ABSTRACT

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A central component of evaluating the legitimacy of a representative democracy has to rest in determining the quality of representation received by the various segments of its residents and citizenry. The question of adequate representation for disadvantaged and marginalized groups is particularly relevant, as these are groups that are already subject to additional societal barriers. This project is devoted to explaining why certain members of the U.S. Congress choose to build their legislative reputation around advocating for disadvantaged groups in society, and what sets them apart from their colleagues. Members of Congress work to build reputations for themselves that speak to what their focus is within the legislature, and on whose behalf they are committed to working. But legislators have a finite amount of time and resources, and must make specific choices about the topics on which they develop their expertise and the groups that they champion. Disadvantaged groups, though frequently requiring greater levels of government assistance or protection, tend to have lower levels of political involvement

and political capital. Understanding why members of Congress choose to build reputations around advocating for disadvantaged groups offers critical insight into how and when the needs of these group members are prioritized and represented.

I argue that group size within a state or district couples with the general feelings towards a group to determine the level of a member's advocacy on behalf of a disadvantaged group that would conceivably be tolerated within a district. Within this "advocacy window," discretion of the individual member becomes vitally important. To evaluate what drives members to form reputations as group advocates, I use an original dataset of all members of the House and Senate from a sampling of Congresses over the last forty years featuring an innovative variable measuring the extent to which a member's reputation is rooted in advocating for the disadvantaged. This dissertation offers an important contribution to our understanding of when and by whom representation of the disadvantaged occurs, and also provides broader insight into how members balance personal, partisan, institutional, and electoral concerns in their legislative choices as a representative.

WHO ADVOCATES FOR THE DISADVANTAGED? REPUTATION AND
THE REPRESENTATION OF GROUP INTERESTS

by

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

> "Our representative democracy is not working because the Congress that is supposed to represent the voters does not respond to their needs. I believe the chief reason for this is that it is ruled by a small group of old men." - Rep. Shirley Chishom (D-NY12) in *Unbought and Unbossed*, 1970

These words were spoken by a former member of Congress who was not afraid to rock the boat, and who made a name for herself by serving as an advocate for many of those voters whose needs she felt were not being met. Rep. Shirley Chisholm was the first black woman elected to the United States Congress, and she served as a voice for the minority and impoverished constituents of her Brooklyn congressional district. She even launched a consciously symbolic bid for the presidency to highlight the discrimination faced by women and Black Americans.

There are some signs over the course of the past decade—from Occupy Wall Street, to Black Lives Matter, to DREAMers, to the #MeToo movement—that a growing portion of American society has begun engaging in a deeper scrutiny of the inequalities within its social and political structures that Rep. Chisholm emphasized back in the 1960s and 1970s. But while popular attention has just begun to shine a brighter light on these issues, for the actual members of marginalized or disadvantaged groups, the struggle to be recognized by governing institutions—and Congress in particular—has gone on for decades. Congress is an institution that tends toward the status quo. And since its founding, that status quo has indeed tended to be in the interest of wealthy, able-bodied, white men.

Congresswoman Chisholm's observations about the deficits that exist when it comes to representing constituent needs have been supported by a considerable amount of scholarship in the intervening years, particularly when it comes to the needs of some of the most disadvantaged groups in American society. For instance, prior research has shown that members of Congress are more likely to cast votes in line with the views of wealthier individuals (Carnes 2013), and that the preferences of white Americans tend to have a greater influence over member behavior than those of non-white Americans when preferences conflict (Griffin and Newman 2008). These examples provide clear evidence that disadvantaged groups may be less likely to see their needs addressed in Congress, but the important question is, why does it matter?

In and of itself, the simple presence of a discrepancy in how well a particular group is represented is not cause for concern. There are a number of groups in society for whom it is considered preferable that their desires are less well represented in our governmental structures, such as fringe or extremist groups. Likewise, when difference in levels of representation are due to random chance, such as if the preferences of 44-year-olds were better represented than 43-year-olds, that wouldn't be particularly alarming. But the consistent, systematic discrepancies in the representation that disadvantaged groups tend to receive are quite different than either of these scenarios. In the next section, I lay out a case for studying the representation of disadvantaged groups in Congress, and why the results are worth caring about.

The Case for Studying the Representation of Disadvantaged Groups

Disadvantaged groups, from racial/ethnic minorities and the poor to women and senior citizens, hold a unique place in American society. What sets them apart are the additional challenges they face relative to non-group members. These barriers can be cultural, as with groups who must navigate racism, sexism, or ageism, or material, as is the case for groups with limited access to resources. In this section, I lay out three main reasons for why it is important to study disadvantaged groups, and to care about the representation they receive.

First and foremost, the representation of disadvantaged groups matters because they are among the most vulnerable groups in American society. In *Federalist 51*, James Madison wrote of the critical importance of having a system of government that can protect the rights of the minority from the tyranny of the majority. Now, Madison may well have been talking about protecting the smaller number of wealthy, landed interests from a lower-class "mob mentality," but the importance of this idea extends beyond this initial conception. If our democratic system was designed and intended to protect the rights and needs of the minority, it is important to determine how well these less-powerful and disadvantaged minority groups actually fare within Congress. The existence of clear differences in how well disadvantaged groups are represented implies that some element of the representational system is not functioning as it should. This creates a crucial need to diagnose and understand the flaws in our system that keep disadvantaged groups from receiving more equitable representation.

Second, the representation of disadvantaged groups as a whole is not well understood. There are some disadvantaged groups, such as racial/ethnic minorities and

women, which have received a considerable amount of focus from scholars, while others have received very little attention. This creates a situation in which there is a considerable amount of excellent and worthwhile scholarship into the representation of some specific groups, but not a good sense of what drives the representation of disadvantaged groups more broadly. Gaining a clearer, big-picture view of the representation of disadvantaged groups as a whole is an important next step in creating a more cohesive picture of how congressional representation really works. Disadvantaged groups, by their very nature, are systematically different from other groups in American society. By developing a broader theory of how disadvantaged groups generally are represented in Congress, this project offers a clearer understanding of how well our political system actually represents some of the most vulnerable people in society.

Finally, this study of the representation of disadvantaged groups stands apart from previous work that investigated members' representational decision-making through the lens of party pressures or committee membership. Unlike situations in which a member makes the choice to represent, for example, manufacturers, teachers, or environmentalists, there is not a single committee (with the possible exception of the Veterans Affairs committee) with its jurisdiction exclusively linked to serving disadvantaged groups. Every single committee in Congress offers opportunities to serve as an advocate for disadvantaged groups, if a member wishes to take them. Appropriators can make sure that poor communities are receiving funds to promote economic development, or push for increases in the resources devoted to studying women's health. Members of the Agriculture committee can propose amendments ensuring that food stamp requirements don't negatively impact seniors. Individuals

serving on the Armed Services committee can investigate the rate of promotions for non-white service members relative to white service members. Similarly, both Democrats and Republicans can make the choice to serve as advocates for disadvantaged groups, even if their proposed solutions take on very different forms. Regardless of whether a Republican member chooses to push for tax breaks for business that hire veterans or a Democratic member works to fund additional job placement programs for veterans, they both can gain a reputation for veterans' advocacy. The distinct phenomenon that I explore in this study—disadvantaged group advocacy—is clearly one that cannot be readily explained by committee or party factors alone.

Instances of Disadvantaged Group Advocacy

Despite the strong tendency for legislation coming out of Congress to favor those who already wield a considerable degree of power in American society, disadvantaged groups have not been wholly without allies in the U.S. Congress, nor have they gone entirely without legislative successes. From Social Security to the Voting Rights Act to the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Congress has at times taken actions that are specifically intended to benefit disadvantaged groups. In each case, for any of these high-profile pieces of legislation to have made it through the legislative process, the successful alignment of political will, popular support, and competent coalition building was essential. But while the passage of any bill is marked by a moment of clear cooperation from a number of different actors at the time the final vote occurs, none of these legislative coalitions are constructed instantaneously. Instead, they can only come into being after building on the steady, determined actions of members of Congress who

make the decision to invest their time and energy into advocating on behalf of the disadvantaged groups who would benefit, often long before a successful piece of legislation ever comes to fruition.

In this dissertation, I focus not on the discrepancies that exist between the representation of advantaged and disadvantaged groups in society, but instead make use of this knowledge that *some* members of Congress do choose to represent *some* disadvantaged groups, at least *some* of the time. In particular, I investigate what drives these members to make the choice to serve as an advocate for disadvantaged groups. Much is to be gained by taking a systematic look at what drives these decisions, both to fill some of the gaps in the scholarly understanding of how congressional representation works, and also for its normative implications. Building a better understanding of the reasons why members of Congress choose to advocate on behalf of disadvantaged groups can open the door to identifying how it could be possible to boost the representation that disadvantaged groups receive.

Who, then, are these members who make the choice to fight on behalf of the disadvantaged? A few short examples, pulled from the member profiles of the 110th Congress edition of Congressional Quarterly's *Politics in America*, can quickly provide a glimpse into the variety of individuals who make the decision to consciously serve as an advocate for disadvantaged groups, and provide some clues into the reasons behind their decision-making:

> "[Rep. Jose Serrano (D-NY16)] is always mindful that he represents one of the poorest districts in the country. As a new member of the college of cardinals, as the 12 Appropriations subcommittee chairmen are known, he will be attentive to social welfare spending for the inhabitants of the Bronx."

"[Sen. Olympia Snowe (R-ME)], one of 16 women in the Senate, likes being a role model for younger generations entering politics. A 2002 Miss America pageant contestant cited her as inspiration. As the top-ranking Republican on the Small Business Committee, she encourages female entrepreneurs."

"[Rep. Ciro Rodriguez (D-TX23)] was born on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande. … He began his college studies intending to be a pharmacist but soon turned to social work. He has held jobs helping heroin addicts and patients in mental health clinics. 'My experience as a social worker had a profound influence on my decision to enter public life,' Rodriguez said in March 2007. 'I could see that many of the challenges facing my clients and those that I worked with had stemmed from the decisions being made at the public policy level. Serving in Congress allows me to be able to continue to help my clients in a broader capacity.'"

"[Rep. Dale Kildee (D-MI5)]'s grandparents, immigrants from Ireland, had frequent contact with Indians on the reservation near Traverse City. As a child, Kildee often heard his father say that Indians were treated unfairly. … When lawmakers in 1997 started talking about taxing Indian-run gambling operations, Kildee founded the Native American Caucus."

Each of these members varies at least to some degree in their backgrounds and formative experiences, in the groups they choose to advocate for, and in the specific actions they've taken in Congress. But the common element that links them all is that they have made an explicit decision to build a reputation within the legislature as an advocate for a disadvantaged group. This project recognizes the centrality of these legislative reputations to the way in which members of Congress demonstrate the work that they are doing to represent their constituents. By focusing on the reputations that members of Congress build as disadvantaged group advocates, this dissertation offers a new way of thinking about the representational relationship. This fresh conceptualization makes an important contribution to the study of congressional representational by offering a realistic portrayal that takes into account both the way that constituents understand their representative's work within the legislature as well as the diversity of actions that a member can choose to engage in.

Big Questions That This Dissertation Answers

The primary question that this dissertation seeks to answer is, why build a reputation as an advocate for disadvantaged groups? To address this, I focus on three components in turn. First, what is a legislative reputation, and how common are reputations for disadvantaged group advocacy? Second, what drives members to make the choice to form a reputation as a group advocate? Third, does this decision-making dynamic work differently in the House of Representatives and the Senate?

Before it can be known why members choose to build a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate, there must first be a thorough understanding of what makes legislative reputations a valuable component of representation. In this dissertation, I present a clear definition of legislative reputations and describe what makes them different from other means of conceptualizing representation. I also develop an original measure of which members have a reputation for disadvantaged group advocacy, differentiating across intensity of advocacy behavior. By utilizing this measure, this project presents a clear overview of how common these reputations for disadvantaged group advocacy are among members of Congress, while also breaking them down along the important dimensions of group, party, and chamber. Gaining a better grasp of the frequency with which certain members of Congress choose to visibly integrate disadvantaged group advocacy into their work within the institution provides important information in its own right, and also lays the foundation for a deeper analysis of why members are driven to form these reputations.

The heart of this project comes in addressing this second question—why do members of Congress choose to form reputations as disadvantaged group advocates? I

offer a new theory to explain the representational choices that members of Congress make, through the introduction of the concept of the *advocacy window*. As articulated by Mayhew in 1974, much of the behavior of members of Congress is driven by the urge to vigilantly guard their electoral prospects. Thus, their representational choices are constrained by their desire to secure the vote of as many of their constituents as possible. The advocacy window represents the level of discretion that individual members have in which groups they choose to incorporate into their legislative reputation without compromising their electoral margins, once relevant district characteristics, such as the size of a group within a district and the average feelings towards that group, are taken into account.

However, not all disadvantaged groups are exactly the same. Therefore, decisions to form a reputation as an advocate of a particular disadvantaged group are not made in exactly the same way, either. By leveraging differences in how worthy of government assistance different disadvantaged groups are generally perceived to be, this project is able to shed light on what drives a member's decision to form a reputation as an advocate for particular categories of disadvantaged groups. Examining the motivations of those who choose to stake their reputation on working for disadvantaged groups provides deeper insight on when and why Congress effectively acts on behalf of the disadvantaged.

The final component of this project addresses how the institutional differences between the Senate and the House create distinct incentive structures for legislators. I investigate the diverging characteristics of the decision-making environments of the Senate relative to the House—such as electoral instability and the importance of the

advocacy behavior of others within the chamber—and explore how those distinctions can impact the representation that disadvantaged groups receive. Examining what drives a member to form a reputation for serving a disadvantaged group within each of the chambers of Congress provides a more complete determination of why members cultivate this reputation, as well as how distinct circumstances can alter a member's calculus. In a bicameral legislature, it is not enough for a group to only be represented in one chamber. By analyzing the differences that exist in the advocacy offered on behalf of disadvantaged groups within the House and the Senate, it becomes possible to see where representational bottlenecks exist, and thus to begin to determine the ways in which these discrepancies can be mitigated.

Overview of the Study

In the chapters to follow, I offer an original theory to explain what drives members to form a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate, and introduce the concept of the advocacy window as a means of understanding those choices. This project focuses on the previously understudied centrality of legislative reputations to understanding how congressional representation works, and does so in a way that takes into account the commonalities in how both members of Congress and their constituents view the political world. Through the use of empirical analysis, I investigate the impact of constituency factors, personal demographics, and institutional characteristics on the likelihood that a member will make the choice to cultivate a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate, and compare those results for the House and the Senate.

The remainder of this section provides a brief overview of what is to come in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 2 reviews the previous literature surrounding congressional representation and highlights the important contributions that this project offers relative to this body of scholarship, both theoretically and methodologically. It then proceeds to offer a definition of what it means to be a disadvantaged group and presents a means of categorizing disadvantaged groups based upon the extent to which the group is generally perceived to be deserving of government assistance. In this chapter, I introduce the concept of the advocacy window as a new way of conceptualizing the key factors shaping a member's decisions in cultivating legislative reputations for advocacy on behalf of disadvantaged groups. The advocacy window concept illuminates the amount of leeway members have in deciding what level of representation to offer a given disadvantaged group, once constituency characteristics are taken into account. I argue that the size of a group within a district should determine the minimum level of representation that should be expected, while the feelings towards that group by the district at large act as a cap on the potential range of representation that a member could offer without negative political repercussions.

Chapter 3 establishes what a legislative reputation is and explains why members of Congress aim to cultivate them. I present a novel measurement for legislative reputation by utilizing the member profiles found in the well-regarded *Politics in America* collection and explore the frequency with which members choose to develop reputations as disadvantaged group advocates. This chapter demonstrates the variation in the intensity of the level of advocacy offered, and displays the differences in the

reputations that tend to be formed by members of the House of Representatives compared to the Senate. It also shows the breakdown of the members who choose to form these reputations across a number of dimensions, including the disadvantaged group advocated for and the party affiliation of the member.

An empirical analysis of what drives members of the House of Representatives to cultivate a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate is found in Chapter 4. I perform these analyses using an original dataset of the members of five Congresses sampled from within the 103rd – 113th Congress time frame (ranging from 1993-2015). I find that the greater the size of a disadvantaged group within their district, the more likely a member of Congress is to form a reputation as group advocate. Higher levels of district hostility towards a group reduces the odds that a member will be a group advocate, particularly for groups that are generally considered to be less deserving of government assistance. The results of this chapter also demonstrate that descriptive representatives tend to be more likely to capitalize on a wider advocacy window to increase the level of representation that they offer than non-descriptive representatives.

In Chapter 5, I perform a similar set of analyses on members of the Senate from the corresponding Congresses. I find a number of important differences in the factors most strongly influencing a senator's decision to form a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate relative to a member of the House. Chief among these distinctions is the diminished impact of the size of a disadvantaged group within the state. Senators are not likely to choose to build a reputation as a group advocate for any but the groups considered to be the most highly deserving of government assistance. This chapter also introduces and tests three additional hypotheses reflecting the unique institutional

characteristics of the Senate, finding that the larger the number of group advocates

present within a given Congress, the more likely it is that another senator will also be

willing to incorporate advocacy on behalf of that group into their own reputation.

The final chapter offers concluding thoughts and reflections on the findings of the

preceding chapters. In Chapter 6, I summarize the earlier findings and explore the

normative implications of some of the big takeaways. This chapter focuses on the

important insights that are gained by conceptualizing intentionally cultivated legislative

reputations as a primary conduit through which representation takes place. Additionally,

I consider the benefits of using the advocacy window as an analytical tool to reveal

important information about the quality of representation that different categories of

disadvantaged groups tend to receive from their representatives. The chapter closes by

discussing future extensions of the research agenda.

CHAPTER 2: MEMBER REPUTATION AND THE ADVOCACY WINDOW: AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF REPRESENTATION

Understanding if and when constituent groups are represented in their legislatures are fundamental questions in understanding democracy and representation in the United States and around the world, and are a perennial pursuit of legislative scholars. Though there are a number of studies that demonstrate the representational inequality that exists for members of disadvantaged groups such as racial minorities or the poor (e.g., Carnes 2013; Griffin and Newman 2008), gaps remain in the literature surrounding the situations in which members of Congress actually do engage in representational actions benefiting these groups. The passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, the GI Bill, Medicare and Medicaid, the Equal Rights Amendment (which did pass through Congress, even if it wasn't ratified), the Violence Against Women Act, and others are a testament to the fact that Congress at times attends to the needs of disadvantaged groups. Yet, there is not a clear picture of when and why this happens. Who, then, are these members of Congress that make the choice to fight on behalf of the disadvantaged?

In this chapter, I review the current state of the literature around congressional representation, and develop a theory for when and why members of Congress choose to form a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate. In doing so, I reexamine how scholars have conceptualized the representational relationship between members of Congress and their constituents, and offer a more realistic portrayal that takes into

account the knowledge and goals of both members and citizens. This chapter also offers a specific and bounded definition for what counts as a disadvantaged group, and presents a nuanced categorization scheme within this classification of disadvantaged based on a group's general perceived deservingness of government assistance. After laying this definitional foundation, I then offer a broader theory explaining when and why members of Congress make the choice to foster a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate. This theory introduces the concept of the advocacy window as a means of understanding the constraints a member of Congress faces when making these representational decisions, as well as how different types of members respond to these constrictions. The chapter concludes by discussing the important differences between the House and the Senate, and their implications for when and why legislators working within these institutions choose to build reputations as advocates for the disadvantaged.

Prior Literature

A fundamental, perennial pursuit for political scientists has been determining the extent to which our political institutions are representative of the people. Particularly for an institution like the U.S. Congress, designed to be a representative body that is responsive to the needs and desires of constituents, it is of great interest to know whether it lives up to that intended purpose. For many decades, political scientists and theorists have been focused on unlocking the true nature of the relationship between representative and represented, and attempting to elucidate the most important connecting threads. This exploration has focused principally on the answers to three questions. First, who is it that

is being represented? Second, what are the means by which representation happens?

And finally, what is the quality of the representation provided?

DEFINING CONSTITUENCY

There is a long history of work evaluating the dyadic relationship that exists

between members of Congress and their constituents (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Cnuddle

and McCrone, 1966; Fiorina, 1974; Kuklinski and Elling, 1977; Erikson 1978; Weissberg

1979; McCrone and Kuklinski, 1979; Erikson and Wright, 1980; Canes-Wrone et al.,

2002). The object behind all of these projects is to determine the extent to which a

member's ideology or legislative actions align with the interests and opinions of the

entire geographic constituency. But more often than not, members tend to envision their

constituency not as one cohesive entity, but rather parcel it out into smaller constituencies

of interest. Richard Fenno, in *Home Style*, finds that the majority of the members of

Congress he follows tend to describe their constituencies in terms of the smaller groups

that make them up. He states that "House members describe their district's internal

makeup using political science's most familiar demographic and political variables:

socioeconomic structure, ideology, ethnicity, residential patterns, religion, partisanship,

stability, diversity, etc. Every congressman, in his mind's eye, sees his geographic

constituency in terms of some of these variables" (pg 2). More recent research confirms

that members of Congress see their districts in terms of subconstituencies, and

emphasizes that the critical factor in understanding congressional representation is which

of these smaller components of a constituency are being recognized and attended to

(Bishin, 2009; Miler, 2010).

Given the crucial role that groups and group membership play in politics and political understanding, this subconstituency focus is not surprising. A plurality of the electorate root both their party identification (Green et al., 2002) and their broader political understandings in terms of group identities (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964; Conover, 1984; Popkin, 1991; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). Recognizing this, it would make sense that members of Congress also base their representational strategies around the groups in their district to whom they must appeal for their own reelection. Previous scholars seeking to evaluate the impact of constituent groups upon member behavior have recognized this, but have tended to evaluate groups in isolation, be it nonvoters (Griffin and Newman, 2005), primary voters (Brady, Han, and Pope, 2007), African Americans and Latinos (Griffin and Newman, 2008), or the poor (Bartels, 2008). Rather than looking at one single group, this project examines a larger category of groups—those that are at a systematic disadvantage in society. By expanding beyond the study of a single group, this project is able to present a general theory for when and why members of Congress choose to serve as advocates for disadvantaged groups more broadly.

WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE REPRESENTED?

The next critical aspect of research into relationships between a member of Congress and their constituents focuses on the means by which representation occurs. This question has motivated a large number of studies. Each of these studies puts forward some concept of relevant constituent issues or beliefs and some measure of member actions or positions relevant to those issues or beliefs. Identifying the interests

of constituent groups is challenging, with most previous studies taking one of two approaches. The first approach is to use aggregated survey responses to questions about specific policy or ideological preferences. Policy preferences tend to be determined either by questions that ask about the relative levels of spending that are preferred, or by questions that describe a bill that came up for a vote in Congress and then ask whether the survey respondent would have liked their representative to have voted yes or no (Ansolabehere and Jones 2010; Hutchings 2003; Alvarez and Gronke 1996; Wilson and Gronke 2000; Clinton and Tessin 2007). Those that use ideological preferences rely on measures asking respondents to self-identify their own ideological position on a seven-point Likert scale from very conservative to very liberal (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Stimson 1999; 2003; Griffin and Newman 2005). The second approach is to make assumptions about what policies would be in the best interests of the group, given the primary challenges that the group tends to face (Thomas, 1994; Bratton and Haynie, 1999; Bratton et al. 2006; Reingold, 2000; Swers, 2002; 2013; Burden, 2007; Carnes, 2013).

Each of these methods has advantages and disadvantages. Using survey responses alleviates the pressures of having to make assumptions about what is in a constituency's best interests, but it also asks a great deal of respondents in terms of political knowledge and awareness. A large number of studies, extending back to Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes' *The American Voter* (1960), highlight the degree to which the average American struggles to think in ideological terms, while others emphasize the low levels of political sophistication displayed (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Converse 1964). The

second approach sidesteps these concerns, but it is a decidedly more paternalistic approach.

That said, taking a somewhat paternalistic tone in preselecting what is or is not in a group's best interest is not inherently a bad thing from a research design perspective, if the goal is to reasonably reflect the means by which a member of Congress might go about determining group interests. While members of Congress engage in some of their own internal polling, they are not able to do so on every issue, and their results are just as likely to be plagued by the information asymmetry present in external polling. Given the amount of time and effort put into getting to know their districts, it seems highly likely that members of Congress would trust their own instincts when it comes to group interests, and when uncertainty exists, consult with an interest group advocating on the group's behalf. Because this project is rooted in member behavior and member assumptions, I allow members to set their own determination of what it means to represent a constituent group. This insures that each of the different iterations for how members may choose to represent a given group can be captured, without artificially restricting what "group interests" should be.

When it comes to the member behavior side of the equation, most studies evaluating the congruency between member actions and constituent preferences focus on roll call votes (Bartels 1991; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004; Miller and Stokes 1963; Griffin and Newman 2005; Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1987). These votes are unquestionably important, as they determine policy outputs—the laws that actually end up being passed and affecting people's lives. But they also necessarily require collective action. A bill being passed cannot be attributed to the actions of a single representative

responding to their constituents. Moreover, most bills never make it to this stage. The bills that are voted on for final passage are, in most cases, acceptable to the majority party and its leadership (Cox and McCubbins 1993). Thus, to have a more complete picture of the ways in which a member of Congress can represent their constituents, actions further upstream in the policy-making process must be taken into account (Schiller, 1995; Canon, 1999; Bratton and Haynie, 1999; Swers, 2002; 2013; Carnes 2013).

These behaviors, including bill sponsorship and cosponsorship, committee work, and speeches on the floor of the chamber, are particularly consequential for representation, because they are actions that members can take either entirely of their own volition or that require the cooperation of a limited number of colleagues. For example, any member can decide to sponsor whatever bill they so choose, regardless of what other members are doing. To cosponsor a bill, it is only required that one other member have proposed it first. Working on a bill in committee requires the consent of the committee chair, but the preferences of the broader chamber do not always need to be taken into account. Releasing a statement to the press or using social media, on the other hand, is something a member can choose to do without consulting any other members of Congress. Similarly, members have various opportunities to speak on the floor on topics of their choosing.

A recognition of the assortment of actions that members can take and the varying importance of each is crucial to developing a holistic picture of the means by which representation happens. That said, representation is by its very nature an interplay between elected officials and their constituents back home. Lawmakers are aware of the fact that their constituents are hardly watching their every move and will frequently have

little to no idea about the day-to-day activities within the legislature. Knowing this, legislators must consciously work to develop an identity and a reputation that can penetrate down to the constituent level, even if most of their actions themselves remain unknown. Therefore, to really understand a member's representational focus, one must examine the reputation that they craft and the group interests that are central to it.

Reputation is broadly considered to be important, and legislative scholars widely acknowledge that lawmakers strategically hone a reputation that is advantageous to them. However, there has not been an attempt to quantify reputation separate and apart from actions like voting, bill sponsorship, or constituent communication. These actions doubtless influence a member's reputation, but do not give the whole picture. Reputation is something that a lawmaker works at by engaging in certain behaviors and rhetoric, but it is through middlemen like the press that constituents actually get a sense of member reputation (Schiller, 2000a; 2000b). This study departs from the trend of focusing on behavioral outputs alone, instead choosing to evaluate member reputations as filtered through a third party source—allowing for member reputations to be evaluated through the use of a medium that reflects the primary means by which constituents gain information about their member of Congress. The next chapter is devoted to providing a detailed accounting of precisely what a legislative reputation is, explaining why members concentrate their energy upon cultivating these reputations, and demonstrating how many legislators actually have reputations as disadvantaged group advocates across both chambers of Congress.

Previous work has examined the effort that members put in to being perceived as effective lawmakers (Frantzich, 1979; Fenno, 1991; Schiller, 1995), and how well that

effort is reflected in their reputations as members who can get things done. However, as highlighted above, to be effective in the legislature—to actually move legislation through the chamber and pass it—is necessarily a collective act. Therefore, a member's individual reputation must be more than just effectiveness; it is also based in the groups on whose behalf they focus their efforts. Not all efforts, of course, are created equal. Thus, to truly understand the representation a member offers, one must recognize which group a member is working on behalf of, as well as the extent of those efforts, particularly relative to their other work within the legislature. Though not done through the explicit lens of legislative reputation, a number of studies have sought to address this third component of the representational equation—what is the quality of representation provided, and how does this vary across important group divisions in American society?

INEQUALITIES IN REPRESENTATION

The next piece that must be determined, then, is who reaps most of the benefits from the representational efforts of members of Congress. To a large degree, the same groups that are advantaged in American society broadly are also more likely to see their interests and preferences reflected in the acts of their members of Congress. White Americans (Griffin and Newman, 2008), men (Griffin, Newman, and Wolbrecht, 2012), and the wealthy (Bartels, 2008; Gilens, 2012) are far more likely to see legislators working on their behalf. While it is well established that disadvantaged groups in society, such as the poor, racial and ethnic minorities, and women,[1] tend to receive less

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[1] An important caveat to this are the findings by Griffin, Newman, and Wolbrecht that while men's interests are better represented by Republican members of congress, Democrats tend to be closer to their female constituents, at least on measures of roll call voting and ideological scoring. To my knowledge, there are no studies specifically evaluating whether or not men's interests receive a higher level of attention

attention to their interests, there is a noticeable void in the literature when it comes to examining the instances in which disadvantaged groups *do* receive representation, and the conditions under which members of Congress choose to act as their advocates.

An exception to this literature gap are the studies in which researchers have investigated the advantages (or disadvantages) of increasing the number of representatives who are themselves members of a disadvantaged group. In nearly all cases, this work focuses on female (Dolan, 1997; Swers, 2002; 2013; Lawless, 2004; Dodson, 2006), African American (Canon, 1999; Gamble, 2007; Minta, 2009), Latino (Hero and Tolbert, 1995; Bratton, 2006; Minta, 2009), blue collar (Carnes, 2013), or, more recently, lesbian, gay, or bisexual members of Congress (Haider-Markel, 2010).[2] Burden (2007) demonstrates that personal experiences can impact and shape legislative priorities. Descriptive representation scholars, in turn, argue that the experience of being a part of a disadvantaged group—which includes confronting systemic barriers in society that those outside of the group have not faced—provides a unique perspective that is unlikely to be matched by a representative who has not shared a similar experience (Williams, 1998; Mansbridge, 1999; Dovi, 2002). What these scholars find is that descriptive representatives are more likely to try to get group interests on the legislative agenda (Canon 1999; Swers, 2002; 2013; Bratton 2006) and to raise group priorities in committee markup sessions (Swers, 2002), floor speeches (Canon 1999; Swers, 2002;

when it comes to bill sponsorship, committee participation, or other activities further upstream in the policy making process.

[2] An exception to this is the small but robust literature exploring an intersectional framework, most frequently by focusing on Black or Latina women in Congress (Crenshaw, 1995; Gay and Tate, 1998; Hawkesworth, 2003; Bratton et al., 2006; Smooth, 2010). While outside the scope of the current project, these studies move beyond the contention that individuals are defined by a single identity. They find that intersectional identities manifest in behaviors that cannot be explained by the assumptions of a purely additive framework alone, offering an important level of nuance to the study of representation.

Osborn and Mendez, 2010), and hearings (Ellis and Wilson, 2013) more often than other members.

Representing the Disadvantaged

This project develops a broader theory of when and why members of Congress choose to advocate for disadvantaged groups. This theory centers on the pivotal role that a group-centered legislative reputation plays in the representation that groups receive, and integrates the important and differential impacts of constituency effects, descriptive representation, and institutional differences within the House and the Senate. The sections that follow lay out a clear definition for what counts as a disadvantaged group, and argues for the important distinctions among these groups in terms of how deserving of government assistance they are perceived to be. Next, I introduce the concept of the advocacy window as a means of understanding how group size and group affect within a state or district can drive the representational decisions that members make, and highlight how these effects are conditioned by perceptions of deservingness. Finally, the chapter illustrates how the institutional differences between the House and the Senate can alter the calculus behind members' reputational decision-making.

THE GROUP-CENTRIC NATURE OF REPRESENTATION

Members of Congress put a great deal of effort into cultivating a political and legislative reputation as a senator or representative. This reputation is derived from focused actions that that the individual takes within Congress and is reinforced through interactions with constituents and with the media. For some members, these reputations

are built on policy, as with someone who is known for being an expert on healthcare or taxation. For select members, reputation is built on politics and strategy, as is often the case with members who hold positions in party leadership. For others, reputation comes as an advocate for a constituent group, such as farmers, women, or organized labor. For many members, reputations are multifaceted and may contain more than one of these elements, though overarching priorities are often readily apparent. This project focuses attention on members who develop a reputation as a group advocate.

Groups and group affiliation are and have been a critical component of American political thinking. For decades, research has consistently shown that most Americans do not think in constrained ideological terms and instead make political decisions based upon group identities and group conflicts (Campbell et al. 1960, Green et al. 2002, Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Thus, it makes sense that members of Congress would seek to develop reputations based upon advocating for specific groups in society, as that is one of the primary ways in which individuals make political evaluations. Although members with reputations as advocates for disadvantaged groups are the specific subject of this study, this conceptualization also has broader utility. Understanding how the formation of a reputation as a group advocate serves as one of the primary means by which members of Congress are able to communicate their priorities back to their constituents can provide important insight into the representation of many groups in American society.

Members of Congress do not have infinite time, and their constituents do not have an infinite capacity to process every detail of their work within the legislature. For this reason, all members must make choices about the groups on which they are going to

focus the bulk of their attention. Most districts (and nearly all states) contain a vast

assortment of constituent groups: small business owners, suburban families, racial/ethnic

minorities, farmers, veterans, women, manufacturers, seniors, and a great many others. It

is impossible for a single member to create a legislative reputation as an advocate for all

of these groups. Thus, they must make explicit decisions about which groups to prioritize

as a part of their reputation, frequently with an eye towards the greatest potential electoral

benefit. It therefore seems intuitive that members' best approach to winning elections

would simply be to spend all of their time working on behalf of the largest and most

popular groups in their district or state.

In practice, however, this is not a hard and fast rule. While large and popular

groups—like the middle class—do receive a lot of attention (both rhetorical and

substantive) from members of Congress, some members *do* sometimes choose to develop

reputations as advocates for groups that are not necessarily the biggest or most well-

regarded within a state or a district. The select group of members who make the decision

to incorporate disadvantaged group advocacy into their legislative reputations tends to be

a prime example of this dynamic at work. So what drives them to do this?

While it certainly has normative appeal for members of Congress to advocate on

behalf of disadvantaged groups, why they would choose to do so has not be adequately

explained. Again, in an ideal world, a legislator may very well want to equally represent

all groups present in their district. But in reality, choices have to be made, particularly

when some group interests are seen as being at odds with others. For this reason, the

calculus around deciding to become an advocate for disadvantaged groups can become

especially complicated. Because of the precarious position held by a number of

disadvantaged groups in society, members must draw a balance between seeking to draw in voters who either are themselves members of a disadvantaged group or view that particular group sympathetically and those who look upon assisting these groups with dismay.

Some preliminary evidence of this important relationship between public opinion and constituency presence comes from Hansen and Treul (2015). Though they focus solely on the representation of LGBTQ Americans, the authors make a new and important contribution to our understanding of group representation by showcasing the interplay between district opinion and group size on the quality of representation a group receives. They find that while the size of the LGBTQ population in a district has a positive effect on the substantive representation (measured through bill sponsorship) the group receives, the impact of constituency size on symbolic representational actions (measured as caucus membership and position taking) is conditioned by public opinion on same-sex marriage. However, there are some idiosyncrasies to studying the LGBTQ community that limit how broadly these findings can be applied. In particular, the LGBTQ community is fairly unique amongst disadvantaged groups in having a single, uncomplicated policy—legalizing same-sex marriage—that can serve as a solid proxy for opinions regarding the group itself.

This project expands upon these ideas in three important ways. First, I argue that it is not feelings towards specific policies that matter in reputation building, but rather the feelings towards the disadvantaged group more broadly. Given that most constituents have little specific knowledge of policy, the nuances between various policy proposals is likely to be lost. Thus, I make the case that the level of hostility or affinity towards a

group within a district shapes whether or not serving that group's interests are actively incorporated into a member's reputation. Second, by using a member's reputation as a group advocate as the measure of representation, I can more cohesively incorporate a variety of substantive and symbolic actions. Third, I examine a number of different disadvantaged groups that have varying levels of societal esteem, allowing for a generalized theory of how district opinion impacts the representation of disadvantaged groups.

DISADVANTAGED GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES

Disadvantaged groups are those groups that face additional societal barriers, particularly a history of discrimination. The groups I examine for this paper are: (1) the poor, (2) women, (3) racial/ethnic minorities, (4) veterans, (5) the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) community,[3] (6) seniors (Americans over age 65), and (7) immigrants. Nearly all of these groups are members of particular classes afforded nondiscrimination protections by United States federal law.[4] The one group that is included in this project but excluded from federal nondiscrimination laws is the poor. However, though protections for people in poverty are not currently enshrined in federal law, many states, counties, and cities include statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of income level. The presence of these nondiscrimination protections at the state

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[3] Though any discussion in Congress over the last few decades has largely focused on lesbian and gay individuals, the needs of transgender individuals has recently begun to enter into important debates within the legislature.

[4] These laws include the Civil Rights Act of 1963 (Title VII), the Civil Rights Act of 1991, The Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act, and the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. It is also worthy of note that federal protections for LGBTQ individuals are somewhat contested. While the EEOC under the Obama administration declared that sexual orientation and gender identity were also protected under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, this interpretation was rescinded by the Trump administration.

and local level, as well as the challenges facing those in poverty with regard to food security, safe housing, quality education and adequate healthcare merit the inclusion of the poor within the category of "disadvantaged groups." Altogether, this provides a clear case for why each of these groups are included under the banner of "disadvantaged," as the purpose of these federal and state laws are to offer legal protection to groups that are at risk of receiving unequal treatment by non-group members.

This not to say that all disadvantaged groups are the same, or even that all members of the group are disadvantaged to an equivalent degree. In no way does this project make the claim that, for example, veterans are as equally disadvantaged in American society as racial and ethnic minorities, nor does it attempt to create a hierarchy of disadvantage, which would be impossible (particularly given that these group identities are not exclusive to one another). Rather, the use of the term disadvantaged makes the assumption that an average group member faces a higher degree of systemic challenges than the average non-group member. Disadvantaged groups, then, are a broad category that implies that as a result of the group trait, additional barriers to success in American society are in place that are not present for non-group members.

The inclusion of veterans as a disadvantaged group, for instance, is an important example of this. Veterans may be frequently venerated at ballparks and Veterans' Day parades, but still must navigate special obstacles to integrating back into civilian life and finding appropriate employment when compared to the average American who did not serve in the military. They also face higher instances of physical disabilities and mental health conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder, which can place additional barriers on their path to success relative to non-veterans. Again, this acknowledgement

that veterans can be subjected to these additional societal barriers is not to paint with a single broad brush and declare that all hardship is created exactly equal. Not all veterans deal with the same challenges, and even their treatment by society at large has not remained constant over the course of the last three-quarters of a century. Service members returning from World War II received a different kind of welcome from those who returned home from the Vietnam War, which is yet different from those coming from Iraq and Afghanistan.

The other groups analyzed in this project also exhibit varying degrees of heterogeneity both within and across groups when it comes to the form of additional societal barriers they face. But in all cases, it remains true that the average member of a disadvantaged group must overcome challenges that the average American who is not a member of that disadvantaged group needn't address. The primary concerns of a middle class black family in suburban Atlanta may be quite different than those of a single, young black man in Indianapolis. But nonetheless, each must still combat additional barriers stemming from racial discrimination and the vestiges of centuries of systemic segregation that do not negatively impact white Americans in a comparable way. As another example, a married women with children may not feel the impacts of the gender wage gap as strongly as a single woman with children, but neither is immune from the negative consequences of gendered expectations or sexism.

