

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: THE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CIVIL RESISTANCE

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What shapes individual attitudes about civil resistance? Chapter 1 introduces the topic, provides an overview of contemporary civil resistance research, and outlines the key findings. Chapter 2 constructs a five-pronged political psychology theory of civil resistance based on emotions, efficacy, identification with a movement and other people, message frames, and political ideology. I argue that (a) happiness and anger increase civil resistance support, but that fear decreases it; (b) pragmatic message frames will increase civil resistance support; (c) identification with the movement or with other people increases civil resistance support; (d) high personal and group-efficacy increase civil resistance support, and (e) political liberals show higher levels of civil resistance support than political conservatives. Chapters 3 utilizes an original survey experiment to measure civil resistance support leading up to the 2017 People's Climate March. Contrary to my expectations, both anger and fear make engaging in environmental civil resistance appear more risky. Different message frames have only a minimal impact on individuals' evaluations of the risks of engaging in environmental civil resistance. Identification with

the environmental movement, efficacy, and liberal political ideology increase environmental civil resistance support. Chapters 4 and 5 extend my argument beyond the United States and consider the global context. Chapter 4 studies environmental activism, specifically environmental demonstration participation and donating to environmental organizations, for over 61,000 participants in 50 countries. The analysis reveals that happiness, high levels of efficacy, and identification with environmental movements correspond with higher levels of environmental civil resistance participation. Chapter 5 also uses global survey data to examine participation in four forms of civil resistance: petition signing, peaceful demonstrations, boycotts, and, strikes. I find that happiness correlates with petition signing but unhappiness corresponds with peaceful demonstrations and boycotts and cosmopolitanism positively corresponds with petitions, peaceful demonstrations, and boycotts. Political efficacy and political liberalism are also positively related to civil resistance participation in all measures. Chapter 6 restates the main findings and discusses avenues for future research.

THE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CIVIL RESISTANCE

By

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Dedication

For Grandpa Bob

Acknowledgements

This work benefited from the support and advice of many people over the past several years. I trace this project back to my time as an undergraduate studying at the University of St. Thomas, where my passions for political science, psychology and academia began. It further developed as a graduate student at the University of Maryland when I became more interested in political psychology and was introduced to civil resistance scholarship.

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Any remaining faults in this work are my own.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The beginning of the twentieth century marked an important shift as millions of people around the world began using civil resistance¹ with greater frequency to challenge repressive governments and government authorities.² Individuals and groups effectively ended the British occupation of India under the leadership of Mohandas Gandhi, toppled the Marcos government in the Philippines, ended apartheid system in South Africa, ended the rule of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, overthrew the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia, and ended many other repressive regimes.

People continue to use civil resistance in the twenty-first century to demand democratic improvements and policy changes. For example, protesters in South Korea recently called for greater government accountability and millions of protestors gathered throughout the United States in 2017 for the Women's March, Science March, and People's Climate March.

Civil resistance research over the past decades has greatly enhanced our understanding of the tactics. Beginning with Gene Sharp's mid-twentieth century theory on strategic nonviolence, theoretical and empirical scholarship on civil resistance has taken off in recent decades. Recent work has examined the success and failure of large scale civil resistance campaigns (Schock 2005; Stephen and Chenoweth 2008; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), tactics employed by self-determination groups

¹ Civil resistance acts are contentious nonviolent actions that break from routine. A *nonviolent* act is any action or set of actions that abstains from the use of violence (Tarrow 2011). *Contentious actions* are acts or sets of actions that fall outside of the traditional political and institutional setting (Summy 1994; Tarrow 2011). For example, participating in a boycott is a contentious action, whereas voting in a presidential election is not. Actions that *break from routine* are disruptive in nature and often startle bystanders and leave people disoriented (Tarrow 2011). The terms civil resistance, nonviolent action, nonviolent resistance, and strategic nonviolence are all synonyms.

² The decision to engage in civil resistance represents a preferred tactic other several competing options: doing nothing, engaging in conventional politics (for example, voting), and/or violence.

(Cunningham 2013; Cunningham, Dahl, and Frugé 2016), and civil resistance during the Arab Spring (Pearlman 2013; Lawson 2015).

However, additional research is needed to examine the microfoundations of civil resistance attitudes and behaviors. There is still much to understand about how individual characteristics influence support (or opposition) to civil resistance, because much of the existing civil resistance literature focuses on larger units of analysis, such as movements and group level-behaviors (Summy 1994; Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).³ Therefore, I build on the recent microfoundational emphasis in comparative politics and international relations (Kertzer 2017; Kertzer and Tingley 2018) and construct a political psychology theory of civil resistance to better understand why individuals support and engage in civil resistance.

In the remainder of this chapter, I first highlight contemporary civil resistance research. Second, I discuss micro-level explanations for protest in social science research. Third, I present an overview of the dissertation and summarize my main arguments and findings.

³ Some scholars have noted the divide between social movement and civil resistance literature, despite the fact that they are both concerned with contentious politics and political processes (see Schock 2013, 2015a; Ritter 2015 for examples). While this is an important point, the goal of this study is to primarily consider civil resistance work, not to compare the two bodies of literature. One important distinction between the two strands of literature bears repeating: that social movement research typically emphasizes structural conditions (Kitschelt 1986; Tilly 1995; McAdam 1996; Tarrow 2011), whereas civil resistance research shows preferences for actors, or the skills of the actors (Summy 1994; Ackerman 2007; Schock 2005; Schock 2013; Schock 2015a).

Civil Resistance Research

There are four primary periods of civil resistance research. The first period of civil resistance writing derived from Gandhian traditions (Schock 2013, 2015a) and focused on principled methods of nonviolence, as in the Indian independence movement and the American Civil Rights Movement (Ritter 2015, 470). The second period encompasses the work of Gene Sharp and the scholarship that derived from his ideas. Sharp, and many writing in his tradition, embraced strategic nonviolence as opposed to principled commitments. Much of this writing was descriptive, normative, and/or intended for activist audiences (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013). The third period is characterized by the work of Kurt Shock and Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan. This period signaled another turn in civil resistance research, which is characterized by analytical and empirically rigorous research. This research has “been particularly inclined to understand why and how nonviolent movements succeed” (Ritter 2015, 469). Furthermore, Chenoweth and Stephan’s work led to an explosion in civil resistance research. As Nepstad (2015) writes, “[f]ollowing Chenoweth and Stephan’s landmark work, there has been an incredible surge of publications on nonviolence or civil resistance in mainstream academic disciplines and presses” (418). The fourth period of civil resistance research encompasses the diverse work following the publication of *Why Civil Resistance Works*. This work has diversified the types of research questions asked, empirical tools employed, and units of analysis considered. In the remainder of this section, I summarize the development of contemporary civil resistance work.

The first period of civil resistance draws from the tradition of Gandhi. Richard B. Gregg's *The Power of Non-Violence* (1934) provides an early psychological theory of civil resistance. His work is perhaps the first American academic study of the subject (Schock 2005). Until recently, it was some of the only research applying psychology to the study of civil resistance. Gregg traveled to India to observe Gandhi's campaigns and then created a psychological theory of Gandhi's philosophy for Western audiences (Schock 2015a). He argued that "[m]odern psychology enables us to understand the emotional, mental, and moral mechanisms" involved in nonviolent resistance (Gregg 1934, 43). Gregg also developed the concept of *moral jiu-jitsu*, which states that a nonviolent resister has a moral advantage over a violent opponent. This moral advantage in turn causes "the attacker to lose his moral balance" (Gregg 1934, 44). He contends that civil resisters must overcome feelings of anger or fear and instead to be "fearless, clam, steady" (Gregg 1933, 43). Gregg discusses the role of emotions in the process of violence, as well. A few pages later, Gregg explicitly states that, "In waging war, fear must be controlled, while anger is deliberately intensified and directed against the enemy; in nonviolent resistance, both anger and fear are controlled" (Gregg 1934, 55).

Gene Sharp's research in the mid-twentieth century began the second major period of civil resistance work. He focused on civil resistance tactics and ways to succeed in campaigns. Sharp's first book, *Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power: Three Case Histories*, explored a principled commitment to nonviolence. However, as his theory developed, Sharp became the leading proponent of strategic nonviolence (Weber 2003). In *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (1973), Sharp created a theory of civil resistance based on a strategic conception of nonviolence to counter principled (or

ethical) commitments. In Part I, Sharp develops a consent theory of power, which argues that there are two categories in all power relationships: the rulers and the subjects. If the subjects withdraw their consent, Sharp argues, the rulers are left powerless. This theory presents a direct challenge to monolithic theories of power, which contend that power comes from the top down (Shock 2005; 2015a). When individuals engage in collective action via civil resistance, they actively remove their consent and obedience (Sharp 1973; Sharp 2005) and draw attention towards their grievances.

Sharp's theory also challenges so-called conventional wisdom that structures matter more than the skills of the actors (see Ackerman 2007 for a recent endorsement of Sharp's position and Marin 1989 for a critique of it). In Part II, Sharp identifies three categories and 198 methods of nonviolent action. The categories are protest and persuasion, noncooperation (economic, social, and political), and nonviolent intervention. Part III lays out an ideal model for the stages of a successful nonviolent campaign.

Sharp's research on strategic nonviolence widely influenced practitioners and scholars of nonviolence, including activists in Serbia, Burma, Ukraine, Egypt and others (McCarthy 2018). In the decades after this seminal work, many scholars examined the dynamics of strategic nonviolence (Bond 1988; Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Ackerman and Duvall 2000; Helvey 2004). Sharp's work signaled a turn away from the primacy of principled civil resistance in theory and ushered in the era of pragmatic civil resistance (or strategic nonviolence).

Bond's (1988) study on civil resistance uses Sharp's framework, and 72 cases Sharp identifies, to conduct the first quantitative civil resistance research. The research examines 72 cases of nonviolence, mentioned in Sharp (1973), and 59 variables –

including ones on actors, situations, actions, and outcomes – to understand the political phenomena of civil resistance. Bond’s strongest finding is that civil resistance is far more likely to occur in non-democracies.

Ackerman and colleagues (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Ackerman and Duvall 2000) pick up on the concept of strategic nonviolence and on Sharp’s theory of power to study civil resistance campaigns. Like Sharp before them, they contend that civil resistance stems from strategic, rather than ethical, commitments. In fact, the central thesis in Ackerman and Kruegler is that, “*The quality of the strategic choices made by nonviolent protagonists matters to the outcome of nonviolent struggle*” (1994, 2).⁴ Ackerman and Kruegler examine strategic nonviolence and nonviolent action in 6 cases in this book.

In a related work, Ackerman and DuVall (2000) conducted descriptive studies of nonviolent campaigns throughout the twentieth century and all over the world. Their cases include campaigns in North America, Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Europe. As with Ackerman and Kruegler (1994), this work picks up on the theme of pragmatic nonviolence. The authors assert that “it is often assumed that the choice of nonviolent resistance is made for moral reasons, but the historical record suggests otherwise. Most who used nonviolent action in the twentieth century did so because military and physical force was not a viable option” (Ackerman and Duvall 2000 5). The work provides four lessons from their investigations: (1) nonviolence occurs more frequently than people tend to realize, (2) strategic nonviolence works against all forms of government oppression, (3) success decreases once a movement engages in violence and (4) that nonviolent movements, civil society, and democracy are interconnected.

⁴ Emphasis included in Ackerman and Kruegler.

Robert Helvey's (2004) book is also heavily influenced by Sharp's work, which Helvey acknowledges in the opening pages of his manuscript. Helvey's book on a "third alternative" to armed conflict and submission aims to provide "a framework that encourages orderly thinking about the fundamentals of strategic nonviolent opposition to state tyranny" (2004, xi). As with the work before him, Helvey is interested in civil resistance campaigns. Of particular interest to my project, Helvey considers the psychological components of civil resistance (Chapter 8) and the role of emotions in contentious campaigns (Chapter 10). In particular, he discusses how "[p]sychological operations (PSYOPS) is the centerpiece of a well-planned strategic nonviolent struggle. Its purpose is to influence attitudes and behaviors of target audiences, mainly through the use of propaganda" (Helvey 2004, 77). In Chapter 10, Helvey asserts that "a primary reason that people obey a tyrant is fear of sanctions for disobedience," and he provides strategies for overcoming fear (Helvey 2004, 101, 102-106).

The third period of civil resistance research begins with Kurt Schock's (2005) *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*, which presents the first systematic comparative study of successful and unsuccessful civil resistance campaigns in South Africa, the Philippines, Burma, China, Nepal, and Thailand. Instead of descriptive accounts, Shock employed a qualitative, comparative, and methodologically rigorous analysis of civil resistance campaign successes and failures. Although Schock discusses individuals, organizations, and campaigns, his primary unit of analysis is the movement. He argues that political transformations depend on (a) the ability of challengers to withstand repression and (b) the ability of challengers to undermine government power (Schock 2005, 49). Schock also highlights concentration

(i.e., protests) and dispersion (i.e., stay-aways) methods for challenging the state (Howes 2013, 434)

As Chenoweth and Stephan state, “What has been missing though, are catalogs of known campaigns and systematic comparisons of the outcomes of both nonviolent and violent resistance” (2011, 16). Their work does this with a mixed-method approach to examine maximalist violent and nonviolent campaigns (defined as anti-regime, anti-occupation, and secession campaigns). By examining 323 campaigns across the world between 1900-2006 that included at least 1,000 participants, they showed that civil resistance was two times more effective than violent resistance (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).⁵ They also find that civil resistance campaigns are larger than violent ones and are more likely to emerge and stay democracies. Specifically, they argue that civil resistance campaigns have four primary advantages over violent ones: lower physical, informational, moral, and commitment barriers (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 34-39).

Civil resistance’s fourth period consists of recent empirical work after the publication of *Why Civil Resistance Works* and was ushered in with the 2013 *Journal of Peace Research* special issue edited by Erica Chenoweth and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham. The period is characterized by diverse research questions, empirical research tools, and units of analysis. As the editors note in the introduction, “[u]ntil quite recently, scholarship on nonviolent struggle has been primarily applied (Martin, 1984, 1993; Sharp, 1973, 2005), descriptive (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000), or normative

⁵ Chenoweth and Stephan define a “successful” campaign by “two conditions: the full achievement of its stated goals (regime change, antioccupation, or secession) within a year of the peak of activists and a discernible effect on the outcome, such that the outcome was a direct result of the campaign’s activities (Pape 1997)” (2011, 14).

(Holmes & Gan, 2004)” (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013, 272). The special issue empirically and systematically analyzed civil resistance with various methodologies and units of analysis. The units of analysis include “individuals (Davenport & Trivedi, 2013), events (Shellman, Levey & Young, 2013), organizations (Asal et al., 2013), country-years (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013; Cunningham, 2013; Rivera Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013), and combinations of micro-level quantitative and qualitative data (Kaplan, 2013)” (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013, 274).

Davenport and Trivedi (2013) focused on individuals by examining the attitudes of 98,316 Dalits from Gujarat, and found that some types of nonviolence make people more aware of oppression than others. In particular, they found that exposure to other activists or oppressors lead to greater awareness of discrimination (Davenport and Trivedi 2013, 371).

Shellman et al (2103) focused on events by developing a structural (foreign direct investment, government repression) and sentiment based (societal sentiment toward the group, societal sentiment toward the government) model to predict strategy shift (i.e., switching from nonviolent to violence or vice versa) for the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines. They conclude “that movements are more likely to use violent methods when state repression is low and more likely to resort to nonviolent methods when state repression is high” (Nepstad 2015, 420).

Asal and colleagues focused on organizations by considering the strategies employed by 104 ethno-political organizations in the Middle East. They found that gender-inclusive organizations “were much more likely to adopt a protest-only approach

(19.5%), much less likely to adopt violence-only (−19.3%), and mildly less likely to adopt a mixed strategy (−1.3%)” (Asal et al 2013, 313).

Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) presented NAVCO 2.0, a cross-national time-series dataset on major nonviolent and violent campaigns. The NAVCO 2.0 dataset considers campaign-year data, whereas NAVCO 1.0 focused on campaigns (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). Chenoweth and Lewis then compared violent campaign onset from the NAVCO 2.0 data onset with Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) civil war onset research. Chenoweth and Lewis found that “the results for violent campaigns from the NAVCO 2.0 data are largely consistent with Fearon & Laitin’s (2003) results, except for the loss of significance of ongoing war and war in a neighboring state” (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013, 420). Next, they compared nonviolent campaign onset with NAVCO 2.0 and Fearon and Laitin’s civil war onset study. They found “a clear divergence in the determinants of campaign onset” and that, “violent and nonviolent campaigns share only one determinant in common: population size” (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013, 420).

Cunningham (2013) considered the tactics of organizations at a smaller-scale than the mass nonviolent campaigns and examined why self-determination groups chose between mass nonviolence, civil war, or conventional politics. Cunningham found that “that nonviolent campaign is more likely, compared to conventional politics, when groups are smaller, less geographically concentrated, excluded from political power, face economic discrimination, make independence demands, and operate in non-democracies.” (292). In a recent study, Cunningham, Dahl, and Frugé (2017) examined the tactics of self-determination groups and see if they tend to copy one another (diffuse tactics) or use different ones (diversify tactics). They find that, “organizations can

achieve some of their proximate goals more efficiently by diversifying tactics rather than copying” (Cunningham et al, 2017 593).

Lastly, Kaplan (2013) uses a combination of micro-level quantitative and qualitative data to show that local institutions, specifically the Peasant Worker Association of the Carare River (ATCC) in Colombia during the civil war, matter in limiting conflict/violence by bigger groups.

Similarly, a 2015 special issue of *Mobilization* dedicated to “Nonviolent Resistance Research” edited the Sharon Erickson Nepstad urged social movement researchers to “promot[e] the cross-fertilization of ideas” with civil resistance researchers (2015, 416). Like the *Journal of Peace Research* special issue, the *Mobilization* issue brought together diverse social science scholars to investigate civil resistance. With the exception of an article by Chenoweth and Schock (2015) on radical flank effects, the articles are primarily qualitative. They investigated diverse topics, such as civil resistance outcomes in the Arab Spring (Lawson 2015), actors’ tactical choices and structural factors (White et al 2015; Schock 2015b), and evaluated civil resistance studies (Martin 2015; Chabot and Vinthagen 2015).

