to win reelection in the newly drawn

SMD. Simon, on the other hand, enjoyed support from community organizations in the

district because of his past work with homeowners associations and other local groups,

and was in a better position to compete effectively in an SMD.

MMD representatives reduce their dependence on their district mates and

maintain long-term electoral security by building and maintaining the "personal vote,"

defined as the support a candidate derives from his or her own personal characteristics or

record (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987, 4-9). Electoral rules and procedures influence

the strategies candidates employ to build and maintain the personal vote (Cain, Ferejohn,

and Fiorina 1987, 219-224). MMD candidates must distinguish their personal

accomplishments from those of their district mates, a strategy that has been referred to as

"differentiation" (Ames 1995a; Crisp, Jensen, and Shomer 2007; Schiller 2000). They

accomplish this by playing different roles and working with different segments of the

constituency, focusing on geographic and issue niches (Carey and Hix 2011; Carey and

Shugart 1995; Crisp, Jensen, and Shomer 2007; Zittel and Gschwend 2008). As

representatives of dual-member districts, same-state senators typically divide up the

constituency along geographic, economic, demographic, or other lines, depending on the

organized interests within the constituency (Jung, Kenny, and Lott 1994; Schiller 2000,

115). Schiller concludes that they cultivate unique bailiwicks because of "incentives…

for senators from the same state to compete with one another to build independent reputations" (Schiller 2000, 31).[9]

Apart from focusing on specific issues, candidates in MMDs conduct targeted mobilization strategies, focusing on unique geographic segments of the constituency. A new candidate cannot hope to build connections as strong and as positive as an established candidate among the same community. They build ties to voters in distinct geographic areas, and spend less time mobilizing voters in neighborhoods dominated by their district mate (Ames 1995a; Schiller 2000, 114-115). The geographic basis of the personal vote is also emphasized by the ballot design in certain MMD state legislatures. Elections for the Vermont House of Representatives, for example, list candidates' hometowns on the ballot below their names.[10] This suggests that Vermont Representatives that share an MMD are elected by different geographic segments of the constituency.

To prepare for reelection, legislators engage in "home style," building relationships and advertising themselves among constituents (Fenno 1978). District magnitude influences constituent interaction and communication. Recall that on the campaign trail, MMD candidates are more likely than those in SMDs to perceive of their constituents as organized into issue-motivated groups and to interact with specific organized interests as opposed to individual constituents (Jewell 1982; Loewenberg and Kim 1978). They reinforce ties to these interests by attending events, publishing newsletters detailing their activities and accomplishments, and meeting with community leaders, lobbyists, and activists (Arnold 1990; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Fenno 1978; Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005; Mayhew 1974b). During these interactions,

candidates often make promises, pledging to uphold the group's interests should they win the election.

The issues that dominate a candidate's time on the campaign trail influence their legislative agenda in office (Sulkin 2009, 2011). MMD representatives build a personal vote by developing a unique issue specialty. They secure specific committee seats, cultivate relationships with other representatives, senators, and political actors such as lobbyists and activists also concerned with the same interests, sponsor bills that benefit those interests, and claim personal credit for their accomplishments (Schiller 2000, 33-63). By specializing in distinct issue areas, MMD representatives gain name recognition and build a positive reputation among issue-motivated segments of the constituency; they become recognized as "friends" or champions of the cause. Newly-elected U.S. senators, for example, seek out "open territory – issue areas in which they can build a name for themselves, in and outside the Senate, that have not already been co-opted by another member" (Schiller 2000, 23). Candidates for the National Congress of Brazil, which elects members from districts that vary in magnitudes ranging from 8 to 70, also establish unique specialties and secure small geographic and demographic-based electoral coalitions (Ames 1995b). In larger magnitude districts, it is more difficult for candidates to differentiate themselves from a large set of district mates (Ames 1995a, 1995b). State legislators in MMDs, including those that routinely campaign as a part of a team, brought up the need to establish a specialty recognized by constituents. Because relationships with organized interests and other policy-motivated constituents take a significant amount of time for a legislator to develop, they tend to persist throughout the legislators' careers and become a part of their legacy. As Feldman notes,

A lot of legislators like to try to form a niche, a specialty, that they can identify as a brand. I think trying to find a brand for yourself is something that's a good thing, nobody wants to be a generalists that nobody remembered very much about.[11]

The tendency for MMD legislators to develop a unique area of specialization also influences agenda setting and issue attention (Schiller 2000). MMD legislators tend to be more responsive to small, issue-motivate segments of the population (e.g., minority interests) than those elected from SMDs, contributing to inequality among constituents (Cox 1990; Jewell 1982; Myerson 1993). Legislators sponsor legislation to enhance the personal vote and indicate their particular area of expertise to the constituency (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1997; Kessler and Krehbiel 1996; Schiller 1995). Schiller notes that U.S. senators, for example, "construct their legislative agenda with an eye to advertising concrete accomplishments in specific issue areas" (Schiller 2000, 91). They avoid overlapping with those issues championed by their district mates; senators who share a state and party almost never introduce bills pertaining to the same issues (Schiller 2000, 54). By developing a unique legislative agenda, MMD representatives ensure that they will receive personal credit for their accomplishments. Furthermore, the issues that a legislator can use as a base for their reputation are constrained by the interests that are present in the state (Schiller 2000, 23). In larger MMDs, representatives tend to appeal to smaller segments of the constituency (Cox 1990; Myerson 1993). State legislative districts are smaller and contain a much less diverse set of organized interests than the entire states that U.S. senators represent. The sets of issues that make up an MMD state legislator or local representative's specialization, therefore, may be even more limited than those available to U.S. senators, requiring MMD legislators to specialize very narrowly.

Coordination is compatible with specialization. Rather than work with every

salient issue, MMD representatives can rely on other district mates to develop ties with

interests with which they have less experience. Recall that in Maryland, three member

district constituencies are roughly three times the size of those in single member districts.

Representing a large and highly diverse constituency can be difficult; delegates, therefore,

coordinate by dividing up the issues that are important to constituents, allowing them to

ignore certain issue areas and devote more time to their chosen specialty. For example,

Feldman states,

> Each of us outside the legislature have some unique backgrounds, so one of our members has been a transportation engineer, so I think she naturally would gravitate towards some issues that, so I think that we're able to take advantage of that, whereas if you were one person representing 120,000 people serving on one committee that only deals with certain kinds of narrow issues I think that would be far more challenging.[12]

Each member of Feldman's district delegation specializes in a unique set of issues,

extending the reach and influence of the delegation. Members of a MMD delegation

typically serve on different committees. By coordinating, they are able to take advantage

of the institutional positions of their colleagues. New Jersey Assemblyman Gary

Chiusano (R) and Assemblywoman Allison McHose (R) follow a similar strategy. They

share a two-member district and often coordinate to address particular issues, taking

advantage of their positions on the Budget, Appropriations, and Consumer Affairs

Committees. By working with separate issues, they interact with different constituents

and develop issue-specific legislation, and sometimes offer to share the credit. Below,

Chiusano alludes to the importance of cosponsorship.

> Because of what comes out of discussions with constituents and others, because they know I'm on the budget committee or financial institutions, they might say well we need to look at legislation that would address those issues. And so I

would take the lead on that. With [Assemblywoman] Allison [McHose], I would go to her and say would you be willing to cosponsor this bill with me, and what have you, and vice versa, that would happen. And if somebody had an issue with human services, or something came up with the committee, then she might take the lead on it and ask me if I would be interested in being a cosponsor…[13]

MMD legislators cosponsor legislation to signal approval and recognition of issues that are not necessarily part of the legislator's area of expertise (Ashworth and Bueno De Mesquita 2006; Schiller 2000). They attach their names to bills introduced by their district mates in an effort to claim some credit for the efforts of their colleague.

Developing a personal reputation is likely an important part of the MMD legislator's career strategy. By working within their own areas of expertise, MMD legislators are able to more effectively cover a large set of salient issues and build support for the entire team. New Jersey Assemblyman Albert Coutinho (D), for example, describes the coordination among the Assembly members and State Senator from district 29:

The thing is this, again, in our particular case, we all have our areas of expertise. In terms of the key priorities of the area, we speak on a regular basis. Not coincidentally, the big things in our area are economic, we need economic growth because jobs and unemployment, you know, number one issue there. The issue of public education, which is a big problem, and public safety. So all three of us fight for those main areas, but we've identified, either one of the three of us will take more active lead, in the different areas.[14]

Reelection-minded legislators engage in "position taking," using roll call votes, speeches, and other public actions to take a stand on a particular issue, with the hopes of garnering the support of particular segments of the constituency (Mayhew 1974b). Does district magnitude influence position taking? MMD representatives use their roll-calls votes to signal their support for particular issues and maintain support among issue-motivated constituents. Organized interests often look to roll-call voting records to

indicate legislators' areas of expertise, and many rank legislators based upon their decisions on key votes.[15] Roll-call voting is influenced by the need to appeal to interests that make up the personal vote; U.S. Senators, for example, tend to vote more in line with their personal electoral coalitions than with the average voter in their state (Jung, Kenny, and Lott 1994). This finding is particularly troubling from a normative perspective because it means that MMD legislators may be more inclined than others to ignore portions of their constituents; indeed, the results of one study indicate that MMDs promote more unequal distributions of government funding because legislators rely on smaller groups of supporters to win reelection than those elected from SMDs (Myerson 1993). Chapter 5 analyzes the impact of district magnitude on legislative agendas and specialization, extending these earlier analyses to include the issue content of agendas rather than resource distributions.

District magnitude has a broad influence on how legislators build a career and represent interests present within the district. Because they work to develop and advertise unique policy positions, legislators elected in MMDs also tend to stake out more extreme ideological positions than those elected from SMDs; after the Illinois state house switched from multimember to single member districts, ideological diversity among Illinois state house representatives declined significantly (Adams 1996). In a similar study that compared roll-call votes across chambers, members of the Arizona House of Representatives, composed entirely of two-member districts, were found to be significantly more ideologically diverse than those in the entirely SMD Arizona Senate (Bertelli and Richardson 2008). Roll-call voting records also indicate that parties in MMD legislatures tend to be more diverse and contain more organized factions because

MMD legislators tend to carve out unique electoral coalitions (Adams 1996; Bertelli and Richardson 2008; Cox 1990).

Summary

This chapter discussed the unique electoral challenges MMDs present, and the ways they influence the strategies candidates use to build and maintain support. In contrast to those competing in SMDs, MMD candidates must appeal to a larger and often more diverse constituency. They also serve alongside one or more district mates, requiring them to develop new strategies to establish a unique personal reputation and claim credit for personal accomplishments.

How does district magnitude influence the competitive environment? The literature offers a number of observations and general expectations. MMD candidate fields are more crowded, which may make it more difficult for candidates to establish name recognition and consistently win reelection (e.g., Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000; Cox and Morgenstern 1995). This is open to challenge, however, because candidates may coordinate to meet many of the challenges of competing in a MMD. On the campaign trail, MMD candidates often advertise themselves as part of a team. Working together may reduce campaign costs, allow candidates to reach more potential voters, and help incumbents ward off potential challengers. MMD incumbents, particularly those who share a party with their district-mates, are likely to have a strong working relationship, making it especially difficult for challengers to compete against them. Indeed, some MMD incumbents enjoy an even greater advantage over challengers than those in SMDs (Hirano and Snyder 2009), suggesting that they have developed effective strategies to cope with MMD elections.

The effects of district magnitude extend beyond elections to influence both substantive and descriptive representation. This project will focus primarily on the substantive aspect of representation. Previous studies predict that MMDs will encourage legislators to focus on the needs of broader constituencies and pay comparatively little attention to the interests of those in their home districts (Hamilton 1967; Jewell 1982b). This is open to challenge, however, because district mates may work together to direct attention and resources to constituents by introducing legislation and voting as a bloc (Snyder and Ueda 2007). If MMDs encourage district mates to work together, constituents represented by MMD delegations may in fact benefit from the district design.

Others find that MMD legislators develop unique strategies to build support and claim credit for their accomplishments (Schiller 2000). Those who coordinate may draft legislation and offer to include district mates as cosponsors, and rely on their colleagues to help promote and move the bill to floor. Coordination means that maintaining personal support and working with specific issue niches promotes both the individual candidate and the district team. Furthermore, recall that certain issues, such as local projects that require state aid, encourage coordination even among district mates that do not share a party.

Although MMD representatives may coordinate to meet the challenge of serving a large constituency, they are also careful to maintain their individuality. They may develop specific geographic and issue-based niches in an effort to build a personal "brand." This strategy involves appealing to unique segments of the constituency. The political environment of the multimember district encourages candidates to secure a select group of supporters within the district as their own, and to defend their core

supporters against other candidates in the same district, even members of their own party. They build the personal vote by promoting their specific reputation and claiming credit for their accomplishments, focusing on unique geographic and issue-based segments of the constituency, attending events and develop relationships with organized interests, and introducing and promoting issue-specific legislation. District magnitude, therefore, is anticipated to encourage specialization and result in legislators that are responsive to smaller segments of the constituency and that pay disproportionate attention to narrow minority interests, influencing the agenda of MMD legislatures and promoting inequality within the constituency (Ames 1995a). Focusing on narrow interests means that MMD incumbents are especially vulnerable to redistricting, particularly when teammates leave office or retire or MMDs are converted to SMDs. An incumbent from a large MMD, for example, is unlikely to have developed a broad personal vote, placing him or her at a disadvantage in a single-member election.[16]

The following chapters explore the strategies MMD legislators employ to build and maintain electoral support, draw comparisons with SMD legislators, and address many of the challenges to the current MMD literature. The analyses will delve into advertising, credit claiming, position taking, and home style, drawing comparisons between SMD and MMD state legislators based upon unique datasets, case studies, and personal interviews. What circumstances encourage coordination and personal vote building? Are certain types of MMD candidates more likely to coordinate? How effective are these strategies, and what effect do they have on representation?

State legislatures provide an opportunity to test these expectations by examining the behavior of a large set of representatives from districts of varying magnitudes as they

campaign, sponsor legislation, and participate in roll-call votes. There are several advantages to this approach. Subnational legislatures allow for an examination of district magnitude amongst institutions from the same nation, meaning there is some commonality in terms of political culture, norms, and social expectations that may influence campaign strategy, agenda setting, and roll call voting.

I expect coordination among MMD "teams" to impart a significant electoral advantage. However, little has been done to define the circumstances that encourage coordination, or measure the advantage. Are certain types of candidates better suited to work together? A number of candidate qualities are expected to encourage coordination. For example, district mates who have served together longer are more likely to have developed a working relationship. District mates who share a party should also be more likely to coordinate on the campaign trail and in office. Do MMD candidates who coordinate with well-qualified district mates do better than others?

The following chapter explores coordination on the campaign trail, and estimates the relationship between coordinated campaigning, district magnitude, and electoral advantage. The chapters that follow consider the relationship between district magnitude and substantive representation, focusing on efforts to claim credit, secure benefits for the home district, and influence the legislative agenda. Overall, the analyses confirm many of the expectations, and show that by influencing how elected officials build careers, district magnitude has a broad influence on democratic representation.

Chapter 3: Coordinated Campaigns

> Multimember districts require more money. They require a whole different approach.
> -*Former New Hampshire House Leader Peter Burling (D)*[1]

> For an incumbent I think it's clearly, it might not be good for democracy, but in terms of incumbency protection or self-interest, this multimember district thing I think gives the incumbents an advantage.
> *Maryland Delegate Brian Feldman (D)*[2]

Certain U.S. legislatures provide representatives with almost perfect job security, whereas others have relatively high rates of turnover. The reelection rate of U.S. Congressmen, for example, is consistently very high. From 1964 to 2012, members of Congress have been reelected at a rate above 85 percent.[3] In 2007 and 2009, 98 and 100 percent of New Jersey General Assembly incumbents won their reelection bids. Legislators in several other states achieved very high reelection rates; over 95 percent of those in California, Hawaii, Idaho, Georgia, Maryland, and Vermont, for example, achieved reelection from 2009 to 2010.[4] Also in 2009 and 2010, in contrast, voters in states such as Arkansas and Alabama reelected only about half of their state legislative incumbents. What explains these differences? The rules and procedures that structure elections may influence the rate of reelection; they have been shown to affect the competitive environment, altering the level of competition, challengers' decision to wage a campaign, and the advantage incumbents enjoy over other candidates (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000; Carson, Engstrom, and Roberts 2007; Desposato and Petrocik 2003).

Notably, New Jersey, Maryland, and Vermont are three of the eleven states that currently elect at least some state legislators from multimember districts (MMDs). Does district magnitude (the number of legislators elected from a district) influence the competitive environment? Does it change how candidates compete for office? There are

two competing perspectives. From one point of view, because more candidates compete in an MMD than in SMD elections, campaigning is more difficult and incumbents are more vulnerable (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000). In support of this perspective, a recent study of U.S. Senate campaigns portrays same-state candidates as rivals for competing for voters' attention. As Schiller (2000, 86) concludes, "…because two senators from the same state share the same media audience, they face constant competition to attract individualized media coverage." This competition supposedly makes it more difficult for candidates to build name recognition and maintain effective electoral coalitions.

An alternative perspective is that, because MMD candidates are able to rely on copartisans and other similar candidates competing in the MMD to mobilize voters, campaigning is in fact easier in MMDs compared to SMDs. Proponents of this view argue that incumbents are able to take advantage of natural alliances to enhance their electoral security (Hirano and Snyder 2009). Rather than compete for the attention of voters, MMD candidates may be able to coordinate to build collective support.

At the center of this debate is our understanding of the interaction between MMD candidates competing in the same district. Do same-district candidates share electoral support? For example, do MMD candidates receive a benefit when competing alongside a similar, well-experienced candidate? Do they coordinate? What benefits does coordination provide? To address these questions, I utilize a unique data set of district and precinct-level election returns to measure electoral success in both MMD and SMD state legislative contests in Maryland, New Jersey, and Vermont. Recall that I rely on these states because Maryland and Vermont elect members from both MMDs and SMDs, and New Jersey allows for an examination of campaign strategy in an MMD chamber

that holds elections in odd years. I exclude Arizona from the statistical analyses because its electoral rules are similar to those in Maryland and Vermont, but it does not provide variation in district magnitude within the same chamber. I also draw upon personal interviews with state legislators serving in both single and multimember districts to gain perspective on the effects of district magnitude on campaign strategy. Although I do not conduct statistical analyses on Arizona in this chapter, quotes from Arizona candidates are included to provide additional background and insight.

The results indicate that MMD candidates that compete alongside one or more copartisan incumbents and those that raise and spend campaign money through localized joint campaign accounts received a greater share of the vote than others and more similar levels of electoral support to their district copartisans. The findings suggest that MMD district-mates' ability to work together is an important factor in their ability to ward off and defeat challengers. They not only improve our understanding of the incumbency advantage in U.S. elections, but also the relationship between electoral systems and campaign strategy.

The Electoral Environment

As the previous chapter describes, MMDs present candidates with unique challenges. Compared to elections in single member districts, ballots in MMDs are longer and tend to have more complex instructions, often making it more difficult for individual candidates to stand out from pack. Voters often fail to cast a complete ballot, either because of intentional "bullet voting" (voting only for a single MMD candidate to give him or her an advantage over others) or unintentional under-voting. Complex ballot instructions mean that large percentage of voters do not recognize that they are allowed to

cast multiple votes for some offices (Niemi and Herrnson 2003). In 2006 and 2010, for example, voters in Maryland's three-member state legislative districts on average cast only about half of the votes available to them.[5]

MMD candidates may find it more difficult to capture the attention of voters and advertise their individual qualities and accomplishments because the field of candidates is larger (Ashworth and Bueno De Mesquita 2006; Cox and Morgenstern 1993). Incumbents competing in MMDs also find it more difficult to claim exclusive credit for their accomplishments (Ashworth and Bueno De Mesquita 2006) and tend to have fewer opportunities to conduct constituent casework (Cox and Morgenstern 1993). These conditions may make it more difficult for candidates to develop and maintain support; MMD incumbents sometimes find it more difficult than those in SMDs to sustain voter attention, which may reduce the electoral advantage they typically enjoy over challengers (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000; Cox and Morgenstern 1995; Holbrook and Tidmarch 1991).

Longer ballots and multiple seats may encourage voters to rely on the party label, encouraging them to support all of the candidates from a single party (Hamilton 1967; Niemi, Hill, and Grofman 1985). Because MMD candidates compete for multiple seats, potential district allies, such as same-party incumbents competing for seats in the MMD, may be particularly important to their electoral prospects. MMD candidates who campaign alongside well-qualified district mates gain two key advantages. First, they have the opportunity to share electoral support with their district mates. In office, legislators who represent the same MMD often work together, cosponsoring legislation that can be used as a source of credit claiming on the campaign trail (Kirkland 2012).

MMD candidates competing in the same district also coordinate campaign visits. By promoting one another at campaign stops, they are able to extend their reach and name recognition (Ames 1995a; Carey and Shugart 1995). When coordinating these visits, district-mates often divide up the MMDs based upon what some describe as home "sectors," based upon issues, geography, demographics, or some other factor (Schiller 2000).

What is more, district allies may coordinate campaign fundraising and advertisements, allowing them to raise and spend campaign money more efficiently. Candidate fundraising tends to decline as district magnitude rises as more candidates compete for funds and the demand for contributions begins to outweigh the supply (Curry, Herrnson, and Taylor 2013). Those who don't have the resources to conduct their own campaigns often respond by banding together, relying on allied candidates to help raise and spend the money necessary to win election (Samuels 1999).

The Candidate's Perspective

Candidates who have recently competed in MMDs provide valuable insight into the effects of district magnitude on campaign strategy and the competitive environment. One of the most useful insights I gleaned from conversations with these candidates is that interaction and coordination are important to a successful MMD campaign. Shared support can make it easier to establish name recognition in MMDs. This is especially important to open seat candidates; same-party incumbents are in a particularly powerful position to help nonincumbents build a reputation by advertising them to their supporters as a new "team member." For example, in the two-member Vermont district Lamoille-Washington-1, incumbent Vermont House Speaker Shap Smith (D) worked to help the

46

nonincumbent Peter Peltz (D) win election in 2006 against two Republicans also vying

for the open seat. Smith relates,

> Particularly in that year, you know that was my third time running, I was relatively well known in the district, so I was trying to help him with name recognition.[6]

Incumbents who have represented the same MMD for several legislative sessions

establish joint name recognition; they become known as a district team. In some cases,

voters become so used to the district team that that they support the incumbents even

when they are from opposing political parties.

Establishing name recognition is an important but difficult task for politicians

competing in down-ballot contests such as those for the state legislature or local office. In

MMDs, advertising is more challenging than in SMDs because more candidates compete

for the attention and approval of potential voters, ballots are longer and more complex,

and district populations are larger.[7] What is more, state legislative candidates, many of

whom run their campaigns on a shoestring budget, often do not have the money to

advertise effectively. As one three-member district Maryland Republican Delegate

describes, most voters don't recognize the candidates competing for the state legislature,

and they almost never feel well enough informed to cast multiple votes. As district

magnitude rises, therefore, name recognition becomes even more important to a

successful campaign.

> My district is a large rural district that's not really door knockable; it's not really an efficient use of my time to do that. And mail's expensive. And so name id is huge. They go in the polling place, when they get down the ballot to "delegate," their first question is "what's a delegate? Choose three? I've never heard of any of them…" There's nine people on the ballot, pick three of them. My task is to get people to go all the way to the bottom and find me. But so my strategy on a

delegate race, which would be apart from Congress or state senator, even councilmatic, when you're one of three, that name id is massive…[8]

District copartisans are able to build name recognition by promoting one another at different campaign events. When team members appear in the news, make campaign stops, attend speaking engagements, etc., they often mention their teammates. Campaign visits are sometimes divided among members of the MMD team to ensure maximum coverage. New Jersey Assemblyman Gary Chiusano (R), for example, explains that holiday events across the district that occur on the same day are typically divided among coordinating candidates, allowing the copartisans to maintain a presence across a large constituency.

> If I can't get the Morris County memorial day event, you might expect everybody has Memorial Day at the same time, or a Fourth of July parade, and with three different counties and 36 different municipalities, so there may be representatives who cover that county, we might say please let the folks of Morris County know that we're there too, we're there in spirit.[9]

MMD candidates may also conduct actively coordinated campaigns, allowing them to advertise to a diverse constituency, establish support among a broad group of organized interests and voters, and spend campaign money more efficiently. Candidates may coordinate fundraising campaigns, print and distribute campaign materials together, and divide up public speeches and rallies, promoting their teammates at these events. A competitive electoral environment often motivates coordination, particularly among district copartisans. Incumbents who coordinate with their district-mates are often better able to ward off challengers and weather unfavorable or unpredictable electoral environments, such as those brought about by substantial changes to district boundaries after redistricting. For example, following the 2010 redistricting, Arizona Representatives John Kavanagh (R) and Michelle Ugenti (R), incumbents from the two member District 8,

were relocated to the heavily Republican District 23. They used their experience as

campaign teammates to their advantage, coordinating a primary campaign and promoting

the team through joint mailers and other advertisements. Kavanagh notes that he typically

joins forces with Ugenti after the primary election to take on Democratic opponents in the

general; however, redistricting and the presence of two well-qualified primary

challengers forced the incumbents to combine their efforts earlier in the election cycle.

> This time we have two people who appear to be RINOS, as we call them, and
> we're both conservatives, so we see a mutual threat so this time we're teaming
> up…yeah we may do some joint mailers. We've done that in the general where
> you're going against the Democrat, but in the primary, we've never done it before
> but we will be doing it this time because of a perceived threat from our left.[10]

MMD incumbents who have campaigned together in the past often team up as a

show of strength to ward off challengers. Delegate Brian Feldman (D) describes the

decision to form a home district team, and the advantages incumbent teams enjoy. In

Maryland, these teams are often organized around a home district "slate," which is a

separate joint campaign committee formed among allied candidates to raise and spend

money together.

> Ultimately it comes down to whether the candidates decide, whether you do
> decide to slate with other candidates. You have to get along with them, and that
> presents some challenges. I think for the most part, even if you don't get along
> with the Democrats, the self interest of, if you conclude that it's in your political
> self interest, then people are willing to hold their nose… And for incumbents it's
> a way, in all candor, to box out challengers. So if incumbents get together, and
> you know I think it presents a problem for challengers.[11]

As Feldman notes, MMD teams are formed in large part out of political necessity.

MMD incumbents find themselves in a precarious situation when a member of the team

decides to leave office. Recall from chapter 1 that, when there is an open seat, district

copartisans will often select candidates to form a team early in the process to better

compete against primary challengers. In Maryland's General Assembly District 15,

incumbent Delegate Craig Rice retired to pursue a seat on the Montgomery County

Council. The remaining Democratic incumbents, Feldman and Kathleen Dumais, were

then forced to decide whether to endorse a candidate in the primary, or to "let democracy

run its course" without intervention. As Feldman describes, choosing to stay out of the

process can be a risky decision, because several candidates often run for open seats,

which puts the incumbents at risk of losing the nomination. Coordination in this

circumstance helped to prevent a competitive (and unpredictable) primary election. As

Feldman describes,

> Last election one of our delegates left, so the question for the two incumbent
> House members and the Senator was "do we pick up, do we self select a candidate"
> or do we, do the two House members and the Senator get together and form an
> incumbent slate, an incomplete one, and just allow everyone else to compete for
> that third seat… So in the 16th district, which is Bethesda, they had the same
> scenario. They left the third seat open, and thirteen candidates ran. Now if you're
> one of the two incumbents that's a little unnerving, because with thirteen people
> running, that can take out one of your guys. So it's kind of risky… so we saw
> what was happening in that district, we decided to go and recruit somebody. And
> put her on our slate.[12]

As New Jersey Assemblyman Albert Coutinho (D) describes, he and

Assemblywoman L. Grace Spencer (D) develop stronger relationships with particular

segments of the constituency, and share the support of their diverse coalitions. Coutinho

specifically mentions geographic and racial groups as bases for the division of the

electorate among the members of the team.

> And so usually what we do is we try to get around to all events as much as
> possible, again in the regular governing and campaign thing. But then that is the
> one difference where we usually have our home sectors, and we would cover
> more heavily that on a regular basis. In the campaign season, we make an added
> effort for the two or three of us, when the senator's running with us as well, to
> make sure that we show up together. That would be one difference, so on a
> regular basis we try to divide up the district to where we're known more… In our

district for example we really believe in diversity. We're probably a very unique situation in that between our state senator and two Assembly folks, we have three people from different parts of the district. We have three different races, an African American, a white, and a Latina… Without question in my specific case team elections seem to be important. Yeah, it seems to be the norm. So here in New Jersey without question the issue of who your running mate is very important. There is a coordination…You know in the case of our district, we have the north ward where the city of Newark is, I'm from the east ward, and Assemblywoman Spencer's from the south ward. So generally usually on an ongoing basis, again to the extent that there's a critical issue, we will appear, wherever it is. But on an ongoing, let's call it a political "maintenance" level, usually we divide up the zone and we make sure we keep the relationships strong with community leaders in each of our base areas.[13]

By maintaining support and promoting their teammates among their electoral base, Coutinho and Spencer are able to develop ties to groups of constituents that they would not have the time, energy, or background to work with alone.

Coordination allows MMD candidates to do more with less. Joint advertisements permit MMD candidates to spend campaign money more efficiently, using less money to reach more potential voters. Feldman, for example, speaking from experience as a member of the "District 15 Leadership Slate," a joint campaign committee composed of Democratic state legislative candidates from the three-member 15th district, notes that coordinated fundraisers organized district copartisans make it easier to raise money and run an effective campaign.

Generally I think it makes it easier to get elected. In our case, Maryland, you only have to finish in the top three. So right off the bat that takes some pressure off of you… it allows for very tight what they would call "slating…"[14]

Likewise, in the Arizona state house, House Speaker Andy Tobin (R) regularly organizes joint fundraising events with his copartisan district-mate, Representative Karen Fann (R).

We end up at the same place, sometimes we drive to the same places just to save money, and we do fundraisers together.[15]

Home district campaign teams also combine forces to fund joint advertisements, including mailers, fliers, and door-hangers. For example, in New Jersey, campaign publications typically bear the names of the two Assembly and one state senate candidates. As Chiusano describes,

> We coordinate mailers with Assemblywoman McHose and Senator Oroho…its a team, and in fact we're one of the few legislative districts in the state of New Jersey that has a joint legislative office.[16]

Many candidates competing in Vermont MMDs adopt a similar approach. Vermont Representative Jim Masland (D), for example, distributes joint campaign advertisements with his Windsor-Orange-2 district copartisan, Representative Margaret Cheney (D).