In sum, people belonging to each of these groups (seniors, veterans, racial/ethnic minorities, LGBTQ individuals, immigrants, women, and the poor) face challenges above and beyond those faced by non-group members that serve to put them at a disadvantage relative to other members of American society. The federal government (or in some

cases, state and local government), in recognition of these disadvantaged positions, offers unique protections to members of these groups. In doing so, they acknowledge the need for the government to intervene to at least some degree on their behalf to provide them with a more equivalent opportunity to be successful in American society. But, while the presence of some form of relevant disadvantage is consistent across all of these groups, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the exact nature and intensity of the barriers facing these groups can vary widely. The next section explores the extent to which these groups face different levels of receptivity from the public at large regarding the government's assisting them in overcoming the barriers they face, and the impact that this perceived deservingness can have on the representation group members receive.

PERCEIVED DESERVINGNESS OF GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE

Not all disadvantaged groups in the United States are held in the same level of esteem. Amongst the groups examined here, there are clear differences in how different groups are perceived, and in the extent to which they are broadly considered to be deserving or undeserving of government assistance by the public at large. This section lays out a categorization scheme based upon how deserving of government assistance a disadvantaged group is generally considered to be. These disadvantaged groups fall into three broad categories: groups with a high level of perceived deservingness of government assistance, groups with a low level of perceived deservingness of government assistance, and groups for which the perceived level of deservingness is more mixed.

These perceived categories of groups are rooted in broader societal beliefs regarding the extent to which a group has sacrificed and thus earned assistance from the government, or whether the group is perceived as seeking something extra from the government. Veterans who have trained and/or fought on behalf of the U.S. are largely seen as being owed not just gratitude, but actual benefits in exchange for their service. Similarly, seniors are considered to be deserving of a government safety net as a reward for a lifetime as a hard-working American taxpayer.

At the same time, resentment and lack of willingness to acknowledge historic (and current) discrimination also play into these impressions, particularly for groups that are less favorably regarded. Discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities and corresponding feelings of racial resentment among white Americans in both political parties results in a context where a considerable portion of U.S. citizens consider further government assistance to these groups to be undeserved and unnecessary. Despite the considerable increase in the support for equal treatment of LGBTQ individuals in the last few years, they are still regarded with animosity by a significant percentage of the country. This was even truer in the 2000s, when *the* cultural wedge issue of the 2004 election was a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage.

For other groups, such as women, immigrants, and the poor, the public's sense of deservingness is more mixed. Feelings towards the poor are pulled by the competing values of providing equal opportunity (this is particularly true for programs serving poor families and children) and lionizing the power of hard work. These dynamics were front and center in the debate over changes to the Medicaid program in the proposed Republican health care bill during the summer of 2017, where some members made the

case for protecting the most vulnerable, while others argued that poor life choices were the cause of health problems. Similarly, opinions about immigrants revolve around both the positive personal connections to being a "nation of immigrants" and the fears of demographic change in the U.S. Competing views about government assistance for women are present in the dual popularity of "girl power" initiatives and concerns that men are in fact being disadvantaged or treated unfairly.

Support for this broad categorization scheme can be seen in Figure 2.1. Though there is no survey data available that directly asks about how deserving of government assistance each of these disadvantaged groups is perceived to be, this figure shows a close approximate for at least one of the groups in each of the three deservingness categories. Figure 2.1 utilizes the American National Election Study (ANES) time series data to show the varying levels of support for increasing government funding for the poor, blacks,[5] childcare, and Social Security. For the purposes of this example, support for additional government funding for childcare is taken as a rough proxy for government assistance for women, while support for additional Social Security funds are taken as a proxy for government assistance for seniors. Spending on the poor and Black Americans (as well as question asking about government aid to blacks without specifying spending levels) are a more straightforward approximate of support for the government doing more to help these groups, with Black Americans operating as a proxy for racial/ethnic minorities more broadly.

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[5] "Blacks is the specific term used in the ANES survey question.

**Figure 2.1. Average National Support for Increases in Government Spending
For the Poor, Childcare, Social Security, and Black Americans, 1990-2012.**

*Note: Figure shows the average level of support by year for increasing government spending on
behalf of the poor, blacks, childcare, and social security. Also included in the figure is the
average level of support for the government doing more to help Black Americans (as opposed to
Black Americans being left to help themselves). This measure follows almost exactly the same
trajectory as the level of support for increased funding for blacks, but was asked in a greater
number of years. All data comes from the American National Election Study's time series data,
and is weighted to be nationally representative.*

As seen in Figure 2.1, support for government assistance to Black Americans is

consistently lower than the other groups evaluated. This is in accordance with the

expectation that racial/ethnic minorities will generally be seen by the general public as

less deserving of government assistance. Government support for seniors, seen through

the proxy of support for increased government funding for Social Security, is consistently

at the highest levels of perceived deservingness of government assistance. This

demonstrates that classifying seniors as being generally seen as worthy of government

help is appropriate based on the data available. Women and the poor, however, both see

levels of support that somewhere between that for racial/ethnic minorities on one end and

seniors on the other.

Categorizing these groups on the basis of their perceived deservingness of government assistance offers important insight into how public opinion about a group can affect the quality of representation that group members receive. These broad, national-level feelings about different disadvantaged groups' deservingness of government help are important because they shape the environment in which representatives make decisions about which groups to incorporate into their legislative reputations. Groups that are generally considered to be less deserving of assistance represent a riskier selection for a member of Congress, especially compared to those groups that are considered to be highly deserving of help from the government, because their constituents are more likely to angered by their representative expending so much energy on behalf of a group that has not "earned" it.

In the next section, I use this categorization scheme to offer important insight into the quality of reputation that a group will receive, and the ways in which public opinion can condition the impact of group presence within a state or district. Specifically, I introduce the concept of the advocacy window to explain how the average level of positive or negative feelings in a state or district towards a group can condition the effects of the size of the disadvantaged group within the constituency, and discuss the specific hypotheses that can be derived from this theory. I also discuss how the advocacy window is expected to work differently for disadvantaged groups with varying levels of perceived deservingness of government assistance.

Representation and the Advocacy Window

Broadly speaking, the size of a group within a district should increase the likelihood that a representative will choose to include advocacy on behalf of that group as an important component of their legislative reputation. I will refer to this as the *group size hypothesis*. Members must be strategic in their choices about which groups on whose behalf to advocate. Thus, having a larger group presence in a state or district (and thus a greater potential electoral benefit to offering visible representation of this group) should make a member much more likely to prominently include this group in their legislative reputation than a member representing an area with a small group presence.

Similarly, as feelings towards a group within a state or district—the ambient temperature—become warmer, members should also be more likely to incorporate group advocacy into their reputation. This, I will subsequently call the *ambient temperature hypothesis*. Though there is expected variation in the effects of ambient temperature based on how deserving of government assistance a group is perceived to be, on average, reputations for group advocacy should be more common in states or district with higher ambient temperatures than lower ambient temperatures. For a closer look at the nuanced ways in which group size and ambient temperature can interact with one another to drive the choices members make about which groups to advocate for, I next introduce and explain the concept of the advocacy window.

THE ADVOCACY WINDOW

The advocacy window is a means by which to conceptualize the amount of discretion that a representative is able to exercise in terms of how much of their

reputation they wish to devote to a particular disadvantaged group, once group size and ambient temperature are taken into account. The percentage of group members in a district or state essentially acts as a floor, where members of Congress are expected to provide at least that much representation (which, below a certain point, is unlikely to influence the reputation that member chooses to cultivate). Public opinion regarding a group in a district, however, acts as a ceiling—if the group is well regarded, there are no limits to the amount of effort that could acceptably be put in on behalf of group members, but if the group is poorly regarded, the level of advocacy that would be accepted without putting the member in electoral danger is tamped down. Figure 2.2 demonstrates this relationship.

The space in between the floor and the ceiling is what I am referring to as the *advocacy window*. The advocacy window is essentially the potential amount of acceptable, additional work that a member can do on behalf of a disadvantaged group, if they so choose, without damaging their chances electorally.[6] If the level of public disdain for a group is low, then even if the constituency group within a district is small, a member of Congress would still have a great deal of discretion over the degree to which they integrate group advocacy into their legislative reputation. But if public disdain for a group is high, the advocacy window is likely to be small, even if the constituent group within a district is moderately sized. This theoretical framework is in line with the empirical findings of Hutchings, McClerking, and Charles (2004), indicating that the impact of Black constituency size on congressional support varies across areas with high levels of racial tension.

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[6] Electoral damage in this context refers solely to any backlash that a member of Congress may receive for advocating on the behalf of a disadvantaged group, and not the opportunity cost that would come from spending legislative energy working on the issues of one group rather than another.

Figure 2.2. The Advocacy Window.

Note: This figure demonstrates the conceptualization of the advocacy window. The advocacy window can be understood as the degree of latitude that a member of Congress has to incorporate group advocacy into their legislative reputation without suffering clear electoral damage once the size of the group within a district have been taken into account.

While this analogy holds for the vast majority of cases, there are instances in which group size can actually exceed the ambient temperature within a district. Much like a house in which the roof has collapsed, members in these districts find themselves in a treacherous space without a perfect solution. I expect that in these rare cases, the damned-if-they-do, damned-if-they-don't nature of the district environment will result in other factors such as member characteristics or partisanship to take precedence.

PERCEIVED DESERVINGNESS OF ASSISTANCE AND THE ADVOCACY WINDOW

To this point, this chapter has highlighted both the district/state specific ambient temperature towards a group as well as a broader, more national sense of how deserving of government assistance a group is perceived to be as each having an important impact on the representation a group receives. While these two elements may be related to another, it is important to note that these are in fact distinct concepts. Regardless of the

group being evaluated, there is going to be some variation from district to district when it comes to the ambient temperature towards this group.[7] These changes are what are captured by the ceiling of the advocacy window. The broader conceptions of the deservingness of a group when it comes to government assistance, on the other hand, are a shaping force across all districts. These more general categorizations essentially describe the risk environment, and help to dictate how a member will respond to the advocacy window they face within their district.

Groups that are somewhat universally considered to be deserving, like military veterans or seniors, will find more ready advocates within the legislature, with variations in ambient temperature having less impact on constituency size effects. This is not to say that having more members of this group does not increase the likelihood of a member being an advocate, but that smaller numbers and changes are required for that to happen. For a disadvantaged group widely considered to be deserving, there may exist a potential boost to a member of Congress who firmly integrates providing for the group's needs into their legislative reputation. For example, constituents may be more likely to support a member who focuses on serving the needs of veterans, because they consider it to be a worthwhile use of government time and effort, even if they are not veterans themselves. Because of this potential boost, being a descriptive representative should be less necessary for a member to formulate a reputation as an advocate.

For groups where the sense of deservingness of government assistance is more mixed or party dependent, such as immigrants or the poor, I expect that constituent group

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[7] Further evidence is provided in Chapter 4, and can be clearly seen in Figure 4.1.

size would have a large impact on whether or not a member becomes an advocate,[8] but that this effect would be minimally mitigated by its interaction with district ambient temperature regarding that constituent group. Unlike with those groups deemed widely deserving, if feelings toward a group are fairly mixed or of a more neutral variety, I would expect that the group's presence within a district or state would be the driving factor behind advocacy. Given the more neutral level of public regard, where advocacy is neither seen as a clear electoral positive or negative, I expect that a member's party or experiences as a descriptive representative will be a large contributor to a member cultivating a reputation as a group advocate.

In the final category, for groups that are considered to be markedly less deserving of assistance, I expect that ambient temperature towards the group puts in place a large barrier to advocacy that is only cleared when a very large percentage of group members are present within a district. If public regard for a group is low, then members advocating for this group will receive no electoral boost or additional benefit from individuals who do not belong to the group. In fact, if a disadvantaged group is actively disliked, advocating for that group's needs could even backfire on a member so to reduce the electoral support they might otherwise have received.

DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATIVES

In all cases, I expect that being a descriptive representative of the group is a factor that will make a representative more likely to foster a reputation as an advocate for that

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[8] Group size should not have a large effect on whether or not a member of Congress chooses to become an advocate for women. This is because of the unique place that women hold among the disadvantaged groups studied – there is minimal variation across states/districts in the percentage of women within the constituency, with these percentages consistently holding steady at around 50% of the population.

group. I expect, however, that this effect will be the most readily apparent for members who represent a district with a large advocacy window. Given that a descriptive representative's knowledge and affinity for the group tends to exceed that of non-group members, I anticipate that they will more likely aim for the ceiling when facing a broad advocacy window and base their reputation in advocacy for that marginalized group. In accordance with Mansbridge's (1999) predictions about when descriptive representation should be most important, a member's own personal experience with discrimination or marginalization will make them more likely to risk any negative consequences that come from being a group advocate. Thus, given this potential risk, descriptive representatives should be more likely to take advantage of an expanded advocacy window to cultivate a reputation as an advocate.

Legislative Reputations in the House and the Senate

Given the institutional distinctions between the House and the Senate, there should be some differences in how members make decisions about which groups to include in their legislative reputations. Members of the House are considered to be specialists, at least compared to senators. Being a part of a 435-member body means that members are prone to develop narrow legislative identities and address very specific issues, groups, and policies. House districts also tend to be more homogeneous than those of the Senate (though this is not true in all cases).[9] This means that House districts

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[9] It is possible that small and rural states may be more homogenous than the typical House district, and there are seven states that are equivalent to House districts in population. However, when comparing the average House district to the average state, states do tend to be larger and more heterogeneous. The inclusion of these smaller, less diverse states could serve to bias the Senate sample to look more like the House sample, making it more difficult to detect differences in representational decision-making, and thereby serving as a more conservative test of the importance of representing larger and more heterogeneous areas.

are more likely to be spaces in which members of disadvantaged groups are concentrated. Coming from a more homogeneous district also minimizes the likelihood that advocating for one group in particular will provoke conflict. For these reasons, I expect that members of the House are more likely to formulate a reputation around being an advocate for a marginalized group than a member of the Senate, and that they will devote a larger portion of that reputation to advocating for the group.

In the Senate, members have far more freedom to be entrepreneurial in their legislative approach. Not only do they serve on more committees than House members, it is not unusual for senators to propose legislation outside of their specific committee-driven areas of expertise. The ability to offer non-germane amendments to legislation assists in this. Because members of the Senate tend to be generalists, this gives them a lot more latitude in the groups that they choose to represent. As a result, senators have a high level of discretion to hone their legislative reputation strategically, which provides incentives to incorporate as many "safe" groups into their legislative reputations as possible. Therefore, it is expected that Senators will more likely opt for a more superficial form of group advocacy, rather than devoting a large share of their energies towards working on behalf of any particular group.

For a large portion of American history, political theorists regarded the Senate as the protector of minority groups against the popular majorities in the South. Those assumptions that minority interests are somehow linked with the interests of smaller states, however, are highly problematic, particularly where racial/ethnic minorities are concerned (Dahl 1956, Lee and Oppenheimer 1999). Compared to the House, senators are more likely to be running scared—the electoral margins tend to be smaller for

senators, and their seats more competitive. So, there also are more risks for senators in developing a reputation as an advocate for an unpopular group, especially if the group's members are not sufficiently numerous to compensate for any losses to the senators' electoral coalition that might result from that advocacy. Given this, I hypothesize that the increased electoral vulnerability of most senators relative to most members of the House will make senators less likely to become advocates of disadvantaged groups in general, and that this will be particularly acute for groups who are not considered to be broadly deserving of government assistance, such as racial/ethnic minorities.

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the ways that previous research has understood the representational relationship, and offered a more realistic conceptualization of representation that takes into account the type of information that members of Congress and their constituents could actually be expected to know. It presented a new, integrated theory of when and why members choose to represent the groups that they do, with a special focus on disadvantaged groups. In doing so, it recognizes that not all members of disadvantaged groups are considered to be equally deserving of assistance from the government by society at large, and that those different categorizations of deservingness have an impact on which members of Congress are willing to develop a reputation as a group's advocate.

Each state or district has an advocacy window, which represents the degree of latitude that a member of Congress has in making decisions about how extensively to incorporate disadvantaged group advocacy into their legislative reputations. After the

size of a group within a district or state is taken into account, members rely upon their own discretion to determine the level of group representation to offer, which is conditioned by the ambient temperature towards a group within that state or district. For all but those disadvantaged groups that are held to be the most highly deserving of assistance, such as seniors and veterans, cross-state or district variations in how favorably the rest of the district feels towards a group is expected to have a conditioning effect on how likely it is that a member will choose to include advocacy on behalf of that group into their legislative reputation. This should be most acutely felt for disadvantaged groups such as the LGBTQ community or racial/ethnic minorities that are viewed as less sympathetic by broad swathes of the American public.

The next chapter examines the critical role that legislative reputations play in the ways that groups are represented in Congress. It makes a case for legislative reputation as one of the primary conduits of representation, and offers a clear definition and operationalization for what legislative reputations are, as well as what they are not. Finally, it demonstrates the incidence of members with legislative reputations for serving the disadvantaged across a sampling of Congresses. It highlights the variation in the primacy of each group to a member's reputation, and showcases the partisan and House-Senate differences in the types of reputations members form.

CHAPTER 3: MEMBER REPUTATION

Claude Pepper had a long career in the U.S. Congress, serving as a Florida senator from 1936-1951, and as a representative of Miami from 1963 until his death in 1989. The very first line of his obituary in the *New York Times* referred to him as a "former United States Senator from Florida who became a champion of the elderly in a career that spanned 60 years." These sorts of characterizations continued throughout, both in memorializing quotes from others as well as in descriptions of his work within the legislature:

> "'Claude Pepper gave definition and meaning to the concept of public service,' the President [George H.W. Bush] said. 'He fought for the poor and the elderly in his own determined way.'"

> "Horace B. Deets, the executive director of the American Association of Retired Persons, said it would be difficult to find an advocate for the rights of older Americans who could replace Mr. Pepper. 'There really isn't anyone on the American political landscape who could step into Claude Pepper's shoes,' he said."

> "From 1929, when he first entered politics, until his death, Mr. Pepper fought for the rights of the elderly. One of his first acts in the Florida House of Representatives was to sponsor a bill that allowed older residents to fish without a license. And as he grew older Mr. Pepper continued to wage war against those he considered willing to take advantage of the elderly. At the age of 78 he voted for a law that raised the mandatory retirement age to 70 from 65."

> "In 1977 Mr. Pepper was named chairman of the House Select Committee on Aging, soon becoming known as 'Mr. Social Security' for his ardent defense of Social Security and Medicare. He built a national reputation as the primary Congressional advocate for the elderly, introducing legislation to fight crime in housing projects for the elderly, to cut Amtrak fares for senior citizens and to provide meals to invalids."

"Mr. Pepper's stands on behalf of the elderly did not hurt him in his own district, where 30 percent of adults are at least 65 years old. Over the last decade, he consistently won re-election with more than 70 percent of the vote."

In the special election following his death, the 18th District of Florida elected Ileana Ros-Lehtinen to be the first Latina to serve in Congress. She subsequently won all of her reelection battles, and in the spring of 2017 announced her intent to retire at the end of the term. A piece in the Miami Herald describing her tenure in Congress discussed her consistent emphasis on foreign affairs, particularly in regards to Cuba, as well as her long-time advocacy for the LGBTQ community. The author writes:

"For years, Ros-Lehtinen represented the Florida Keys, including gay-friendly Key West, and advocated for LGBTQ rights -- far ahead of much of the GOP. Eventually, her transgender son, Rodrigo Heng-Lehtinen, made his way into the public spotlight; last year, he and his parents recorded a bilingual public-service TV campaign to urge Hispanics to support transgender youth."

In both cases, these individuals are described in terms of their legislative reputation. In particular, their work in Congress is defined by their broad efforts on behalf of specific groups. Describing a member's reputation is used as a way of summarizing a member's work within the legislature in a way that is easily understandable. Notably, member reputation is used as a concept that is distinct from any one particular action such as bill sponsorship, and distinct from group presence within a district. When specific actions are mentioned, such as Sen. Pepper's efforts to allow seniors to fish without licenses or to address crime in housing for the elderly, they are included to give examples of the work that went into building this reputation, rather than the critical factors in and of themselves. Additionally, while the importance of district composition is made clear by emphasizing the relatively high level of senior citizens and the presence of the Key West's large LGBTQ population within the district, sizeable district presence alone is not synonymous with legislative reputation. If it were, one would expect both members to have formed very similar

reputations, as Reps. Pepper and Ros-Lehtinen represented roughly the same district, but this is not the case.

So what exactly is a legislative reputation, then? In this chapter, I lay out a specific definition for what a legislative reputation is, along with its requisite characteristics. I then make a case for why legislative reputations are important, and why members seek to craft them. Finally, I describe the source material and coding scheme for my original measure of member reputation, and present descriptive statistics for the measure.

What is a Legislative Reputation?

The concept of a reputation is one that is familiar and frequently used in common parlance, but the precise elements that make up a reputation can be hard to pin down. Despite this, scholars and journalists alike tend to treat a member's reputation as an important way of understanding their behavior within the legislature. Much like the terms "maverick" or "political capital", member reputations are commonly referenced, but rarely thoroughly defined.

There are a few exceptions that make notable contributions to a holistic understanding of what a legislative reputation really is. Swers (2007) highlights the benefits conferred upon members with a reputation as an expert in national security in the post-9/11 world, and explores the gender-based differences in where members focus their reputation-building efforts. Fenno (1991) explains that to establish reputations as effective legislators, senators must work both within the legislature to pass bills and on the campaign trail to bring it to constituents' attention. Schiller

(2000) argues that "the requirements for successful reputation building … [are] media attention and constituent recognition."

Each of these authors offers important pieces to the broader puzzle of what makes a legislative reputation. Fenno emphasizes that reputations come from intentional efforts on the part of members that depend upon their communication to constituents, while Schiller develops this further by conceptualizing member reputation as part of a two-way communication with media as essential arbiter. Swers highlights the nuanced differences in how members craft their reputations, even within the same issue area. She also offers insight into the linkage between a member's descriptive characteristics and attempting to build credible reputations.

At its simplest, a member's legislative reputation is what they are known for prioritizing and spending their time working on while in Congress. This is a definition that leaves a great deal of latitude, both in terms of the subject matter and the means of acquisition. For example, in considering applicable subject matter for this project, I am particularly interested in reputations that are crafted around advocating for particular constituent groups. However, reputations can also be built around other aspects of legislative work, such as being a deficit hawk or attending to foreign affairs in Eastern Asia. Similarly, there are a vast number of different ways that members can "work on" issues they consider to be important. So, if legislative reputations aren't just set lists of topics or behaviors, what are they?

I contend that a reputation has three essential components. First, reputations must be greater than the sum of the individual actions that contribute to them. Second, there is

no single action that is required for a reputation to be formed. And third, reputations are the result of the observation and interpretation of others.

EMERGENT PROPERTIES

When biologists seek to define some of the principal characteristics of living organisms, one of the most important of these is that it possesses what are referred to as emergent properties. Emergent properties are present at all levels of biological structure, and are responsible for important characteristics of life such as responsiveness to stimuli, reproduction, and evolutionary adaptation. Biological organisms are made up of an enormous number of different components that have various functions, but these components then interact to become something more than just their individual tasks—it is greater than the sum of its parts. So too when thinking about what makes a legislative reputation. It is not simply votes cast, bills proposed, or speeches given. It is the distillation of what this individual is about, and what is most important to them.

A reputation cannot simply be taking specific actions, or saying specific words. Rather, it is the culmination of a number of different actions that then interact to form a broader picture. One can step outside of the political realm to get an intuitive sense of how this works. You don't have to know where Mother Teresa practiced her ministry or be able to name any of her works of mercy to know of her reputation for working to serve the poor and the sick. To give an example familiar to children and parents of children from the 1990s, one needn't remember any specific storylines or plot twists to feel confident in stating that Captain Planet's top priority was protecting the environment. These reputations are built from a consistent series

of actions that signal dedication to a particular cause or service to a particular group, that then take on a life of their own. They are connected to specific behaviors, but can also be broadly understood apart from them.

REPUTATION IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH ANY SPECIFIC ACTION

This second property is related to the first—in the same way that a reputation is more than the specific actions and signals that go into its crafting, it also does not directly imply that any particular action on behalf of a group has been taken. There are a variety of ways that a member can represent the groups within their district, and all of them feed into a member's reputation. But no one specific action—be it sponsoring a bill, speaking on the floor, or cosponsoring a number of bills to benefit the group—guarantees that a member has a reputation for advocating for the group more broadly. Similarly, knowing that a member has a reputation as a group advocate does not mean that you can predict with absolute certainty what legislative actions they will have taken.

This is a critical definitional element of a reputation for two main reasons. First, it takes into account the amount of discretion members have in terms of what they do, and how they do it. Reputations build over time as the result of a conglomerate of actions. But depending upon the member's seniority, committee membership, position in the chamber, and their other group and issue priorities, they enact their group advocacy in different ways. For example, some members of Congress sponsor hundreds of bills in a given Congress, while others may introduce less than five. By not assuming that reputation means any one specific action, it takes

into account this variation in the preferred means of representation. Second, it highlights the fact that members can take some of the same actions, with no guarantee that it will impact their respective reputations in exactly the same way. Just because members have similar cosponsorship records, for instance, does not mean that each will have the same reputation for group advocacy.

THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER

Finally, one of the primary characteristics of a reputation is that it inherently must be interpreted by others. There are a variety of things that can be done to shape a reputation, but ultimately, it is in the eye of the beholder. In the political world, that beholder most commonly is the media. Even the most politically engaged tend not to spend copious amounts of their time scouring the *Congressional Record* for every action their member took on the floor that day, or tuning in to endless hours of committee hearings on CSPAN. Instead, individuals depend upon a variety of media sources to keep them updated on what their member is up to, with only occasional specifics. This can take a number of different forms: who the media quotes on a particular topic, pieces that do a deep dive into actions that have been taken on a salient policy topic, reports on a member's town hall, or candidate biographies and descriptions that are published to prepare voters for an upcoming election. These are distilled down from a huge quantity of member actions and positions, and once a reputation is established, it tends to be reinforced by other members of the media as well.

In the lead-up to the 2012 election, Mitt Romney declared that he had been a "severely conservative governor" of Massachusetts. The former presidential candidate was widely mocked for this statement, as it did not comport with the narrative surrounding his time in office, where he was generally described a compiling a moderate record. He did take a number of what could be considered "conservative" actions while serving as governor, but that was not the interpretation that had been drawn by the media and others who had examined his history. Conversely, in the Democratic primary campaign of 2015 and 2016, Bernie Sanders routinely described himself as the candidate of the working class, with very little pushback. This self-assessment was congruent with how the Senator tended to be described by the news media, and thus served to reinforce the reputation that had already been developed.

These examples illustrate the fact that one's reputation cannot simply be declared to be whatever one would like it to be—it must be drawn by the consensus of others who observe that person's behavior over time. Obviously, this is not to say that a person has no control at all over their own reputation, because they most certainly do. Individuals can take any number of actions in an attempt to craft and shape their own reputation. Many of the behaviors that a member of Congress engages in are designed to send important signals about their priorities and the work they're doing. But these behaviors must be interpreted by others—primarily the media—rather than simply claimed by the member themselves.

Because reputations rely upon outside determinations, they are also self-reinforcing. This can happen in two ways. First, if some members of the media

repeatedly reference a member of Congress in particular ways, this can get picked up by other reporters and other news outlets as well, until there is a broad understanding of what the big pieces of a member's reputation generally are. Second, when reporters are seeking comment on particular issues, they generally want to ask a member who has experience and expertise on the topic. If a member gives an interview in which they spend a good deal of time discussing the challenges facing immigrants in this country or how pending immigration legislation might affect that group, they will get to be known as someone who can speak with authority on the issue, prompting other journalists to seek them out as well. This then has the effect of further bolstering a member's reputation as an advocate for immigrants.

Because the reputation that is communicated to constituents is dependent upon this outside party assessment, it ensures that it will have at least a base level of face validity. Members of the media and other outside observers will only coalesce around a particular understanding of a member's reputation if it is seen to be reasonably credible. Credibility generally requires that a member be considered to have a relatively high level of expertise, that they have taken at least some actions related to an issue, and that they haven't taken actions considered to stand in opposition to an issue or group.

Strom Thurmond was one of the longest serving politicians in American history, representing South Carolina in the U.S. Senate for 48 years. Some of what he is best known for is his run for president in 1948 under the banner of the anti-civil rights States Rights Democratic Party, staging the longest filibuster in history against the 1957 Civil Rights Act, opposing all civil rights legislation over the next two

decades, and changing parties in 1964 to protest the Democratic Party's embrace of civil rights. In his later years in the Senate, he did make some overtures to his black constituents, who by that time made up a sizable portion of the electorate in South Carolina. These small actions had little to no effect on his general reputation as someone who was certainly not an advocate for Black Americans and other communities of color, as they did not comport with the decades of strong evidence to the contrary.

A member's credibility is most frequently considered to come from study of issues under a committee's jurisdiction, but it also goes beyond this. Some members also take reputation-building actions on issues that are not specific to their committee assignments. This is particularly common in the Senate, where senators are expected to be generalists, but can be true in the House as well. These instances also speak to the differences between legislative effectiveness and a legislative reputation. Working on issues relevant to the jurisdiction of the committees a member is on doubtless increases their chances of moving legislation through the process. But reputation formation does not rely upon success alone. Legislators can gain reputations as "squeaky-wheel" advocates, even if their proposed changes are rarely enacted.

A person's personal, descriptive characteristics can also serve as a short cut to credibility even without a committee-specific tie. For example, being a female member of Congress lends additional credence to their status as an advocate for women and women's issues. This then makes it more likely that members of the media will approach them on these issues, thereby serving to amplify this component of their reputation.

However, there are some instances, as demonstrated by Swers (2007), in which personal characteristics or demographics can make it a tougher climb to reach credibility. Jay Rockefeller, for instance, spent three decades representing West Virginia in the United States Senate. But, as a member of a famously wealthy family, Rockefeller had to put great effort into demonstrating his understanding of and compassion for the challenges facing the poor and elderly in West Virginia.

In summary, a legislative reputation is defined by three important characteristics. First, a reputation is essentially an emergent property—it is more than the sum of individual actions. Second, a reputation cannot guarantee that a member will have engaged in any one particular behavior. And third, reputations are translated through third-party observers. Next, I turn to why legislative reputations are important, and what drives members to attempt to craft them.

Why Do Members of Congress Seek to Build Legislative Reputations?

Members of Congress attempt to cultivate legislative reputations for a number of reasons, rooted in both their electoral concerns about communicating their priorities and achievements back to their constituents as well as the advantages that are conferred within the legislature itself. First, members want their constituents to know what they've been doing to represent them, but recognize that the vast majority of their constituents have extremely limited political knowledge about a member's specific actions day to day. Working to craft a clear legislative reputation is a way to demonstrate a broad picture of their efforts, without counting on the transference of specific facts. Second, much of politics is rooted in group-based understandings, making reputations for group advocacy

a common denominator of communication between members and constituents. Finally, to be effective in Congress, members know they have to play the long game. By cultivating reputations, members make it easier to claim legislative turf and build coalitions over time.

LIMITED POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE

At its most basic, the idealized representational relationship consists of an elected representative diligently working within the legislature to promote actions in the best interests of their constituents. These constituents then take careful note of the member's behavior over the course of their term, and, if they feel that they have done a good job of working on behalf of the constituency, reward them with another term in office. In practice, this relationship is considerably more complicated. Despite an increase in transparency since in the reforms of the 1970s, constituents do not have full information about what their representative is doing available to them. Even considering only the (still considerable) information that individuals can access, most nonetheless have extremely limited knowledge.

A member's constituents cannot be expected to follow everything that a member does. This is not inherently a criticism. Most citizens have lives and priorities that leave little time for in-depth explorations of what their member of Congress has been up to each day. Given the high cost of this information gathering and the limited personal incentives for any one person to engage in this process, it ought not to be surprising that levels of political knowledge and information are fairly low. Thus, in a political reality in which fewer than one-third of Americans can name one of their state's senators

(Breitman 2015), it is unlikely that any given constituent will be aware of a specific action that a member of Congress takes. That said, even if a member cannot count on a sizable portion of their constituency to be up-to-date on the most recent amendment they proposed in mark-up or the bill they signed on to as one of the first cosponsors, it is reasonable to expect that those individuals paying at least some amount of attention to what's going on in Congress and the political world will pick up on some of the broader trends about what their member is doing.

It's this general picture of themselves that members of Congress seek to control. As described in the above section discussing reputation as inherently in the eye of the beholder, members of Congress do not have absolute control over their reputations. That said, they are very far from helpless. Members of Congress are exceedingly conscious of how their actions are perceived by others, and work to create a cohesive pattern of behavior. Members seek to build these reputations because of their simplicity and power to penetrate down to the constituent level. The likelihood of any one vote, hearing, speech, or bill introduced becoming widely known is extremely slim, but members are able to cultivate a broader reputation by repeatedly taking actions that contribute to larger picture of advocacy for a specific group or towards achieving particular goals.

This is then reinforced by the media, both in the way that a member is described and in who the media seeks out for comment on particular issues. Given that member reputation is filtered down to constituents through the media, this reinforcement is particularly important. Once a member begins to develop a reputation with some sources within the media as an advocate for a particular group, this understanding will be repeated. This is true at the national level and at the local level. Members of Congress

place a great deal of value on local news outlets, as they are frequently the sources that constituents pay the most attention to. But given that few local media outlets are able to send staff to Washington, there is a considerable amount of member action for which local media look to previous national reporting to shape their stories. Additionally, reporters and broadcasters sometimes actively seek out members to comment and speak to specific issues. Those who have a reputation as group advocates and experts on those issues are likely to be those who are sought out. This is turn further emphasizes that reputation, as media appearances are an important piece of the narrative.

GROUP-BASED UNDERSTANDINGS

While politics at the elite level are frequently talked about in terms of political ideology, at the individual level, people are far more likely to see politics as rooted in group identities (Converse, 1964). This means that a large percentage of people think about politics as coalitions of different groups, and their issue positions or partisan identification is directly related to what groups they support or feel connected to, and which groups they oppose or see as undeserving (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002). Members of Congress also frequently see their districts as composed of groups and factions (Fenno, 1978). They pay close attention to district demographics and other subgroup divisions when conceptualizing their districts and deciding what actions to take.

Member reputation as a group advocate, then, is a particularly helpful way of thinking about representation. It acknowledges the emphasis on group-based understandings that many constituents use when evaluating their representatives, but also reflects one of the principal ways that members make decisions and take action within the

legislature. This is not to say that all of politics is rooted in group affinity, or that group considerations are the only means by which members of Congress make decisions. But, it is one of the most common means that constituents and members alike use to think about the political world and political decisions, creating a place of overlap in how both representatives and the represented conceptualize representation.

PLAYING THE LONG GAME

Member reputations also provide a boost to members over the long term when it comes to getting things done within the legislature. It is extremely rare that issues are raised, problems understood, and solutions are proposed and adopted in the two years of a single Congress. Issues can take years to enter into the public consciousness, and some never will. Single pieces of legislation are introduced over and over, some with various tweaks but the legislative intent remaining the same. In the overwhelming majority of cases, if members want to actually accomplish anything in Congress, they have to be prepared to play the long game. Working to establish legislative reputations assists members in that goal in two ways: aiding coalition building and establishing legislative "turf."

Coalitions can be thought about in two ways. The first is of a majority coalition within the legislature. This involves bringing on board half of the members of the House or the Senate to legislation that is favored by a group or is meant to serve a group. These coalitions can be established by either getting other members to agree to act on behalf of a given group's cause, or by adding in provisions that would serve other groups or favored issues as well.

The second way of thinking about a coalition is one of affected parties and stakeholders outside of the legislature itself, either nationally or within a district. Coalitions of this sort are necessary both to determine what sorts of services or actions groups want and require, and also to gain buy-in from important entities that can communicate to other constituent group members. Building coalitions with groups in the district that work to end hunger, provide housing for the homeless, raise awareness of the EITC, or provide job training opportunities for struggling communities helps a member stay in touch with issues that are most important to low-income individuals, but also bolsters their own reputation as an advocate for the poor. In turn, having a strong reputation on these issues can serve as a signal to other potential community partners that a member can be trusted to work diligently on their behalf.

Members also seek to establish their own legislative "turf" as a means of communicating expertise and gaining prestige within the legislature. Establishing a reputation as an expert and important operator on a specific issue increases the likelihood that a member will be able to play a major role in important legislation and gain higher visibility in the media on that issue. This then reinforces that reputation and boosts the likelihood that their efforts will be recognized by their constituents.

Having now defined legislative reputation as a concept, made a case for why reputation is an important means of understanding representation, and explained why members seek to cultivate a legislative reputation, I next turn to a discussion of how reputation can be measured.

Measuring Representation

For this project, I have developed an original variable of reputation that quantifies which members cultivate a legislative reputation as an advocate for disadvantaged groups. I created this variable by systematically coding the written member profiles found in Congressional Quarterly's *Politics in America* for the 103rd, 105th, 108th, 110th, and 113th Congresses, included within the period from 1993-2014. This marks an important departure from the previous work operationalizing reputation by looking at roll-call voting, bill sponsorship, and bill cosponsorship (Swers 2007; Schiller 2000). Utilizing these member profiles allows me to construct a reputation variable that takes into account the critical characteristics discussed earlier in the chapter—namely, that reputation is more than just a set of specific actions, and that it relies upon the interpretation of an outside observer.

CQ'S POLITICS IN AMERICA

Congressional Quarterly's *Politics in America* is a compendium of profiles of all members of Congress and their districts, published every two years with each new incoming Congress. Member profiles are a combination of biographical information and descriptions of priorities and past work within the legislature, with a primary emphasis on giving a robust sense of a member's identity in Congress. Each profile contains approximately two pages of text in addition to listed biographical information such as place and date of birth, military service, education, and previous political office. The profiles also contain the member's interest group scores and record on key votes.[10]

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[10] The format has changed slightly over the last few decades. In the 2000s, the structure became much more uniform, with two pages devoted to each member (the only exception being brand new members of

The relatively short length of these profiles is important, because it ensures that they are not simply a listing of all of the actions a member has taken on each and every issue position. Rather, they are a concise distillation of the most important elements of what a member has done, said, or intends to do. Though each profile does devote one or two paragraphs to narrating some biographical backstory or electoral intrigue, the vast majority of the profile is spent discussing what the member is known for within the legislature. Any additional biographical information that is included serves the purpose of explaining why advocating for particular groups or issues is so important to a member. This can range from highlighting how (now former) Rep. Mike Ross's (D-AR04) career as a pharmacist drove him to push for controls on prescription drug prices, to describing Rep. Ruben Hinojosa's (D-TX) experiences in segregated schools as a Spanish-speaking child as the catalyst for his work to promote educational equality for minority students.

It is common for members of Congress to serve for a number of terms. An important element of these profiles is that they account for the ways that a member's reputation can change over the course of their career. While there is clear overlap in some of the content that is discussed in a member's profile from Congress to Congress (as would be expected), the profiles are revisited and written anew for each term. This is important for three reasons. First, this is essential for ensuring that the information presented is up-to-date as of the contemporaneous Congress. Reputation building frequently takes time and is developed over a number of years, and this allows for new actions to be taken into account. Second, member profiles tend to be more heavily weighted towards more recent actions, allowing for reputations to evolve over time.

the House, who receive only a single page for the description of the member and their district.). Prior to this, profiles averaged around two pages, but were sometimes extended for members with particularly long tenures or who held a senior leadership position.