Other recent civil resistance research has used quantitative research methods to investigate various aspects of civil resistance. For example, civil resistance in a neighboring country can increase the likelihood of diffusion to another country (Gleditsch and Rivera 2015) and Karakaya (2016) found a positive correlation between globalization and preferences for nonviolence over of violence.

Micro-Level Explanations of Protest in Social Science

Past political science research on civil resistance usually considers organizations, events, years, and/or campaigns, leaving plenty of space to theorize and empirically examine civil resistance preferences at the individual level. I briefly discuss micro-level political science and psychology research below.

Of the limited political science research in this domain, some interesting findings have emerged. In a large N cross national study examining both macro and micro-level explanations, Dalton and colleagues found that individual traits, such as overall happiness, education, and left political ideology, are positively correlated with protest behavior (Dalton et al 2010). In a qualitative study on the Second Palestinian Intifada, Norman finds that framing civil resistance as a strategic choice, instead of as a moral commitment, increased support for its use (2010). In a different qualitative study, Pearlman examined the microfoundations of the Arab Spring through emotions. Pearlman argued that ‘emboldening’ emotions (i.e., anger, joy, and pride) increase civil resistance participation, because they increase optimistic assessments and risk acceptance. In contrast, ‘dispiriting emotions’ (i.e., fear, sadness, and shame) do the opposite—they increase pessimistic assessment and decrease risk acceptance (Pearlman 2013, 388).

Psychology has paid greater attention to micro-foundational explanations of civil resistance (VanZomeren et al 2004; VanZomeren et al 2008; Tausch et al 2011; Ayanian and Tausch 2016) than has political science. Of this research, though, much of it examines protest attitudes and intended behaviors. While protest and persuasion is a key category of civil resistance (Shock 1973), there are an infinite number of tactics from which actors can choose. Nonetheless, this research is particularly helpful in developing a

political psychology theory of civil resistance. For example, psychologists find that emotions, especially anger, and high levels of efficacy lead to increased risky collective action (VanZomeren et al 2004; Tausch et al 2011). Others found that anger, high efficacy, and identification motivated Egyptian activists during the 2013 uprising (Ayanian and Tausch 2016).

Dissertation Overview

The key research question is: what shapes individual attitudes about civil resistance? In Chapter 2, I construct a five-pronged political psychology theory of civil resistance based on emotions, efficacy, identification with a movement and other people, message frames, and political ideology. I argue that (a) happiness and anger increase civil resistance support, but that fear decreases it; (b) that pragmatic message frames will increase civil resistance support; (c) that identification with the movement or with other people increases support; (d) that high personal and group-efficacy increase civil resistance support, and (e) that political liberals show higher levels of support than political conservatives.

Chapters 3 utilizes an original survey experiment to measure civil resistance attitudes leading up to the 2017 People's Climate March. In line with my expectations, fear makes civil resistance appear more risky. Contrary to my expectations though, anger also makes environmental civil resistance appear more risky. Different message frames have only a minimal impact on individuals' evaluations of environmental civil resistance. Identification with the environmental movement, efficacy, and liberal political ideology increase support for environmental civil resistance.

I examine environmental civil resistance for three reasons. First, environmental politics have increasingly used methods of civil resistance in recent. In particular, the 2009 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 15) in Copenhagen signaled “a turning point in terms of the number of organizations that were willing to sponsor contentious collective action” (Hadden 2015, 63). Prior to COP 15, “16 percent of organizations used contentious actions more than half of the time in 2008, whereas 58 percent did so in 2009” (Hadden 2015, 63). In 2014, for example, over 400,000 people and over 1,500 participating organizations took to the streets in New York City for the People’s Climate March to “demand climate action.”⁶ In sum, “[n]onviolent direct action has played an important role in the campaigns” of environmental groups (Schock 2015a).

Second, environmental civil resistance, especially at the individual level, is rarely studied in social science research. Rather, recent empirical work considers overall civil resistance strategies (Sharp 1973, Helvey 2004), struggles for democratization (Schock 2005), and other maximalist campaigns (Stephen and Chenoweth 2008; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Studying environmental civil resistance provides an important contribution to the scholarship on nonviolent political action.

Third, studying environmental civil resistance increased the external validity of the research. In fact, the 2017 People’s Climate March presented a unique opportunity to study an important moment in civil resistance while it occurred. In the days leading up the April 29, 2017 event, I fielded an original survey experiment that examined attitudes (specifically risk perceptions) and intended actions related to the march. Participation

⁶ [People's Climate Movement.](#)

estimates range from tens of thousands⁷ to more than 200,000 people marching through the streets of D.C.⁸ Some estimates place total participation across the U.S. around 300,000, with 370 sister marches occurring throughout the country.⁹ Only the 2014 People’s Climate March received more attention from citizens around the world. According to Google Trends, time around the 2017 People’s Climate March yielded the second most online searches for the term “climate march.”, trailing only the lead up to the 2014 event.¹⁰ See Figure 1.1 below.

Figure 1.1: “Climate March” Interest Over Time in Google Searches (May 2013-May 2018)¹¹



In Chapters 4 and 5, I extend my argument beyond the United States and consider the global context. In Chapter 4, I study environmental activism, specifically environmental demonstration participation and donating to environmental organizations, for over 61,000 participants in 50 countries. The analysis reveals that happiness, high levels of efficacy, and identification with environmental movements correspond with higher levels of environmental civil resistance participation. This extension allows me to examine how emotions, identification, efficacy, and political ideology relate to civil

⁷ [New York Times](#), [Washington Post](#), [NPR](#)

⁸ [Washington Post](#), [People's Climate Movement](#)

⁹ [People's Climate Movement](#)

¹⁰ According to Google, “Numbers represent search interest relative to the highest point on the chart for the given region and time. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for the term. A value of 50 means that the term is half as popular. A score of 0 means there was not enough data for this term”

¹¹ Available at: <https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=today%205-y&q=climate%20march>

resistance in a global context and during a different time period (2010-2014). I find that happiness, identification with the environmental movement, efficacy, and left-political ideology are all positively correlated with environmental activism. This provides additional support for the findings in Chapter 3.

Chapters 3 and 4 explicitly consider environmental civil resistance at the micro-level. However, as is well-documented, civil resistance occurs for a wide variety of reasons: democratization, national liberation, human rights, anti-foreign occupation, anti-corruption, etc. This is an important scope condition on the research in these chapters. In Chapter 5, I address this scope condition through analysis of civil resistance more broadly. Importantly, I examine if the findings from my analyses on environmental civil resistance are valid more generally.

Chapter 5 uses global survey data to examine participation in four forms of civil resistance: petition signing, peaceful demonstrations, boycotts, and strikes. I find strong support for the central arguments of the dissertation. In particular, I find that emotions have an important impact on petition signing, participating in peaceful demonstrations, and boycott participation.¹² In line with my expectations, happiness correlates with petition signing. Unhappiness, however corresponds with peaceful demonstrations and boycotts. Cosmopolitanism positively corresponds with petitions, peaceful demonstrations, and boycotts.

Also, political efficacy and political liberalism are positively related to civil resistance participation in all measures.

¹² Happiness correlates with petition signing but that unhappiness corresponds with peaceful demonstrations and boycotts, and cosmopolitanism positively corresponds with petitions, peaceful demonstrations, and boycotts.

Chapter 6 restates the main findings and discusses avenues for future research. I suggest five avenues for future research, and pay particular attention to how research can explore the interaction between civil resistance and civil society.

Chapter 2: Literature and Theory

Social movement scholars and civil resistance researchers both study contentious politics. However, there exists a “lack of engagement” between the two camps (Schock 2015, 47) as each area of study emphasizes different aspects of contentious politics. A central distinction between these two research agendas is the emphasis on structures, such as regime type and political openness, by social movement scholars versus the emphasis on actors by scholars of civil resistance (for a review see Schock 2005, 2013, 2015a). According to social movement scholars, protest and other forms of contentious politics are more likely to occur in political contexts with greater resources (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tarrow 2011). Scholars of civil resistance have instead argued that civil resistance tactics can overcome even the most repressive regimes when the actors are skilled enough (Summy 1994; Ackerman 2007). Early civil resistance research by Gregg (1934) also placed an emphasis on actors and paid particular attention to the psychological motivators of civil resistance. Picking up on these assumptions, and integrating a political science lens, I construct an agent-based political psychological theory of civil resistance.

This chapter lays out my political psychology theory of civil resistance. In particular, the discussion centers on one broad question: What persuades individuals to support civil resistance? In answering it, I construct a novel theory focusing on five primacy questions and components. I present the research questions and summarize the arguments pertaining to each below.

(1) **Emotions:** *What impact do happiness, anger and fear have on civil resistance support?* I predict that happiness and anger increase civil resistance support and participation but fear decreases them.

(2) **Frames:** *To what extent do civil resistance message frames matter?* Message frames stressing strategic reasons for civil resistance will be more effective than arguments stressing the ethical benefits of it.

(3) **Identification:** *How does identification with others influence civil resistance support?* Individuals that identify with a movement and other people will be more likely to support civil resistance.

(4) **Efficacy:** *How does efficacy influence support for civil resistance?* High self and/or group efficacy will correspond with greater civil resistance support.

(5) **Political Ideology:** *How does political ideology influence support for civil resistance?* Individuals that identify as left-leaning will be more supportive of civil resistance than those that identify as right-leaning.

Although there are an infinite number of factors that *could* influence civil resistance attitudes, I limit my analysis to these five aspects. I do this for two reasons. First, there is substantial evidence showing that these aspects are important indicators of political preferences and some evidence suggests that these may matter for civil resistance. Second, there is only limited micro-level research on civil resistance, so this project works to develop a new theoretical model and also to test it.

In the five sections that follow, I expand the theoretical arguments for each component. First, I begin with emotions and consider the influence happiness, anger, and fear have on civil resistance. Second, I consider how message frames influence civil resistance and pay particular attention to pragmatic and principled civil resistance message frames. Third, I examine how identification with a group and with other people influences civil resistance support. Fourth, I argue that high efficacy increases civil

resistance support. Fifth, I argue that politically liberal ideology increases support for civil resistance. Finally, I recap the main arguments and provide a brief overview of the empirical tests.

2.1. The role of emotions

Recent political science research pays increasing attention to the significant influence emotions have on political attitudes and behaviors.¹³ Research shows that emotions explain political attitudes and behavior in many contexts, such as political advertising (Brader 2006), voting (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000), and interstate conflict (Crawford 2000). Because emotions are so central to political behavior, it seems likely that they may influence attitudes and behaviors pertaining to civil resistance. In fact, we already know that emotions influence attitudes towards protest (van Zomeren et al 2008; Tausch et al 2011). In the realm of social movement scholarship, researchers have begun examining how emotions contribute to various political actions, such as protest (Jasper 1988) and climate activism (Kleres and Wettergren 2017). What is missing from political science analysis, though, is a theory of emotions for various acts of civil resistance (i.e. protests petition signing, boycotts, strikes, etc.).

My analysis focuses on happiness, anger, and fear, because these emotions frequently predict preferences for risky behavior. For example, past research finds a positive correlation between happiness and protest behavior (Dalton, Van Sickle, and

¹³ Brader (2006, 51) describes “emotions as specific sets of physiological and mental dispositions by the brain in response to the perceived significance of a situation or object for an individual’s goals.” Eagly and Chaiken (1993, 1) define an attitude as “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor.”

Weldon 2010). Other work shows that anger and fear shape perceptions of risk, support for risky behavior, and willingness to engage in it.

My study incorporates a valence-based approach to attitudes (see Smith and Ellsworth 1985), Appraisal Tendency Framework (ATF) (Lerner and Keltner 2000; 2001; Han, Lerner, and Keltner 2007), and the Dual Pathway Model of Collective Action (Van Zomeren et al. 2004; Van Zomeren et al. 2010; Tausch et al. 2011). I use these three prominent social psychology framework, to uncover how happiness, anger, and fear impact civil resistance attitudes.

Valence-based approaches emphasize how positive or negative emotions influence subsequent emotions. For example, “people induced to feel negative affect consistently make more pessimistic estimates about the frequency of death than did participants induced to feel positive affect (E.J. Johnson & Tversky, 1983)” (Lerner and Keltner 2001). Most important, then, is whether an emotion is positive (i.e., happiness) or negative (i.e., sadness).

Contrary to valence-based approaches, AFT and the Dual Pathway Model of Collective Action stress the importance of examining the role of discrete emotions and that emotions of the same valence can have differing effects on attitudes and behaviors. According to these theories, although anger and fear both have negative valence, they can lead to very different evaluations of situations. In contrast, although happiness and anger have a different valence, they can lead to similar evaluations of situations. As Lerner and colleagues state, “[u]nlike valence-based models, the ATF predicts that emotions of the same valence (such as fear and anger) can exert opposing influences on choices and

judgments, whereas emotions of the opposite valence (such as anger and happiness) can exert similar influences” (Lerner et al 2015, 804).

ATF studies show that, within the realm of contentious collective action, happiness and anger correspond with approach tendencies, but fear corresponds with avoidance (Lerner and Keltner 2000; 2001). AFT studies often find that anger increases support for risky behavior and fear decreases it. Prior research typically used the ATF to study risky behavior but, to my knowledge, has not been applied to the study of civil resistance.

The Dual Pathway Model framework argues there are two primary, but distinct, motivators of collective action. The first is emotions and the second is efficacy. This research finds that high levels of anger or efficacy correspond with support for risky collective action, whereas fear or low efficacy correspond with less support for collective action. Like AFT, the Dual Pathway Model has not typically been applied to civil resistance broadly. Some research has, however, examined protest behavior, such as efforts to stop tuition increases or foreign policy preferences (see Tausch, Beckers, Spears, Christ, Saab and Singh 2011).

One final note about my research plan. My research examines both ‘state’ and ‘trait’ emotions.¹⁴ Studies on state emotions may consider how feeling angry or afraid at a given moment will influence an immediate and subsequent attitude and/or behavior. For example, an individual that is that is currently angry may be more likely to engage in a protest. Trait emotions, conversely, refer to the frequency an individual experiences an emotion. For instance, some people are more frequently angry than others. This project

¹⁴ This is sometimes referred to as dispositional and momentary emotions. See Lerner and Keltner (2000) for a review.

considers these types of momentary emotions and appraisals, but also how trait (or state) emotions influences participation in civil resistance. In particular, I examine how an individual's trait happiness corresponds with various civil resistance behaviors. I also consider how individuals appraise a single situation (i.e. participation in a specific protest) and how individuals appraise their lives overall (i.e. how happy they are overall). I predict that:

H₁: Fear will have an opposite effect than happiness and anger on civil resistance attitudes.

2.1.1 Happiness

Happiness corresponds with high levels of certainty and control (Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Tiedens and Linton 2001), which should correspond with willingness to engage in civil resistance. Also, “[i]ncreasing happiness and anger were similarly related to increasing optimism about future events” (Lerner and Keltner 2001, 150). In an analysis of nationally representative samples from counties around the world during Waves 3 and 4 of the World Values Survey, Dalton and colleague (2010) found that happiness was positively correlated with protest participation (Dalton et al 2010, 64). Furthermore, Dalton et al (2010), found that “political grievances appear unrelated to protest” (67).

Relatedly, joy is considered an “emboldening emotion”, which leads to “pleasure with progress toward[s] a goal” and optimistic risk assessments (Pearlman 2013, 392).¹⁵ Feelings of joy have been present during recent civil resistance in the 21st century. For example, the People Power (PP) group in Hong Kong adopted the tactic of “joyous resistance” after unsuccessfully using violent tactics (Ng and Kin-man Chan 2017).

¹⁵ In making these arguments, Pearlman (2013) references: Lazarus (1991), Mano (1994), Elster (1999), Lerner and Keltner (2000), Lerner and Keltner (2001)

During one Occupy Wall Street march (2011), Angela Davis stated how “it was this amazing, joyful experience and so many people seemed to experience that joy of being together” (Kolhatkar 2011, 77). For these reasons, I predict that:

H_{1A}: Happiness will make civil resistance more appealing (i.e., less risky, increase support, and increase willingness to participate).

2.1.2 Anger

Early research on social movements argued that contentious political action resulted from anger, frustration, and alienation from politics (Saunders et al 2012, 267). Gurr’s early models (1968, 1970) argue that grievances cause citizens to enter into conflict.

Recent work has also considered the role of anger in attitudes and behaviors. Like happiness, anger corresponds with feelings of control and certainty and optimistic evaluations of situations and their potential outcomes (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001; Pearlman 2013). Unlike happiness, though, anger has a negative valence. Individuals feeling angry tend to believe in their own efficacy, meaning that believe they have a high level of control over event outcomes. Individuals’ high efficacy levels correlate with protest participation (Klandermans et al. 2008; Corrigan-Brown 2012). Angry individuals also tend to feel more optimistic and believe that they can do something to rectify suboptimal situations. They feel emboldened and believe their actions can “make a difference.” Therefore, anger should lead to *lower* perceptions of risk and a *greater* likelihood of participation.

Angry individuals often choose a specific person or people as targets for their grievances (Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards 1993; Pearlman 2013). By assigning blame, individuals can use their anger to work towards concrete goals. For example, anger and

frustration against repressive regimes lead to anti-government protests during the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, and the absence of anger and other ‘emboldening’ emotions could explain the lack of an uprising in Algeria (Pearlman 2013).

The ability to capitalize on individuals’ anger is critical to the success of civil resistance. Anger decreases perceptions of risk and corresponds with greater support for risky behavior (Lerner and Keltner 2000; van Zomeren et al. 2004; Druckman and McDermott 2008), such as protest (Tausch et al. 2011; Pearlman 2013; Ayanian and Tausch 2016). Anger also lowers the barrier to entry by making risky behavior appear less risky and increases perceived benefits of participating while simultaneously lowering perceived costs. This is important because engaging in civil resistance is risky behavior. Individuals face social and/or legal sanctions for participation. Even in consolidated democracies, people may face arrest for participating in protests or sit-ins. For example, over 1,200 people were arrested during the “Democracy Spring” civil resistance activities in Washington, D.C. in 2016 for refusing to vacate from the outside steps of the US Capitol (Norton 2016).