> We coordinate quite a bit, we do mailings together. We don't go door to door together, I guess, I mean recently none of us have really done door to door only because we have been unopposed…but we recently have gone to Selectboards[17] together. We go to town meetings together and we do mailings together. Although not a lot of them but we do them in our town end of session reports…it saves cost, we have a common message, we are both Democrats.[18]

Some representatives mentioned that candidates that join together in a slate are at a significant advantage because they are able to spend less money on advertising expenses such as direct mail and printing. One Maryland three-member district Republican delegate describes joint advertisements as a "cost saver" that are particularly beneficial to cash-strapped statehouse candidates.

> You know… of course money is huge, fundraising for campaigning, it's a huge motivator to slate up. Huge. If we can spend a quarter splitting the costs four ways. Huge cost saver. I mean if you look at how much mail costs, mail is really expensive.[19]

In rare cases, even MMD incumbents who share a district with a member of an opposing party work together to raise money. However, I found no evidence that

members of opposing parties actively coordinate their entire campaign, but rather

combine forces sporadically to build support among a singular nonpartisan, issue-

oriented constituency. For example, Arizona Democrat Lynne Pancrazi occasionally

holds joint campaign visits and fundraisers among constituents concerned with local

agriculture with her Republican district mate Russ Jones on the campaign trail.

> Jones and I have worked together for years. We even have fundraisers together…I
> don't do them with [Arizona State Senator Don] Shooter, but I do them with Russ.
> Because Russ and I have a lot of similarities. Our votes don't always reflect it but
> we do have a lot of similarities. We care about a lot of the same issues, and we
> don't have all of our fundraisers together, don't get me wrong. Our agricultural
> fundraisers we usually do, because we're both very very involved in the
> agriculture industry.[20]

As Vermont Representative Anne Donahue (R) describes, constituents in her two-

member district consistently vote a split ticket to maintain the popular district team. Her

district (Washington-2) traditionally supports Democrats for Congress and state

constitutional offices, but has selected Donahue, a Republican, and her Democratic

district mate Maxine Jo Grad in each of the past five state legislative elections (2002-

2010).[21] The bipartisan team draws support from constituents based largely upon their

record on non-partisan, local issues. Donahue describes the bipartisan support she and

Grad enjoy:

> I think they know we work together on local issues, and in Vermont its personal
> more than the political stuff and so they know they've gotten to know both of us
> as doing a good job I think. And so, it's not a party issue nearly, obviously there
> are people who vote party line, but it's not so much that as it is the person and you
> know, they like us as a team, they like us.[22]

Bipartisan coordination may be more common in Vermont because the state's voters tend

to be less closely affiliated with the major parties. Vermont does not require citizens to

declare a party when registering to vote and Vermont is one of the only states that

consistently elect third party candidates to the state legislature. What is more, Vermont

legislators indicated that the smaller constituency and district sizes in the state mean that

personal contact is often more important to vote choice than party affiliation.

Measuring Electoral Dynamics

What is the relationship between district magnitude and electoral security? Are

candidates who compete in MMDs with copartisan incumbents and those who coordinate

campaign efforts at an advantage over others? To address these questions, I compiled a

data set of major party candidates competing in the 2006 and 2010 general elections for

the Maryland House of Delegates and the Vermont State Senate and Vermont State

House, and the 2007 and 2009 general elections for the New Jersey General Assembly.

These elections provide an opportunity to study the effects of district magnitude and

coordinated campaigning on electoral success. Depending on their home district, voters

in Maryland select between one and three candidates for the House of Delegates; in

Vermont, between one and two for the state house, and one, two, three, or six for the state

senate; and in New Jersey, two for the General Assembly. In the MMD elections in these

states, the number of votes a voter may cast is equal to the district magnitude (they also

may cast fewer votes). None of these states allow voters to cast multiple votes for one

candidate (i.e., cumulative voting).

These state legislatures also constitute a desirable sample for these analyses

because they vary in terms of campaign costs and electoral rules and regulations,

allowing us to generalize to a broad range of electoral settings. Leading up to the 2009

election, New Jersey Assembly candidates raised an average of over $63,000; in 2010,

the average Maryland General Assembly candidate raised just over $70,000. Elections for

the Vermont State Legislature are comparatively inexpensive; the typical Vermont state

legislative candidate raised slightly under $4,000 leading up to the 2010 elections.[23]

The timing of elections may also influence electoral dynamics. New Jersey, for

example, elects members of the General Assembly in odd years. Without high-profile

gubernatorial or congressional contests to draw voters to the polls, turnout has

traditionally been very low; in 2011, for example, only 27 percent of registered voters

cast a ballot in state legislative contests in New Jersey.[24] This means that Assembly

candidates may find it more difficult to mobilize voters, and that they are better insulated

from national political tides than those that compete in even years. Maryland and

Vermont, in contrast, hold elections in even numbered years (Maryland's coincide with

the congressional midterm elections, and Vermont's are held every two years). Recall

that I do not conduct these statistical analyses on Arizona candidates because Arizona's

election rules are similar to those in Maryland and Vermont, but the chamber does not

provide the variation in district magnitude that would allow for a rigorous analysis.

Elected officials in New Jersey speculate that, because odd year elections tend to

result in very low turnout, they may advantage teams comprised of same-party candidates.

As Coutinho describes,

> I think one of the reasons again that you see most districts represent people from
> the same party because there is "the power of the line," and whatever the
> dominant party is in the district usually that will win. And it comes back to the
> issue of low turnout. So whoever comes out, usually there's an affiliation with the
> party and that's how they vote…[25]

Team campaigning may be especially important in low turnout, off year elections

because it is so difficult to mobilize voters without high-profile contests on the ballot.

Candidate Vote Share

Because the number of votes citizens are able to cast equals the district magnitude, the analysis requires a measure of the share of the vote earned by each candidate that is comparable across districts of varying magnitude. Shigeo Hirano and James Snyder developed a suitable measure of vote share for state legislative elections that incorporates magnitude to account for voters' ability to cast multiple votes (Hirano and Snyder 2009). A candidate's *vote share* is calculated as $v_j / (v_{sum} / M)$, where v_j is the number of votes earned by candidate j, v_{sum} is the number of votes earned by all major party candidates, and M is the district magnitude.

The measure ranges from 0.07 to 1.3 for the elections in the sample. It is possible for a candidate's vote share to range to above one because some MMD voters do not cast the maximum number of allowable votes, a practice known as "partial abstention" or "bullet voting." Voters may partially abstain for a number of reasons. First, MMD ballots often contain confusing instructions, and many voters likely do not realize that they may cast multiple votes for one particular office. Second, a voter may partially abstain to give one or more selected candidates an advantage over others (Cox 1984). A vote share score above one is appropriate for the MMD candidates that benefit from partial abstention, and therefore is a desirable property of the vote share measure. These MMD candidates enjoy the exclusive support of voters, similar to SMD candidates, but they must only finish in the top three to win election. About 6 percent of candidates competing in the sample elections received a vote share score higher than one.

Two Maryland candidates illustrate the vote share measure. In the 2006 general election, three Republican challengers competed against Democratic Delegate Joan

56

Cadden, a four-term incumbent competing in the three-member 31st legislative district, a traditionally competitive portion of Anne Arundel County. Cadden received 16.9 percent of the vote; her vote share score is 0.508, below the Maryland average of 0.596. Another Maryland three-member district incumbent, Delegate Shane Pendergrass (D), was more successful in 2006. Pendergrass, along with incumbent Frank Turner (D) and nonincumbent Guy Guzzone, faced and defeated three Republican challengers in the 13th legislative district, a heavily Democratic section of southern Howard County, earning 22.1 percent of the vote. Her vote share score is 0.66, above the Maryland average.

Copartisan Vote Similarity

In many state legislative elections, events such as county fairs, farmer's markets, and town hall meetings may be the best way to meet and build relationships with a significant number of constituents. Coordination among members of a home district team allows legislators in these districts to cover far more territory and extend name recognition to groups they would never have been able to contact if campaigning alone. The three Republican legislators in Arizona's District 25 (two representatives and one senator) coordinate campaign visits in a similar manner. District 25 covers a large, mostly rural section of southern Arizona. State Representative David Stevens (R) notes that the size of the district he shares with Representative Peggy Judd (R) makes it especially difficult to meet potential voters in person. Stevens and Judd, however, coordinate with their district's State Senator, Gail Griffin (R), to reach as many potential voters as possible.

> We have groups, Tea Party, women's groups, you attend all of those. Any event that turns up in the community is better than going door to door…. Now Peggy lives 80 miles from us, so, because she lives up in Wilcox, and there are times where in the month of September there are multiple things going on across the

district, and we can't all go to them, so we split them up. I'll go to one, Gail will go to another, and we'll promote all of us.[26]

Judd notes that her electoral base consists of constituents who relate to her, and that the home district team allows her to extend support to a broader set of constituents.

I was elected by a certain electorate in my district that could relate to me… It's kind of like a Venn diagram… there's an overlap for sure, because we're all Republicans, but we all meet kind of a different need. And we relate to different people in our district.[27]

MMD candidates develop separate bases of support because many voters cannot be counted on to support a full slate of candidates. Many select only the candidates they know best, or those they have had personal contact with. Coordinated campaigns, however, encourage voters to cast the maximum number of votes to support the entire copartisan team. To estimate the extent to which candidates develop unique bases of support, I utilize a data set of voting precinct-level election returns for the Maryland House of Delegates and the Vermont House and Senate. The unit of analysis is a group of copartisans competing within a voting precinct (e.g., the group of Democrats competing in Precinct 1 constitute one case, and the group of Republicans competing in Precinct 1 another case, etc.).

I utilize the Hirshman-Herfindahl index to measure the distribution of vote shares earned by the members of copartisan group competing in each precinct (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). The index is designed to measure vote distributions across parties or candidates. I divide the votes earned by each candidate by the sum of all votes earned by the candidate's copartisans, resulting in *copartisan vote similarity*. The index equals $(1/\sum v_j^2)$ / M, where v_j is the copartisan vote share earned the jth candidate (the votes earned by the candidate divided by the total votes earned by all copartisans competing in

the election precinct), and *M* is the district magnitude. Higher vote similarity values indicate that the copartisan candidates received more equal vote shares; lower values imply inequality, indicating that partisan voters are favoring either a single candidate or a subset of copartisan candidates. The measure ranges from 0.33 to 1.

Voting precinct results from the 2010 general elections in two Maryland legislative districts provide examples of the vote similarity measure. In Maryland's three-member 6th district, a geographically compact urban district directly outside of Baltimore City, incumbent Democrats Mike Weir, Joseph (Sonny) Minnick, and John Olszewski easily won reelection. Figure 3-1 displays the partisan vote shares of the three Democratic incumbents across the district precincts. Even though the district 6 Democrats performed differently in each precinct, each received at least moderate support across the entire district. Indeed, the average vote similarity score for the District 6 Democrats was 0.99 in 2010. Vote similarity scores across the 28th district precinct Democrats vary only marginally across the district, from a low of 0.98 to a high of 0.999 (almost perfect vote equality). No voting precinct in the district received a similarity score below the average for all Maryland Democrats of 0.97.

Figure 3-1: 2010 Democratic Copartisan Vote Similarity in Maryland's 6th Legislative
District

	.981 to .984
	.985 to .990
	.991 to .992
	.993 to .994
	.995 to .999

Source: Maryland State Board of Elections and the United States Census Bureau.

Notes: Copartisan vote percentages are calculated by dividing the number of votes earned
by the candidate by the total number of votes earned by all same-party candidates
competing for the same office in the election precinct (the district copartisans).

The Democratic incumbents Jill Carter, Samuel Rosenberg, and Nathaniel Oaks,

competing in Maryland's 41st legislative district, another urban district near Baltimore,

also received support from different parts of the district during the 2010 elections.

However, only one Democrat dominated many of the voting precincts in District 41 (see

Figure 3-2). For example, more than 40 percent of the Democratic vote in three of the

precincts located in the northern part of the district went to Samuel Rosenberg, compared

to less than 28 percent for Nathaniel Oaks. These precincts received vote similarity scores

as low as 0.93, below the average of 0.97 for Democratic copartisans in Maryland. Some

voting precincts scattered across the 41st district turned out in relatively equal numbers

for the three Democrats, earning a vote similarity score as high as 0.997, above the

Maryland average for Democratic copartisan groups.[28]

Figure 3-2: 2010 Democratic Vote Share in Maryland's 41st Legislative District

☐	.937 to .953
☐	.954 to .980
☐	.981 to .987
☐	.988 to .992
☐	.993 to .997

Source: Maryland State Board of Elections and the United States Census Bureau.

Notes: Copartisan vote percentages are calculated by dividing the number of votes earned
by the candidate by the total number of votes earned by all same-party candidates
competing for the same office in the election precinct (the district copartisans).

District Magnitude, Shared Incumbency Advantage, and Active Coordination

District magnitude in the Maryland House of Delegates varies between one, two, and three; between one and two in the Vermont House of Representatives and one, two, three, and six in the Vermont State Senate; and all New Jersey Assembly districts elect two Assembly members. To account for any non-linear effects of magnitude, I include dummy variables for *two member, three member*, and *six member* districts. I expect district magnitude to influence electoral results in two ways. First, candidates will achieve lower vote shares as district magnitude rises, because those competing in MMDs will have a more difficult time gaining support than those in SMDs. Second, copartisan vote similarity will decrease as district magnitude rises because candidates will develop narrower voting coalitions, resulting in more voting precincts dominated by one copartisan candidate (Ames 1995b).

Because MMD candidates attract similar voters and share electoral support, those who compete alongside one or more established incumbents of the same party are expected to receive a higher vote share than others. To measure the effects of shared incumbency advantage, I include measure the *number of copartisan incumbents*, coded as the number of incumbents (not including the candidate himself or herself) that are competing in the MMD; this is expected to have a positive relationship with both vote share and vote similarity.

MMD candidates who actively coordinate campaign efforts with one or more district mates are expected to encourage voters to support the entire team. Active coordination is distinct from shared incumbency advantage; rather than simply benefit from association with a well-known incumbent, active coordinators work to promote

district copartisans on the campaign trail. Those who campaign as a team enjoy numerous advantages that should translate into greater success at the polls. What is more, they should receive more similar vote shares across district precincts because district copartisans work to promote their colleagues on the campaign trail. Coordinated campaigns may explain the results of one recent study that finds that district magnitude enhances, rather than decreases, the incumbency advantage (Hirano and Snyder 2009). Two key explanatory variables, *number of years as district team* and *localized joint fundraising committee spending* measure active coordination. The number of years the same representatives have represented the same legislative district (*number of years as district team*) may also indicate coordination. Incumbents with experience working together on the campaign trail have had years to develop a coordinated strategy; as the number of years district has been represented by the same team increases, vote share and vote similarity are also expected to increase. For example, as Arizona Representative Macario Saldate (D) notes, candidate relationships develop and strengthen over time. When describing his working relationship with Representative Sally Ann Gonzelez (D), Saldate says,

> So now we're in the situation that we feel that we spoke out for each other, we did some collaboration when we were running, so that makes you closer too. So in the future, you know that means… we collaborate more. So there's a benefit to identifying in terms of being partners early if possible, there's a great benefit and I see that with her.[29]

Reelection rates tend to be higher for MMD incumbents who compete alongside at least one other copartisan district incumbent. Table 3-1 shows the reelection rates of incumbents in Maryland, Vermont, and New Jersey. Those competing in three member districts, for example, with no copartisan ally achieved a reelection rate of only 81.8

percent, compared to 97.8 percent for those competing in the same district with one or more copartisan incumbents.

Table 3-1: Reelection and Copartisan District Incumbents

	No Copartisan Incumbents	One or more Copartisan incumbents	Complete Team of Copartisan Incumbents
District Magnitude			
1	94.16%	--	94%
2	93.07	96.98	95.8
3	81.82	97.81	94.4

Source: Maryland State Board of Elections.

Notes: Includes incumbents competing in the 2006 and 2010 Maryland House of Delegates Elections and the Vermont State Senate and State House elections, and the 2009 and 2011 New Jersey General Assembly elections. The number of copartisan incumbents does not include the incumbent himself or herself.

Campaign finance regulations in Maryland and New Jersey require candidates who combine finances to form joint campaign accounts and file reports with the state. These committees are structured similarly to congressional campaign committees organized at the federal (Herrnson 2009) and state level (Gierzynski 1992; Shea 1995). As of 2012, three of the eleven states that elect at least some members from MMDs regulate joint candidate campaign committees (referred to as "slates" or "multicandidate committees").[30] In Maryland, campaign finance regulations define candidate "slates" as "political committees of two or more candidates who join together to conduct and pay for joint campaign activities."[31] Slates raise money together in separate campaign accounts and spend it to promote members. Maryland state law also allows unlimited transfers between the campaign committees of slate members.[32] Although slates can be organized among any set of candidates (regardless of whether they share a district), many are formed exclusively among candidates for a single legislative district.

Many MMD candidates form separate joint fundraising accounts because they provide a number of advantages. Donors are able to contribute the maximum legal limit to both the candidate's personal campaign account and the joint account, allowing them to contribute beyond the traditional contribution limit. Joint accounts also make it easier for team members to transfer money between candidate accounts. New Jersey General Assembly candidates competing in the same district often form what are known in the state as "joint candidate committees" composed of state legislative candidates competing in the same legislative district. In 2009, 40 percent of candidates for the New Jersey General Assembly were members of joint candidate committees; in 2010 in Maryland, 35 percent were members of joint committees organized among district copartisans.[33]

Candidates who spend money as part of a district team are able to conduct more efficient advertising campaigns; they design joint mailers and other campaign material, saving costs and reaching more potential voters. The variable *Joint fundraising committee spending* is the amount of money candidates spent through a joint candidate committee composed exclusively of state legislative candidates competing in the same legislative district (in hundreds of thousands of dollars). Those who spend more through these joint committees are expected to earn larger vote shares than others. What is more, because they spend money to advertise the team, district copartisans who spend more through joint committees are expected to receive higher vote similarity scores. Because Vermont does not recognize separate joint campaign accounts or require them to file campaign finance reports, localized joint committee spending figures are only available for Maryland and New Jersey candidates.

Candidate Quality

A number of candidate characteristics also may influence vote share. Some candidates enjoy an advantage over others because of their experience and status as a lawmaker, majority party member, or party leader. Incumbents competing for legislative office, for example, enjoy a number of electoral advantages over challengers, including broader name recognition and the capability to claim credit for legislative accomplishments (Mayhew 1974a), the ability to perform constituent casework (Fiorina 1977), and improved access to campaign contributors (Abramowitz 1991). I include *incumbent* (coded 1 for incumbents, and 0 otherwise) to account for these advantages.

More legislative experience is also associated with higher candidate quality and is important to electoral success (Carson, Engstrom, and Roberts 2007; Hirano and Snyder 2009). Incumbents who have successfully won election several times may enjoy an additional advantage because they have had more time to build popular support and hone their campaign strategy. I measure experience as the number of years incumbents have served in the legislature (*tenure*). Campaign funding also serves as an indicator of candidate quality (Basinger and Ensley 2007). Candidates who receive more *Campaign contributions* (in hundreds of thousands of dollars) also have an advantage over others. Well-funded campaigns are able to reach more potential voters through media and other forms of voter outreach.

Legislative party leaders also enjoy added visibility by virtue of their position (*Leadership*, coded 1 for party leaders, and 0 otherwise). Finally, party affiliation influences candidate vote share. In Maryland and Vermont, for example, the Democratic Party dominates the legislature. Majority party members may enjoy an increase in vote

share because they can rely on their relationships with other party members in positions of power. I include party affiliation (*Democrat*, coded 1 for Democrats and 0 otherwise) to account for these differences.

Competition

The level of electoral competition is also important to vote share and vote similarity. Candidates compete for a finite number of votes. As the number of quality candidates increases, demand for voter support increases, and individual candidate vote shares decrease. I calculate three measures of competition for each contest. First, competition is calculated using the percentage of the vote each candidate received. To create a measure that is comparable across districts of varying magnitude, I again use the Hirshman-Herfindahl Index (Laakso and Taagepera 1979), this time calculated using all candidates competing in the district (not just copartisans). Recall that the index equals $(1/\sum v_j^2) / M$; to measure overall competition, v_j is the vote share of the jth candidate (the votes earned by the candidate divided by the total number of votes earned by all candidates in the district), and M is the district magnitude. The values range roughly from one to two; higher values indicate more competition (a more equitable distribution of the vote across a full set of candidates), and lower values less competition. The range extends slightly below one and above two because of the presence of third party and write in candidates. The number of copartisans competing in each precinct could also influence the distribution of the partisan vote. Therefore, I control for the *Number of district copartisans*, coded as the number of same-party candidates competing in the precinct, when estimating vote similarity.

Open-seat races tend to be more competitive, inspiring more qualified candidates to compete (Lazarus 2008; Maestas et al. 2006). Because MMD elections are contests for multiple seats, it is possible for a contest to be "partially open." I measure open seats as the *proportion of incumbents* competing for reelection as the number of incumbents divided by the district magnitude (Curry, Herrnson, and Taylor 2013). The measure ranges from 0, indicating a full set of open seats in the district, and 1, indicating a full set of incumbents seeking reelection.

Some districts are less competitive because a single party traditionally dominates them. *District partisan favorability* accounts for partisan balance; this is measured as the percentage of registered voters who share a party affiliation with the candidate (Curry, Herrnson, and Taylor 2013). In Maryland and New Jersey, I use party registration figures provided by the Maryland State Board of Elections and the New Jersey Department of State. Voters in Vermont, however, do not declare a party when registering. Therefore, I use the percentage of primary election participants who voted in each party's primary to calculate district partisan favorability for candidates in Vermont. For example, if 40 voters participated in a Vermont Democratic primary, and 60 participated in the Republican primary, the partisan favorability for Democrats would be 0.4 (40 / (40+60)=0.4), and for Republicans 0.6. As district partisan favorability increases, vote share and vote similarity are expected to increase as the pool of party adherents grows.

Because the Vermont candidates include those competing for both the House and Senate, I also include the variable *Senate* (coded 1 if competing for the State Senate, and 0 for the State House) to account for differences candidates competing for different chambers. Recall that the Maryland and New Jersey samples include only candidates

competing for the lower chamber of the state legislature; therefore, the *Senate* control is not included for the analyses of these states.

Methods

To estimate the effects of magnitude and cooperation on vote share and vote similarity, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. OLS is appropriate because the dependent variables, vote share and copartisan vote similarity, are continuous. Recall that the unit of analysis when analyzing vote share is the candidate, and when analyzing vote similarity, the election precinct. Both data sets contain grouped data. The data I use for the vote share regressions, for example, contains candidates grouped into legislative districts; similarly, election precincts are also grouped into legislative districts. To account for the grouped nature of the data, I estimate robust standard errors corrected for clustering (Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo 2007).[34] Because a number of factors including electoral regulations, party dynamics, and culture vary by state, I estimate separate regressions for candidates within each state.

Because the number of copartisan incumbents is related to the district magnitude, I also conducted regressions separately on candidates who competed in each different district magnitude across Maryland and Vermont (see the Appendix). Holding district magnitude constant removes the possibility of interactive effects between district magnitude and the other variables in the model. As the results presented in the Appendix indicate, the substantive effects of the coefficients are similar and therefore robust to a variety of model specifications.

Results

The findings provide support for many of the expectations. Candidates competing in MMDs receive smaller vote shares than those in SMDs; however, shared incumbency advantage and active coordination significantly advantage some MMD candidates over others. Table 3-2 shows that, as expected, district magnitude has a negative effect on candidate vote share. Recall that district magnitude varies between legislative districts in Maryland and Vermont, but not New Jersey. The first column of Table 3-2 displays the estimates for Maryland candidates. Candidates in a two-member and a three-member district have an average vote share that is lower than those in single member districts by 0.02 and 0.049, respectively. Although these effects may appear moderate, it is important to keep in mind that victory margins in competitive state legislative contests are often very small. More than 14 percent of Maryland 2006 and 2010 elections for Delegate, for example, were decided by a vote share margin smaller than 0.05 (calculated as the difference between the vote shares of the lowest vote-earning winner and the highest vote-earning loser). Vermont's electoral returns revealed a similar relationship. The largest effect in Vermont comes from moving from an SMD to a six-member district, resulting in an average vote share decrease of 0.15.

Table 3-2: The Impact of District Magnitude and Coordination on Candidate Vote Share

	Maryland	Vermont	New Jersey
District Magnitude			
Two Member District	-0.020	-0.040**	--
	(0.017)	(0.019)	
Three Member District	-0.049***	-0.044*	--
	(0.016)	(0.034)	
Six Member District	--	-0.151***	--
		(0.061)	
Shared incumbency advantage			
Number of Copartisan Incumbents	0.058***	0.064***	0.037**
	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Active Coordination			
Localized Fundraising Committee Spending	0.018**	--	0.002
	(0.008)		(0.001)
Number of Years as District Team	0.005***	<0.001	<0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Candidate Quality and Party Affiliation			
Incumbent	0.095***	0.181***	0.065***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.022)
Tenure	-0.003***	0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Leadership	-0.004	0.001	-0.022
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.024)
Campaign contributions	0.005*	0.202***	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.082)	(0.003)
Democrat	-0.109***	0.016	-0.138***
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.022)
Competition			
Proportion of Incumbents Competing	-0.109***	-0.103***	-0.065**
	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Competition	-0.116***	-0.345***	-0.128***
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.049)
District Partisan Favorability	0.934***	0.073*	1.194***
	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.203)
Senate	--	-0.043**	--
		(0.023)	
Year 2010	-0.008	0.013	--
	(0.009)	(0.015)	

Table 3-2 cont.

Year 2009	--	--	-0.012
			(0.013)
Constant	0.444***	1.163***	0.507***
	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.121)
Adjusted R-Squared	0.856	0.675	0.803
N	468	552	307

Source: Election returns and campaign finance data provided by the Maryland State Board of Elections, Vermont Secretary of State, New Jersey Department of State. Candidate information provided by the Sunlight Foundation and candidate websites.

Notes: Cell entries are ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10, one tailed tests. Standard errors corrected for clustering in parentheses.

What benefits do MMD candidates receive from competing alongside a copartisan incumbent? Table 3-2 shows that in all three states, the addition of copartisan incumbents significantly increases candidate vote share, as expected. These results suggest that MMD candidates who compete with copartisan incumbents, therefore, are able to overcome the disadvantages of competing in districts of larger magnitude. A hypothetical Maryland MMD candidate competing in a three-member district with two copartisan incumbents, for example, receives a lower vote share (by 0.049) due to the district magnitude, but is advantaged by 0.116 (0.58 x 2=0.116) by the presence of his incumbent colleagues, resulting in a net vote share advantage of 0.067 over a comparable SMD candidate competing with no copartisan district incumbents.

Active coordination (localized joint fundraising committee spending and number of years as a district team) often has a positive and significant effect on candidate vote share. Increases in *localized joint fundraising committee spending* and *number of years as district team* enhanced the vote share of candidates for the Maryland House of Delegates, but surprisingly does not have a consistent positive effect on the candidates competing for the other chambers. In Maryland, candidates who spend an additional $100,000

through their localized joint fundraising committee receive an average vote share increase of 0.018. Although the effect appears to be small, by this measure, in Maryland state legislative contests, more than 4 percent of contests were decided by margins smaller than 0.018. Localized joint fundraising committee spending also increases candidate vote share in New Jersey; however, the effect fails to reach statistical significance at conventional levels (p=0.147, one-tailed test).[35] The next measure of active coordination, the *number of years as a district team,* also has a positive effect on vote share. In Maryland, the average MMD incumbent delegate has represented the same district for about three years; this length of time is associated with a vote share increase of about 0.015 (0.005 x 3=0.015). The number of years as a team, however, fails to have a statistically significant effect on vote shares in Vermont or New Jersey. In these states, the results suggest that the incumbency status of one's district copartisans influences vote share more so than active coordination.

Many of the candidate quality and competition variables have the expected effect on vote share. Overall, candidate quality was important. Incumbent candidates in each contest enjoyed advantages over others, as did candidates who were able to raise more campaign money. The number of years the candidate has served in office (*tenure*), however, did not have a significant and positive effect; similarly, party leaders did not enjoy a significant advantage over others. Higher competition reduced the average vote share of each candidate, as expected. Conversely, candidates competing in districts containing a higher percentage of voters registered with their party enjoyed a significant advantage in contests for every office except for the Vermont Senate.

What district and candidate-level characteristics encourage voters to support an entire set of district copartisans? Table 3-3 shows that district magnitude, shared incumbency advantage, and active coordination had the expected effect on copartisan vote similarity. As district magnitude rises, voters in Maryland and Vermont are less likely to support the entire set of copartisan candidates competing in the district. The district magnitude coefficients almost double with each magnitude increase, suggesting that many MMD voters do not cast the full number of allowable votes. The results suggest that in MMDs, candidates receive the attention and support of smaller and smaller sets of voters than in SMDs. They support earlier studies that conclude that very large MMDs encourage candidates to establish and maintain narrow electoral coalitions (Ames 1995b; Schiller 2000).

Shared incumbency reduces the vote share disparity between copartisan MMD candidates, making it more difficult for challengers to target and defeat incumbents seeking reelection alongside other copartisans incumbents. Again, consider the example of defeated incumbent Joan Cadden (D). Cadden competed for reelection in 2006 in a three-member district without the benefit of a single district copartisan incumbent. Her District 31 Republican opponents enjoyed slightly higher levels of vote similarity, with a district average of 0.995 compared to the Democrats' 0.991, meaning that more voters supported the entire Republican team. The ability to turn out supporters for the entire copartisan candidate slate likely contributed to all three of the Republican candidates winning election. Note that the difference in vote similarity between the winning and losing sets of copartisans is only 0.004, which is similar in magnitude to the effect of adding one additional copartisan incumbent. In Vermont, the effect of adding copartisan

incumbents on vote similarity is even larger (see the second column of Table 3-3),

suggesting that shared incumbency advantage has an even larger effect in this state.