While members frequently exhibit a high level of consistency in the groups they advocate for, as discussed above, there are also instances in which members can shift their priorities or take up new causes. By updating for each new Congress, these changes can be incorporated. Finally, this also allows for the continuity for an individual member across sessions of Congress to be more organically derived. While each new writer undoubtedly references what has been written in the past, they are also at liberty to select new information to include or old information to drop based upon their interpretation of how best to describe a particular member. This process in and of itself also mirrors the process by which a member's reputation is built, evolved, and reinforced through the eyes of the media.

In the introduction to the 13th Edition of *Politics in America* (detailing the members of the 109th Congress, which was in session from 2005-2006), Editor and Senior Vice President David Rapp describes the process of compiling these profiles in the following way:

> Congressional Quarterly, which has been the "bible" on Congress since 1945, sets out every two years to compile the definitive insider's guide to the people who constitute the world's greatest democratic institution. The book is organized so that each member's "chapter" provides a full political profile, statistical information on votes and positions and a demographic description of the state or district a member represents.

> We evaluate every member by his or her own standards. We do not try to decide where a politician ought to stand on a controversial issue; our interest has been to assess how they go about expressing their views and how effective they are at achieving their self-proclaimed goals.

> The 125 reporters, editors and researchers at CQ cover Congress and its members on a weekly, daily, and even hourly basis, through the pages of CQ Weekly and CQ Today, and our online news service, CQ.com.

Under the direction of editors Jackie Koszczuk and H. Amy Stern, they have produced the most objective, authoritative and interesting volume of political analysis available on this fascinating collection of people.

In constructing these profiles, CQ writers draw upon prior reporting on the day-to-day actions in the House and the Senate, member interviews, campaign materials, and media appearances, among other sources. An example of the first page of one of these profiles is given in Figure 3.1.

OPERATIONALIZING REPUTATION

For each group of interest, reputation is measured on an ordinal scale that ranges across four levels: no advocacy, superficial advocacy, secondary advocacy, and primary advocacy. These classifications are made on the basis of both the legislative actions on behalf of the group that are enumerated in the profile as well as the representational statements that are used to characterize the member. To ensure a consistent and reproducible coding scheme, my definition of legislative actions includes the following: sponsoring a bill; cosponsoring a bill; being a member of the group's congressional caucus; offering amendments in committee or on the floor; staging public demonstrations (such as a talking filibuster or the 1991 march over to the Senate by women in the House during the Clarence Thomas hearings); holding hearings on relevant topics; shepherding a bill through the committee process or onto the floor; or publicly speaking out on behalf of the group while operating in an official capacity (as when speaking on the floor of the chamber or in an interview with the media).[11]

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[11] For a specific listing of the topics considered relevant to each group, please see Appendix A.

Of equal importance is what is excluded from this definition of legislative actions. Roll call voting is not included because it does not require any initiative on the part of the member. As this project is focused on consciously constructed legislative reputation, only actions that require a member-initiated choice to actively advocate on behalf of a group are included. Representational statements are those included in the profile to give a sense of the member's legislative priorities, such as "he has promoted legislation to help his district's substantial population of American Indians" (used to describe Rep. J.D. Hayworth of Arizona's 5th District in the 108th Congress) or "Conyers has championed the causes of civil rights, minorities, and the poor" (words describing John Conyers of Michigan's 14th District).

A member rated on the lowest end of this ordinal scale, no advocacy, is either someone who is never mentioned in conjunction with a group or working on behalf of that group's legislative concerns, or someone who has actively worked against a group or its interests. For example, a member who fought against the reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act would be coded as having a reputation that is not rooted in the advocacy of racial/ethnic minorities, as would a member whose profile focuses primarily on their efforts to reduce climate change, with no mention of any disadvantaged groups. The next step up, superficial advocacy, is the category for members whose reputations are largely based on other issues or groups, but whose profile does include a brief mention of a single legislative action taken on behalf of the disadvantaged group of interest. Most commonly, this would be something like sponsoring a single bill providing tax credits to businesses that hire unemployed veterans.

The next two categories, secondary and primary advocacy, represent the band of

Figure 3.1. Example of CQ *Politics in America* Member Profile

Rep. Frederica S. Wilson (D)

Elected 2010; 2nd term

Wilson prioritizes the needs of the underprivileged, particularly those in her northern Miami district. "I've always advocated for children, for seniors and for poor people," she says. "Not the middle class. Poor people. And I call it just like that. I don't say that I am trying to strengthen the middle class. I am trying to help people who are poor. The working poor."

While many of her House colleagues have embraced deficit reduction debates, the former educator's agenda features more-traditional Democratic initiatives: boosting employment and economic development through government spending. Wilson said the nation needs more economic recovery, and she does not want cost-cutting until then. "I don't think you can put people to work and make cuts," she said in 2011.

Wilson, a member of both the Congressional Progressive Caucus and the Congressional Black Caucus, was the oldest freshman elected to the House in November 2010. She was also one of the most widely recognized. Her trademark is flamboyant hats, a fashion choice she adopted from her grandmother. (Sadly, they're not allowed on the House floor.) Her legislative style isn't necessarily flamboyant, but she won't hesitate to speak her mind at the lectern.

She'll likely have plenty to say as a member of the Education and the Workforce Committee in the 113th Congress (2013–14). A former elementary school teacher and principal who served on the Miami-Dade County School Board, Wilson wants to play a role in revamping the George W. Bush-era education law known as No Child Left Behind. She says the law has hurt some students with its focus on testing and college preparedness.

As a member of the Science, Space and Technology Committee, she tries to boost federal programs for education in science, technology, engineering and mathematics. "People are losing their jobs not only because of downsizing or outsourcing," she said. "They are not able to blend into the new world of technology." She introduced a bill in the 112th Congress (2011–12) to create a pilot program for grants to local governments or community-based organizations for worker retraining. Wilson is currently the top Democrat on the Science committee's Technology panel.

Wilson sat on the Foreign Affairs Committee during her freshman term, and she still has a parochial interest in foreign policy. Her young, majority-minority district is home to many Haitian-Americans.

Citing reports during the 112th that deportations of Haitians had resumed for the first time since a devastating earthquake struck the country in 2010, Wilson urged the Obama administration to stop that practice. "Current political instability, widespread human rights abuses and the cholera outbreak make conditions on the ground too risky for Haitians to return safely," she told the South Florida Sun Sentinel.

Wilson has visited Haiti a number of times. She expressed concern in November 2011 that Haiti was seeking to build up its army; Wilson said those finances should go elsewhere.

While serving in the Florida Legislature, Wilson sponsored a law requiring the state to have a procedure to report missing foster care children. It is named after Rilya Wilson, a young girl from her community who went missing; Rilya Wilson's foster parent in February 2013 was sentenced to 55 years in prison. Wilson has introduced legislation to replicate her law on a national scale.

She also has introduced a bill to withhold federal transportation funds to states that do not enact laws prohibiting texting or using a cell phone while driving with a minor in the vehicle. "Too many Americans die tragically and needlessly every year due to distracted drivers," she said. She supported a

Capitol Office
225-4506
wilson.house.gov
208 Cannon Bldg 202-15-0513; fax 226-0777

Committees
Education & the Workforce
Science, Space & Technology

Residence
Miami Gardens

Born
Nov. 5, 1942; Miami, Fla.

Religion
Episcopalian

Family
Widowed; three children

Education
Fisk U., B.A. 1963 (childhood education); U. of Miami, M.Ed. 1972 (elementary education)

Career
At-risk youth mentorship program founder; elementary school teacher and principal; homemaker

Political Highlights
Miami-Dade County School Board, 1992-98; Fla. House, 1998-2002; Fla. Senate, 2002-10 (minority leader pro tempore, 2006-08)

ELECTION RESULTS

2012 GENERAL
Frederica S. Wilson (D) ... unopposed

2012 PRIMARY
Frederica S. Wilson (D) ... 42,807 ... 66.4%
Rudolph "Rudy" Moise (D) ... 21,680 ... 33.6%

2010 GENERAL
Frederica S. Wilson (D) ... 106,361 ... 86.7%
Roderick D. Vereen (NPA) ... 17,009 ... 13.8%

Member profile from the 113th Congress for Congresswoman Frederica Wilson, representative for Florida's 24th District.

members for whom advocating on behalf of a disadvantaged group forms a considerable portion of their legislative reputation.[12] A member is coded as having a reputation as a secondary advocate if the profile mentions more than one legislative action and/or reputational references (generally less than one paragraph in total), but there are other groups and issues that they are more strongly associated with. Primary advocates are members who are profiled as having strong reputational connections to the group—they tend to be explicitly mentioned as being an advocate and having a strong focus on this group, usually within the first few paragraphs—as well as having taken multiple legislative actions on that group's behalf. The profiles of primary advocates usually devote at least 1-2 paragraphs worth of content to their efforts on behalf of the group, and there is no other issue with which they are more strongly associated.

In the 113th Congress, Sen. Jack Reed of Rhode Island would be an example of a secondary advocate. Over the course of his long career, he has worked on a number of bills and provisions specifically intended to assist poor Americans, including measures to help low-income renters and provide assistance to people experiencing homelessness. His overall legislative reputation, however, is much more focused on foreign affairs and military conflicts in the Middle East. Rep. Frederica Wilson, of Florida's 24th District, is a primary advocate for the poor. Her profile describes her as one who "prioritizes the needs of the underprivileged," and cites her own words as further proof. She says "I've always advocated for children, for seniors, and for poor people. Not the middle class. Poor people. And I call it just like that. I don't say that I'm trying to strengthen the middle class. I am trying to help people who are poor." In service to this goal, Wilson

---

[12] A list of all members included in the sample with reputations for primary or secondary disadvantaged group advocacy can be found in Appendix B.

has been a strong supporter of federal spending for unemployment and economic

hardship, and advocated for the creation of a program to improve worker training efforts.

Reputation for Disadvantaged Group Advocacy in Congress, 1992-2012

In each Congress evaluated between 1992 and 2012, a sizeable number of

legislators formulated at least some portion of their reputation around representing

disadvantaged groups. As seen in Figure 3.2, between 37 and 57% of members of

Congress have a reputation as a primary, secondary, or superficial advocate for a

disadvantaged group in any given term. The highest percentage of members with a

reputation for disadvantaged group advocacy was in the 108th Congress, with the lowest

coming in the 113th Congress.

Figure 3.2. Disadvantaged Group Advocacy in Congress

Percentage of members of Congress with a reputation for group advocacy in the 103rd, 105th, 108th, 110th, and 113th Congresses.

Consistently, across all Congresses, there were higher percentages of superficial

advocates than primary or secondary advocates, with the smallest percentage of members

having a reputation for primary advocacy. The percentage of members with a reputation for superficial group advocacy largely follows the trajectory seen across all advocates, peaking in the 108th Congress and then declining over time. The rates of primary and secondary advocacy remained largely constant across the sample of Congresses studied. This demonstrates that while there is a small but consistent block of members who root a considerable portion of their reputation in serving disadvantaged groups, bigger changes over time are driven by those who exhibit superficial advocacy.

VARIATION IN REPUTATIONS FOR ADVOCACY ACROSS GROUPS

There has also been variation over time in the percentage of members with a reputation for advocacy on behalf of any given disadvantaged group. Figure 3.3 shows the group-specific breakdown in advocacy in each of the sampled Congresses. In each Congress, more members incorporate advocacy on behalf of the poor into their legislative reputations than that of any other group, but there have been large swings in how many members have taken on this advocacy role. Given the centrality of economic concerns to the work within Congress, it makes sense that advocacy on behalf of the poor would be consistently at the top amongst other disadvantaged groups. Additionally, for much of the last century, there has been a broad consensus in Congress that the federal government should play at least some role in assisting those who are economically disadvantaged (even if the scope and means of that assistance has been fiercely debated.)

Behind the poor, veterans and seniors tend to be the groups that members of Congress are the next most likely to cultivate a reputation around serving.[13] Veterans,

---

[13] The exception to this is the 103rd Congress. This was the Congress elected during 1992, frequently referred to as the "Year of the Woman." Women's issues were at the forefront following the harsh

seniors, and the poor are largely viewed sympathetically by the American public at large, so it is in line with theoretical predictions that higher percentages of members would choose to base at least some part of their legislative reputations around serving these groups. The LGBTQ community has tended to see the lowest percentages of group advocates within Congress.

Figure 3.3. Members of Congress with Reputation as Disadvantaged Group Advocate

Percentage of members of Congress with reputations as an advocate for the poor, women, racial/ethnic minorities, veterans, seniors, the LGBTQ community, or immigrants in the 103rd, 105th, 108th, 110th, and 113th Congresses.

Despite this consistency in which groups have the highest and the lowest percentages of members of Congress with reputations advocating on their behalf, there is considerable jostling amongst the middle ranks. This variability, in conjunction with the changes in magnitude across Congresses, demonstrates that there is considerably more to be understood about when members of Congress choose to cultivate a reputation around working on behalf of disadvantaged groups. It also highlights the importance of

treatment of Anita Hill by an all-male Judiciary Committee during the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings, and the number of women serving in Congress surged dramatically following the 1992 election.

determining which groups are most likely to be the beneficiaries of these advocacy

efforts, and what other factors can affect this over time.

It is also important to note that advocacy on behalf of these disadvantaged groups

does not always exist in isolation. Rather, there are a number of members with

reputations rooted in the advocacy of a number of different disadvantaged groups,

sometimes with equal intensity and sometimes not. Twenty percent of sampled members

who have fostered reputations for serving one disadvantaged group also have a reputation

for advocating for another. Table 3.1 displays the correlations between member

reputations as advocates on behalf of different groups.

This table shows the linkages between reputations for advocacy across groups.

The strongest significant relationship exists between advocates for the poor and

advocates for racial and ethnic minorities, implying that it is not uncommon for members

with a reputation as an advocate for one to also have a reputation as an advocate for the

other. There are also notable ties between reputations for advocating for the poor and

reputations for advocating for women and seniors. A reputation for advocating for

women is also linked to reputations for LGBTQ

Table 3.1. Correlations between Reputations for Advocacy of Disadvantaged Groups

	Poor	Women	Racial/Ethnic Minorities	Veterans	LGBTQ	Seniors	Immigrants
Poor	1.00	**0.12**	**0.22**	**0.05**	**0.05**	**0.18**	**0.06**
Women	**0.12**	1.00	**0.13**	<0.00	**0.12**	**0.09**	**0.06**
Racial/Ethnic Minorities	**0.22**	**0.13**	1.00	-0.01	**0.07**	**0.07**	**0.14**
Veterans	**0.05**	<0.00	<0.00	1.00	0.01	0.03	<0.01
LGBTQ	**0.05**	**0.12**	**0.07**	0.01	1.00	0.02	**0.07**
Seniors	**0.18**	**0.09**	**0.07**	0.03	0.02	1.00	-0.02
Immigrants	**0.06**	**0.06**	**0.14**	<0.01	**0.07**	-0.02	1.00

Pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients showing the relationship between holding reputations for advocacy across different disadvantaged groups. Statistically significant correlations (alpha=0.05) are in bold face. N=2675

advocacy. Additionally, there is a statistically significant relationship between reputations for advocating for racial and ethnic minorities and those for advocating on behalf of immigrants.

PARTY AFFILIATION AND REPUTATION FOR GROUP ADVOCACY

Given the bonds between many of these disadvantaged groups and the general Democratic Party coalition, it is tempting to dismiss the formation of a reputation as a group advocate as a purely Democratic phenomenon. But in fact, these reputations are held by both Democratic and Republican members of Congress. While Democrats are considerably more likely to formulate such a reputation, with 59% of the Democrats sampled holding reputations at least partially based on advocating for disadvantaged groups, a non-negligible percentage of Republicans do as well. About a third of the Republicans sampled (33%) had primary, secondary, or superficial reputations for working on behalf of the disadvantaged. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the breakdown by group of the reputations for advocacy among Democrats and Republicans.

These figures are interesting for revealing both the variation between the parties as to which groups members seek to incorporate as a part of their legislative reputation, as well as the similarities. Again, Democrats in the sample are nearly twice as likely to have advocating for at least one disadvantaged group as a part of their reputation than Republicans. But among just those instances in which some portion of a member's legislative reputation is devoted to advocating for the disadvantaged, there are a surprising number of similarities. Roughly the same percentage of Democratic and Republican advocates focus their efforts on behalf of women, the poor, and seniors, with

Democrats slightly more likely to have reputations around advocating for the poor, and

Republicans slightly more likely to advocate for seniors. There is also almost no

difference in the percentage of Democrats and Republicans with reputations for

Figure 3.4. Disadvantaged Group Advocacy among Democrats, 1992-2012

Breakdown by group of all instances of reputations formed around advocating for disadvantaged groups among Democrats.

Figure 3.5. Disadvantaged Group Advocacy among Republicans, 1992-2012

Breakdown by group of all instances of reputations formed around advocating for disadvantaged groups among Republicans.

advocating for immigrants and the LGBTQ community.

Given the large differences between the Republican and Democratic coalitions and their corresponding policy agendas, this level of agreement is somewhat surprising. Amongst those who advocate for disadvantaged groups, there is a considerable amount of cross-party agreement in terms of which groups are incorporated into some portion of a member's reputation. This demonstrates some of the advantages of using a method of operationalization that focuses on intent, rather than means. Democrats and Republicans may have very different approaches to how best to advocate on behalf of these disadvantaged groups, but the efforts of each are still recognized.

There are also some noteworthy points of departure between the two parties. The biggest difference in reputation formation comes in the advocacy on behalf of racial and ethnic minorities. While for Democrats serving as an advocate for racial and ethnic minorities is the second most common reputation to hold, among Republicans it is one of the least common. When it comes to Republicans, however, a considerably higher portion of Republicans incorporate advocacy on behalf of veterans into their legislative reputations than is true of Democrats.

Finally, there are additional differences in the levels of advocacy that Republicans and Democrats tend to engage in. Nearly 21% of Democrats with a reputation for disadvantaged group advocacy are primary advocates, while this is true for only 6% of Republicans. Democrats are also more likely to be secondary advocates, with 45% of Democrats in the sample meeting this criteria, compared to only 26% of Republicans. Republicans are slightly more likely than Democrats to have reputations for superficial advocacy alone, by a margin of 80% to 73%.

Distinctions in the number of members with reputations for group advocacy exist

not only between members with different party affiliations, but also between members

serving in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Figure 3.6 shows the percentage

of members in each chamber with reputations for disadvantaged group advocacy for each

of the five Congresses in the sample. Generally speaking, there are a higher percentage

of senators possessing these reputations in any given Congress than there are members of

the House of Representatives. On average, 53% of senators form some portion of their

legislative reputation around serving the disadvantaged, while the same is true for only

45% of members of the House. This general difference in the percentage of members in

each chamber with reputations as disadvantaged group advocates matches with the

general understanding of senators as generalists, while House members tend to specialize.

But how does this break down across levels of advocacy?

Figure 3.6. All Disadvantaged Group Advocates across Chambers

Percentage of members of the House and Senate by Congress with a reputation for primary, secondary, or superficial advocacy on behalf of disadvantaged groups.

Figure 3.7 shows the percentage of members in the House and the Senate with a reputation as primary, secondary, and superficial advocates for disadvantaged groups. Here, too, the general divergences between the two chambers tend to comport with expectations around the percentage of their reputations that senators devote to a single group or issue relative to members of the House. A higher percentage of senators have a reputation of superficial advocacy than House members, with their profiles making note of only a single action or general representational statement on behalf the group. This matches with the picture of senators as more likely to weigh in on a broad array of issues, and less likely to devote high proportions of their representational energy to a single group. Reputations for secondary advocacy are roughly the same across the two chambers, while a higher percentage of House members hold reputations as primary advocates for disadvantaged groups.

Figure 3.7. Types of Advocates across Chambers

Percentage of senators and members of the House of Representatives with a reputation for primary, secondary, and superficial disadvantaged group advocacy in the 103rd, 105th, 108th, 110th, and 113th Congresses.

To this point, differences between the House and the Senate largely align with what would be expected just given broad tendencies towards specialization or generalization respectively within those chambers. But this story changes somewhat when considering reputations for advocacy broken down by group, as seen in Figure 3.8. Across a number of these groups, the same general patterns hold, with the Senate tending to have more members with reputations for advocacy in total, but most of that boost coming from superficial and secondary advocates. Similarly, for most disadvantaged groups, higher percentages of members with primary reputations for advocacy are found in the House.

Figure 3.8. Reputations for Advocacy in each Chamber across Groups

Percentage of members of the House and Senate with reputations for primary, secondary, and superficial advocacy broken out across disadvantaged groups. Data includes members of the 103rd, 105th, 108th, 110th, and 113th Congresses.

It is the deviations, however, that stand out the most. The most glaring of these is the difference between the House and the Senate in the percentage of members with reputations for advocating on behalf of racial and ethnic minorities. There are considerably more members with a reputation for primary advocacy in the House, but the

discrepancy goes well beyond this. Members of the House also outstrip senators in terms of reputations for secondary and superficial advocacy as well. In addition to this, there are also more members of the House with reputations for advocating on behalf of veterans, immigrants, and the poor, but the bulk of the differences are accounted for by higher numbers of primary advocates in the House. However, there are a few groups with a higher percentage of advocates in the Senate than in the House. Women and seniors have had a larger percentage of senators with a reputation for working for them than House members.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I describe legislative reputations and make a case for why they are important, as well as introduce my original measure operationalizing reputation. A member's legislative reputation offers a concise way of summarizing their work within the legislature, and provides a realistic way of understanding the representational relationship between a member and their constituents. There are three essential characteristics to a legislative reputation. A reputation is more than just the sum of individual actions, and does not require any one specific, singular action to have occurred. Reputations are formed through the observation and interpretation of others, and only stick when they have been deemed credible by these observers.

Members have strong incentives for seeking to craft their own legislative reputations. First, members know that constituents have limited political knowledge, and while they may not be aware of specific actions that a member takes while in Congress, it is more likely that they can gain a general sense of a member's priorities through the way that member is talked about. Second, a considerable percentage of individuals root their

political decisions in a group-based understanding of politics. Thus, developing

reputations around group advocacy provides a common denominator through which

members can communicate their efforts to constituents. Finally, members generally must

play the long game to be effective in Congress, and creating legislative reputations assists

them in claiming political "turf" and maintaining and growing issue coalitions over time.

For this project, I created an original variable that utilized member profiles from

Congressional Quarterly's *Politics in America* to determine what portion of a member's

legislative reputation is rooted in advocacy on behalf of disadvantaged groups. The

dataset includes a sampling of five Congresses in session from January, 1993 – January,

2015. The variable is an ordinal ranking of reputation ranging from no advocacy, to

superficial advocacy, to secondary advocacy, to primary advocacy.

Between 40-50% of members tend to incorporate disadvantaged group advocacy

into some portion of their reputation in a given Congress. The highest percentage of

these advocates have a reputation for superficial advocacy, with the smallest percentage

serving as primary advocates. There are some changes over time in where different

disadvantaged groups tend to rank in levels of representation, but the poor consistently

have the highest percentage of members offering at least superficial advocacy. While

more Democrats craft reputations around serving disadvantaged groups, a considerable

number of Republicans do as well. Generally speaking, senators have higher levels of

disadvantaged group advocacy overall, but it is driven by higher percentages of

superficial advocates, while the House has considerably more members with reputations

as primary advocates. An important break in these patterns comes in members who

advocate for racial and ethnic minorities—this is considerably less common in the

Senate, across all levels of advocacy.

CHAPTER 4: THE CHOICE TO BE A DISADVANTAGED GROUP ADVOCATE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

Members of Congress cultivate legislative reputations as a means of signaling to their constituents what their representational priorities are and the type of work that they've been doing during their time in Congress. As shown in the last chapter, there are certain members of Congress that choose to build these reputations around serving disadvantaged groups in particular. While these reputations can vary in terms of which group on whose behalf a member chooses to act or exactly how central a particular disadvantaged group is to that reputation, there are a select group of members that make that choice consistently, across time and party lines. So, why do members do this? What factors contribute to a member's choice to devote at least some notable portion of their legislative reputation to serving the disadvantaged?

In this chapter, I explore what drives members of Congress to form reputations as advocates for the disadvantaged. In particular, I investigate the role that disadvantaged group size within a district, the district ambient temperature toward a group (the general group affect), and personal experience as a group member have on a member's choice to cultivate a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate. To start, I will describe in greater detail the construction of these primary explanatory variables of interest. Next, I analyze their effects using a series of generalized ordered logistic regression models. In this analysis, I determine the impact of group size, ambient temperature, and other relevant variables on member reputation for different levels of disadvantaged group

advocacy, both individually and in a comprehensive model. Finally, I use these models

to evaluate the role of the advocacy window, as described in Chapter 2.

Group Size

As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the primary hypotheses is that a large group

presence in a district will make it more likely that a member will form a reputation

around serving that group. This hypothesis is derived directly from a basic understanding

of how a democratic republic *should* work; members of Congress are elected by people

back in their districts, and thus it is their responsibility to work on their behalf. And as

demonstrated in the previous chapter, this work frequently takes the form of developing a

reputation around serving the groups in their district.

MEASURING GROUP SIZE

Group size in a state or district is measured for each decade using state and

district census totals. This is determined at the unit of district/state decade to consistently

account for population shifts and changes in the number and size of districts over time.

For nearly all groups, this is a straightforward measure of the percentage of group

members in a state or district at the time of the census. Veterans are the percentage of

civilian veterans over the age of 16, seniors are the percentage of residents aged 65 or

older, immigrants are the percentage of foreign born individuals, women are the

percentage of the total population that identify as female, the poor are the percentage of

individual residents whose income is at or below the poverty line, and racial/ethnic

minorities are the percentage of residents in a district that do not identify as non-Hispanic whites.

Determining the size of the LGBTQ population in a state or district is considerably more complicated, and a perfect measure simply does not exist. The census has never included any questions about sexual orientation or gender identity at the individual level, but it does provide data about the percentage of same-sex unmarried-partner households within a state or district. The way that the Census Bureau has determined this, however, has undergone important changes over the course of the last several decades. In 1990, the Census added the category of "unmarried-partner household" for the first time, and also recorded whether that household contained an opposite-sex couple or a same-sex couple. Because same-sex marriage was not recognized at the national level until the 2013 U.S. Supreme Court decision in *United States. v. Windsor*, there has never been a formal Census report that included same-sex married couples, and households that classified themselves as same-sex married couples had their relationship type changed to unmarried-partner.[14]

Using the percentage of unmarried-partner households in a district is certainly an imperfect proxy for the percentage of LGBTQ individuals, but the lack of a superior alternative has made it the preferred measure used by social scientists (e.g., Hansen and Treul 2015; Warshaw and Rodden 2012). For this same reason, I also utilize this measure as an approximation of the percentage of LGTB Americans in the state or

---

[14] For the 1990 Census, it was assumed that individuals who returned Census forms that indicated a same-sex married couple household had made an error in recording their gender, and the Census Bureau instead recorded them as an opposite-sex married couple, rather than a same-sex unmarried partner household. This likely led some legitimate same-sex households to be improperly characterized as opposite-sex spousal households.

district, but acknowledge that it has two important shortcomings.[15] First, by definition, this measure leaves out a count of LGBTQ individuals that is not in a same-sex coupled household, and offers no insight to the percentage of transgender individuals or bisexual individuals partnered with a person of the opposite sex in a district. This undoubtedly results in an undercount relative to the actual percentage of LGBTQ individuals in a district. Second, the percentage of same-sex unmarried partner households is likely to be highly correlated with the feelings of warmth or hostility towards a group. While LGBTQ individuals exist everywhere in the country, the likelihood of being part of an "out" same-sex couple that also feels comfortable enough to identify as such on a government form is assuredly higher in a less-hostile environment. I expand further upon the consequences of this expected strong correlation in a later section discussing the relationship between group size and group ambient temperature.

Ambient Temperature

Though most Americans do not conceptualize their political beliefs and decisions on strongly ideological grounds, a large percentage of individuals do use group identities and intergroup dynamics as a way of understanding politics (Campbell et al. 1960; Green et al. 2002; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Given this centrality of group-based political attitudes, intergroup dynamics within a district can play an important role in understanding the reputations members of Congress choose to form. In particular,

---

[15] There is an important difference of note in one component of my calculation of this variable relative to previous work. While other studies have used the Census data from the 2000s and the 2010s, they have not attempted to extend this calculation back to the 1990s. For the 2000 and 2010 Census, calculations of the percentage of same-sex unmarried-partners were made at the state- and congressional district-level, while for the 1990 Census, this data is only provided at the state and selected county level. However, the data does provide the number of same-sex unmarried households according to their status as an urban or rural household. Thus, for the 1990s, I approximate the percentage of same-sex married households using state-wide urban and rural percentages weighted by the rural-to-urban composition in the district.

feelings toward different disadvantaged groups can shape the likelihood that a member

will work on their behalf. Next, I describe the operationalization of these feelings of

warmth or hostility towards a particular group—what I'm referring to as the group

ambient temperature.

MEASURING GROUP AFFECT

For this analysis, I utilize feeling thermometer scores as a measure of how the

average district resident feels about members of a particular disadvantaged group. A

feeling thermometer is a commonly used survey tool that asks respondents to rate, on a

scale from 0-100, how warmly they feel towards a particular societal group. To

demonstrate, the American National Election Study (ANES), which has included very

similar feeling thermometer questions for decades, offers the following instructions to

respondents:

> We'd also like to get your feelings about some groups in American society. When
> I read the name of a group, we'd like you to rate it with what we call a feeling
> thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees-100 degrees mean that you feel
> favorably and warm toward the group; ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean
> that you don't feel favorably towards the group and that you don't care too much
> for that group. If you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward a group you
> would rate them at 50 degrees. If we come to a group you don't know much about,
> just tell me and we'll move on to the next one. (ANES codebook)

Feeling thermometers are a simple, readily understandable way for individuals to

articulate how warmly they feel toward a particular group without needing much in the

way of political knowledge or sophistication. For this reason, feeling thermometer

ratings are preferable to other, more complex ways of attempting to determine group-

specific representational preferences. Compared to more intricate undertakings like

expressing a definitive opinion on a particular policy or political action, rating a group on

a feeling thermometer is a much more manageable task for respondents across levels of political information. This makes it less subject to top-of-the-head influences and inconsistencies than other measures. As an example, a question asking individuals to identify which groups they most want their representative to work on behalf of or asking how they would want them to allocate their time is extremely complicated, and invites greater opportunity for respondents to misunderstand the question and its intent.

Indeed, the influence of social desirability bias that is one potential downside to using a feeling thermometer is also evidence that respondents have a keen understanding of the task set before them when presented with a feeling thermometer. Social desirability bias exists when respondents answer a question in a way that they feel is most likely to be acceptable and gain the approval of others (such as the person administering the survey), rather than in accordance with their genuine sentiment. As an example, in the United States, being racist is generally considered by society at large to be a bad thing, at least over the last few decades. Thus, if an individual gives "Black Americans" a higher feeling thermometer rating than might actually be true out of a fear of being perceived negatively, that respondent clearly understands that the fundamental task of a feeling thermometer is to rate their own personal level of affinity towards members of different groups.

The range of disadvantaged groups I evaluate in this analysis runs the gamut in terms of expected social desirability bias. For instance, the poor and the LGBTQ community provoke very different levels of public support and affection, with the poor largely being well regarded[16] and the LGBTQ community being looked on with suspicion

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[16] This is true in spite of low public opinions of welfare spending or concerns about the effectiveness of the social safety net. As a group, the poor are relatively popular (Gilens 2012).

or outright animosity (particularly during the 1990s and 2000s). This results in different amounts of social pressure to positively evaluate each group. However, because this analysis focuses on differences across districts for each group rather than within-district differences across groups, it is only the relative positioning of each group in different areas of the country that is important. Additionally, because the presence of this bias would move the ratings in a consistent direction, artificially inflating the feeling thermometer scores, it actually provides a conservative test for the hypothesis that a higher ambient temperature will boost the likelihood of a member crafting a reputation around advocating on behalf of a disadvantaged group.

Using a measure of district hostility as the primary explanatory variable also eases the theoretical expectations for how transfer of knowledge occurs between a member of Congress and their constituents. In most conceptions of the representational relationship, constituents must be able to communicate their policy preferences to their member of Congress. For salient issues, particularly those coming up for a major vote, it is sensible that this communication takes place on a fine-grained level–constituents call or write into congressional offices and show up at town halls to express their opinions, and members frequently have access to internal or external polling indicating how the public feels about an issue. But when a member is considering sponsoring or cosponsoring a new policy bill, or preparing for a vote on an issue that hasn't received a great deal of public attention, it is far less likely that members have a clear, specific sense of their constituent's opinions to guide their actions. These concerns largely fade, however, when this situation is reconsidered with a district's group affects in mind. It is not unreasonable that members would have a sense of how popular certain groups of people

are back home in their district. Therefore, a member does not need to have specific

polling data on how constituents feel about a pilot program promoting minority-owned

small businesses or bill to eliminate food deserts in poor communities to have a sense of

whether or not there is political risk or political benefit to sponsoring or cosponsoring

such a piece of legislation.

Using feeling thermometer scores has a number of practical advantages as well.

Survey designers have been using feeling thermometers for decades, allowing for the

analysis of the impact of district hostility on member behavior over a broader range of

time than studies utilizing the more recent Cooperative Congressional Election Study

(CCES) or the National Annenberg Election Study (NAES) data, which tend to focus on

more policy-specific questions. The format and measurement of feeling thermometer

questions have also been remarkably consistent over time, alleviating some of the

difficulties of working with specific issue questions, where a topic might be asked about

while it is salient and actively being pursued by Congress, but then is dropped or replaced

as other issues gain more prominence. I generate estimates of state- and district-level

feeling thermometer scores using multilevel regression with poststratification.

MULTILEVEL REGRESSION WITH POSTSTRATIFICATION

Multilevel regression with poststratification (MRP) is a technique that uses

multilevel modeling and Bayesian statistics to generate estimates that are a function of

both demographic and geographic characteristics (Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2004; Lax

and Phillips 2009; Warshaw and Rodden 2012). This method combines demographic and

public opinion data to create predictions for small subsets of the population, which are

then weighted by subgroup population within a geographic area and summed for all subgroups within that area (in this case, a congressional district.) For data with an inherently hierarchical structure (as is the case for individuals within districts that are within states), multilevel models have an advantage over classical regression models. Classical regression models use either complete pooling data to generate effects (as when no district or state effects are taken into account) or no pooling (as when models include fixed effects for a respondent's state or district). Multilevel regression models allow for data to be partially pooled to a degree dictated by the data, based upon group sample size and variation. These models thus allow for the effects of demographics to vary by geography, while also pulling the estimates for states or districts with limited numbers of observations or high variance towards the mean, and allowing estimates for states and districts with more robust samples and tighter variances to be more influenced by district-specific effects.

MRP generated estimates of public opinion out-perform both disaggregated means and presidential vote share measures at the state-, congressional district-, and state senate district-levels, producing estimates that are more correlated with population means, have smaller errors, and are more reliable (Lax and Phillips 2009; Warshaw and Rodden 2012). These differences are even more apparent with the smaller sample sizes (2,500 for congressional districts) common to most national surveys. MRP estimates are also far less subject to bias than disaggregated means. Disaggregating from nationally (rather than district or state) representative samples can result in biased predictions. MRP avoids this pitfall because all estimates are weighted according to the percentage of a state or district that any particular subgroup makes up. Additionally, nonresponse bias is

less likely to influence within-group estimates for MRP relative to disaggregation because of the effects of partial pooling (Lax and Phillips 2009).

Buttice and Highton (2013) find that MRP is most effective as an estimator when higher-level variables (in this case, state or district) are strongly predictive of the concept of interest, and when there is a high level of geographic variation in the quantity being estimated.[17] To ensure the greatest level of validity and reliability in my estimates, I include a number of state- and district-level predictors with a clear theoretical tie to expected levels of warmth or hostility toward the selected disadvantaged groups. I also have a clear expectation that due to geographically-driven district heterogeneity and distinct state and district cultures, inter-district variability should be high.

MRP MODEL FOR ESTIMATING STATE AND DISTRICT AMBIENT TEMPERATURE

Data

To model individual responses, I use the National Election Study aggregated time-series data from 1992 to 2016. This dataset is intended to be nationally representative, and has a total of 24,122 observations. Given the sampling technique and relatively small sample size (relative to the CCES or the NAES), MRP is the best estimator for generating unbiased and reliable measures of district opinion. To account for over-time changes in district lines and public opinion, I model each decade separately, with 9,085 observations for the 1990s; 5,006 observations for the 2000s; and 10,031

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[17] This greater importance of constituency level variables over individual variables is also confirmed in research by Hanretty, Lauderdale, and Vivyan (2016) investigating British opinion regarding the EU.

observations for the 2010s. Feeling thermometer estimates are generated for each group in each of the three decades.

In each of these models, the dependent variable is the group feeling thermometer score. The ANES includes feeling thermometer questions for a number of societal groups, and close approximates for others. The models estimating the average district and state ambient temperature towards racial and ethnic minorities, the poor, and seniors are a direct match with the feeling thermometer question in the ANES, while the models estimating feelings towards the LGBTQ community, women, immigrants, and veterans utilize proxies. Respectively, these proxies are: lesbians and gays, feminists/women's libbers, illegal immigrants/illegal aliens, and the military.[18] With the exceptions of lesbians and gays (which could result in a slightly more positive rating by not activating biphobia or transphobia), it is likely that each of these proxies may result in a slightly lower average feeling thermometer score. However, because the later analysis focuses on cross-district differences towards each group separately rather than comparing across groups, it is not expected that this reduction in the estimated mean ambient temperature will appreciably alter the results.

The individual-level predictor variables in each of these models includes a respondent's gender (two categories: male, female)[19], race (four categories: white, black, Hispanic, other), education (five categories: less than high school completion, completed high school, some college, college graduate, graduate school), state, and congressional district. Additionally, district-level predictors (average income, percent urban, percent military, same-sex couples, percent Hispanic, and percent African American) and state-

[18] These are the group names used in the ANES survey questions.
[19] While gender is not a strictly binary concept, data constrictions require it to be treated as such for the purposes of this project.

level predictors (region, percent union, and percent Evangelical or Mormon) were obtained using decennial U.S. Census data, as well as data from the U.S. Religion Census. Survey year is also included to account for any variation in context or questions.

Model

I generate estimates of district hostility by modeling individual responses as a function of individual-level demographic characteristics as well as district- and state-level predictors. I model this as a multilevel linear regression equation, using the lmer package in R.[20] The structure of the model estimating individual feelings towards the poor is given by the following:

(1) $\qquad y_i^{ft\,poor} = \gamma_0 + \alpha_{r[i]}^{race} + \alpha_{f[i]}^{female} + \alpha_{e[i]}^{educ} + \alpha_{y[i]}^{year} + \alpha_{d[i]}^{district}$

$$\alpha_r^{race} \sim N(0, \sigma_r^2), \text{ for } r = 1, 2, 3, 4$$

$$\alpha_f^{female} \sim N(0, \sigma_f^2)$$

$$\alpha_e^{educ} \sim N(0, \sigma_e^2), \text{ for } e = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5$$

$$\alpha_p^{year} \sim N(0, \sigma_y^2), \text{ for } p = 1, 2$$

The random effects across each level of these individual predictors (e.g., all five categories of education) are modeled[21]. These effects are expected to be normally distributed with a mean of 0, and a variance determined by the data. Both the district- and state-levels model random effects for each district and state (respectively) in the

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[20] The framework for the code sequences used comes from the study replication file for Warshaw and Rodden (2012).