Finally, anger makes individuals more likely to challenge authorities (Klandermans et al. 2008) and corresponds with support for civil resistance, such as willingness to engage in environmental boycotts (Böhm 2003, 200). For these reasons I predict that:

H_{1B}: Anger will make civil resistance more appealing (i.e. less risky and increase willingness to participate).

2.1.3 Fear

Regarding fear, I predict that it will decrease support for civil resistance. Fear, unlike happiness or anger, leads to pessimistic appraisals of situations and their potential

outcomes (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001; Pearlman 2013). Fear corresponds with a low sense of certainty and lack of control over situations (Pearlman 2013, 392). Individuals feeling fear are more likely to develop pessimistic appraisals of situations, experience decreased feelings of efficacy, and feel more risk averse. The pessimism relates to the current situation as a perceived inability to make changes. In short, fear triggers pessimism that future situations will be just as bad, or even worse. Therefore, fear should lead to *greater* perceptions of risk and *less* likelihood of participation in civil resistance.

Pessimistic appraisals of situations, and their potential outcomes, cause low self and group efficacy (Lerner and Keltner 2000; Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; Pearlman 2013). Low levels of efficacy correlate with decreased levels of participation in protest (Klandermans et al. 2008; Corrigan-Brown 2012). Fear also decreases individuals' likelihood of supporting risky behavior (Lerner and Keltner 2000; van Zomeren et al. 2004; Druckman and McDermott 2008), such as protest (Tausch et al. 2011; Pearlman 2013) and increases the cost of support and participation. Fear has been called a "dispiriting emotion" by scholars as well (Pearlman 2013, 392).

Overall, fear decreases one's likelihood of supporting or participating in risky behavior (Lerner and Keltner 2000; van Zomeren et al 2004; Druckman and McDermott 2008), such as protest (Tausch et al 2011; Pearlman 2013). Fear increases the barriers to entry, by making risky behavior appear less appealing. Once this happens, an individual may not be persuaded to act. Because people want to minimize costs (Homans 1961, Emerson 1976), it seems likely that increasing the costs while decreasing the rewards should negatively influence support and participation.

I should note that a few other studies suggest that fear may actually correspond with *increased* action. Witte and Allen (2000), argue that fear shouldn't adversely impact individuals with high self-efficacy, and that "positive effects of fear only occur when individuals have high self-efficacy" (Van Zomeren, Spears, and Leach 2010, 341).

Although I keep these studies in mind, I predict that:

H_{1C}: Fear will make civil resistance less appealing (i.e., more risky) and decrease willingness to participate.

2.2. Message Framing and Framing Effects

The second component influencing civil resistance is message framing and framing effects. Message frames "occur when (often small) changes in the presentation of an issue or an event produce (sometimes large) changes of opinion" (Chong and Druckman 2007, 104). The impact of message framing is well-documented in social science research and has been widely observed in various political contexts. For example, framing influences attitudes towards government spending (Jacoby 2000), campaign finance (Grant and Rudolph 2003), support for the Supreme Court (Nicholson and Howard 2003), and opinions of foreign nations (Brewer, Gradf, and Willnat 2003).

Despite the prevalence of framing and framing effects, there have been only limited investigations into message frame effects in civil resistance at the micro-level. In fact, many social movement researchers examine message frames for collective social and political action, but they do not typically consider these efforts at the individual level (see Schock 2005 for a review). Of these limited number of investigations, research

shows that message frames impact support for civil resistance (Norman 2010)¹⁶, and petition signing (McEntire et al 2015a; McEntire et al 2015b). In Chapter 3 of this study, I examine two primary frames for civil resistance: pragmatic (i.e. it is effective) or principled (i.e. it is ethical).¹⁷

To my knowledge, almost no empirical research has examined the relative impact of ethical vs. pragmatic framing (see Heuberger, Levy, and Wright 2016 for the lone example) and no extant research has investigated this within the context of civil resistance. In the only empirical study looking at this, Norman (2010) found that civil resistance support was greater when it was framed as a strategy instead of a moral preference during the Second Palestinian Intifada.

Pragmatic civil resistance is civil resistance that is employed as a strategy. It is ‘tactical nonviolence’ (Schock 2015a: 24-26; Weber 2003; Vinthagen 2015), where “furthering one’s own goals is what counts most of all” (Vinthagen 2015, 7). Since Sharp’s (1973) research on strategic nonviolence, most scholars contend that pragmatic considerations motivate civil resistance (Ackerman 1976; Ackerman and Duvall 2000; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Howes 2013). In fact, Ackerman (1976) estimated that 85 percent of known of civil resistance actions resulted from pragmatic considerations. There are numerous examples of pragmatic civil resistance throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. For example, The United Democratic Front (UDF) in South Africa embraced nonviolent resistance during the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa because of

¹⁶ Norman interviews, conducts surveys, and observes Palestinian citizens to better understand civil resistance in the context of the Second Palestinian Intifada

¹⁷ For this study, I see pragmatic and principled reasons as competing frames and examine the relative effectiveness of each frame. Although these distinctions are commonplace, some see different civil resistance motivations on a continuum. Gan (2013) argues that civil resistance is best understood as a spectrum between selective nonviolence and comprehensive nonviolence, instead of as a dichotomy between principled and pragmatic action. Others argue that describing civil resistance as motivated only by principled reasons or only by pragmatic reasons is a false assumption (Hallward and Norman 2015).

pragmatic consideration. It was “not based on moral condemnations of violent action.” In fact, “the UDF realized the strategic virtue of methods of nonviolent action and understood that state power was more likely to be undermined through nonviolent action than through violence” (Shock 2005, 61).

Pragmatic civil resistance frames may be persuasive, because they emphasize that civil resistance is twice as effective as violent resistance. Consider, Stephan and Chenoweth’s well-cited finding that “major nonviolent campaigns have achieved success 53 percent of the time, compared with 26 percent for violence resistance campaigns” has legitimized the pragmatic camp (2008, 8).¹⁸

Knowing that civil resistance is so effective may convince individuals to act nonviolently, dissuade individuals from refraining to act, and discourage violent actions. High success rates should be particularly important for fostering efficacy. And since high-levels of efficacy are related to civil resistance participation (Klandermans et al. 2008; Corrigan-Brown 2012), this may be particularly persuasive.

In addition to emphasizing success and increasing a sense of efficacy, pragmatic civil resistance frames are easily adaptable to people of various worldviews. In other words, a person does not have to be a committed pacifist in order to subscribe to pragmatic nonviolence. In fact, most people engaging in nonviolence are not committed pacifists (Lakey 1973). In a way, pragmatic commitments to civil resistance represent a sort of “overlapping consensus” (Rawls 1999, 340). People of difference comprehensive political and/or religious doctrines can all engage in pragmatic civil resistance without

¹⁸ A detailed description for success, limited success, or failure can be found on pg. 17 of their article. The campaigns of interest are (a) domestic regime change, (b) campaigns against foreign occupations and (c) self-determination campaigns. Of note, social and economic campaigns, such as the US civil rights movement, aren’t included in the data.

having to subscribe to the specific doctrine of pacifism. For instance, a conservative Christian or a liberal Christian could both engage in civil resistance without having to compromise their respective worldviews.

Pragmatic civil resistance frames can build off the fact that civil resistance has lower physical, information, moral, and commitment errors than violent forms of action (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 34-39). This makes pragmatic civil resistance more appealing, because marching in a protest requires a lot less of an individual, than does learning how to use and operate a firearm. Marching simply requires that one show up and be supportive of a cause. Operating a firearm requires training and a commitment to (possibly) end the life of others. As Schock notes, “empirical studies show it is psychologically more difficult to carry out violent actions than nonviolent ones (Collins 2009; Grossman & Siddle 2008)” (2015a, 110). Pragmatic civil resistance can therefore attract larger segments of the population, such as women and the elderly, which are often excluded from participating in armed resistance (Schock 2013; Hallward and Norman 2015).

On the other hand, principled civil resistance stems from a complete moral/ethical commitment to nonviolence (Schock 2015a: 24-26; Weber 2003; Vinthagen 2015), and is “the renunciation of violence in its many forms and in every moment of one’s life” (Gan 2013, 68). It is a “lifestyle” where “nonviolence is the activist’s principle ethical approach or religious reasoning” to all situations (Vinthagen 2015, 7). The process of nonviolence is as important as achieving a particular goal for adherents of principles nonviolence. In other words, the means are just as important as the ends. In fact, “people rely to a disproportionate extent on moral arguments to form their opinions” (Heuberger,

Levy, and Wright, 2016 6). Principled civil resistance has been used during the US Civil Rights Movement (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, 321) and national liberation movements in Africa following WWII (Schock 2015a, 82). For example, during the Nashville sit-ins in 1960, leaders of the movement made copies of a list of “do and don’ts” that were handed out to the new recruits.” Included in the list of “dos” was “Remember the teachings of Jesus Christ, Mhatama Gandhi and Martin Luther King” and that “Love and nonviolence is the way” (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, 321).

Overall, principled civil resistance is more limiting than pragmatic civil resistance. Unlike pragmatic civil resistance, principled civil resistance does not allow for an “overlapping consensus” of worldviews (Rawls 1999, 360). Rather, it only allows for one worldview: a complete and comprehensive rejection of violence in all of its forms. In short, there is never an acceptable time or place to employ violence. Contrast this with the earlier example of the UDF in South Africa, the organization “approved of violent when it was used in self-defense and never condemned the armed actions of the ANC”¹⁹ (Schock 2005, 61).

For individuals without this worldview, principled arguments are likely to be ineffective. In fact, they may not be very convincing at all. If a principled commitment relies on a particular set of spiritual beliefs, then those arguments, and more specifically, that framing will not be convincing for individuals holding alternative world views.

I suspect that pragmatic or principled frames should increase support for civil resistance, but am ambivalent about which will be more effective. I predict that:

H₂: Pragmatic and principled message frames will make civil resistance more appealing.

¹⁹ The AFC is the African National Congress.

2.3. Identification

De Weerd and Klandermans (1999) identify social identity as “that part of someone's self-concept that relates to his or her awareness to belong to a specific group or category and that has a certain value and emotional meaning. Social identity requires that an individual breaks down his or her social environment into groups and categories.” (1075). Thoreau recognized that identification with others and their suffering was a necessary condition for civil resistance (Nelson 1962, 59). Recent social science also finds this to be the case. Collective identification with others provides one pathway to civil resistance. Identification with a group increases likelihood of protest (Stürmer and Simon 2004; Stürmer and Simon 2009) and political identification with groups or movements increases support for them (Ayanian and Tausch 2016).

Group identification matters for civil resistance, because people tend to care more about members of their own group (Tajfel et al 1971). In a detailed study of Dutch farmers, De Weerd and Klandermans (1999) found that farmers identifying with other regional or national farmers were more likely to protest than those that didn't. They also found, however, that identification with other farmers in the European Union had no effect on protest. This means that, there are limits to the impact of identification.

The separation between ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ has been widely studied in the social sciences. Tajfel and Turner's (1979) Social Identity Theory (SIT) in psychology sheds light on attitudes and behaviors that individuals hold towards both types of group. In fact, we know that individuals are much more likely to give preferential treatment to those deemed part of their ‘in-group’ (Tajfel et al 1971; Tajfel and Turner 1979).

Relatedly, they are likely to treat outgroups (or ‘them’) worse than the members of their ‘in-group’.

Even random categorization of people into groups results in favoritism towards those randomly assigned to the same group. In a seminal study by Tajfel and colleagues (1971), students were presented with prints of paintings Paul Klee or Wassily Kandinsky, two abstract painters. The students were then asked which artist they preferred. Instead of actually assigning the participants to the artist they liked better, they were randomly assigned to a Klee or Kandinsky group. Finally, the students were asked to assign cash rewards to other people. Perhaps surprisingly, the researchers found that even these seemingly meaningless categorizations create preferences for individuals like ‘us’ (Tajfel et al 1971).

The above highlights how ‘in-groups’ can be arbitrarily formed and how these biases influence people’s preferences. I predict that ‘in-group’ preferences should apply to civil resistance and that those with larger ‘in-groups’ are likely to be more supportive of civil resistance. When the line between ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ is faint (or nonexistent), people are more likely to support civil resistance. Conversely, low levels of identification should correspond with less support of civil resistance.

Another form of identification is membership in formal civil society organizations.²⁰ In fact, Verba, Scholzman, and Brady (1995) find that organizational membership and protest is more common in countries with advanced economies and consolidated democracies. Others suggest that organizations are important because they connect individuals with the movement (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2000), and then also to other forms of political action. Corrigan-Brown (2012) also proposes a

²⁰ I return to this idea in the concluding chapter.

relationship between formal organization membership and protest participation. In line with past work (Botetzagias and van Schuur 2012; Bamberg, Rees, and Seebauer 2015), I predict that strong identification with a movement and/or membership in a formal organization should correspond with civil resistance. The fourth hypotheses is:

H₃: Identifying with a civil resistance movement and with other people (i.e., cosmopolitanism) will correspond with greater support for civil resistance.

2.4. Efficacy

Efficacy is the belief that a person or a group have the power to change the status quo. Theories of collective action indicate that efficacy is an important predictor of risky collective action (see Ayanian and Tausch 2016 for a review), so higher individual and/or group efficacy should correspond with more favorable civil resistance evaluations.²¹ It should *decrease* perceptions of risk, but *increase* willingness to participate.

Self-efficacy is the belief that you are able to affect change by yourself, and that “[r]ather than merely adapting to external circumstances, individual efficacy beliefs enable humans to change their circumstances through individual actions” (Van Zomeren, Saguy, and Schellhaas 2012, 619). It stems from the belief that an individual is “capable of the specific behaviors required to produce a desired outcome in a given situation” (Gorrigall-Brown, 2012, 19, as cited from Gecas 2000). High personal efficacy should relate to greater civil resistance support, since it corresponds with engagement in protest behaviors (Klandermans et al. 2008; Corrigall-Brown 2012) and activism (Gilbert 1988). High personal efficacy should relate to civil resistance, because it does correspond with

²¹ Much of the psychology and sociology contentious collective action research examining risky behavior considers protest (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2010; Tausch et al 2011; Ayanian and Tausch 2016). My project departs from this and considers a wider range of civil resistance tactics.

protest behavior (Klandermans et al 2008; Corrigan-Brown 2012) and activism (Gilbert 1988). Corrigan-Brown (2012) describes personal efficacy as “the belief that one is capable of the specific behaviors required to produce a desired outcome in a given situation (Gecas 2000)” (19). Research also finds that high self-efficacy increases risk taking (Llewellyn, Sanchez, Asghar, and Jones 2008).

A similar logic should apply to group efficacy. Group efficacy (Bandura 1997) is the belief that “we” as a group are able to enact change together.²² For example, in the realm of environmentalism, high perceived collective efficacy correlated with intentions to join a neighborhood-based climate change initiative (Rees and Bamberg 2014), greater concern for environmental concern (Milfont 2012), and higher likelihood of exhibiting pro-environmental behavior intentions (Jugert, Greenaway, Barth, Büchner, Eisentraut, and Fritsche 2016, 12). Furthermore, even disadvantaged groups will engage in civil resistance if they believe that a desired outcome can be achieved (Mummendey et al 1999; van Zomeren et al 2008; Tausch et al 2011). This leads me to the fourth hypotheses:

H₄: High personal or group efficacy will make civil resistance more appealing, than those with low personal or group efficacy.

2.5. Political Ideology

Political ideology also relates to civil resistance attitudes and behaviors. As Corrigan-Brown writes, “social movements have long been associated with the Left. Movements such as those for women’s rights, for civil rights, on behalf of labor, against

²² Group Efficacy may be contingent on identification with the disadvantaged group in question. If one does not identify with disadvantaged people, then arguments about that disadvantage may not be effective. This identification can either come in the form of being a member of this group or being able to empathize for people that are disadvantaged.

war, and to protect the environment have led to significant social change” (2012, 18). Furthermore, researchers find that political liberals show greater levels of support for civil resistance from political liberals (Hirsch 1990; Dalton 2008; Dalton et al. 2010; Corrigan-Brown 2012; Torcal, Rondon, and Hierro 2016). Torcal and colleagues contend that there are two primary reasons why the political left protests more than the political right: (a) the left’s connections to “relevant mobilization agents” such as trade unions and (b) the values of the left are less tied to authoritarianism than the right (Torcal et al 2016, 331-332). Based on this I argue that:

H₅: Political liberals will be more supportive of civil resistance than political conservatives.

2.6. Conclusion

In conclusion, I constructed an argument about the political psychology of civil resistance. I put forth a five-pronged theory to explain support and participation in civil resistance and argued that (1) happiness and anger increase support but fear decreases it, (2) message frames emphasizing the strategic benefits of civil resistance will increase support for it, (3) that identification with a movement or other people increases support, (4) that self and group-efficacy increase support, and (5) that political liberals will be more supportive of civil resistance. I provide a summary of the hypotheses for each chapter in Table 2.1 below.

Table 2.1 Summary of Hypotheses for Each Empirical Chapter

	Chapter 3	Chapter 4	Chapter 5
Scope of Study	2017 People’s Climate March, U.S.	Global Environmental Civil Resistance	Global Environmental Civil Resistance
Emotion (H ₁)	Anger makes civil resistance more appealing, but fear does not	High levels of reported happiness will correspond with greater support for environmental advocacy	High levels of reported happiness will positively correspond with greater civil resistance participation
Message Frames (H ₂)	Pragmatic and principled frames increase the appeal of civil resistance	--	--
Identification (H ₃)	Identification with the environmental movement corresponds with higher levels of civil resistance support	Membership in an environmental organization will positively correlate with other engagement in other forms of environmental advocacy	Cosmopolitanism identification will positively correlate with civil resistance participation
Efficacy (H ₄)	Higher levels of individual and group efficacy correspond with increased support for environmental civil resistance	High personal efficacy will correspond with greater support for environmental advocacy	High personal efficacy will correspond with greater civil resistance participation.
Political Ideology (H ₅)	Left-political ideology increases support for civil resistance	Political liberals will show greater support for environmental advocacy than political conservatives	Political liberals will participate in civil resistance at higher rates than political conservatives.
Knowledge (H ₆)	More knowledge about climate change will correspond with greater support for environmental civil resistance	--	--

In the next chapter, I test the argument within the current environmental movement in the US. I pay particular attention to the 2017 People’s Climate March in Washington, D.C. In Chapter 4, I extend this argument to environmental civil resistance around the globe. I then consider various forms of civil resistance around the world in Chapter 5.