Table 3-3: The Impact of Shared Incumbency and Coordination on Copartisan Vote Similarity

	Maryland	Vermont	New Jersey	New Jersey
District Magnitude				
Two Member District	-0.373***	-0.492***	--	--
	(0.012)	(0.007)		
Three Member District	-0.692***	-0.951***	--	--
	(0.016)	(0.018)		
Six Member District	--	-2.338***	--	--
		(0.042)		
Shared Co-Partisan Advantage				
Number of Copartisan Incumbents	0.004*	0.016***	0.008	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.000)
Number of Copartisan candidates	0.343***	0.454***	--	0.498***
	(0.008)	(0.011)		(0.001)
Active Coordination				
Joint Fundraising Committee Spending	0.005***	--	0.001	<0.001
	(0.002)		(0.001)	(<0.001)
Number of Years as District Team	0.000	-0.000*	<0.001*	<0.001
	(<0.001)	(<0.001)	(<0.001)	(<0.001)
Candidate Quality and Party Affiliation				
Democrat	-0.014***	0.006	--	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.006)		(0.001)
Campaign contributions*	<0.001	-0.019	--	<0.001
	(<0.001)	(0.016)		(<0.001)
Competition				
Proportion of Incumbents Competing	-0.004	-0.014***	--	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.005)		(0.002)
Competition	0.002	0.006	--	-0.000
	(0.007)	(0.005)		(0.002)
District Partisan Favorability	-0.001	-0.009	--	0.003
	(0.020)	(0.013)		(0.004)
Senate	--	0.001	--	--
		(0.005)		
Year 2010	-0.005*	0.006**	--	--
	(0.003)	(0.003)		

Table 3-3 cont.

Year 2009	--	--	--	0.002***
				(0.001)
Constant	0.662***	0.539***	0.979***	-0.001
	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.003)
Adjusted R-squared	0.982	0.952	0.016	0.953
N	6404	1899	2038	2038

Source: Election returns and campaign finance data provided by the Maryland State Board of Elections, Vermont Secretary of State, New Jersey Department of State. Candidate information provided by the Sunlight Foundation and candidate websites.

Notes: Cell entries are ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10, one tailed tests. Standard errors corrected for clustering in parentheses. *Campaign contributions here are calculated as the sum of contributions to all copartisan candidates competing in the district in that election year (in hundreds of thousands of dollars).

Does active coordination enhance MMD copartisan vote similarity? Candidates who spend more through a joint candidate committee receive more similar levels of support to their copartisans, as expected. In Maryland, an additional $100,000 spent through a localized joint campaign committee increases vote similarity by 0.005, an effect similar in magnitude to adding one additional copartisan incumbent to the district team. The other measure of active coordination, *number of years as a district team*, however, did not have the expected effect on vote similarity in either state. This is unexpected given comments by current MMD legislators that suggest that voters grow "used to" a district team and continue to support them over several elections, even in rare circumstances going so far as to vote a split-ticket to maintain the team (as Donahue describes above). Nevertheless, the results suggest that additional years of experience do little to encourage voters to support the entire team, perhaps because voters are more responsive simply to a candidate's status as an incumbent, rather than their years of experience in the legislature.

Although the number of copartisan incumbents and joint committee spending have a positive influence of vote similarity in New Jersey, the coefficients fail to reach statistical significance at conventional levels. It is possible that odd year elections influenced voting behavior in New Jersey. As Coutinho speculates in the quote presented earlier in this chapter, odd year elections may be more likely to draw only the most politically active voters; these active voters are also more likely to be committed partisans. Therefore, joint spending and other attempts to coordinate on the campaign trail may do little to influence the level of similarity between two same-party candidates competing in the same New Jersey MMD, particularly when those who show up on Election Day are already likely to support the entire district team.

Summary

This chapter addressed seemingly contradictory perspectives of MMD campaigns. From one perspective, MMDs reduce reelection rates because incumbents find it more difficult to capture the support of voters and claim credit for their accomplishments because they must compete for attention among a broader range of candidates. A competing argument is that MMD candidates are able to rely on their district mates to maintain electoral security, allowing some MMD incumbents to maintain higher reelection rates than others. MMDs, from the latter perspective, do not make incumbents more vulnerable; rather, they inspire new campaign strategies and encourage a reliance on one's copartisan district mates.

The analyses provide support for the latter perspective: when competing in an MMD, a candidate's allies matter a great deal to his or her success. Shared incumbency advantages and active coordination help MMD incumbents to discourage challengers,

reach more potential voters, and spend campaign money more efficiently, and potential challengers understand that it is more difficult to defeat an established incumbent team or target vulnerable members of a team. In exploring the strategies that MMD candidates use to build and maintain support, I find that MMD candidates who compete alongside district copartisan incumbents enjoy a significant shared incumbency advantage. Those who form and spend more money through localized joint fundraising committees received larger vote shares and more similar levels of support compared to their copartisans. However, collaborative campaigning was expected to significantly advantage some MMD candidates over others, active collaboration did not have a large effect on electoral success. Rather, shared incumbency advantage and name recognition with one's district mate(s) bestowed a more significant advantage.

U.S. Senate elections are perhaps the most well recognized examples of U.S. MMD elections. Studies of campaigns for the U.S. Senate find that the Senate candidate's same-state colleague is often his or her chief rival for media attention (Schiller 2000, 86–87). In state legislative elections, however, media and voter attention is more often shared rather than jealously hoarded. Rather than compete for attention, many actively work together to build shared attention. One reason the dynamics of state legislative elections may be different from those of the U.S. Senate is because MMD state house and senate candidates appear on the ballot at the same time, rather than in staggered elections. The timing means that at the state legislative level, MMD candidates can build support concurrently rather than independently. An important part of their campaign strategy is to build a collective electoral coalition; they share costs and extending name recognition by

promoting the team with joint mailers and signs. They attend events and promote other

"team" candidates, and they reach more potential voters through their district copartisans.

This chapter explored the importance of campaign coordination to the electoral

strategy of MMD candidates. Does coordination continue when MMD candidates

become legislators? Do bonds and working relationships carry over from the campaign

trail to the state house? The following analyses address these questions with an analysis

of the legislative activity of representatives elected from both MMDs and SMDs.

Chapter 4: Representation and Attention to Local Issues

> I believe the time has come for single-member districts…that delegate would be more attentive and know the area much better than they would in a multimember district. So, is it a better service to the citizens and the taxpayers? Absolutely. - *U.S. Senator Joe Manchin (D-WV)*[1]

> Our house districts are essentially the same as our senate districts, which means that when I compare the size of a Maryland house district to a Virginia house district, for example, it's substantially larger. Substantially larger. So I think it's kind of an unusual thing, so you're covering the same legislative district as a senator, so therefore there's actually four of you representing the same constituents in the same district, which I think is good for the district. – *Maryland Delegate Brian Feldman (D)*[2]

One of the key decisions legislators face when crafting a legislative agenda is how much time and energy to devote to the needs of the local interests in their district. Some devote significant effort, whereas others spend more time building a career on broader issues that affect the entire state or nation. Delegate Tawanna Gaines (D), of Maryland's Prince George's County, typically falls into the former category. During the 2010 legislative session, Gaines introduced five bills, four of which responded to the needs of specific towns and neighborhoods within her three-member district. One bill, HB 643, devoted state funds to construct a YMCA facility in Hyattsville, a town in her district. Another, HB 326, directed funds to a community facility in Edmonston, another community in Gaines's home district.[3] In contrast, Maryland Delegate Benjamin Kramer (D), also a member of a three-member district, introduced ten bills, none of which related to interests specific to his home district. The legislation he introduced sought to amend regulations for health insurance providers in Maryland; to protect senior citizens living in nursing homes; and to protect homeowners seeking reverse mortgages, among other subjects.

A broad theme of this study is that electoral systems structure legislative behavior. Preparation for reelection influences many of the decisions legislators make, from which legislation to introduce and sponsor, to which position to adopt when communicating with constituents or participating in roll call votes (Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974b). As an important feature of an electoral system, district magnitude has been thought to influence the degree to which legislators work with local versus broad issues. As the quotes above suggest, however, the relationship between district magnitude and local representation is far from clear. Recall from Chapter 2 that scholars theorized that MMDs would encourage legislators to focus on broad concerns at the expense of local interests (Ashworth and Bueno De Mesquita 2006; Duverger 1951; Hamilton 1967; Klain 1955). However, many empirical studies find the opposite, that MMD legislators are more likely than those in SMDs to advocate for local interests (Dauer 1966; Snyder and Ueda 2007). This chapter considers these opposing perspectives and brings new empirical evidence to bear on the subject. What is the effect of district magnitude on legislators' tendency to respond to local concerns as opposed to broad issues? Are constituents residing in MMDs receiving a different character or quality of representation than those in SMDs?

To examine these questions, I conducted interviews with state legislators elected in both MMDs and SMDs and collected and analyzed a data set of the legislative actions of state legislators from Maryland, Arizona, and Vermont. Recall that, because district magnitude does not vary and the number of district copartisans typically does not vary in New Jersey, members of the New Jersey Assembly are not included in the statistical analyses in this chapter. However, quotes from New Jersey legislators provide useful insight and are included where relevant.

The results suggest that MMD legislators spend a larger portion of their time in office drafting and sponsoring legislation that pertains to specific local interests. However, the relationship between district magnitude and local advocacy is more complex than previously thought. Other factors, such as whether the members of an MMD share a political party affiliation, also influence the extent to which legislators focus on local issues.

District Magnitude and Local Representation

Elected officials are constantly working to respond to the needs of disparate constituencies. When they represent districts, as opposed to an entire state or nation at-large, there is a divide between the needs of the broader constituencies and those of the home district. As they seek to meet the demands of both a broad and local constituency, they must respond to interests that are both "private and public… acting for a single principal or organization and acting for a constituency" (Pitkin 1967, 214). Because time and resources are limited, they cannot possibly respond to all of these demands. A legislator that spends time dealing with a local issue, such as securing funding for a ball field or community center, has less time to devote to broader concerns, such as improving access to health care. Given the complexity of meeting diverse needs while seeking to build a winning reelection coalition, it is easy to see why maintaining a balance between representation of local and broad concerns has been described as one of the major "dilemmas" of representation (Pitkin 1967, 215).

Legislators respond to the concerns of the district constituency in part because these efforts generate electoral benefits (Arnold 1990; Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974b). They introduce legislation pertaining to local interests and issues to claim credit for

accomplishments that many of the voters in their district consider to be important (Ferejohn 1974; Mayhew 1974b). Electoral structures influence these incentives and the behavior of elected officials. Recognizing this, scholars have long thought that district magnitude influences attention to the needs of the district. However, the current scholarship offers two contradictory perspectives. The first predicts that multimember as opposed to single member districts discourage legislators from working for local interests because MMD legislators have weaker ties to district constituents, reducing the incentive to work with local interests and secure pork (Jewell 1982b; Lancaster 1986). Legislators who are the sole representatives of a district are expected to have stronger ties to local constituents because they are exclusively reliant on the district voters for reelection (Dahl and Lindblom 1953). Also in support of the first perspective, some have argued that local representation may be more difficult for MMD representatives because of the incentive to free ride on the efforts of ones' district mates. Because legislators in MMDs share a constituency, credit for locally oriented legislative achievements may be shared among the members of the delegation, reducing the benefit each legislator receives (Ashworth and Bueno De Mesquita 2006; Hamilton 1967; Klain 1955). What incentive do MMD legislators have to build a strong record of local accomplishments when other legislators may receive similar credit, despite contributing less to the effort?

The second perspective predicts the opposite: that MMDs, at least in certain electoral systems, encourage legislators to advocate for local interests. The comparative politics literature indicates that the way ballots are structured and the rules that govern how votes are cast influence the relationship between district magnitude and representation. Of particular importance is whether candidates are listed individually

(open list) or as part of a party list (closed list). Larger district magnitudes are expected to reduce interest in local concerns under closed list elections because candidates draw electoral support from the party rather than develop a strong personal vote (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Carey and Shugart 1995). Studies that compare legislators elected in SMDs to those in MMDs, in contrast, find that candidates tend to spend more time advocating for local interests and building a record of personal accomplishment (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Carey and Shugart 1995). French Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), for example, are elected at-large by closed list elections. Surveys of French MEPs show that they are more likely to describe themselves as representatives of the entire nation rather than distinct sub-constituencies; they also participated in fewer constituency-oriented activities in comparison to British MEPs elected from individual SMDs (Scholl 1986). Legislators in the National Congress of Brazil, elected by open list in MMDs, spend most of their time securing funding for projects that benefit specific municipalities and neighborhoods (Ames 1995a). In the U.S., MMD elections follow plurality voting rules and are similar to open list proportional representation (PR) systems in that they allow voters to cast ballots for individual candidates. Given the voting rules in the U.S., these studies suggest that, similar to the Brazilian representatives, state legislators elected in MMDs would be more interested in local interests than those elected in SMDs.

Proponents of the second perspective also offer an answer to the free riding argument. Rather than free ride on the efforts of their district mates, members of MMD delegations may instead collaborate to represent the interests of a shared constituency. For example, MMD legislators who share a constituency cosponsor more legislation

together than others, even if they do not share the same party affiliation as their district-mate (Kirkland 2012). Furthermore, recall that representatives who share an MMD have higher roll call voting cohesion scores than others (Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson 1981; Jewell 1982b). Because they are likely to vote the same way on legislation that affects their local constituency, MMD delegations may be powerful voting blocs, allowing them to promote and pass more legislation that benefits the district. Evidence of frequent collaboration among district mates suggests that MMD representatives may not be particularly concerned with the problem of free riding.

Which perspective is more accurate? Empirical studies offer mixed conclusions. The handful of empirical studies that examine the relationship between district magnitude and the local responsiveness of state legislators rely primarily on two forms of evidence: survey results, and the distribution of state funding. The survey studies of state legislators ask respondents to indicate how much time they spend working with constituency concerns (e.g., Freeman and Richardson 1996; Jewell 1982). These studies have produced mixed results, which may be explained by variations in question wording. For example, relying on different surveys of state legislators, Jewell (1982) concludes that MMDs discourage legislators from responding to constituents, but Freeman and Richardson (1996) find the opposite: a positive relationship between district magnitude and constituency responsiveness.

Analyses of resource distributions compare the level of state funding allocated to municipalities represented by state legislators elected in MMDs to those represented by SMDs, and find that MMD-represented municipalities receive more state funding on average (Dauer 1966; Snyder and Ueda 2007). They conclude that sharing a constituency

encourages district mates to work on local issues as a team, putting them in a better position to secure funding for their district and allowing them to overcome the free riding problem. For example, U.S. municipalities represented by MMDs in the state legislature receive more state aid on average than others represented by SMDs (Dauer 1966; Snyder and Ueda 2007). MMD legislators represent "natural economic communities," such as cities, towns, or counties, may act as more effective legislative advocates for these local interests. Although SMDs tend to elect representatives with strong ties to the home constituency, they also divide up a geographic area into small districts and may encourage divisiveness; legislators elected in SMDs, therefore, may be less likely to collaborate on collective projects than those in MMDs (Snyder and Ueda 2007).

Local Representation from the MMD Legislator's Perspective

Conversations with state legislators in both MMDs and SMDs provide some insight and suggest, notably, that most MMD legislators adopt a collaborative approach to local representation. The legislators indicated that district constituents place significant demands on them, and that those in MMDs often coordinate with their district mates to meet these demands. In some cases, constituents bring their concerns directly to the state senator or representative and ask them to introduce legislation on their behalf. The subject matter of these local concerns vary significantly, from securing funding for improvements to a town main street to altering local hunting rights.

Recall that I will not conduct statistical analyses of legislative action in the New Jersey General Assembly because, typically, all but one legislative district in that chamber is represented by two members of the same party, making it difficult to estimate the effects of district magnitude and shared party affiliation through a comparison of

Assemblymen. Although they are not useful for the statistical tests, quotes from legislators in New Jersey provide important insight into the strategies MMD legislators adopt to represent a district together. For example, New Jersey Assemblyman Gary Chiusano (R) described the legislation he drafted to help farmers protect their crops from local wildlife with the help of his district mate, Assemblywomen Alison McHose (R), and State Senator Steven Oroho (R), who shares a constituency with the two Assembly members.

> The farmers here are losing crops, costing them thousands and thousands of dollars. So we'll put sometimes in bills that will expand the rights of farmers or hunters or the right to carry a gun, and in this current environment, in our situation we don't think the Democratic controlled majority will pass those bills, but our constituents still ask us to put them through. They want us to try, so we have to do that.[4]

A number of diverse issues may dominate the local politics of a legislative district. State representatives must address these issues to remain in touch with the concerns of a significant portion of their constituency. In Arizona, for example, military and agricultural issues are particularly important to constituents in certain parts of the state. As Arizona House Speaker Andy Tobin (R) describes, state representatives in many Arizona state legislative districts spend a significant amount of time advocating for local interests because they recognize that building a positive record on those issues is essential to their political survival.

> You go down to Yuma, they're unemployment rate is 25%; they're a military community, big Ag [sic] world, and once you get out of Yuma, you've got airbases and agriculture… of course you've got education and all the other issues… you need to make sure you're on board with those issues…[5]

Although many equate local advocacy with pork barrel politics, many of the local concerns brought up by the legislators did not involve obtaining state funding. For

example, Vermont State Representative Jim Masland (D), discussing his working relationship with his district mate, Representative Margaret Cheney (D), mentions that they work together to ensure that local opinion finds its way into the policymaking process.

> I was also on the League of Cities and Towns… Margaret and I work together on that sort of stuff and we work sort of tag team with the agency that's at issue or the committee at issue or that sort of stuff like that. Sometimes it is not so much monetary things as getting policy right and legislation right.[6]

Many MMD legislators indicated that serving alongside district mates facilitates advocacy for local concerns because they are able to work together on issues that matter to their shared constituency. In Maryland, Delegates sharing three-member districts often support each other's efforts to secure funding for local projects. Recall that Gaines, for example, introduced four district-specific bills during the 2012 legislative session. Her district mates, Delegates Anne Healy (D) and Justin Ross (D), cosponsored all of Gaines's legislation.[7] In Arizona, Representative David Stevens (R) notes that working with his district-mate, Representative Peggy Judd (R), and the senator that shares their constituency, Senator Gail Griffin (R), allows the three legislators to address a broader range of issues. As Stevens describes, one member of the MMD delegation decides to introduce the local legislation, and the other legislators cosponsor and help to promote that legislation (the "division of labor" among MMD delegations is explored in greater detail in Chapter 5).

> We tend to have our own legislation, and if something comes up specific to our own district, generally one of us will head it up, and the other two will support it, the senator and the other house member. That way we can branch out and cover more area.[8]

Arizona State Representative Steve Court (R) also talks about working with his district-mate, Representative Cecil Ash (R), to draft and influence legislation that affects the city of Mesa, Arizona.

> We work together. We speak together almost daily. I'll hear of an issue that maybe affects our district, and we can talk about it, maybe share resources on how to handle it. But, since our district covers just part of one city, we can kind of concentrate our efforts on issues that our city may have with legislation that's moving through here and help to work through some solutions.[9]

Similarly, in Vermont's Washington-5 legislative district, Representatives Warren Kitzmiller (D) and Mary Hooper (D) work together to promote the interests of local municipalities. Kitzmiller notes, however, that because of Hooper's background in municipal politics, she often takes the lead when addressing local concerns.

> Yes, if there's something… we have sort of a working relationship that, she takes the lead on truly municipal issues because she was the mayor. She knows the municipal government better than I, I don't consider myself part of municipal government. I'm not beholden to the city manager or the city council, I'm beholden only to the citizens. So Mary tends to take the lead if it's really a municipal issue.[10]

> One Republican state delegate described legislation introduced during the 2012 session that would fund a local volunteer fire hall. The senator and three legislators who share the constituency are promoting the legislation as a team.

> Yes, I'm working with the Senator on it, the two of us are working together. And we'll pull the other two in on it as well, when we go forward it will be a "district" initiative, and we hope to get the other two to sign on and I'm hopeful they will… The two of them are very close. They share an office. And they've been in together, and I think probably personally they're good friends. And it's a little bit different because I was a staffer. But now that I'm a delegate, I'm the lowly freshman. And I'll say to them "this isn't my job. One of you should be doing this." Because I'm the lowest member in this delegation. And I don't want to be their staffer.[11]

> Maryland Delegate Brian Feldman (D) notes that he will cooperate with the district mates to secure state funding for local interests.

You know, when we cooperate is when there are what we call bond bills, capital projects for our district, for our county. Specific things for our district. We work together a lot on constituent issues that are impacting our district…So in our case, our collaboration comes mainly when it comes to constituent matters, Montgomery County broad issues…[12]

State legislators also noted that advocating for local interests extends beyond the formal legislative process. New Jersey Assembly members Chiusano, McHose, and Oroho, for example, write letters and meet state and local officials to advocate for constituents as a team. This approach may allow these legislators to influence more decisions that affect their district. Chiusano notes, for example, that the three legislators often help local groups secure state funding.

It's usually the three of us will work in concert. We'll send a letter to the approving authority, or the funding authority, and it will come from all three of us…[13]

Vermont Speaker Shap Smith (D), elected from a two-member district, also notes that serving local interests involves using the influence of the office to persuade state officials. Persuasion is coordinated among those legislators that share the constituency.

You know, so I look at it as a team approach with Rep. Peltz and with the senator from the county, with regard to the truck route and also with regard to the courthouse financing. Senator Westman and I talked a little bit about, you know, "what are we going to do here?" And I made it clear that I would make a call to the secretary of administration about the courthouse, and then we've both kept in close contact with the secretary of transportation with regard to the truck route.[14]

MMD district-mates also show their support for local organized groups coordinating responses to letters and solicitations from these local governments and organizations. Again, Kitzmiller's comments on his relationship with district-mate Hooper illustrate the strategy:

We are friends, and we're both Democrats, and we coordinate quite a bit. Through emails or phone calls, or just something like 'did you see that letter from so and

90

so today? Do we need to respond to that?' 'Are you going to the blah blah blah meeting, should we share a ride, or should we not bother going?'[15]

Legislators who share a constituency are often in agreement on local issues even when they are from opposing political parties. They work together to move legislation through the policy process and vote as a bloc when that legislation comes to the floor. Here, Arizona Representative Lynne Pancrazi (D), serving in a two-member district, describes working together with her district-mate, Representative Russ Jones (R), to introduce and promote local legislation.

> Yes… he makes sure I sign on to the legislation he runs, because as a minority member and a veto proof majority, any bill that I would propose would more than likely not go anywhere. It would go through committee but it would never make it to the floor. And so I sign on to the legislation… a lot of the legislation he runs is legislation I wanted or asked for and he runs it.[16]

> As Arizona House Speaker Tobin describes, many of the Arizona legislators who

share a two member have nearly identical voting records on local issues, even though they do not share a party.

> …we have a Republican and Democrat representing down there, and they're on the same page on those issues – they're almost synonymous on their voting record.[17]

Arizona Representative Tom Chabin (D) also notes that legislation that affects MMD legislator's shared constituency tends to inspire bipartisan cooperation.

> Mostly it has to do with communities within the district, just so we both know. And a piece of legislation that's important to our constituencies. And it's all pretty much non-partisan, if he was a Republican we'd probably… we'd work on our respective caucuses.[18]

> The legislators indicate that, contrary to the first perspective presented above,

MMD representatives spend a great deal of time responding to the concerns of their local constituency. Legislators who share a constituency tend to have common interests. Many

MMD legislators recognize that by teaming up to promote local interests, they extend their power and influence and are able to accomplish more. Many are able to coordinate advocacy for a broad range of local interests; they can attend more events organized by local groups (as noted in Chapter 3), influence legislative and administrative decisions that affect their constituents, and secure resources for local projects.

Representation and Legislative Action

Although the interviews with state legislators provide some suggestive evidence of attention to local issues from those elected in MMDs, the effects of district magnitude remain unclear. The following analysis relies on a unique data set of legislative sponsorships and cosponsorships to measure the attention legislators pay to local concerns during the agenda setting and policy formulation stages of the policymaking process. This approach is unique from previous studies that rely on surveys or on resource distributions. By focusing on the legislative agenda as opposed to resource distribution, this analysis formally recognizes that there is more to local legislative representation than securing funding. For example, state legislative bills that apply to only a specific district, county, or municipality include those that regulate utility companies in a particular county, define rules for hunting and fishing in certain parts of the state, or change the names of public buildings (Gamm and Kousser 2010).

To form a representative sample of legislative action, I drew random samples bills from Maryland and Arizona consisting of 2,000 bills introduced in the Maryland House of Delegates during the 2007 through 2010 sessions and 1,500 bills introduced in the 2009, 2010, and 2011 sessions of the Arizona House of Representatives. Because Vermont legislators typically introduce less legislation during the session, I was able to

include all 794 bills introduced in the Vermont House of Representatives during the 2009 and 2010 session. The sample size differs by state due to the yearly productivity of the legislature.[19]

Legislation was coded according to the geographic region of the state that it would affect to identify actions that target local interests. The coding scheme is similar to that of Gamm and Kousser (2010), who analyze bill introductions to measure the degree to which legislatures focus on broad versus particularistic bills. The data set and coding procedure for this chapter is unique, however, because it is designed for an analysis of legislative actions (sponsorships and cosponsorships), allowing for comparisons within legislatures rather than between states.

I defined six categories to capture the geographic extent of each bill included in the sample: *statewide, county, municipality, local organization, general local*, and *other*. Statewide bills apply to the entire state (e.g., Maryland HB1328, which would repeal the death penalty in the state). County bills relate to a specific county (e.g., Maryland HB914, a bill that would alter the constant yield tax rate, but only in Cecil County); municipal bills relate to a specific municipality (e.g., Maryland HB1383, which would alter the employee pension system for those employed by the Town of University Park); local organization bills relate to specific local groups or organizations, such as schools, libraries, etc. (e.g., Maryland HB117, which would provide funding for Camp Brighton Woods). General local bills refer to all local governments, and the other category encompasses bills that cover more than one category. Table 4-1 provides examples of legislation introduced in the Maryland General Assembly and the geographic code

assigned. Note that the geographic code is assigned according to the constituents that the

proposed legislation would affect.

Table 4-1: Geographic Codes for Maryland General Assembly Legislation

Bill Number	Session	Title	Affected Constituents	Geographic Code
HB 1328	2008	Criminal Law - Death Penalty - Repeal	State	State
HB 525	2009	State Government - Commemorative Months - Black History Months	State	State
HB 1207	2010	Deer Hunting on Private Property on Sundays*	Calvert County	County
HB 914	2010	Cecil County Property Tax Rate - Constant Yield Tax Rate	Cecil County	County
HB 1334	2009	Baltimore City Charter - East Baltimore Community Benefits District	Baltimore / East Baltimore	Municipal
HB 1383	2009	Town of University Park Employees - Participation in the Employees' Pension System	University Park	Municipal
HB 117	2010	Creation of a State Debt - Montgomery County - Camp Brighton Woods	Camp Brighton Woods	Local Organization
HB 502	2008	Anne Arundel County - Historic London Town Visitors Center and Museum Loan of 2001	London Town Visitors Center and Museum	Local Organization
HB 397	2008	Local Governments - Collective Bargaining - Citizen Votes	All Local Government	General Local
HB 811	2009	State Treasurer - Local Government Units - Local Debt Policies	All Local Governments	General Local

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Maryland General Assembly and the Sunlight Foundation. *Although the title of HB 1207 does not mention a specific county, the text of the bill states that the provisions of the law would only apply to residents of Calvert County.

Table 4-2 displays the distribution of legislation across the geographic categories. The majority of legislation in each of the three states relate to statewide issues. There are a number of reasons that state level legislation dominates the agenda. State level bills often propose sweeping change and draw a large number of cosponsors from across the state. What is more, most issues pertain to interests that are spread across the state, rather than those that concern only constituents within the home district (see Chapter 5 for a list of the most common issues covered by these state legislatures).

Some differences are readily apparent across the states. Maryland legislators introduced far more bills relating to specific counties than those in Arizona or Vermont. Representatives in Vermont, alternatively, introduced the most legislation pertaining to municipalities, which is not surprising given the attention in Vermont to the town as a fundamental unit of government. Arizona legislatures introduced far fewer bills pertaining to specific counties, municipalities, and groups than those in Vermont or Maryland. Rather, the Arizona bills that did concern local more often pertained to all, as opposed to specific, local governments. Only 2.6 percent of bills related to local organizations or locations within Arizona. In comparison, of the bills introduced in the Maryland General Assembly and Vermont House of Representatives, almost 25 and 7 percent, respectively, concerned specific counties, municipalities, or organizations.

Table 4-2: The Geographic Scope of Legislation by State

	Maryland	Vermont	Arizona
State	73.19%	86.65%	86.31%
County	12.33	0.5	0.53
Municipal	3.34	4.53	0.8
Local organization	9.19	2.02	1.27
General Local	1.6	5.04	10.82
Other/Combination	0.35	1.26	0.27
N	2,000	794	1,500

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Maryland General Assembly, the Vermont Legislature, the Arizona State Legislature, and the Sunlight Foundation.

Notes: Legislative actions include bills sponsored and cosponsored by lower-chamber legislators. The sample is drawn from the 2007 through 2010 sessions of the Maryland General Assembly, the 2009-2010 session of the Vermont House of Representatives, and the 2009, 2010, and 2011 sessions of the Arizona House of Representatives. χ^2=753.71, p<.001.

Political history and legislative procedure may explain some of these differences. Arizona politics, for example, has been dominated in recent years by the issue of illegal immigration, which may discourage certain legislators from pursuing district-specific legislation for fear of being perceived as seeking handouts for "undeserving" constituents. Maryland, on the other hand, is a long-standing bastion of the Democratic Party, and home to a constituency that is relatively comfortable with the expansive role of government. Term limits may also be an important part of the story. One study, for example, finds that term limits discourage legislators from securing pork for their home district, encouraging them to focus their energy instead on broader concerns (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998).

To measure relative attention to local issues, I calculate the percentage of locally oriented legislative actions in a state legislator's session agenda. The variable *local action* is the sum of county, municipal, local organization, and general local actions divided by the sum of statewide legislative actions taken during that session. The legislative records

of Gaines and Kramer, the Democratic Maryland MMD legislators discussed at the beginning of the chapter, illustrate the measure. During the 2010 legislative session, the average Maryland delegate devoted 9 percent of his or her legislative actions to local issues (see the Appendix for summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis). Gaines devoted 25 percent of her legislative actions to local issues in 2010, 16 percentage points above the mean, reflecting her emphasis on local issues. Kramer, in contrast, fell well below the average, devoting only 6 percent of his legislative actions to local issues, indicating his relative attention to statewide matters.

District Magnitude

Do MMD legislators introduce more locally oriented legislation than those elected in SMDs? Recall that, in MMDs, the personal vote tends to be more important to electoral success, encouraging candidates to introduce more legislation that adds to their personal record of accomplishments (Carey and Shugart 1995). Furthermore, because MMD legislators work together on local issues, they may be able to count on the support of their district mates, particularly when it comes to local, non-partisan issues that are important to their shared constituency (e.g., Kirkland 2012). MMD legislators' ability to work together may allow them to respond to more local concerns and build a more diverse record of accomplishment. Therefore, I expect legislators elected in MMDs to devote a larger portion of their legislation to local issues than those in SMDs.