[21] Because gender is coded as a dichotomous dummy variable for whether or not a respondent identifies as female, only fixed effects are modeled.

dataset as well as fixed effects for the other relevant predictors, while random effects are modeled for each of the four region categories:[22]

$$\alpha_d^{district} \sim N(\kappa_{s[d]}^{state} + \gamma^{inc} * income_d + \gamma^{urban} * income_{urban} + \gamma^{mil} * military_d +$$

$$\gamma^{hisp} * hispanic_d + \gamma^{black} * black_d, \sigma_{district}^2), \text{ for } d = 1, \dots, 435$$

$$\alpha_s^{state} \sim N(\alpha_{z[s]}^{region} + \beta^{union} * union_s + \beta^{relig} * religion_s, \sigma_{state}^2), \text{ for } s = 1, \dots, 50$$

$$\alpha_z^{region} \sim N(0, \sigma_{region}^2), \text{ for } z = 1, 2, 3, 4$$

Poststratification

This model is then used to generate district hostility estimates for the average member of each of 17,400 subgroups. Each of these subgroups represents a unique combination of demographic categories by which the sample is weighted: race (4), gender (2),[23] education (5), and congressional district (435).[24] Once predictions for average feeling thermometer scores are generated for each of these subgroups (from white men with less than a high school education in the first district of Alabama to non-white, black, or Hispanic women with a graduate education in the at large district of Wyoming), these estimates are then weighted according to the proportion of a district that is composed of members of these subgroups, and summed across districts.

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[22] District-level effects are modeled for all district ambient temperature estimates, but are not included for state ambient temperature estimates.

[23] For the 1990 Census, data is not available for gender by race by education by district categories, but only for race by education by district categories, so this poststratification scheme is used for this decade instead. This reduces the total number of poststratification categories to 8700.

[24] For the state ambient temperature estimates, the demographic categories used are gender by race by education by state, resulting in a total of 2000 categories.

Formally, weighted district opinion estimates are obtained using this method:

$$(2) \qquad y_{district} = \frac{\sum_{c \in d} N_c \theta_c}{\sum_{c \in d} N_c}$$

Where c represents each of the 40 demographic subcategories (race, gender, and education) within d, a given congressional district, θ_c is the prediction associated with each subcategory, and N_c is the frequency of individuals within a district that belong to a demographic subcategory. To weight my estimates, I use the calculated frequency proportions for each demographic category in each state or district. A summary of the estimates generated is given in Table 1, and graphical illustrations of each of the estimates produced is given in the next section.

Table 4.1: Summary of Estimates for District Feeling Thermometer Ratings by Group

Group	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Seniors	1740	78.74	2.33	64.89	98.89
Veterans	2175	72.66	3.88	54.14	85.80
Poor	2175	69.35	2.96	56.91	87.05
Women	2175	56.32	3.56	41.28	72.54
Immigrants	2175	42.43	8.71	22.48	70.47
Racial/Ethnic Minorities	2175	66.09	3.23	53.42	79.76
LGBTQ	2175	47.83	7.82	25.47	77.83

Displayed are the average estimated values for the feeling thermometer scores across all congressional districts from 1992-2016. Estimates were generated using multilevel regression with poststratification. The estimate for racial/ethnic minorities is an average of the ambient temperature generated for each district for Black, Hispanic, and Asian Americans.

Group Size and Ambient Temperature: Related but Distinct Concepts

Before discussing and presenting the multivariate models exploring the factors that drive members of Congress to foster reputations as advocates of disadvantaged

groups, this section takes a quick look at the relationship between the two primary

independent variables—group size and ambient temperature—and establishes them as

related but separate concepts, each with distinct reasons for inclusion in the models to

follow.

Group size and ambient temperature are expected to be related concepts. Having

frequent interactions with a group, or having a high percentage of group members within

a district can boost the positive feelings towards that group. However, this relationship

needn't only work in a singular direction; for example, some research has shown that

when white Americans are confronted with information about increasing racial/ethnic

minority and/or immigrant populations, negative feelings towards those groups can

actually increase (Craig and Richeson 2014; Alba, Rumbaut, and Marotz 2005; Blumer

1958). Table 4.2 displays the correlations between district group size and district

ambient temperature for each of the groups whose representation is being analyzed here.

Table 4.2. Correlations between District Group Size and Group Ambient Temperature by Disadvantaged Group.

Seniors	Veterans	Poor	Women	Immigrants	Racial/Ethnic Minorities	LGBTQ
-0.0245	0.0640*	0.4477*	0.1635*	0.5334*	0.4287*	0.6319*

Note: Figure displays Pearson's r correlation coefficients of the relationship between group size and ambient temperature for each of the disadvantaged groups analyzed. Stars represent a statistical significance level of $p \geq 0.05$.

There is broad diversity across disadvantaged groups when considering the

strength of the relationship between the size of group within a district and the general

feelings towards that group. For the two groups that are broadly considered to be

deserving of government assistance, seniors and veterans, there is little to no

correlation between the two variables, with the correlation for seniors failing even to

reach conventional levels of statistical significance. These results match with

expectations–because of the high esteem these groups are held in, any variations in ambient temperature should not be related to the percentage of veterans and seniors in a district. Women also have a low correlation between ambient temperature and group size, best explained by the very small amount of variation in the percentage of women across districts. For the poor, immigrants, racial/ethnic minorities, and the LGBTQ community, there is evidence of a much stronger correlation between group size and ambient temperature. Given the higher levels of skepticism these groups face relative to groups like veterans or seniors, this relationship is expected and, as discussed above, likely is not purely linear. The correlation between the two variables for the LGBTQ community also reflects the nature of the creation of the group size variable itself, and how Census reporting for same-sex couples are likely themselves somewhat reflective of group ambient temperature. In no case, however, even for the LGBTQ community, is there evidence of even close to a perfect correlation between the two variables, as seen in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1 shows the variation in the estimated ambient temperature and group size across all congressional districts in the continental United States for the 108th Congress (Jan 2003-2005). These maps showcase both the instances of overlap in the variation in ambient temperature and group size, and the discrepancies. When considering immigrants, for example, similar bright areas in Southern California and Southern Texas display the close relationship between the percentage of and general regard for immigrants in the area. Another clear example of similarities comes in the bright green dot around San Francisco indicating both one of the higher percentages of LGBTQ individuals in the countries as well as one of the highest ambient

temperatures. For groups like women, seniors, and veterans, however, a high level of variation in the shading between each of the two maps can be seen.

Figure 4.1. Average District Ambient Temperature and Percentage of Group Members by District and Disadvantaged Group.

Note: Figure displays maps of the estimated average group ambient temperature and group size by district for the 108th Congress. Groups included in the figure racial/ethnic minorities, LGBTQ, immigrants, veterans, seniors, the poor, and women.

Though not present for all groups, the relatively high correlations between ambient temperature and group size for racial/ethnic minorities, immigrants, the poor, and LGBTQ individuals do have some ramifications for the multivariate models to follow. This multicollinearity will likely have the effect of slightly inflating the standard errors on these variables, making conventional statistical significance harder to achieve. Despite this, the strong theoretical reasons for including each of these

measures, laid out in Chapter 2, necessitate that the models contain both of them. Group size is a straightforward accounting of the number of group members who comprise a member's constituency, while ambient temperature measures how the district constituency tends to feel about a group writ large. To truly understand what drives members to make the reputational choices that they do, the impact of each of these variables must be accounted for. Including both of these variables is also necessary to evaluate the role of the ambient window, as is done towards the end of this chapter.

Modeling Reputation Formation

As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, reputation is coded as a four-category ordinal variable, ranking from Non-Advocates to Superficial Advocates to Secondary Advocates to Primary Advocates. In the remaining sections of the chapter, I analyze how group size, group ambient temperature, and other relevant explanatory variables impact the type of reputation members of Congress form. Specifically, in this chapter, I focus on the reputation formation of members of the House of Representatives, while the reputation formation of senators in considered in the following chapter. In the remainder of this section, I explain why I choose to demonstrate this relationship using generalized ordered logistic regression, or the partial proportional odds model, and then describe the remaining control variables that will be included in the model.

GENERALIZED ORDERED LOGISTIC REGRESSION

When seeking to explain the variation in an ordered dependent variable, an Ordinary Least Squares model is inappropriate, as it requires a continuous interval variable, and using multinomial logistic regression is undesirable because it discounts important information found in the ranking of the categories. Instead, I utilize a generalized ordered logit model. I make this selection over the use of an ordered logit model for statistical as well as theoretical reasons. Employing an ordered logistic regression requires that the model abide by the parallel regression assumption, or proportionality assumption (Brant, 1990). This assumption states that the relationship between each of the explanatory variables and the dependent variable cannot vary across categories of the dependent variable. In determining the primary factors involved in reputation formation, models using ordered logistic regression violate the parallel regression assumption.[25]

This violation occurs as a result of certain independent variables having an asymmetric effect on levels of reputation (Williams 2016). Theoretically, this asymmetric effect is expected—moving from having no reputation at all for group advocacy to having a reputation for occasional advocacy is a calculation that members must make that is likely different from that of moving from a reputation for occasional action to that of primary or secondary advocacy. A partial proportional odds model relaxes the parallel regression assumption, and specifically demonstrates how the relationship between the explanatory and dependent variables can change across

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[25] This violation was determined using the Brant test, which assesses both the proportionality of the effect of each independent variable across values of the dependent variable as well as the proportionality of the model as a whole.

categories, providing insight into these important asymmetries (Williams 2016). These models are calculated using the gologit2 program for Stata (Williams 2006).

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

In addition to my primary variables of interest, group size and group ambient temperature, I include a number of control variables: party affiliation, whether or not a member is in their first term in Congress, the partisan leaning of the district, and whether or not the member represents a district in the South. I also include decade fixed effects and cluster the standard errors by member. Controlling for the decade fixed effects accounts for specific time-bounded changes in what drives members to form reputations around serving disadvantaged groups. By clustering my standard errors by individual member, I avoid any artificially deflated standard errors that could arise from the same person remaining in the House across more than one Congress in the sample.

First and foremost, I control for the party of the representative, coded as a dichotomous variable.[26] Given the centrality of partisan concerns in the U.S. Congress and the differences between the electoral coalitions of the Democratic and Republican Parties, understanding party-specific differences is crucial. As seen in the previous chapter, while both Democrats and Republicans do form these reputations for disadvantaged group advocacy, the phenomenon is more common among members of the Democratic caucus. Thus, even with other factors accounted for, I expect that Democrats in Congress are going to be more likely to form a reputation around advocating for

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[26] The few Independent members of the House included in the dataset are coded in accordance with the major party they chose to caucus with.

disadvantaged groups than Republicans, particularly for those groups for whom government intervention is generally viewed with more skepticism.

I include a dichotomous variable in the model indicating if a member is in their first term in the House for two reasons. First, members who have just won their first term in the House simply haven't had enough time to develop a strong legislative reputation as an advocate for disadvantaged groups. Reputation building requires a pattern of behaviors and interactions, in which new members have not had the opportunity to engage. Second, practically speaking, *Politics in America* devotes less space to first-term members than to members that have at least one full congressional session under their belt, meaning there is also less available information that is written about them.[27] For these reasons, the coefficient on this variable is expected to indicate a strongly negative effect on whether a member has a reputation for disadvantaged group advocacy.

I control for the partisan leaning of the district by including a measure of the two-party vote share that the Democratic presidential candidate received in the most recent presidential election. I expect that the more Democratic a district is, the more likely it is that a member will have a reputation for disadvantaged group advocacy. Finally, I also control for regional effects by including a dummy variable for whether or not a district is located in the South. I define South as including the original former Confederate states, as well as states bordering the former confederate states. These states include: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. I expect

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[27] First term members usually receive a profile of only one page in length, rather than the two that is generally standard for other members. This difference is reflective of the reality that these new members simply haven't yet had the chance to fully establish themselves in the legislature in the same fashion as members with a longer tenure in the institution.

that the political culture will generally make members representing districts within these states less likely to form a reputation around advocating for disadvantaged groups, and that these effects will be most acute for disadvantaged groups that are not highly regarded in the country at large.

Group Size, Ambient Temperature, and Member Reputation

In this section, I investigate the independent relationships between group size and then ambient temperature on member reputation, after taking into account all of the alternative variables listed above. Understanding each of these variables can provide valuable insight into how group size and group affect within a state or district influences the representational choices members of Congress make. Following from the basic expectations of republican governance, wherein an individual is elected by a set of constituents to act in accordance with their interests, it is expected that group size will have a positive relationship with member reputation. Members of the House of Representatives with a reputation for serving as a group advocate are more likely to come from a district with a large number of group members than a district with very little group presence. Given how inherent this is to the fundamental notion of representation, this should be true regardless of how deserving of government assistance a group is considered to be. Ambient temperature is also expected to have a generally positive effect on the likelihood of members forming reputations as group advocates. However, these effects should be the most apparent for groups that are considered to be less deserving of government assistance.

Tables 4.3 - 4.5 present the results of the generalized ordered logistic regression models with reputation for disadvantaged group advocacy as the dependent variable of interest. Each group has three models (0, 1, and 2), which contain important information about how the independent variables can asymmetrically impact the likelihood of a member having a certain kind of reputation.[28] The dichotomous variable indicating whether or not a member was just elected to their first term in Congress is modeled as a having parallel proportional effects,[29] while all other explanatory variables are modeled with partial proportional effects. Model 0 demonstrates how group size and the other independent variables impact the likelihood of a member shifting from having no reputation for group advocacy at all to having some kind of reputation for advocacy. The likelihood of moving from no advocacy or superficial advocacy to secondary or primary advocacy is shown in Model 1, and the shift from one of the lower levels of advocacy to primary group advocacy is presented in Model 2. Breaking the models up in this way allows for differential impacts of the explanatory variables to account for the variation in representational levels. I will next evaluate all of the groups in turn to determine the impact of disadvantaged group size and ambient temperature on the reputation a member of Congress formulates.

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[28] The exception to this are the models for LGBTQ advocacy. The exceedingly small number of cases of members with a reputation as a primary advocate for LGBTQ individuals makes the calculated coefficients for the terms demonstrating the relationship between the independent variables and the likelihood of holding a reputation as a primary advocate rather than any of the other categories unreliable. For this reason, the categories for primary and secondary advocates have been collapsed together. Thus, for the LGBTQ analysis, only Model 0 and Model 1 are presented.

[29] The use of parallel proportional effects for this variable acknowledges the strong negative effect of a member being in their first term on reputation formation, particularly at the two highest levels of advocacy. Because there are no incoming members with reputations for primary or secondary group advocacy, the partial proportional effects cannot be calculated.

VETERANS AND SENIORS

The impact of the percentage of veterans and seniors in a district on member reputation is presented in Table 4.3. Across nearly all levels, group size has a positive and significant effect on the type of reputation a member forms. As expected, even for groups that are considered to be broadly deserving of government assistance across the U.S., members representing districts with higher quantities of group members are more likely to form reputations around advocating on their behalf. For veterans, group size has a significant impact on all shifts across levels of reputation. Seniors exhibit the same pattern when moving from a non-advocate to an advocate and when shifting to develop a reputation as a primary or secondary advocate from non- or superficial advocacy. However, a higher percentage of seniors in a district did not significantly push members from the lower levels of advocacy into primary advocacy. Florida's 5th district, for example, has consistently had one of the highest percentages of seniors in a Congressional district since the 1990s. Rep. Karen Thurman (D-FL5), who served in the 1990s, and Rep. Ginny Brown-Waite (R-FL5), who won the seat in the 108th Congress (during the 2002 elections), each developed reputations for superficial advocacy of seniors during their time in office.

Different patterns are evident when examining the role of group ambient temperature. Warmer feelings towards veterans within a district has a positive and statistically significant impact on a member having a reputation around advocating for veterans, regardless of the level of advocacy. For seniors, however, group ambient temperature has no significant effect on member reputation. In the models including

Table 4.3. Group Size, Ambient Temperature and Member Reputation for Advocacy for Veterans and Seniors.

	Veterans						Seniors					
	0	1	2	0	1	2	0	1	2	0	1	2
Group Size	0.210	0.262	0.399	--	--	--	0.093	0.121	0.082	--	--	--
	0.00	0.00	0.00				0.00	0.00	0.54			
Ambient Temperature	--	--	--	0.09	0.17	0.18	--	--	--	-0.02	0.06	-0.10
				0.00	0.00	0.05				0.66	0.44	0.57
Republican	-0.466	-0.814	-1.148	-0.157	-0.425	-0.262	-0.830	-1.123	-1.733	-0.721	-0.929	-1.565
	0.02	0.02	0.13	0.41	0.20	0.63	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.05
Dem Pres Vote	0.000	0.018	0.061	0.002	0.030	0.072	-0.002	-0.019	-0.075	0.015	-0.003	-0.088
	0.99	0.42	0.23	0.85	0.16	0.11	0.86	0.34	0.22	0.20	0.89	0.15
South	0.185	0.590	0.512	0.028	0.363	0.544	-0.118	-0.215	-1.550	0.025	-0.199	-1.586
	0.38	0.19	0.38	0.91	0.46	0.42	0.53	0.49	0.13	0.91	0.63	0.10
1990s	-1.319	-1.126	-1.649	-0.346	0.322	-0.048	-0.217	-0.334	-1.227	-0.578	-0.770	-1.605
	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.25	0.57	0.96	0.11	0.24	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.02
2000s	-0.938	-0.671	-1.594	0.217	0.941	0.618	--	--	--	--	--	--
	0.00	0.09	0.02	0.33	0.01	0.28						
First Term	-1.056			-0.920			-1.020			-0.834		
	0.00			0.00			0.00			0.00		
Constant	-3.669	-6.611	-11.207	-8.595	-17.650	-21.992	-2.495	-3.143	-0.973	-0.719	-7.104	8.840
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.68	0.80	0.26	0.56
N	2175			2175			2175			2175		
Wald's Chi ^{2}	95.6			90.1			68.9			70.3		
Pseudo R^2	0.0651			0.0388			0.0436			0.0414		

Note: Coefficients calculated using generalized ordered logistic regression, with First Term modeled as a parallel proportional term and the rest of the independent variables modeled as partial proportional terms. Standard errors are clustered by member, and p-values are in grey. Model 0 represents the likelihood of a shift from no advocacy to superficial, secondary, or primary advocacy; Model 1 is no advocacy or superficial advocacy to primary or secondary advocacy; and Model 2 is any of the lower categories of advocacy to primary advocacy. Feeling thermometer questions for seniors were not included in the ANES of the 2010s, so the decade base category for seniors is the 2000s.

ambient temperature, the role of party affiliation is also different for seniors and for

veterans. Once the ambient temperature for veterans is taken into account, members of

Congress from both parties are equally likely to form reputations as advocates. This is

different when considering members with reputations around advocating for seniors, where Democrats still have a statistically significant advantage. Given that both of these groups are considered to have high levels of deservingness of government assistance, this discrepancy is intriguing. This difference is likely attributable to the close ties between seniors' issues and Social Security and Medicare, which in turn are also more closely bound to the Democratic Party.

When it comes to group size, for both veterans and seniors, Republicans are significantly less likely to form reputations as group advocates than are Democratic members. So, while a larger share of Republican members with reputations for disadvantaged group advocacy are advocates for veterans and seniors relative to Democrats, Democratic members are still more likely to have formed these reputations on the whole. After other factors are accounted for, the partisan lean of the district and presence in the South do not have a significant impact on whether or not a member forms their reputation around advocating on behalf of veterans or seniors. Members of Congress were significantly less likely to have reputations for veterans' advocacy in the 1990s and 2000s compared to the current decade, which may be due to a recent acknowledgement of the challenges facing veterans returning from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

LGBTQ AND RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES

The LGBTQ community and racial/ethnic minorities are disadvantaged groups that are generally considered to be less deserving of government assistance, and it is expected that both the size of the group in the district and the group ambient temperature

will make it more likely that a member will have a reputation around serving as a group advocate. As seen in Table 4.4, both group size and ambient temperature do have the expected positive and significant effect on member reputation. Unlike with seniors, where group size is not significantly related to the decision to serve as a primary group advocate and group affect has no significant determinative effect on reputation formation, decisions about advocacy for less highly regarded groups such as the LGBTQ community and racial/ethnic minorities are significantly related to these variables. When ambient temperature and group size are modeled separately, higher values of each increases the likelihood that a member will have a reputation for group advocacy. This is true across nearly all levels of advocacy.[30]

Republican members of Congress are significantly less likely to form reputations around advocating for racial/ethnic minorities and the LGBTQ community. This is in accordance with the breakdowns by party shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.5–considerably fewer Republicans hold reputations as advocates for racial/ethnic minorities and LGBTQ individuals than Democrats. Though less common, Republican representatives are not wholly immune to the effects of group size or ambient temperature. Ray LaHood (R-IL18), for instance, began to be known as a superficial advocate for racial/ethnic minorities (particularly those of Middle Eastern descent) in the 2000s, after the ambient temperature of his district increased by nearly a full standard deviation in the wake of redistricting.

Region, however, has slightly different effects on the advocacy of racial/ethnic minorities and the LGTBQ community. When other explanatory variables are taken into

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[30] The ambient temperature does meet the threshold of a one-tailed significance test when considering the shift from non- or superficial advocacy for the LGBTQ community to primary or secondary advocacy.

Table 4.4. Group Size, Ambient Temperature and Member Reputation for Advocacy for Racial/Ethnic Minorities and the LGBTQ Community.

	LGBTQ				Race/Ethnicity					
	0	1	0	1	0	1	2	0	1	2
Group Size	1.824	3.805	--	--	0.051	0.064	0.054	--	--	--
	0.01	0.03			0.00	0.00	0.00			
Ambient Temperature	--	--	0.07	0.11	--	--	--	0.22	0.24	0.22
			0.01	0.08				0.00	0.00	0.00
Republican	-1.553	-2.319	-1.848	-2.270	-1.929	-2.116	-2.758	-2.522	-3.172	-3.779
	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
Dem Pres Vote	0.057	0.092	0.045	0.059	-0.027	-0.043	-0.041	-0.013	-0.016	-0.021
	0.12	0.04	0.20	0.27	0.11	0.05	0.07	0.38	0.43	0.40
South	--	--	--	--	-0.007	0.079	0.176	0.261	0.417	0.408
					0.98	0.82	0.66	0.29	0.19	0.27
1990s	1.014	4.552	0.429	1.421	1.148	0.943	0.098	1.641	1.402	0.684
	0.06	0.14	0.45	0.21	0.00	0.00	0.81	0.00	0.00	0.12
2000s	-0.226	2.809	0.123	1.189	1.301	1.090	0.151	1.696	1.719	0.940
	0.60	0.23	0.82	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.67	0.00	0.00	0.01
First Term	-1.348		-1.411		-1.882			-1.705		
	0.08		0.06		0.00			0.00		
Constant	-7.956	-14.778	-9.861	-14.065	-2.867	-3.683	-3.752	-16.683	-18.497	-17.114
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	2175		2175		2175			2175		
Wald's Chi ^{2}	34.7		38.1		367.4			226.1		
Pseudo R^2	0.1889		0.1335		0.3048			0.1791		

Note: Coefficients calculated using generalized ordered logistic regression, with First Term modeled as a parallel proportional term and the rest of the independent variables modeled as partial proportional terms. Standard errors are clustered by member, and p-values are in grey. Model 0 represents the likelihood of a shift from no advocacy to superficial, secondary, or primary advocacy; Model 1 is no advocacy or superficial advocacy to primary or secondary advocacy; and Model 2 is any of the lower categories of advocacy to primary advocacy. No LGBTQ member advocates come from the South, so the variable is excluded on the basis of perfect prediction. Because there is only a single member included in the sample with a primary reputation for LGBTQ advocacy, Model 2 cannot be reliably calculated for this group. For the LGBTQ analyses, reputations for primary and secondary advocacy have been collapsed into single category.

account, whether or not a member represents a district in the South does not have a

significant impact on forming a reputation as an advocate for racial/ethnic minorities.

However, because there are zero members of Congress representing southern districts with a reputation for LGBTQ advocacy, the precise effects of region cannot be calculated, on account of perfect prediction.

There also exists an interesting difference between representation of the LGBTQ community and racial/ethnic minorities when considering the impact of the partisan leaning of the district. When group ambient temperature is taken into account, the partisan leaning of a district does not significantly impact reputation formation as an advocate of racial/ethnic minorities or LGBTQ individuals. But when group size is considered in place of ambient temperature, partisan leaning works in opposite directions for LGBTQ folks and racial/ethnic minorities. While partisan leaning does not have a significant effect on whether or not a member shifts from being a non-advocate to having a reputation as some level of group advocate, it does have significant impact on the move from non- or superficial advocacy to primary or secondary advocacy. After controlling for the size of the LGBTQ community in a district, members coming from more Democratic districts are *more* likely to have a reputation as a primary or secondary advocate. However, members from heavily Democratic districts are *less* likely to have a reputation as an advocate for racial/ethnic minorities once racial composition of a district is accounted for.

IMMIGRANTS AND THE POOR

Immigrants and the poor are groups that hold a complicated place in the American mind. Many people are highly sympathetic to the poor while simultaneously treating with great skepticism those who access our welfare systems, and immigrants hold dual

roles in the national zeitgeist of both heroic ancestor and multicultural villain. For each

of these two disadvantaged groups, district group size and ambient temperature have a

significant, positive relationship with the likelihood of members having a reputation for

group advocacy, as seen in Table 4.5. The single apparent exception to this comes when

considering members with a primary reputation for serving the poor—group ambient

temperature does not have a statistically significant effect on this final move up the

ladder, implying that other conditions are the driving force for this last step. Major

Owens (D-NY11) is an example of someone who made the decision to form a reputation

as a secondary advocate for the poor during the 1990s, pushing for increases in the

minimum wage and boosts for other social programs. His district fell just outside of the

top 10th percentile for the percentage of people in poverty, but had the second highest

ambient temperature towards the poor of any other district in the sample.

Across all levels of advocacy, Republican members of Congress are significantly

less likely to have a reputation as an advocate for those in poverty. In contrast, this effect

is less consistent for members with reputations as immigrant advocates. After immigrant

ambient temperature is held constant, Republicans are not significantly less likely to be

primary or secondary advocates for immigrants. Particularly considering the time period

under consideration, this difference fits with the general perceptions of the party

identities—despite some more recent changes, immigration had long been considered to

be a fairly bipartisan issue. And once again, members in their first term are significantly

less likely to have a reputation for disadvantaged group advocacy.

Table 4.5. Group Size, Ambient Temperature and Member Reputation for Advocacy for Immigrants and the Poor.

	Immigrants						Poor					
	0	1	2	0	1	2	0	1	2	0	1	2
Group Size	0.111	0.149	0.214	--	--	--	0.067	0.094	0.107	--	--	--
	0.00	0.00	0.00				0.00	0.00	0.00			
Ambient Temperature	--	--	--	0.09	0.13	0.16	--	--	--	0.06	0.13	0.07
				0.00	0.00	0.06				0.05	0.00	0.31
Republican	-0.635	-0.570	-2.518	-1.044	-0.551	-1.380	-1.136	-1.818	-2.037	-1.385	-2.217	-2.624
	0.04	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.36	0.51	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Dem Pres Vote	-0.079	-0.080	-0.213	-0.014	0.016	-0.017	0.021	0.016	0.002	0.012	0.002	-0.001
	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.56	0.74	0.86	0.04	0.22	0.96	0.25	0.91	0.97
South	-0.325	-0.578	-2.365	-0.084	0.044	-0.689	-0.362	-0.833	-0.833	-0.311	-0.835	-0.498
	0.40	0.32	0.01	0.84	0.96	0.72	0.03	0.00	0.22	0.08	0.00	0.46
1990s	-0.055	0.004	0.241	0.367	0.248	0.623	0.582	0.582	-0.697	0.558	0.615	-0.806
	0.85	0.99	0.62	0.21	0.54	0.64	0.00	0.01	0.08	0.00	0.01	0.07
2000s	-0.001	0.200	-0.988	-0.123	-0.116	-0.583	0.735	0.659	0.176	0.708	0.810	0.057
	1.00	0.54	0.10	0.56	0.64	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.58	0.00	0.00	0.90
First Term	-2.000			-1.621			-1.222			-1.212		
	0.00			0.00			0.00			0.00		
Constant	-0.020	-2.174	3.013	-5.697	-10.510	-10.221	-3.039	-4.204	-4.506	-5.446	-11.104	-7.545
	0.99	0.32	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.16
N	2175			2175			2175			2175		
Wald's Chi ^{2}	307.2			122.6			257.0			212.6		
Pseudo R^2	0.2851			0.1166			0.1229			0.1011		

Note: Coefficients calculated using generalized ordered logistic regression, with First Term modeled as a parallel proportional term and the rest of the independent variables modeled as partial proportional terms. Standard errors are clustered by member, and p-values are in grey. Model 0 represents the likelihood of a shift from no advocacy to superficial, secondary, or primary advocacy; Model 1 is no advocacy or superficial advocacy to primary or secondary advocacy; and Model 2 is any of the lower categories of advocacy to primary advocacy.

The negative effects on likelihood of reputation formation of coming from a southern district are particularly strong when considering advocates for the poor, and more mixed for those with reputations as advocates for immigrants. Partisan lean of a district also has a different effect for each of these two groups. When ambient

temperature is accounted for in the model, partisan leaning does not have a statistically significant effect on reputation formation for either group. For the poor, more Democratic leaning districts are more likely to push members to form superficial reputations for working on behalf of the group, but do not have a significant effect on reputations for higher levels of advocacy. The pattern for immigrants, however, is more similar to that of racial/ethnic minorities—after controlling for the percentage of immigrants in a district, more Democratic-leaning districts are actually less likely to produce members with reputations as immigrant advocates.

WOMEN

Women are particularly unique among the disadvantaged groups studied in this project, both because of their limited variation in group size across districts, and because their size is near or above a majority of individuals in all districts. Based on size alone, one could argue that building a reputation around advocating on behalf of women would be a winning strategy for all members of Congress, and yet very few members choose to foster such a reputation. As seen in Table 4.6, the percentage of women in the district has no statistically significant impact on the likelihood of a member having a reputation as a women's advocate. Group ambient temperature does have significant effect on reputation formation, but the effect is nuanced. Higher ambient temperatures towards women have a significant impact on the shift from having a reputation as a non-advocate towards being an advocate at any level, even if superficial, but it is not a significant driving force behind the move to secondary or primary advocacy.

Table 4.6. Group Size, Ambient Temperature and Member Reputation for Advocacy for Women.

	Women					
	0	1	2	0	1	2
Group Size	0.016	-0.098	0.050	--	--	--
	0.78	0.29	0.81			
Ambient Temperature	--	--	--	0.05	0.03	0.01
				0.05	0.22	0.92
Republican	-0.826	-1.342	-2.135	-0.766	-1.277	-2.253
	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01
Dem Pres Vote	0.054	0.069	0.086	0.047	0.063	0.102
	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01
South	-0.554	-1.054	-1.612	-0.550	-1.039	-1.613
	0.05	0.03	0.18	0.05	0.04	0.17
1990s	0.704	0.272	0.062	0.702	0.306	0.374
	0.00	0.33	0.93	0.00	0.30	0.50
2000s	0.631	-0.001	-0.041	0.535	-0.040	-0.042
	0.00	1.00	0.93	0.01	0.88	0.93
First Term		-1.238			-1.246	
		0.00			0.000	
Constant	-5.993	-1.320	-10.904	-7.478	-7.818	-9.811
	0.06	0.81	0.29	0.00	0.00	0.03
N		2175			2175	
Wald's Chi^2		131.6			121.5	
Pseudo R^2		0.0901			0.0902	

Note: Coefficients calculated using generalized ordered logistic regression, with First Term modeled as a parallel proportional term and the rest of the independent variables modeled as partial proportional terms. Standard errors are clustered by member, and p-values are in grey. Model 0 represents the likelihood of a shift from no advocacy to superficial, secondary, or primary advocacy; Model 1 is no advocacy or superficial advocacy to primary or secondary advocacy; and Model 2 is any of the lower categories of advocacy to primary advocacy.

Chapter 3 showed that among instances of disadvantaged group advocacy for

Democrats and Republicans, each party had equivalent percentages of their members

with reputations as women's advocates, but Democrats had a greater number of

advocates overall. These descriptive statistics are born out here in the multivariate

model. Across all of the models analyzed and all levels of advocacy, Republican members of Congress are significantly less likely to have reputations for advocacy on behalf of women. Other variables also had similar effects across models. First term members are less likely to have a reputation for advocacy, as are members from the South. These regional effects are statistically significant for the shift to superficial advocacy and secondary advocacy, but do not have a significant effect on the decision to form a primary reputation around advocating for women. Members also become increasingly likely to have a reputation as a women's advocate the more Democratic the district that they represent.

The Relationship Between Group Size and Ambient Temperature

Generally speaking, with a few exceptions, the results above demonstrate that both group size and ambient temperature have an important and positive impact on whether or not a member has a reputation as a group advocate when each is considered separately. However, as discussed earlier, while group size and ambient temperature are related, they are nonetheless distinct concepts that are expected to work in different ways depending upon the circumstance. Thus, I next explore the overall effects of each of these variables when allowed to work together in a single model.

VETERANS, SENIORS, RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES, LGBTQ INDIVIDUALS

Table 4.7 demonstrates that when combined within a single model, the general relationship between group size, ambient temperature, and reputation follow the same general pattern, regardless of whether a group is broadly considered to be highly

deserving of government assistance or less deserving of government assistance. Across levels of reputation for advocacy, group size nearly always has a positive and statistically significant impact upon reputation formation. Once again, members with primary reputations for advocating on behalf of seniors present the only exception to this, as group size is not a significant determinant of which members choose to focus the bulk of their representational efforts on seniors. That this should represent the exception is not in defiance of expectations, because members should not fear negative reprisals from their constituents for investing such a large share of their efforts into serving a group considered to be so deserving of assistance, even if seniors do not themselves make up a sizeable portion of the district.

An example of the significant impact of group size on the likelihood that a member will form a reputation as a group advocate even for groups that are generally considered to be less deserving of government assistance can be seen in Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D). Throughout the 1990s, Nadler represented the 8th District of New York, covering western Manhattan and parts of Brooklyn. During that time, he consistently served as a secondary advocate for LGBTQ Americans. After the decennial redistricting, most of that territory was shifted into the 10th District, and the percentage of LGBTQ individuals increased by almost a full standard deviation. As the representative of the 10th District of New York in the 113th Congress, Nadler gained a reputation as a primary advocate, becoming a leader of the efforts to repeal Don't Ask, Don't Tell.

When group size is taken into account, ambient temperature is no longer seen to exert a significant effect upon the reputations members choose to form. This is not unexpected. While higher levels of group ambient temperature boost the likelihood of a

Table 4.7. Combined Effects of Group Size and Ambient Temperature on Member Reputation for Advocacy for Veterans, Seniors, LGBTQ Individuals, and Racial/Ethnic Minorities.

	Veterans			Seniors			LGBTQ		Race/Ethnicity		
	0	1	2	0	1	2	0	1	0	1	2
Group Size	0.201	0.235	0.394	0.095	0.117	0.085	1.673	3.721	0.051	0.068	0.057
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.51	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00
Ambient Temperature	0.050	0.108	0.047	-0.012	0.078	-0.087	0.046	0.074	0.009	-0.049	-0.033
	0.091	0.071	0.589	0.744	0.358	0.622	0.126	0.243	0.778	0.229	0.649
Republican	-0.466	-0.819	-1.173	-0.775	-1.006	-1.643	-1.532	-2.316	-1.927	-2.116	-2.749
	0.02	0.02	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.01
Dem Pres Vote	0.003	0.026	0.062	0.012	-0.008	-0.088	0.039	0.068	-0.029	-0.036	-0.037
	0.80	0.22	0.20	0.33	0.70	0.18	0.29	0.17	0.08	0.09	0.12
South	0.039	0.322	0.363	-0.017	-0.317	-1.632	--	--	-0.019	0.128	0.213
	0.86	0.50	0.55	0.94	0.39	0.12			0.94	0.71	0.59
1990s	-1.015	-0.488	-1.324	-0.611	-0.802	-1.635	1.450	5.492	1.182	0.893	0.081
	0.00	0.44	0.15	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.14	0.00	0.01	0.85
2000s	-0.721	-0.210	-1.377	--	--	--	0.147	3.483	1.323	0.957	0.066
	0.01	0.66	0.06				0.77	0.21	0.00	0.00	0.88
First Term	-1.051			-0.897			-1.321		-1.892		
	0.00			0.00			0.08		0.00		
Constant	-7.526	-14.989	-14.827	-2.003	-9.427	6.807	-9.512	-17.803	-3.408	-0.860	-1.839
	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.49	0.16	0.66	0.00	0.01	0.17	0.76	0.68
N	2175			1740			2175		2175		
Wald's Chi^2	104.6			93.2			38.2		368.2		
Pseudo R^2	0.0678			0.0543			0.1954		0.3058		

Note: Coefficients calculated using generalized ordered logistic regression, with First Term modeled as a parallel proportional term and the rest of the independent variables modeled as partial proportional terms. Standard errors are clustered by member, and p-values are in grey. Model 0 represents the likelihood of a shift from no advocacy to superficial, secondary, or primary advocacy; Model 1 is no advocacy or superficial advocacy to primary or secondary advocacy; and Model 2 is any of the lower categories of advocacy to primary advocacy. Feeling thermometer questions for seniors were not included in the ANES of the 2010s, so the decade base category for seniors is the 2000s. No LGBTQ member advocates come from the South, so the variable is excluded on the basis of perfect prediction. Because there is only a single member included in the sample with a primary reputation for LGBTQ advocacy, Model 2 cannot be reliably calculated for this group. For the LGBTQ analyses, reputations for primary and secondary advocacy have been collapsed into single category.

member forming a reputation as a group advocate when considered independently, it should not overtake the effects of the size of a group. The other explanatory variables also largely perform as anticipated, with first termers and Republican members of Congress being less likely to have reputations as advocates for any of the four groups. Other district demographic factors such whether or not a district is in the South and the partisan lean of a district generally have no significant impact on member reputation as advocates for these groups.

WOMEN, IMMIGRANTS, AND THE POOR

Table 4.8 displays the results of the combined model evaluating reputations for serving women, immigrants, and the poor. For the groups that hold a more mixed position in the American psyche, such as immigrants and people in poverty, group size again has a positive and statistically significant impact on reputation for group advocacy. This can be seen through the actions of former Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-CA30/31/34). Originally known through much of the 1990s and 2000s as a primary advocate for immigrants, Becerra also began building other forms of advocacy into his reputation as redistricting moved him from a district of nearly 60% immigrants to one in which immigrants made up less than a majority.

Once group size is accounted for, ambient temperature does not have a statistically significant effect on member reputation for serving immigrants and the poor. Having a reputation as a women's advocate, however, is not dependent upon group size. Ambient temperature does have positive and statistically significant impact on whether or

not a member chooses to form a reputation as some kind of women's advocate, though

the choice to be a primary or secondary advocate is reliant upon other factors.

Table 4.8. Combined Effects of Group Size and Ambient Temperature on Member Reputation for Advocacy for Women, Immigrants, and the Poor.