Chapter 3: 2017 People’s Climate March

Largescale environmental civil resistance demonstrations occur with greater frequency today than in previous decades. The 2009 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 15) in Copenhagen signaled “a turning point in terms of the number of organizations that were willing to sponsor contentious collective action” (Hadden 2015, 63). Prior to COP 15, “16 percent of organizations used contentious actions more than half of the time in 2008, whereas 58 percent did so in 2009” (Hadden 2015, 63). Additional protests occurred at subsequent COP conferences, including widely covered protests coinciding with the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 21). One estimate placed the number of protestors around the world at 570,000.²³

Five years after Copenhagen, the largest climate civil resistance event in history took place on the night before the 2014 United Nations Climate Summit in New York City. Over 400,000 people and over 1,500 participating organizations took to the streets in New York City for the People’s Climate March to “demand climate action.”²⁴ The demonstrations were not confined to New York and an additional 2,646 events simultaneously occurred in 162 countries.²⁵ Most recently, a second round of People’s Climate Marches occurred in Washington, D.C. and around the world on April 29, 2017. Some estimates for participation place the number of attendees at over 200,000 people in

²³ [BBC News](#)

²⁴ [People's Climate Movement](#)

²⁵ [People's Climate Movement](#)

Washington, D.C.²⁶ Estimates also place total participation across the U.S. around 300,000 people, with 370 sister marches occurring throughout the country.²⁷

Within the US, individuals also recently engaged in smaller acts of environmental civil resistance. In March of 2017 five anonymous environmental activists vandalized Trump National Golf Club to protest against the administration's environmental policies (Norton 2017). In another event, 300 people protested outside of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Chicago Regional Office (about 100 were EPA employees) against Scott Pruitt's confirmation as head of the agency (Page 2017). Over 800 former EPA employees also signed a letter protesting Pruitt's confirmation (Murdock 2017).

The massive turnout of these events relies on the organizers' ability to attract largescale support and participation and convince people that change requires their participation. For example, on March 30, 2017, the People's Climate Movement tweeted, "To change everything, we need everyone!"²⁸ Demonstrators carried banners with a similar message during the 2014 People's Climate March.²⁹ An environmental organization called 350.org has an entire webpage devoted to the message, "Only Mass Mobilization Can Save the EPA."³⁰

With this in mind, this chapter asks: what influences environmental civil resistance attitudes? Specifically how do emotions, message frames, efficacy,

²⁶ [Washington Post, People's Climate Movement](#)

²⁷ [People's Climate Movement](#)

²⁸ [People's Climate Movement on Twitter](#)

²⁹ [Flickr](#)

³⁰ [350.org](#)

environmental movement identification, and political ideology shape perceptions of risk and willingness to participate in environmental civil resistance?

I explore the factors that influence individuals' attitudes toward environmental civil resistance and focuses specifically on how those factors shape individuals' perceptions of risk and willingness to participate in civil resistance. Much of the environmental movement occurs outside of conventional political participation channels (i.e., voting) and, instead, employs tactics such as nonviolent demonstrations. To utilize these tactics successfully, the environmental movement needs to decrease perceptions of risk associated with these actions and, ultimately, persuade individuals to participate in them. And despite recent focus on the political psychology of environmental attitudes, there has been little investigation of the motivations behind environmental civil resistance attitudes.

I test the theory put forth in the previous chapter within the context of the 2017 People's Climate March in Washington, DC. Specifically, I measure perceptions of risk and intentions to participate in the People's Climate March. In Section 3.1, I briefly restate the theoretical framework and list the hypotheses. Section 3.2 presents the experimental design, which is a 3 (emotion: relaxed/anger/fear) x 3 (frame: neutral/pragmatic/principled) factorial design post-test only survey experiment. Section 3.3 lists the dependent, independent, and demographic variable for the study. Section 3.4 presents the study's main findings. Contrary to my expectations, both anger and fear make environmental civil resistance appear more risky and that different message frames have only a minimal impact on individuals' evaluations of environmental civil resistance. In line with my expectations, I find that identification with the environmental movement,

self-efficacy, and group-efficacy increase support for environmental civil resistance. Section 3.5 concludes this chapter by presenting the implications for environmental civil resistance, as well as potential avenues for future studies.

3.1 Literature and Theory

Emotions

In this experiment, I focus on the two discrete emotions of anger and fear because both are common reactions to environmental degradation (McDaniels, Axelrod, and Slovic 1995). I draw from valence based approaches, Appraisal Tendency Framework (ATF) (Lerner and Keltner 2000; 2001; Han, Lerner, and Keltner 2007), and the Dual Pathway Model of Collective Action (Van Zomeren et al. 2004; Van Zomeren et al. 2010; Tausch et al. 2011).

Anger and fear, although both unpleasant, differ on “central dimensions” of “certainty, control, and responsibility” (Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 476). Anger triggers perceptions of high levels of certainty, control, and responsibility whereas fear does the opposite (Lerner and Keltner 2000; 2001). I argue that fear corresponds with higher perceptions of risk and less willingness to engage in risky behavior, whereas anger typically decreases perceptions of risk and increases willingness to engage in risky behavior. Fear corresponds with a low sense of certainty and lack of control over situations (Pearlman 2013, 392). Individuals feeling fear are more likely to develop pessimistic appraisals of situations, experience decreased feelings of efficacy, and feel more risk averse. Therefore, fear should lead to *greater* perceptions of risk and *less*

likelihood of participation in environmental civil resistance.³¹ Based on this, I predict that:

H₁: Anger will have an opposite effects on civil resistance attitudes than fear.³²

H_{1b}: Anger will make civil resistance more appealing (i.e. less risky and increase willingness to participate).

H_{1c}: Fear will make civil resistance less appealing (i.e., more risky) and decrease willingness to participate.

Frames

Extant research shows that frames impact environmental attitudes and behaviors. Chong and Wolinsky-Nahmias (2005) find that framing government land-buying programs as contributing to “clean drinking water” are more effective than alternative frames. Others find that the frame of “global warming” is more effective than “climate change” for Republicans in the US (Schuldt et al. 2011; Villar and Krosnick 2010). In other investigations, people agreed most with a “greenhouse gas emissions message when it was formulated in terms of avoidance of negative, safety-related outcomes” (Bertolotti and Catellani 2014, 474).

My study examines two environmental civil resistance forms: pragmatic calls for environmental civil resistance (i.e. it is effective) and principled called for environmental civil resistance (i.e. it is ethical). Pragmatic frames may effectively increase civil resistance support, because people tend to support actions that they believe are effective. I also consider principled nonviolence frames, because of its relationship to the environmental movement. In fact, one of the four main pillars of Ecologism 1980s is

³¹ Refer to Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of anger and fear.

³² I only test anger and fear in this chapter.

nonviolence.³³ I pick these categories, because they are prevalent in civil resistance scholarship and practice, yet have not been systematically compared to one another. In fact, primary motivations for civil resistance might be seen as a choice between principled and pragmatic considerations. Put differently, people choose civil resistance because they think it works or they choose it because they think violence (or inaction) are unethical.³⁴

Pragmatic civil resistance, or strategic civil resistance may be persuasive, because it might emphasize that civil resistance is twice as effective as violent resistance. Specifically, Stephan and Chenoweth's (2008) find that "major nonviolent campaigns have achieved success 53 percent of the time, compared with 26 percent for violence resistance campaigns" may lend credibility to the strategic approach (8).³⁵ Environmental activists can use the success of other nonviolent actions to send a signal that demonstrations *actually* work.

On the other hand, principled civil resistance stems from a complete moral/ethical commitment to nonviolence (Schock 2015a: 24-26; Weber 2003; Vinthagen 2015), and is "the renunciation of violence in its many forms and in every moment of one's life" (Gan 2013, 68). It is a "lifestyle" where "nonviolence is the activist's principle ethical approach or religious reasoning" to all situations (Vinthagen 2015, 7). Put differently, the

³³ The four pillars of Ecologism are: ecological responsibility, social justice, nonviolence and grassroots democracy.

³⁴ Although these distinctions are commonplace, some see different civil resistance motivations on a continuum. Gan (2013) argues that civil resistance is best understood as a spectrum between selective nonviolence and comprehensive nonviolence, instead of as a dichotomy between principled and pragmatic action. Others argue that describing civil resistance as motivated only by principled reasons or only by pragmatic reasons is a false assumption (Hallward and Norman 2015). While I acknowledge that the dichotomy between pragmatic or principled may oversimplify real world nuances in choice, it does provide a useful starting point for empirical research.

³⁵ A detailed description for success, limited success, or failure can be found on pg. 17 of their article. The campaigns of interest are (a) domestic regime change, (b) campaigns against foreign occupations and (c) self-determination campaigns (15). Of note, social and economic campaigns, such as the US civil rights movement, aren't included in the data.

process of nonviolence is at least equally important to achieving a particular goal for adherents of principles nonviolence. In fact, “people rely to a disproportionate extent on moral arguments to form their opinions” (Heuberger, Levy, and Wright, 2016 6).

I suspect that pragmatic or principled frames should increase support for environmental civil resistance, but am ambivalent about which will be more effective.

Overall, I predict that:

H₂: Pragmatic and principled message frames will make environmental civil resistance more appealing.

Identification

I predict that strong identification with the environmental movement should correspond with greater support for environmental civil resistance (Botetzagias and van Schuur 2012; Bamberg, Rees, and Seebauer 2015). The forth hypotheses is:

H₃: Participants identifying with the environmental movement will be more supportive of environmental civil resistance than those who don't identify with it.

Efficacy

Higher self and/or group-efficacy should correspond with more favorable civil resistance evaluations. It should *decrease* perceptions of risk, but *increase* willingness to participate. High personal efficacy should relate to greater environmental civil resistance support, since it corresponds with engagement in other protest behaviors (Klandermans et al. 2008; Corrigan-Brown 2012) and activism (Gilbert 1988). High perceived collective efficacy correlated with intentions to join a neighborhood-based climate change initiative (Rees and Bamberg 2014), greater concern for environmental concern (Milfont 2012), and higher likelihood of exhibiting pro-environmental behavior intentions (Jugert,

Greenaway, Barth, Büchner, Eisentraut, and Fritsche 2016, 12). This leads me to the fourth hypotheses:

H4: High self or group-efficacy will make environmental civil resistance more appealing, than those with low personal or group-efficacy.

Ideology

Political ideology also relates to climate change attitudes and behaviors. Researchers often find that political liberals show greater levels of support for climate change initiatives and indicate combating climate change as more important than political conservatives do (Dunlap 1975; Kahan et al. 2012; Tobler, Visschers, and Siegrist 2012).

Based on these findings, I suggest that:

H5: Political liberals will be more supportive of environmental civil resistance than political conservatives.

Knowledge

In addition to the five components discussed in the theory chapter, I also consider the role of climate change knowledge on environmental civil resistance attitudes. In fact, Climate change knowledge corresponds with climate attitudes and (intended behaviors). For example, researchers find that high levels of climate knowledge correlate with beliefs that climate change is occurring (Sundblad, Biel, and Gerling 2007; Tober, Visschers, and Siegrist 2012). In turn, belief that climate change is occurring should correspond with risk perceptions and willingness to engage in environmental civil resistance. I predict that:

H6: More knowledge about climate change will correspond with greater support for environmental civil resistance.

I also include controls for gender, age, education, and education, because these components frequently include political attitudes and behaviors.

3.2 Experimental Design

I first obtained University of Maryland IRB approval to conduct the study.³⁶ Participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk)³⁷ to complete a study on “life events and current events.” I conducted the experiment from April 25-April 28, which were the days leading up to the 2017 People’s Climate March, which occurred on April 29, 2017. I picked these days, because they provided insight into public opinion immediately preceding an actual large-scale environmental civil resistance event. The time period allowed me to best measure public perceptions within the political context in which the event occurred. In total, 1061 participants are included in the analysis.³⁸

I utilize a post-test-only between-subject survey experiment to evaluate the research questions and hypotheses. It is a 3 (emotion: relaxed/anger/fear) x 3 (frame: neutral/pragmatic/principled) factorial design. Participants are randomly assigned to one of nine possible groups: (1) Relaxed/Neutral Frame, (2) Relaxed/Pragmatic Frame, (3) Relaxed/Principled Frame, (4) Angry/Neutral Frame, (5) Angry/Pragmatic Frame, (6)

³⁶ Experiment conducted under University of Maryland IRB#792000-1. The approval letter is available in Appendix 3A.

³⁷ MTurk is an online crowdsourcing platform where participants complete short tasks for monetary payment. It is increasingly used by social scientists to conduct research (see, for example, Chilton 2014, McEntire, Leiby and Krain 2015). While MTurk samples tend to be younger, more educated, and more liberal than the general U.S. population (Huff and Tingley 2015), participants recruited through MTurk are typically better representations of the U.S. population than in-person convenience samples (Berinsky, et al. 2012) and university undergraduate populations (Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010). MTurk obtained data meets or exceeds “the psychometric standards associated with published research” (Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011, 5).

³⁸ Respondents were paid \$0.50 on April 25-April 26 and \$0.75 on April 26-April 28. I increased the payment in order to get more participants. There were no statistical differences between participants paid \$0.50 or those paid \$0.75. The average time for completion was 10.7 minutes. This translates to an hourly wage of \$2.80 for participants paid \$0.50 and \$4.21 for participants paid \$0.75. Although this is below minimum wage in the US, it is still much higher than the median wage of \$1.38 that is paid for online study completion (Horton and Chilton 2010).

Angry/Principled Frame, (7) Fear/Neutral Frame, (8) Fear/Pragmatic Frame or (9) Fear/Principled Frame. The first group serves as the control group for the experiment.

All participants first complete an Autobiographical Emotional Memory Task (AEMT) in order to induce a discrete, momentary emotion.³⁹ Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three AEMT tasks. Following past research, I used relaxation as a baseline emotion to compare with fear or anger (see for example, Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, and Hutchings 2011; Banks and Hicks 2016). The AEMT prompts use language from Lerner and Keltner (2001), Valentino et al. (2011), Banks and Valentino (2012), and Banks and Hicks (2016).

Next, all participants read a short news story about the upcoming People's Climate March in Washington, DC. I constructed the story to mirror a BBC news article and participants were randomly assigned to one of three stories. I choose the BBC because it is a widely recognized news source and only a small percentage of individuals distrust it (Mitchell and Weisel 2014). One story does not mention the rationale for using civil resistance tactics (neutral frame). The other stories are almost identical, except that one mentioned how nonviolent action is advocated because it is more effective than violence (pragmatic), whereas the other mentions that nonviolence is used because it is

³⁹ This method is also called autobiographical procedure (Görizt and Moser 2006) or directed writing task (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005) and “discrete emotions” (Tsai and Young 2010) are sometimes called “specific emotions” (Myers and Tingley 2016). Researchers are increasingly utilizing emotional induction tasks to experimentally study how discrete emotions influence political preferences (Myers and Tinley 2016). Researchers have used a variety of methods, such as images, video clips, self-described experiences, campaign ads, and others to induce emotions (see Alberton and Gadarian (2016) for a review). Of the various induction methods available, the Autobiographical Emotional Memory Task (AEMT) provides many advantages. First, it is the method most often used by political scientists (Myers and Tinley 2016, 494). Second, it produces stronger emotional responses in comparison to alternative methods (Searles and Mattes 2015, Study 1). Third, recent studies have utilized AEMT for research conducted over the MTurk platform (Mills and D’Mello 2014; Searles and Mattes 2015; Banks and Hicks 2016).

more ethical (principled). The induction tasks and news articles are included in Appendix A.

3.3 Variables

Next, all participants answer the dependent variables, other independent variables questions, demographic, attention check, and manipulation check questions. The first dependent variable asks participants “Which of the following options best describes your opinion about the statement below? “It is risky to participate in the 2017 People’s Climate March.” The question is loosely based on a risk perception question from Tsai and Young (2010)⁴⁰ Responses range on a seven-point scale from “Strongly Disagree” (coded as 1) to “Strongly Agree” (coded as 7). The second dependent variable asks “How likely are you to participate in the 2017 People’s Climate March, either in Washington DC or in a city closer to you?” Respondents choose from a point five-point scale of “Definitely Will Not” (1), “Probably Will Not Participate” (2), “Might/Might Not Participate” (3), “Probably Will Participate” (4), and “Definitely Will Participate” (5). The question is based on a question from Van Zomeren, Spears, and Leach (2010).⁴¹

The primary independent variables are the nine experimental groups, described in the previous section. In addition, I include independent variable questions on identification with the environmental movement, efficacy, and climate change knowledge. The same seven point scales of “Strongly Disagree” (1) to “Strongly Agree” (7) are used for these independent variable questions. The environmental identification question asks “Which of the following options best describes your opinion about the

⁴⁰ The original wording from Tsai and Young (2010) is “How risky is this decision?”

⁴¹ Van Zomeren et al. (2010) original wording was “I would like to do something together with others to fight the climate crisis.” Previous work finds that participation intentions are good predictors of actual engagement (De Weerd and Klandermans 1999, Blackwood and Lewis 2012, 81).

statement below? “I am a member of the environmental movement.” A similar identification question is used in Van Zomeren, Leach, and Spears (2010).

The individual efficacy question is “Which of the following options best describes your opinion about the statement below? “I can help prevent the negative consequences of climate change.” The group-efficacy question is “Which of the following options best describes your opinion about the statement below? “Together, people can prevent the negative consequences of climate change.” Both efficacy questions are based on a questionnaire used by Van Zomeren, Spears, and Leach (2010). There are two climate change knowledge questions. The first is “Which of the following options best describes your opinion about the statement below? “We contribute to the greenhouse effect every time we use coal or gas.” (Alberton and Busby 2015). The second knowledge question comes from Spence et al. (2012) and asks “Which of the following options best describes your opinion about the statement below? “Most scientists agree that humans are causing climate change.” I create a climate change knowledge composite measure from these two questions. I first code correct or incorrect responses for each question. A correct answer for each question is answering “Agree” or “Strongly Agree.” The new composite score ranges from 0 (both incorrect) 1 (one correct) or 2 (both questions correct).