The variables *two-member district* and *three-member district* (coded 1 if the legislator is elected from a two or three member district, respectively, and 0 otherwise) account for district magnitude. Members of the Maryland House of Delegates are elected from one, two, or three member districts; the Vermont House of Representatives are

elected from one or two-member districts; and all members of the Arizona House of

Representatives are elected from two-member districts. To illustrate the distribution of

legislative action by district magnitude, Table 4-3 displays the geographic focus of

legislation introduced by Maryland Delegates. As district magnitude rises, legislators

devoted smaller percentages of their legislative actions to statewide issues, and larger to

local issues. Of course, several other factors are also expected to influence legislative

attention to local issues; these will be examined and incorporated into a more robust

analysis to follow.

Table 4-3: District Magnitude and the Scope of Legislative Action of the Maryland Delegates

	One Member District	Two Member District	Three Member District
State	90.77%	88.75%	87.51%
County	3.09	3.64	2.05
Municipal	0.88	1.36	2.38
Local organization	2.68	3.36	5.21
General Local	2.26	2.32	2.11
Other/Combination	0.32	0.56	0.74
N	2,167	2,498	11,832

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Maryland General Assembly and the Sunlight Foundation.

Notes: Data are based upon a random sample of 2,000 bills sponsored and cosponsored by Maryland Delegates during the 2007 through 2010 legislative sessions. A legislative action is a bill sponsorship or cosponsorship. χ^2=96.74, p<.001.

Shared Party Affiliation

Because they represent the same constituency, an MMD legislator's district mates

are potential allies, particularly when it comes to issues that affect the district. By

working together, they may be able to advocate for a broader range of local interests. One

might expect legislators who share a party and a constituency, therefore, to form a natural

team and introduce more local legislation together. There is a strong argument, however, that sharing a party with one's district-mate may in fact reduce attention to the district. Because MMD legislators must develop a personal and unique record of accomplishments, legislators that share a party may fear that the benefits of their accomplishments would accrue equally to the entire team of copartisans, regardless of the relative effort of each legislator. U.S. senators who share a state and a party, for example, must work harder to distinguish themselves, which in some cases discourages collaboration (Schiller 2000). When district-mates share a party, potential supporters are less likely to be able to distinguish their individual accomplishments, enhancing the possibility of free riding (Ashworth and Bueno De Mesquita 2006). Therefore, I expect *shared party affiliation* (coded 1 if the legislator has the same political party affiliation as his or her district-mates, and 0 otherwise) to reduce attention to local issues relative to statewide concerns.

Party affiliation is also expected to influence legislative action. Members of the majority party, for example, may face different incentives to develop a personal record of accomplishment because they are able to rely more heavily on the party label to win reelection. Furthermore, majority party members may introduce more local legislation as a team because they are able to use their collective influence and the perquisites of majority party status to shepherd it through the legislative process. It follows that the effect of shared party affiliation may be less significant for majority than for minority party members. To examine this possibility, I include the interaction *Shared party affiliation x Democrat* (the party affiliation variable, *Democrat,* is coded as 1 if the legislator is a Democrat, 0 otherwise). The interaction term is expected to be positive,

reducing the negative effect of shared party affiliation, in the states in which Democrats are in the legislative majority (Maryland and Vermont), and negative where they are the minority (Arizona).

The party of the governor may also influence state legislator's attention to local matters. Members of the "out-party" have less control over the distribution of state resources and are more likely to face the threat of the governor's veto (Alt and Lowry 2000). Therefore, legislators who do not share the party of the governor, knowing that they will not be able to enact a broad agenda, may introduce fewer local initiatives than others because they recognize that their success rate may be less than desired. Because the party of the governor in the selected states does not change during the time period under consideration, however, no additional variables beyond party affiliation are required to account for the effect of sharing the party of the governor.

District Characteristics and Demand for Local Legislation

Several district characteristics may influence attention to local issues. As was demonstrated in Table 4-1, much of what is defined as local legislation pertains to counties and municipalities. Although legislators represent equal numbers of constituents on average, their district may span multiple local governments, or fall within only one. The number of local governments and geographic distribution of the district may influence the demand for local legislation. More compact districts might encourage representatives to pursue more local issues because, regardless of district magnitude, in these districts it is more likely that a legislator could draft an agenda based largely on local concerns that is popular among a majority of the district constituency, thereby increasing the payoff of local advocacy. State legislators in larger states, for example,

passed smaller percentages of district-oriented bills on average than those in more compact states (Gamm and Kousser 2010).

I measure three district characteristics that may influence attention to local issues. These were compiled from data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.[20] Each of these is expected to negatively influence local action. The first district characteristic is the *Number of counties* spanned by the legislative district. The second is the *Number of municipalities* within the district.[21] Legislative districts vary significantly in terms of local government. For example, the three-member district 28 in Maryland follows the geographic boundaries of Charles County. Similarly, Maryland's district 43 is entirely contained within Baltimore City. Legislators in District 28 and District 43 are more likely to take action on Charles County and Baltimore City issues, respectively, because these efforts will impact the entire home district. In contrast, the state's two-member District 37B covers parts of four counties (Caroline, Dorchester, Talbot, and Wicomico). Legislation that pertains to specific counties or municipalities would only affect a small percentage of the District 37B constituency. In addition to including the number of local governments spanned by the legislative district, I also measure geographic size (*area*, in square miles).

Legislator Characteristics

Leadership positions, experience, party affiliation, and participation in the legislative process may also influence a legislator's tendency to focus on local issues. Institutional positions bestow greater influence over the legislative process, and may allow legislators to act as more active advocates for their home district. Party leaders (*Leadership*, coded one for the Speaker, Majority Leader, Minority Leader, and Majority

and Minority Whips, and zero otherwise) and *Committee chairs* (coded 1 for committee chairs and 0 otherwise), for example, may have the opportunity to take action on more locally oriented legislation. Likewise, members of the *Appropriations Committee* (coded 1 for members, 0 otherwise) are in an advantageous position to advocate for local interests because of their influence over the distribution of state funds. Therefore, legislators in these institutional positions are expected to devote a larger percentage of their legislative actions to local issues.

Some legislators are also more active participants in the legislative process than others. During the Vermont House of Representative's 2009 to 2010 session, for example, the least active legislator sponsored only one bill, and the most active sponsored 86. The ability to more actively pursue legislation over the short time period of the legislative session may indicate greater legislative skill and experience, which may allow legislators to more actively advocate for the home district. To control for this possibility, I measure participation as *total bills sponsored* (incorporating both primary and cosponsorships). Similarly, those who did not serve the entire legislative session, either due to scandal, early retirement, or death, may not have had a chance to pursue a complete legislative agenda. I control for this possibility with the variable *Partial session* (coded 1 if the legislator did not serve the entire session, and 0 otherwise).[22] Furthermore, legislators with more experience may have developed closer ties with local officials and leaders of local organizations. Therefore, they are expected to be in closer touch with local concerns. *Tenure*, measured as the number of years the legislator has served in the chamber, is expected to positively influence the percentage of legislative actions that pertain to local issues.

The party affiliation of the legislator (*Democrat*, coded 1 if Democrat and 0 otherwise) may also influence their tendency to advocate for local interests. Republicans typically advertise themselves as the party of small government and seek to eliminate or reduce government spending, which may discourage members of the Republican Party from seeking state funding or intervention on behalf of only their district. Democrats, therefore, are expected to devote a larger percentage of their legislative actions to local issues. The Vermont legislature, however, is unique in that it routinely elects members of third parties. I also control for *Minor party affiliation* in the analyses that include Vermont Representatives (coded 1 for minor party members, and 0 otherwise).

Methods

The dependent variable, local action, is a continuous measure; therefore, ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is appropriate. However, legislators are grouped into districts, which may influence the standard errors estimated by ordinary least squares. To correct for the possible bias due to clustering, I use methods developed to account for the clustered nature of the data when calculating standard errors (Harden 2011). Furthermore, because the data include legislators from multiple sessions in Maryland and Arizona, I include dummy variables for legislative sessions to account for any possible differences due to time.

Results

The results indicate that, as expected, larger district magnitude encourages legislators to devote a greater percentage of their legislative actions to local issues, sponsoring more bills relating to local government, counties, municipalities, and local organizations. Also, in general, those who represent an MMD alongside another member

of the same party devote less of their time to local issues. Although these general conclusions hold in each state in the analysis, the size and significance of the effects differ somewhat by legislative institution. Below I discuss the results separately by state.

Maryland

The results of the analysis of the legislative actions of Maryland Delegates are shown in Table 4-4. As expected, legislators in two- and three-member districts spend proportionally more time sponsoring locally oriented legislation, even when controlling for the variety of district and legislator characteristics. On average, legislators in two and three member districts devote 6 and 7 percent more of their legislative actions to locally oriented legislation, respectively, than those in single members districts. However, the coefficients for two- and three-member districts are not statistically different from one another (Wald joint test of significance, $p<0.48$), suggesting that as a group, MMD legislators adopt different legislative strategies than those in SMDs. These findings are consistent with a similar study that analyzes fundraising strategy as district magnitude increases and finds differences between SMD and MMD legislators, but no significant differences between the strategies of candidates competing in two and three member districts (Curry, Herrnson, and Taylor 2013).

Table 4-4: The Impact of District Magnitude on the Local Legislative Action in the Maryland House of Delegates

	Coefficient	Standard Error
District magnitude		
Two member district	0.060*	(0.045)
Three member district	0.070*	(0.043)
Shared party affiliation		
Shared party affiliation	-0.045	(0.040)
Shared party affiliation x Democrat	-0.004	(0.030)
Demand for local legislation		
Number of counties	0.036**	(0.012)
Number of municipalities	-0.001	(0.003)
Area	-0.000	(0.000)
Legislator characteristics		
Total bills sponsored	-0.001**	(0.000)
Leadership	0.047*	(0.029)
Committee chair	0.061**	(0.025)
Appropriations committee	0.007	(0.014)
Democrat	0.035*	(0.027)
Tenure	<0.001	(0.001)
Partial session	-0.036**	(0.012)
Legislative sessions		
Session 2008	-0.081**	(0.007)
Session 2009	-0.069**	(0.008)
Session 2010	-0.087**	(0.008)
Constant	0.137**	(0.028)
Adjusted R-squared	0.282	
N	565	

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Maryland General Assembly, the Vermont Legislature, the Arizona State Legislature, the Sunlight Foundation, and the United States Census Bureau.

Notes: Coefficients are ordinary least squares regression coefficients. Standard errors are corrected for clustering. **p<0.05 *p<0.10, one tailed test.

The Maryland results also lend some suggestive support to the expectation that sharing a party affiliation with one's district mate discourages attention to local issues. Maryland Democrats, on average, spend 3.5 percent more time drafting and sponsoring local legislation than Republicans in the state; Democrats serving in MMDs with Democratic copartisans, however, devote slightly less (3.1 percent) of their time to local issues (Shared party affiliation and Shared party affiliation x Democrat for the Maryland regression are jointly significant; Wald test of significance, p<.04). Although the effect is statistically significant and in the expected direction, the size of the coefficient indicates that sharing a party affiliation with one's district mate has little substantive effect on Maryland legislators' tendency to pursue local as opposed to statewide issues.

Many of the control variables have significant and expected effects. Party leaders and committee chairs devoted a larger percentage of their legislative action to local issues. Furthermore, legislators who only served a partial session devoted a smaller percentage of their time to local issues, on average. Surprisingly, legislators serving in districts that span multiple counties introduced more local legislation than those who represented fewer, calling findings drawn from previous studies into question (Gamm and Kousser 2010). It is possible that, instead of discouraging local action, the diverse demands that these counties place on their representatives actually encouraged it. The number of municipalities in the home district and the geographic size, however, did not have a significant effect on local attention.

Arizona

Because district magnitude is fixed at two for all Arizona House districts, the analysis in this state examines the influence of serving in an MMD with a copartisan. The

findings indicate that serving in a district with a copartisan has a larger effect on legislators in Arizona than in Maryland. Table 4-5 displays the results. Recall that serving in an MMD with a copartisan is expected to have a less substantial effect on members of the majority party than others. As expected, shared party affiliation has a smaller effect on the local action of Arizona Republicans (the majority party) than for Democrats (Shared party affiliation and Shared party affiliation x Democrat are jointly significant using the Wald test; $p<0.07$, one-tailed test). For Arizona Republicans, the average effect of sharing a party with one's district-mate is to reduce local attention by 1.5 percent; for Democrats, shared party affiliation reduces local attention by an average of 3.8 percent.

Table 4-5: The Impact of Shared Party Affiliation on Local Legislative Action in the Arizona House of Representatives

	Coefficient	Standard Error
Shared party affiliation		
Shared party affiliation	-0.015	(0.023)
Shared party affiliation x Democrat	-0.023	(0.030)
Demand for local legislation		
Number of counties	0.008	(0.024)
Number of municipalities	-0.001	(0.004)
Area	0.000	(0.000)
Legislator characteristics		
Total bills sponsored	-0.001*	(0.000)
Leadership	-0.027	(0.021)
Committee chair	-0.016	(0.016)
Appropriations committee	0.012	(0.012)
Democrat	0.009	(0.030)
Tenure	0.005**	(0.003)
Partial session	0.006	(0.076)
Legislative sessions		
Session 2009	-0.053**	(0.013)
Session 2010	0.045**	(0.015)
Constant	0.187**	(0.043)
Adjusted R-squared	0.239	
N	184	

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Maryland General Assembly, the Vermont Legislature, the Arizona State Legislature, the Sunlight Foundation, and the United States Census Bureau.

Notes: Coefficients are ordinary least squares regression coefficients. Standard errors are corrected for clustering. **p<0.05 *p<0.10, one tailed test.

Surprisingly, few of the control variables have significant and expected effects on local attention in Arizona. The lack of significant findings for the legislator characteristic control variables may be explained in part by term limits. Higher legislative turnover tends to discourage members from pursuing district bills (Gamm and Kousser 2010) because members are trying to more quickly "make their mark" by passing broad policy initiatives, rather than use particularistic efforts to build enduring electoral coalitions to

see them through future electoral challenges or help them advance to higher office. Institutional leaders in Arizona, therefore, may be more likely to use their position to advance statewide policy as opposed to district legislation. Furthermore, because the Republicans are in the majority in Arizona, the party leaders and committee chairs are Republican. The added visibility that these positions bring may encourage leaders to adopt a more traditionally Republican approach and avoid being seen as generating earmarks or directing government "handouts."

Unlike in Maryland, experience, measured as a legislator's tenure in office does have a positive and significant influence on local action, as expected. Term limits may have enhanced the influence of experience in the state. Arizona Representatives may serve up to eight consecutive years in that chamber. Those with the most experience, however, have circumvented the eight-year ceiling by running for the State Senate, or taking a break from the legislature, and then returning to compete again. These returning representatives require significant name recognition and local support to win back a seat that they have not occupied for at least two years. Therefore, they may focus more on local issues to ensure that they maintain strong, long-lasting electoral coalitions.

Vermont

Local legislative action is conducted somewhat differently in Vermont compared to Arizona and Maryland. As in many New England states, the town is considered the fundamental unit of democracy. Legislator names are always listed followed by their town of residence in the legislative record (e.g., "Heath of Westford," "Johnson of South Hero," etc.).[23] Candidates also appear on the ballot followed by the name of their

hometown. Because towns dominate local politics in Vermont, municipal action may be a more precise estimate of attention to local issues in this state.

Recognizing the unique importance of the town to Vermont state politics, I conducted regressions on two separate dependent variables. The first is local action, the same variable analyzed in the Maryland and Arizona regressions. The second is *municipal action*, which is the number of municipal (i.e., town) oriented legislative actions divided by the sum of all legislative actions taken by the legislator. The independent variables for the two regressions are identical (recall that the presence of minor party-affiliated representatives requires an additional party control variable).

The first column of Table 4-6 displays the results of the regression using local action as the dependent variable. District magnitude has a positive effect on the local attention of Vermont legislators, but the effect fails to reach statistical significance at conventional levels. Shared party affiliation does not significantly influence local attention. Some of the control variables, however, do have the expected effect. Committee chairs and Appropriations Committee members, for example, devote more of their legislative attention to local issues than other Vermont Representatives.

Table 4-6: The Impact of District Magnitude on the Local Legislative Action in the Vermont House of Representatives

	All Local Legislative Action	Municipal Legislative Action
District magnitude		
Two member district	0.011	0.027*
	(0.018)	(0.017)
Shared party affiliation		
Shared party affiliation	0.004	-0.016
	(0.017)	(0.013)
Shared party affiliation x Democrat	0.013	0.029*
	(0.023)	(0.020)
Demand for local legislation		
Number of municipalities	0.005	0.003
	(0.012)	(0.009)
Area	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Legislator characteristics		
Total bills sponsored	-0.000	-0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Leadership	0.244	0.226
	(0.223)	(0.236)
Committee chair	0.067*	0.064*
	(0.048)	(0.049)
Appropriations committee	0.042*	0.009
	(0.027)	(0.017)
Democrat	-0.004	0.007
	(0.014)	(0.011)
Minor party affiliation	-0.018	0.001
	(0.017)	(0.013)
Tenure	-0.003**	-0.002*
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.090**	0.046**
	(0.021)	(0.016)
Adjusted R-squared	0.210	0.253
N	150	150

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Maryland General Assembly, the Vermont Legislature, the Arizona State Legislature, the Sunlight Foundation, and the United States Census Bureau.

Notes: Coefficients are ordinary least squares regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering. **p<0.05 *p<0.10, one tailed test.

The second column displays the results of the regression using municipal actions to calculate the dependent variable instead of all local actions (i.e., county, municipal, and local organizations). The directions of the coefficients are similar to those in the first column, but they are larger and more achieve statistical significance at conventional levels. Because municipal action is expected to more closely approximate local attention in New England states such as Vermont, the differences in size and significance may be explained by the relative precision of these measures. The results of the second regression indicate that Vermont legislators in two member districts devoted an average of 2.7 percent more of their legislative actions to municipalities than those in single member districts, when controlling for the number of towns present in the district and other factors that influence attention to local issues. Republicans who shared an MMD with another Republican devoted about 1.6 percent fewer actions to municipal issues than others; however, Democrats sharing an MMD with a copartisan actually devoted about 1.3 percent more of their legislative effort to local issues. Therefore, as expected, the effect of sharing a party with a district-mate is influenced by the party affiliation of the legislator. As explained earlier, members of the majority party may interact with their district-mate differently than those in the minority party. The control variables in the second Vermont regression have similar effects and achieve similar levels of statistical significance as those in the first.

Summary

Legislators in the U.S. represent both district and statewide constituencies. This chapter addressed a fundamental question of democracy: how do districted representatives divide their time between the local constituency and broader concerns?

Putting aside the normative question of which constituency is more deserving of attention, I considered the impact of district magnitude. In so doing, I sought to address a disagreement in the current literature between those who predict that greater district magnitude will discourage attention to local issues, and those who predict the opposite.

Notably, the results call into question the premise of one of the most common arguments against electing officials in MMDs: that they result in representatives who are less attentive to the needs of the home district. Politicians such as Senator Manchin, in the quote that leads this chapter, have invoked this argument in an effort to convince others to eliminate MMDs, saying that SMD representatives tend to be more "attentive" to their constituents. The argument is in need of revision. The findings instead support the latter perspective, that district magnitude encourages local attention, at least among legislators elected in the MMD plurality elections currently used to elect some state legislators in the United States. MMD legislators also indicated that sharing a constituency with another representative allowed them to divide up the task of responding to local concerns, giving them the opportunity to work with a broader range of interests than they would have without a district mate. Furthermore, sharing a district with a legislator from the same party has been shown to discourage local attention, suggesting that party affiliation may play a more complex role in the way MMD legislators represent their constituents.

More broadly, the results also indicate that district magnitude and the presence of copartisan district-mates influence how legislators craft a legislative agenda and build a political career. Relying on the same data set of legislative action, the next chapter delves

more deeply into the effects of district magnitude on agenda setting and the issues that

legislators address while in office.

Chapter 5: Issue Attention and Specialization

> Despite the problems with dual representation, such as decreased accountability and potential conflict within a Senate delegation, the total benefit of having two senators who represent the same geographic constituency outweigh the total costs… Although our legislative system does not always function efficiently or productively, the competitive structure of Senate delegations does create the potential for broad and responsive representation… (Schiller 1995, 173)

In 2010, 186 general election candidates competed for the Maryland House of Delegates in the same MMD as one or more same-party candidates, compared to only 49 appearing on the ballot as the only Democrat or Republican for Delegate. Recognizing that voters often have a difficult time discerning between same-party candidates competing for the same office, area newspapers issued detailed voter guides and made a number of candidate endorsements. The endorsements often cited past accomplishments or experience in one or two distinct issue areas, such as "the strength of her clout on education issues," or "her effort to advance health coverage."[1] The election in Maryland's 15th district, for example, featured three Democrats, three Republicans, and one Libertarian vying for three at-large seats. The *Washington Post* endorsed the two incumbents, Delegate Brian Feldman (D) and Delegate Kathleen Dumais (D), and open-seat candidate Aruna Miller (D), a transportation engineer. The editors lauded Feldman for his work with the biotech sector, and Dumais for her work with domestic-violence laws. Miller received the *Post's* endorsement over the other hopeful open seat candidates. The article cited Miller's transportation experience as the rationale for the endorsement, arguing that transportation policy is especially important to the densely populated and often gridlocked 15th district.[2]

Typically legislative scholars assume that candidates in SMDs develop a "home style" by building and advertising a list of accomplishments (Fenno 1978; Mayhew

1974b). Studies of representatives elected in MMDs, however, find that their approach to home style is more strategic and deliberate. MMD elections encourage politicians to develop personal reputations that are unique from their district mates, dividing up the electorate amongst themselves along geographic and issue-based lines (Ames 1995a; Carey and Shugart 1995; Schiller 2000). In office, salient issues are divided among the district mates according to their interests and expertise, reinforcing legislators' ties to their individual electoral coalitions. These personal reputations are essential to candidates' ability to advertise themselves and claim credit for their accomplishments, particularly when a large number of similar candidates are competing for voter's attention.

Legislators that share an MMD typically develop separate policy specializations, resulting in an unofficial division of labor within the district (Schiller 2000). A division of labor implies specialization; legislative committees, for example, divide a complex legislative agenda among policy specialists, directing specific bills to the appropriate experts (e.g., Fenno 1973). Institutional positions and electoral circumstances influence the issues that reelection-minded legislators work with in office (Koger 2003; Woon 2009). As chapter 4 shows, district magnitude influences issue attention and agenda setting, encouraging legislators to spend proportionately more time working with local issues. This chapter examines the impact of district magnitude on the legislative agenda from another perspective. If MMDs encourage legislators to market themselves as unique from their district mates, do they also encourage specialization?

To address this question, an original data set of bill sponsorships coded by issue is utilized to measure the level of specialization of elected officials in three legislative chambers that select at least a portion of their membership from MMDs: the Maryland

General Assembly, and the Vermont and Arizona House of Representatives. These legislative chambers provide an opportunity to study the effects of magnitude on legislative specialization, and are diverse in terms of partisan balance, legislative procedure and professionalism. New Jersey is again excluded from the statistical analyses; recall that, because it is very rare for members of the New Jersey General Assembly to serve in the same district with a member of another party, and district magnitude does not vary, that legislature does not provide a useful opportunity to examine the relationship between district magnitude and legislative behavior in this context. Sixteen interest categories are used to measure the number and types of interests that make up each representative's legislative record. Interviews with state legislators collected following the 2012 legislative session also serve in this chapter to describe the relationship between magnitude, specialization, and issue attention.

Specialization and the Division of Labor

The U.S. Senate provides many examples of the division of labor within multimember delegations. Within the same state, one U.S. senator typically establishes support among specific organized interests by securing the appropriate committee assignments and building relationships to serve those particular interests over time (Schiller 2000). That legislator is much better suited to serve that particular interest. Policy divisions are common among MMD delegations in state legislatures as well. Recall that Dumais (D), Feldman (D), and Miller (D) of Maryland's three-member at-large district 15 each received a *Post* endorsement for their efforts within unique policy areas. Delegate Feldman observes that this informal arrangement dictates how the legislators spend their time in office and the bills they introduce.

When it comes to legislation itself, each of us have our own niche areas, and I think all of us tend to gravitate and to introduce bills that are in our sort of comfort zone and subject areas, and at least in our case, there isn't a great deal of overlap. One of our delegates is a family law lawyer on the outside, so most all of her bills go to the judiciary committee, most all of my bills go to the economic matters committee, if you look at my bills, I do a lot of bills dealing with corporate business laws, biotech sector, and then our other delegate serves on the ways and means committee, she's gravitated to some other kinds of totally different issues.[3]

New additions quickly find their place within the delegation. Miller, as expected, established her own niche as the "transportation expert" within Maryland's 15th Legislative District, while Dumais covered judicial issues, and Feldman biotech and health issues. During her first legislative session, Miller earned a seat on the Transportation Subcommittee of the Ways and Means Committee and introduced and sponsored legislation relating to alternative fuels and road safety for cyclists.

The division of labor is part of a deliberate strategy to maintain electoral security. The personal vote is thought to be more important to MMD than SMD candidates because MMD legislators must appear unique among a broader field of similar candidates (Ames 1995a; Carey and Shugart 1995; Schiller 2000). Legislators from the same district that share a party are expected to work even harder to distinguish themselves from their district mate because voters cannot rely on the party label alone to distinguish them (Primo and Snyder 2010; Schiller 2000). State legislators serving in MMDs offer a supplemental explanation to the literature: MMDs encourage the division of labor because they allow legislators to defer to other specialists from within the district delegation when it comes to issues that are not a part of the legislator's area of expertise. The ability to depend on other district policy specialists encourages legislators to stay within their "comfort zones." Rather than become experts in all issue areas that concern

their constituents, MMD representatives are able to fall back on the expertise of other members of the district delegation, freeing up more time to focus on their own interests. The members of the MMD delegation, therefore, act as members of a team working to represent a constituency together, rather than as rivals competing over supporters. They have learned to use the MMD to their advantage, working together to maintain electoral security and represent diverse interests.

SMD representatives do not share the same advantages. The team aspect of representation is especially strong among legislators that share an MMD because they have the option to market themselves to voters as a team, which is precluded in contemporary Congressional contests by staggered elections in the Senate and single member districts in the House. In an MMD, coordination and deference to a same-district colleague are not simply examples of collegiality, but rather are designed to improve the electoral prospects of the entire district delegation. Delegation members choosing to work together actively divide up the issues to collectively represent their constituents. Legislators in these districts depend on one another, playing up the specialties of each representative to expand their collective voting base. They recognize that, depending on the subject matter of the legislation, their institutional positions and expertise make some better suited to take the lead on certain issues. The "lead" will introduce bills that pertains to particular interests, and the other district members will provide support if necessary. When coordinating the division of labor, institutional positions of the delegation members influence their contributions. For example, as Speaker of the House, Arizona Representative Andy Tobin (R) enjoys significant control over the legislative process, but

the demands of his position make it difficult for him to introduce, sponsor, and promote

bills that pertain to local interests.

> Because of my position, it puts a lot of pressure on [Representative Fann] to carry a lot of local legislation, local issues. And I can support by helping move it through the process. But often times she gets to be the one carrying those flags and I can help her steer it… You see that big white sign she snuck in [to my office]? I have four or five sticky notes, "Don't forget about state parks," helping her with state parks legislation… Of course we review our legislative agenda for our district together.[4]

Because another Republican member also represents Representative Tobin's district, he

can defer local-interest issues such as parks and transportation to his district colleague

rather than take them on himself. This strategy allows Speaker Tobin to devote more time

to statewide general interest bills and to his work as Speaker of the House, while

maintaining ties to local interests through his district mate.

MMD legislators are also able to refer questions and concerns from constituents

about specific policies and issues to the appropriate "expert" within the delegation, rather

than take the time to learn about and address the issue themselves. This arrangement

allows legislators to appear responsive to a broader set of policy interests without actually

taking the time to gain knowledge and build experience unique to those interests.

Speaking engagements at events hosted by interest groups, for example, are often

assigned to the appropriate district expert.

Recall that I am not conducting statistical analyses on the New Jersey General

Assembly in this chapter. Again, although New Jersey does not provide an opportunity to

examine expectations statistically, quotes from members of Assembly provide instructive

insight. In the New Jersey's two-member General Assembly District 24, for example,

policy issues are divided between Assemblyman Chiusano (R), Assemblywoman

McHose (R), and Senator Oroho (R), thus freeing up each representative to focus more

energy on their particular specialty. McHose spends much more time working with

Veterans affairs, whereas Chiusano and Oroho work together to pass budget-related bills

through the Senate and General Assembly. Chiusano explains:

> [Assemblywoman] Allison [McHose], whose husband is active duty national guard, she serves on a veterans affairs and health and human services, so we divided up, we don't have to know about all the issues… if we were looking for a speaker at a particular function who would speak about veteran's issues, or health and human services issues, [we turn to] Allison. Or we all might go, two of us might go, but we'd let her take the lead. On the other hand, if we're talking about budget issues, one of us [Senator Oroho or Asm. Chiusano] will take the lead.[5]

Likewise, the two assemblymen and one senator representing New Jersey's district 29

divide the agenda among well-defined policy sectors.

> My focus is on economic development, Grace Spencer is on law and public safety, she's a lawyer, and then Teresa is focused on education. So the three major areas facing our community, we've also divided that, we work together on them, but everybody takes the lead. I mean I've been a major sponsor of New Jersey's major tax incentive programs, spurring economic growth. The senator's leading the charge on tenure reform, and Assemblywoman Spencer's done a whole host of work on legal reform, judicial reform, and things of that nature.[6]

The State House delegation currently representing Arizona's second district

provides another example. The two-member MMD is home to Democratic

Representatives Christopher Deschene and Tom Chabin. These positions help Deschene

and Chabin to collectively respond to the most politically active constituencies in their

district: Native American tribes, and businesses that rely on Grand Canyon tourism. As a

former natural resources and environmental attorney representing Native American tribes,

Deschene drafts a number of bills each session that relate specifically to the Navajo tribe,

a significant organized interest in the second district. His position on the Natural

Resources and Rural Affairs Committee provides opportunities to work on tribal

legislation. Chabin, on the other hand, introduces legislation that relates to business and tax regulations, the environment, and the tourism industry around the Grand Canyon; his position on the Ways and Means Committee presents opportunities to influence business and tax law.[7]

Maryland state delegates also indicated that multimember districts help them to "share the burden" of representing the district, because they are able to defer questions from constituents pertaining to issues outside their area of expertise to another member representing the district. Feldman, for example, argued that sharing a MMD with two other Democrats provides an advantage to delegates.