	Immigrants			Poor			Women		
	0	1	2	0	1	2	0	1	2
Group Size	0.121	0.153	0.226	0.068	0.090	0.110	0.001	-0.110	0.058
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.99	0.26	0.79
Ambient Temperature	-0.033	-0.005	-0.058	-0.003	0.032	-0.051	0.048	0.043	0.008
	0.118	0.866	0.517	0.918	0.482	0.481	0.046	0.118	0.919
Republican	-0.664	-0.407	-2.809	-1.136	-1.815	-2.067	-0.765	-1.286	-2.173
	0.03	0.45	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
Dem Pres Vote	-0.078	-0.078	-0.222	0.021	0.014	0.005	0.047	0.062	0.088
	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.33	0.90	0.01	0.03	0.03
South	-0.356	-0.595	-2.608	-0.358	-0.903	-0.597	-0.550	-1.050	-1.617
	0.35	0.28	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.39	0.06	0.04	0.17
1990s	-0.292	-0.160	-0.450	0.575	0.633	-0.749	0.713	0.257	0.091
	0.40	0.72	0.67	0.00	0.01	0.08	0.00	0.39	0.90
2000s	0.051	0.157	-1.110	0.728	0.773	-0.041	0.541	-0.094	-0.132
	0.84	0.65	0.08	0.00	0.01	0.93	0.01	0.74	0.77
First Term	-1.992			-1.221			-1.243		
	0.00			0.00			0.00		
Constant	1.314	-2.091	6.429	-2.844	-6.296	-1.072	-7.529	-2.738	-11.806
	0.41	0.28	0.44	0.18	0.04	0.84	0.02	0.61	0.26
N	2175			2175			2175		
Wald's Chi^2	359.4			266.3			156.0		
Pseudo R^2	0.2895			0.1239			0.093		

Note: Coefficients calculated using generalized ordered logistic regression, with First Term modeled as a parallel proportional term and the rest of the independent variables modeled as partial proportional terms. Standard errors are clustered by member, and p-values are in grey. Model 0 represents the likelihood of a shift from no advocacy to superficial, secondary, or primary advocacy; Model 1 is no advocacy or superficial advocacy to primary or secondary advocacy; and Model 2 is any of the lower categories of advocacy to primary advocacy.

As with the representation of the groups discussed above, first term and

Republican members are less likely to form any kind of reputation as advocates for

women, immigrants, and the poor. Members coming from districts with a more Democratic lean are more likely to have reputations for advocating on behalf of women, but actually less likely to advocate for immigrants. Partisan leaning also has a statistically significant effect on the choice to form a reputation for at least some level of advocacy for the poor, but is not a significant determinant of primary or secondary advocacy. Members representing Southern districts are also less likely to form reputations as advocates for these groups, though it does not retain statistical significance across all advocacy levels.

Descriptive Representatives and Member Reputation

Thus far, this chapter has demonstrated that group size and group temperature can play an important role in a member's choices about the reputations they seek to foster, and which groups they do or do not wish to be known as an advocate for. But as discussed in Chapter 2, personal experiences—particularly, being a member of the disadvantaged group yourself—also contribute to these decisions, both by increasing the salience of issues facing that group and by providing an opening to be seen as a credible group advocate. In this next section, I first explore the impact of being a descriptive representative on the reputations for group advocacy that members form. Next, I take a closer look at how the effect of ambient temperature on reputation formation changes for members of Congress that are and are not themselves a descriptive representative.

For these analyses, members are coded as being descriptive representatives of a group if they themselves can claim group membership. For women, racial and ethnic minorities, veterans, and LGBTQ members, this determination is straightforward. Members are considered to be immigrants if they themselves were foreign born and

immigrated to the United States, while members with immigrant parents who personally were born in the U.S. are not included. Those who were first elected to the House at or above the age of 65 are considered to be descriptive representatives of seniors. This specific criterion is used in place of someone who has reached the age of 65 while serving to both acknowledge that reputations are something that are built over time and that having lived experience as a senior adult prior to entering into Congress may impact the representational choices a person may make once in the institution. This provides continuity with all other descriptive representatives in that experiences prior to serving in Congress are expected to make a difference.

Obviously, there are no members of Congress that are currently destitute—members of Congress tend to be much wealthier than the average American. However, I code a member as a descriptive representative if their *CQ Politics in America* profile describes them as having grown up in poverty (not working class, but poor), or if there was a time in their life that they relied on public assistance for those in poverty, such as welfare or food stamps. Given the popularity of "up by the bootstraps" narratives among those of both parties in Congress, members with such histories tend to place those experiences front and center in their life stories.

Table 4.9 shows the number of members who are themselves a member of a disadvantaged group who also serve as group advocates. To account for the relatively small number of descriptive representatives in the House of Representatives and ensure a sufficient number of cases across levels of advocacy, for these analyses I combine the categories of secondary advocates and primary advocates. Thus, in each of the models discussed below, there are only two sets of coefficients, rather than three. Model 0 is

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evaluating the relationship between the explanatory variables and the shift from

reputations for non-advocacy to reputations for superficial, secondary, or primary

advocacy, and Model 1 compares the impact of the same variables when comparing

members with reputations for non-advocacy or superficial advocacy with primary and

secondary advocates. Members with reputations as advocates for seniors are excluded

from this portion of the analysis, as there are no members that were elected to the House

when they were over the age of 65 that are secondary or primary advocates for seniors. I

expand further on the significance of this lack of descriptive representatives devoting the

bulk of their reputations to advocacy for seniors at the end of this section.

Table 4.9. Number of Members Serving as Advocates of Disadvantaged Groups across Descriptive and Non-Descriptive Representatives

		Seniors	*Veterans*	*Women*	*Poor*	*Immigrants*	*Racial/Ethnic Minorities*	*LGBTQ*
Non-DR	*Non*	1897	1437	1785	1587	2032	1781	2130
	Superficial	183	76	66	284	63	57	19
	Secondary	65	28	17	128	23	10	11
	Primary	11	11	1	39	24	3	1
	Total	2156	1552	1869	2038	2142	1851	2161
DR	*Non*	18	541	191	75	23	122	7
	Superficial	1	54	47	28	2	69	1
	Secondary	0	20	42	17	6	81	6
	Primary	0	8	26	17	2	52	0
	Total	19	623	306	137	33	324	14

VETERANS, RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES, AND THE LGBTQ COMMUNITY

The first sets of results in Table 4.10 display models including whether or not a

member is themselves LGBTQ, a veteran, or a racial/ethnic minority alongside all of the

previous explanatory variables. Here, while many of the patterns seen earlier for these

groups that have higher and lower levels of perceived deservingness remain the same, there are a few additional insights that are important. Members who are themselves

Table 4.10. Descriptive Representatives and Member Reputation for Advocacy for Veterans, LGBTQ Individuals, and Racial/Ethnic Minorities.

	Veterans				LGBT				Race/Ethnicity			
	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
Group Size	0.195	0.233	0.195	0.237	2.010	5.072	1.974	5.058	0.015	0.033	0.016	0.032
	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.07	0.02	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00
Ambient Temperature	0.047	0.105	0.020	0.062	0.059	0.189	0.060	0.189	-0.018	-0.070	-0.039	0.091
	0.114	0.084	0.529	0.301	0.065	0.106	0.069	0.108	0.712	0.184	0.413	0.528
Descriptive Representative	0.663	0.504	-5.725	-12.130	4.380	6.351	9.064	5.756	3.339	3.257	0.221	14.324
	0.00	0.12	0.07	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.87	0.00	0.00	0.97	0.16
Ambient Temp. & DR	--	--	0.086	0.170	--	--	-0.097	0.012	--	--	0.047	-0.167
			0.04	0.15			0.46	0.99			0.57	0.28
Republican	-0.516	-0.856	-0.521	-0.885	-1.340	-1.507	-1.387	-1.563	-1.430	-1.409	-1.435	-1.317
	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.34	0.04	0.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Dem Pres Vote	0.004	0.028	0.004	0.028	0.011	0.013	0.013	0.014	-0.016	-0.022	-0.017	-0.019
	0.73	0.19	0.74	0.18	0.72	0.85	0.68	0.84	0.32	0.30	0.29	0.37
South	-0.015	0.291	-0.059	0.225	--	--	--	--	-0.163	0.051	-0.176	0.072
	0.95	0.56	0.80	0.66					0.53	0.87	0.49	0.82
1990s	-1.191	-0.622	-1.173	-0.525	1.845	8.757	1.783	8.713	1.492	1.039	1.511	1.025
	0.00	0.31	0.00	0.39	0.01	0.14	0.01	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
2000s	-0.771	-0.260	-0.802	-0.263	0.218	4.767	0.192	4.753	1.590	0.941	1.660	0.897
	0.00	0.59	0.00	0.59	0.71	0.29	0.77	0.28	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
First Term	-0.953		-0.953		-1.643		-1.523		-2.501		-2.512	
	0.00		0.00		0.10		0.12		0.00		0.00	
Constant	-7.413	-14.894	-5.372	-11.746	-9.304	-24.508	-9.377	-24.508	-2.181	-0.344	-0.833	-10.974
	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.50	0.92	0.80	0.24
N	2175		2175		2175		2175		2175		2175	
Wald's Chi ^{2}	90.6		101.8		89.2		141.6		493.3		512.9	
Pseudo R^2	0.0782		0.0816		0.3024		0.3033		0.4245		0.4258	

Note: Coefficients calculated using generalized ordered logistic regression, with First Term modeled as a parallel proportional term and the rest of the independent variables modeled as partial proportional terms. Standard errors are clustered by member, and p-values are in grey. Model 0 represents the likelihood of a shift from no advocacy to superficial, secondary, or primary advocacy and Model 1 is no advocacy or superficial advocacy to primary or secondary advocacy.

No LGBTQ member advocates come from the South, so the variable is excluded on the basis of perfect prediction.

LGBTQ or a racial/ethnic minority are considerably more likely to form a reputation for group advocacy across both levels, even while group size remains an important determinant of member reputation. Reps. Albert Wynn (D-MD4) and Joe Crowley (D-NY7), for example, represent districts with nearly the same ambient temperature and percentage of racial/ethnic minorities in moderately liberal states. But while Wynn, a black man, has consistently served as a superficial or secondary advocate for racial/ethnic minorities, Crowley, who is not a descriptive representative for racial/ethnic minorities, has prioritized other groups. For veterans, however, being a descriptive representative is significantly related to having at least some part of your reputation built around advocating for veterans, but those who have taken on the highest levels of group advocacy are driven by the percentage of veterans in their districts.

Once again, first term and Republican members of Congress are less likely to form these reputations for group advocacy, though there is some small variation in the significance of the effect of party. This is particularly true for members with reputations as advocates for the LGBTQ community—once descriptive representatives are taken into account, these other variables that have been significant in prior models drop in significance. After the principal explanatory variables and decade-specific fixed-effects are taken into account, neither the partisan lean nor representing a district in the South has a significant effect on member reputation.

Women, immigrants, and the poor are groups that do not fit as neatly into the categories of being generally considered to be of high or low deservingness of government assistance. The effects of descriptive representation, ambient temperature, and group size on member reputations as advocates for these groups are given in Table 4.11, and a few differences from the groups discussed above can be seen. Being an immigrant is not a statistically significant predictor of member reputation as an advocate for immigrants, while the percentage of immigrants and partisan leaning of a district do have a significant impact. Additionally, while Republican members are less likely to have reputations as advocates for immigrants at any level, partisanship is not a statistically significant factor separating non- and superficial advocates from secondary and primary advocates. But while members representing Southern districts are not any less likely to have reputations for serving as advocates for immigrants, Southern members are considerably less likely to build reputations as advocates on behalf of the poor, after group size and other variables are held constant. Partisan leaning of a district is also a significant source of separation between non-advocates and members with a reputation for some level of advocacy. After these district-specific factors are taken into account, group size, ambient temperature, and descriptive representation follow now-familiar patterns. Personal experience with poverty and the percentage of poor constituents in a district each have a significant impact on member reputation, while the significance of ambient temperature drops off.

The unique situation of women among other disadvantaged groups is again revealed in these models—while group size in a district is not a driving force behind

members forming reputations as women's advocates, being a woman in Congress has an enormous influence. These effects can be clearly seen in the case of Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA13). Lee has cultivated a reputation as a primary advocate for women, serving as a vocal defender of abortion rights and a strident opponent to any cuts in the funding of women's health organizations such as Planned Parenthood. Lee was preceded as a

Table 4.11. Descriptive Representatives and Member Reputation for Advocacy for Women, Immigrants, and the Poor.

	Immigrants				Poor				Women			
	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
Group Size	0.123	0.155	0.127	0.160	0.066	0.089	0.064	0.088	0.098	0.009	0.089	0.008
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.16	0.94	0.20	0.94
Ambient Temperature	-0.041	-0.020	-0.046	-0.029	-0.005	0.027	-0.017	0.025	0.016	0.016	0.045	0.077
	0.078	0.532	0.059	0.381	0.861	0.580	0.588	0.625	0.581	0.646	0.182	0.136
Descriptive Representative	0.084	0.235	5.377	-7.473	0.574	0.606	-10.239	-1.740	2.746	3.370	6.340	9.151
	0.90	0.73	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.78	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.02
Ambient Temp. & DR	--	--	-0.116	0.157	--	--	0.155	0.034	--	--	-0.063	-0.100
			0.04	0.03			0.03	0.70			0.23	0.14
Republican	-0.700	-0.587	-0.662	-0.491	-1.106	-1.773	-1.120	-1.775	-0.426	-0.942	-0.427	-0.940
	0.02	0.30	0.03	0.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.01	0.07	0.01
Dem Pres Vote	-0.080	-0.087	-0.082	-0.088	0.022	0.015	0.022	0.016	0.050	0.053	0.050	0.054
	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.28	0.04	0.27	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.05
South	-0.419	-0.762	-0.403	-0.750	-0.355	-0.884	-0.361	-0.855	-0.386	-0.847	-0.364	-0.803
	0.29	0.20	0.31	0.21	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.20	0.08	0.23	0.10
1990s	-0.416	-0.341	-0.469	-0.380	0.570	0.625	0.561	0.613	1.353	1.001	1.360	0.992
	0.23	0.43	0.19	0.40	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
2000s	0.052	0.209	0.059	0.224	0.697	0.727	0.712	0.723	0.932	0.152	0.921	0.169
	0.84	0.55	0.81	0.52	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.65	0.00	0.60
First Term	-1.983		-1.965		-1.206		-1.203		-1.771		-1.771	
	0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00	
Constant	1.859	-0.861	2.074	-0.496	-2.713	-5.998	-1.896	-5.876	-12.263	-8.769	-13.501	-12.268
	0.29	0.75	0.25	0.86	0.20	0.06	0.39	0.09	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.07
N	2175		2175		2175		2175		2175		2175	
Wald's Chi ^{2}	275.2		293.2		239.6		251.7		258.7		275.8	
Pseudo R^2	0.2894		0.2928		0.129		0.131		0.2521		0.2539	

Note: Coefficients calculated using generalized ordered logistic regression, with First Term modeled as a parallel proportional term and the rest of the independent variables modeled as partial proportional terms. Standard errors are clustered by member, and p-values are in grey. Model 0 represents the likelihood of a shift from no advocacy to superficial, secondary, or primary advocacy, and Model 1 is no advocacy or superficial advocacy to primary or secondary advocacy.

representative of the 13th District of California by Rep. Pete Stark (D). Stark built a reputation as an advocate for liberal healthcare solutions, but did not focus his advocacy specifically on women's health or other issues directly pertaining to women.

Once descriptive representation is taken into account, the ambient temperature towards women in a district no longer plays a statistically significant role in member reputation. Members coming from more Democratic districts are more likely to craft reputations around serving women, and while Republicans are less likely to have reputations as primary or secondary advocates, conventional levels of statistical significance are not quite met when evaluating the role of party on the choice to become a superficial advocate of women. This could indicate that once a member's gender is taken into consideration, the choice to form a reputation as a superficial advocate of women is a slightly less partisan choice than that of other disadvantaged groups.

INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION ON REPUTATION

Next, I look more closely at the differences in the effect of ambient temperature on reputation for descriptive and non-descriptive members. To this point, ambient temperature has only been occasionally (as in the case of women's advocates) been seen to have a statistically significant effect on member reputation once group size is included in the model. But while it is not surprising that the size of the group within a district would have a much stronger pull on member reputation than group ambient temperature, I do expect that the marginal effects of changes in ambient temperature will have different effects for members who are themselves a descriptive representative of a disadvantaged group than those who are not.

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I test this by including an interaction term between ambient temperature and whether or not someone is a descriptive representative, and then examining the predicted marginal effects on the probability of a member holding a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate. The models themselves can be seen in the second set of columns in Tables 4.10 and 4.11. Because these are generalized ordered logistic regression models, predicted probabilities are the best means of displaying the interactive effects of these variables on member reputation for group advocacy. These predicted effects can be seen in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. For each of these figures, all other variables in the models besides ambient temperature and the dichotomous measure for descriptive representatives take on the actual values that they have in the dataset, which allows for the specific marginal effects of ambient temperature to be isolated and estimated for descriptive representatives and non-descriptive representatives.

Figure 4.2 shows the differences in the marginal predicted effects of ambient temperature on forming any level of reputation for advocacy of disadvantaged groups for members of the House who are themselves a part of that group, and members who are not a descriptive representative. One of the most interesting trends seen below is not just how the impact of ambient temperature on reputation varies depending upon the group being represented, but the differences in these predicted marginal effects for members who are and are not descriptive representatives. For non-descriptive representatives, the effects of changes in ambient temperature on the likelihood of having a reputation for group advocacy are extremely small, with slopes remaining close to constant. For members who are descriptive representatives, however, changes in ambient temperature

have larger effects on reputations for group advocacy, with stronger effects for some

groups than others.

Figure 4.2. Predicted Effects of Ambient Temperature for Members with Reputations as Advocates Relative to Non-Advocates for Descriptive Representatives.

Note: Figures show the predicted marginal effects of ambient temperature on reputation for superficial, secondary, or primary advocacy relative to non-advocacy for members who are themselves descriptive representatives of the group and members who are not. Predicted marginal effects are calculated using Stata's margins command for the Model 1's containing interactions between descriptive representative and ambient temperature shown in Tables 4.10 and 4.11. All other variables are held to their observed values within the dataset. Clockwise from the top left, the groups whose representation is being analyzed are racial/ethnic minorities, LGBTQ individuals, women, the poor, immigrants, and veterans.

For veterans, the group broadly considered to be deserving of government

assistance, there is little change in the predicted effects across values in ambient

temperature. The same is true for immigrants and LGBTQ members. Women in the

House, though, have a clear and significant boost in the likelihood of having a reputation

as a women's advocate relative to men, but also do not see a clear shift in that likelihood

as ambient temperature increases. For racial/ethnic minorities and those with a history of poverty, however, there is a clear increase in the likelihood of a member of the House who is a descriptive representative forming a reputation as some kind of group advocate—even if only a superficial advocate, as is true in the majority of cases—as the group ambient temperature of the district goes up.

The marginal effects of ambient temperature for descriptive and non-descriptive representatives when considering the difference between non- and superficial advocates and primary and secondary advocates are shown in Figure 4.3. These figures demonstrate that there are important differences in how descriptive representation and ambient temperature affects the likelihood of having a reputation that may include superficial group advocacy versus that of a reputation specifically for secondary or primary advocacy—those members that choose to cultivate a considerable amount of their legislative reputation around advocating for a disadvantaged group. The groups for which changes in ambient temperature were previously seen to do little to increase the likelihood of some level of advocacy on their behalf, regardless of whether or not a member was a descriptive representative, largely do see some effects of changes in ambient temperature when comparing those members with reputations for primary and secondary advocacy to all other members.

As before, members of Congress who are not themselves descriptive representatives experience only very small boosts in the likelihood of having primary or secondary reputations for group advocacy when ambient temperature increases. For members who are themselves a member of the disadvantaged group, however, increases in the predicted effects are seen for nearly all groups. Veterans, immigrants, those with a

history of poverty, and LGBTQ members see an increased likelihood of being primary or

secondary group advocates at high levels of district group ambient temperature. Once

again, members with reputations for advocating for women are the exception to this trend

–even when only considering what sets primary and secondary advocates apart, changes

in ambient temperature have very little effect once the large and clearly statistically

significant boost that comes from being a woman is taken into account.

Figure 4.3. Predicted Effects of Ambient Temperature for Members with Reputations as Primary or Secondary Advocates relative to Non- or Superficial Advocates for Descriptive Representatives.

Note: Figures show the predicted marginal effects of ambient temperature on reputation for secondary or primary advocacy relative to non- or superficial advocacy for members who are themselves descriptive representatives of the group and members who are not. Predicted marginal effects are calculated using Stata's margins command for the Model 1's containing interactions between descriptive representative and ambient temperature shown in Tables 4.10 and 4.11. All other variables are held to their observed values within the dataset. Clockwise from the top left, the groups whose representation is being analyzed are racial/ethnic minorities, LGBTQ individuals, women, the poor, immigrants, and veterans.

One of the most interesting trends that can be seen in Figure 4.3 is the effect of changes in ambient temperature on reputation as a primary or secondary advocate for racial and ethnic minorities. Here again, there is a clear and statistically significant difference in the effects of ambient temperature between descriptive representatives and non-descriptive representatives. However, in this instance, as ambient temperature increases, the likelihood that a member who is themselves a racial/ethnic minority will have a primary or secondary reputation for group advocacy actually *decreases*. This change in the direction of the predicted probabilities speaks to the uniqueness of the place of racial/ethnic minorities in American politics, even when compared to other disadvantaged groups. It implies that, unlike for other disadvantaged groups, members of Congress who are racial and ethnic minorities are more likely to serve as advocates for their group when the threat environment is high, rather than when it is low. I return to this point for further discussion in the conclusion.

THE ADVOCACY WINDOW

These figures showing the marginal predicted effects also allow for evaluation of the concept of the advocacy window introduced in chapter 2. The advocacy window is the space between the level of representation that is expected based upon the size of the group in a district, conceptualized as the floor, and the high point of the amount of representation that would be tolerated given the feelings toward a particular group in a district, analogized to the ceiling. On their own, both group size and ambient temperature tend to have a positive, significant relationship with member reputation, as would be expected. But once these variables are evaluated within a single model, group size tends

to take precedence, and ambient temperature loses significance. This indicates that, when making decisions about where to focus their reputations, most members tend to stay firmly rooted to the floor when considering the representation of disadvantaged groups.

A level of additional nuance is added, however, when descriptive representation is taken into account. Most other members tend not to shoot for the ceiling when creating their reputations as advocates, but descriptive representatives tend to be more likely to take advantage of an open advocacy window when it exists. This important difference in the effect of the advocacy window on members' reputational choices is on full display in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. Particularly when considering members who build reputations as primary or secondary advocates for disadvantaged groups, there is a noticeable increase in the responsiveness of descriptive representatives to changes in the ambient temperature—the opening and closing of the advocacy window. Those who are themselves a member of a disadvantaged group tend to utilize this opening of the advocacy window to boost the level of group advocacy they choose to build their reputation around.

Members who are racial/ethnic minorities, however, have an important and unique response to these changes in the dimensions of the advocacy window. For these members, reputations for primary or secondary advocacy of racial/ethnic minorities are more likely to come in districts with a tighter advocacy window. This very likely speaks to the unmatched levels of suspicion and concentrated discrimination racial/ethnic minorities have experienced relative even to other disadvantaged groups. Under such circumstances, members who have themselves experienced this may be most likely to dedicate their reputation to serving racial/ethnic minorities when the threat is high—when

they feel if they do not step up for their minority constituents, no one will. Only when the advocacy window is large can they relax, and focus more of their attention on other issues.

This is very different than the situation facing members who enter Congress as a senior, for instance. Zero members of Congress who won their first election to the House of Representatives at or after the age of 65 made the choice to craft a reputation as a primary or secondary advocate for seniors. Very clearly, there is not the same sense that if they do not take these actions, no one else will. Instead, they can feel free to focus their legislative reputations around whatever issues they please, knowing that there will always be other members willing to advocate for seniors.

Conclusions

The results from this chapter demonstrate the crucial roles that group size, ambient temperature, and descriptive representation have on the legislative reputations that members choose to cultivate. Both group size and ambient temperature tend to have a positive and significant effect on member reputation when considered independently, with group size serving as the more prominent force behind reputation formation when considered together. Descriptive representatives were also more likely to take on reputations as group advocates than other members, with the exception of those disadvantaged groups considered to be most highly deserving.

This chapter also introduced group ambient temperature as a new measure for group affect in a district. It explained the process through which estimates of how positively or negatively a district tends to feel towards a group on average can be

generated, making use of the multilevel regression with poststratification procedure. Maps and summary measures were used to provide face validity for these ambient temperature estimates, which were then compared to the variations in group size across districts.

In sum, this chapter provides evidence that reputations for serving disadvantaged groups are rooted both in district demographics such as group size and partisan lean, as well as member characteristics such as party affiliation and personal experience as a member of a disadvantaged group. Decision-making on legislative reputations in the House of Representatives is well characterized by the concept of the advocacy window, wherein group size is considered to be floor, or baseline level of representation that would be expected, and ambient temperature serves as a ceiling the members could reach for if they so choose. For most members, this is not a favored choice, preferring instead to root their reputation for advocacy on the floor, and preserve the remainder of their representational capital for other issues. Descriptive representatives break this pattern by being more likely to increase the part of their reputation that they devote to group advocacy when their district provides them with a wider advocacy window. Racial/ethnic minority members are the exception to this trend, instead being more likely to cultivate a primary or secondary reputation for advocacy of racial/ethnic minorities in instances when ambient temperature is lower, and the advocacy window is reduced. In the next chapter, I turn to the U. S. Senate. In it, I utilize a similar framework to determine what drives a senator to form a reputation as an advocate for the disadvantaged.

CHAPTER 5: THE CHOICE TO BE A DISADVANTAGED GROUP ADVOCATE IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE.

This chapter turns to the U.S. Senate to examine what leads someone to cultivate a reputation as an advocate for the disadvantaged. In particular, it will investigate how certain institutional differences between the House of Representatives and the Senate can affect how members make representational choices. Compared to members of the House, senators have considerably more individual power, and do not face the same pressures to specialize. Senators serve on more committees, are markedly less restrained in their ability to speak on the floor, and are more likely to be a pivotal vote on any given piece of legislation. This expectation that senators will be involved in a broader range of issues allows for considerably more flexibility when crafting their legislative reputations, and makes it less likely that they will solely prioritize advocating for any one particular group. Chapter 3 demonstrated this difference in the incidence of senators with a reputation for primary or secondary advocacy on behalf of disadvantaged groups relative to members of the House in Figure 3.7.

However, it is important to bear in mind that while this increased pressure on senators to diversify their representative activities may make them less likely to craft reputations as primary or secondary advocates for the disadvantaged, they are actually slightly more likely on average to serve as disadvantaged group advocates at least at a superficial level (as seen in Figure 3.7). Thus, even if senators tend to build reputations as superficial advocates rather than primary or secondary advocates (though these higher

levels of advocacy on behalf of disadvantaged groups do still exist within the upper

chamber), it remains necessary to determine if the same factors driving the decisions

behind reputation formation in the House are also at work in the Senate. The sections to

follow take on that task, and work to untangle the ways in which different pressures and

institutional constraints can alter the reputation building calculus for members within the

two legislative chambers.

In this chapter, I will analyze the impact of the size of a disadvantaged group and

the ambient temperature towards a disadvantaged group on reputation formation in the

Senate, and compare the effects with what was seen in the House of Representatives.

Next, I will introduce and evaluate three alternative hypotheses that take into account

senator electoral security and the advocacy environment within the Senate to determine

their impact on senator reputation. Following that, I will investigate how the reputations

of descriptive representatives in the Senate differ from non-descriptive representatives,

and highlight the implications of these differences, particularly relative to descriptive

representatives in the House. Finally, I return to the concept of the advocacy window,

and discuss how well the concept characterizes the decision to build a reputation as a

disadvantaged group advocate in the U.S. Senate.

Constituency Characteristics: Group Size and Ambient Temperature

As with the previous chapter, explaining what drives members to cultivate a

reputation as an advocate for disadvantaged groups starts with an exploration of the role

of group size and group ambient temperature within a state. These variables are a useful

place to start this discussion about when and why senators build legislative reputations

because a basic understanding of how a democracy *should* work provides clear expectations. Assuming that, just as in the House, members of the Senate care both about getting reelected and about representing their constituents, one would expect that as the size of a group increases within a state, members will devote more of their efforts to working on their behalf, and be more likely to craft a reputation as a group advocate. Similarly, the more warmly the average person in a district feels toward a group, it seems reasonable to expect that a senator would be even more likely to form a reputation as a defender of that group. In the remainder of this section, I briefly review the operationalization of these two key variables. Next, I utilize the same models used to explain the formation of member reputations in the House to evaluate the extent to which these expectations hold in the U.S. Senate.

GROUP SIZE

For the analysis to follow, group size is measured using the Census counts for the percentage of group members within a state. Racial and ethnic minorities within a state are determined using the percentage of individuals who do not identify as non-Hispanic whites, veterans are the percent of the civilian population that served in any branch of the armed services, seniors are the percentage of individuals over the age of 65, and immigrants are the percentage of residents of a state who are foreign born. The percentage of women in a state is a straightforward count, and the percentage of poor residents are those whose household income is below the federal poverty line. The Census has never asked the sexual orientation or gender identity of respondents, and thus operationalizing the percentage of LGBTQ individuals within a state requires a proxy.

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Because of this lack of data, I follow the lead of prior researchers and use the percentage

of same-sex households within a state to approximate the size of the state LGBTQ

population (e.g., Hansen and Treul 2015; Warshaw and Rodden 2012).[31]

AMBIENT TEMPERATURE

The ambient temperature variable is a unique measure that conceptualizes feeling

thermometer scores as a way of determining the average level of hostility or favorability

towards a group within a state or district, which was introduced in detail in the previous

chapter. For this analysis exploring reputation formation in the Senate, I followed the

same procedure from Chapter 4 to estimate the state ambient temperature towards a

group (as opposed to congressional district ambient temperature). This was done using

multilevel regression and poststratification on the feeling thermometer questions from the

ANES time series data, aggregated by decade.[32] Table 5.1 shows a summary of the state

estimates generated for each of the disadvantaged groups analyzed.

Table 5.1: Summary of Estimates for State Feeling Thermometer Ratings by Group

Group	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Seniors	400	78.63	2.34	72.20	85.10
Veterans	500	72.37	3.82	65.23	82.34
Poor	500	68.76	2.89	61.24	77.63
Women	500	55.42	3.18	46.84	63.19
Immigrants	500	40.75	7.63	26.59	57.61
Racial/Ethnic Minorities	500	65.38	2.90	59.31	71.58
LGBTQ	500	46.25	7.75	21.85	64.57

Displayed are the average estimates values for the feeling thermometer scores across all fifty states from 1992-2016. Estimates were generated using multilevel regression with poststratification. The estimate for racial/ethnic minorities is an average of the ambient temperature generated for each district for Black, Hispanic, and Asian Americans.

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[31] For further discussion of why this proxy was selected and the potential consequences of this selection, please see Chapter 4, where this issue is addressed at length.

[32] Again, for those groups that were not expressly asked about in the ANES during this time period, I use a close proxy. Veterans, women, immigrants, and LGTBQ individuals were not included directly, so instead I use the military, feminists, illegal immigrants, and gays and lesbians, respectively, as proxies.

Reputations for Disadvantaged Group Advocacy in the U.S. Senate

Chapter 3 demonstrated that legislative reputations for disadvantaged group

advocacy are common to both the House and the Senate, with over 50% of senators

possessing a reputation for at least superficial advocacy of a disadvantaged group. Table

5.2 shows the total number of senators sampled with a reputation for disadvantaged group

advocacy, separated by group and level of advocacy.[33] Compared to their counterparts in

the House, senators are less likely to have reputations as primary or secondary

disadvantaged group advocates, tending to opt for superficial advocacy instead. Given

the markedly smaller number of senators compared to members of the House—100 to

435—these differences in the level of advocacy a senator or member of the House are

known for have important consequences for selecting the most appropriate means of

modeling those reputations.

Table 5.2. Number of Senators with Reputations as Advocates for Disadvantaged Groups (103rd, 105th, 108th, 110th, and 113th Congress).

	Seniors	*Veterans*	*Women*	*Poor*	*Immigrants*	*Racial/Ethnic Minorities*	*LGBTQ*
Non	426	458	430	386	470	476	487
Superficial	52	29	44	76	23	16	9
Secondary	17	13	18	36	6	7	3
Primary	5	0	8	2	1	1	1
Total Advocates	74	42	70	114	30	24	13

Table 5.2 shows that, for five out the seven groups under evaluation, there are

fewer than two senators with a primary reputation as group advocates. Because the raw

numbers for the highest category are so small, in the analysis to follow, I combine

reputations for primary and secondary advocacy into a single category, to create a three-

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[33] As described at length in Chapter 3, the sample includes all 500 senators from the 103rd, 105th, 108th, 110th, and 113th Congresses.

category ordered dependent variable. Using this combined top category allows for better estimation of the impact of relevant explanatory variables on the likelihood that a member will have a reputation for superficial advocacy or higher.[34]

Group Size, Ambient Temperature, and Reputation Formation in the Senate

Chapter 4 showed that both the size of a disadvantaged group and feelings towards that group play an important role in the legislative reputations that members of the House choose to form. Particularly for groups that are generally considered to be less deserving of government assistance, both group size and ambient temperature had a positive, significant effect on the likelihood that a member would form a reputation as a group advocate when evaluated independently. In this section, I examine the relationship between these variables and member reputation for the U.S. Senate.

To gain a more nuanced understanding of how these explanatory variables impact member reputation and to account for any violations of the parallel regression assumption, I utilize generalized ordered logistic regression models.[35] Because member reputation has been collapsed into a three-category ordinal variable, each generalized ordered logistic regression model will produce two sets of estimated coefficients, referred to in each instance as Model 0 and Model 1. Model 0 shows the estimated effects of each independent variable on the likelihood that a senator will have a reputation for some level of advocacy relative to non-advocacy, while Model 1's coefficients represent the

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[34] Because of the particularly small number of cases of senators with reputations as advocates of the LGBTQ community at any level, I further collapse the dependent variable into just two categories: reputation for advocacy (superficial, secondary, or primary) and no reputation for advocacy. Thus, for estimates of the likelihood of a senator having a reputation for LGBTQ advocacy, I utilize a logistic regression model, rather than generalized ordered logistic regression.

[35] A more in-depth discussion of why generalized ordered logistic regression models are most appropriate can be found in Chapter 4.

estimated effect that a variable has on the likelihood of having a reputation for primary or secondary advocacy, relative to non-advocacy or superficial advocacy. The results of these models are displayed in Tables 5.3 – 5.6.

VETERANS AND SENIORS

The coefficients of the models evaluating how group size and ambient temperature affect the likelihood of senators building reputations as advocates of veterans and seniors are shown in Table 5.3. For these groups, with a high level of perceived deservingness of government assistance, the forces driving senators to foster reputations as advocates look relatively similar to those that were at work in the House, but with some important exceptions. The percentage of veterans and seniors in a state has a positive and statistically significant impact on whether or not a senator will have some form of reputation as a group advocate, but not on the choice to expand that reputation as a primary or secondary advocate.

This distinction is not unexpected—senators have a great deal of leeway in determining how to allocate their legislative efforts. State demographics do push senators to try to dedicate at least a small portion of their legislative reputation to serving veterans and seniors, but other factors are responsible for determining which senators choose to signal that advocating for these groups are their top priority. Many Florida senators, for instance, despite representing the state with the highest percentage of individuals over the age of 65, have a superficial reputation as an advocate for seniors. People like Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL), most known for his work on anti-crime legislation (particularly his support for the death penalty), also made

sure that he could be described as a supporter of seniors by pushing for prescription

drug coverage for Medicare recipients.

Table 5.3. Group Size, Ambient Temperature and Member Reputation for Advocacy for Veterans and Seniors.

	Veterans						Seniors					
	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
Group Size	0.325	0.461	--	--	0.320	0.417	0.025	0.022	--	--	0.023	-0.049
	0.00	0.04			0.00	0.11	0.04	0.32			0.05	0.72
Ambient Temperature	--	--	-0.061	0.014	-0.051	0.014	--	--	-0.018	-0.016	-0.009	0.012
			0.29	0.93	0.36	0.93			0.81	0.89	0.90	0.93
Republican	-0.677	-1.150	-0.650	-0.920	-0.696	-0.932	-0.735	-1.770	-0.723	-2.067	-0.764	-2.092
	0.11	0.08	0.12	0.37	0.09	0.36	0.04	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.04	0.01
Dem Pres Vote	0.004	-0.044	-0.007	-0.045	0.004	-0.031	-0.004	0.018	-0.012	0.012	-0.011	0.012
	0.89	0.48	0.78	0.43	0.88	0.62	0.84	0.52	0.52	0.74	0.56	0.75
South	0.052	0.465	-0.052	0.279	0.056	0.364	0.114	0.563	-0.050	0.475	-0.009	0.559
	0.90	0.48	0.90	0.72	0.90	0.64	0.73	0.26	0.89	0.42	0.98	0.31
1990s	-0.660	-0.131	-0.610	0.438	-0.956	-0.110	-0.210	-0.420	-0.477	-0.564	-0.543	-0.498
	0.18	0.91	0.31	0.73	0.12	0.95	0.42	0.31	0.07	0.20	0.04	0.31
2000s	-1.785	-1.929	-0.953	-0.403	-1.994	-1.796	--	--	--	--	--	--
	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.56	0.00	0.14						
First Term	-1.073		-1.059		-1.105		-0.655		-0.467		-0.524	
	0.10		0.10		0.08		0.13		0.30		0.25	
Constant	-5.227	-5.980	3.419	-2.117	-1.280	-7.197	-1.470	-3.754	1.012	-1.690	0.018	-3.258
	0.01	0.20	0.39	0.87	0.75	0.58	0.12	0.02	0.86	0.86	1.00	0.74
N	500		500		500		500		400		400	
Wald's Chi^2	41.5		26.1		46.9		21.6		19.7		23.7	
Pseudo R^2	0.0599		0.0419		0.0638		0.0445		0.0488		0.0563	

Note: Coefficients calculated using generalized ordered logistic regression, with First Term modeled as a parallel proportional term and the rest of the independent variables modeled as partial proportional terms. Standard errors are clustered by member, and p-values are in grey. Model 0 represents the likelihood of a shift from no advocacy to superficial or primary/secondary advocacy, and Model 1 is no advocacy or superficial advocacy to primary/secondary advocacy. Feeling thermometer questions for seniors were not included in the ANES of the 2010s, so the decade base category for seniors is the 2000s.

State ambient temperature, on the other hand, does not have a statistically

significant effect on a senator's reputation as an advocate of either of these two

groups. Because veterans and seniors are broadly considered to be deserving of

government assistance, it is not expected that small state-by-state variations in how

these groups are viewed would have a large effect on reputation. Senators can be reasonably confident that advocating for these groups will not negatively impact them, and may even provide a boost in how they are regarded by their constituents.

As was true for members of the House, neither partisan lean nor location in the South has a significant impact on a senator's choice to build a reputation as a veteran or senior advocate. Democrats are more likely to have a reputation an advocate for seniors, but, unlike in the House, the choice to become a veteran's advocate in the Senate is non-partisan. One last noteworthy but not unexpected difference between the House and the Senate comes in considering the gap in reputation building between first-termers and returning incumbents. In the House, members in their first term simply have not spent long enough within the institution to have amassed the over-time pattern of behavior that is required to build a legislative reputation. Senators, with a full six years before they must face the voters again, have considerably more time in their first term to craft a reputation that reflects their legislative priorities. This also speaks to the erosion of the norm of apprenticeship highlighted by Mathews in *The Folkways of the Senate*—being in their first term does not deter a senator in the contemporary Congress from taking action to establish their legislative reputation (Sinclair 1989).

LGBTQ AND RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES

Table 5.4 displays the impact of group size and ambient temperature on the likelihood of a senator having a reputation for advocacy on behalf of the LGBTQ community and racial/ethnic minorities. These models indicate that *neither* group size

nor ambient temperature have a statistically significant impact on a senator's choice to cultivate a reputation as an LGBTQ or racial/ethnic minority advocate. This is a crucial and telling distinction from what was seen in the previous chapter.