Demographic measures of political ideology, gender, income, age, and education are also included, because these traits are correlated with environmental attitudes. I use a standard 7-point scale to assess political ideology. Responses are coded from Extremely Liberal (1) to Extremely Conservative (7). Respondents are asked if they are male (1), female (2), transgender (3), or prefer not to respond (coded as missing and dropped from the analysis). Annual income has an 8 possible responses ranging from “under \$25,000”

(1) to “Over \$150,000” (8). Age is six categories, with 18-24 (1), 25-34 (2), 35-44 (3), 45-54 (4), 55-64 (5), or 65 and above (6). Lastly, education is nine points ranging from “Some high school, but did not finish” to “Completed advanced graduate work or Ph.D.” (9).

The sample was 48% liberal or liberal leaning, 22% moderate, and 30% conservative or conservative leaning, 44% male, average income between \$40,000 and \$75,000, an average age between 25 and 44, and over 55% had a bachelor’s degree. Descriptive Statistics of the variables are presented in Table 3.1 below, and the study’s survey questions are included in the Appendix.

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics⁴²

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Dependent Variables</i>					
Risk	1,061	2.297	1.576	1	7
Participation	1,061	2.260	1.223	1	5
<i>Independent Variables</i>					
Relax/Control	118	--	--	--	--
Relax/Works	123	--	--	--	--
Relax/Moral	117	--	--	--	--
Angry/Control	116	--	--	--	--
Angry/Works	121	--	--	--	--
Angry/Moral	119	--	--	--	--
Fear/Control	122	--	--	--	--
Fear/Works	111	--	--	--	--
Fear/Moral	114	--	--	--	--
Self-Efficacy	1,061	5.395	1.508	1	7
Group-Efficacy	1,061	5.049	1.567	1	7
Environmentalism	1,061	3.993	1.838	1	7
Climate Knowledge	1,061	1.241	0.860	0	2
<i>Demographic Variables</i>					
Ideology	1,061	3.541	1.770	1	7
Gender	1,061	1.563	0.496	1	2
Income	1,061	3.536	1.842	1	8
Age	1,061	2.947	1.362	1	6
Education	1,061	4.575	1.691	1	9

⁴² With the exception of the age demographic, all other demographic characteristics are not statistically correlated with any of the experimental groups. Chi-squared tests show that demographic characteristics of gender, ideology, education, and income were not statistically related to treatment assignment. Self-efficacy, group-efficacy, environmental identification, and climate knowledge were also randomly distributed and were not statistically correlated with any of the experimental groups.

3.4 Findings

This section evaluates the study's findings in light of its main hypotheses, focusing particularly on the findings pertaining to the risk perception question (DV₁) and the intended behavior question (DV₂). First, although I hypothesized that anger and fear would have opposite effects on perceptions of risk (H₁), the study finds that both emotions increase perceptions of risk. I also find that emotions only have a limited effect on willingness to participate in The People's Climate March (H₁). Second, contrary to the expectations of H₂, I find that both pragmatic and principled frames increased risk perceptions, and have no impact on individuals' willingness to participate. Third, environmental ID showed no impact on perceptions of risk, but it increased individuals' willingness to participate in environmental civil resistance (H₃). Fourth, I find strong support for H₃, that personal or group-efficacy influence environmental civil resistance attitudes. High self-efficacy has no bearing on risk perceptions, but increases willingness to participate. High group-efficacy makes environmental civil resistance more appealing: it is negatively correlated with risk, but positively correlated with willingness to participate. Fifth, political conservatives were more likely to believe that participation in The People's Climate March is risky and were less likely to participate in the People's Climate March (H₆). Sixth, and finally, greater knowledge of climate change decreased individuals' perceptions of risk, but had no effect on their willingness to participate (H₆).

Risk Perceptions


Anger and fear both, when compared to the emotion control frames, increased risk perceptions in all groups, although the amount of increase varied. The first dependent variable asked participants their opinion on the statement, "It is risky to participate in the

2017 People’s Climate March.” Responses ranged from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” on a 7-point scale. Mean score responses range from 2.297 in the control group to 3.042 in the Angry/Moral group.⁴³ All three anger conditions (and corresponding frames) and all three fear conditions (and corresponding frames) increased risk perceptions. The largest effects, when compared to the control group, were the Angry/Moral group (coefficient 0.745, $p < 0.01$) and Fear/Works group (0.721, $p < 0.01$).

I also found statistical differences between many of the experimental treatments showing that emotions had a larger independent effect on risk perceptions than message framing did. The means of four groups -- Angry/Works ($p < .10$), Angry/Moral ($p < 0.01$), Fear/Works ($p < 0.01$), and Fear/Moral ($p < .05$) -- are all larger than the Relaxed/Works group. These four groups are also statistically larger than the Relaxed/Moral group. Additionally, the Angry/Moral mean is statistically larger than the Angry/Control mean ($p < 0.05$). Furthermore, the Fear/Works mean is higher than both the Fear/Control and Angry/Control means ($p < 0.10$ and $p < 0.05$ respectively). Figure 3.1 shows the difference of means between the groups at the 95% confidence interval.

⁴³ The other means for the risk perception question were: 2.447 for the Relax/Works group, 2.504 for the Relax/Moral group, 2.647 for the Angry/Neutral Frame group, 2.777 for the Angry/Works group, 3.042 for the Angry/Moral group, 2.680 for the Fear/ Neutral Frame group, 2.851 for the Fear/Moral group, and 3.016 in the Fear/Works group.

Figure 3.1: Risk Perception Means and Confidence Intervals



Abbreviation	Experimental Group
R/C	Relax/Control
R/W	Relax/Works
R/M	Relax/Moral
A/C	Angry/Control
A/W	Angry/Works
A/M	Angry/Moral
F/C	Fear/Control
F/W	Fear/Works
F/M	Fear/Moral

To reach these findings, I used OLS regression with the experimental groups as independent variables and the control group as the constant in a restricted model. Because no controls were included in the restricted model, this is essentially an additional difference of means testing between the control and the experimental treatments. I use one-tailed tests in the analysis, because the study's hypotheses examine relationships in a single direction. See the OLS results in (Table 3.2, Model 1).

Table 3.2: Risk Perceptions and Willingness to Participate

VARIABLES	(1) Risky	(2) Risky	(3) Participate	(4) Participate
Relax/Works	0.151 (0.201)	0.134 (0.234)	-0.0832 (0.158)	0.165 (0.248)
Relax/Moral	0.208 (0.204)	0.323* (0.235)	0.0790 (0.160)	0.180 (0.248)
Angry/Control	0.350** (0.204)	0.500** (0.235)	-0.00438 (0.160)	-0.0584 (0.252)
Angry/Works	0.480*** (0.202)	0.502** (0.240)	0.0270 (0.158)	0.135 (0.247)
Angry/Moral	0.745*** (0.203)	0.982*** (0.232)	0.0400 (0.159)	0.142 (0.247)
Fear/Control	0.384** (0.202)	0.475** (0.237)	-0.131 (0.158)	-0.129 (0.250)
Fear/Works	0.721*** (0.207)	0.902*** (0.242)	0.151 (0.162)	0.124 (0.252)
Fear/Moral	0.554*** (0.205)	0.631*** (0.241)	0.0700 (0.161)	0.120 (0.250)
Self-Efficacy		0.0641 (0.0591)		0.171*** (0.0655)
Group-Efficacy		-0.0997* (0.0607)		0.171*** (0.0684)
Environmental ID		-0.00739 (0.0417)		0.442*** (0.0447)
Knowledge		-0.458*** (0.0833)		0.00387 (0.0884)
Ideology		0.122*** (0.0397)		-0.115*** (0.0410)
Gender		0.0441 (0.113)		0.109 (0.120)
Income		-0.0154 (0.0322)		-0.0237 (0.0345)
Age		-0.102*** (0.0416)		-0.174*** (0.0447)
Education		-0.0555* (0.0353)		-0.0268 (0.0374)
Constant	2.297*** (0.144)		2.246*** (0.113)	
Observations	1,061	1,061	1,061	1,061
R-squared	0.023		0.004	
Model	OLS	OLogit	OLS	OLogit

One-Tailed Test, Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

I then analyzed the responses in an unrestricted model. I used ordered logit regression because the dependent variable is categorical and ordered (Long 1997). The unrestricted model includes self-efficacy, group-efficacy, environmental ID, climate change knowledge, ideology, gender, income, age, and education (Table 3.2, Model 2). I find that my results for the independent variables parallel the OLS findings. The Angry/Moral and Fear/Works groups still have the largest effects and Relax/Moral also increases risk perceptions. Although statistically significant ($p < 0.10$), Risk/Moral has the smallest substantive effect. Additionally, I find that, as does increased climate knowledge ($p < 0.01$). Political conservatives are more likely to view participation as risky ($p < 0.01$). Older participants are less likely to view participation in The People's Climate March as risky ($p < 0.01$), as are people with higher levels of education ($p < 0.10$).

I also calculated predicted probabilities to better understand the differences between the control group and the experimental treatment groups. I find that participants in the control group had a 33% probability of answering "strongly disagree" to this question. Participants in the Angry/Moral group had only a 15 percent probability of choosing this response and the Fear/Works group had a 17 percent probability, which are drops of 18 and 16 percentage points, respectively.⁴⁴ Predicted probabilities for these three groups are available in Appendix B.

⁴⁴ Predicted probabilities calculated by holding the self-efficacy, group-efficacy, environmental ID, knowledge, ideology, income, age, and education variables at their means. Since gender was dichotomous, I held this variable at its mode (female). Complete predicted probability tables with confidence intervals are on file with the author. Please contact the author for the tables.

Participation Intentions

The second dependent variable asked participants, “How likely are you to participate in the 2017 People’s Climate March, either in Washington, D.C. or in a city closer to you?” Responses ranged from “Definitely Will Not Participate” to “Definitely Will Participate” on a 5-point scale. I used a behavioral intention, because these are decent indicators of actual participation (De Weerd and Klandermans 1999; Webb and Sheeren 2006; Blackwood and Lewis 2012), even collective action (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009).


As with the first dependent variable, I conducted difference of means tests comparing the groups. Means scores range from a low of 2.115 for the Fear/Neutral group to a high of 2.396 for the Fear/Works group.⁴⁵ None of the experimental control groups were statistically different from the control. There were, however, statistical differences between some of the treatment groups. Three groups had statistically larger means than the Fear/Neutral message group. They are the Relaxed/Moral ($p < 0.10$), Fear/Works ($p < 0.05$), and Fear/Moral ($p < 0.10$). This indicates that fear has an independent effect in this instance and increases one’s willingness to participate in The People’s Climate March. Also, the Fear/Works, has a statistically larger mean than the Relaxed/Works group. Figure 3.2 shows the difference of means between the groups at the 95% confidence interval.

Overall, I find no main effect with either the emotion inductions or the message frames. I do find support that self-efficacy, group-efficacy, environmental identification,

⁴⁵ The mean score for participants in the control group was 2.246, 2.325 for the Relax/Moral group, 2.241 for the Angry/Neutral Frame group, 2.273 for the Angry/Works group, 2.286 for the Angry/Moral group, 2.115 for the Fear/Neutral Frame group, 2.396 for the Fear/Works group, and 2.316 for the Fear/Moral group

and liberal political ideology all correspond with greater willingness to participate in the People’s Climate March.

Figure 3.2: Participation Means and Confidence Intervals



Abbreviation	Experimental Group
R/C	Relax/Control
R/W	Relax/Works
R/M	Relax/Moral
A/C	Angry/Control
A/W	Angry/Works
A/M	Angry/Moral
F/C	Fear/Control
F/W	Fear/Works
F/M	Fear/Moral

To reach these findings, I again used OLS regression with participation as the dependent variable and the experimental groups as independent variables. The restricted model confirms the findings from the difference of means tests that none of the groups were statistically different than the control group (Table 3.2, Model 3).

I then used an unrestricted model using ordered logit because the dependent variable is both categorical and ordered (Long 1997). Like the risk measure, the unrestricted model includes self-efficacy, group-efficacy, environmental ID, climate change knowledge, ideology, gender, income, age, and education. (Table 3.2, Model 4). I find that none of the emotion and/or framing independent variables are significant in the unrestricted model. I do find that self-efficacy ($p < 0.01$), group-efficacy ($p < 0.01$), environmental ID ($p < 0.01$) are positive and significant. I also find that liberals are more willing to participate ($p < 0.05$) and age is negative and significant ($p < 0.01$).

I calculated the predicted probabilities to better understand the substantive differences between the experimental treatment groups mentioned above. Predicted probabilities indicate that the probability of “Definitely won’t” participate in the People’s Climate March is 37 percent in the Fear/Neutral group. In comparison, it’s 30 percent in the Relax/Moral frame, 31 percent in the Fear/Works group, and 31 percent in the Fear/Moral frame. There is a difference of 6 and 7 percentage points between these group and the Fear/Neutral group. Comparing the predicted probabilities between the Fear/Works and the Relaxed/Works yields little substantive difference. In both cases, the probability that an individual “definitely won’t” participate is around 31 percent. I included predicted probability graphs in Appendix B.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Predicted probabilities calculated by holding the self-efficacy, group-efficacy, environmental ID, knowledge, ideology, income, age, and education variables at their means. Since gender was dichotomous,

To further isolate the effect of emotions, I analyzed the data based on the three emotion induction prompts. I compared all the anger induction groups (control frame, works frame, and moral frame) to the relaxed induction groups (control frame, works frame, and moral frame) and the fear induction groups (control frame, works frame, and moral frame). Consistent with the previous models, these results show that anger and fear both increase perceptions of risk. See Table 3.3 below.

Table 3.3: Risk Perceptions and Willingness to Participate, by Emotion Treatments

VARIABLES	(1) Risky	(2) Risky	(3) Participate	(4) Participate
Anger	0.407*** (0.117)	0.515*** (0.135)	0.0238 (0.0916)	-0.0004 (0.143)
Fear	0.428*** (0.118)	0.507*** (0.137)	0.0279 (0.0922)	-0.0598 (0.144)
Self-Efficacy		-0.0995** (0.0602)		0.201*** (0.0664)
Group-Efficacy		0.0731* (0.0568)		0.227*** (0.0618)
Environmental ID		-0.0533 (0.0604)		0.636*** (0.0634)
Knowledge		-0.451*** (0.0833)		0.0220 (0.0876)
Ideology		0.115*** (0.0387)		-0.146*** (0.0402)
Gender		0.0406 (0.113)		0.120 (0.119)
Income		-0.0162 (0.0321)		-0.0219 (0.0343)
Age		-0.109*** (0.0412)		-0.159*** (0.0442)
Education		-0.0517* (0.0353)		-0.0375 (0.0375)
Constant	2.416*** (0.0827)		2.243*** (0.0647)	
Observations	1,061	1,061	1,061	1,061
R-squared	0.016		0.000	
Model	OLS	OLogit	OLS	OLogit

One-Tailed Test, Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

I held this variable at its mode (female). Complete predicted probability tables with confidence intervals are on file with the author. Please contact the author for the tables.

3.5 Discussion and Conclusion

This last section reviews the study's key findings, considers the findings' implications, and suggests avenues for future research.

First, in line with my expectations, fear made environmental civil resistance seem riskier. Contrary to my expectations though, anger also made environmental civil resistance seem riskier. As mentioned and as predicted, anger typically decreased risk perceptions and fear increased them. This suggests that valence explanations provide more explanatory power for perceptions of risk regarding environmental civil resistance than do the Appraisal Tendency Framework. Interestingly, self-efficacy has no impact on perceptions of risk and group-efficacy only slightly decreased risk ($p < 0.10$). This does not provide strong support for the Dual Pathway Model of Collective Action with respect to risk perceptions.

Perhaps most surprising, is that fear and anger had no discernable impact on participation intention, despite their effects on risk perceptions. It would have seemed plausible that increased risk perceptions would correspond with decreased participation intentions. This did not happen though. Emotions, at least fear and anger, did not impact whether individuals would participate in a march. One possible explanation for the lack of relationship between anger and participation comes from Van Zomeren, Spears, and Leach (2010). Citing Lazarus (1991) and Scherere, Schorr & Johnstone (2001), they suggest that "anger requires a responsible outgroup that can be blamed for the appraised harm" and that "a clear culprit tends to be absent in the climate crisis" (Van Zomeren et al 2010). I find partial support for the Dual Pathway Model of Collective Action though. Increased self and personal efficacy corresponded with greater participation intentions.

Future studies might examine the impact of other positive or negative valence emotions on environmental civil resistance. For instance, others posit that guilt and shame may better motivate pro-environmental behaviors (see Rees and Bamberg 2014: 468 for a review). Research could also look at momentary emotions explicitly directed at climate change contentious action, such as understanding if anger about climate change or anger about a perceived lack of government action affects perceptions of risk and behaviors.

One last point about emotions. Differences in baseline emotional states may help explain individuals' support, or lack thereof, for environmental civil resistance. Some research on collective action has used survey questionnaires, such as the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) to examine baseline differences in trait emotions (see Jugert et al. 2016 for an example). Put differently, some people are simply more often happy, angry, or afraid than others. In the next chapter, I consider the relationship between overall happiness and environmental civil resistance.

Second, message frames had no main effect on participation intentions. This is particularly interesting, because so much of the empirical work on civil resistance asserts that civil resistance happens due to pragmatic considerations (Ackerman 1976; Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Ackerman and Duvall 2000; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). The findings suggest that the pragmatic frames are no more effective than principled ones, at least within the context of environmental civil resistance in the US. This is an important question that deserves further investigation. I intentionally kept the message frames as similar as possible to see if small changes would yield any differences. Perhaps further differentiating the two frames would show

observable differences in message frames. Furthermore, perhaps the dynamics are different in maximalist challenges.

Although there were not main effects for the message frames, recall that three treatments were statistically larger than the Fear/Neutral message group. Participants in the Fear/Works ($p < 0.05$), Fear/Moral ($p < 0.10$), Relaxed/Moral ($p < 0.10$) were all more likely to participate in the climate march than were individuals in the Fear/Neutral message group. This indicates that both message frames have an important impact on participation intentions when participants are afraid. In these instances, pragmatic and moral message frames counteract the effects of the fear. It is less clear why the Relaxed/Moral group corresponded with greater participation intentions than the Fear/Neutral group though.