> Each one of us, at least in my district, serves on a different committee. So if somebody sends in queries about specific questions that were about bills that were in one of our committees, often times we'll defer, or be able to defer, because I don't hear the bill, I don't bring the expertise that goes with having had a full blown bill hearing with witnesses on both sides. So I think that is helpful…[8]

MMDs, therefore, provide an opportunity for legislators to be responsive to a diverse set of constituent interests by relying on their district mates. By developing a close working relationship with these district colleagues, MMD legislators draw upon the diverse backgrounds, specialties, and experiences of the entire delegation. Furthermore, the ability to defer to an appropriate policy expert from the same district frees the legislator to spend more time on his or her own issues. Legislators serving in MMDs frequently cast this division of labor as a positive aspect of the MMD system.

Measuring Issue Attention

The bills introduced and sponsored by legislators during each session (often referred to as the legislator's agenda) are important to each representative's reelection strategy (Hayes, Hibbing, and Sulkin 2010; Woon 2009). When sponsoring and

cosponsoring legislation, representatives build support among key constituencies by taking positions and claiming credit for adding specific items to the legislative agenda (Arnold 1990; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1997; Mayhew 1974b; Schiller 1995). Politically aware constituents, particularly those with a vested interest in the outcomes of legislative sessions such as interest group leaders, expect their representatives to build and communicate a legislative agenda. State legislators regularly communicate with constituents and many send out formal updates that describe the bills they introduced and cosponsored. Interest groups active in state politics, such as the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) and the League of Conservation Voters, use lists of bill sponsorships, along with roll-call voting records, to formulate score cards and make candidate endorsements.[9]

To measure specialization, I rely on legislation sponsored by state legislators in Maryland, Vermont, and Arizona. I utilize the same set of legislation as analyzed in Chapter 4. In Maryland, I rely on a random sample of 2,000 bills introduced during the 2007 to 2010 session; for Arizona, a set of 1,500 bills introduced during the 2009, 2010, and 2011 sessions; and for Vermont, all 794 bills introduced during the 2009 to 2010 session. I used the subject area designations and synopses available on the state legislative websites to develop a comprehensive list of issue categories that are regularly present in the legislative agenda, and then condensed these into a smaller set of related interests.[10] The resulting coding scheme is similar to that used to categorize Congressional bills by issue (Adler and Wilkerson 2004; Hayes, Hibbing, and Sulkin 2010; Sulkin 2005), but tailored to state politics. Unlike the issues designed for Congressional legislation, there is no category for foreign policy or defense, and issues

that are typically the province of state governments, such as gambling and alcohol regulation, are also included because they frequently demand significant state legislative attention. The samples of bills were then assigned to up to three of the resulting sixteen categories based upon information included in the bill text, title, and synopsis (if provided).[11]

Politically active organized interests are often concerned with these issues, and representatives are motivated to take action in part to gain the approval of these interests. Organized interests and the issues they represent serve as convenient bases for developing unique reputations. They are easily identifiable; they command resources and attention that representatives require to win reelection; and legislation is often crafted to benefit or recognize them (Schiller 2000, 27). Legislators often enter office with existing ties to organized interests, either through time served in local political office, prior work as a political activist, or professional ties developed in the private sector.

More than two thirds of bills in each sample were matched to at least one issue category. Health care, education, environment and energy, and the judiciary (representing lawyers and criminal justice) categories, each represented by active lobbyists and PACs, make up a large percentage of these bills (see Table 5-1).[12] The distribution by interest area reflects the different regional and political concerns of these states. A larger portion of the bills introduced by Arizona's lawmakers, for example, were concerned with immigration than in the other states. Environmental and health care issues, on the other hand, made up a larger share of bills on the agenda in Vermont. Bills that were not assigned to another issue category were coded as "general interest." These consist of state administrative and budget bills that did not concern funding that impacts specific

organized interests (such as bills that define the technical roles and relationships between

state, municipal, and county governments, and bills that set funding levels for state

agencies).

Table 5-1: Legislative Action by Issue Category

	Maryland	Vermont	Arizona
Judiciary/Law Enforcement/Guns	16.48%	3.79%	14.26%
Environment and Energy	11.00	13.95	9.79
Education and Fine Arts	8.85	8.54	10.29
Health	8.11	13.63	7.73
Family, Gender, and Sexuality	8.18	9.58	5.91
Transportation	4.25	5.37	3.43
Labor and Government Employees	3.83	3.79	5.08
Business	1.16	2.01	1.36
Gambling and Alcohol	1.77	1.42	0.61
Construction and Housing	1.22	2.22	5.16
Welfare and Social Services	5.62	3.28	1.17
Agriculture	1.36	5.50	2.15
Military and Veterans	2.21	4.77	4.72
Immigration and Native Americans	1.46	0.13	4.64
Other	4.19	4.06	3.34
General Interest	20.32	17.93	20.35
N	22716	7461	8560

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Maryland General Assembly, the Vermont Legislature, the Arizona State Legislature, and the Sunlight Foundation.

Notes: Cell entries are percentages of legislative actions (sponsorships and cosponsorships) based upon the first interest group category coded. Sample sizes vary due to the number of sessions and the legislative productivity of each chamber. Percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding.

Using the sets of bills coded according to issue category, I calculated two separate

measures of legislator specialization. First, a legislator's *issue coverage* is the number of

issue categories for which he or she sponsored at least one bill (including both primary

and cosponsorships). Legislators that specialize are expected to sponsor bills relating to a

smaller set of issues, resulting in lower issue coverage scores. Second, a legislator's *issue*

concentration is the standard deviation across the bills introduced or cosponsored in each issue category. Higher standard deviations indicate a more uneven distribution across the issue categories. Legislators that specialize are expected to receive higher concentration scores. There is a great deal of variation in both issue coverage and concentration among legislators in each state, suggesting that some legislators are far more specialized than others (see Table 5-2). Furthermore, there is little indication that any state's legislators are significantly more or less specialized than those in other states.

Table 5-2: Issue Coverage and Concentration by State

	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Maryland Delegates					
Coverage	565	11.12	2.10	3	16.00
Concentration	565	2.98	1.10	0.62	6.38
Vermont Representatives					
Coverage	150	12.62	2.18	1	15.00
Concentration	150	3.30	1.43	0.25	8.21
Arizona Representatives					
Coverage	184	11.80	2.84	0	16.00
Concentration	184	3.20	1.45	0	7.06

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Maryland General Assembly, the Vermont Legislature, the Arizona State Legislature, and the Sunlight Foundation.

Notes: Compiled from data collected by the Sunlight Foundation and the Maryland General Assembly (www.mlis.state.md.us), the Vermont House of Representatives (www.leg.state.vt.us), and the Arizona House of Representatives (www.azleg.gov).

Two Maryland legislators illustrate the measures of legislative diversity. During the 2010 legislative session, Delegate Peter Hammen (D), representing a three-member district, sponsored legislation relating to only eight different interest categories, below the Maryland average of eleven. As Figure 5-1 shows, Hammen's sponsorships were highly concentrated. Of the 27 bills he sponsored, 9 related to judicial issues, and 10 related to

general interests; no other issue area received more than 5 sponsorships. He received an

issue concentration score of 3.2, roughly 7 percent above the average of 2.98. In contrast,

single member district Delegate Rudolph Cane (D) sponsored a more diverse legislative

agenda during the 2010 legislative session. His sponsorships covered thirteen issues, well

above the average. They were also spread more evenly across the issue categories than

Hammen's (see Figure 5-2). "Environment/energy" and "general interest" received the

most legislative actions, but the remaining eleven issues received roughly equal attention,

earning him a below-average issue concentration score of 2.5, roughly 15 percent below

average.

Figure 5-1: Delegate Hammen's Issue Attention, 2010

Source: Compiled from data provided by the Maryland General Assembly and the
Sunlight Foundation.

Figure 5-2: Delegate Cane's Issue Attention, 2010

Source: Compiled from data provided by the Maryland General Assembly and the Sunlight Foundation.

District Magnitude, Partisanship, and the Division of Labor

MMDs are expected to encourage representatives to develop unique specialties and to defer to other district specialists. Two state legislatures present an opportunity to compare single- and multimember district representatives from the same chamber. The Maryland General Assembly elects delegates from one, two, and three-member districts, and the Vermont House of Representatives elects members from one and two member districts. The independent variable of interest in these states, *District magnitude*, is the number of representatives elected from the legislator's home district. Magnitude is expected to encourage specialization; therefore, the effect on issue diversity is expected to be negative, and on issue concentration positive.

Recall that representatives that share a district with same-party colleagues are less able to rely on their party affiliation to define their unique positions and record in the

128

eyes of voters (Carey and Shugart 1995; Schiller 2000). U.S. Senators that share a state and party, for example, establish more unique reputations and overlap less with their state colleague than those from different parties (Schiller 2000). Because same-party district mates are more likely to work together, they also are expected to defer to their same-party colleague when it comes to issues that are not part of the legislator's specialty. The variable *One party MMD* is coded one if the legislators serve in a multimember district alongside members entirely from the same party and zero otherwise, and is expected to encourage specialization.

The level of organization and activity of the party, whether the party is in the legislative majority or the minority, and the types of issues the public perceives the party to "own" may also influence issue attention (Petrocik 1996). Members of the majority party, moreover, serve alongside a large group of legislators with similar ideologies and concerns, and must work harder to distinguish themselves from the pack (Carey and Shugart 1995). Members of the minority party are more likely to use cosponsorship to define their philosophy because roll-call and other votes afford them less opportunity to advance their policy priorities (Koger 2003). The legislator's party affiliation, *Democrat*, coded one if the legislator is a Democrat and zero if Republican, is included to account for the effects of party affiliation on issue attention and specialization. The effect of sharing an MMD with same-party colleagues may differ by party; therefore, the interaction term *One party MMD x Democrat* is included to allow for the party's influence on sharing a district with a same-party colleague.

Legislators that have represented the same constituency together for longer are also more likely to have developed a division of labor. Members of long-serving district

delegations are likely to have worked out a method to share the burden of representation

and to maintain electoral security for the entire set of legislators. By contrast, delegations

that have recently elected new inexperienced members are also less likely to contain

policy experts, reducing the opportunity for delegation members to defer specific policy

concerns to their district mates. To capture the effect of serving together, the variable

number of years as district team is measured as the number of years the district has been

represented by the same set of legislators, and is expected to encourage specialization.[13]

Leadership Positions and Legislative Experience

Legislators that command more resources and draw upon more years of

experience are typically better able to actively participate in the legislative process than

others (Schiller 1995). Legislators with more years of experience in office are also better

able to introduce complex legislation relating to a more broad set of issues (Kousser 2006,

422; Schiller 1995). The representative's *Tenure*, measured as the number of years the

legislator has served in the chamber, therefore, is expected to increase their ability to

introduce a diverse agenda. The legislative agendas of elected officials that only serve a

partial session, either due to resignation, retirement, or scandal, are less likely to develop

a diverse legislative agenda simply because they did not have as much time to sponsor

and introduce as many bills as those legislators that served the full session. The variable

Partial session, coded one if the legislator served only part of the current session and zero

if they served the entire session, is also included to control for these differences.[14]

Leadership positions allow legislators to take action on a more diverse set of

issues. Party leaders, by virtue of their position, enjoy larger budgets for professional

staff and tend to have more institutional knowledge and experience than the average

legislator. A position as a party leader (*Party leadership*, coded one for the Speaker, Majority Leader, Minority Leader, and Majority and Minority Whips, and zero otherwise) is expected to increase the legislator's ability to introduce a diverse legislative agenda. Committee chairs (*Committee chair*, coded one for chairs, zero otherwise) also enjoy significant influence over the legislative process and are better suited to introduce issue-specific legislation (Schiller 1995; Woon 2009).

Term limits reduced the overall experience level of the Arizona legislature. Arizona representatives that are termed out may return to the House after sitting out for at least one term; however, few Arizona representatives exercised the option to leave office and return. The average number of years served by Arizona Representatives in the sample is less than three, compared to almost six in Vermont and almost nine in Maryland. Term limits have the potential to alter the types of issues representatives care about and how they spend their time in office. Representatives in term limited legislatures on average focus more on the needs of the state rather than those of the home district, resulting in less time and effort spent seeking pork and increasing the time spent on broad policy issues, an effect known as the "Burkean shift" (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998). Term limits have also been found to reduce the complexity and breadth of bills introduced by a legislature (Kousser 2006). Among state legislatures with MMDs, Arizona and South Dakota impose term limits on representatives (set at eight years in both states). After serving four terms, legislators in Arizona are eligible for election again only after sitting out for at least one term.[15]

Constituency Diversity

A basic tenet of democratic theory is that constituency demands influence the legislative agenda. Indeed, as representative institutions, state legislatures are generally responsive to the opinions and demands of their constituents (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993). The types of salient interests and issues are related to characteristics of the constituency. The *Demographic Diversity Index* is a summary of U.S. Census demographics collected from the 2000 Census, based upon a measure developed by John Sullivan that captures the demographic diversity of an area across multiple dimensions (Herrnson and Gimpel 1995; Sullivan 1973). The index is calculated using proportions of the population within categories of gender, race, occupation, education, and income.[16] The scale ranges from 0.50 to 0.64; lower values indicate less diversity, and higher values more diversity.[17]

What effect does demographic diversity have on legislative diversity and concentration? On the one hand, more diverse districts place more demands on representatives, encouraging those elected officials to sponsor a more diverse agenda. Indeed, one study finds that representatives use bill introductions and sponsorships to respond to demographic changes in their constituencies due to redistricting (Hayes, Hibbing, and Sulkin 2010). Other studies find that as constituencies become more heterogeneous, representatives are less constrained by the preferences of the district median voter (Gerber and Lewis 2004). Legislators in more heterogeneous districts, therefore, may be freer to pursue their own interests and carve out smaller core constituencies, allowing them to specialize and base their support on narrower interests. The consequence, as Gerber and Lewis (2004,1378) put it, is that "in terms of having

their preferences expressed in policy, [constituents] would be better off in different districts with like-minded citizens." Although the effect of constituency heterogeneity is still a matter for debate, it is reasonable to expect some relationship to legislative action. Constituency diversity is especially important to the following analyses because district magnitude may encourage specialization simply because MMDs contain larger (see chapter 2), more diverse populations than SMDs in the same chamber.[18] For example, the average Demographic Diversity Index score for Maryland single member districts is 0.55; for two member districts, 0.57, and for three member districts 0.59 (differences are statistically significant; one-way ANOVA, F=76.3, p<0.001).

Legislative Participation

Given the nature of the issue coverage and concentration measures, some legislators may receive higher issue coverage scores than others simply because they sponsor more bills during a particular session. I estimate two control variables to account for participation. Because legislators who sponsor more are also likely to cover more issues, the issue coverage models include a control for *total sponsorships* (the number of primary and cosponsorships during the session). Recall that issue concentration is the standard deviation across the sponsorships in each issue category. I expect legislators that participate in only one or two categories are likely to receive very low concentration scores, because most of the issue categories receive the same number of sponsorships (i.e., zero). Legislators that cover more issues, on the other hand, are expected to receive higher concentration scores. Therefore, the issue concentration model includes *issue coverage* (the number of issue categories receiving at least one legislative action) to control for participation.[19]

Methods

Each legislative chamber is analyzed separately. The unit of analysis is the legislator, and the dependent variables are issue coverage and issue concentration. The explanatory variables described above are measured at both the legislator level (e.g., tenure and leadership positions), and the district level (e.g., district magnitude and district partisanship). Recall that the first dependent variable, issue coverage, is the number of categories that received one or more sponsorships. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is inappropriate when the dependent variable is not continuous. Poisson regression, therefore, is used to estimate the effect of magnitude and partisanship on issue coverage (Long 1997, 217-220).[20] To analyze the substantive impact of the Poisson coefficients, I also generate predicted counts using the observed values approach, a technique that estimates counts and average effects using the observed values in the sample (Hanmer and Kalkan 2012).

OLS regression is used to estimate the effect of district magnitude and shared party affiliation on the level issue concentration, and is the most appropriate technique given that the issue concentration score is continuous. Standard errors corrected for clustering by district and session are calculated to account for the multilevel data structure (Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo 2007). This approach to estimate clustered standard errors has been found to yield consistent and efficient coefficient estimates with smaller sample sizes, and is frequently used to estimate the effect of state and district-level institutional variables on the behavior of individuals such as state legislators and political candidates (Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo 2007).[21]

Results

The results support the expectation that members of MMD delegations, and particularly those who share a district with members from the same party, are on average more specialized than others. However, they vary by state. In Vermont, for example, sharing an MMD with a same-party district mate had a much larger effect on issue attention than in either Maryland or Arizona. The differences between the states suggest that chamber-specific factors such as political culture and history, party organization, and legislative procedure may influence how MMD representatives decide to allocate their time and attention. The results for each state are discussed in detail below, and comparisons are drawn between the findings for each state legislative chamber.

Maryland

As expected, Maryland MMD delegates on average sponsored more specialized legislative agendas compared to those serving in SMDs. The issue coverage Poisson regression coefficients are displayed in column one of Table 5-3. The effect of district magnitude is negative, meaning that on average, delegates serving in MMDs covered fewer issues than others. Using the observed values approach to generate predicted counts, I find that Maryland SMD delegates covered an average of 11.6 issues per session, compared to an average of 11.3 and 11.0 for those serving in two and three member district, respectively. Maryland Democrats from one-party MMDs on average covered fewer issues than others, as expected. The effect of serving in a one-party MMD for Democratic delegates is in the expected direction and statistically significant (the effects of One party MMD and One party MMD x Democrat are jointly significant; Wald test,

p<0.09, one-tailed test). However, sharing an MMD with members from the same party only marginally decreases issue coverage. The model predicts that the average Democratic delegate serving in a one-party three-member district, for example, covered 10.9 issues, only slightly below the average of 11.0 for all three-member district delegates. The difference between one-party MMD Democrats and others may be modest because it requires very little effort for a legislator to extend their issue coverage through cosponsorships. The fact that coverage is even slightly lower for MMD legislators than those in SMDs suggests that MMD legislators pay attention to fewer issues, even though extending their attention to more issues would require relatively little time or effort.

Table 5-3: Issue Coverage and Concentration of Maryland Delegates

	Issue Coverage	Issue Concentration
District Magnitude	-0.026**	0.272**
	(0.013)	(0.084)
Indicators of MMD coordination		
One party MMD	0.041**	-0.493**
	(0.024)	(0.174)
Democrat	0.009	-0.503**
	(0.025)	(0.178)
One party MMD x Democrat	-0.046*	0.611**
	(0.031)	(0.220)
Number of years as district team	-0.001	0.004
	(0.002)	(0.010)
Leadership and Experience		
Tenure	>0.001	-0.009
	(0.001)	(0.008)
Party leadership	-0.042**	0.025
	(0.025)	(0.148)
Partial session	-0.002	-0.155
	(0.027)	(0.167)
Committee chair	-0.038	-0.520**
	(0.046)	(0.167)

Table 5-3 cont.

Constituency diversity		
Demographic diversity index	0.318	1.674
	(0.269)	(2.192)
Legislative participation		
Total bills sponsored	0.011**	--
	(0.001)	
Issue coverage	--	0.207**
		(0.020)
Session		
2008	0.064**	-0.492**
	(0.016)	(0.131)
2009	0.012	-0.384**
	(0.020)	(0.126)
2010	0.011	0.061
	(0.017)	(0.134)
Constant	1.939**	-0.113
	(0.148)	(1.184)
Log-Likelihood	-1265.056	--
Adjusted R-Squared	--	0.274
N	565	565

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Maryland General Assembly and the Sunlight Foundation.

Notes: Cell entries in column 1 ("Issue Coverage") are Poisson regression coefficients. Cell entries in column 2 ("Issue Concentration") are ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients. **p<.05 *p<.10, one tailed tests. Standard errors corrected for clustering in parentheses.

Surprisingly, and in contrast to the Democrats, Maryland Republicans serving in a one-party MMD covered slightly more issues than others. It is possible that Republicans, as the minority party, pursue a different legislative strategy in the state of Maryland; because the platform of the GOP calls for smaller government, Republicans in the minority may be less likely to pursue unique career paths, opting instead to form a united opposition to counter the efforts of the Democratic majority. Although a thorough test of this expectation is beyond the scope of this study, this may explain the small positive relationship between one-party MMDs and issue coverage for Republicans. Many of the

control variables for the issue coverage model are in the expected direction. Party leaders covered fewer issues, possibly because their position places more demands on their time. Legislators who sponsored more bills (*Total bills sponsored*) also covered more issue areas.

The second model of specialization, issue concentration, supports the expectation that MMDs encourage Maryland delegates to focus their legislative effort on a small subset of issues. Recall that the dependent variable is the standard deviation of the numbers of sponsorships each legislator made across the issue categories. Positive coefficients indicate that sponsorships were more concentrated across the issue categories. The second column of Table 5-3 displays the issue concentration estimates, and as expected, district magnitude is positively related to issue concentration. The average issue concentration score for Maryland delegates in a single member district is 2.7; the results indicate that, on average, compared to single member districts, two member district representatives concentrate 10 percent more, and three member districts 20 percent more, on average. Although these effects may seem small, they indicate meaningful differences in issue concentration; recall, for example, that Hammen's issue concentration score for the 2010 session is only 7 percent above average, yet his sponsorships are highly concentrated among only a handful of issues (see Figure 5-1).

The partisan affiliation of the legislator influenced the effect of shared party affiliation on issue concentration (One party MMD and One party MMD x Democrat are jointly significant; Wald test, p<0.01, one-tailed test). The bill sponsorships of Democrats from a one-party MMD were on average 4.4 percent more concentrated than the average Maryland single-member district delegate. Republicans from a one party MMD, on the

other hand, divide their attention across the issue categories more equally than others. Many of the control variables had the expected effect on issue concentration. Delegates with more years of legislative experience spread their attention more evenly, receiving lower concentration scores. Committee chairs, on the other hand, concentrated their efforts on small sets of issues, as expected.

In Maryland overall, MMD delegates cover fewer issues and concentrate on smaller niches than those in SMDs. The findings also suggest that Democrats from one-party MMDs developed and were more likely to focus on issue niches during the legislative session. Republicans, however, did not react to same-party district mates in the same way, suggesting that Republicans may have been less willing or able to divide up the agenda and defer to their colleagues. The findings lend support to the opinions expressed by Maryland MMD delegates. Because they are encouraged to develop unique reputations, and they are able to defer issues outside of their expertise to their district mates, they concern themselves with fewer issues and are better able to concentrate on their specialty.

Vermont

In the Vermont state house, those who served in one party MMDs were more likely to specialize than others. However, contrary to expectations, Vermont Representatives in two-member districts did not specialize to a greater degree than those in SMDs. Party affiliation and the interaction between same-party district-mates, therefore, were more important than district magnitude to issue attention in Vermont than Maryland.

Both Democratic and Republican Vermont representatives from one party MMDs covered fewer issues, on average, than others. Similar to the Maryland delegates, the effect of one party MMDs on issue coverage is much larger for Democrats than Republicans. The first column of Table 5-4 reports the estimates of the issue coverage model; both shared party affiliation (One party MMD) and the interaction term (One party MMD x Democrat) are negative and significant (Wald joint test of significance, $F=4.4$, $p<0.06$, one-tailed test). Serving in a one-party MMD had a much larger effect on the issue coverage of Democrats than Republicans. Again using the observed values approach to calculate predicted counts based upon the model estimations, we see that Vermont Democrats who did not share an MMD with another Democrat covered an average of 12.9 issues during the 2009-2010 session; in comparison, again using the observed values approach to calculate predicted counts, the model estimates indicate that the average Democrat serving in a one-party MMD covered 11.9 issues. Republicans serving in one-party MMDs, however, were only marginally different from the average Republican, covering only 0.14 fewer issues, on average. Some of the control variables were in the expected direction, but many failed to achieve statistical significance at conventional levels. Committee chairs covered fewer issues, and more active legislators (measured by *total bills sponsored*) covered more issues, on average.

Table 5-4: Issue Coverage and Concentration of Vermont Representatives

	Issue Coverage	Issue Concentration
Magnitude		
District Magnitude	0.012	-0.239
	(0.028)	(0.225)
Indicators of MMD Coordination		
One Party MMD	-0.011	0.285
	(0.029)	(0.316)

Table 5-4 cont.

Democrat	-0.019	0.240*
	(0.024)	(0.182)
One Party MMD x Democrat	-0.066*	0.812**
	(0.041)	(0.453)
Number of years as district team	0.002	0.007
	(0.003)	(0.036)
Leadership and Experience		
Tenure	0.001	-0.013
	(0.002)	(0.026)
Party Leadership	-0.207	-0.330
	(0.206)	(0.273)
Partial session	--	--
Committee Chair	-0.034	0.222
	(0.046)	(0.350)
Constituency Diversity		
Demographic Diversity Index	0.886	-0.118
	(0.944)	(10.593)
Legislative Participation		
Total Bills Sponsored	0.008**	--
	(0.001)	
Issue Coverage	--	0.414**
		(0.036)
Constant	1.757**	-1.508
	(0.495)	(5.542)
Log-Likelihood	-343.15	--
Adjusted R-Squared	--	0.435
N	150	150

Table 5-4 cont.

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Vermont Legislature and the Sunlight Foundation.

Notes: Cell entries in column 1 ("Issue Coverage") are Poisson regression coefficients. Cell entries in column 2 ("Issue Concentration") are ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients. "Partial session" is excluded because no Vermont Representatives served a partial session from 2009 to 2010. **p<.05 *p<.10, one tailed tests. Standard errors corrected for clustering in parentheses.

The issue concentration results suggest that shared party affiliation among district mates encouraged Vermont legislators to pay disproportionate attention to a narrow issue niche. The second column of Table 5-4 displays the issue concentration estimates. Both Democrats and Republicans in one-party MMDs were more likely than others to concentrate their sponsorships among issue niches (One party MMD and One party MMD x Democrat are jointly significant; Wald test, p<0.01, one-tailed test). Shared party affiliation again had a larger effect on Democrats than Republicans. The model predicts a concentration score of 4.39 for the average Democrat from a one-party MMD, which is 33 percent above the average for all Vermont representatives of 3.3. The average Republican from a one-party MMD, on the other hand, received a concentration score of 3.6, or 9 percent above the average for all Vermont representatives.

In contrast to the Maryland results, few of the control variables had the expected effect on issue coverage or concentration in Vermont. As expected, party leaders on average received lower concentration scores than others. However, MMD representatives who had served for more years with the same district mates were no more or less likely to specialize. Likewise, Vermont committee chairs were no different from other legislators.

The differences I find between Vermont and Maryland may be explained in part by the fact that Vermont is an amateur legislature that produces relatively little legislation. Recall, the sample sizes are smaller in Vermont; legislators introduced far fewer bills than those in Maryland or Arizona, meaning that the sponsorship diversity index for Vermont legislators is based upon a much smaller sample of bills, resulting in a less precise measure of sponsorship diversity. During the 2009 to 2010 session, Vermont legislators collectively introduced only 794 bills over two years; over the same time

frame, Maryland delegates introduced 3,175 bills, and Arizona representatives introduced 1,588 bills. The lack of professionalism and staff funding likely contributed to the small number of bills introduced in the Vermont House. Of these case studies, the Vermont legislature is the least professional, ranking 28th among all states; in comparison, Maryland ranks 18th, and Arizona 11th (Squire 2007). Most Vermont state representatives have neither offices nor staff to assist with drafting and researching legislation. In contrast, each Maryland delegate and each Arizona representative employs at least one staff member during the session to assist with constituent affairs and drafting and researching legislation.

Arizona

Every Arizona statehouse district elects two representatives to the lower chamber of the state legislature. The Arizona analysis, therefore, excludes district magnitude but estimates the effect of shared party affiliation. As in Maryland and Vermont, Democrats serving in an MMD with a same-party district mate covered fewer issues and concentrated their attention among narrow issue niches.

Democrats serving in one-party MMDs covered fewer issues on average than other Democrats. The first column of Table 5-5 displays the issue coverage results for Arizona representatives. The positive coefficient for Democrat indicates that Democrats on average covered more issues than Republicans, and the negative coefficient for One-party MMD x Democrat indicates that serving in a one party MMD reduces the issue coverage of Democrats on average. The effect of one party MMD falls short of statistical significance at conventional levels (Wald test; $p<0.2$, one-tailed test). However, the results are suggestive. The observed values predicted counts show that Arizona

Democrats who did not share a two-member district with another Democrat covered an average of 13 issues per session, compared to 12.1 issues for the average Democrat serving in a one-party MMD. Republicans serving in a two- member district with a Democratic district mate, on the other hand, covered an average of 11.5 issues, compared to 11.8 for the average Republican serving in a one-party MMD.

Table 5-5: Issue Coverage and Concentration of Arizona Representatives

	Issue Coverage	Issue Concentration
Indicators of MMD Coordination		
One Party MMD	0.025	-0.194
	(0.054)	(0.318)
Democrat	0.121**	-1.360**
	(0.055)	(0.363)
One Party MMD x Democrat	-0.091	0.757**
	(0.074)	(0.455)
Number of years as district team	0.019**	-0.019
	(0.011)	(0.064)
Leadership and Experience		
Tenure	-0.005	-0.111**
	(0.010)	(0.039)
Party Leadership	0.020	-0.214
	(0.045)	(0.301)
Partial session	-0.319**	-0.857**
	(0.116)	(0.463)
Committee Chair	-0.035	0.306
	(0.046)	(0.259)
Constituency Diversity		
Demographic Diversity Index	-0.691	-1.449
	(0.885)	(5.249)
Legislative Participation		
Total Bills Sponsored	0.006**	--
	(0.001)	
Issue Coverage	--	0.258**
		(0.029)
Session		
2009	-0.035	0.763**
	(0.032)	(0.230)

Table 5-5 cont.

	Issue Coverage	Issue Concentration
2010	-0.175**	1.184**
	(0.040)	(0.261)
Constant	2.555**	1.370
	(0.525)	(3.053)
Log-Likelihood	-434.787	--
Adjusted R-Squared	--	0.442
N	184	184

Table 5-5 cont.

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Arizona State Legislature and the Sunlight Foundation.

Notes: Cell entries in column 1 ("Issue Coverage") are Poisson regression coefficients. Cell entries in column 2 ("Issue Concentration") are ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients. $**p<.05$ $*p<.10$, one tailed tests. Standard errors corrected for clustering in parentheses.