Table 5.4. Group Size, Ambient Temperature and Member Reputation for Advocacy for Racial/Ethnic Minorities and the LGBTQ Community.

	LGBTQ			Race/Ethnicity					
	logit	*logit*	*logit*	0	1	0	1	0	1
Group Size	-0.989	--	-1.824	0.009	-0.001	--	--	0.009	-0.010
	0.75		0.46	0.48	0.97			0.52	0.70
Ambient Temperature	--	0.047	0.055	--	--	0.081	0.076	0.070	0.303
		0.63	0.56			0.45	0.75	0.50	0.52
Republican	-0.604	-0.624	-0.618	0.410	-0.372	0.397	-0.393	0.429	-0.153
	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.41	0.60	0.41	0.69	0.38	0.85
Dem Pres Vote	0.074	0.065	0.083	0.037	0.059	0.044	0.040	0.039	0.060
	0.10	0.08	0.04	0.25	0.44	0.14	0.42	0.23	0.43
South	-0.640	-0.627	-0.669	-1.232	-14.895	-1.142	-15.884	-1.222	-16.160
	0.54	0.54	0.51	0.03	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.03	0.00
1990s	-0.823	0.282	-0.380	2.172	16.927	2.558	18.091	2.559	19.664
	0.60	0.87	0.86	0.04	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.00
2000s	-0.662	-0.269	-0.203	1.417	15.263	1.712	16.149	1.701	17.235
	0.40	0.84	0.88	0.19	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.14	0.00
First Term	-0.933	-0.997	-0.943	-1.031		-1.057		-1.013	
	0.34	0.30	0.32	0.14		0.14		0.15	
Constant	-6.168	-8.869	-9.261	-6.559	-22.812	-12.288	-27.651	-11.536	-44.894
	0.01	0.17	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.10	0.13	0.18
N	500	500	500	500		500		500	
Wald's Chi²	8.4	9.2	8.8	2049.2		1105.8		1055.6	
Pseudo R^2	0.0814	0.0882	0.0912	0.1176		0.1155		0.1230	

Note: Coefficients for LGBTQ are estimated using logistic regression, as necessitated by the bivariate coding of the LGBTQ advocacy reputation variable. Coefficients for racial/ethnic minorities are calculated using generalized ordered logistic regression, with First Term modeled as a parallel proportional term and the rest of the independent variables modeled as partial proportional terms. Standard errors are clustered by member, and p-values are in grey. Model 0 represents the likelihood of a shift from no advocacy to superficial or primary/secondary advocacy, and Model 1 is no advocacy or superficial advocacy to primary/secondary advocacy.

Of all of the disadvantaged groups being studied here, the LGBTQ community and racial/ethnic minorities are generally considered to be the least deserving of government assistance by the country at large, particularly for the time period

investigated here. In the House, both the percentage of racial/ethnic minorities and same-sex households and the general feelings towards those groups within a district had a positive and significant effect on the likelihood that a member would form a reputation as an advocate. This connection is critical, because it demonstrates that if a group is large enough in a district, even if they're unpopular nationally, their member of Congress is still more likely to actively represent them within the legislature, and that this is further enhanced by improvements in district ambient temperature.

In the Senate, however, there appears to be a disconnect when it comes to this expected dyadic relationship. An example of this can be seen in the senators from Rhode Island and Vermont. These two northeastern states consistently have one of the highest percentages of same-sex couples, but none of their senators included in the sample have cultivated a reputation as an advocate for LGBTQ individuals. Clearly, other factors outside of the status of the group within a state are the driving force behind a senator's choice to form a legislative reputation as an advocate for racial/ethnic minorities and the LGBTQ community. Because of this, these groups cannot feel confident that their likelihood of being represented by their own senator will increase even if their numbers or the state-wide feelings towards them as a group go up.

The insignificant impact of partisanship on the chance that a senator will decide to form a reputation as an advocate for these groups is also striking. Even in a context where few senators take on this responsibility and choose to advocate for racial/ethnic minorities or LGBTQ people, Republicans are not significantly more or less likely to take this leap, once the partisan leaning of a state is taken into account. The more Democratic a state is, the more likely it is that a senator will form some portion of their reputation

around advocating for the LGBTQ community. Notably, however, the partisan leaning

of a state does not impact the choice of a senator to cultivate a reputation as a

racial/ethnic minority advocate. Given how closely tied racial/ethnic minorities are to the

Democratic coalition, particularly for Black Americans, this relationship (or lack thereof)

is stunning. One of the biggest factors influencing if a senator will have a reputation as

an advocate for racial/ethnic minorities is instead whether or not they are representing a

state in the South. The decade fixed effects also have a particularly strong and significant

effect on reputation formation, indicating that the likelihood of having a reputation as an

advocate for racial/ethnic minorities in the senate was considerably larger in the 1990s

and 2000s than in the current decade.

IMMIGRANTS AND THE POOR

The models demonstrating the effect of ambient temperature and group size on

the likelihood of a senator having a reputation as a group advocate for immigrants and the

poor are shown in Table 5.5. Here, too, there are some important similarities and

differences in the effects of these variables on senators relative to members of the House.

Both the percentage of immigrants and the poor in a district and the group ambient

temperature, when evaluated independently, had a significant impact on whether or not a

member of the House would craft a reputation as a group advocate. In the Senate, these

patterns are different.

As seen in Table 5.5, the percentage of immigrants in a state has a significant and

positive effect on whether or not a senator makes the choice to integrate some level of

advocacy on behalf of immigrants into their legislative reputation. Reputations for

primary or secondary advocacy, though, are not significantly affected by group size within a state. This is similar to the effects observed for senators with reputations as advocates of veterans or seniors—superficial advocacy is significantly driven by state demographics, while higher levels of advocacy in the Senate are encouraged by other factors. Variation in ambient temperature towards immigrants across states, however, consistently does not have a significant effect, even when examined in isolation.

Table 5.5. Group Size, Ambient Temperature and Member Reputation for Advocacy for Immigrants and the Poor.

	Immigrants						Poor					
	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
Group Size	0.104	-0.076	--	--	0.104	-0.075	0.008	0.034	--	--	-0.006	-0.001
	0.00	0.69			0.01	0.69	0.85	0.53			0.90	0.99
Ambient Temperature	--	--	0.029	0.010	0.001	-0.017	--	--	-0.068	-0.155	-0.070	-0.155
			0.61	0.95	0.99	0.92			0.23	0.11	0.24	0.12
Republican	1.014	1.927	0.790	1.455	1.014	2.018	-0.518	-0.917	-0.533	-0.915	-0.535	-0.913
	0.03	0.09	0.07	0.16	0.03	0.16	0.08	0.03	0.07	0.03	0.07	0.03
Dem Pres Vote	0.014	0.074	0.043	0.058	0.014	0.076	0.058	0.038	0.057	0.035	0.057	0.034
	0.58	0.20	0.07	0.03	0.59	0.18	0.02	0.25	0.01	0.26	0.02	0.28
South	-0.474	-16.656	-0.576	-14.331	-0.474	-16.652	-0.277	-1.095	-0.268	-0.956	-0.251	-0.962
	0.40	0.00	0.30	0.00	0.40	0.00	0.39	0.10	0.42	0.11	0.43	0.13
1990s	-0.136	-2.751	-0.233	-1.166	-0.122	-3.079	0.465	1.258	0.220	0.665	0.206	0.662
	0.77	0.25	0.79	0.66	0.89	0.40	0.16	0.02	0.56	0.31	0.61	0.31
2000s	-0.587	-0.996	-0.700	-1.119	-0.587	-1.056	0.536	0.986	0.226	0.235	0.203	0.229
	0.15	0.26	0.08	0.28	0.15	0.35	0.12	0.12	0.57	0.76	0.65	0.76
First Term	-0.459		-0.578		-0.460		-0.316		-0.329		-0.331	
	0.47		0.35		0.47		0.28		0.27		0.28	
Constant	-4.373	-6.529	-6.008	-7.201	-4.428	-5.837	-4.409	-5.213	0.657	6.461	0.901	6.486
	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.34	0.19	0.47	0.01	0.01	0.88	0.37	0.85	0.39
N	500		500		500		500		500		500	
Wald's Chi ^{2}	988.6		1429.7		1030.9		34.6		38.1		38.6	
Pseudo R^2	0.0903		0.0536		0.0904		0.0681		0.0743		0.0743	

Note: Coefficients calculated using generalized ordered logistic regression, with First Term modeled as a parallel proportional term and the rest of the independent variables modeled as partial proportional terms. Standard errors are clustered by member, and p-values are in grey. Model 0 represents the likelihood of a shift from no advocacy to superficial or primary/secondary advocacy, and Model 1 is no advocacy or superficial advocacy to primary/secondary advocacy.

When it comes to senators with reputations for advocating on behalf of the poor, neither group size nor ambient temperature is a significant driver of their decision. This insignificance of group size to the choice to craft a reputation as an advocate of the poor is important. It indicates, much like with advocates of racial/ethnic minorities and the LGBTQ community, that there is a disconnect between senators' reputation-building choices and what some of the basic principles of a representational democracy would predict for groups that are not generally considered to be highly deserving of government assistance.

The effects of senators' party affiliation on reputations for advocacy on behalf of immigrants and the poor have several layers of nuance. While Republican senators are less likely to form a reputation as a primary or secondary advocate for the poor, the effects of partisanship dissipate when the bar for advocacy for those in poverty is lowered to a superficial level. Conversely, partisanship has an insignificant effect on the formation of primary or secondary reputations as immigrant advocates, but Republican senators are actually *more* likely to cultivate at least a superficial reputation around advocating for immigrants. This likely speaks to the fact that, in the 1990s and much of the 2000s, issues pertaining to immigrants were considerably more bipartisan than is the case in the 115th Congress. Republicans like Connie Mack (FL) and Alan Simpson (WY) exemplified this—while advocating for immigrants was never their primary concern in the Senate, they did serve as consistent, supportive voices for a compassionate approach. This is still seen in the current decade as well, as with the junior and senior Republican senators from Arizona, Jeff Flake and John McCain.

Senators from the South are significantly less likely to form a primary or secondary reputation as advocates for immigrants, but geography does not have a significant effect on the formation of a reputation that at least reaches the level of superficial advocacy. However, southern senators are no more or less likely to have a reputation as an advocate for the poor, which makes another departure from the dynamics of reputation formation in the House. Democratic-leaning states are more likely to produce senators that openly work to benefit the poor at some level of advocacy, though not primary/secondary advocates in particular, while partisan leaning does not have a significant effect on immigrant advocacy.

WOMEN

Table 5.6 shows the estimated effects of group size and ambient temperature on the likelihood that a senator will have a reputation for advocating on behalf of women. The initial pattern that stands out in these models is that the percentage of women in a state has a significant and negative relationship with senator reputation as a women's advocate. As discussed in the previous chapter, women are the only disadvantaged group being considered here whose representation should *not* be dependent upon group size, as women consistently make up roughly 50% of the population in each state (give or take about two percentage points). This means that in every state, women are a strong electoral force, and the very small variation across states should have no effect on that. Thus, the fact that the percentage of women in a state has not just a significant relationship, but a significant *negative* relationship, is at first perplexing. After a more

in-depth examination, however, it can be seen that this result is masking other dynamics

at work.

Table 5.6. Group Size, Ambient Temperature and Member Reputation for Advocacy for Women.

	Women					
	0	1	0	1	0	1
Group Size	-0.115	-0.715	--	--	-0.114	-0.739
	0.69	0.05			0.702	0.043
Ambient Temperature	--	--	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.05
			0.95	0.55	0.96	0.52
Republican	-0.273	-0.479	-0.305	-0.429	-0.276	-0.396
	0.48	0.49	0.43	0.50	0.48	0.58
Dem Pres Vote	0.059	0.129	0.054	0.098	0.059	0.136
	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.00
South	-0.364	1.364	-0.439	0.632	-0.362	1.320
	0.48	0.21	0.37	0.49	0.48	0.23
1990s	0.839	0.513	0.819	0.064	0.839	0.523
	0.02	0.41	0.03	0.90	0.02	0.39
2000s	0.159	0.096	0.138	-0.450	0.171	-0.143
	0.65	0.86	0.68	0.25	0.63	0.77
First Term	-0.690		-0.694		-0.693	
	0.05		0.049		0.050	
Constant	0.796	26.104	-4.916	-9.995	0.889	24.312
	0.96	0.15	0.17	0.02	0.96	0.18
N	500		500		500	
Wald's Chi^2	39.7		49.6		42.1	
Pseudo R^2	0.093		0.0825		0.0946	

Note: Coefficients calculated using generalized ordered logistic regression, with First Term modeled as a parallel proportional term and the rest of the independent variables modeled as partial proportional terms. Standard errors are clustered by member, and p-values are in grey. Model 0 represents the likelihood of a shift from no advocacy to superficial or primary/secondary advocacy, and Model 1 is no advocacy or superficial advocacy to primary/secondary advocacy.

In Table 5.6, group size essentially serves as an inadvertent proxy for descriptive

representation. The states with the highest percentage of women also happen to be states

that tend not to elect women to serve in the Senate. The three states with the highest

concentration of women—Mississippi, Alabama, and Pennsylvania—have never elected

a woman to the U.S. Senate.[36] Out of the ten states included in this analysis with the

highest percentage of women, six of them have never elected a woman to serve in the

Senate, and one of them, Massachusetts, only elected a woman to the Senate for the first

time in 2012.[37]

Though untangling the tantalizing riddle of why this negative relationship

between the percentage of women in a state and actually electing women to the Senate

exists is beyond the scope of this project, its effects are clearly visible. In the Senate, just

as in the House, female representatives are markedly and significantly more likely to

build reputations as women's advocates than male representatives. Once the presence of

female senators is taken into account, the coefficient showing the estimated effects of

group size loses significance. Though the precise effects of descriptive representation

across groups are examined in more detail later in the chapter, models retaining all

present variables while also adding an indicator that denotes the senator's gender can be

found in Table C-1 of the Appendix.

Table 5.6 also reveals that, once again, ambient temperature does not have a

statistically significant effect on a senator's choice to build a reputation as a women's

advocate. Given that there is very little variation across states and districts in their gender

composition, ambient temperature towards women within a state would be expected to

play an even larger role in a senator's decision-making when seeking to build their

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[36] There have been two women that were appointed to serve in the Senate from the state of Alabama. The first, Dixie Bibb Graves, served only four months in the late 1930s after being appointed by her husband to hold the seat and did not compete in the special election. The second woman, Maryon Pittman Allen, was appointed in 1978 after her husband, Senator James Allen, died in office. Allen did run for the seat, but was defeated in the primary, and resigned immediately after the election, having only served for five months.

[37] The ten states with the highest percentage of women, from highest to lowest, are Mississippi, Alabama, Pennsylvania, New York, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, West Virginia, Louisiana, Missouri, and Tennessee. Elizabeth Warren is the female senator that was elected by the state of Massachusetts in 2012.

legislative reputations than might be the case for other disadvantaged groups. This is, in fact, the dynamic that is present in the House, where an increase in the ambient temperature makes members more likely to have a reputation as a women's advocate, even when considered jointly with group size. But this is not the case in the Senate, where, as with the other groups analyzed here, reputations as women's advocates are driven by factors outside of the ambient temperature toward women within the state. Additionally, a senator's party affiliation does not have a significant effect on member reputation, but senators representing states that lean Democratic are more likely to have a reputation as an advocate for women.

DISCUSSION

In each of these cases, when considering those who build reputations as advocates for any one of these disadvantaged groups, the non-significant impact of state ambient temperature on those decisions is an important and noteworthy departure from what was seen in the House. The initial hypotheses laid out in Chapter 2 indicate that in states that feel more warmly towards a particular disadvantaged group, a senator should be more likely to incorporate advocacy on that group's behalf into their legislative reputation, but this is not what these results show. Instead, ambient temperature has no appreciable effect on the reputation a senator chooses to build.

The disparity in effects of group size on senator reputation between the House and the Senate are also critically important for understanding the different forces driving the representation of disadvantaged groups in each of the two chambers. In the House, the size of a disadvantaged group in a district had a significant effect on member reputation

for nearly every group (except for women). Thus, in the House, there is a strong dyadic

relationship between how many of a representative's constituents belong to a

disadvantaged group, and the intentional effort put in on their behalf.

In the Senate, however, the strength of this dyad appears to rest upon how

generally deserving of government assistance a group is broadly perceived to be. For the

two groups included in the analysis with a high level of perceived deservingness—

veterans and seniors—and one of the groups with a more mixed level of perceived

deservingness—immigrants—their size within a state has an important impact on the

likelihood that a senator will build a reputation as an advocate on their behalf. But for

racial/ethnic minorities, the LGBTQ community, and the poor—groups with generally

mixed or lower levels of perceived deservingness of government assistance—variations

in the size of their group within a state do not have a significant effect on a member's

decision to include advocating for them in their legislative reputation.

So far, this analysis has demonstrated that while the reputations that members

choose to build as disadvantaged group advocates in the House are significantly impacted

by the size and ambient temperature towards that group, senators tend to rely on other

factors to make their decisions, especially for groups that are not broadly considered to be

deserving of government assistance. But if group size and ambient temperature tend not

to be significant elements in the decision to craft a reputation as an advocate for

disadvantaged groups, what is? Next, I turn to the institutional and electoral factors that

contribute to reputation formation in the U.S. Senate.

Alternative Drivers of Reputation Formation in the U.S. Senate

In this section, I pursue three alternative explanations to explore the extent to which certain elements of the institutional and electoral environment can take precedence over constituency-specific factors for senators making decisions about whether or not to actively include disadvantaged groups within their legislative reputations. Specifically, I will evaluate the following hypotheses: the *electoral insecurity hypothesis*, the *in-state differentiation* hypothesis, and the *collective amplification hypothesis*.[38]

ELECTORAL INSECURITY HYPOTHESIS

Almost as a rule, most members of Congress tend to be fairly risk-adverse—they don't want to take actions that have a high likelihood of jeopardizing their chance at being reelected—but this caution is even stronger within the Senate (Schiller 2000). On average, incumbent senators have a lower probability of getting reelected than an incumbent member of the House (Jacobson 2013). Senators are not oblivious to this fact—they know that they are more likely to face a competitive race during their next election cycle, and they make strategic choices in their legislative behavior to try to position themselves as well as possible for that fight. Given this risk-avoidant environment, it is possible that only the senators who perceive themselves to have the safest seats are willing to take the risk of focusing at least some of their legislative reputation around serving disadvantaged groups—especially those that are considered to be less deserving of government assistance.

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[38] For a deeper comparison and to further illustrate the differences in the institutional and electoral environments between the House and the Senate, a replication of the analysis of the electoral insecurity hypothesis and the collective amplification hypothesis in the House of Representatives, as well as a short discussion, can be found in Appendix D.

The *electoral insecurity hypothesis* builds off of these assumptions, and predicts that the closer a senator's previous election, the less likely they are to want to be known as an advocate of the disadvantaged. Senators who survived a "close call" in their last election spend more time looking over their shoulder, and may be less inclined to take the chance of alienating constituents in their state who are less comfortable with members of a given disadvantaged group. In the next section, I evaluate this hypothesis by examining the impact of a senator's state vote share in their most recent election on the likelihood that they will have chosen to build a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate.

IN-STATE DIFFERENTIATION HYPOTHESIS

In her book *Partners and Rivals*, Wendy Schiller argues that senators seek to differentiate themselves from their same-state counterparts by crafting intentionally distinctive reputations for subject-matter expertise within the institution. She demonstrates this both through case studies and by comparing the legislative similarity of same-state senators across measures such as roll-call votes, committee assignments, and bill cosponsorship, and finds that the legislative pairings of these same-state senators rarely mirror one another. By this logic, same-state senators should also be less likely to form legislative reputations as advocates for the same disadvantaged group. However, the degree to which Schiller's argument can be expanded to shed additional light on a senator's decision to include disadvantaged group advocacy within their legislative reputation is an open question.

During the over two decades that they served together, California senators Barbara Boxer (D) and Diane Feinstein (D) could be an example of this sort of

differentiation when it comes to disadvantaged group advocacy. During her time in the House, Sen. Boxer had already begun developing a reputation as a primary advocate for women, which she continued when she reached the Senate. But despite being a woman herself and coming from a state where such advocacy was clearly not discouraged, Sen. Feinstein developed a legislative reputation that did not include prominent advocacy for women's issues. This is what would be expected if same-state senators intentionally chose not to develop the same advocacy reputations. As a counter example, though, citizens of Ohio were represented in the 1990s by two senators, John Glenn (D) and Howard Metzenbaum (D), who both had developed legislative reputations as superficial advocates for women.

A primary reason for this uncertainty is that disadvantaged group advocacy is not always a conventional subset of subject-matter expertise in the way that crime, environmental, or tax policy would be. Disadvantaged group advocacy can span a huge range of issues and subject areas, and is only occasionally tethered to a singular committee or area of expertise. For example, during a conversation about how members think about their advocacy, one staffer for a member with a reputation for women's advocacy outright rejected the notion that there exists a single set of "women's issues." They explained that women's concerns are instead incorporated into the broader subject matter that the member focuses on, such as labor or healthcare. Former Kansas Sen. Bob Dole (R) provides another illustration of the distinction between group advocacy and subject-matter expertise. Before his time as a Republican presidential candidate or Senate Majority Leader, Bob Dole was known as an expert on agriculture policy. But

within that context he also built a reputation as an advocate for people in poverty through his concentrated efforts to expand the food stamp program.

Given these important differences between policy-domain expertise and group advocacy, it is worth investigating whether or not a senator takes into account their same-state counterpart's reputation for disadvantaged group advocacy when making decisions about their own reputation, in the same way that they would take into account their counterpart's subject-matter specialization. The *in-state differentiation hypothesis* predicts that senators with a same-state counterpart who has integrated advocacy for a given disadvantaged group into their legislative reputation will be less likely to have one themselves. To evaluate this hypothesis, I include in the analysis a categorical variable denoting the type of reputation for group advocacy held by a senator's same-state counterpart.

COLLECTIVE AMPLIFICATION HYPOTHESIS

Toddlers, teenagers, and frankly most human beings, are more likely to do something if the people around them are doing it as well. This is particularly true for actions that are potentially risky. A child who has never leapt off a diving board is more likely to take the plunge after watching their friends jump and emerge from the water unscathed. Drivers on the interstate are more likely to exceed the speed limit if the cars around them are speeding as well. So too it may be for senators facing the decision to cultivate a legislative reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate.

The *collective amplification hypothesis* predicts that as the total number of disadvantaged group advocates within the institution increases, other senators will be

more likely to incorporate at least a superficial level of advocacy for that group into their legislative reputations as well. As more senators feel comfortable crafting a reputation that includes advocating for a given disadvantaged group, perceptions of the risk associated with including such advocacy into one's legislative reputation may decline, leading others to then do the same. To evaluate this hypothesis, I add a variable for the number of other senators with a reputation for advocacy for each disadvantaged group in a given Congress.

Institutional Environment, Electoral History, and Reputation Formation

In this section, the three alternative hypotheses described above are tested by incorporating the relevant variables into the same generalized ordered logistic regression models utilized above. To evaluate the impact of these additional variables on senator reputation relative to that of the constituency variables previously described, I estimate these effects of the institutional and electoral variables both independently and all together. The results of these models are displayed in Tables 5.7 – 5.10.

VETERANS AND SENIORS

Table 5.7 displays the effects of these additional institutional and electoral variables on the likelihood of a senator having a reputation as an advocate for seniors and veterans. For both of these cases, a senator's vote share from their most recent election does not significantly impact their choice to serve as an advocate. This implies that, at least when advocacy for these groups is considered, the electoral insecurity hypothesis is not supported. However, because veterans and seniors are generally considered to be broadly deserving of government assistance, it is not unexpected that the negative effects

of electoral insecurity would be attenuated—the positive regard with which these groups are held creates a relatively low-risk advocacy environment.

Table 5.7. Institutional, Electoral, and Constituency Effects on Member Reputation for Advocacy for Veterans and Seniors.

	Veterans						Seniors					
	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
Total Advocates	0.167	-0.083	--	--	0.167	-0.222	0.061	-0.003	--	--	0.062	-0.017
	0.05	0.64			0.05	0.56	0.03	0.96			0.03	0.77
Same State Advocate	0.163	-0.697	--	--	0.190	-0.585	0.086	-0.394	--	--	0.103	-0.505
	0.64	0.31			0.59	0.43	0.67	0.30			0.60	0.24
Previous Vote Share	--	--	-0.015	-0.029	-0.011	-0.063	--	--	0.014	-0.043	0.015	-0.053
			0.49	0.54	0.61	0.45			0.36	0.23	0.35	0.14
Group Size	0.313	0.369	0.316	0.379	0.310	0.295	0.023	-0.053	0.023	0.010	0.023	0.015
	0.00	0.16	0.00	0.24	0.01	0.36	0.06	0.68	0.05	0.86	0.05	0.66
Ambient Temperature	-0.051	0.087	-0.053	0.022	-0.055	0.117	-0.006	-0.008	-0.006	-0.006	-0.003	-0.036
	0.347	0.665	0.34	0.91	0.29	0.62	0.933	0.945	0.93	0.96	0.97	0.74
Republican	-0.744	-1.081	-0.690	-0.946	-0.741	-0.896	-0.687	-2.150	-0.783	-2.162	-0.690	-2.394
	0.06	0.39	0.09	0.33	0.06	0.47	0.07	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.07	0.01
Dem Pres Vote	-0.001	-0.038	0.005	-0.031	0.000	-0.025	-0.001	0.003	-0.011	0.032	-0.001	0.020
	0.96	0.64	0.87	0.63	0.99	0.79	0.97	0.94	0.53	0.46	0.97	0.65
South	0.050	0.005	0.086	0.452	0.093	-0.113	-0.010	0.757	-0.020	0.740	-0.040	1.082
	0.91	1.00	0.84	0.50	0.82	0.92	0.98	0.23	0.96	0.23	0.91	0.10
1990s	-0.391	0.208	-0.964	0.083	-0.440	0.408	-0.010	-0.418	-0.506	-0.620	0.051	-0.691
	0.53	0.91	0.12	0.97	0.48	0.83	0.98	0.59	0.06	0.19	0.89	0.37
2000s	-1.059	-1.534	-1.954	-1.569	-1.042	-1.960	--	--	--	--	--	--
	0.19	0.19	0.00	0.29	0.21	0.17						
First Term	-1.115		-1.166		-1.152		-0.474		-0.473		-0.431	
	0.08		0.07		0.07		0.29		0.29		0.32	
Constant	-2.948	-10.854	-0.896	-6.971	-2.484	-10.480	-2.072	-1.163	-0.442	-2.952	-2.668	0.491
	0.46	0.52	0.82	0.59	0.52	0.51	0.73	0.90	0.94	0.76	0.64	0.96
N	500		500		500		400		400		400	
Wald's Chi ^{2}	74.0		45.7		71.4		41.1		28.9		38.1	
Pseudo R^2	0.0875		0.0659		0.0941		0.0709		0.0655		0.0832	

Note: Coefficients calculated using generalized ordered logistic regression, with First Term modeled as a parallel proportional term and the rest of the independent variables modeled as partial proportional terms. Standard errors are clustered by member, and p-values are in grey. Model 0 represents the likelihood of a shift from no advocacy to superficial or primary/secondary advocacy, and Model 1 is no advocacy or superficial advocacy to primary/secondary advocacy. Feeling thermometer questions for seniors were not included in the ANES of the 2010s, so the decade base category for seniors is the 2000s.

Of the two variables representing the advocacy environment within the institution, only one has a statistically significant relationship with senator reputation. As the number of senators who incorporate advocacy for veterans and seniors increases, there is an increased likelihood that other senators will follow suit, at least at the superficial advocacy level. Having a same-state counterpart with a reputation as an advocate for veterans and seniors, however, has no effect on reputation formation. These models provide support for the collective amplification hypothesis, but not the same-state differentiation hypothesis. This evidence of the significance of the institutional advocacy context provides an important layer to understanding when and why senators form reputations as advocates for veterans and seniors, but it also does not eliminate the importance of the district constituency effects—group size remains a significant driver of the choice to incorporate this advocacy at least at a superficial level.

LGBTQ AND RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES

Models estimating the effects of electoral insecurity and institutional advocacy context on senator reputation as an advocate for racial/ethnic minorities and the LGBTQ community are given in Table 5.8. Here too, a senator's vote share in the previous election does not significantly impact a senator's decision to cultivate a reputation as a group advocate. Once again, the electoral insecurity hypothesis is not supported. While this was not unexpected when considering advocacy on behalf of groups with a high level of perceived deservingness, the context of advocacy for groups like racial/ethnic minorities and the LGBTQ community is where electoral insecurity should have its strongest effects. Instead, models imply that relative electoral marginality is not a pivotal

factor that senators use to make decisions about the reputations they craft as disadvantaged group advocates.

Table 5.8. Institutional, Electoral, and Constituency Effects on Member Reputation for Advocacy for Racial/Ethnic Minorities and the LGBTQ Community.

	LGBTQ			Race/Ethnicity					
	logit	*logit*	*logit*	0	1	0	1	0	1
Total Advocates	0.880	--	0.902	0.251	1.249	--	--	0.188	3.262
	0.04		0.03	0.10	0.48			0.23	0.16
Same State Advocate	--	--	--	-0.055	0.018	--	--	0.096	7.033
				0.92	0.99			0.84	0.24
Previous Vote Share	--	-0.006	-0.012	--	--	0.040	-0.060	0.035	-0.369
		0.81	0.57			0.10	0.58	0.17	0.26
Group Size	-3.251	-1.827	-3.270	0.009	0.018	0.009	-0.025	0.014	-0.069
	0.30	0.46	0.30	0.49	0.72	0.49	0.38	0.29	0.28
Ambient Temperature	0.062	0.055	0.063	0.071	0.440	0.069	0.459	0.037	2.123
	0.50	0.56	0.50	0.48	0.38	0.49	0.52	0.72	0.16
Republican	-0.534	-0.619	-0.544	0.477	0.751	0.582	-2.361	0.795	-6.477
	0.60	0.54	0.59	0.31	0.51	0.22	0.43	0.11	0.33
Dem Pres Vote	0.119	0.085	0.124	0.052	0.146	0.045	0.038	0.052	0.677
	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.16	0.74	0.15	0.51	0.19	0.23
South	-0.665	-0.650	-0.617	-1.155	-12.287	-1.308	-15.899	-1.151	-13.657
	0.52	0.52	0.55	0.05	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.06	0.00
1990s	0.384	-0.393	0.400	0.837	10.763	2.580	20.795	0.929	5.612
	0.83	0.85	0.83	0.60	0.30	0.03	0.00	0.58	0.49
2000s	1.559	-0.189	1.635	0.906	10.962	1.616	15.815	0.892	0.976
	0.20	0.89	0.19	0.48	0.11	0.17	0.00	0.49	0.92
First Term	-0.803	-0.959	-0.834	-0.927		-0.817		-0.516	
	0.38	0.32	0.37	0.15		0.22		0.45	
Constant	-14.450	-9.236	-14.603	-12.547	-60.532	-12.591	-51.859	-11.070	-196.836
	0.01	0.13	0.01	0.09	0.27	0.09	0.31	0.13	0.13
N	500	500	500	500		500		500	
Wald's Chi²	13.8	14.4	19.2	1631.7		769.3		3221.8	
Pseudo R^2	0.1166	0.0915	0.1177	0.1577		0.1553		0.2261	

Note: Coefficients for LGBTQ are estimated using logistic regression, as necessitated by the bivariate coding of the LGBTQ advocacy reputation variable. Coefficients for racial/ethnic minorities are calculated using generalized ordered logistic regression, with First Term modeled as a parallel proportional term and the rest of the independent variables modeled as partial proportional terms. Standard errors are clustered by member, and p-values are in grey. Model 0 represents the likelihood of a shift from no advocacy to superficial or primary/secondary advocacy, and Model 1 is no advocacy or superficial advocacy to primary/secondary advocacy. Presence of same-state advocate is omitted from the LGBTQ models due to perfect prediction; there are no states for which both senators have reputations as LGBTQ advocates.

While electoral insecurity is insignificant across each of the models estimated in Table 5.8, the institutional advocacy context variables do not have the same effect on the likelihood of having a reputation as a racial/ethnic minority advocate as they do reputations for LGBTQ advocacy. The decision to craft a reputation as an advocate for racial/ethnic minorities is not significantly impacted by the number of other senators with reputations as minority advocates nor by the presence of a same-state advocate. The decision to form a reputation as an LGBTQ advocate, however, is significantly related to the number of other advocates within the institution, providing further support for the collective amplification hypothesis.

IMMIGRANTS AND THE POOR

Table 5.9 displays the coefficients demonstrating the estimated effects of electoral insecurity and the institutional advocacy context on the likelihood of a senator having a reputation as an advocate for immigrants and the poor. Across all of these models, the effects of partisanship on senator reputation retain their significance, as does the effect of the percentage of immigrants within a state. Senators from more Democratic-leaning states also remain more likely to have at least a superficial advocate for the poor. Though, a senator's previous vote share yet again does not exhibit a significant effect on the choice to build a reputation as group advocate.

The presence of a same-state senator with a reputation as an advocate for immigrants or the poor once again does not have a significant effect on senator reputation, and thus fails to provide support for the same-state differentiation hypothesis. Additionally, while having a larger number of other senators who are actively known as

Table 5.9. Institutional, Electoral, and Constituency Effects on Reputation for Advocacy for Immigrants and the Poor.

	Immigrants						Poor					
	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
Total Advocates	0.166	1.543	--	--	0.174	1.653	0.099	0.055	--	--	0.098	0.055
	0.58	0.15			0.56	0.25	0.02	0.29			0.02	0.30
Same State Advocate	0.271	0.290	--	--	0.279	0.543	0.238	0.202	--	--	0.231	0.204
	0.52	0.67			0.51	0.67	0.12	0.33			0.13	0.33
Previous Vote Share	--	--	0.029	0.042	0.029	0.047	--	--	0.008	0.000	0.006	-0.002
			0.09	0.28	0.09	0.60			0.55	0.98	0.70	0.91
Group Size	0.104	-0.108	0.114	-0.063	0.114	-0.097	-0.002	0.001	-0.008	-0.003	-0.003	0.000
	0.01	0.64	0.00	0.73	0.00	0.66	0.97	0.98	0.86	0.96	0.95	1.00
Ambient Temperature	0.002	-0.165	-0.003	-0.013	-0.002	-0.167	-0.063	-0.149	-0.069	-0.158	-0.062	-0.152
	0.98	0.36	0.96	0.93	0.97	0.35	0.30	0.14	0.24	0.11	0.30	0.14
Republican	0.984	2.423	1.075	2.035	1.046	1.978	-0.510	-0.887	-0.534	-0.900	-0.509	-0.873
	0.04	0.18	0.03	0.20	0.03	0.55	0.08	0.03	0.07	0.03	0.09	0.04
Dem Pres Vote	0.012	0.094	0.014	0.073	0.011	0.081	0.061	0.038	0.056	0.034	0.061	0.037
	0.67	0.26	0.58	0.19	0.67	0.33	0.03	0.29	0.02	0.29	0.03	0.31
South	-0.448	-16.794	-0.467	-15.305	-0.439	-16.764	-0.234	-0.905	-0.265	-0.954	-0.244	-0.893
	0.44	0.00	0.40	0.00	0.44	0.00	0.46	0.17	0.41	0.14	0.45	0.17
1990s	0.522	-1.287	-0.085	-2.984	0.591	-0.638	-0.562	0.209	0.211	0.654	-0.555	0.201
	0.73	0.71	0.92	0.40	0.69	0.89	0.24	0.79	0.60	0.33	0.24	0.80
2000s	0.081	4.707	-0.652	-1.309	0.042	4.964	-0.476	-0.143	0.189	0.200	-0.481	-0.162
	0.95	0.26	0.12	0.30	0.97	0.34	0.34	0.87	0.68	0.80	0.34	0.86
First Term	-0.448		-0.388		-0.369		-0.247		-0.299		-0.227	
	0.48		0.54		0.55		0.43		0.32		0.46	
Constant	-5.891	-13.363	-4.875	-6.725	-6.395	-14.427	-1.670	-0.247	0.758	6.726	-1.753	5.156
	0.18	0.17	0.14	0.35	0.14	0.20	0.75	0.43	0.88	0.38	0.74	0.53
N	500		500		500		500		500		500	
Wald's Chi ^{2}	1247.0		970.1		1539.6		59.4		39.6		60.1	
Pseudo R^2	0.1053		0.0980		0.1129		0.0864		0.0751		0.0868	

Note: Coefficients calculated using generalized ordered logistic regression, with First Term modeled as a parallel proportional term and the rest of the independent variables modeled as partial proportional terms. Standard errors are clustered by member, and p-values are in grey. Model 0 represents the likelihood of a shift from no advocacy to superficial or primary/secondary advocacy, and Model 1 is no advocacy or superficial advocacy to primary/secondary advocacy.

immigrant advocates does not have a significant impact on the choice to build a reputation as an advocate for immigrants, it does significantly enhance the chances that a senator will have a reputation as at least a superficial advocate for the poor, providing mixed support between these two cases for the collective amplification hypothesis.

Table 5.10 presents the models demonstrating the effects on senator reputation as a women's advocate for each of the institutional, electoral, and

Table 5.10. Institutional, Electoral, and Constituency Effects on Member Reputation for Advocacy for Women.

	Women					
	0	1	0	1	0	1
Total Advocates	0.167	0.276	--	--	0.167	0.265
	0.00	0.03			0.00	0.04
Same State Advocate	-0.087	-0.371	--	--	-0.114	-0.354
	0.67	0.23			0.58	0.23
Previous Vote Share	--	--	-0.019	0.002	-0.019	-0.004
			0.37	0.95	0.38	0.88
Group Size	-0.176	-0.953	-0.102	-0.798	-0.172	-0.950
	0.56	0.03	0.73	0.05	0.57	0.02
Ambient Temperature	-0.005	0.051	-0.006	0.071	-0.007	0.067
	0.93	0.55	0.92	0.36	0.90	0.41
Republican	-0.215	-0.125	-0.277	-0.579	-0.218	-0.293
	0.58	0.87	0.48	0.46	0.57	0.73
Dem Pres Vote	0.076	0.181	0.061	0.134	0.079	0.177
	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00
South	-0.277	1.553	-0.332	1.362	-0.231	1.542
	0.59	0.21	0.50	0.21	0.65	0.18
1990s	-0.658	-1.661	0.813	0.609	-0.673	-1.539
	0.15	0.11	0.02	0.31	0.15	0.15
2000s	-0.035	-0.211	0.216	-0.249	0.008	-0.313
	0.92	0.77	0.54	0.59	0.98	0.62
First Term	-0.651		-0.770		-0.726	
	0.06		0.03		0.04	
Constant	1.588	29.493	0.689	26.228	1.640	28.898
	0.92	0.14	0.97	0.17	0.92	0.14
N	500		500		500	
Wald's Chi^2	45.7		45.9		50.2	
Pseudo R^2	0.1132		0.0988		0.1166	

Note: Coefficients calculated using generalized ordered logistic regression, with First Term modeled as a parallel proportional term and the rest of the independent variables modeled as partial proportional terms. Standard errors are clustered by member, and p-values are in grey. Model 0 represents the likelihood of a shift from no advocacy to superficial or primary/secondary advocacy, and Model 1 is no advocacy or superficial advocacy to primary/secondary advocacy.

constituency factors introduced to this point. These models show that senators

representing more Democratic-leaning states remain significantly more likely to have a

reputation as an advocate for women, and that the percentage of women within a state

retains its significant effect.[39] As has been the case for all groups for which advocacy on

their behalf has been examined, the models also indicate that variation in a senator's vote

share from their most recent election does not have a significant effect on member

reputation. These models do, however, provide further support for the collective

amplification hypothesis, as evidenced by the significant effect that the total number of

women's advocates has on member reputation for both superficial and primary/secondary

advocacy.