In line with my expectations, I found that higher group-efficacy decreased perceptions of risk and that high self- and group-efficacy corresponded with increased willingness to participate in The People's Climate March. Self-identification with the environmental movement also increased individuals' willingness to participate and knowledge of climate change also decreased risk perceptions of participation in the People's Climate March. This suggests that findings message frames and other strategies to efficacy and identification would increase environmental activism. In fact, one study by Van Zomeren, Leach, and Spears (2010) experimentally manipulated group efficacy. They found that higher group efficacy increased both group identification and collective action tendencies (Van Zomeren et al 2010). Further testing this relationship is necessary, because the researchers used single study with 98 university students.

Finally, conservatives perceived participation as riskier and were less willing to participate than liberals. This was expected and is hardly surprising, since liberals and conservatives typically differ on environmental preferences (Dunlap 1975; Kahan et al 2012; Tobler, Visschers, and Siegrist 2012). An important next step would be uncovering the conditions under which political conservatives may become more supportive of environmental civil resistance. Social psychology research on Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) may provide an avenue for this. MFT identifies a series of five innate, “intuitive ethics,” or foundational systems of moral thought—care, fairness, loyalty, respect, and purity (Haidt 2001). Subsequent research finds that political liberals and political conservatives prefer different moral foundations (Haidt and Graham 2007; Graham, Hadit, and Nosek 2009; Feinberg and Willer 2012). Political conservatives can be receptive to all five moral channels, but show greater acceptance of in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. Political liberals are receptive to two moral channels: harm/care and fairness/reciprocity though (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009).

In a series of studies, Feinberg and Willer (2012) examine the relationship between environmental attitudes, political ideology, and MFT. As a baseline, they observe that political liberals hold more pro-environmental attitudes than conservatives. They also find that messages stressing harm/care actually decrease environmental support for conservatives. Lastly, and most importantly, they find that when environmental issues are framed in terms of purity/sanctity, that the difference between political liberals and political conservatives disappears.

This chapter provides a first look at the influence of emotions, message frames, efficacy, and environmental identification on environmental civil resistance attitudes and

behaviors. In the next chapter, I consider environmental civil resistance in the global context.

Chapter 4: Environmental Advocacy Across the Globe

In the previous chapter I examined environmental civil resistance in the context of the 2017 People’s Climate March in Washington, DC. I extend the analysis beyond the United States and to a slightly earlier time period (2010-2014) in this chapter, because environmental civil resistance has been a fixture of environmental politics since the latter part of the twentieth century. In particular, civil resistance has become increasingly used by the environmental movement to make environmental demands. Recall that, the 2009 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 15) in Copenhagen signaled “a turning point in terms of the number of organizations that were willing to sponsor contentious collective action” (Hadden 2015, 63). During COP 15, between 40,000 and 100,000 people took to the streets and demanded that “governments across the world agree to a binding global deal to tackle climate change.”⁴⁷

In 2014, the largest climate civil resistance event in history took place on the night before the 2014 United Nations Climate Summit in New York City. Over 400,000 people and over 1,500 participating organizations took to the streets in New York City and around the world for the People’s Climate March to “demand climate action.”⁴⁸ A second round of People’s Climate Marches occurred in Washington, D.C. and around the world on April 29, 2017. Participation estimates range from tens of thousands⁴⁹ to more than 200,000 people marching through the streets of D.C.⁵⁰ Some estimates place total

⁴⁷ [The Guardian](#)

⁴⁸ [People's Climate Movement](#)

⁴⁹ [New York Times](#), [Washington Post](#), [NPR](#)

⁵⁰ [Washington Post](#), [People's Climate Movement](#)

participation across the U.S. around 300,000, with 370 sister marches occurring throughout the country.⁵¹

Additional protests occurred at subsequent COP conferences, including widely covered ones during the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 21). In fact, one estimate placed the number of protestors around the world at 570,000.⁵² Protesters also filled the streets during the 2017 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 23) in Bonn, Germany.⁵³ According to 350.org's Facebook page, "Germany held its largest climate march ever today through the streets of Bonn."⁵⁴

It's clear that environmental civil resistance is occurring around the world, because individuals and groups want action on environmental degradation. It's less clear though, what's translating these grievance into action. In this chapter I extend my argument beyond the context of the United States and consider environmental civil resistance around the globe. I instead used global survey data from 2010-2014 to examine environmental civil resistance in 50 countries and donations given to environmental organizations in 51 countries. In doing so, I uncover individual-level trends that correlate with environmental civil resistance and activism.

Overall, I find that happiness is positively correlated with environmental civil resistance, life control is positively associated with civil resistance, and membership in an environmental organization is highly correlated with environmental demonstration participation. I also consider donations to environmental organizations as a second outcome of interest, because it captures another form of support for the environmental

⁵¹ [People's Climate Movement](#)

⁵² [BBC News](#)

⁵³ [Reuters](#)

⁵⁴ [350.org on Facebook](#)

movement. As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, environmental organizations have increasingly used civil resistance tactics since Copenhagen (Hadden 2015, 63). The findings on environmental donations mirror those of the findings on environmental demonstration participation.

4.1 Hypotheses

In the section below, I briefly present the hypotheses for this analysis. Specifically, I look at the impact of emotions, efficacy, environmental identification, and ideology on environmental advocacy, which I defined as participation in an environmental demonstration or donating money to an environmental organization.

Happiness

I examine the role that happiness and unhappiness play in environmental advocacy in this chapter, instead of anger and fear. I do this for three reasons. First, happiness is one of the central emotions in Appraisal Tendency Theory, so this allows me to consider another prominent emotion within the context of this theory. Second, it shares many similar characteristics to anger – it increases optimism, certainty, and a sense of control at the individual and group levels (Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Tiedens and Linton 2001). I therefore use it as a proxy for anger for this component of the study. Third, I consider happiness out of practical considerations. Very few cross-national studies explicitly ask respondents about their emotions, so the World Values Survey provides an opportunity to examine how emotions correspond with political preferences and behaviors. One limitation of this survey though, is that the only emotions it asks about are happiness and unhappiness.

An additional benefit of this analysis is that I am able to examine the relationship between trait emotions and political action. In the previous chapter, I examined state emotions. Recall that trait emotions refer to one's overall disposition, whereas state emotions refer to a temporary moment in time. In short, I predict that:

H₁: High levels of reported happiness will correspond with greater support for environmental advocacy (i.e., civil resistance and donations to environmental organizations).

Identification

Identification as an environmentalist will correspond with greater support for environmental advocacy. As argued in the previous chapter and past research (Botetzagias and van Schuur 2012; Bamberg, Rees, and Seebauer 2015):

H₃: Membership in an environmental organization will positively correlate with other engagement in other forms of environmental advocacy.

Efficacy

Efficacy corresponds with other types of protest behavior (Klandermans et al. 2008; Corrigan-Brown 2012) and activism (Gilbert 1988), so I predict that:

H₄: High personal efficacy will correspond with greater support for environmental advocacy.

Ideology

I consider political ideology in this analysis, because it frequently relates to environmental preferences. Following the logic of previous research (Dunlap 1975; Kahan et al. 2012; Tobler, Visschers, and Siegrist 2012) and the preceding chapter, I contend that:

H₅: Political liberals will show greater support for environmental advocacy than political conservatives.

Individual-Level and Country-Level Controls

As in the previous chapter, I include controls for age, gender, and education for individuals, because these each correspond with environmental preferences. Each of these individual-level indicators come from the World Values Survey. I also include several country-level control variables. They are GDP/capita, polity, and population. In the appendix, I include models with environmental indicators as robustness checks for the findings. I consider CO₂ emissions, country land mass, and percentage of the urban population (many of these measures were included in Murdie and Urpelainen 2015). I discuss these specific measures below. All country-level controls are obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.

4.2 Research Design

I utilize survey data from the World Values Survey (WVS) Wave 6 for the individual-level measures. The WVS collects nationally representative survey data for “almost 100 countries which contain almost 90 percent of the world’s population, using a common questionnaire” ([World Values Survey](#)). The sixth wave was conducted from 2010 to 2014. The data utilized for this study includes over 61,000 participants in 50 countries.⁵⁵ For the country-level variables, I make use of the World Bank World Development Indicators. All measures are available in the Appendix.

⁵⁵ DV1 includes 61,077 participants in 50 countries and DV2 includes 62,034 participants in 51 countries. The reason for this variation is that some questions are not asked in all countries.

4.3 Variables of Interest

Dependent Variables

There are two dependent variables in this analysis. The first is a question about participation in environmental demonstrations that asks individuals, “During the past two years, have you participated in a demonstration for some environmental cause?” The second question asks individuals, “During the past two years, have you given money to an ecological organization?” The first question is a specific measurement of environmental civil resistance participation.

The second question, although not explicitly civil resistance, is an indirect measure of environmental civil resistance support, because environmental organizations increasingly use civil resistance tactics (Hadden 2015, 63). Demonstrations are considered part of the protest and persuasion dimension of Sharp’s (1973) classification. They oftentimes won’t lead to direct policy changes, but rather are meant to increase widespread support and encourage additional political action. This includes actions such as engaging in additional protests, voting for a preferred political candidate, and also donating to a specific cause. By examining both demonstration participation and donations to environmental organizations, I can capture the degree to which there is overlap between these two forms of political action. For both questions, respondents chose either yes (coded as 1) or no (coded as 0).

Independent Variables⁵⁶

There are four independent variables of interest. The first measure asks about an individual's emotional well-being. It examines how a general-state emotion corresponds with one's willingness to engage to support environmental efforts. In other words, it asks about the *overall* emotional well-being of respondents without pinning that emotion to *something* or *someone*. The question asks "Taking all things together, would you say you are _____?" Participants choose one of four options: "very happy" (1), "rather happy" (2), "not very happy" (3), or "not at all happy" (4) (WVS V10).

This measure allows me to look at state-emotions instead of momentary or induced ones. State-emotions are the general emotions that an individual reports "generally" having. The measure presents an important supplement to the previous chapter on momentary emotions, because individuals experience different levels of happiness, unhappiness, fear, anxiety, etcetera throughout their lives. Put differently, some people are happier than others throughout their lives. Additionally, there is a precedent in the literature for examining the relationship between state-emotions and civil resistance participation (Dalton et al 2010). There haven't, however, been investigations into the relationship between state-emotions and environmental civil resistance.

The second independent variable measures one's identification with the environmental movement. I use a direct measure of environmental organization membership that asks, "Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member, or not a member of that type of organization?" The type of organization relevant

⁵⁶ The WVS does not have adequate measures of group-efficacy or knowledge of the environment or climate change. For this reason, these two components are not examined in this chapter.

for this analysis is “environmental organization”. Responses of “don’t belong” are coded as 0, “inactive member” as 1, and “active member” as 2. This provides a formalized measure of identification with the environmental movement.

The third independent variable is a measure of self-efficacy. Specifically, it states that “Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means “no choice at all” and 10 means “a great deal of choice” to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.” Responses range from “no choice at all” (1) to “a great deal of choice” (10) (WVS V55). Because high sense of control is related to high-efficacy, this is useful substitute measure for self-efficacy. Furthermore, both are measures of individual agency, and, more specifically, of perceptions of one’s own agency.

The fourth independent variable measures political ideology. It asks, “In political matters, people talk of the “left” and the “right.” How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?” (WVS 95). Response range from 1 to 10, where 1 indicates “left” and 10 indicates “right.”

Individual-Level Controls

I include individual-level control variables in the analysis: gender, age, and education. The gender variable codes male as 1 and female as 2 (WVS 240). The age question, as asked by the WVS enumerators, give each age its own separate category. To more similarly mirror the age measure in the previous chapter, I collapse the age measure into 6 categories (WVS V242). They are under 25 (1), 25-34 (2), 35-44 (3), 45-54(4), 55-

64 (5), and 65+ (6). The education measure asked, “What is the highest educational level that you have attained” and ranges from “no formal education” (1) to “university level education, with degree” (9) (WVS V248).⁵⁷

Country-Level Controls

I also include standard country-level variables, such as regime, GDP/capita, and population. I use the Polity IV scale for regime, which ranges from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The GDP/capita is in current US dollars, and population is total population. Both measures come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and have been included in past studies on environmental politics (Murdie and Urpelainen 2015).

Country-Level Robustness Check Variables

As a robustness check, I also consider country level-indicators that correspond with environmental activity (see Murdie and Urpelainen 2015 for a review). These measures include CO2 emissions per metric tons, country size in square kilometer land area, and percentage of the population living in urban areas. Following Murdie and Urpelainen (2015), I obtain these measures from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the models appear in the Appendix.

⁵⁷ If a participant mentions that he/she is still a student, the enumerator asks to indicate the highest level of education expected.

4.4 Findings

This section begins with an overview of the findings in light of the chapter's primary hypotheses. I then discuss the environmental demonstration (DV₁) and donation (DV₂) findings in greater detail. Summary statistics for the environmental demonstration and environmental donation models are below. The analysis on environmental demonstrations includes 61,077 participants in 50 countries, whereas the analysis on environmental donations includes 62,034 participants in 51 countries. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the summary statistics for the variables in relation to the two dependent variables. Since the dependent variables are binary, I use logit models for my analysis (Long 1997). I use one-tailed tests in the analysis, because the study's hypotheses examine relationships in a single direction. I also cluster the standard errors around each country since the model includes both individuals and state level independent variables (Primo, Jacobsmeisr and Milyo 2003).⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Primo et al (2003) argue that a standard clustered error approach more accurately captures statistical significance for mixed-level data than does multilevel modeling.

Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for Environmental Demonstrations Models

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Demonstration Participation	61,077	0.083	0.277	0	1
Happiness	61,077	1.845	0.754	1	4
Environmental Membership	61,077	0.159	0.458	0	2
Life Control	61,077	7.104	2.178	1	10
Ideology	61,077	5.742	2.308	1	10
Gender	61,077	1.508	0.500	1	2
Age Category	61,077	3.199	1.596	1	6
Education	61,077	5.723	2.377	1	9
GDP/capita	61,077	14,446.020	16,718.260	667.415	67,646.100
Polity	61,077	6.119	4.974	-9	10
Population	61,077	156,000,000	331,000,000	1,116,644	1,260,000,000

Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for Environmental Donations Models

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Donations	62,034	0.140	0.347	0	1
Happiness	62,034	1.848	0.755	1	4
Environmental Membership	62,034	0.162	0.464	0	2
Life Control	62,034	7.102	2.171	1	10
Ideology	62,034	5.755	2.306	1	10
Gender	62,034	1.507	0.500	1	2
Age Category	62,034	3.197	1.594	1	6
Education	62,034	5.713	2.382	1	9
GDP/capita	62,034	14,532.030	16,670.080	667.415	67,646.100
Polity	62,034	5.924	5.253	-10	10
Population	62,034	157,000,000	334,000,000	1,116,644	1,260,000,000

There is strong support for the chapter's primary hypotheses. In line with the expectations of H₁, I find that happiness is positively associated both measures of environmental activism (p<0.05) for demonstration participation and (p<0.01) for donations. Second, environmental membership is positively associated with demonstration participation and giving donations with p<0.01 in both instances (H₃). I

find that efficacy (H₄) positively correlates with both protest demonstration and donations to environmental organizations ($p < 0.05$ and $p < 0.10$ respectively). Concerning H₅, self-identified political liberals are also more likely to participate in environmental demonstrations ($p < 0.05$) and donate to environmental organization ($p < 0.10$).

Concerning the control variables, men are statistically more likely to participate in environmental demonstrations and donate to ecological organizations. Higher education corresponds with greater likelihood of participation in demonstrations and giving donations. Regarding GDP/capita, there is a negative relationship between GDP and demonstrations whereas there is a positive relationship between GDP and donations. Environmental demonstrations are more likely in democratic countries. Larger populations within a country correspond with a greater occurrence of demonstrations and donations. Concerning the models with country-level robustness variables, the relationship between country size and donations flips from positive to negative, and countries with smaller urban population are slightly less likely to have individuals donating to ecological organizations. The findings are presented in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Participation in Environmental Demonstrations and Donations to Environmental Organizations

VARIABLES	(1) Demonstration Participation	(2) Donations
Happiness	-0.107** (0.0471)	-0.189*** (0.0357)
Environmental Membership	0.930*** (0.0538)	0.941*** (0.0714)
Life Control	0.0373** (0.0163)	0.0355* (0.0217)
Ideology	-0.0261** (0.0155)	-0.0268* (0.0187)
Gender	-0.158*** (0.0469)	-0.0615* (0.0404)
Age	-0.0781*** (0.0247)	0.0663*** (0.0236)
Education	0.0876*** (0.0143)	0.0870*** (0.0152)
GDP/capita	-1.99e-05*** (6.64e-06)	1.91e-05*** (4.93e-06)
Polity Score	0.0505*** (0.0214)	0.00712 (0.0165)
Population	6.26e-10*** (1.35e-10)	4.79e-10*** (1.38e-10)
Constant	-2.826*** (0.248)	-2.893*** (0.324)
Observations	61,077	62,034
Countries	50	51
Models	Logit	Logit

One-Tailed Tests, Robust standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors clustered by country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Demonstration Participation Findings

The first dependent variable asked individuals if they have “participated in a demonstration for some environmental cause” over “the past two years” (WVS V83). Respondents answered either “Yes” or “No” to this question. In order to further investigate the substantive relationship between each of the independent variables and this dependent variable, I calculated predicted probabilities for the independent variables of interest.⁵⁹ I first considered all of the independent variables together by holding the four independent variables at their respective minimums or maximums. For example, I compared one hypothetical person with another. Person 1 is (a) very unhappy, (b) isn’t a member of an environmental organization, (c) has no perceived life control and (d) is very politically conservative. Person 2 is (a) very happy, (b) is an active member of an environmental organization, (c) has great perceived life control, and (d) is very politically liberal.⁶⁰ Person 1 has a predicted probability of environmental demonstration participation of only 3.160%, whereas Person 2’s predicted probability of participation is 33.822%. This is a staggering difference of 30.662 percentage points.