The second column of Table 5-5 reports the results of the issue concentration model for Arizona representatives. Arizona Democrats serving in one-party MMDs received higher issue concentration scores on average than others. The positive coefficient for the interaction term, One party MMD x Democrat, suggests that serving in a one party MMD increases issue concentration for Democrats. The effect of one party MMD on issue concentration is statistically significant at conventional levels (Wald test, $p<0.07$), and the coefficients indicate that on average Arizona Democrats from one party MMDs received issue concentration scores that were 18 percent larger than the typical Arizona representative, on average.

Many of the control variables had the expected effect on the issue coverage and concentration of Arizona representatives. Those with more experience (tenure) spread their attention more evenly among issues, receiving lower concentration scores. Committee chairs focused more attention on a small set of issues, received higher

concentration scores. Party leaders in the Arizona House, however, were no different than others in terms of issue coverage or concentration.

Term limits may have reduced the incentive to specialize in Arizona. Because Arizona Representatives cannot serve more than four consecutive terms, they also may be less motivated to stake out specific niches to maintain long-term electoral security. Many career politicians in the statehouse are most likely using the position as a stepping-stone to higher office. Some circumvent term limits by switching between the House and Senate every eight years, alternatively running in an MMD and an SMD. With the future in mind, rather than carve out a unique issue niche, these legislators would more likely appeal to a broader segment of the constituency because they would expect to draw on a broader electoral coalition in the future.

The results indicate that larger district magnitude and sharing a district with copartisan legislators generally decrease issue coverage and increase concentration, as expected. In all three states, Democratic representatives elected in an MMD dominated entirely by Democrats covered fewer issues and sponsored more concentrated legislative agendas than others. Republicans elected from one party MMDs, however, responded differently, and only in Vermont were they more specialized than others. Remarkably, Democratic members of one-party MMDs specialized to a greater degree than Republicans in both Democratic (Maryland and Vermont) and Republican (Arizona) controlled legislatures, suggesting that majority party status in the legislature does not explain the differences between the members of the two parties. Rather, as expected, the different effects for Democratic and Republican legislators suggest that characteristics of the political party, such as the role and influence of the legislative party leaders, the

history of the state party, and the degree of party discipline may have influenced the interaction among same-party district mates, lending support to prior studies that suggest a relationship between party dynamics and agenda setting (Carey and Shugart 1995).

Summary

MMDs encourage specialization, and they tend to elect representatives who sponsor legislation that relates to fewer issues each session than those elected in SMDs. Members elected in MMDs represented entirely by Democrats were also more likely to specialize than those elected in MMDs comprised of Republicans, suggesting that party dynamics are important to the development of unique reputations and the interaction between district mates (Carey and Shugart 1995; Primo and Snyder 2010; Samuels 1999; Schiller 2000).

The results of the analyses have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between electoral systems and legislative attention. Legislators advertise and claim credit for their accomplishments, meaning that electoral motivations influence the legislative agenda (Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974b). By requiring legislators to compete for multiple seats, district magnitude alters this relationship. MMD legislators craft a more deliberate legislative agenda, with an eye towards developing a unique specialty. These findings show that this deliberate strategy alters the legislative agenda and results in representatives who translate constituent concerns into policy differently from those elected in SMDs.

These findings should be of interest to those who study the U.S. Congress. U.S. Senators, for example, may develop narrower specialties than they would have had they been elected in SMDs, a conclusion that is suggested by Schiller's (2000) analysis. A

change in the electoral procedures used to elect members of the U.S. House, such as a law that would again allow states to elect at-large congressional delegations, may alter the legislative agenda by encouraging members of Congress to develop narrower issue specialties.

Cosponsorship allows legislators to pay "lip-service" to interests outside of their issue specialty, allowing them to appear to be active on issues that they may know little about (Schiller 2000). One can imagine an MMD legislator simply cosponsoring every piece of legislation introduced by the other members of the MMD delegation, while at the same time introducing their own bills relating to entirely different interests. This strategy would convey an advantage, allowing MMD legislators to build a diverse portfolio while devoting very little of their own time and effort. These analyses suggest, however, that even though the cost of cosponsorship is low, legislators in MMDs chose to concentrate their attention on a narrower set of interests than others. The desire to develop a reputation unique from their district-mates may discourage MMD legislators from cosponsoring all of the bills introduced by their district colleagues.

Legislative specialization may be a risky strategy, even when MMD legislators are able to rely on a diverse team of district allies. Recall from chapter 2 that redistricting, retirements, or bids for higher office may break up the district team. It may be necessary to appear unique from one's district mates when running in an MMD. SMD elections, in contrast, require more widespread support. Forced to rely on small segments of the constituency on their own, highly specialized legislators may lose to a challenger who enjoys broad name recognition, as was the case with many Florida statehouse incumbents following the shift from MMDs to SMDs (see chapter 2). This is one explanation for why

MMD legislators advocate for some issues outside of their area of expertise, particularly when those issues are important to a large segment of the constituency. Despite the risks associated, most MMD representatives chose to adopt narrower issue niches than those in SMDs, potentially putting themselves at a disadvantage in future elections.

Does specialization benefit or degrade the quality of representation provided by the legislature? Higher levels of specialization may mean that fewer interests are represented overall as legislators focus on narrower segments of the constituency (Cox 1990), and broad issues may be ignored in favor of special interests. Legislators in the large MMDs of the Brazilian legislature, for example, spend much of their time securing pork for constituents in small geographic bailiwicks, rather than work on nationwide issues (Ames 1995b). In their quest to develop unique electoral coalitions, members of MMDs may also develop an agenda that is less representative of the entire universe of interests present within the district (Myerson 1993). On the other hand, policy specialists may be more effective legislators because they are more likely to have the expertise to draft and pass quality legislation.

Chapter 6: District Magnitude and Legislative Influence

> We usually identify areas and one of us takes the lead. And we do talk all the time. We talk on a regular basis, and then the other member will be supportive. - *New Jersey Assemblyman Albert Coutinho (D) on his work with district mate L. Grace Spencer (D)*

> Any time she wants my support she'll get it. If it's an issue I'm a little iffy on, I'll bend as far as I can to make sure I support her. – *Vermont Representative Warren Kitzmiller (D) discussing his relationship with district mate Mary Hooper (D)*

Legislators represent the needs and desires of constituents by introducing and enacting new laws and changes to existing law. In most legislatures, however, some members make a more significant legislative impact and generate a lengthy list of legislative accomplishments, and others are less productive. During the 2009 to 2010 session of the Vermont House of Representatives, for example, Representative Sarah Copeland-Hanzas (D), elected from the single member Orange-2 district, sponsored twenty-four bills; two of these, relating to the sale of unpasteurized cow's milk and biomass energy production, were enacted into law. In contrast, Representative Clem Bissonnette (D), a fellow Vermont Democrat elected from the two member Chittenden 3-6 district, sponsored fifty bills, thirteen of which were enacted into law. Among other subjects, his successful legislation related to the charter of the City of Burlington (located in his district), home mortgage protections for Vermonters, and municipal fire department costs.

In recent years, scholars have looked to productivity as an important indicator of legislative influence. More productive legislators have been shown to exert more power over policy outputs than others because they have more control over the legislative agenda (Cox and Terry 2008; Moore and Thomas 1991; Miquel and Snyder 2006). Systematic differences in productivity across members of a legislative institution may

influence not only policy output, but the balance of power in the legislature. What is more, constituents represented by less productive legislators may be at a disadvantage because the issues they care about are less likely to make it on the legislative agenda.

As the previous chapters show, district magnitude influences how legislators compete for and retain office. How does district magnitude influence productivity? There are competing perspectives. First, legislators elected from MMDs may be less productive because they free ride on their district mates (Ashworth and Bueno De Mesquita 2006). Free riding may reduce productivity because it diminishes the benefit legislators receive from generating successful legislation. On the other hand, legislators who share districts may be more likely to work together, making them better able to introduce and pass a comprehensive agenda. Compared to similar legislators in separate SMDs, those who share an MMD are more likely to cosponsor legislation together (Kirkland 2012), agree more often on roll call votes (Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson 1981), and on average bring home more resources to their home districts (Dauer 1966; Snyder and Ueda 2007).

This chapter draws upon personal interviews and a data set of the legislative records of representatives serving in single and multimember districts in Maryland, Vermont, and Arizona to analyze the relationship between district magnitude and productivity. Again, the New Jersey General Assembly is excluded from the statistical analyses because that chamber offers little opportunity to examine comparatively the influence of both district magnitude and district mate copartisans. However, quotes from New Jersey Assembly members provide valuable insight into the legislative strategies of those serving in MMDs.

Similar to previous chapters, I find that many MMD legislators develop strategies to use their district mates to their advantage. They collaborate to promote legislation, and communicate before roll calls, using their district mates as natural allies to build longer legislative records. The findings suggest that district magnitude may influence the distribution of power in a legislature in unforeseen ways, and that MMD legislator's influence is closely related to their relationship with other members of the district delegation.

Legislative Production in Multimember Districts

Although the formal function of the legislator is to represent the interests of constituents by drafting, promoting, and passing legislation, there is no requirement that elected representatives make meaningful changes to public policy while in office. What motivates legislative productivity? A large literature suggests that a strong motivator is the electoral benefit legislators stand to gain from advertising their accomplishments to constituents, known as claiming credit or building the personal vote (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Ferejohn 1974; Mayhew 1974b). Elected officials frequently advertise these accomplishments to achieve career goals, whether these include winning reelection or competing for higher office (Maestas 2000; Maestas et al. 2006; Mayhew 1974b; Moncrief, Squire, and Jewell 2001).

In practice, the relationship between legislative accomplishment and electoral credit is far from perfect. Recognizing that constituents do not perfectly monitor the actions of their representatives, Grimmer, Messing, and Westwood (2012) compare the approval ratings of U.S. senators representing the same state, and find that the senator who more often claims credit for bringing home resources receives higher approval

ratings, regardless of whether that senator actually did more to secure those resources. Their findings indicate that the benefit politicians receive is more closely related to the frequency with which they advertise accomplishments rather than the actual benefits they secure for their home state. Therefore, the motivation to win reelection may encourage legislative production only to the extent that constituents are able to effectively monitor the activities of their legislators.

Another implication of constituents' limited knowledge and attention to legislators is that constituents are likely to pool information about their representatives, attributing the accomplishments of one to others. Those represented by MMD legislators are even more likely to pool information because they must monitor the activities of an entire delegation. Because information and credit are shared, representatives from the same district have an incentive to free ride on the efforts of district mates (Ashworth and Bueno De Mesquita 2006). If voters have trouble distinguishing between MMD district mates, the argument goes, candidates may have little incentive to build a long list of personal accomplishments. Therefore, a rational politician would spend more time claiming credit than building a lengthy list of legislative accomplishments, meaning that legislators in MMDs would produce less legislation than those in SMDs.

An alternative perspective on productivity focuses more on a legislator's ability to work within the institution to generate meaningful legislation, rather than the electoral incentives that supposedly drive legislative production. Recent studies find that social relationships between legislators are particularly important to productivity. Studies of elected officials find that they consistently rely on colleagues to help promote legislation, move it through committee, and support it when it reaches the floor (Campbell 1982;

Kingdon 1989). Other studies seek to measure the influence of legislative social dynamics, and find that a legislator's relationships with his or her colleagues influence their ability to generate legislation (Bratton and Rouse 2011; Fowler 2006; Kirkland 2012; Pellegrini and Grant 1999; Tam Cho and Fowler 2010). The coalition that supports a piece of legislation is also important to success; for example, Browne (1985) finds that legislation that has more cosponsors is on average more likely to be signed into law. Legislators who work together more often and are more closely connected agree more often on roll call votes and may have more influence over policy outcomes (Fowler 2006).

Legislators in MMDs may be better situated to introduce and promote legislation than others because they are in a unique position to form a coalition. Those who share an MMD are more likely to work together to cosponsor legislation; even legislators from opposing parties are more likely to work together if they share an MMD (Kirkland 2012). Legislators who share an MMD are also more likely to vote the same way than those who do not (Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson 1981; Jewell 1982b).

The literature offers seemingly contradictory conclusions. Studies suggest that MMD legislators face fewer incentives than those in SMDs to produce legislation because constituents are less aware of their records. This is open to challenge, however, because they enjoy natural ties to other legislators. Rather than reduce legislative productivity and influence, recent studies find that those elected in MMDs are uniquely well positioned to introduce and enact legislation.   Which perspective is correct? Several arguments based upon analyses and interviews discussed in the previous chapters provide support for the second perspective, predicting a positive relationship between district magnitude and legislative productivity. First, party elites and district mates are

important to MMD legislators' career, which puts them into a position to punish free riding. MMD primary candidate fields are very large, particularly when an open seat is up for grabs. A typical Democratic primary in a Maryland three member district, for example, may have six competitors. Politicians hoping to win and to hold on to a seat in an MMD must rely on the support of the party and their potential district mates to help them rise above the pack, and they coordinate to fill vacancies and discourage challengers (recall Delegate Feldman's discussion of "selecting" candidates to fill vacancies in Chapter 3). Relying on one's colleagues to consistently win reelection should inspire teamwork and collegiality, not free riding.

Second, winning constituent approval is only one of many motives encouraging legislative production. Elected officials are also hoping to build a resume, and career politicians often use positions in local or state government as a stepping-stone to higher office (Squire 1988). Many state legislators who aspire to a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives, for example, work to build broad legislative portfolios designed to appeal to a diverse group of constituents (Maestas 2000; Maestas et al. 2006). Ambitious MMD legislators may have to work harder to build their own careers than those in SMDs because they must stand out as unique from their district mate(s). In support of the perspective that MMDs encourage productivity, Wendy Schiller concludes that sharing a district can influence representation, resulting in more active representatives working to build and advertise lasting personal reputations. While summing up the effects of two-member districts on representation, Schiller (2000, 172) writes,

> Failing to emerge from the shadow of a more prominent state colleague can render a senator more vulnerable to a strong challenger in the next reelection

campaign. Consequently, the dual nature of the Senate delegation exerts pressure on both senators to serve their states in a responsible fashion…

Third, because they share a constituency, MMD district mates have a natural connection and are more likely to work together than those who do not share a district (Kirkland 2012). Sharing a district may be particularly beneficial if a district mate happens to be in a position of power, such as a member of the majority party or a party leader. MMD legislators, therefore, may be at an advantage because they are able to work together as a team, relying on the skills, expertise, and institutional positions of power of their district mates.

Strength in Numbers

Do district mates enhance or degrade productivity? It is important to keep in mind that MMD legislators have larger constituencies than those in SMDs. To respond to more constituents and more diverse policy demands, MMD representatives repeatedly mentioned that they collaborate with one or more district mates. Collaboration may enhance legislators' ability to introduce more legislation and to build a winning coalition to support their efforts. The analysis in Chapter 5 showed that those who share an MMD are often able to rely on one another's expertise to cover more issues and build more diverse legislative agendas. Teamwork may reduce the costs of legislating, allowing those who work together and rely on the influence and expertise of their district mates to produce more than others.

Legislation is carefully crafted to improve existing law, respond to the concerns of policy-motivated interests, and, if the issue is salient enough, improve public opinion of the elected official (Arnold 1990; Kingdon 1989; Mayhew 1974b). Representatives must learn a great deal about an issue before they introduce legislation. They look to

other members, interest groups, staff if they have them, and others for pertinent

information (Kingdon 1989). Resources, such as time and staff assistance, are limited

(Fenno 1978). Members of the U.S. Congress rely heavily on staff to gather information,

but state legislators must work with a very limited staff budget, meaning that most rely

heavily on their colleagues and a shared legislative services office to learn about the

issues (Squire 2007).

What do MMD elected officials have to say? Recall that, similar to the previous

analyses of legislative behavior, I exclude New Jersey from statistical analyses of

legislative behavior because New Jersey does not provide sufficient variation in district

magnitude the number of copartisans. Nevertheless, quotes from New Jersey legislators

provide useful insight into the legislative strategies of elected officials in the state. For

example, as New Jersey Assemblyman Albert Coutinho (D) describes, drafting effective

legislation is a significant time commitment, particularly for state representatives, who

must conduct research without the benefit of the experienced policy researchers on the

staffs of members of Congress.

> That's why it's important that you become very knowledgeable of that core issue
> you're fighting for. And the cost/benefit analysis of investing in that issue, so you
> can advocate for it and make it a priority in the state budget…. we definitely have
> a role in bringing money back to the district. But the way you do it is by being
> fully cognizant of the issue, and advocating and fighting for it as part of the state
> budget.[1]

The expertise of other members, particularly those who represent the same

geographic constituency, is a valuable resource. Who better to offer guidance than a

colleague who relies on the same constituents for support? Arizona Representatives

Nancy McLain (R) and Doris Goodale (R), for example, share a two-member district, and

frequently rely on one another to learn about issues before the legislature. As McLain describes,

> She [Goodale] has a particular interest in education; she serves on the school board for eighteen years, and she also has some law enforcement background, she served as a probation officer for 33 years. So when there's a bill that comes before the legislature having to do with either one of those issues, I look to Mrs. Goodale for her experience and expertise, you know is this a good thing or not, and I have her explain it to me if it's not readily apparent. And she does the same thing with me on banking issues or insurance issues, that sort of thing. So we kind of look to each other to help out.[2]

Recall from Chapter 5 that multimember districting helps legislators spread out the burdens, relying on others to help respond to the needs of constituents. Multiple legislators serving the same constituents may help representatives better serve the interests of the people. Maryland Delegate Brian Feldman (D), when questioned about the impact of MMDs on representation, said, "I think it's good for the legislators… you can meet more people, you can spread the burdens out a bit."[3]

State legislators indicated that cooperation could be particularly beneficial to members who share a district with someone in an influential institutional position (such as members of the majority party, committee chairs, or party leaders) or who have more legislative experience. Recall that MMDs encourage cooperation even among district mates from opposing parties (Kirkland 2012). Republicans, for example, dominate the Arizona legislature. During the 2009 legislative session, Democratic representatives often found it difficult to win the support necessary to pass legislation. Arizona Democratic State Representative Patricia Fleming encountered difficulty trying to move several pieces of legislation through committee. She turned to her Republican district mate, Representative David Stevens, for help. Because the legislation pertained to many of their

constituents,[4] Stevens was glad to help, using his contacts within the majority party to

promote the bills. As Stevens recalls:

> We worked on two bills, and they were both hers. She had problems getting them
> through the process and I was helping out. And that was the first or the second
> year she came for help.[5]

As some legislators point out, getting bills through the committee system and to

the floor is often the most difficult part of the legislative process. Legislators who can

rely on allies to help them advocate and move legislation have a significant advantage.

Coutinho, for example, notes the importance of "fighting and advocating" to move a bill

to the floor in the New Jersey Assembly.

> In terms of voting here in the capitol… there is a lot of party line voting… But
> there are times where you're going to get some defections and dissention. You see
> here in Jersey you have 78 to 0 or 78 to 2, or you'll have an ideological no. But
> for the most case, there are a lot of unanimous votes. The point is to get the bill
> through the process, to the point where it gets posted. Right now here we are,
> we're just 6 months into the session, I think we're close to 3,000 bills being
> introduced. So the issue is, a lot of times, you know the fighting for or against
> something is getting it to this point, you know, getting it to the point where it goes
> through the committee procedure and gets posted for a vote. But if you get it to a
> voting session here in Jersey, and you look at the record, you'll see most of the
> votes are lopsided. You know, not just within the caucus, but within the whole
> house. The issue is fighting and advocating for your bill to get it through the
> process and to get it there… But usually to the point that a bill gets to be voted on
> the floor, there is an unofficial thing that you're not supposed to vote against your
> own party's bill.[6]

Serving in an MMD may also enhance a legislator's influence because legislators

who share a constituency typically (although not always) vote the same way. Many feel

that sharing a district improves their ability to garner enough votes to pass legislation.

Arthur Simon, a former Florida State Representative, for example, served as the chair of

the Dade County legislative delegation following the state's switch from multi to single

member districts. He notes that multimember districting in some ways made it easier for

legislators to work together to achieve common goals.

> For the most part when you had the multimember districts you had, you elect people that had certain commonalities, they were generally from the same party, generally had similar ideological views, they were basically accountable to the same core constituencies. And there was much less diversity and much less divisiveness as a result…When you move to single member districts, hell whenever you draw new boundaries, the more boundaries you have, the greater the potential that there's going to be conflicts... it's always a challenge, particularly as the delegation became more diverse. That is arguably one of the downsides of the single member districts is we do elect more people who are more sharply focused on a more narrow base within the overall constituency. And so that made it much more difficult to come up with uniform, countywide delegation priorities… And it became increasingly difficult to be the chairperson of the "united" delegation when in fact we weren't all that terribly united too often…[7]

When asked how often they disagree with their district mates on roll call votes,

MMD representatives typically had difficulty coming up with an answer. When asked

how often he disagrees with district mate Representative Mary Hooper, Kitzmiller said,

> Maybe once or twice a session…[its] rare. Roll call votes are done alphabetically, so Hooper comes first, and if she says "yes," and she hears me say "no," she'll spin around kind of like "what the hell." She might be surprised… If I know that we differ I'll talk to her ahead of time, and she would too… But sometimes I'll have somebody who really needs my support on a particular issue, and it's different from where Mary's going, so… we do differ once in a while. We don't march in lockstep together…[8]

When differences do arise, it is often because MMD representatives have different

backgrounds and work with different policy-motivated interests. Recall from Chapter 5

that MMD legislators seek to develop unique bases of support, and they use these votes

as an opportunity to take public positions and appear unique. As Vermont Representative

Jim Masland describes,

> Some of our differences have to do with what committee we are on. Occasionally Natural Resources has a strong position on something and ways and means will be slightly different. Margaret will have heard something in natural resources and

develop something that is the way to go. We hear different voices in ways and means and then come to a modified conclusion, that is different than hers.[9]

A Maryland three-member district Republican describes how her delegation typically votes together, unless groups of constituents with different policy goals divide them. In one example she describes, rural and urban interests clashed, and members of the normally united delegation took sides. It should again be noted, however, that these circumstances are rare, and MMD legislators often had difficulty identifying any specific examples of disagreement within the delegation.

> The vast majority of what we vote on is unanimous. Outside of those controversial issues, the typical stuff that you would expect a typical Republican stand on an issue, you know, a lot of them, we have 43 members in our caucus, if it's 35, it's probably the three of us, because I think the three of us are three of the more conservative members of our caucus, so ideologically I think we're going to agree on a lot of things, but I absolutely don't always vote the way they vote… There are definitely issues that I have not voted with them on… some of the crime issues… I'm trying to think there was a bill on allowing cops to write tickets… it was an issue that actually helped rural cops versus urban cops, and I voted with the rural cops on that and I think those guys voted with the urban cops on it… sometimes if the Black Caucus makes a good argument, I'll vote with them…You know, you see the Democrats just vote as a block, and so do we, you know it's nothing the Republicans don't do as well. You know on some of those issues that aren't quite as philosophically centered, you know if one of them gets up or somebody else on the floor I respect gets up and makes a good argument.[10]

New Jersey Assemblyman Gary Chiusano (R) notes that his district mate, Assemblywoman Alison McHose (R), and state Senator Steve Oroho (R), who shares the same district, typically agree on legislation that reaches the floor for a vote. When asked whether he always votes the same way as the other District 24 representatives, Chiusano replied,

> Not all the time…not 100 percent of the time… there are times we see things differently, whether it's Steve and I, Allison and I, Allison and Steve. And there are times when I can't think of one off the top of my head. I would say if we had 100 votes, probably 95% of the time we're in agreement, and probably 5% of the time we're not.[11]

Members of Chiusano's MMD delegation may disagree when it comes to certain

roll call votes because they rely on different constituencies for electoral support. In the

following example, Chiusano departed from the delegation to vote against a bill that

restaurant owners opposed.

> This was a very contentious bill, it was wineries, and it's a good example because it's a nonpartisan example… I think in Virginia you can buy wine in 7-11's… well New Jersey has wineries, and New Jersey has a law that the wineries cannot ship wine… But then the federal government came in and said wait a minute, you're allowing your Jersey wineries to do that, but you're not allowing out of state wineries to ship into your state, so that's against the federal rules and you need to fix this. So the way they decided to fix it was to pass this winery bill, and it allowed the winery to set up points of sale in addition to their own winery. Allison and Steve supported it, I chose not to. But the reason I did was because I worked with the restaurant association and others, and I said I'm going to work to get those numbers of outlets down, and I was assured they would get them down, but they didn't go down far enough for me, so I voted against it. But it passed, and we get along fine…[12]

The Maryland General Assembly provides a unique opportunity to examine the

effect of MMDs on roll call voting cohesion. Each Maryland state senate district elects

three delegates to the lower chamber. In some districts, the three delegates are elected

from three separate SMDs; in others, they are elected from one two-member MMD and

an SMD, and the rest elect three at-large delegates from a single MMD. Table 1 shows

the percentage of roll call votes and key votes for which the three delegates sharing a

senate district voted the same way during the 2007 through 2010 sessions combined.[13]

Among the senate-district delegations, those elected at-large from a single three-member

district voted together much more often than those elected from three separate single-

member districts, particularly on important key votes.

Table 6-1: District Magnitude and Unified Votes of Three-member Maryland Delegations, 2007 to 2010

	Three Single-Member	One Single-Member, One Two-Member	One Three Member
All Roll Call Votes (N=462,882)	83.30%	89.60%	89.10%
Key Votes (N=5,988)	25.0%	64.6%	78.9%

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Maryland General Assembly and Project Vote Smart.

Notes: Key votes are identified as controversial, highly publicized, or otherwise important decisions by Project Vote Smart. For a detailed description of the criteria used to identify key votes, see votesmart.org.

It is difficult to discern from interviews alone whether free riding is a concern, and whether it reduces legislative productivity. Most representatives were quick to praise their district mates, and may have been unwilling to complain publicly about their colleagues' failure to pull their own weight. To more closely examine the relationship between district magnitude and productivity, the following section describes a statistical analysis comparing the productivity of single- and multimember district representatives.

An Analysis of Productivity

Similar to the previous analyses, this chapter will again rely on multiple legislative sessions of three chambers that utilize MMDs: the 2007 through 2010 sessions of the Maryland House of Delegates, the 2009 to 2010 session of the Vermont House of Representatives, and the 2009 through 2011 sessions of the Arizona House of Representatives. These legislative chambers present a unique opportunity to study the effects of district magnitude because representatives in Maryland serve in one, two, or three-member districts; in Vermont, one or two member districts; and in Arizona, all representatives serve in two-member districts. Although district magnitude does not vary

within the Arizona House of Representatives, the chamber provides an opportunity to examine the effects of serving with a copartisan district mate because there are significant numbers of both party-united and party-split MMDs.[14] New Jersey, however, does not provide a similar opportunity to examine the effects of copartisan district mates, and is therefore excluded. As in previous chapters, legislators will be analyzed separately by state, removing the possibility that institutional or cultural factors specific to each legislative chamber could influence the results.

I measure productivity in two ways. First, the legislator's ability to draft legislation is indicated by a count of the amount of *legislation sponsored* (both primary and cosponsorships) during each legislative session. This measure has been used in the past to capture legislative "activity" or "entrepreneurship" among members of the U.S. Congress (Garand and Burke 2006; Wawro 2000). Second, I measure the number of bills sponsored or cosponsored by the legislator that were *signed into law*. This measure has been used to compare the legislative effectiveness of elected officials (Frantzich 1979). These measures capture both the legislator's ability to draft and introduce a robust legislative agenda, and to advocate for their legislation to move it through the process (see Appendix Table 6-1 for summary statistics of all variables in the analysis).

The District Mate Advantage

Recall that, because legislators in MMDs are able to rely on district mates as natural allies, the literature and interviews with elected officials lead us to expect a positive relationship between district magnitude and legislative productivity. Table 6-2 presents a simple comparison between the average numbers of bills introduced and signed into law by members elected in both SMDs and MMDs. In Maryland, delegates

elected from three member districts introduced more legislation and had more bills signed into law than those in single member districts; however, two-member district delegates produced less legislation than single or three-member.

It is possible that party affiliation influenced the pattern of legislative production across district magnitudes in this state. Three-member district delegates in Maryland were primarily Democrats (86 percent), whereas delegates from single and two member districts were more evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans. Majority party status, therefore, may have boosted the legislative production of three-member district delegates rather than district magnitude. The full statistical model will control for this possibility to more accurately estimate the influence of district magnitude.

The averages presented in Table 6-2 suggest that the relationship between district magnitude and legislative production may not be linear; therefore, I specify dummy variables for each district magnitude (*two member district* and *three member district*), with single-member districts as the excluded category, to be utilized in the multivariate analysis presented later in the chapter. What is more, because productivity is not always larger in MMDs than SMDs, the preliminary analysis suggests that the relationship between district magnitude and productivity may be influenced by other factors, such as characteristics of the legislators serving in these districts.

Table 6-2: District Magnitude and Productivity

	Average Sponsored	Average Signed into Law
District Magnitude		
Maryland		
1 (N=85)	27.08	26.44
2 (N=96)	26.02	23.26
3 (N=385)	31.32	27.87
ANOVA	F=11, p<.001	F=5.3, p<0.01
Vermont		
1 (N=66)	35.94	5.21
2 (N=84)	41.23	5.77
ANOVA	F=4.1, p<0.04	F=1.0, p<0.31
Arizona		
2 (N=184)	38.59	12.11

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Maryland General Assembly, the Vermont Legislature, the Arizona State Legislature, and the Sunlight Foundation.

Notes: Maryland includes the 2007 to 2010 sessions of the House of Delegates; Vermont includes the 2009-2010 session of the House; Arizona includes the 2009, 2010, and 2011 sessions of the House of Representatives. ANOVA test statistics are calculated using the oneway ANOVA command in Stata 12; two-tailed test.

Several factors are expected to influence legislators' ability to introduce and pass legislation. Because MMD legislators may rely on influential district mates to help them draft and promote legislation, I include three measures of the institutional clout of a legislator's district mates. Recent studies show that majority party members are significantly more productive than those in the minority (e.g., Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier, and Sinclair-Chapman 2003; Cox and Terry 2008). Therefore, I include *majority party district mates*, measured as a count of the number of representatives in the district who are members of the majority party (not included the legislator him or herself). Legislators who share a district with more majority party members are expected to be more productive than others.

A position as a leader of a standing committee or political party also may influence legislative participation and production (e.g., Froman 1967, 35; Hall 1996). Two variables: *party leader district mates* and *committee chair district mates*, measured as the number of party leaders and committee chairs with whom the legislator shares a district (not including the legislator him or herself), are used to measure the extent to which legislators benefit from sharing an MMD with a representatives in leadership positions.