DISCUSSION

　　None of these models demonstrating the relative impact of these institutional,

electoral, and constituency factors on senator reputation as a disadvantaged group

advocate support the electoral insecurity hypothesis. Regardless of the particular group

that senators are known as advocating for, their vote share in their most recent election

does not have a significant effect on the choice to craft such a reputation.[40] At first look,

this result is surprising. Most senators face a more heterogeneous electorate than

members of the House, and the average Senate election is more competitive than the

average House election. Because it is less likely that a single constituent group will

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[39] Again, this significant result is most likely due to the curious correlation between states with the highest percentage of women and states who have never sent a woman to the Senate (as discussed in more detail earlier in the chapter). Because of this, group size is essentially serving as a proxy for descriptive representation, as can be seen in Table C-1 of the Appendix and in Table 5.12.

[40] I also ran these analyses using Cook's Partisan Voter Index (PVI) as a measure of marginality in place of the senator's previous vote share, and the results are not appreciably changed.

dominate in a state in the same way as in a congressional district, it becomes even more important to be sure that representational decisions on behalf of one group do not inadvertently raise the ire of another. But to understand the lack of support for the electoral insecurity hypothesis, it is important to keep in mind what these results do and do not show.

The insignificance of a senator's most recent vote share to the reputations they form demonstrates that close reelections themselves do not actively turn a senator off from building a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate, even for those groups that are generally viewed more skeptically in American society. It does not imply, however, that reelection concerns play no role in reputation formation. These models are also compatible with a circumstance in which, particularly for groups that are not considered to be highly deserving of government assistance, there is no electoral margin that is "safe" enough to push a senator to form a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate in the absence of incentives from other factors. This makes the lack of support for the electoral insecurity hypothesis particularly important, because it implies that a senator's decisions about the electoral risk of their reputational decisions may be untethered to the reality of their electoral situation.

These models also do not provide support for the same-state differentiation hypothesis. There is no evidence, for any of the group advocacy reputations evaluated, that senators are less likely to decide to build a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate on account of their same-state senator being known for similar advocacy work. This serves to demonstrate how unique disadvantaged group advocacy is relative to more subject-matter specific specializations. These results also actually emphasize the

importance of considering representation as a reputation built over time by an assortment of actions (over which a senator has a wide range of latitude), rather than a specific set of policy preferences or pre-determined types of member behavior.

The collective amplification hypothesis, however, receives strong support. Women, the poor, the LGBTQ community, veterans, and seniors are significantly more likely to gain additional senators as advocates for their needs as the number of advocates within the institution increases.[41] Note that this effect was present in a model that controlled for underlying public opinion toward the group. Having higher numbers of senators who include disadvantaged group advocacy in their legislative reputation not only provides an example to other senators that it can be "safe" to do so, it also raises the salience of issues relevant to these groups. The level of advocacy where the greatest increase is seen is superficial advocacy. Superficial advocates are rarely those who take it upon themselves to insert a disadvantaged group's needs into the conversation, and instead frequently piggy-back off of the actions of others, whether through cosponsorship or some other partnering. Thus, it is perfectly reasonable that as the number of other senators with reputations for advocacy go up, more senators could be induced to join them.

Women's advocates are particularly unique in this, because the boost in the number of other senators with reputations for women's advocacy occurs both for superficial advocates as well as for primary and secondary advocates. This implies that the presence of other advocates within the Senate doesn't just push others to jump on board with less frequent or lower-key actions like cosponsorship, but rather encourages

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[41] Operationalizing other group advocates within the institution as the number of primary or secondary advocates in a given Senate produces similar results.

them to take up a greater role in pushing for the needs and interests of women. In sum, out of all three of these alternative hypotheses, only the collective amplification hypothesis is supported by these models.

Descriptive Representation and Reputation Formation in the U.S. Senate

As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, personal experiences as a member of a disadvantaged group may make a legislator more determined to address some of the challenges group members face, and can also serve as a shortcut for crafting a reputation as a credible group advocate. In the House, descriptive representatives—those who are themselves a member of a disadvantaged group—are significantly more likely to form a reputation as an advocate for nearly all disadvantaged groups under consideration (immigrants and seniors being the exceptions). It is expected that descriptive representation will boost the likelihood that a representative will have a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate in the Senate as well. Given the amount of leeway that senators possess relative to a member of the House in establishing their legislative reputations, those personal experiences as a member of a disadvantaged group may even have an outsized influence in pushing a senator to form a reputation as an advocate. In this section, I specifically examine that relationship, and estimate the impact of being a descriptive representative on the likelihood of a senator building a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate.[42]

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[42] The coding scheme for descriptive representatives matches that used in the analysis of members of the House of Representatives, and is described in detail in Chapter 4.

Table 5.11 shows the number of descriptive representatives included in the dataset, broken down by group and level of advocacy. When looking at this table, there is one inescapable fact that must be acknowledged before moving forward in analyzing the effect of descriptive representation on senator reputation: there simply are far fewer descriptive representatives present in the Senate than in the House. This is particularly evident for descriptive representatives of groups that are considered to be anything less than highly deserving of government assistance. There are two particularly important consequences that follow from having such a small number of cases, with the first being qualitative, and the second quantitative.

Table 5.11. Number of Members Serving as Advocates of Disadvantaged Groups across Descriptive and Non-Descriptive Representatives

		Seniors	*Veterans*	*Women*	*Poor*	*Immigrants*	*Racial/Ethnic Minorities*	*LGBTQ*
Non-DR	*Non*	417	288	402	365	470	455	487
	Superficial	50	15	27	71	21	15	9
	Secondary	17	7	7	36	6	7	3
	Primary	5	0	0	2	1	0	0
	Total	489	310	436	474	498	477	499
DR	*Non*	9	170	28	21	0	21	0
	Superficial	2	14	17	5	2	1	0
	Secondary	0	6	11	0	0	0	0
	Primary	0	0	8	0	0	1	1
	Total	11	190	64	26	2	23	1

First, from a qualitative perspective, these basic descriptive statistics regarding what type of people are present within the institution already say a great deal about some of the critical differences between the two chambers of Congress. For nearly all disadvantaged groups, descriptive representatives are less likely to successfully make it to the Senate than to the House of Representatives. This discrepancy is most

egregious in the case of racial/ethnic minorities, who make up 25% of the sample of members of the House, but less than 5% of senators. While it is not a new observation that there are fewer descriptive representatives in the Senate than in the House, it has important implications for the analysis to follow.

It is beyond the scope of this current project to pin down all of the reasons for this divergence, but the fact that it exists implies that there may be systematic differences between the types of descriptive representatives that are present in the Senate relative to the House. Just under two thirds of racial/ethnic minorities in the House, for instance, have reputations as advocates for racial/ethnic minorities, compared to the less than ten percent of racial/ethnic minorities in the Senate. The implication of this is that, particularly for descriptive representatives for those groups that are not broadly considered to be highly deserving of government assistance, the characteristics it takes to be successful in a Senate election may not be the same as for a House election. This important caveat is addressed in more detail below, when interpreting the results of the analysis for descriptive representatives in the Senate.

Second, from a quantitative perspective, the severely restricted number of cases changes both the best coding of the dependent variable and the type of model that is most appropriate for estimating the effects of descriptive representation. Table 5.11 shows that, among the descriptive representatives in the Senate, there are a number of types of representation for advocacy that are not occupied. To account for the quantity of zeros across these individual categories, reputation is collapsed into a binary variable for the analysis of the effects of descriptive representation on

reputation formation in the Senate.[43] The analysis to follow, then, estimates the

impact of descriptive representation on the likelihood that a member will have a

reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate at any level.

Even after reputation is collapsed to combine all levels of advocacy into a

single category, the number of cases remains small because of the limited number of

total descriptive representatives in the Senate. Given the relative rarity of the event

that a senator will be a descriptive representative with a reputation for group

advocacy, the data shows signs of quasi-complete separation. Quasi-complete

separation occurs when, for one of the two values of a binary independent variable, the

dependent variable takes on the same value. Under such conditions, maximum

likelihood estimates will be biased or inestimable.

Thus, for the analysis to follow, I utilize Firth's method of Penalized

Maximum Likelihood Estimation (1993). This method modifies the estimate

equations to reduce the degree of bias present in the model and to facilitate model

convergence. Test statistics are then computed by comparing the log-likelihood

values of a model in which the separated explanatory variable is constrained to with

the unconstrained model.[44] To perform this analysis, I use Joseph Coveney's firthlogit

program for Stata.

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[43] Senators with reputations as advocates for the LGBTQ community are left out of the analysis, as there is only a single LGBTQ senator included in the dataset. That senator, Tammy Baldwin (D) of Wisconsin, does herself have a primary reputation as an LGBTQ advocate. This provides anecdotal support for the contention that descriptive representatives are more likely to form reputations as advocates for the disadvantaged groups that they themselves are a part of, but there simply is not enough data to perform any statistical analysis.
[44] This method can be sometimes result in an over-correction of bias, which can serve to understate the substantive effects of the variable of interest.

The Impact of Descriptive Representation on Senator Reputation

Table 5.12 presents the coefficients demonstrating the estimated effect of being

a member of a disadvantaged group on the likelihood of a senator having a reputation

as a group advocate. These models also include all variables incorporated in the

sections above, to evaluate their relative impacts. Given the data constraints discussed

above, these models should not be treated as perfect estimates, but rather as the best

means available to glean important insights about the general relationship between

descriptive representation and reputations for disadvantaged group advocacy in the

Senate.

VETERANS, SENIORS, AND RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES

Table 5.12 shows the impact that descriptive representation in the Senate can

have on the representation of groups that are broadly considered to be the most

deserving of government assistance, like veterans and seniors, and those groups that

are considered to be less deserving of assistance, like racial/ethnic minorities. For the

highest deservingness groups, results are mixed. Veterans in the Senate are

significantly more likely to form reputations as veterans' advocates, just as they were

in the House. For seniors, however, entering the institution over the age of 65 does

not make a senator more likely to serve as a senior advocate. With groups that are

considered to be the most deserving of government assistance, descriptive

representation is expected to be less important to a senator's decisions about the

reputation they craft. The results for seniors, then, fit in with these expectations.

Veterans may still be more likely to form reputations as veterans' advocates than non-veterans because of the extra credibility that is granted to them as a result of their military service. Also noteworthy is that group size remains a significant factor in member reputation as an advocate even after descriptive representation is taken into account.

Table 5.12. Descriptive Representatives and Senator Reputation for Advocacy.

	Veterans		Seniors		Race/Ethnicity		Poor		Immigrants		Women	
	logit	*logit*	*logit*	*logit*	*logit*	*logit*	*logit*	*logit*	*logit*	*logit*	*logit*	*logit*
Total Advocates	0.160	0.160	0.057	0.056	0.234	0.242	0.092	0.092	0.144	0.144	0.208	0.216
	0.09	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.03	0.63	0.63	0.01	0.01
Same State Advocate	0.307	0.320	0.116	0.118	0.001	0.002	0.303	0.320	0.392	0.391	-0.479	-0.528
	0.37	0.35	0.60	0.60	1.00	1.00	0.08	0.06	0.31	0.31	0.10	0.08
Previous Vote Share	-0.015	-0.015	0.015	0.018	0.036	0.040	0.005	0.005	0.031	0.031	-0.007	-0.007
	0.45	0.44	0.33	0.24	0.12	0.09	0.71	0.68	0.13	0.13	0.73	0.70
Group Size	0.313	0.307	0.023	0.023	0.008	0.017	-0.002	0.000	0.098	0.098	0.142	0.117
	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.64	0.35	0.95	0.99	0.01	0.01	0.52	0.59
Descriptive Representative	0.701	6.032	0.180	115.938	0.233	48.317	-0.659	-6.126	3.883	7.615	3.688	-2.941
	0.05	0.337	0.81	0.28	0.81	0.07	0.20	0.528	0.02	0.90	0.00	0.64
Ambient Temperature	-0.048	-0.007	-0.005	0.005	0.070	0.111	-0.062	-0.069	0.006	0.006	-0.063	-0.094
	0.374	0.919	0.93	0.93	0.50	0.30	0.19	0.161	0.92	0.92	0.27	0.15
Ambient Temp. & DR	--	-0.074	--	-1.487	--	-0.739	--	0.081	--	-0.091	--	0.118
		0.40		0.28		0.08		0.57		0.94		0.30
Republican	-0.766	-0.745	-0.667	-0.659	0.512	0.578	-0.554	-0.563	0.864	0.863	0.072	0.062
	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.28	0.23	0.03	0.03	0.08	0.08	0.83	0.86
Dem Pres Vote	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	0.002	0.052	0.055	0.057	0.057	0.000	0.001	0.054	0.055
	0.98	0.99	0.97	0.92	0.09	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.99	0.98	0.03	0.03
South	0.075	0.110	-0.003	-0.073	-1.178	-1.282	-0.218	-0.199	-0.578	-0.580	-0.714	-0.731
	0.83	0.76	0.99	0.81	0.07	0.05	0.44	0.48	0.25	0.25	0.10	0.09
1990s	-0.673	-0.614	-0.011	0.019	0.658	0.881	-0.524	-0.524	0.763	0.758	0.223	0.040
	0.30	0.35	0.98	0.96	0.64	0.55	0.29	0.29	0.58	0.58	0.79	0.96
2000s	-1.146	-1.032	--	--	0.564	0.729	-0.419	-0.420	0.018	0.012	0.543	0.431
	0.16	0.21			0.61	0.51	0.41	0.41	0.99	0.99	0.33	0.44
First Term	-0.924	-0.931	-0.345	-0.320	-0.629	-0.881	-0.156	-0.159	-0.568	-0.558	-1.518	-1.462
	0.12	0.12	0.44	0.48	0.38	0.27	0.63	0.62	0.41	0.42	0.01	0.01
Constant	-2.973	-5.993	-2.379	-3.347	-12.598	-15.860	-1.406	-0.960	-5.699	-5.701	-12.088	-9.107
	0.53	0.31	0.61	0.48	0.10	0.05	0.72	0.81	0.14	0.14	0.28	0.42
N	500	500	400	400	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500
Wald's Chi^2	20.8	21.4	18.6	18.8	18.4	20.6	43.6	43.8	23.1	25.4	78.1	79.5
Prob > Chi^2	0.054	0.0663	0.068	0.0949	0.1034	0.0809	0.0000	0.0000	0.027	0.0205	0.0000	0.0000

For groups with lower levels of perceived deservingness of government assistance, results are vastly different from those seen in the House of Representatives. In the House, members who were themselves racial/ethnic minorities were considerably more likely to form a reputation as a minority advocate. As seen in Table 5.12, however, this significant effect is absent in the Senate. As highlighted above, this has some particularly important implications. First, this further supports the contention that there are systematic differences in the characteristics and priorities of racial/ethnic minorities who are elected to the House, relative to the Senate. Second, this difference is critical because it speaks to the representational inequalities in the Senate when it comes to racial/ethnic minorities. One of the most notable elements of Table 5.12 is that *none* of the explanatory variables included in the model have a significant, *positive* effect on a senator forming a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate. This demonstrates that, even relative to other disadvantaged groups, racial/ethnic minorities receive especially low levels of representation, and there is not an immediately apparent means that can be pointed to of rectifying it.

IMMIGRANTS, THE POOR, AND WOMEN

Immigrants, women, and the poor are groups that have a more mixed position in the American psyche, and tend not to be seen as either broadly deserving or not deserving of government assistance. For these groups as well, the effects of descriptive representation are mixed. Senators who are themselves women and immigrants are significantly more likely form reputations as group advocates, while those with a

personal history of poverty are not. This is different from that which was seen in the House, where the impact on reputation of having personally spent time in poverty and emigrating from another country are inverted. For the poor, the lack of the significance of descriptive representation could stem from the fact that any U.S. senator is likely to be very far removed from their days in poverty, even relative to members of the House, leaving them less connected to individuals who are currently experiencing poverty.

Immigrants, on the other hand, stand out as the only other group outside of veterans and seniors for whom group size retains its significant effect on senator reputation. Though the number of immigrants that have served in the Senate and are included in the sample are small—there are only two of them—each incorporated advocacy for immigrants into their reputations. The first, Democratic Sen. Mazie Hirono (HI), fought for benefits for Filipino service members who immigrated to the United States, and the second, Rep. Mel Martinez (state), worked to pass an immigration reform bill that included a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants.

In both the House and the Senate, female members are significantly more likely to have a reputation as women's advocates than male members. The positive effect of more Democratic states being more likely to have a senator with a reputation as an advocate for women also retains its significance, as does the presence of additional women's advocates within the institution. Also in these models, once women in office are themselves accounted for, the percentage of women within a state loses its misleading prior significance.

As in the previous chapter, I next turn to examine the differences in the impact that ambient temperature has on descriptive representatives relative to non-descriptive representatives. As seen in the earlier analysis in this chapter, ambient temperature has not been seen to have a statistically significant effect on senator reputation, even when analyzed independently from group size or descriptive representation. Thus, the object of this analysis is to determine if ambient temperature takes on a significant role for descriptive representatives, as would be expected by the theory laid out in Chapter 2, despite these effects being masked when examining the Senate as a whole.

Figure 5.1 displays the predicted effects of ambient temperature on member reputation for senators who are themselves members of a given disadvantaged group relative to those who are not. For women's advocates, these effects in the Senate very closely resemble those of the House. Regardless of the ambient temperature toward women in a state or district, female senators and members of the House are consistently and significantly more likely to have a reputation as an advocate for women. The difference in the predicted effects of being a woman is even larger in the Senate than in the House—the predicted likelihood that a female senator will have a reputation for some level of women's advocacy is over 50%, compared to less than one percent for male senators.

For all other groups, the effects shown in Figure 5.1 may not be consistently statistically significant, but the trajectories of the predicted effects still provide important insight into the role of descriptive representatives as group advocates in the Senate. As can be readily seen by comparing Figures 4.2 and 5.1, for the majority of groups

examined, the pattern of effect is quite different in the Senate than in the House. In the

Senate, descriptive representatives are more likely than non-descriptive representatives to

build a reputation as a group advocate in instances where ambient temperature is low.

However, this distinction fades when the group ambient temperature increases. This is

essentially the opposite from what is seen in the House, where members who are

themselves descriptive representatives become more likely to build a reputation for group

advocacy as the ambient temperature in a district increases.

Figure 5.1. Predicted Effects of Ambient Temperature for Members with Reputations as Advocates relative to Non-Advocates for Descriptive Representatives.

Note: Figures show the predicted marginal effects of ambient temperature on reputation for superficial, secondary, or primary advocacy relative to non-advocacy for members who are themselves descriptive representatives of the group and members who are not. Predicted marginal effects are calculated using Stata's margins command for the models containing interactions between descriptive representative and ambient temperature shown in Tables 5.12. All other variables are held to their mean values within the dataset. Clockwise from the top left, the groups whose representation is being analyzed are veterans, seniors, racial/ethnic minorities, the poor, immigrants, and women.

The Advocacy Window and the U.S. Senate

The analysis contained within this chapter also allows for the evaluation of the concept of the advocacy window in the context of the U.S. Senate. The advocacy window, as introduced in Chapter 2, is a means of conceptualizing the discretion that a legislator has when making decisions about the legislative reputation they seek to cultivate. It argues that for any disadvantaged group, there is essentially a "floor" level of representation that is expected, and that the placement of this floor is tied to the size of the group within a state or district. There is also a "ceiling" for group representation that marks the higher end of the level of representation that will be tolerated in a given state or district, which is based on the general feelings toward a group in a state or district. If a group is popular, a legislator can devote more of their time and energy to serving the needs of those group members without provoking a negative response from rest of the state or district as a whole (and thus without risking unnecessary electoral reprisals). If a group is unpopular in a state or district, legislators have less space in which they can exercise discretion over the amount of representation they provide without risking the ire of the majority of the state or district.

In the House, the advocacy window is a fairly effective means of conceptualizing the decisions that members make in regards to the reputations for disadvantaged group advocacy that they choose to cultivate. For nearly all groups evaluated, the likelihood of a member having a reputation for some level of advocacy increases as the size of a group in a district increases, and as positive views towards a disadvantaged group within a district go up. Also, as per expectations, there is evidence that descriptive representatives

are more likely to take advantage of a large advocacy window, especially for those groups that are generally considered to be less deserving of government assistance.

When it comes to the advocacy window, there are important differences between the House and the Senate. First, while group size played in important role in the House in determining whether or not a member would have a reputation for at least a superficial level of advocacy, in the Senate, group size plays a significant role for only a limited number of groups. Specifically, group size has the expected significant and positive effect for those groups that are broadly considered to be deserving of government assistance, like seniors and veterans. For nearly all other groups, the size of the group constituency within a state is not a significant factor.

This implies that, in the Senate, the acceptable "floor" for groups that are not held in high esteem in the country is in fact doing nothing at all. Generally speaking, there are more constituent groups that are vying for the attention of a senator than a member of the House, and any one particular group is less likely to be a dominant force in a state, compared to a congressional district. Therefore, it tends to be only the disadvantaged groups who are held in high regard who are able to command enough influence to raise the floor of their advocacy window to match their presence within the state. Other constituent groups are markedly less likely to be resentful of a senator who advocates for the veterans and seniors in their state, for example, than for other disadvantaged groups that are viewed skeptically, making it a less electorally risky choice.

Second, while group ambient temperature may well still serve as a ceiling for the potential level of representation a legislator can offer a group, hardly any senators actually aim to reach that ceiling. When evaluated independently, having a higher

ambient temperature in and of itself doesn't make a senator more likely to form a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate, regardless of the group being considered. Bringing descriptive representatives into the mix, however, adds important nuance into this discussion.

In the House, descriptive representatives are generally more likely to form a reputation as a group advocate as ambient temperature goes up and the advocacy window increases in size. But in the Senate, descriptive representatives tend to invert that behavior—they are more likely to have a reputation as a group advocate when the ambient temperature in a state is low, with that advantage over non-descriptive representatives fading away as ambient temperature and the advocacy window increases. This implies that there is a fundamental difference between members of the House and the Senate in how they view their advocacy window, and when they are sparked into action.

As a general rule, for both senators and members of the House, descriptive representatives tend to be more likely to craft a reputation as a group advocate. But in the Senate, these descriptive representatives may instead be more likely act when things feel dire—when the advocacy window is closer to closing. Senators who are themselves disadvantaged group members (especially those who are descriptive representatives for less well regarded groups) face a constant pressure between group identity and electoral viability, and tend to be pushed into action only when they perceive the threat level against their group to be particularly high. Members of the House, on the other hand, will act when they see the greatest opportunity at the lowest risk—when the advocacy window is large.

The tale of two senators from Illinois can illustrate both the vast level of discretion that senators possess when cultivating their reputations, as well as the additional levels of risk that descriptive representatives may sometimes be willing to take on relative to senators who are not themselves a member of a disadvantaged group. Illinois is one of the more racially/ethnically diverse states in the country, and has become even more so over the course of the last few decades. During the 1990s, Illinois was also a state with one of the lowest ambient temperatures toward racial/ethnic minorities. 1992, Carol Moseley-Braun (D) became the first black woman elected to the U.S. Senate. During her first and only term in the Senate, she built a reputation as a primary advocate for racial/ethnic minorities, despite the relatively low ceiling of her advocacy window in Illinois. Less than a decade after Sen. Moseley-Braun's defeat in her reelection battle, Illinois sent another racial/ethnic minority to the Senate. Sen. Barack Obama (D), likely with his eyes on a national constituency rather than the state of Illinois alone, made the opposite decision, and chose not to integrate racial advocacy into his legislative reputation.

Conclusion

Senators tend to face additional stressors as the result of responsibilities that come with representing an entire state. Relative to the average congressional district, states contain considerably more groups that a senator must adjudicate between when making decisions about the legislative reputation they wish to cultivate. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is simply not possible to build a reputation as an advocate for all the different groups that are present within their state—they must be strategic, and they must choose wisely.

This makes them much less likely to stick their neck out to represent a group that is generally viewed as being less deserving of government assistance, out of fears that it will frustrate non-group members, and diminish their chances of reelection.

This chapter has shown that, unlike in the House, the size of a disadvantaged group within a district generally does not increase the likelihood that a senator will form a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate, unless the group is broadly considered to be deserving of government assistance. Likewise, though group ambient temperature had a positive independent effect on member reputation in the House, in the Senate, disadvantaged group ambient temperature is not a significant driving factor in reputation formation. These distinctions also shed light on important differences in the way that senators and members of the House make use of the advocacy window.

In the House, the advocacy window holds up well as a means of representing the amount of discretion a member has in choosing the extent to which they devote their legislative reputation to serving the needs of disadvantaged group members, with descriptive representatives as the most likely to take advantage of a large advocacy window. In the Senate, however, the advocacy window works slightly differently. Rather than having a floor of expected advocacy that is in line with the size of the group within a district, the minimum level of anticipated advocacy in the Senate tends to be none at all, unless a disadvantaged group is considered to be particularly deserving of government assistance. Additionally, given their risk-adverse nature, senators only rarely shoot for the ceiling of their advocacy window, as set by the general ambient temperature towards a group in a district, unless they are themselves a descriptive representative. And if they are, unlike in the House, where descriptive representatives are more likely to take

advantage of a larger advocacy window, senators feel more pressure to act in the face of an advocacy window that is especially narrow.

To account for some of the variations in the institutional and electoral environments faced by members of the House and the Senate, this chapter also introduced and evaluated three alternative hypotheses to explain reputation formation in the Senate. The first, the electoral insecurity hypothesis, argued that senators with more marginal victories in their most recent elections would be less likely to work to craft a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate, out of fear that it would reduce their chances of success in their upcoming election. The second, the in-state differentiation hypothesis, built off of insights from Schiller (2000) to assert that senators with a same-state counterpart who already has a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate are less likely to themselves have a reputation for advocacy of the same group. Finally, the collective amplification hypothesis asserted that the larger the number of senators with reputations as group advocates present in a given Congress, the most likely that others would elect to incorporate such advocacy into their reputation. After performing the analysis, only the collective amplification hypothesis was supported, implying that the presence of other advocates within the institution will encourage additional senators to include advocacy for disadvantaged groups on their own legislative reputation as well, at least at a superficial level.

In the next and final chapter, I offer some concluding remarks on the principal contributions of this project, and emphasize the important insights to be gained by viewing representation through the lens of the legislative reputations that members of Congress choose to cultivate. Additionally, I reflect on the normative implications of this

project, especially for the representation of racial/ethnic minorities. Finally, I will discuss the next steps for this research agenda.

CHAPTER 6:
CONCLUSIONS

In every state and district, there are a number of groups jostling for the attention of their member of Congress. Not all of these groups, however, are on an equal playing field. Disadvantaged groups, from the poor to racial/ethnic minorities to veterans, are uniquely positioned in that they face additional challenges and have been recognized across levels of government as requiring additional protections to ensure their equal treatment. Given this recognition, it is particularly important to determine how well Congress is actually doing at providing adequate representation and group advocacy.

This dissertation approached this topic from a new direction, and reconfigured the way that the representational relationship between members of Congress and their constituents has previously been conceived. It explored which legislators are the most likely to prioritize representing disadvantaged groups and why, by investigating the formation of legislative reputations as disadvantaged group advocates. Taken together, this project suggests three major conclusions.

First, members of Congress cultivate specific group-centered legislative reputations as one of the primary means of fulfilling their representational responsibilities and of communicating their legislative activities to constituents. Second, the framework of the advocacy window makes an important theoretical contribution to understanding the constituency-specific constraints a member faces when making decisions about whether or not to include a group in their legislative reputation, as well as the circumstances under which those constraints can be overcome. Third, the representation of racial/ethnic

minorities consistently takes a different form than that of other disadvantaged groups, with members, particularly in the Senate, demonstrating a marked wariness to forming a reputation as a minority advocate. In the sections to follow, I explore these conclusions in greater detail, and discuss the normative implications of each.

Legislative Reputations as an Essential Conduit for Representation

This project presents legislative reputations as a critically important, but frequently overlooked, means of understanding how representation happens on a realistic, practical level. The overwhelming majority of the constituents of a member of Congress will be almost entirely in the dark about the specific actions that a member engages in while in the legislature. Instead, what they know about their representative is filtered through the media, and commonly comes in the form of a distilled-down picture of which groups a member tends to focus their attentions on. Recognizing this, most members seek to create a pattern of behavior that can trickle down to their constituents in a way that will effectively signal which groups on whose behalf they are working. This requires that members make specific choices about which groups they wish to try to center their reputations around. The central focus of this dissertation has been to determine when and why members of Congress choose to cultivate legislative reputations as advocates for disadvantaged groups, in particular.

Chapter 3 demonstrates the frequency with which members include disadvantaged group advocacy in their legislative reputations, and finds that a significant percentage of legislators do make the choice to include this advocacy in their reputations.   Within that group of legislators, though, there is a considerable degree of variation in terms of the

level of advocacy being offered, and the particular group that is the focus of those advocacy efforts. A higher percentage of Democrats hold these reputations for group advocacy than Republicans, with reputations for primary advocacy being more common in the House, and superficial advocacy being more common in the Senate.

NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS

To truly understand the quality of representation being offered to disadvantaged groups, it is necessary to take a big picture view of what representation looks like. If representation is about forming these group-based legislative reputations that can serve as a place of shared understanding for representatives and their constituents, it becomes necessary to survey the entire landscape of reputation building within the House and the Senate to comprehend how equitable our congressional politics really are. Under this framework, constituency characteristics do play an important role in shaping which groups members will choose to include in their reputations. But at the same time, no member can possibly represent all of the groups within their state or district at once— there is a finite limit to the number of groups that can be included in a single member's legislative reputation. Given this, it is the likelihood that any particular group will be included that is most important.

This group-centered view of politics, wherein legislators must make choices about which groups they choose to advocate for, reflects many of the norms of a pluralist system. Each group cannot expect to find an advocate in every member, but they should be able to expect a similar chance that a member will choose to represent them, relative to the size of their group. But, as the preceding paragraphs have clearly shown, this

pluralistic norm breaks down, even among already disadvantaged groups. Groups that

are considered less deserving of government assistance generally do not receive the same

level of advocacy as those groups that are broadly considered to be highly deserving of

government assistance. This discrepancy matters, and can make a real difference in

people's lives.

On a purely substantive level, group advocacy on the part of members of

Congress is necessary to ensure that the needs of a group are addressed, and to push for

their inclusion within important legislation. But this advocacy can have more symbolic

effects as well. Individuals who feel that their needs are getting a fair hearing in the

legislature are more likely to have confidence in the political system, and to be active and

engaged in the political process (Uslaner and Brown 2005). Groups that do not feel that

they are being adequately represented, however, can be disincentivized from participating

in the political system, exacerbating the inequality that already exists.

Member Reputation and the Advocacy Window

Chapter 2 of this dissertation introduced the concept of the advocacy window to

explain some of the primary drivers of a member's choice about whether or not to include

disadvantaged group advocacy in their legislative reputation. The advocacy window

demonstrates the level of discretion that a member has in their choice to include advocacy

for a disadvantaged group as a component of their reputation, once the size of a group

and the ambient temperature towards a group are taken into account. The advocacy

window, as depicted in Figure 2.2, is essentially the range in the amount of group

representation that a member could engage in without unduly risking the ire of the

constituency at large and damaging their electoral prospects. The floor of the advocacy window, the level of representation that would be expected as a starting point, represents the size of the disadvantaged group within the district, while the ceiling, the high point of representation that a member could reasonably engage in, reflects the level of negative feelings towards a group in a district.

As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, the advocacy window is a useful means of conceptualizing which members will choose to focus their advocacy on disadvantaged groups, and why. In the House, group size is seen to be an important baseline factor in determining the level of representation that a group will receive for nearly all groups under evaluation (with the sole exception being women, which I will discuss in greater detail below). Consistently, members with a higher percentage of group members in their district are more likely to form a reputation as a group advocate. Similarly, for all but the most highly regarded group (seniors), the ambient temperature does serve as a high water mark on the representation offered, with members being significantly less likely to form a reputation as a group advocate the lower the ambient temperature towards the group in their district.

While there is a good deal to be learned from these instances in which disadvantaged group representation follows the expectations of the advocacy window, there are also important insights to be gained by examining the conditions under which group representation occurs in ways that are not predicted by the advocacy window. When considering representation in the House of Representatives, for instance, the representation of women essentially serves as the exception that proves the rule. Women are unique, in that they not only have very little variation in their size from district to

district, but that that size—around 50 percent of a constituency—always has the capacity to make a considerable electoral impact.[45] Thus, for women, the floor of the advocacy window would be almost entirely stationary from district to district. Instead, other factors, such as the district ambient temperature, partisanship, and most especially, having a representative who is a woman, have an outsized influence on the reputations as women's advocates that are formed.

Over in the Senate, however, representation of disadvantaged groups—particularly those who are not generally considered to be highly deserving of government assistance—defy some of the expectations for the advocacy window in extremely important ways. Chief among them is the placement of the floor of the advocacy window. For groups such as seniors and veterans, the larger the group presence within a state, the more likely it is that a senator will include advocacy on their behalf as a component of their legislative reputation, as the advocacy window would predict. But for nearly all of the groups that are not consistently seen as being deserving of government assistance, increasing a group's size within a state does not actually make their senator more likely to form a reputation as a group advocate. This means, in practice, that for groups that are not generally seen as deserving of government assistance, the floor for an acceptable level of representation in the Senate is doing nothing at all. This is strikingly different from the advocacy window in the House, where, regardless of the disadvantaged group under consideration, group size in a district does have a significant effect on the minimum level of representation that a group receives.

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[45] Obviously, women do not vote anywhere near a monolithic block, but all the same, there is no district in which it could be argued that women did not at least have the potential to be an electorally important constituency.

Finally, Chapters 4 and 5 have also provided insight into which members of Congress are most likely to take advantage of the existence of a wider advocacy window. Generally speaking, descriptive representatives in the House are more likely to take advantage of having a wider advocacy window to boost the level of representation that they offer a group than non-descriptive representatives. This tends to be true for each group, at each level of advocacy, but with two important exceptions. The first exception is, once again, the representation of women. Female representatives are significantly more likely to have a reputation as a women's advocate than men, regardless of the size of the advocacy window. The second exception is narrower, and refers exclusively to those descriptive representatives who form a reputation for primary or secondary advocacy of racial/ethnic minorities. Unlike in other instances, in which descriptive representatives are more likely to take advantage of the larger advocacy window, minority representatives are more likely to form a reputation as a primary or secondary advocate when the advocacy window is *small*. As discussed in Chapter 4, this is important, as it implies that a minority representative acts to maximize their representation of racial/ethnic minorities in conditions where the threat level is higher, and their margin of error is lower.

In the Senate, the role of descriptive representatives more closely resembles the behavior of racial/ethnic minority representatives with reputations for primary or secondary advocacy in the House. Though female representatives are once again more likely to have a reputation as women's advocates regardless of the size of the advocacy window, for other descriptive representatives in the Senate, they too receive a stronger push to action relative to non-descriptive representatives when facing a narrower

advocacy window. In the Senate, then, descriptive representatives are not seeking to maximize the representation they offer to a group when the advocacy window is at its widest, but rather are more likely to include at least some level of group advocacy into their legislative reputation when the advocacy window is at risk of closing.

NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS

There are a number of normative consequences that stem from these findings about how members of Congress alter their representational decision-making based upon the advocacy window that they face. First and foremost, the differences in the location of the floor of the advocacy window between the House and the Senate has some troubling implications in terms of the representation that different groups receive. One of the most basic theories of how representative democracy should work contends that representation must be rooted in the needs of the constituency itself. In the House, this holds up reasonably well. But in the Senate, the choice to form a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate is, in many cases, untethered from the size of the group within the constituency. This means that, especially for groups that are considered to be less deserving of government assistance, simply being present in a state, even in large numbers, does not guarantee the level of representation that would otherwise be expected.

Generally speaking, the representational scheme through which seats are allocated in the Senate tends to work to the detriment of disadvantaged groups, as they are unlikely to ever represent a majority of a state (women being the exception to this). But these results show that this handicap may in fact be even worse for those disadvantaged groups who are not considered to be broadly deserving of government assistance, as the degree

of representation they receive is not even significantly related to what they could expect given their size within a state. Given the bicameral nature of the lawmaking process in the United States, this asymmetric representation of groups that are less well regarded by the population at large could have outsized effects. Even if disadvantaged groups tend to receive more appropriate levels of representation in the House than in the Senate, it is not enough to guarantee that their needs actually make it into law, as all legislation must pass through both chambers.

There are also normative implications to the reluctance of members to utilize the openings that their advocacy windows present to provide a higher level of representation for the disadvantaged. This hesitancy is evident in both the House and the Senate, where, even for groups whose size within a district provides a stable floor for the level of representation that can be expected, few members seek to move above that floor. This tendency of most members to avoiding shooting for the ceiling can make the disconnect between group size and representation in the Senate even more problematic. If the floor for most groups who are not considered to be the most deserving of government assistance is actually doing nothing at all, and members are hesitant to utilize the additional representational space that their advocacy window provides, that means that less well-regarded disadvantaged groups can end up having few or no advocates in the Senate (as is largely the case over the time period studied for racial/ethnic minorities and the LGBTQ community).

Even in the House, where group size does generally represent a solid floor that can be relied upon when members are making their representational decisions, most members are unwilling to take risks and take advantage of the level of disadvantaged

group advocacy that could be permitted, given the size of the advocacy window. The overt caution of most lawmakers when it comes to the advocacy window available to them makes the placement of the floor within a district especially crucial. Because most members tend not to budge from the floor of their advocacy window, the intentional creation of things like majority-minority districts can bolster the representation that a disadvantaged group receives. Steve Cohen (D), for example, is one of the few white members of Congress representing a majority non-white district, the 9th District of Tennessee. To meet level of representation that would be expected given his advocacy window, he assiduously cultivates his reputation as an advocate for racial/ethnic minorities, once even petitioning to join the Congressional Black Caucus.

Finally, these results do clearly show the importance of having descriptive representatives of the disadvantaged present within Congress. While it is far from a new argument to say that descriptive representatives lead to better representation, this project is able to demonstrate this in a comprehensive way, across a number of different groups, including those that have been less subject to scholarly scrutiny. The advocacy window, in an ideal world, should work in the same way for all representatives—with each being equally likely to utilize their discretion and boost their advocacy on behalf of any given group. The clear separation between descriptive and non-descriptive representatives when it comes to making the decision to incorporate disadvantaged group advocacy—especially for groups that aren't broadly considered to be highly deserving of government assistance—demonstrates the extent to which it cannot simply be assumed that any representative for a state or district will represent that group in the same way. Instead, for most groups (with the primary exception receiving further discussion below), boosting

the number of descriptive representatives in Congress is an effective means of increasing the likelihood that a member of Congress will prioritize their representation.

The Representation of Racial/Ethnic Minorities

One of the last big takeaways from this project is that, quite simply, the representation of racial/ethnic minorities is different than that of other disadvantaged groups in a number of key ways. Most crucially, these differences tend to only run in a single direction—that of receiving less representation than would otherwise be expected. The previous two sections have alluded to several of these distinctions, but it is worth examining them at greater length. To begin, as seen in Chapter 3, the partisan and chamber-specific differences in who chooses to cultivate a reputation as an advocate for racial/ethnic minorities are markedly unlike those seen for any other disadvantaged group.