Recall that happiness is positively associated with demonstration participation. I calculated predicted probabilities for this variable by holding environmental organization membership, life control, ideology, age, education, GDP/capita, polity score, and population at their means. The gender variable was held as its mode (female). Respondents answering that they are “very happy” had a 6.816% predicted probability of participating in an environmental demonstration, whereas participants answering that

⁵⁹ Complete predicted probability tables with confidence intervals are included in the Appendix E.

⁶⁰ For the “minimum” likelihood, happiness held at 4, life control at 1, membership at 0, and political ideology at 10. The “maximum” likelihood estimation held happiness at 1, control at 10, membership at 2, and ideology at 1. Gender was held at the mode (female) and country controls held at their means.

they are “not at all happy” had a 5.040% predicted probability of participating in an environmental demonstration. Although this is less than a drop of 2 percentage points, it represents a 26.056% decrease.

The second independent variable considered if a membership in an environmental organization was positively associated with participation in an environmental demonstration. I calculated predicted probabilities for this variable by holding happiness, life control, ideology, age, education, GDP/capita, polity score, and population at their means. The gender variable was held as its mode (female). Individuals not belonging to an environmental organization had only a 5.452% predicted probability of participating in an environmental demonstration. For individuals that are “inactive members”, this jumps to 12.79%. For “active members”, there is a 27.024% predicted probability that individuals would participate in an environmental demonstration. These are sizable differences of 7.338 and 21.572 percentage points, respectively.

Turning to the third independent variable, life control was positively associated with participation in environmental demonstrations. I calculated predicted probabilities for this variable by holding happiness, environmental organization membership, ideology, age, education, GDP/capita, polity score, and population at their means. The gender variable was held as its mode (female).⁶¹ Participants believing that they had “no choice at all” in their lives have a 5.053% predicted probability of participating in an environmental demonstration. For participants responding that they had “a great deal of choice” in their lives, the predicted probability of participating in an environmental demonstration was 6.929%. This is a difference of close to two percentage points.

⁶¹ In the demonstration models, there were 30,037 men and 31,040 women.

I also consider how difference in political ideology relate to participation in environmental demonstration. I calculated predicted probabilities for this variable by holding happiness, life control, environmental organization membership, age, education, GDP/capita, polity score, and population at their means. The gender variable was held as its mode (female). I find that the left-most political liberals had a 7.031% predicted probability of participation in environmental demonstrations, but the right-most political conservatives had 5.642% predicted probability of participation. This is a difference of just over one percentage point.

Donations to Environmental Organization Findings

The second dependent variable asked participants if they “have given money to an ecological organization” and they had the option of answering “Yes” or “No.” (WVS V82). As with the first dependent variable, I calculated predicted probabilities for the independent variables of interest.⁶² As with the first dependent variable, I compared two hypothetical people. Person 3 is (a) very unhappy, (b) isn’t member of an environmental organization, (b) has no perceived life control, and (d) is very politically conservative. Person 4 is (a) very happy, (b) is an active member of an environmental organization, (c) has great perceived life control, and (d) is very politically liberal.⁶³ Person 3 has a predicted probability of 5.230%, whereas Person 4’s predicted probability of donating is 52.782%. This is a substantial difference of 47.552 percentage points.

As with demonstration participation, happiness is positively associated with donations. I calculated predicted probabilities for this variable by holding environmental

⁶² In the donations model, there were 30,568 men and 31,466 women.

⁶³ For the “minimum” likelihood, happiness held at 4, life control at 1, membership at 0, and political ideology at 10. The “maximum” likelihood estimation held happiness at 1, control at 10, membership at 2, and ideology at 1. Gender was held at the mode (female) and country controls held at their means.

organization membership, life control, ideology, age, education, GDP/capita, polity score, and population at their means. The gender variable was held as its mode (female). Respondents answering that they are “very happy” had a 13.606% predicted probability of participating in an environmental demonstration, whereas participants answering that they are “not at all happy” had a 8.211% predicted probability of donating to an environmental organization. This is a decrease in willingness to donate of over five percentage points.

The second independent variable considered if a membership in an environmental organization was positively associated with donations. I calculated predicted probabilities for this variable by holding happiness, life control, ideology, age, education, GDP/capita, polity score, and population at their means. The gender variable was held as its mode (female). Individuals not belonging to an environmental organization had a 10.332% predicted probability of donating to an environmental organization. For individuals that are “inactive members”, this jumps to 22.797%. For “active members”, there is a 43.075% predicted probability that individuals would participate in an environmental demonstration. This is a substantial difference of 32.743 percentage points between active members and nonmembers.

Life control was positively associated with environmental donations. I calculated predicted probabilities for this variable by holding happiness, environmental organization membership, ideology, age, education, GDP/capita, polity score, and population at their means. The gender variable was held as its mode (female). Participants believing that they had “no choice at all” in their lives had a 9.751% predicted probability of donating and participants responding that they had “a great deal of choice” in their lives had a

12.950% predicted probability of donating. This is a difference of over three percentage points.

Lastly, I considered how differences in political ideology relate to participation in environmental demonstration. I calculated predicted probabilities for this variable by holding happiness, life control, environmental organization membership, age, education, GDP/capita, polity score, and population at their means. The gender variable was held as its mode (female). I found that the left-most political liberals had a 13.225% predicted probability of donating, but the right-most political conservatives had 10.698% predicted probability of donating. This is a difference of over two percentage points.

4.5 Discussion and Conclusion

Overall, I found strong support for the hypotheses in this chapter. First, happiness is positively correlated with both participation in environmental demonstrations and giving donations to environmental organizations. This supports the theory that happiness corresponds with optimism, certainty, and a sense of control (Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Tiedens and Linton 2001). Interestingly, this runs counter to grievance-based theories of political action, (Gurr 1968; Gurr 1970), which contend that grievances (i.e., unhappiness) would correspond with collective action. One alternative explanation would be that environmental concerns only take shape in the absence of other political issues, such as regime overthrow. In fact, some have argued that environmental concerns may be postmaterial concerns, because they are beyond the immediate needs of individuals (Inglehart 1977, 1990, 2008). However, environmental concerns may be a primary concern for individuals living in countries facing immense environmental

challenged. The data supports this argument. India had the largest proportion of the population engaging in environmental demonstrations (29.5%) according to the data.

Second, I found that environmental membership is positively associated with both participation and donations. Third, life control had a positive relationship for both protest and donations. Lastly, political liberals were more likely to protest and donate than were political conservatives.

The findings of this chapter provide support for the theoretical arguments and the empirical findings from the chapter on the 2017 People's Climate March. It shows that emotions, identification, efficacy, and left-political ideology all matter for environmentalism in the global context.

Some interesting country-level trends emerged, as well. GDP/capita is negatively associated with demonstrations, but positively associated with donations. This suggests that people in less wealthy countries may use non-institutionalized mediums to push for environmental changes, whereas citizens in wealthier countries may rely on less contentious measures, such as giving donations to organizations. Polity score has a small, but positive association with demonstration participation. People in more democratic societies are slightly more likely to protest. Put differently, the political structures matter to a small extent.

The addition of the country-level robustness check variables (in the appendix) had minimal impact on the main findings of the study. Of note, the CO₂ indicator had no impact on either demonstration participation or donations. The country size had no relationship with demonstration participation, but was positively related to donations. The same held true with the percentage of the population living in urban area.

In the next chapter, I examine how these factors correspond with civil resistance participation beyond just the environmental sphere.

Chapter 5: Global Participation in Civil Resistance

In the previous two chapters, I examined civil resistance within the context of environmental politics in the United States and then globally. I found strong support for the study's central arguments that emotions, identification, efficacy, and political ideology correspond with environmental civil resistance attitudes and behaviors.

However, much of the well-known civil resistance during the twentieth and twenty-first century did not occur within the realms of environmental politics and environmental activism. Rather, it occurred to challenge repressive regimes and to push for democratic improvement. For instance, out of 67 transitions to democracy during the twentieth century, 50 involved substantial civil resistance campaigns (Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005). People also civil resistance in recent decades to demand democratic improvements and policy changes. Protesters in South Korea called for greater government accountability recently, 5.3 million women joined a 24-hour strike in Spain on International Women's Day (2018),⁶⁴ and over 200,000 protestors recently gathered in Washington, DC for the March for Our Lives (2018).⁶⁵

In this chapter, I extend the argument to examine civil resistance participation more broadly. Doing so allows me to examine test the theory in a wider political context and to see if the theory applies beyond environmental civil resistance.


I consider four forms of civil resistance: signing petitions, boycotts, peaceful demonstrations, and strikes. I do this for two reasons. First, these four measures capture

⁶⁴ [BBC News](#)

⁶⁵ [CBS News](#)

“ordered activities along” a spectrum “with several thresholds” (Dalton et al 2010, 61).⁶⁶ The first tier of civil resistance is the initial move from conventional politics (voting, for example) to low-cost forms of contentious politics, such as petitions and lawful demonstrations. The second tier is direct action, which consists of semi-legal actions such as boycotts. The third tier is made up of illegal non-violent actions such as strikes or occupying buildings. The fourth tier is the use of violence. Using this framework, I am able to examine two types of first tier actions (petitions and lawful demonstrations), one type of second tier actions (boycotts), and one type of third tier actions (strikes). The spectrum presents a useful theoretical framework to capture the move from conventional politics to violent political action. Actions on the left-side of the spectrum as less risky and less costly, whereas actions on the right-hand side are very risky and very costly. See Figure 5.1 below.

Figure 5.1: Spectrum of Political Actions⁶⁷



⁶⁶ According to Dalton et al (2010), early studies of civil resistance used this ordered continuum. In particular, Dalton et al (2010) cite Barnes, et al., *Political Action*; Edward Muller, *Aggressive Political Participation* (Princeton, Conn.: Princeton University Press, 1979).

⁶⁷ Based on Dalton et al (2010).

Second, civil resistance tactics often times happen in conjunction with one another. For example, civil resisters during the anti-Apartheid struggle in South Africa engaged in stayaways, strikes, boycotts, and peaceful demonstrations to challenge the state. In fact, well-coordinated civil resistance campaigns often times employ diverse tactics of dispersion and concentration in order to withstand government repression efforts and to address different components of the movement. (Schock 2005, 2013, 2015). In particular, protest and persuasion tactics can mobilize people and help overcome apathy, whereas noncooperation aimed at the opponent's power source can directly challenge them (Schock 2015, 131-135).

Through studying four types of civil resistance, I am able to examine the extent to which similar (or different) motivations compel people to engage in various tactics. This is useful to practitioners, because particular frames may be necessary to mobilize different types of actions. It may be the case that happiness corresponds with a low-cost action, such signing a petition, but that unhappiness corresponds with more costly civil resistance, such as participation in boycotts.

In the following section, I present the hypotheses for the chapter. In section 5.2, I describe the research design. Section 5.3 lists the key dependent, independent variables, and the control variables for the analysis. The findings are presented in section 5.4. In sum, I find that emotions, cosmopolitanism, efficacy, and political ideology are important correlates of civil resistance participation across four measures: petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, and strikes. More specifically, I find that happiness correlates with petition signing but that unhappiness corresponds with peaceful demonstrations and boycotts. I find that cosmopolitanism positively corresponds with petitions, peaceful demonstrations,

and boycotts. Also, political efficacy and political liberalism are positively related to civil resistance participation in all measures. I discuss the implications in section 5.5.

5.1 Hypotheses

I outline the hypotheses for Chapter 5 in this section. As in previous chapters, I explicitly consider how emotions, efficacy, cosmopolitanism, and political ideology correspond with civil resistance.

Happiness

I consider how happiness and unhappiness influence four forms of civil resistance. As in Chapter 4, I use a measure from the WVS, which asks “Taking all things together, would you say you are _____?” Participants choose one of four options: “very happy” (1), “rather happy” (2), “not very happy” (3), or “not at all happy” (4) (WVS V10). Recall that this measure captures the state-emotion of happiness. An added benefit of this measure, is that it also captures unhappiness. Therefore, I can examine the effects of a positive valence emotion (happiness) and a negative valence emotion (unhappiness or sadness). Recall that happiness corresponds with high levels of certainty and control (Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Tiedens and Linton 2001). I therefore predict that:

H₁: High levels of reported happiness will positively correspond with greater civil resistance participation.

Identification

I use a measure of cosmopolitanism to measure identification in this part of the study, because identification with others makes contentious political action more likely

(Stürmer and Simon 2004; Stürmer and Simon 2009). I discuss the rationale for this measure below. I predict that:

H₃: Cosmopolitanism identification will positively correlate with civil resistance participation.

Efficacy

In line with past work (Klandermans et al. 2008; Corrigan-Brown 2012), I predict that:

H₄: High personal efficacy will correspond with greater civil resistance participation.

Ideology

Political ideology matters for civil resistance and political liberals are more likely to participate in civil resistance than political conservatives (Hirsch 1990; Dalton 2008; Dalton et al 2010; Corrigan-Brown 2012). I also predict that:

H₅: Political liberals will participate in civil resistance at higher rates than political conservatives.

Individual-Level and Country-Level Controls

I include individual-level controls for education, gender, and age in the models, because these often correspond with political participation. The models also include country-level controls for GDP/capita, polity, and population, because cross-national studies often control for these measures. I get these measures from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. In the appendix, I also include models with controls for conflict intensity and large protest occurrences. I use the UCDP Conflict Intensity Data to capture violent conflict and construct a nonviolent contentious politics measure based on the Mass Mobilization Data Project (Clark and Regan 2015).

5.2 Research Design

I use the World Values Survey (WVS) Wave 6 for the individual-level measures. The WVS collects nationally representative survey data for “almost 100 countries which contain almost 90 percent of the world’s population, using a common questionnaire” ([World Values Survey](#)). The sixth wave was conducted from 2010 to 2014.

The data utilized for this study includes over 56,000 participants 48 countries in the petition model and 47 for the boycotts, peaceful demonstrations, and strikes models. For the country-level variables, I make use of the World Bank World Development Indicators. I also use the UCDP Conflict Intensity data to measure violent conflict, and the Mass Mobilization Data Project to measure protest events in each country. All measures are available in the Appendix.

5.3 Variables of Interest

Dependent Variables

This chapter examines four dependent variables, each asking about a different form of civil resistance participation: signing a petition (WVS V85), attending peaceful demonstrations (WVS V87), joining in boycotts (WVS V86), and joining strikes (WVS V88) With regards to each form of civil resistance, participants are asked if they “have done”, “might do”, or “would never do” the specific activities. Because I am interested in the correlates of actual participation, I collapse the “might do” and “would never do” into a single measure. The new binary measure therefore captures individuals that have not participated in a given action (coded as 0) and those who have (coded as 1).

Independent Variables

I use the same measures of happiness as in from Chapter 4. The happiness question asked, “Taking all things together, would you say you are _____?” Participants choose one of four options: “very happy” (1), “rather happy” (2), “not very happy” (3), or “not at all happy” (4).

The second independent variable measures identification with members of humanity in the form of asking about one’s identification as a world citizen.⁶⁸ The question asks participants their level of agreement with the following statement: “I see myself as a world citizen” (WVS V212). Response options are: (1) “strongly disagree,” (2) “disagree,” (3) “agree,” or (4) “strongly agree.” Therefore, lower numerical values indicate less identification as a world citizen and higher values indicate greater identification as a world citizen.

Although this is not a perfect measure for identification with a particular movement or set of movements, this measure directly captures the connection that an individual has with her fellow human beings. It is a proxy measure for group membership and capacity for empathy towards those suffering injustices. As we know from past research, group membership is an important factor in determining which actions someone will (or won’t) participate in. As mentioned earlier, research shows that when individuals prefer their own group, they are likely to show favoritism and act in the best interest of that group (Tajfel et al 1971). This, I argue, could include pro-social behaviors such as the civil resistance behavior of a group. Second, empathy is consistently linked to various

⁶⁸ An alternative measure used in other studies is a count of the number of organizations that an individual belong to, and this could be a measure of political resources. See Verba et al (1995) for a discussion of political resources and Dalton et al (2010) for this count measure.

pro-social behaviors⁶⁹ (Eisenberg et al 2010; Telle and Prister 2016) and dispositional empathy is linked to attitudes endorsing human rights principles (McFarland and Mathews 2005a, 2005b).⁷⁰ In fact, empathy has the capacity to persuade individuals to help others for entirely altruistic reasons (Batson 1991; Batson 1991 and Shaw 1991). Instead of relying on pure egoism and a cost-benefit analysis, the presence of empathy can over-ride self-interest. This matters for civil resistance, because there may be instances where support or participation run contrary to self-interest (i.e., when there is possibility of emotional and or physical harm).

I use the same measures of self-efficacy and political ideology as used in Chapter 4. The efficacy question states that, “Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them.” Recall that responses range from “no choice at all” (1) to “a great deal of choice” (10) (WVS V55). The political ideology questions asks, “In political matters, people talk of the “left” and the “right.” How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?” Response range from 1 to 10, where 1 indicates “left” and 10 indicates “right” (WVS 95).

Individual-Level Controls

As in Chapter 4, I include individual-level control variables in the analysis: gender, age, and education. The gender variable codes “male” as 1 and “female” as 2 (WVS 240). The age question (WVS V248) is collapsed into 6 categories. They are “under 25” (1), “25-34” (2), “35-44” (3), “45-54” (4), “55-64” (5), and “65+” (6) (WVS

⁶⁹ Prosocial behaviors are broadly “any act performed with the goal of benefiting another person” (Aronson et al 2007, 344)

⁷⁰ This draws on Davis’ (1983) Empathetic Concern Scale (EC).

242). The education measure asked, “What is the highest educational level that you have attained,” and ranges from “no formal education” (1) to “university level education, with degree” (9) (WVS V 248).⁷¹

Country-Level Controls

I also include the standard country-level variables, such as regime, GDP/capita, and population. I use the Polity IV scale for regime, which ranges from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The GDP/capita is in current US dollars, and population is total population. Both measures come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

Country-Level Robustness Check Variables

As a robustness check, I consider country level-indicators that correspond with violent and nonviolent political conflict within each state. For violent intrastate conflict, I used the UCDP Conflict Intensity Data.⁷² It indicates “less than 25 battle deaths” (0), “minor conflict” of 25-999 battle-related deaths in a given year (1), and “large-scale conflict” of 1000+ battle deaths per year (2).