Legislator Characteristics

A legislator's own institutional positions also may influence productivity. Therefore, I specify three dichotomous variables indicating whether a legislator is a *Democrat*, a *Party leader*, and a *Committee chair*. Additionally, legislative seniority and experience also influence legislators' ability to generate successful legislation (Miquel and Snyder 2006). Therefore, I also measure legislative *tenure* as the number of years the legislator has served in office. Because members who did not serve the full legislative session did not have a chance to introduce and promote a complete legislative agenda, I also include *Partial session,* coded one if the legislator did not serve the entire session, and zero otherwise. I also control for differences between legislative sessions using dummy variables to indicate the session.

Method

The two dependent variables, legislation sponsored and signed into law, are count variables; therefore, I use negative binomial regression, the same method adopted by previous studies to analyze productivity (e.g., Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier, and Sinclair-Chapman 2003; Cox and Terry 2008). As these studies note, due to the

distribution of count measures of legislative production, negative binomial regression is the appropriate method because, unlike the similar Poisson regression, negative binomial both tests and corrects for overdispersion, a characteristic of the data in which the conditional variance exceeds the mean. Because legislators are grouped into districts, I also calculate standard errors corrected for clustering at the district level (Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo 2007).

District magnitude and district mate characteristics may interact. To examine the possibility of interaction, I compared the results of several statistical approaches designed to account for interactive effects. Recall that, because the unit of analysis is the legislator, the sample sizes are constrained by the number of legislators serving in the chamber. The data did not support the estimation of models that include interactions between district magnitude and district mate characteristics; these resulted in high levels of collinearity. Therefore, in this chapter I take a similar approach to that utilized in chapter 3 by conducting analyses on subsets of candidates who share the same district magnitude. By holding district magnitude constant, this approach removes the possibility of interactive effects between district magnitude and the other variables in the model. The results are robust to a variety of model specifications. Estimations generated from regressions on subsets of the data are presented in the Appendix, and are substantively similar to those obtained from models that control for district magnitude but do not estimate interactive effects.

Results

Do representatives elected in MMDs produce more legislation than others? The results suggest that the answer is more complex than previously thought. Serving in an

MMD reduces productivity, holding all else constant; however, MMD legislators are often able to take advantage of influential district mates to draft more legislation than others. These findings shed new light on the relationship between district magnitude and legislative influence, and suggest that MMDs alter the balance of power in the legislature.

Table 6-3 shows the results the negative binomial regressions for the Maryland House of Delegates. In Maryland, legislators in two and three member districts sponsored and signed into law significantly fewer bills, on average, than those in SMDs, holding all else constant. The characteristics of one's district mates, however, were also important to legislative production. Delegates serving in MMDs with one or more majority party member district mates were able to sponsor and pass significantly more legislation than others. Those serving with party leader district mates did not sponsor more legislation than others, but they did pass more legislation than others on average, suggesting that party leaders may help their district mates move legislation through the process.

Many of the legislator characteristics also have significant effects. Members of the majority party enjoy a clear advantage: although Democrats in Maryland sponsored fewer bills than Republicans, they signed more into law. Party leaders, committee chairs, and more experienced legislators in Maryland actually produce less legislation than others.

Table 6-3: The Impact of District Magnitude and District Mates on Maryland
Legislation Introduced and Signed into Law, 2007 to 2010 Sessions

	Legislation Sponsored	Legislation Signed into Law
District magnitude		
Two member district	-0.090*	-0.219***
	(0.060)	(0.074)
Three member district	-0.100*	-0.315***
	(0.072)	(0.076)
Influential district mates		
Majority party district mates	0.193***	0.167***
	(0.039)	(0.041)
Party leader district mates	0.009	0.126***
	(0.032)	(0.040)
Comm chair district mates	-0.160***	-0.138**
	(0.066)	(0.068)
Legislator characteristics		
Democrat	-0.168***	0.157***
	(0.050)	(0.067)
Party leader	-0.097*	-0.176***
	(0.064)	(0.071)
Committee chair	-0.351***	-0.267***
	(0.085)	(0.085)
Tenure	-0.006***	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Partial session	-0.073	0.048
	(0.086)	(0.104)
Legislative session		
Session 2008	-0.019	-0.078*
	(0.050)	(0.053)
Session 2009	-0.232***	-0.225***
	(0.055)	(0.051)
Session 2010	-0.026	-0.038
	(0.052)	(0.051)
Constant	3.506***	3.316***
	(0.061)	(0.071)
Log psuedo-likelihood	-2139.8	-2145.1
N	565	565

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Maryland General Assembly and the
Sunlight Foundation. *Notes*: Cell entries are negative binomial regression
coefficients. Standard errors corrected for clustering by legislative district in
parentheses. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10, one-tailed tests.

Although the negative binomial regression coefficients indicate direction and significance, they reveal little of the substantive size of the effects. To calculate substantive impact, I calculate the effects of district magnitude and majority party, party leader, and committee chair district mates using the observed values approach, a technique that utilizes the observed values within the sample to generate predicted counts and average effects (Hanmer and Kalkan 2012). I also generate confidence intervals around these effects using a simulation method of drawing random vectors based upon the normal distribution and computing repeated sets of predicted counts (Herron 1999). Figure 6-1 shows the predicted effects of moving between discrete values of the district magnitude and district mate characteristic variables for Maryland Delegates. The figure shows that, on average, legislators in two and three member districts sign into law about 8 and 10 fewer bills per session than those in SMDs, holding all else constant.

Figure 6-1: The Impact of District Magnitude and Influential District Mates on
Legislative Productivity in the Maryland House of Delegates

Notes: Predicted effects are calculated using the observed values approach (Hanmer and
Kalkan 2012); error bars are 95% confidence intervals, calculated using a simulation
method (Herron 1999).

Majority party district mates provide a clear advantage in the Maryland legislature.

Each additional majority party district mate increases the number of bills a Maryland

Delegate sponsors and signs into law by about 5, on average. A party leader district mate

helps Maryland Delegates sign about 4 more bills into law per session, on average. However, as previously discussed, committee chair district mates actually reduce productivity, by about 4 bills sponsored and signed into law, on average.

Table 6-4 shows the results of the analysis of legislative productivity for Vermont Representatives. In Vermont, those serving in two member districts do not sponsor or sign into law significantly more or less than those in SMDs. The first column of Table 6-4, however, shows that those serving in MMDs with majority party district mates and committee chair district mates sponsored more legislation on average than others.

Table 6-4: The Impact of District Magnitude and District Mates on Vermont Legislation
Introduced and Signed into Law, 2009 to 2010 Session

	Legislation Sponsored	Legislation Signed into Law
District magnitude		
Two member district	-0.020	0.063
	(0.085)	(0.126)
Influential district mates		
Majority party district mates	0.161**	0.096
	(0.082)	(0.122)
Party leader district mates	-0.441***	0.187*
	(0.054)	(0.142)
Committee chair district mates	0.239***	-0.087
	(0.068)	(0.149)
Legislator characteristics		
Democrat	0.004	0.117
	(0.073)	(0.101)
Party leader	-0.678*	-0.390
	(0.438)	(0.322)
Committee chair	-0.047	0.323**
	(0.148)	(0.184)
Tenure	0.001	-0.013*
	(0.007)	(0.009)
Constant	3.609***	1.608***
	(0.082)	(0.105)
Log psuedo-likelihood	-627.8	-373.8
N	150	150

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Vermont Legislature and the Sunlight
Foundation.

Notes: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients. Standard errors
corrected for clustering by legislative district in parentheses. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10,
one-tailed tests.

Contrary to expectations, those serving with party leader district mates sponsored

fewer bills than others. This may be due to the unique role of the top party leader in the

Vermont House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House. The Vermont Speaker does

not participate in roll call votes, unless his or her vote is needed to break a tie, and serves

on no policy committees. As the current Vermont House Speaker Shap Smith (D)

describes, much of his time is spent with "running the House" rather than introducing

legislation.

> I don't have committee assignments… I'm basically running the House… in the
> four years I've been Speaker, I'm not sure whether I've introduced any bills.[15]

The Vermont House Speaker's unique roll may make him more of a liability than an asset

when it comes to drafting legislation. Given the Speaker's lack of direct involvement in

agenda setting, the results indicate that the rolls played by MMD representatives have an

impact on the productivity of their district mates.

The second column of Table 6-4, on the other hand, shows the effects of district

mate characteristics on the number of bills Vermont legislators sponsor that are signed

into law. Here, party leader district mates have a positive and significant influence on

legislative production. This may reflect the fact that Vermont party leaders spend more

time facilitating the passage of legislation than introducing it. This finding corroborates

Speaker Smith's description of the role of Vermont party leaders in the State House. For

example, as described in Chapter 4, although he rarely drafts or cosponsors legislation,

Smith often helps his district mate, Representative Peter Peltz (D) move bills through the

legislative process. Smith does this by using his contacts in the Senate and state agencies

to gather information and promote Peltz's initiatives.

Figure 6-2 shows the predicted effects among members of the Vermont House of

Representatives. In Vermont, district magnitude has no significant influence on

productivity. Majority party district mates and party leader district mates, on the other

hand, both increase the number of bills the average representative sponsors, by about 6

and 10, respectively. Surprisingly, a committee chair district mate in Vermont actually

increases the number of bills a legislator signs into law, by about 2 bills per session.

Figure 6-2: The Impact of District Magnitude and Influential District Mates on
Legislative Productivity in the Vermont House of Representatives

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Vermont Legislature and the Sunlight
Foundation.

Notes: Predicted effects are calculated using the observed values approach (Hanmer and
Kalkan 2012); error bars are 95% confidence intervals, calculated using a simulation
method (Herron 1999).

How does the Arizona House of Representatives, a chamber with no variation in

district magnitude and controlled by a Republican majority, compare? The first column

of Table 6-5 shows the results of the Arizona analysis of legislation sponsored. Although

the effect of majority party district mates is positive, it fails to have a significant effect on legislation sponsored; party leader and committee chair district mates also did not increase the amount of legislation sponsored by Arizona Representatives. The second column of Table 6-5, however, shows that majority party district mates (in the case of Arizona, the Republicans) did significantly increase the amount of legislation signed into law. As the minority party in Arizona, Democrats were at a disadvantage, sponsoring and signing into law less legislation than members of the GOP.

Table 6-5: The Impact of District Magnitude and District Mates on Arizona
Legislation Introduced and Signed into Law, 2009 to 2011 Sessions

	Legislation Sponsored	Legislation Signed into Law
Influential district mates		
Majority party district mates	0.011	0.186**
	(0.074)	(0.085)
Party leader district mates	-0.023	-0.047
	(0.114)	(0.120)
Committee chair district mates	-0.099	-0.091
	(0.079)	(0.098)
Legislator characteristics		
Democrat	-0.295***	-1.416***
	(0.069)	(0.088)
Party leader	0.048	-0.094
	(0.121)	(0.161)
Committee chair	0.026	-0.030
	(0.121)	(0.149)
Tenure	-0.053***	-0.045*
	(0.020)	(0.031)
Partial session	-0.648***	-0.931***
	(0.238)	(0.338)
Legislative session		
Session 2009	0.038	-0.120
	(0.085)	(0.117)
Session 2010	0.315***	0.625***
	(0.085)	(0.121)
Constant	3.811***	2.700***
	(0.089)	(0.103)
Log psuedo-likelihood	-775.9	-566.7
N	184	184

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Arizona State Legislature and the Sunlight Foundation.

Notes: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients. Standard errors corrected for clustering by legislative district in parentheses. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10, one-tailed tests.

Figure 6-3 shows the predicted effects based upon the observed values approach

for members of the Arizona House of Representatives. Legislators who serve in an MMD

with a majority party member signed an average of about 2 more bills into law per session. Similar to the results in Maryland, legislators who serve in an MMD with a committee chair appear to have lower legislative output than others, although the effect fails to reach statistical significance at conventional levels.

Figure 6-3: The Impact of District Magnitude and Influential District Mates on Legislative Productivity in the Arizona House of Representatives

Average Effect

☐ Total Bills Sponsored   ☒ Total Signed into law

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Arizona State Legislature and the Sunlight Foundation.

Notes: Predicted effects are calculated using the observed values approach (Hanmer and Kalkan 2012); error bars are 95% confidence intervals, calculated using a simulation method (Herron 1999).

Surprisingly, in Arizona, serving in an MMD with a party leader has no significant effect on legislation sponsored and signed into law. Because of term limits, party leaders in Arizona tend to be less experienced than those in other states. For example, the Maryland Speaker of the House, Michael Busch (D), has been a member of the House of Delegates since 1987. In comparison, Arizona House Speaker Andy Tobin (R) was first elected in 2006. It is interesting that Tobin was one of the only Arizona Representatives to respond positively to questions about term limits, because, as he puts it, only in a term-limited legislature can a legislator with little experience achieve the top spot as the party's leader.

> I kind of like term limits because I think if I stay here, I have two more years, and I just have to ask myself, well, if you didn't have term limits, would you have had a shot at being speaker? [And] what are you going to accomplish sticking around for eight more years that you couldn't have done in four?[16]

It is possible that party leaders in Maryland and Vermont, therefore, improve the legislative productivity of their district mates not only because of their influential positions, but also because they have served for many sessions as an influential member of the legislature, working their way up the ranks and building relationships with other influential representatives. The high levels of turnover in the Arizona legislature, however, may reduce the relative power and influence of party leaders and other representatives in institutional leadership positions.

Democrats may also take a different approach to legislative productivity than Republicans. The Republican Party typically works to reduce the size and activity of government. Therefore, influential district mates may do less to encourage legislative production in Arizona because the majority party is actively working to reduce the size and scope of government. Despite Republican control, however, sharing a district with

members of the majority party increases the number of bills an Arizona legislator is able to pass into law, suggesting that majority party district teams convey additional legislative influence to their members.

Summary

This chapter addressed what appeared to be a straightforward question: how does district magnitude influence productivity? Two perspectives derived from the literature present contradictory answers. From the first, scholars predict that legislators in MMDs would produce less legislation because district mates have an incentive to free ride, receiving the benefit of passing legislation without contributing to the effort. Others argue that legislators in MMDs work together as a team and vote as a bloc, generating more legislation and exerting more influence over policy outcomes than those in SMDs.

The results of the analysis suggest that the answer may be more complex than either perspective presume. In line with the first perspective, district magnitude reduces productivity, holding all else constant. However, sharing a district with majority party members and party leaders increases productivity. Therefore, legislators who have the good fortune of sharing a district with an influential colleague are at a distinct advantage. What is more, the findings suggest that MMD teams composed of several influential legislators may wield significantly more power than others. These results cast a new light on studies that find that urban areas represented by large MMDs tend to have more legislative influence and are better able to secure state funding for their home district (e.g., Dauer 1966; Snyder and Ueda 2007). The large MMD delegations analyzed in these studies likely formed powerful teams because they were composed of several influential members, including majority party members and party leaders. These members are able

to rely on the influence of their same-district colleagues to research, draft, and promote legislation.

Across the three state legislatures, representatives serving in the same MMD as majority party members both sponsor and sign into law more legislation than others, although the effect falls short of statistical significance for legislation signed into law in Vermont and legislation sponsored in Arizona. Sharing an MMD with a party leader, on the other hand, does not always increase a legislator's output. In both Maryland and Vermont, but not in Arizona, legislators who shared a district with a party leader saw more of their sponsored bills signed into law than others. In no state in the sample did sharing a district with a party leader increase the number of bills sponsored. It is possible that party leaders were too preoccupied with other duties to help district mates draft and sponsor legislation, but their help is more beneficial when district mates are working to move bills through the process.

Contrary to expectations, serving in an MMD with a committee chair reduced the number of bills legislators sponsored and signed into law in all three states. Only in Vermont does sharing a district with a committee chair have a positive effect, increasing the number of bills a legislator sponsors but not the legislation they sponsor that is signed into law. It may be that committee chairs have a tendency to work on legislation geared towards more narrow sets of policy interests, making them less likely to work with their district mates and more likely to work with other members of their committee. As Chapter 5 and other studies of MMD representation (e.g., Schiller 2000) show, MMD legislators build careers based upon separate issues. Committee chairs may focus more on

issue-specific legislation, which may mean they have less time to work with and support their district mates on other issues.

Overall, the findings suggest that district magnitude alters the balance of power within a legislative chamber in unforeseen ways. First, if district magnitude varies within the chamber, constituents living in MMDs may receive a different quality of representation than those in SMDs. This should be of particular concern to voters living in states that currently elect state legislators from both SMDs and MMDs because the quality of representation they receive may be related to their place of residence. Second, legislators with the good fortune of serving in an MMD with multiple majority party members and other influential legislators may be able to exercise greater control over the legislative agenda and policy outputs.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Former Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis famously described American state legislatures as "laboratories for democracy." Indeed, the states provide a rich variety of structures, rules, and procedures that allow researchers to compare and contrast different electoral and legislative institutions. Throughout U.S. history, states have adopted a variety of electoral rules and procedures, and contemporary U.S. legislatures are a heterogeneous group. The choice of electoral procedure was often based on very little thought or careful analysis.   Multimember districts, as the introduction to this study describes, were popular among the early states in large part because they were commonly used to elect members of the Parliament of England. The electoral and representational implications of district magnitude were not given much thought, in part because, at the time, America's Founding Fathers had more pressing concerns, and also because there simply was not enough evidence or experience to speculate about the effects of district magnitude. During the 20th Century, most state legislatures were forced or encouraged to eliminate MMDs out of a belief that they discouraged the election of racial and ethnic minorities.

The findings presented in this study indicate that the decision of how many representatives to elect from a single legislative district should not be made lightly. District magnitude influences politicians compete for and retain office, altering many well known strategies such as advertising, position taking, and credit claiming (Mayhew 1974b). The strategies legislators adopt to maintain electoral security have important implications for the conduct of campaigns, as well as the agenda setting process and the balance of power in the legislature. The findings also indicate that MMD legislators

collaborate to represent their shared constituency and run for reelection. What is more, the interaction between legislators who share an MMD influences the bills they introduce, the legislation they produce, and how many votes they earn on Election Day.

I examined a number of expectations based upon the political realities MMD candidates face when building a career as an elected representative. In contrast to those in SMDs, those building a political career in an MMD must appeal to a larger and often more diverse constituency. Drawing upon previous studies, I predicted that MMD representatives would find it more difficult to develop a unique personal reputation and advertise ones' personal accomplishments, and would develop unique strategies to accomplish these career-building endeavors (Carey and Shugart 1995; Schiller 2000). At the same time, interviews with legislators elected in MMDs indicated that coordination with one's district mates is a central part of the typical MMD representatives' campaign and legislative strategy. On the campaign trail, I anticipated that MMD candidates would sometimes work as a team, reducing campaign costs and reaching more potential voters. In office, I expected that MMD candidates would interact with their district mates to represent their shared constituency, influencing the legislation they introduce and cosponsor, and their relative influence over the legislative agenda.

The first step in a representative's political career is to run for and win elective office. MMDs present prospective politicians with a unique challenge. They compete alongside similar candidates for multiple seats. Previous studies speculated that MMDs disadvantage incumbents because they compete with a broader field of candidates to win the attention of voters and advertise their accomplishments (e.g., Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998). However, this is open to challenge; some studies found that MMD

incumbents actually do better than those competing in SMDs (Hirano and Snyder 2009). The analysis in Chapter 3 of this study suggests that, rather than uniformly advantaging or disadvantaging incumbents, MMDs advantage those who are able to rely on high quality district mates, and disadvantage those who do not enjoy the benefit of experienced allies. The findings further indicate that MMD legislators are able to rely on their district mates to help them compete for and win reelection.

The advantages of sharing a party affiliation with an experienced and well-known district mate are numerous. District mates who collaborate, for example, reduce the costs of campaigning in a large district by dividing up campaign visits, meeting with different groups and promoting their colleagues at events across the district. In many states that elect legislators in MMDs, those who share a district also routinely form joint campaign committees to supplement their personal campaign committees and raise and spend money on behalf of allied candidates in the district. This collective strategy allows MMD candidates to run more efficient campaigns by combining support for the entire set of district mates; MMD candidates in multiple states related that they commonly shared the costs of mailers by listing all allied candidates on the same printed materials, and held joint fundraisers to share the costs of hosting events.

The elections analysis also suggests that timing influences the dynamics of MMD elections. The dynamics of state legislative, municipal, and other local MMD elections are different from those of the U.S. Senate; state legislative MMD candidates appear on the ballot at the same time, rather than in staggered elections. With concurrent MMD elections, coordination helps discourage challengers, and gives candidates an opportunity to spend campaign money more efficiently to reach potential voters. Candidates who

share a concurrently elected MMD are not exclusively rivals for attention; rather, many actively work together to build shared attention and support. Election timing, therefore, may encourage collaboration, which may explain why the results presented in this study differ somewhat from Schiller's (2000) analysis of U.S. Senate delegations, which emphasize rivalry and competition between same-state senators.

Because MMD politicians typically rely on their district mates to win and retain office, shared constituencies encourage collaboration with one's district mates from the very beginning of a legislator's political career, beginning with their first primary contest. While serving in office, MMD legislators continue to work with their district mates to represent a shared constituency. As chapters 4, 5, and 6 show, district magnitude significantly alters legislative behavior, particularly the strategies they use to generate and claim credit for legislative accomplishments, with implications for agenda setting and the balance of power in the chamber.

MMD district mates are uniquely positioned to combine forces to promote the interests of their shared geographic constituency. The analysis presented in Chapter 4 indicates that district magnitude and the presence of copartisan district mates influence how legislators build a legislative agenda and a political career. Sharing a constituency with another representative allowed MMD representatives to divide up the task of responding to local concerns. What is more, the division of labor also gives them the opportunity to work with a broader range of interests than they would have without a district mate. I find that MMD legislators sponsor more legislation that relates to local interests than those in SMDs relative to legislation that concerns broader statewide interests. This analysis builds upon previous studies that find that MMD legislators tend

to direct more state funds to their home district than those elected in SMDs (e.g., Dauer 1966; Snyder and Ueda 2007), and indicates that not only are MMD legislators better able to direct funds to their district; they are also more active representatives of local interests. This finding carries particularly troubling implications for mixed-MMD legislative chambers such as the Maryland House of Delegates, the Vermont State Senate and House of Representatives, the West Virginia House of Delegates, and the New Hampshire General Court, because it suggests that constituents living in MMDs may have a stronger voice in the legislature than those living in districts represented by legislators elected in SMDs.

Although they often work as a team, representatives elected in MMDs are also careful to maintain their individuality (Carey and Shugart 1995; Schiller 2000). They develop issue specialties and work to develop a personal brand. They attend events and develop relationships with organized interests (Jewell 1982b), and specialize to introduce and promote issue-specific legislation. Legislators in MMDs are able to rely on their district mates to cover some of the issues that are important to their constituents, allowing MMD legislators to specialize to a greater degree than those elected in SMDs. Relying again on an analysis of bills sponsored by state legislators in Maryland, Vermont, and Arizona, Chapter 5 showed that those elected in MMDs tend to sponsor legislation that covers fewer issues than those elected in SMDs. The desire to build a unique reputation and the ability to coordinate and defer to other same-district policy specialists combine to encourage MMD legislators to specialize, and discouraged them from cosponsoring all of the bills introduced by their district colleagues. Even though cosponsoring legislation

requires little time or effort, legislators in MMDs chose to concentrate their attention on a narrower set of interests than others.

How does specialization influence representation? Because they are able to devote their time and attention to fewer issues, policy experts may do a better job addressing and representing those issue-oriented interests. Again, because the analysis shows that legislators elected in MMDs behave differently from those elected in SMDs from the same chamber, the results are troubling for legislatures that elect members from both MMDs and SMDs. They suggest that by grouping legislators, MMDs result in coordinated teams that are in some ways better able to respond to the needs of their constituents and place issue-oriented legislation on the agenda. On the other hand, because they work with fewer issues, MMD representatives may also be more likely to develop an agenda that is less representative of their entire constituency, a conclusion that Myerson (1993) reaches when analyzing the effects of district magnitude on resource distribution.

Chapter 6 considered the influence of district magnitude on a legislator's productivity and influence over the legislative agenda. Similar to the analysis of electoral dynamics (see Chapter 3), these results indicate that an MMD legislator's district mates influence their ability to build a successful career. They shed new light on a long-standing debate over the effects of district magnitude on the balance of power in a legislature. Two popular perspectives offer seemingly contradictory conclusions. According to proponents of the first perspective, legislators in MMDs produce less legislation because district mates have an incentive to free ride, allowing them to receive the benefit of drafting and passing legislation without contributing to the effort. Those

who adopt an alternative view argue that legislators in MMDs work together as a team and vote as a bloc, generating more legislation and exerting more influence over policy outcomes than those in SMDs. The results provide mixed support for the latter perspective. Specifically, influential district mates, such as majority party members and party leaders, help MMD legislators introduce and pass more legislation than others. The implication is that legislators who have the good fortune of sharing a district with an influential colleague enjoy an advantage, and that MMD teams composed of several influential legislators may wield significantly more influence of legislative agendas and policy outputs than others.

Again, these findings suggest that constituents may receive a different quality of representation simply by virtue of the district magnitude of their home legislative district. In states that vary district magnitude within the state legislative chamber, such as Maryland, Vermont, West Virginia, and New Hampshire, constituents living in MMDs may receive a different quality of representation than those in SMDs. What is more, constituents represented by legislators who serve with multiple majority party members and other influential legislators may be able to exercise greater control over the legislative agenda and policy outputs. The analyses also indicate that legislators who share an MMD with members of the same party behave differently from those who do not. By combining forces, these legislators may be able to dominate districts, discouraging challengers and exerting greater influence over legislative agendas and policy outputs.

Future decisions to convert MMDs to SMDs or reduce district magnitudes may have far reaching effects on campaigns and representation. This change in electoral

procedure would likely reduce collaboration between candidates competing for office. It would also likely shift power away from counties and municipalities represented by MMD delegations, both in terms of agenda setting and resource distribution, and result in the election of well-rounded legislators who deal with a variety of policy issues rather than specialize. What is more, reducing the size of MMDs or eliminating them entirely would likely shift power away from constituencies that benefited from coordinated representation and multiple influential representatives.

The finding that MMD legislators behave differently on the campaign trail and in office should be of particular interest during the redistricting process. A functioning democracy should provide equal representation to its citizens, regardless of the location of their home residence, or their age, race, ethnicity, or other characteristics. Policymakers should consider that electing some legislators from MMDs and others from SMDs potentially creates disparities in the conduct of elections and the quality of representation constituents receive based upon the magnitude of their home legislative district. This study suggests, therefore, that policymakers interested in promoting equal representation should advocate for systems that elect members of the same legislative chamber either entirely from SMDs or entirely from MMDs.

MMDs encourage politicians to adopt different strategies to build their careers than those in SMDs. That being said, the findings do not provide decision makers with a definitive answer as to whether MMDs result in representation that is better or worse than that provided by SMDs. Rather than provide a definitive recommendation of the "best" district magnitude, this study points to several trade offs that should be considered when drawing district lines. By working together, well-coordinated MMD teams may be able to

provide their constituents with a stronger voice in the legislature. However, because state legislative MMD representatives often legislate and compete for reelection as a team, constituents may have a more difficult time monitoring the activities of individual MMD legislators and punishing them for making unpopular decisions. This should come as little surprise to those who study electoral systems, who consistently note that no electoral procedure is better than all others.

Scholars have long recognized the importance of electoral incentives to legislative behavior and representation (e.g., Arnold 1990; Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974b). Future studies should continue to examine the relationship between electoral systems and political career building. This study points to the broad-reaching impacts of district magnitude. Scholars should adopt a similar approach to examine the effects of other aspects of electoral systems, such as the timing of elections, term limits, and ballot design. To better understand the impact of electoral procedures on representation, their effects should examined throughout a politician's career; relatively few existing studies, however, link behavior the campaign trail to that in the legislature (see, however, Schiller 2000; Sulkin 2009, 2011). Although no electoral system provides an ideal form of representation, we must work to improve our understanding of their impact on democracy. America's Founding Fathers had little reason to believe that district magnitude would have an important impact on the functioning of democratic representation; however, we now have the virtue of experience and a broad array of U.S. legislative institutions to examine, compare, and contrast. In the future, constituents and policymakers should use objective observations and analyses such as these to inform their decisions and continue to improve our electoral systems.

Appendices

Chapter 3 Appendix

Appendix Table 3-1: Vote Share Regression Variables

	Maryland				New Jersey			
	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Vote Share	0.60	0.25	0.08	1.21	0.52	0.18	0.07	1.02
Vote Similarity	0.93	0.19	0.33	1	0.99	0.08	0.50	1
District Magnitude	2.46	0.78	1	3	--	--	--	--
Copartisan Incumbents	0.70	0.80	0	2	0.41	0.49	0	1
Local Committee Spend	0.25	0.63	0	4.76	1.47	4.39	0	32.97
Years as District Team	3.04	5.05	0	35	1.71	3.53	0	18
Tenure	4.45	6.94	0	37	2.62	4.72	0	24
Incumbent	0.47	0.50	0	1	0.41	0.49	0	1
Leadership	0.07	0.25	0	1	0.04	0.19	0	1
Campaign Contrib.	0.79	1.15	0	14.10	0.82	1.33	0	10.10
Democrat	0.57	0.50	0	1	0.52	0.50	0	1
Prop. of Incumbents	0.79	0.27	0	1	0.80	0.33	0	1
Competition	1.68	0.35	1.00	2.23	1.85	0.22	1	2.14
District Partisan Favorability	0.47	0.19	0.06	0.87	0.28	0.12	0.04	0.54

(continued on following page)

Appendix Table 3-1 Cont.

	Vermont House				Vermont Senate			
	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Vote Share	0.67	0.25	0.18	1.30	0.55	0.19	0.25	1.10
Vote Similarity	0.96	0.12	0.5	1	0.90	0.17	0.33	1
District Magnitude	1.55	0.50	1	2	3.11	1.64	1	6
Copartisan Incumbents	0.30	0.46	0	1	0.84	0.97	0	4
Local Committee Spend	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Years as District Team	2.33	3.58	0	24	2.173	4.33	0	26
Tenure	3.35	5.22	0	37	4.245	7.93	0	42
Incumbent	0.57	0.50	0	1	0.436	0.50	0	1
Leadership	0.02	0.14	0	1	0.064	0.25	0	1
Campaign Contrib.	0.03	0.03	0	0.25	0.126	0.12	0	0.47
Democrat	0.54	0.50	0	1	0.527	0.50	0	1
Prop. of Incumbents	0.86	0.30	0	1	0.818	0.28	0	1.5
Competition	1.66	0.41	0.97	2.77	1.865	0.31	0.97	2.32
District Partisan Favorability	0.53	0.18	0.05	1.06	0.491	0.18	0.17	0.82

Source: Election returns and campaign finance data provided by the Maryland State Board of Elections, Vermont Secretary of State, New Jersey Department of State. Candidate information provided by the Sunlight Foundation and candidate websites.