Chapter 3 demonstrated that, though Democrats are more likely to have a reputation as disadvantaged group advocate overall, the breakdown in which groups a member is an advocate for are rather similar, with one particular exception. Namely, there are very few Republicans with reputations for advocacy of racial/ethnic minorities. Even among Democrats, however, the bulk of these advocates are found in the House and not in the Senate. In fact, there is only one senator sampled with a reputation as a primary advocate of racial/ethnic minorities, compared to 55 in the House. There is no other disadvantaged group studied for which these discrepancies by party and by chamber are this stark.

As discussed in the previous section, descriptive representation can be a means through which disadvantaged groups that are generally considered to be less deserving of government assistance can bolster the level of representation that they receive. But is this also true for racial/ethnic minorities? The unsatisfying answer to this question is: it depends. As highlighted above, in the House, representation generally tends to nicely follow along with the broad precepts of the advocacy window. And as expected, members who are themselves racial/ethnic minorities are more likely to form reputations as disadvantaged group advocates, even after the percentage of non-white individuals in a district is taken into account.

Racial/ethnic minorities serving in the Senate, however, are not significantly more likely to form reputations as minority advocates. This is quite different than what is seen for the descriptive representatives of most other disadvantaged groups perceived as being less than highly deserving of government assistance in the Senate, and a departure from the effect of minority representation in the House. It is likely, however, that this outcome for minority representation in the Senate is a direct result of the small sample of racial/ethnic minorities that ever make it to the Senate in the first place. As an example, there are only two Black senators out of all of the Congresses sampled. One of these, Carol Mosley-Braun (D), former senator from Illinois, is the only senator included in the sample with a primary reputation as an advocate for racial/ethnic minorities. So, while suggestive of the potential benefits of electing more descriptive representatives to the Senate, the limited numbers make it difficult to estimate what the predicted effects of having a greater number of racial/ethnic minorities might be, and what conclusions should be drawn.

It is also possible that there are systematic differences between the types of racial/ethnic minorities that get elected to the House, and those that get elected to the Senate. Much of the previous research into effects of descriptive representation of racial/ethnic minorities has looked at the House (for the obvious reason that minority representatives are so scarce in the Senate). But if the electoral environment of running for state-wide office makes it less likely that racial/ethnic minorities will be elected to serve in the Senate, and those who are elected are less likely to serve as advocates than those elected to the House, it makes it much more difficult to resolve the representational inequalities that exist.

NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS

The consequences of this unequal access to representation for racial/ethnic minorities, even relative to other disadvantaged groups, may be straightforward and easy to diagnose, but exceedingly difficult to solve. For most of the groups evaluated over the course of this project, the best ways to increase the likelihood that a member will form a reputation as a group advocate is to boost the percentage of group members within a state, or to elect more descriptive representatives. But in the case of the representation of racial/ethnic minorities in the Senate, neither of these are a sure-fire solution.

Ultimately, this representation deficit has real and consequential effects on the amount of effort Congress as a whole puts into addressing the problems facing racial/ethnic minorities in the United States. The reluctance of most members of Congress to incorporate minority advocacy into their legislative reputation, even when their advocacy window would allow for it, speaks to the uniquely precarious position of

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racial/ethnic minorities, even among other disadvantaged groups. This tendency,

particularly in the Senate, for members of Congress to shirk the representational

responsibilities that would be expected for nearly any other group serves to exacerbate

the challenges that racial/ethnic minorities already face, and make it markedly less likely

that their needs will be addressed.

Next Steps for this Research Agenda

This dissertation has provided a deeper understanding of which members of

Congress will choose to build a reputation as a disadvantaged group advocate, and why.

In doing so, it also opens the door to new questions that are worthy of further research.

The three most interesting of these paths for future research involve evaluating possible

links between member reputation and specific legislative actions, exploring the extent to

which members of Congress actively campaign on their legislative reputations, and

investigating the frequency with which disadvantaged group advocates in the House

move to the Senate.

Utilizing legislative reputation as a means of understanding the groups that

members of Congress choose to represent has an important advantage over other ways of

conceptualizing representation by not placing a priori requirements on the types of issues

or actions that a member may choose to undertake on behalf of a group. However, once

those reputations are established, there is potential value to understanding if there are

specific patterns in the ways that members tend to form their reputations as advocates for

specific groups compared to others, or if there are consistencies in how superficial

advocates act relative to primary or secondary advocates. Investigating the patterns of

which actions members choose to engage in to cultivate their reputations as advocates for disadvantaged groups could provide important information about the stage of the process in which advocates tend to put their efforts. It could also be used to demonstrate the effectiveness of these efforts at advancing bills in the legislative process or expanding the size of legislative coalitions within the institution.

Throughout this project, the focus has been directed solely at a member's actions within the legislature. But a member's actions within Congress itself and on the campaign trail are not wholly separate, and there a good deal that could be learned be evaluating the extent to which members of Congress advertise their reputations as disadvantaged group advocates. Or, in the case of non-incumbents running for office, how clearly they foreshadow their future disadvantaged group advocacy. Additionally, examining any variation in how selectively members with reputations as advocates for different groups tout those reputations during their campaigns could provide valuable information about how wary members are about deterring other voters who are not themselves group members. This could be particularly important for members of the House who are choosing to run for the Senate, which ties in directly to the last of the most promising next steps for this research agenda.

Since some of the earliest Congresses, between roughly 30-50% of individuals serving in the Senate had previously been elected to the House of Representatives (Glassman and Wilhelm 2017). In recent years, the percentage of senators with prior service in the House on their resume has stayed near the top end of that range, with 50 out of 100 senators in the 115th Congress having previous House experience. Thus, to better understand the differences in the type and degree of disadvantaged group advocacy

that exist between the House and the Senate, an important place to look would be among members of the House who attempt to move to the Senate. This is a particularly interesting extension of the research agenda, and would have the potential to answer three questions. Specifically, are members of the House with reputations as advocates for a given disadvantaged group more or less likely to: make the decision to run for the Senate, win those races for a Senate seat, or change their legislative reputation upon arrival in the Senate? Providing answers to these questions could provide valuable insight into why the House and the Senate provide such different levels of representation across disadvantaged groups, and also point towards some potential solutions.

Concluding Thoughts

Questions about who gets represented in the United States Congress, and when, and why, and how, lie at the very bedrock of our system of representative democracy. This project has contributed to these perennial questions by investigating which members of Congress make the choice to represent some of the vulnerable and needy groups in our society, and by providing a theoretical framework for understanding what drives those decisions. This dissertation has demonstrated that not all disadvantaged groups receive equivalent levels of representation. Members of Congress are highly cognizant of how their representational choices could affect their reelection prospects, and are particularly wary when it comes to representing those disadvantaged groups that aren't widely seen as being deserving of government assistance.

Group-based legislative reputations are a conduit through which members can express their representational priorities in way that matches up with how their

constituents understand the political world. By centering this investigation on the critical but underappreciated role that legislative reputations play in the representational relationship, this dissertation offers a fresh perspective and a new step toward a better understanding of congressional representation as a whole, while also offering insight into the specific representation that disadvantaged groups receive. This research provides an opportunity to fill in some of the gaps in our knowledge about why representational inequality exists, and in doing so, sheds light on a potential path to more equal representation within the U.S. Congress.

APPENDICES

Appendix A – Issue Coding for Disadvantaged Group Advocacy For Reputation Measure

Table A-1 presents the list of issues that are included as instances as advocacy for a disadvantaged group, in addition to all actions that are specifically attributed to being done to serve a particular group.

Table A-1. Issue Coding By Disadvantaged Group

Veterans

• Employment assistance (workforce training/increased licensures and certifications from military experience/employer tax credits for hiring/employment protections for returning guard members)
• Creation of veteran job corps
• Educational assistance (tuition assistance/GI Bill)
• Healthcare (head trauma/PTSD/benefits expansion/telemedicine for rural vets/veteran suicide prevention /access to mental health care/counseling on deployment and return)
• Assistance for disabled vets (housing/benefits/employment)
• Housing benefits (homelessness prevention/special assistant at HUD
• VA improvements (fixing backlog/higher reimbursements for longer travels/automatic enrollment and training in using the system)
• Resources for survivors of military sexual assault
• Improvement of reintegration programs (counseling/financial planning)
• Veterans History Project

Seniors

• Protecting against financial scams
• Medicare protection/expansion
• Social Security protection/expansion (COLA increases/eliminating income cap)
• Opposition to voter registration/ID laws (because of effects on elderly)
• Expanding prescription drug coverage for seniors
• Senior nutrition and other services
• Older Americans Act
• Expanding access to hospice and long-term care

Table A-1. Issue Coding By Disadvantaged Group (cont.)

LGBTQ

• Repeal DADT

• Repeal DOMA

• Legalizing same-sex marriage

• Employment protections

• Government employee benefits for same-sex partners

• Anti-bullying and nondiscrimination policies

• Domestic violence/sexual assault protections (VAWA)

• HIV/AIDS

Racial/Ethnic Minorities

confinement/racial profiling/marijuana and other drug offenses/former inmate reintegration/police brutality

• Reparations (slavery/Japanese internment)

• Treatment HIV/AIDS (including in prison)

• Voting rights (Opposition to attempts to end early voting and require additional voter registration or ID/simplify voter registration/extension of Voting Rights Act

• Civil Rights Act

• Housing assistance

• Employment (increase federal grants and contracts to minority-owned businesses/assistance to Black farmers

• African American History Museum

• MLK birthday as federal holiday

• Education (minorities in STEM, government and private partnerships with minority colleges/funding

Immigrants

• Immigration reform (path to citizenship/legal status/worker status/asylum seekers)

• Shorten citizenship waiting period (members of military/family reunification)

• DREAM act

• Domestic violence protections (VAWA)

• Citizenship education programs (English language assistance/naturalization workshops)

• Legal status for military/college

• Elimination of country caps

Table A-1. Issue Coding By Disadvantaged Group (cont.)

Women

• Reproductive rights (abortion coverage/contraception coverage and availability)

• Employment (equal pay/pregnancy discrimination/breast pump space)

• Healthcare (mammograms/breast cancer/nopays for preventative care)

• Sexual assault and domestic violence (VAWA/military programs/expansion of definition of rape/homelessness prevention for domestic violence victims)

• Military (expansion of roles for women/equipment like body armor to fit women)

Poor

• Employment assistance (worker training/new WPA or other job corps/tax credits for employers hiring someone unemployed or on public assistance/create "empowerment zones" providing tax credits for companies going into impoverished areas

• Unemployment benefits

• Housing assistance (renters/homelessness/heating assistance/Home Energy Assistance/Program/Affordable Housing Trust Fund/foreclosure assistance/tax credit for the creation of low-income housing

• Nutrition (expansion SNAP benefits/SNAP at farmer's markets/free and reduced lunch benefits

• Education (Head Start/access to art, economics, civics, and foreign language classes/TRIO programs and outreach to disadvantaged students

• Healthcare (Children's Health Insurance Program/Medicaid expansion/dental coverage/support for community health centers/continuous open enrollment for Medicaid and CHIP

• Expanded access to child care

• Broadband access for low-income communities

• Minimum wage increase

• Free tax prep for low-income individuals and families and financial literacy programs

• TANF benefit extensions

The following tables present a list of members who are coded in the 103rd, 105th, 108th, 110th, or 113th Congresses as having a reputation for primary or secondary advocacy of disadvantaged groups. Table B-1 shows the members with these reputations in the House of Representatives, while Table B-2 does the same for those in the Senate.

Table B-1. Reputations for Primary and Secondary Advocacy By Disadvantaged Group in the House of Representatives (103rd, 105th, 108th, 110th, 113th Congress)

Veterans		
Jeff Miller (R-FL1)	Rich Nugent (R-FL11)	Dave Weldon (R-FL15)
Gus Bilirakis (R-FL12)	Bruce Braley (D-IA1)	Bill Pascrell (D-NJ8)
Dan Benishek (R-MI01)	Niki Tsongas (D-MA3)	Marcy Kaptur (D-OH9)
Joe Runyan (R-NJ3)	Tim Walz (D-MN1)	Mike Doyle (D-PA14)
Joe Wilson (R-SC2)	Carol Shea-Porter (D-NH1)	Silvestre Reyes (D-TX14)
Vic Snyder (D-AR02)	Christopher Smith (R-NJ1)	Bob Stump (R-AZ3)
Bob Filner (D-CA51)	Terry Everett (R-AL02)	Luis Gutierrez (D-IL4)
Susan Davis (D-CA53)	Cliff Stearns (R-FL6)	Steve Buyer (R-IN5)
Ginny Brown-Waite (R-FL5)	John Tierney (D-MA6)	Maxine Waters (D-CA35)
Tom Latham (R-IA04)	Stephen Lynch (D-MA9)	George Sangmeister (D-IL11)
Henry Brown (R-SC1)	Michael Michaud (D-ME2)	Jill Long (D-IN4)
Solomon Ortiz (D-TX27)	Chet Edwards (D-TX17)	David Bonior (D-MI10)
Lane Evans (D-IL17)	Ciro Rodriguez (D-TX23)	Jack Fields (R-TX8)
Sonny Montgomery (D-MS3)	Jo Ann Davis (R-VA1)	Frank Tejeda (D-TX28)
Douglas Applegate (D-OH18)	Ron Kind (D-WI3)	Mike Rogers (R-AL3)
Corrine Brown (D-FL5)	Michael Bilirakis (R-FL9)	Elton Gallegly (R-CA24)
Seniors		
Mike Rogers (R-AL3)	Henry Waxman (D-CA30)	Richard Burr (R-NC5)
Pete Stark (D-CA13)	John Larson (D-CT1)	Steve Israel (D-NY2)
Tom Allen (D-ME1)	Robert Wexler (D-FL19)	Rob Portman (R-OH2)
Jo Ann Emerson (R-MO8)	David Loebsack (D-IA2)	Jim Turner (D-TX2)
Lloyd Doggett (D-TX25)	Richard Neal (D-MA2)	Sam Johnson (R-TX3)
Earl Pomeroy (D-ND1)	Dave Camp (R-MI4)	Bernard Sanders (I-VT1)
Gerald Kleczka (D-WI4)	John Dingell (D-MI15)	Earl Hilliard (D-AL7)
William Clay (D-MO1)	Jim Ramstad (R-MN3)	Matthew Martinez (D-CA31)
Jill Long (D-IN4)	Bill Pascrell (D-NJ8)	Greg Ganske (R-IA4)
Jeff Miller (R-FL1)	Joseph Crowley (D-NY7)	Dennis Hastert (R-IL14)
Gus Bilirakis (R-FL12)	John Peterson (R-PA5)	Dale Kildee (D-MI9)
Joe Wilson (R-SC2)	Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV2)	Richard Gephardt (D-MO3)
Terry Everett (R-AL2)	Robert Matsui (D-CA5)	Charles Rangel (D-NY15)
Dennis Moore (D-KS3)	Nancy Johnson (R-CT5)	Sherrod Brown (D-OH13)

Table B-1. Reputations for Primary and Secondary Advocacy By Disadvantaged Group in the House of Representatives (103rd, 105th, 108th, 110th, 113th Congress) (cont.)

Carolyn Maloney (D-NY14)	Peter Deutch (D-FL20)	Chaka Fattah (D-PA2)
Pat Tiberi (R-OH12)	E. Clay Shaw (R-FL22)	Tim Holden (D-PA6)
Ted Strickland (D-OH6)	Jan Schakowsky (D-IL9)	Patrick Kennedy (D-RI1)
Kent Bentson (D-TX25)	Jim McCrery (R-IA4)	Al McCandless (R-CA44)
Ted Deutch (D_FL21)	John Tierney (D-MA6)	C.W. Bill Young (R-FL10)
Peter DeFazio (D-OR4)	Benjamin Cardin (D-MD3)	Andrew Jacobs (D-IN10)
David McKinley (R-WV4)	Michael Michaud (D-ME1)	Sander Levin (D-MI12)
Marion Berry (D-AR1)	Gil Gutknecht (R-MN1)	J.J. Pickle (D-TX10)

LGBTQ

Jerrold Nadler (D-NY10)	Jared Polis (D-CO2)	Patricia Schroeder (D-CO1)
Henry Waxman (D-CA29)	Barney Frank (D-MA4)	Jim McDermott (D-WA7)
Lynn Woolsey (D-CA6)	Jim Kolbe (R-AZ8)	
Lois Capps (D-CA24)	Nancy Pelosi (D-CA8)	

Racial/Ethnic Minorities

Barbara Lee (D-CA13)	Gregory Meeks (D-NY6)	Bob Clement (D-TN5)
John Lewis (D-GA5)	Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX18)	Ben Ray Lujan (D-NM3)
Keith Ellison (D-MN5)	Cynthia McKinney (D-GA4)	Artur Davis (D-AL7)
William Clay (D-MO1)	Donald Payne (D-NJ10)	Ed Pastor (D-AZ4)
Earl Hilliard (D-AL7)	Norman Mineta (D-CA15)	Hilda Solis (D-CA32)
Tom Latham (R-IA04)	Don Edwards (D-CA16)	Grace Napolitano (D-CA38)
Xavier Becerra (D-CA31)	Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL18)	Joe Baca (D-CA43)
Gene Green (D-TX29)	Cardiss Collins (D-IL7)	Kendrick Meek (D-FL17)
Bennie Thompson (D-MS2)	Kwesi Mfume (D-MD7)	William Jefferson (D-LA2)
Ciro Rodriguez (D-TX23)	Barbara-Rose Collins (D-MI15)	Albert Wynn (D-MD4)
Yvette Clark (D-NY9)	Craig Washington (D-TX18)	Emanual Cleaver (D-MO5)
Ruben Hinojosa (D-TX15)	Edolphus Towns (D-NY10)	G.K. Butterfield (D-NC1)
Solomon Ortiz (D-TX27)	Pete Stark (D-CA13)	Jose Serrano (D-NY16)
Juanita Millender-McDonald (D-CA37)	Chaka Fattah (D-PA2)	Silvestre Reyes (D-TX16)
Maxine Waters (D-CA43)	Cliff Stearns (R-FL6)	Charlie Gonzalez (D-TX20)
Bobby Rush (D-IL1)	Raul Grijalva (D-AZ7)	Robert Menendez (D-NJ13)
John Conyers (D-MI13)	Linda Sanchez (D-CA39)	Amo Houghton (R-NY29)
Marcia Fudge (D-OH11)	Alcee Hastings (D-FL23)	Robert Matsui (D-CA5)
Steve Cohen (D-TN9)	Charles Rangel (D-NY15)	Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL21)
Robert Scott (D-VA3)	Lacy Clay (D-MO1)	Floyd Flake (D-NY6)
Michael Honda (D-CA15)	Jesse Jackson (D-IL2)	Henry Bonilla (R-TX23)
Diane Watson (D-CA33)	Joseph Kennedy (D-MA8)	Alan Wheat (D-MO5)
Danny Davis (D-IL7)	Nydia Velazquez (D-NY12)	Major Owens (D-NY11)
Carolyn Cheeks Kirkpatrick (D-MI13)	Lane Evans (D-IL-17)	Hamilton Fish (R-NY19)
Melvin Watt (D-SC12)	Terry Everett (R-AL2)	Louis Stokes (D-OH11)
Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-TX30)	Henry Brown (R-SC1)	Tom Sawyer (D-OH14)
Ed Pastor (D-AZ4)	Jack Fields (R-TX8)	Thomas Foglietta (D-PA1)
Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA34)	Luis Gutierrez (D-IL4)	
Elijah Cummings (D-MD7)	James Clyburn (D-SC6)	

Table B-1. Reputations for Primary and Secondary Advocacy By Disadvantaged Group in the House of Representatives (103rd, 105th, 108th, 110th, 113th Congress) (cont.)

Immigrants		
Xavier Becerra (D-CA31)	Hilda Solis (D-CA32)	Bob Filner (D-CA50)
Yvette Clark (D-NY9)	Zoe Lofgren (D-CA19)	Barney Frank (D-MA4)
Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA34)	Linda Sanchez (D-CA39)	Loretta Sanchez (D-CA46)
Ed Pastor (D-AZ4)	Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL25)	Raul Labrador (R-ID1)
Raul Grijalva (D-AZ7)	Howard Berman (D-CA26)	Mary Bono (R-CA45)
Nydia Velazquez (D-NY21)	Ruben Hinojosa (D-TX15)	Tom Campbell (R-CA15)
Terry Everett (R-AL2)	Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX18)	Romano Mazzoli (D-KY3)
Jose Serrano (D-NY16)	Kendrick Meek (D-FL17)	Luis Gutierrez (D-IL4)
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL18)	Judy Chu (D-CA27)	Grace Napolitano (D-CA38)
Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL21)	Major Owens (D-NY11)	

Women		
Linda Sanchez (D-CA38)	Zoe Lofgren (D-CA19)	Olympia Snowe (R-ME2)
Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA34)	Hilda Solis (D-CA32)	Barbara Vucanovich (R-NV2)
Don Edwards (D-CA16)	Lois Capps (D-CA24)	Ron Wyden (D-OR3)
Cardiss Collins (D-IL7)	Sam Farr (D-CA17)	Steve Buyer (R-IN5)
Carolyn Maloney (D-NY14)	Barbara Lee (D-CA13)	John Shimkus (R-IL19)
Nita Lowey (D-NY18)	Edolphus Towns (D-NY10)	Tim Ryan (D-OH17)
Gwen Moore (D-WI4)	Chaka Fattah (D-PA2)	Anna Eshoo (D-CA14)
Loretta Sanchez (D-CA47)	Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-TX30	Melissa Hart (R-PA4)
Juanita Millender-McDonald (D-CA37)	Lynn Woolsey (D-CA6)	Nancy Johnson (R-CT6)
Patricia Schroeder (D-CO1)	Ed Royce (R-CA40)	Steny Hoyer (D-MD5)
Jackie Speier (D-CA14)	Jerrold Nadler (D-NY10)	Ike Skelton (D-MO4)
Rosa DeLauro (D-CT3)	Henry Waxman (D-CA30)	Jennifer Dunn (R-WA8)
Diana DeGette (D-CO1)	Corrine Brown (D-FL3)	Vic Fazio (D-CA3)
Louise Slaughter (D-NY28)	Susan Davis (D-CA53)	John Edward Porter (R-IL10)
Barbara Kennelly (D-CT1)	Tom Allen (D-ME1)	Tony Hall (D-OH3)
Patsy Mink (D-HI2)	Douglas Applegate (D-OH18)	Ronald Machtley (R-RI1)
Constance Morella (R-MD8)	Tammy Baldwin (D-WI2)	Marilyn Lloyd (D-TN3)
Susan Molinari (R-NY13)	Sue Kelly (R-NY19)	
Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX18)	Elizabeth Furse (D-OR1)	

Poor		
Gwen Moore (D-WI4)	Barbara Kennelly (D-CT1)	Jill Long (D-IN4)
Juanita Millender-McDonald (D-CA37)	Linda Sanchez (D-CA39)	Jeff Miller (R-FL1)
Patsy Mink (D-HI2)	Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX18)	Ted Strickland (D-OH6)
Hilda Solis (D-CA32)	Edolphus Towns (D-NY10)	John Tierney (D-MA6)
Barbara Lee (D-CA13)	Diana DeGette (D-CO1)	Bernard Sanders (I-VT1)
Lynn Woolsey (D-CA6)	Tom Allen (D-ME1)	Matthew Martinez (D-CA31)
Henry Waxman (D-CA29)	Tammy Baldwin (D-WI2)	Earl Pomeroy (D-ND1)
Tony Hall (D-OH3)	Ron Wyden (D-OR3)	Anthony Weiner (D-NY9)
Nydia Velazquez (D-NY21)	Louise Slaughter (D-NY28)	John Peterson (R-PA5)
Maxine Waters (D-CA43)	Gene Green (D-TX29)	Max Sandlin (D-TX1)
Carolyn Cheeks Kirkpatrick (D-MI13)	John Conyers (D-MI13)	Walter Capps (D-CA22)
Charles Rangel (D-NY15)	Michael Bilirakis (R-FL9)	Jim Maloney (D-CT5)

Table B-1. Reputations for Primary and Secondary Advocacy By Disadvantaged Group in the House of Representatives (103rd, 105th, 108th, 110th, 113th Congress) (cont.)

Chaka Fattah (D-PA2)	Jesse Jackson (D-IL2)	Carrie Meek (D-FL17)
Xavier Becerra (D-CA31)	William Clay (D-MO1)	Jerry Costello (D-IL12)
Raul Grijalva (D-AZ7)	Dale Kildee (D-MI9)	Karen McCarthy (D-MO5)
Ruben Hinojosa (D-TX15)	Stephanie Tubbs Jones (D-OH11)	William Coyne (D-PA14)
Major Owens (D-NY11)	Phil English (R-PA3)	Bob Stump (R-AZ3)
Jose Serrano (D-NY16)	George Miller (D-CA11)	David Loebsack (D-IA2)
Al Green (R-TX9)	Chellie Pingree (D-ME1)	Brett Guthrie (D-KY2)
John Lewis (D-GA5)	Judy Biggert (R-IL13)	Michael Turner (R-OH10)
Keith Ellison (D-MN5)	Luis Gutierrez (D-IL4)	Spencer Bachus (R-AL6)
Tom Latham (R-IA04)	Mary Bono (R-CA45)	David Obey (D-WI7)
Marcia Fudge (D-OH11)	Tom Sawyer (D-OH14)	Terri Sewell (D-AL7)
Robert Scott (D-VA3)	Jan Schakowski (D-IL9)	John Larson (D-CT1)
Diane Watson (D-CA33)	Sam Farr (D-CA17)	David Scott (D-GA13)
Danny Davis (D-IL7)	Jim McGovern (D-MA3)	Carol Shea-Porter (D-NH1)
Barbara-Rose Collins (D-MI15)	Sander Levin (D-MI12)	Timothy Bishop (D-NY1)
Joseph Kennedy (D-MA8)	Earl Hilliard (D-AL7)	Mark Souder (R-IN3)
Henry Brown (R-SC1)	Bennie Thompson (D-MS2)	Martin Olav Sabo (D-MN5)
Artur Davis (D-AL7)	Donald Payne (D-NJ10)	Mike McIntyre (D-NC7)
Bobby Rush (D-IL1)	Kwesi Mfume (D-MD7)	Virgil Goode (R-VA5)
Floyd Flake (D-NY6)	Pete Stark (D-CA13)	Tom Petri (R-WI6)
Andre Carson (D-IN7)	Cliff Stearns (R-FL6)	Scott Baesler (D-KY6)
Julia Carson (D-IN7)	G.K. Butterfield (D-NC1)	John Olver (D-MA1)
Eva Clayton (D-NC1)	Gregory Meeks (D-NY6)	Jim Ramstad (R-MN3)
Barney Frank (D-MA4)	Henry Bonilla (R-TX23)	Bruce Vento (D-MN4)
Jim McDermott (D-WA7)	Thomas Foglietta (D-PA1)	Louis Stokes (D-OH11)
Frederica Wilson (D-FL24)	Frank Pallone (D-NJ6)	Ron Klink (D-PA4)
Lloyd Doggett (D-TX25)	Albert Wynn (D-MD4)	Jon Fox (R-PA13)
Ric Keller (R-FL8)	Lacy Clay (D-MO1)	Thomas Barrett (D-WV1)
Jack Quinn (R-NY27)	Loretta Sanchez (D-CA47)	Neil Abercrombie (D-HI1)
Benjamin Cardin (D-MD3)	Harold Ford (D-TN9)	James Oberstar (D-MN8)
Nita Lowey (D-NY18)	Julian Dixon (D-CA32)	Ronald Dellums (D-CA9)
Rosa DeLauro (D-CT3)	Christopher Shays (R-CT4)	Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA34)

Table B-2. Reputations for Primary and Secondary Advocacy By Disadvantaged Group in the Senate (103rd, 105th, 108th, 110th, 113th Congress)

Veterans		
Tom Daschle (D-SD)	John Rockefeller (D-WV)	Patty Murrary (D-WA)
John Glenn (D-OH)	Arlen Specter (R-PA)	John Boozman (R-AR)
Frank Murkowski (R-AK)	Tim Johnson (D-SD)	Bill Nelson (D-FL)
Barbara Mikulski (D-MD)	Larry Craig (R-ID)	

Seniors		
John Rockefeller (D-WV)	David Pryor (D-AR)	Jon Corzine (D-NJ)
Bill Nelson (D-FL)	John McCain (R-AZ)	Mark Dayton (D-MN)
Debbie Stabenow (D-MI)	Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY)	Ron Wyden (D-OR)
Marco Rubio (R-FL)	Harry Reid (D-NV)	Herb Kohl (D-WI)
Tim Johnson (D-SD)	William Roth (R-DE)	Benjamin Cardin (D-MD)
Bernard Sanders (I-VT)	John Breaux (D-LA)	Tom Harkin (D-IA)

LGBTQ		
Tammy Baldwin (D-WI)	Gordon Smith (R-OR)	Charles Robb (D-VA)

Racial/Ethnic Minorities		
Carol Moseley-Braun (D-IL)	Bob Dole (R-KS)	Bill Bradley (D-NJ)
Edward Kennedy (D-MA)	John Danforth (R-MO)	
Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH)	James Jeffords (R-VT)	

Immigrants		
Spencer Abraham (R-MI)	Larry Craig (R-ID)	Robert Menendez (D-NJ)
Richard Durbin (D-IL)	Alan Simpson (R-WY)	
Edward Kennedy (D-MA)	John McCain (R-AZ)	

Women		
Carol Moseley-Braun (D-IL)	Bill Bradley (D-NJ)	Harry Reid (D-NV)
Barbara Mikulski (D-MD)	Charles Schumer (D-NY)	Bob Packwood (R-OR)
Patty Murray (D-WA)	Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX)	Joseph Biden (D-DE)
Olympia Snowe (R-ME)	Tammy Baldwin (D-WI)	John Chafee (R-RI)
Barbara Boxer (D-CA)	Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY)	

Poor		
John Rockefeller (D-WV)	Gordon Smith (R-OR)	Richard Durbin (D-IL)
Bernard Sanders (I-VT)	Claiborne Pell (D-RI)	Christopher Dodd (D-CT)
Olympia Snowe (R-ME)	Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY)	Blanche Lincoln (D-AR)
Tom Harkin (D-IA)	Jon Corzine (D-NJ)	Peter Fitzgerald (R-IL)
Paul Wellstone (D-MN)	Orrin Hatch (R-UT)	Maria Cantwell (D-WA)
Edward Kennedy (D-MA)	Charles Grassley (R-IA)	Paul Sarbanes (D-OR)
Robert Menendez (D-NJ)	Daniel Coats (R-IN)	Jeff Merkley (R-OR)
Paul Simon (D-IL)	Jeff Bingaman (D-NM)	Jack Reed (D-RI)
Bob Dole (R-KS)	Pete Domenici (R-NM)	

Table C-1 displays the models of the effects of group size and ambient temperature on women's advocacy that were presented in Table 5.6, but with descriptive representation included. These models show that the relationship between the percentage of women in a state and reputation formation seen is Table 5.6 is in fact a spurious correlation that is better explained by whether or not a state's senator is a woman.

Table C-1. Group Size, Ambient Temperature, Descriptive Representation and Member Reputation for Advocacy for Women.

	Women					
	0	1	0	1	0	1
Group Size	0.256	-0.173	--	--	0.261	-0.191
	0.34	0.74			0.33	0.76
Ambient Temperature	--	--	-0.069	-0.095	-0.074	-0.063
			0.17	0.37	0.14	0.65
Descriptive Representative	3.551	3.938	3.523	4.196	3.642	3.983
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Republican	0.038	0.124	0.066	0.274	0.088	0.176
	0.92	0.87	0.87	0.72	0.82	0.84
Dem Pres Vote	0.032	0.108	0.044	0.102	0.034	0.112
	0.26	0.01	0.10	0.04	0.23	0.01
South	-0.847	0.738	-0.591	0.637	-0.812	0.806
	0.05	0.36	0.13	0.44	0.06	0.32
1990s	2.045	1.494	2.100	1.264	1.978	1.451
	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.09
2000s	0.450	-0.098	0.755	0.046	0.676	0.136
	0.28	0.87	0.09	0.93	0.13	0.80
First Term	-1.531		-1.501		-1.524	
	0.00		0.00		0.00	
Constant	-18.131	-2.186	-2.177	-5.471	-14.549	1.940
	0.18	0.93	0.49	0.24	0.30	0.94
N	500		500		500	
Wald's Chi ^{2}	80.0		64.7		84.0	
Pseudo R^2	0.2875		0.2857		0.2908	

Note: Coefficients calculated using generalized ordered logit, with First Term modeled as a parallel proportional term and all others as partial proportional terms. Standard errors are clustered by member, and p-values are in grey. Model 0 represents the likelihood of a shift from no advocacy to superficial or primary/secondary advocacy, and Model 1 is no advocacy or superficial advocacy to primary/secondary advocacy.

Appendix D – Effects of the Advocacy Environment and Electoral Insecurity on Reputation Formation in the House

Tables D-1 and D-2 display results for the analysis of the electoral insecurity hypothesis and the collective amplification hypothesis. The effects of the total number of advocates within the House resemble those of the Senate—for nearly all groups, having a greater number of advocates in the House makes it more likely that a member will also make the decision to form as reputation as a group advocate. The effects of electoral insecurity, however, are different in the House than they are in the Senate. While a senator's most recent vote share does not have a significant impact on their representational decision-making, it does have a significant effect in the House, under some circumstances. For groups that are generally considered to be highly deserving of government assistance, like seniors and veterans, a member's electoral security does not change the likelihood that they will choose to serve as a group advocate. But for most groups that are considered to be less deserving of assistance, members with more marginal prior election vote totals are less likely to risk forming a reputation as a group advocate. This demonstrates that while in the Senate, there is no margin at which senators feel comfortable as a disadvantaged group advocate, members of the House of Representatives who hold safer seats are significantly more likely to serve as a group advocate, even for groups that are not considered highly deserving of government assistance.

Table D-1. Institutional and Electoral Effects on Member Reputation for Advocacy for Veterans, Seniors, Racial/Ethnic Minorities, and the LGBTQ Community in the House of Representatives (1992-2014)

	Veterans			Seniors			LGBT	Race/Ethnicity		
	0	1	2	0	1	2	*logit*	0	1	2
Total Advocates	0.027	0.077	0.264	0.025	0.008	-0.009	0.217	0.025	-0.027	0.073
	0.45	0.20	0.36	0.00	0.36	0.67	0.06	0.29	0.37	0.13
Previous Vote Share	-0.005	0.013	-0.010	0.005	-0.010	0.008	0.020	0.024	0.035	0.018
	0.52	0.17	0.80	0.45	0.24	0.82	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.24
Group Size	0.197	0.265	0.417	0.097	0.119	0.091	1.937	0.049	0.061	0.054
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.48	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Ambient Temperature	0.049	0.096	0.013	-0.016	0.086	-0.094	0.040	-0.010	-0.058	-0.044
	0.10	0.12	0.89	0.66	0.33	0.61	0.20	0.77	0.17	0.56
Republican	-0.468	-0.901	-1.237	-0.814	-1.073	-1.570	-1.308	-1.854	-2.218	-2.890
	0.02	0.02	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.01
Dem Pres Vote	0.002	0.023	0.034	0.016	-0.005	-0.096	0.054	-0.033	-0.055	-0.034
	0.86	0.27	0.63	0.20	0.79	0.22	0.18	0.07	0.02	0.24
South	0.050	0.306	0.383	0.029	-0.281	-1.667	0.221	-0.073	-0.050	0.340
	0.83	0.52	0.59	0.89	0.47	0.20	0.70	0.79	0.88	0.44
1990s	-0.240	1.540	5.640	0.097	-0.607	-1.752	2.471	0.641	1.382	-1.453
	0.83	0.38	0.44	0.63	0.11	0.03	0.00	0.21	0.03	0.18
2000s	-0.612	-0.265	-0.800	--	--	--	1.159	0.283	1.628	-2.667
	0.03	0.61	0.38				0.11	0.73	0.13	0.14
First Term		-1.091			-0.805		-1.201		-1.788	
		0.00			0.00		0.14		0.00	
Constant	-8.441	-19.010	-24.111	-4.130	-10.120	7.896	-14.208	-4.201	-0.423	-4.834
	0.01	0.00	0.11	0.17	0.15	0.61	0.00	0.14	0.89	0.33
N		2175			1740		2175		2175	
Wald's Chi²		123.4			163.2		68.7		434.1	
Pseudo R^2		0.0742			0.0708		0.1977		0.3185	

Note: Coefficients for LGBTQ are estimated using logistic regression, as necessitated by the bivariate coding of the LGBTQ advocacy reputation variable. Coefficients calculated using generalized ordered logistic regression, with First Term modeled as a parallel proportional term and the rest of the independent variables modeled as partial proportional terms. Standard errors are clustered by member, and p-values are in grey. Model 0 represents the likelihood of a shift from no advocacy to superficial, secondary, or primary advocacy; Model 1 is no advocacy or superficial advocacy to primary or secondary advocacy; and Model 2 is any of the lower categories of advocacy to primary advocacy. Feeling thermometer questions for seniors were not included in the ANES of the 2010s, so the decade base category for seniors is the 2000s.

Table D-2. Institutional and Electoral Effects on Member Reputation for Advocacy for Immigrants, Women, and the Poor in the House of Representatives (1992-2014)

	Immigrants			Poor			Women		
	0	1	2	0	1	2	0	1	2
Total Advocates	0.067	0.066	-0.158	0.016	0.014	-0.004	0.076	0.096	0.476
	0.03	0.16	0.37	0.00	0.00	0.64	0.02	0.06	0.01
Previous Vote Share	0.021	0.006	0.071	0.013	0.020	0.027	0.005	-0.006	0.018
	0.06	0.69	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.07	0.43	0.56	0.28
Group Size	0.119	0.149	0.301	0.060	0.075	0.072	-0.008	-0.103	0.017
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.86	0.29	0.95
Ambient Temperature	-0.046	-0.008	-0.045	-0.007	0.025	-0.073	0.042	0.040	-0.102
	0.04	0.83	0.49	0.81	0.58	0.35	0.07	0.13	0.33
Republican	-0.618	-0.394	-4.552	-1.179	-1.830	-2.081	-0.713	-1.291	-2.823
	0.04	0.50	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Dem Pres Vote	-0.079	-0.065	-0.404	0.015	0.003	-0.013	0.057	0.075	0.228
	0.00	0.09	0.03	0.14	0.84	0.74	0.01	0.02	0.01
South	-0.442	-0.522	-4.298	-0.391	-0.966	-0.638	-0.490	-0.964	-0.939
	0.26	0.41	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.37	0.11	0.05	0.48
1990s	0.426	0.460	-0.603	0.079	0.197	-0.595	-0.907	-1.815	-9.635
	0.41	0.54	0.72	0.70	0.48	0.22	0.21	0.10	0.01
2000s	-0.159	0.049	-1.930	0.037	0.121	-0.112	-0.822	-1.751	-8.018
	0.52	0.89	0.10	0.87	0.70	0.82	0.19	0.06	0.00
First Term	-1.691			-1.065			-1.196		
	0.00			0.00			0.00		
Constant	-1.346	-4.928	13.261	-4.088	-7.324	0.150	-9.563	-5.600	-24.731
	0.48	0.05	0.28	0.06	0.02	0.98	0.00	0.33	0.08
N	2175			2175			2175		
Wald's Chi ^{2}	370.2			302.6			176.4		
Pseudo R^2	0.3121			0.1344			0.1036		

Note: Coefficients calculated using generalized ordered logistic regression, with First Term modeled as a parallel proportional term and the rest of the independent variables modeled as partial proportional terms. Standard errors are clustered by member, and p-values are in grey. Model 0 represents the likelihood of a shift from no advocacy to superficial, secondary, or primary advocacy; Model 1 is no advocacy or superficial advocacy to primary or secondary advocacy; and Model 2 is any of the lower categories of advocacy to primary advocacy.

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