Appendix Table 3-2: The Impact of Shared Incumbency and Coordination on Vote Share

	MD Two member districts	MD Three member Districts	VT Two Member Districts	VT Three Member Districts	VT Six Member Districts
Shared Incumbency Advantage					
Number of Copartisan Incumbents	0.074**	0.057***	0.061***	0.029	0.082***
	(0.037)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.000)
Active Coordination					
Localized Joint Fundraising Committee Spending	0.025*	0.059**	--	--	--
	(0.018)	(0.029)			
Number of Years as District Team	0.003	0.003*	0.000	0.001	-0.016**
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Candidate Quality and Party Affiliation					
Incumbent	0.099*	0.089***	0.225***	0.118***	0.162**
	(0.064)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.016)
Tenure	-0.005*	-0.002**	0.001	0.000	0.009
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Leadership	0.021	-0.011	-0.046*	0.065**	--
	(0.047)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.022)	
Campaign Contributions per 100k	0.015	0.002	0.511***	0.093	0.223*
	(0.029)	(0.003)	(0.173)	(0.169)	(0.045)
Democrat	-0.125***	-0.102***	0.015	0.148***	--
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.037)	
Competition					
Proportion of Incumbents Competing	-0.116***	-0.166***	-0.138***	-0.090**	--
	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.056)	(0.036)	
Competition	-0.084	-0.110***	-0.335***	0.009	--
	(0.072)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.044)	
District Partisan Favorability	0.959***	0.933***	0.070	-0.065	-0.057**
	(0.202)	(0.066)	(0.077)	(0.053)	(0.003)
Senate	--	--	-0.062**	--	--

| | (0.033) | | | | |

Appendix Table 3-2 cont.

Year 2010	-0.002	-0.010	0.017	0.002	0.038**
	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.003)
Constant	0.359***	0.429***	1.107***	0.416***	0.249***
	(0.143)	(0.081)	(0.093)	(0.076)	(0.004)
Adjusted R-Squared	0.742	0.900	0.678	0.639	0.708
N	86	299	285	36	24

Source: Election returns and campaign finance data provided by the Maryland State Board of Elections, Vermont Secretary of State, New Jersey Department of State. Candidate information provided by the Sunlight Foundation and candidate websites.

Notes: Cell entries are ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10, one tailed tests. Standard errors corrected for clustering in parentheses.

Appendix Table 3-3: The Impact of Shared Incumbency and Coordination on Copartisan Vote Similarity

	Maryland Two member districts	Maryland Three member Districts	Vermont Two Member Districts	Vermont Three Member Districts	Vermont Six Member Districts
Shared Copartisan Advantage					
Number of Copartisan Incumbents	-0.004	0.001	0.015**	0.007	0.026***
	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.003)
Number of Copartisan candidates	0.481***	0.326***	0.466***	0.317***	--
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.011)	
Active Coordination					
Joint Fundraising Committee Spending	0.004***	0.002*	--	--	--
	(0.001)	(0.001)			
Number of Years as District Team	0.001**	0.000	-0.000	0.003	--
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	
Party Affiliation					
Democrat	-0.011**	-0.002	0.010	0.005	--
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.020)	
Competition					
Proportion of Incumbents Competing	0.012*	-0.005	-0.018	-0.012	--
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.019)	
Competition	0.008	0.008	-0.002	0.027	--
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.020)	
District Partisan Favorability	0.014	0.018	-0.017	-0.002	0.011
	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.022)
Senate	--	--	-0.004	--	--
			(0.005)		

Appendix Table 3-3 cont.

Year 2010	0.000	-0.002	0.010**	0.001	0.041***
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Constant	0.003	-0.002	0.042***	-0.042	0.863***
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.009)
Adjusted R-squared	0.985	0.996	0.966	0.506	0.568
N	1285	3943	870	319	116

Source: Election returns and campaign finance data provided by the Maryland State Board of Elections, Vermont Secretary of State, New Jersey Department of State. Candidate information provided by the Sunlight Foundation and candidate websites.

Notes: Cell entries are ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10, one tailed tests. Standard errors corrected for clustering in parentheses.

Chapter 4 Appendix

<div align="center">Appendix Table 4-1: Summary Statistics</div>

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Maryland				
Percent Local Action	0.124	0.093	0	1
Two Member District	0.170	0.376	0	1
Three Member District	0.680	0.467	0	1
Shared Party Affiliation	0.791	0.407	0	1
Number of Counties	1.248	0.643	1	4
Number of Municipalities	3.759	4.778	1	25
Area	134.033	210.867	9.178	1059.029
Total Sponsorships	29.784	11.625	0	76
Leadership	0.080	0.271	0	1
Committee Chair	0.050	0.217	0	1
Appropriations Committee	0.177	0.382	0	1
Democrat	0.736	0.441	0	1
Tenure	8.690	7.548	0	37
Partial session	0.044	0.206	0	1

Appendix Table 4-1, cont.

Arizona

Percent Local Action	0.165	0.083	0	0.667
Two Member District	1	0	1	1
Three Member District	0	0	0	0
Shared Party Affiliation	0.826	0.380	0	1
Number of Counties	1.228	0.611	1	3
Number of Municipalities	3.223	4.590	1	18
Area	3732.628	6646.776	24.182	21677.940
Total Sponsorships	38.587	17.287	0	87
Leadership	0.076	0.266	0	1
Committee Chair	0.239	0.428	0	1
Appropriations Committee	0.207	0.406	0	1
Democrat	0.380	0.487	0	1
Tenure	2.815	2.609	0	13
Partial session	0.049	0.216	0	1

Appendix Table 4-4 cont.

Vermont

Percent Local Action	0.089	0.090	0	1
Percent Municipal Action	0.030	0.088	0	1
Two Member District	0.56	0.498	0	1
Three Member District	0	0	0	0
Shared Party Affiliation	0.347	0.478	0	1
Number of Counties	1	0	1	1
Number of Municipalities	2.547	1.874	1	13
Area	89.447	78.327	0.793	436.541
Total Sponsorships	38.9	16.006	1	86
Leadership	0.027	0.162	0	1
Committee Chair	0.113	0.318	0	1
Appropriations Committee	0.073	0.262	0	1
Democrat	0.627	0.485	0	1
Tenure	5.807	5.652	0	37
Partial session	0	0	0	0

Source: Compiled from data collected by the Sunlight Foundation and the Maryland General Assembly (www.mlis.state.md.us), the Vermont House of Representatives (www.leg.state.vt.us), and the Arizona House of Representatives (www.azleg.gov), and the U.S. Census Bureau. Although term limits restrict Arizona Representatives to no more than four consecutive two year terms, the cumulative number of years in office of some Arizona Representatives surpasses eight because these members have served in other political positions, then returned to the House.

Chapter 5 Appendix

Appendix Table 5-1: Summary Statistics

	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Maryland Delegates					
District Magnitude	565	2.529	0.742	1	3
One Party MMD	565	0.791	0.407	0	1
Democrat	565	0.736	0.441	0	1
Number of years as team	565	4.770	5.130	0	35
Tenure	565	8.701	7.537	0	37
Party Leadership	565	0.080	0.271	0	1
Partial session	565	0.044	0.206	0	1
Committee Chair	565	0.035	0.185	0	1
Demographic Diversity Index	565	0.583	0.031	0.511	0.635
Vermont Representatives					
District Magnitude	150	1.56	0.498	1	2
One Party MMD	150	0.347	0.478	0	1
Democrat	150	0.627	0.485	0	1
Number of years as team	150	3.880	3.862	0	19
Tenure	150	5.807	5.652	0	37
Party Leadership	150	0.027	0.162	0	1
Partial session	150	0	0	0	0
Committee Chair	150	0.113	0.318	0	1
Demographic Diversity Index	150	0.522	0.010	0.505	0.563

Appendix Table 5-1 cont.

Arizona Representatives

District Magnitude	184	2	0	2	2
One Party MMD	184	0.826	0.380	0	1
Democrat	184	0.380	0.487	0	1
Number of years as team	184	1.560	1.857	0	7
Tenure	184	2.815	2.609	0	13
Party Leadership	184	0.076	0.266	0	1
Partial session	184	0.049	0.216	0	1
Committee Chair	184	0.239	0.428	0	1
Demographic Diversity Index	184	0.578	0.023	0.537	0.626

Source: Compiled from data collected by the Sunlight Foundation and the Maryland General Assembly (www.mlis.state.md.us), the Vermont House of Representatives (www.leg.state.vt.us), and the Arizona House of Representatives (www.azleg.gov), and the U.S. Census Bureau. The cumulative number of years in office of some Arizona Representatives surpasses eight because these members have served in other political positions, then returned to the House.

Chapter 6 Appendix

Appendix Table 6-1: Summary Statistics for Analyses of Productivity

	Maryland				Vermont				Arizona			
	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Productivity												
Sponsored	29.8	11.6	0	76	38.9	16.0	1	86	38.6	17.3	0	87
Signed into Law	26.9	12.6	0	79	5.5	3.3	0	16	12.1	9.9	0	43
District Magnitude												
Two Member District	0.2	0.4	0	1	0.6	0.5	0	1	1.0	0.0	1	1
Three Member District	0.7	0.5	0	1	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0
Influential District Mates												
Majority Party District Mates	1.3	0.9	0	2	0.4	0.5	0	1	0.6	0.5	0	1
Comm Chair District Mates	0.1	0.3	0	1	0.1	0.2	0	1	0.3	0.4	0	1
Party Leader District Mates	0.1	0.3	0	2	0.0	0.1	0	1	0.1	0.3	0	1
Legislator Characteristics												
Democrat	0.7	0.4	0	1	0.6	0.5	0	1	0.4	0.5	0	1
Party Leader	0.1	0.3	0	1	0.0	0.2	0	1	0.1	0.3	0	1
Committee Chair	0.0	0.2	0	1	0.1	0.3	0	1	0.2	0.4	0	1
Partial session	0.0	0.2	0	1	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.2	0	1
Tenure	8.7	7.5	0	37	5.8	5.7	0	37	2.8	2.6	0	13

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Maryland General Assembly, the Vermont Legislature, the Arizona State Legislature, and the Sunlight Foundation.

Notes: Maryland includes data from the 2007 through 2010 sessions of the House of Delegates. Vermont includes data from the 2009-2010 session of the Vermont House of Representatives. Arizona includes data from the 2009 through 2011 session of the Arizona House of Representatives.

Appendix Table 6-2: The Impact of District Magnitude and District Mates on Maryland Legislation Introduced and Signed into Law, 2007 to 2010 Sessions

	Legislation Sponsored		Legislation Signed into Law	
	Two Member Districts	Three Member Districts	Two Member Districts	Three Member Districts
Influential District Mates				
Majority Party District Mates	0.083	0.201***	0.532***	0.122***
	(0.077)	(0.042)	(0.082)	(0.043)
Party Leader District Mates	0.369***	-0.013	0.579***	0.115***
	(0.079)	(0.034)	(0.097)	(0.046)
Comm Chair District Mates	-0.164	-0.139**	-0.101	-0.122**
	(0.150)	(0.077)	(0.181)	(0.073)
Legislator Characteristics				
Democrat	--	-0.199***	--	0.221***
		(0.067)		(0.075)
Party Leader	0.466***	-0.127*	0.609***	-0.311***
	(0.075)	(0.087)	(0.096)	(0.080)
Committee Chair	-0.642***	-0.323***	-0.367*	-0.255***
	(0.197)	(0.110)	(0.227)	(0.102)
Tenure	0.012*	-0.008***	0.004	-0.002
	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.004)
Partial session	-0.035	0.089	-0.142	0.191**
	(0.170)	(0.092)	(0.163)	(0.101)
Legislative Session				
Session 2008	0.134**	-0.055	0.046	-0.109**
	(0.081)	(0.063)	(0.105)	(0.062)
Session 2009	-0.169**	-0.232***	-0.240***	-0.191***
	(0.097)	(0.069)	(0.100)	(0.059)
Session 2010	0.079	-0.055	0.030	-0.011
	(0.114)	(0.065)	(0.104)	(0.062)
Constant	3.098***	3.445***	2.838***	3.030***
	(0.105)	(0.079)	(0.128)	(0.059)
Log psuedo-likelihood	-335.80	-1480.44	-334.5	-1460.72
N	96	384	96	384

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Maryland General Assembly and the Sunlight Foundation. *Notes*: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients. Standard errors corrected for clustering by legislative district in parentheses. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10, one-tailed tests.

Appendix Table 6-3: The Impact of District Magnitude and District Mates on Vermont Legislation Introduced and Signed into Law, 2009 to 2010 Session

	Legislation Sponsored	Legislation Signed into Law
	Two Member Districts	Two Member Districts
Influential District Mates		
Majority Party District Mates	0.182**	0.147
	(0.081)	(0.118)
Party Leader District Mates	-0.448***	0.158
	(0.051)	(0.130)
Committee Chair District Mates	0.238***	-0.040
	(0.065)	(0.148)
Legislator Characteristics		
Democrat	-0.043	-0.008
	(0.092)	(0.129)
Party Leader	-3.788***	-2.032***
	(0.187)	(0.285)
Committee Chair	0.038	0.252
	(0.199)	(0.300)
Tenure	-0.004	-0.012
	(0.007)	(0.011)
Constant	3.638***	1.725***
	(0.088)	(0.150)
Log psuedo-likelihood	-348.95	-215.13
N	84	84

Source: Compiled using data provided by the Vermont Legislature and the Sunlight Foundation.

Notes: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients. Standard errors corrected for clustering by legislative district in parentheses. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10, one-tailed tests.

Notes

1. Introduction

[1] Carey, John M, and Simon Hix. 2011. "The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2): 383–397. p. 395

[2] See the Congress 2008 Commission Act (H.R. 1989, 109th Congress); the Congress 2012 Commission Act (H.R. 6396, 110th Congress); and the Congress 2014 Commission Act (H.R. 3972, 111th Congress).

[3] Maintaining county lines while abiding by "one person, one vote" also became particularly difficult when the formerly common "floterial" district fell out of favor with the courts. Floterial districts contained representatives as "floaters" who divided their time between constituencies. They were intended to provide equal representation without resorting to district lines that crossed existing political boundaries.

[4] From 2002 to 2011, 11 state legislatures used MMDs; Nevada eliminated the MMDs used to elect state senators in the 2010 redistricting.

[5] For a list of Maryland special governments using MMDs, see the Maryland State Board of Elections (www.elections.state.md.us).

[6] The scale has been updated through the year 2000; the full competitiveness rankings are available at http://academic.udayton.edu/SPPQ-TPR/index.htm.

[7] See the New Jersey Legislature's website, www.njleg.state.nj.us, for a list of General Assembly members and their party affiliations.

[8] Although New Jersey uses MMDs to elect members of the General Assembly, the state does not provide an opportunity to examine the effects of sharing an MMD with an opposing party member because almost MMDs in the state are represented by members of the same party; for example, from 2009 to 2011, only one of the forty New Jersey General Assembly MMDs elected Assembly members from more than one party.

2. Elections, Representation, and District Magnitude

[1] Figures provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.

[2] See the Maryland State Board of Elections (www.elections.state.md.us) and the New Jersey Department of State (www.nj.gov/state) for information about joint campaign committees formed among same-district candidates (referred to as "slates" in Maryland and "joint committees" in New Jersey).

[3] Figures provided by the Maryland State Board of Elections and available at www.elections.state.md.us.

[4] Maryland Delegate Brian Feldman (D), personal interview, May 9, 2012.

[5] Paul S. Herrnson, Principal Investigator, "Campaign Assessment and Candidate Outreach Project, Mail Survey 1," College Park, MD: Center for American Politics and Citizenship, University of Maryland, 1999.

[6] New Jersey Assemblyman Gary R. Chiusano (R), personal interview, May 15, 2012.

[7] Vermont Representative Anne Donahue (R), personal interview, June 25, 2012.

[8] Former Florida State Representative Arthur Simon, telephonic interview, May 8, 2012.

[9] Although U.S. Senators are elected in staggered elections and MMD state legislators are elected simultaneously, Schillers' observations of the behavior of U.S. Senators in office are applicable to the state legislative setting. Those who compete for office in staggered elections and simultaneously, for example, both have an incentive to build a personal reputation, particularly if they plan to compete for higher office.

[10] See www.vermont-elections.org for examples of ballots used in Vermont MMDs.

[11] Maryland Delegate Brian Feldman (D), personal interview, May 9, 2012.

[12] Maryland Delegate Brian Feldman (D), personal interview, May 9, 2012.

[13] New Jersey Assemblyman Gary Chiusano (R), personal interview, May 15, 2012.

[14] New Jersey Assemblyman Albert Coutinho (D), personal interview, May 23, 2012.

[15] The National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), for example, ranks every state legislator based upon his or her voting record on small business issues. See www.nfib.org.

[16] See the earlier quote from former Florida State Representative Arthur Simon.

3. Coordinated Campaigns

[1] Love, Norma. "Court Unveils new House Districts" *The Union Leader*, July 27, 2002.

[2] Personal interview, May 9, 2012.

[3] See the Center for Responsive Politics (www.opensecrets.org).

[4] National Institute for Money in State Politics, www.followthemoney.org.

[5] Compiled using figures provided by the Maryland State Board of Elections.

[6] Vermont Speaker of the House Shap Smith (D), interview, June 27, 2012.

[7] For example, in Maryland, the average population of a single member district is 39,000, compared to 77,000 and 111,000 in two and three member districts, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau).

[8] Maryland three-member district Republican Delegate (anonymous).

[9] New Jersey Assemblyman Gary Chiusano (R), interview, May 15, 2012.

[10] Arizona Representative John Kavanagh (R), interview, April 16, 2012.

[11] Maryland Delegate Brian Feldman (D), interview, May 9, 2012.

[12] Maryland Delegate Brian Feldman (D), interview, May 9, 2012.

[13] New Jersey Assemblyman Albert Coutinho (D), interview, May 23, 2012.

[14] Maryland Delegate Brian Feldman (D), interview, May 9, 2012.

[15] Arizona Speaker of the House Andy Tobin (R), interview, April 18, 2012.

[16] New Jersey Assemblyman Gary Chiusano (R), interview, May 15, 2012.

[17] "Selectboards" are local government units found in the state of Vermont. Members of the selectboard serve in a supervisory capacity over the affairs of the town. Members of the state legislature visit selectboard meetings to learn about issues facing the local government.

[18] Vermont Representative Jim Masland (D), interview, June 27, 2012.

[19] Maryland Republican Delegate (anonymous).

[20] Arizona Representative Lynne Pancrazi (D), interview, April 18, 2012.

[21] Vermont Secretary of State, www.vermont-elections.org.

[22] Vermont State Representative Anne Donahue (R), interview, June 25, 2012.

[23] Figures provided by the Maryland State Board of Elections, the New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission, and the Vermont State Board of Elections.

[24] New Jersey State Board of Elections, www.njelections.org.

[25] New Jersey Assemblyman Albert Coutinho (D), interview, May 23, 2012.

[26] Arizona Representatives David W. Stevens (R), interview, April 17, 2012.

[27] Arizona State Representative Peggy Judd (R) discussing her relationship with Representative David Stevens (R) and State Senator Griffin (R), also elected from Arizona's two-member district 25 (April 16, 2012).

[28] Schiller finds similar patterns when mapping and comparing the county level election returns of U.S. Senate candidates competing in the same state (Schiller 2000, 113-142).

[29] Arizona Representative Macario Saldate (D), interview, April 16, 2012.

[30] These states are Maryland, New Jersey, and North Dakota. Maryland refers to joint campaign committees as "slates," New Jersey as "joint candidate committees," and North Dakota as "multicandidate committees."

[31] Maryland State Board of Elections, "Summary Guide: Maryland Candidacy and Campaign Finance Laws." www.elections.state.md.us.

[32] Maryland State Board of Elections, "Summary Guide: Maryland Candidacy and Campaign Finance Laws." www.elections.state.md.us.

[33] Figures provided by the New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission.

[34] Often it is necessary to control or correct for the effect of the geographic proximity of election precincts on copartisan vote similarity, either by including controls for geography or addressing spatial autocorrelation with a geographically weighted regression or similar technique (Calvo and Escolar 2003). However, a geographic regression is unnecessary for these data because there is no theoretical or empirical reason to expect that the dependent variable, copartisan vote similarity, is influenced by the geographical location of the election precinct or influenced by the vote similarity scores of spatially proximate election precincts. Referring to the lower right hand maps of Figures 3-1 and 3-2, we see that high and low copartisan vote similarity scores are scattered across the district with no discernible pattern. Therefore, I utilize the simpler traditional OLS regression (with clustered standard errors) to estimate the copartisan vote similarity model, rather than a more complex model designed to account for spatial effects.

[35] One reason the effect of joint spending may be smaller in New Jersey is that active coordination is far more common among both winners and losers than in Maryland. For example, in the sample used for these analyses, only 10 percent of losing candidates in Maryland formed localized joint fundraising committees, compared to 35 percent in New

Jersey. More actively coordinated challenger "teams" may in part explain the marginal effect of local joint committee spending in New Jersey. Nevertheless, although the effect is smaller, the results suggest that active coordination in the form of joint spending advantages candidates in New Jersey.

4. Representation and Attention to Local Issues

[1] Messina, Lawrence. "Heading Toward Senate, Manchin Sees a Few Loose Ends" Charleston Daily Mail, November 15, 2010.

[2] Maryland Delegate Brian Feldman (D), personal interview, May 9, 2012.

[3] "Bill Information," Maryland General Assembly, mlis.state.md.us.

[4] New Jersey Assemblyman Gary Chiusano (R), interview, May 15, 2012.

[5] Arizona Speaker of the House Andy Tobin (R), interview, April 18, 2012.

[6] Vermont Representative Jim Masland (D), interview, June 27, 2012.

[7] Although none of the "22nd District Team's" municipal bills passed the Maryland House (most likely due to the fiscal constraints on the state budget brought on by the continuing recession), the fact that these MMD delegates took the time to introduce and cosponsor them suggests that they consider it important to at least appear responsive to the needs of local municipalities.

[8] Arizona Representative David Stevens (R), interview, April 17, 2012.

[9] Arizona Representative Steve Court (R), interview, April 16, 2012.

[10] Vermont State Representative Warren Kitzmiller (D), interview, June 25, 2012.

[11] Maryland Republican Delegate, three-member district, anonymous interview.

[12] Maryland Delegate Brian Feldman (D), interview, May 9, 2012.

[13] New Jersey Assemblyman Gary Chiusano (R), interview, May 15, 2012.

[14] Vermont Speaker of the House Shap Smith (D), interview, June 27, 2012.

[15] Vermont State Representative Warren Kitzmiller (D), interview, June 25, 2012.

[16] Arizona Representative Lynne Pancrazi (D), interview, April 18, 2012.

[17] Arizona Speaker of the House Andy Tobin (R), interview, April 18, 2012.

[18] Arizona Representative Tom Chabin (D), April 16, 2012.

[19] Legislative data were collected by Open States, a project funded by the Sunlight Foundation (www.openstates.org).

[20] Data compiled using Census Bureau maps, available at www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/tiger.html.

[21] The number of municipalities is calculated using county subdivision boundaries defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. These county subdivisions represent the boundaries of local governments within counties (towns, cities, etc.).

[22] This variable is not included in the Vermont models because every Vermont Representative in the sample served the entire 2009 to 2010 legislative session.

[23] See the Vermont Legislature website, www.leg.state.vt.us.

5. Issue Attention and Specialization

[1] "Choices in Montgomery County," *The Washington Post*, August 23, 2010. www.washingtonpost.com.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Delegate Brian Feldman (D-MD), personal interview, May 9, 2012.

[4] Arizona Speaker of the House Andy Tobin (R) discussing the coordinated approach to legislating he takes with Representative Fann (R) and State Senator Peters (R).

[5] Assemblyman Gary Chiusano (R-NJ), personal interview, May 15, 2012.

[6] Assemblyman Albert Coutinho (D-NJ), personal interview, May 23, 2012.

[7] See www.azleg.gov for a full list of bill sponsorships in the Arizona legislature.

[8] Delegate Brian Feldman (D-MD), personal interview, May 9, 2012.

[9] For an explanation of the rationale behind legislator rankings and candidate endorsements made by the NFIB and LCV, see www.nfib.com and www.mdlcv.org.

[10] Interest group categories based upon those groups active in state politics were provided by the Maryland State Board of Elections, the Arizona Secretary of State, the New Jersey Division of Elections, and the Vermont Secretary of State.

[11] Although a majority of the bills were coded by the author, some of the bills were coded with the help of Summer Research Initiative (SRI) students working with the University of Maryland Center for American Politics and Citizenship (CAPC). Tests for inter-coder reliability indicated substantial agreement between the coders (Cronbach's Alpha=0.81).

[12] In the 2009-2010 election cycle, Health Care interests contributed over $118 million to candidates for state office; interests concerned with government agencies and education contributed over $89 million, and lawyers and lobbyists contributed over $183 million (www.followthemoney.org).

[13] Schiller (2000, 56-57) uses the similarly name "Number of years as congressional team" to measure team behavior between same-state U.S. senators.

[14] All 150 Vermont Representatives in the dataset served the entire 2009-2010 legislative session. The "Partial session" variable, therefore, is excluded from the Vermont regressions.

[15] Arizona law allows term limited members to run for a seat in the opposite chamber; should they win that seat, the term limit clock is reset. Many Arizona legislators have taken advantage of this loophole by switching back and forth between the House and Senate.

[16] The Census demographic categories used to calculate the *Demographic Diversity Index* are as follows. Gender: Percent male, percent female. Education: Less than high school degree, high school degree, some college, bachelor's degree, master's degree or higher. Percentage of households with income: less than $10,000/year, $10,000 to $15,000/year, $15,000 to $25,000/year, $25,000 to $35,000/year, $35,000 to $50,000/year, $50,000 to $75,000/year, $75,000 to $100,000/year, $100,000 to $150,000/year, $150,000 to $200,000/year, and $200,000 or more/year. Age categories: under 5, 5 to 9, 10 to 14, 15 to 17, 18 to19, 20, 21, 22 to 24, 25 to 29, 30 to 34, 35 to 39, 40 to 44, 44 to 49, 50 to 54, 55 to 59, 60 to 61, 62 to 64, 65 to 66, 67 to 69, 70 to 74, 75 to 79, 80 to 84, and 85 and up. Occupation sectors, percentage population employed in: Agriculture, Construction, Manufacturing, Trade, Retail, Transportation, Information and Technology, Finance, Scientific and Management professions, Education and Health Care, Arts and Entertainment, Other service industries, and Public Administration. Race, percentage population identifying as: White, African American, American Indian, Asian, Pacific Islander, Other, Multiple Races, and Hispanic.

[17] MMDs are home to larger and more diverse constituencies than SMDs in the same state.

[18] State legislative district size also varies greatly across the states. District constituencies in Maryland and Arizona tend to be more diverse in demographic terms than those in Vermont (see Appendix Table 5-1). The Vermont constituencies are also much smaller in terms of overall population size. The average Vermont House legislator represents 4,111

constituents, compared to 38,210 for Maryland delegates, and 90,941 for Arizona representatives (Squire and Hamm 2005).

[19] Procedural rules may place restraints on participation in the legislative process. A member of the Arizona House, for example, may not introduce more than seven bills after the fourth day of the session (see www.azleg.state.az.us). In Vermont, the Speaker of the House has a limited direct role in the legislative process. He or she casts roll-call votes only to break ties, and typically introduces or sponsors far fewer bills per session than the typical representative (although there are no formal constraints on the Speaker's sponsorship activity).

[20] Poisson regression is inappropriate in the presence of over-dispersion in the dependent variable. To rule out the possibility of over-dispersion, I estimated identical state-specific models using both Poisson and negative binomial regression. The negative binomial coefficients were identical to the Poisson regression coefficients. Furthermore, the over-dispersion parameter (alpha) was never significantly different from zero. Because estimates using the two regression techniques are identical and there is no evidence of over-dispersion, I chose to report the results from the Poisson regressions.

[21] Admittedly, a hierarchical linear model (HLM), designed for statistical models that include variables at more than one level, would provide more precise estimation of the within and between district effects of magnitude on specialization (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). However, this method was rejected because the size and distribution of these data are inappropriate. The maximum likelihood function used to estimate the HLM requires large sample sizes, at both the individual and group level, to generate consistent coefficient estimates (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Given the limited number of state legislators and legislative districts among the states that elect members from MMDs, it is not possible to generate a dataset large enough to support the estimation of the HLM in this circumstance.

6. District Magnitude and Legislative Influence

[1] New Jersey Assemblyman Albert Coutinho (D), personal interview, May 23, 2012.

[2] Arizona Representative Nancy McLain (R), personal interview, April 17, 2012.

[3] Maryland Delegate Brian Feldman (D), personal interview, May 9, 2012.

[4] Fleming, for example, introduced HB2495, a bill that would extend in-state tuition to veterans serving on Arizona military bases. Stevens, a veteran himself, was happy to help by cosponsoring and promoting the bill among the Arizona Republican representatives.

[5] Arizona Representative David Stevens (R), personal interview, April 17, 2012.

[6] New Jersey Assemblyman Albert Coutinho (D), personal interview, May 23, 2012.

[7] Former Florida State Representative Arthur Simon, personal interview, May 8, 2012.

[8] Vermont Representative Warren Kitzmiller, personal interview, June 25, 2012.

[9] Vermont Representative Jim Masland (D-VT), personal interview, June 27, 2012.

[10] Maryland three-member district Republican delegate, personal interview, May 25, 2012.

[11] New Jersey Assemblyman Gary Chiusano, personal interview, May 15, 2012.

[12] New Jersey Assemblyman Gary Chiusano, personal interview, May 15, 2012.

[13] Key votes were identified by Project Vote Smart; for a description of the methodology used to identify key votes, see votesmart.org/bills.

[14] This is in contrast to the New Jersey General Assembly, which is also composed entirely of two member districts, but almost always elects members of the same party to represent each district. During the 2010 to 2011 sessions, for example, only 1 of the 40 New Jersey General Assembly districts elected members from different parties.

[15] Vermont House Speaker Shap Smith (D), personal interview, June 27, 2012.

[16] Arizona Speaker Andy Tobin (R), personal interview, April 18, 2012.

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