To capture nonviolent contention, I utilized the Mass Mobilization Data Project (Clark and Regan 2015) to construct a variable for presence of large scale protest.⁷³ The Mass Mobilization Data Project records event-level protest data for 162 countries between the years 1990-2014. I created a variable based on the same threshold of a large scale campaign as Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) for large scale campaigns. Protests

⁷¹ If a participant mentions that he/she is still a student, the enumerator asks to indicate the highest level of education expected.

⁷² UCDP data accessed at: <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/> and the codebook is available at codebook available at: <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/dyadic/ucdp-dyadic-171.pdf>. "UCDP Dyadic Dataset version 17.1" was downloaded as a CSV. Conflict inclusion classified by location and side A/side A primary.

⁷³ Mass Mobilization Data Project available at: <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/MMdata>.

with “less than 1000 participants” was coded as 0 and ones with “1,000+ participants” as 1. Although the Mass Mobilization Data Project does not capture sustained campaigns, it does capture individual protest events. The Mass Mobilization Data Project did not include data for Australia, Colombia, New Zealand, Trinidad and Tobago, or the United States. I used similar coding procedures as the Mass Mobilization Data Project to obtain data for these countries.⁷⁴ These models appear in the Appendix for Chapter 5.

5.4 Findings

Section 5.4 begins with an overview of the findings as they relate to Chapter 5’s main hypotheses. I then consider petitions (DV_1), peaceful demonstrations (DV_2), boycotts (DV_3), and strikes (DV_4). Summary statistics for each are provided in Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4. There are 48 countries in the protest model and 47 in the other three models. I use logit models for my analysis, because the dependent variables are binary (Long 1997). I also cluster the standard errors around each country since the model includes both individuals and state level independent variables (Primo, Jacobsmeisr and Milyo 2003). I use one-tailed tests in the analysis, because the study’s hypotheses examine relationships in a single direction.

⁷⁴ A more detailed description of my coding procedures is on file with the author.

Table 5.1: Summary Statistics for Petitions

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Petition	57,326	0.210	0.407	0	1
Happiness	57,326	1.844	0.757	1	4
Life Control	57,326	7.126	2.163	1	10
Ideology	57,326	5.765	2.324	1	10
Cosmo ID	57,326	3.056	0.869	1	4
Education	57,326	5.696	2.384	1	9
Gender	57,326	1.505	0.500	1	2
Age Category	57,326	3.184	1.590	1	6
Polity	57,326	6.194	4.873	-10	10
Population	57,326	151,000,000	321,000,000	1,116,644	1,260,000,000
GDP/capita	57,326	14,737.570	16,798.300	667.415	67,646.100
Conflict Intensity	57,326	0.308	0.495	0	2
Large Protest	57,326	0.805	0.396	0	1

Table 5.2: Summary Statistics for Peaceful Demonstrations

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Peaceful Demonstration	56,543	0.138	0.345	0	1
Happiness	56,543	1.840	0.755	1	4
Life Control	56,543	7.131	2.171	1	10
Cosmo ID	56,543	3.055	0.872	1	4
Ideology	56,543	5.744	2.329	1	10
Education	56,543	5.689	2.385	1	9
Gender	56,543	1.505	0.500	1	2
Age Category	56,543	3.182	1.591	1	6
Polity	56,543	6.490	4.393	-7	10
Population	56,543	158,000,000	330,000,000	1,116,644	1,260,000,000
GDP/capita	56,543	14,431.770	16,820.390	667.415	67,646.100
Conflict Intensity	56,543	0.317	0.499	0	2
Large Protest	56,543	0.802	0.399	0	1

Table 5.3: Summary Statistics for Boycotts

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Boycott	56,095	0.069	0.253	0	1
Happiness	56,095	1.839	0.756	1	4
Life Control	56,095	7.133	2.170	1	10
Cosmo ID	56,095	3.055	0.872	1	4
Ideology	56,095	5.745	2.328	1	10
Education	56,095	5.691	2.385	1	9
Gender	56,095	1.505	0.500	1	2
Age Category	56,095	3.182	1.592	1	6
Polity	56,095	6.473	4.404	-7	10
Population	56,095	157,000,000	329,000,000	1,116,644	1,260,000,000
GDP/capita	56,095	14,418.560	16,838.830	667.415	67,646.100
Conflict Intensity	56,095	0.318	0.500	0	2
Large Protest	56,095	0.801	0.399	0	1

Table 5.4: Summary Statistics for Strikes

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Strike	56,276	0.096	0.294	0	1
Happiness	56,276	1.839	0.756	1	4
Life Control	56,276	7.132	2.172	1	10
Cosmo ID	56,276	3.056	0.872	1	4
Ideology	56,276	5.747	2.329	1	10
Education	56,276	5.688	2.385	1	9
Gender	56,276	1.505	0.500	1	2
Age Category	56,276	3.178	1.590	1	6
Polity	56,276	6.478	4.398	-7	10
Population	56,276	157,000,000	329,000,000	1,116,644	1,260,000,000
GDP/capita	56,276	14,393.730	16,806.040	667.415	67,646.100
Conflict Intensity	56,276	0.317	0.499	0	2
Large Protest	56,276	0.802	0.398	0	1

There is strong support for the chapter's hypotheses. Concerning a positive relationship between happiness and civil resistance participation (H_1), I find strong support with respect to petition signing ($p < 0.05$). I also find statistically significant relationships between happiness and peaceful demonstrations ($p < 0.10$) and between happiness and boycotts ($p < 0.05$). These relationships, however, run counter to the expectations in the first hypothesis. Instead of a positive relationship between happiness and these two forms of civil resistance, the relationship is negative. This shows that greater levels of unhappiness actually correspond with increased participation in peaceful demonstrations and boycotts. This suggests support for traditional grievance-based hypotheses (Gurr 1968; 1970). There is not a statistically significant relationship between strikes and happiness, but it does occur in the expected positive relationship. In sum, emotions are significant in first and second tier forms of civil resistance, but do not factor into tier three actions. This suggests that as the costs become higher, emotions play less of central role in the decision to participate in particularly risky forms of civil resistance. Results are available in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5: Logit Regressions for Civil Resistance Participation⁷⁵

VARIABLES	(1) Petitions	(2) Peaceful Demonstrations	(3) Boycotts	(4) Strikes
Happiness	-0.0732** (0.0424)	0.0522* (0.0364)	0.0738** (0.0434)	-0.0280 (0.0518)
Cosmo ID	0.0786*** (0.0307)	0.0681** (0.0405)	0.130*** (0.0394)	0.109 (0.0859)
Life Control	0.0496*** (0.0143)	0.0265** (0.0140)	0.0244* (0.0175)	0.0326*** (0.0103)
Ideology	-0.0481*** (0.0176)	-0.0778*** (0.0231)	-0.0819*** (0.0245)	-0.0881*** (0.0209)
Education	0.156*** (0.0205)	0.135*** (0.0171)	0.147*** (0.0282)	0.0623*** (0.0190)
Gender	-0.0296 (0.0445)	-0.334*** (0.0632)	-0.345*** (0.0920)	-0.496*** (0.0556)
Age Category	0.0841*** (0.0262)	0.0632*** (0.0220)	0.00580 (0.0225)	0.0270 (0.0492)
Polity	0.0734*** (0.0200)	0.0611*** (0.0224)	0.0593** (0.0299)	0.0496 (0.0425)
Population	7.10e-10*** (1.28e-10)	5.67e-10*** (1.15e-10)	1.30e-09*** (1.65e-10)	7.35e-10*** (1.53e-10)
GDP/capita	3.91e-05*** (4.24e-06)	2.36e-06 (5.39e-06)	1.91e-05*** (5.28e-06)	4.28e-06 (5.96e-06)
Constant	-4.030*** (0.299)	-2.978*** (0.280)	-4.329*** (0.367)	-2.572*** (0.445)
Observations	57,326	56,543	56,095	56,276
Models	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit

One-Tailed Tests, Robust standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors clustered by country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Turning to cosmopolitanism (H₂), it is positively and significantly correlated with three of the forms of civil resistance: petitions (p<0.01), peaceful demonstrations (p<0.05), and boycotts (p<0.01). In each of these instances, self-identification as a cosmopolitan significantly corresponds with participation. As with happiness however, there is not a statistical relationship between cosmopolitanism and participation in strikes.

⁷⁵ Dependent variables coded as binary, 0 for “have not done” and 1 for “have done”. Questions originally from WVS Wave 6, questions V84-V88.

It seems that as the civil resistance becomes more costly, cosmopolitanism ceases to be an important predictor of the behavior.

There is strong support for the third and fourth hypotheses that increased efficacy and identification as a political liberal is correlated with increased participation in all four forms of civil resistance. Greater efficacy corresponds with higher levels of participation in petition signing, peaceful demonstrations, boycotts, and strikes. Men were more likely than women to participate in peaceful demonstrations, boycotts, and strikes. Older participants were more likely to sign petitions and participate in peaceful demonstrations. Higher education was correlated with higher levels of participation for all four measures.

Turning to country-level findings, higher polity scores corresponded with higher overall levels of petition signing, peaceful demonstrations, and boycotts.⁷⁶ Larger populations correlated with higher rates of all four. GDP was positive for petitions and boycotts. Lastly, the violent and protest measures were not significant in most cases. The exceptions are that strikes were less likely during intense conflict and that large scale protests decreased the likelihood of boycotts.

Predicted Probabilities for Civil Resistance Participation

In order to substantively analyze the findings from the logit regressions, I calculated predicted probabilities for each of the four independent variables. As with the analysis in Chapter 4, I first calculated “minimum” and “maximum” predicted probabilities with respect to main independent variables of interest. For example, in the petition model, the “minimum” person is: not happy at all, strongly anti-cosmopolitan,

⁷⁶ This supports a political opportunity structure hypothesis, which state that citizens can make demands without fear of repression, when the barriers for action are lower and acceptance of action is higher (see Dalton et al 2010, 53 for review).

had no perceived life control, and was extremely conservative. The “maximum” person was very happy, strongly cosmopolitan, had high life control, and was extremely liberal. All other variables are calculated at their means and gender was held at its mode (female). Second, I calculated predicted probabilities for each of the independent variables of interest. In this model, I highlight the effect of each independent variable individually. All other variables are held at their means and gender at its mode (female). Predicted probability tables are available in the Chapter 5 Appendix E.

The petition signing measure (WVS V85) captured whether or not an individual had signed a petition. The “minimum” individual had an 8.002% likelihood of signing the petition, whereas the “maximum” individual had a 24.540% likelihood of signing the petition. This is a substantial increase of close to 17% points and an increase of over 206% percent. Moving from “not happy at all” to “very happy” showed a change of close to 3 percentage points, 14.519% to 17.463%. The change from strong disagreement to strong agreement for cosmopolitanism yielded a similar result, with a move from 14.472% to 17.643%. Individuals with no perceived life control had a 12.798% predicted probability of signing a petition, whereas individuals with a great deal of life control had close to a 19% predicted probability of doing so. This is a difference of close to 6 percentage points. Lastly, the impact of political ideology on petition signing was also about 6 percentage points. Liberals in the sample has a 20.007% likelihood of signing a petition, whereas conservatives had a likelihood of 13.961%.

Moving to peaceful demonstration participation (WVS V87), I also consider “minimum” and “maximum.” Recall that contrary to the first hypothesis, happiness and peaceful demonstration participation yielded a negative relationship. For this reason, I

calculated the “minimum” as an individual that is very happy, had no life control, anti-cosmopolitan, and politically conservative. The “maximum” is the opposite: very unhappy, high life control, cosmopolitan, and politically left. The “minimum” individual had a predicted probability of 6.726% for participation in a peaceful demonstration, whereas the “maximum” individual had a 16.208% probability. This is an increase of close to 10 percentage points and an increase of over 140% percent. Moving from “very happy” to “not happy at all” showed a shift from 10.411% to 11.965%. A strong cosmopolitan had an 11.464% probability of participating in a demonstration, whereas a strong anti-cosmopolitan has a probability 9.545%. Lastly, the largest difference in predicted probabilities revolved around political ideology. Liberals has close to a 15% predicted probability of participating in a demonstration, but conservatives had an 8.019% probability.

There were less overall boycott participants than participants who had signed petitions and/or participated in peaceful demonstrations. Like peaceful demonstrations, happiness was negatively associated with increased participation in boycotts, so I used happiness in the “minimum” estimation. I also used strong anti-cosmopolitan, no life control, and right political ideology in this calculation. The “maximum” prediction included very unhappy, cosmopolitan, high life control, and political liberal identification. The “minimum” predicted probability was 2.487% and the “maximum” was 7.280%. This is an increase of close to 5 percentage points, and an increase of over 192%. Although the overall predicted likelihood is small, this is still a staggering increase. Very happy individuals had a 4.206% probability of signing a petition and very unhappy individuals had a 5.194% probability of doing so. Differences in

cosmopolitanism accounted for about a 1.5 percentage point increase from anti-cosmopolitans to strong cosmopolitans, 3.454% compared to 5.016%. Individuals with no life control participated at a predicted rate of 3.867% and those with a great deal of life control did at 4.770%. Ideology also played an important role in boycott participation. Political liberals had a predicted probability of 6.446% and political conservatives had a predicted probability of 3.191%.

Lastly, I consider predicted probabilities for strikes. Unlike the first three forms of civil resistance, there was no statistically significant relationship for either happiness or cosmopolitanism in relation to strikes. For these reasons, my “minimum” calculation holds these measure at their means and only moves life control and political ideology. The “minimum” had no life control and was politically conservative and the “maximum” had high life control and was politically liberal. The “minimum” individual participated in a strike at a predicted rate of 3.953% and the “maximum” at 10.870%. This is a difference of close to 7 percentage points and an increase of close to 175%. Individuals with high life control participated at a greater predicted rate compared to those with low life control, 7.429% versus 5.649%. Lastly, we see a familiar trend with political ideology. Liberals participated at close to a 10% probability but conservatives did so at 4.784%.

5.5 Discussion and Conclusion

I find strong support for the Chapter 5 hypotheses. Happiness, cosmopolitanism, efficacy, and political ideology all play important roles in civil resistance participation. In the remainder of the chapter, I discuss the implications of the findings in light of the

Spectrum of Political Action (Figure 5.1). I then incorporate a classification of nonviolent action used by Cunningham and colleagues (2016) and finally present a new typology of civil resistance.

In line with the study's hypotheses, emotions were statistically significant in three out of four measures, with strikes being the exception. As predicted, a positive relationship between happiness and petition signing existed: happiness worked as an emboldening emotion, enhanced feelings of control, and increased the probability that individuals signed petitions. Contrary to the study's hypothesis, I found a positive relationship between unhappiness and peaceful demonstrations and with boycotts. These findings show that emotions are important correlates of Tier 1 (petitions and demonstrations) and Tier 2 (boycotts) political actions, but not Tier 3 political actions (strikes). In other words, decisions to engage in the most costly forms of civil resistance were not driven by emotions. Therefore, it appears that these decisions are driven by logical considerations and an understanding of the risk involved in these forms of political action.

It's interesting that petitions and peaceful demonstrations, while both influenced by one's emotional state, had opposite effects. Because both fall within the Tier 1 category, it would have made sense that the relationship between each one and happiness would be the same. Instead, this study shows that different emotional states correspond with each type of political action. Rather, a negative valence emotion corresponded with demonstration participation and boycott participation.

Recent work by Cunningham et al (2016) is helpful in better understanding the observed relationship. The research differentiates between low-resource and high-

resource forms of nonviolent action. Low-resource forms of nonviolent action include nonviolent intervention (sit-ins, occupations, or blockades) and social noncooperation (hunger strikes, self-immolation, or other self-harm) and high-resource nonviolent action includes economic noncooperation (strikes, tax refusal, or consumer boycotts) and protests and demonstrations (rallies, protests, or demonstrations) (Cunningham et al 2016, 596).⁷⁷ I present their classifications in Table 5.5 below.

Table 5.5 Nonviolent Action Classification⁷⁸


Low-Resource	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nonviolent intervention: sit-ins, occupations, or blockades • Social noncooperation: hunger strikes, self-immolation, or other self-harm
High-Resource	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic noncooperation: strikes, tax refusals, or consumer boycotts • Protest and demonstration: rallies, protests, or demonstrations
Not easily classified	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political noncooperation: organizational boycotts of elections or withdrawals from political office or coalition in the government

Drawing from the earlier mentioned work by Dalton et al (2010) and the work by Cunningham and colleagues (2016), I construct a new typology to analyze the role between emotions and civil resistance participation. Risk is x-axis and resources the y-axis. See Figure 5.2

⁷⁷ The authors also consider political noncooperation and contend that it is not easily classified (Cunningham et al 2016).

⁷⁸ This is based on Cunningham et al (2016).

Figure 5.2: Civil Resistance Risks and Resources



Petitions fit in the lower-left quadrant, because they are low-risk and low-resource. Actions in this quadrant correspond with happiness. As actions increase in cost and risk, they become motivated by unhappiness. In fact, the findings of the present study show that the relationship between unhappiness and boycott participation mirrors the findings between unhappiness and participation in peaceful demonstrations. Since the same the emotional motivations correspond with both peaceful demonstration participation and boycott participation, it is possible that individuals think of these two forms of civil resistance as having the similar levels of cost and risk. Beyond a certain threshold of risk and/or resources, emotions are no longer central fixtures of the decision to engage in civil resistance. This would explain why there is not a relationship between emotions and participation and strikes.

These findings on emotions have important implications on the potential for civil resistance organizers to mobilize support. It means that people with a strong sense of happiness may be willing to participate in low-cost and low-resource forms of civil

resistance, such as signing petitions. It also signals that strong feelings of unhappiness may be responsible for the decisions to engage in low-cost/low-resource civil resistance and ones with moderate-cost and required resources.

Cosmopolitanism largely worked in the predicted direction. For petitions, demonstrations, and boycotts, this was the case. However, and as with emotions, there was not a relationship between cosmopolitanism and strikes. Again, this trend suggests that certain types of civil resistance that are beyond a particular risk and/or resource threshold are driven by different considerations than those at lower levels.

The efficacy and political ideology findings strongly support the stated hypotheses. In all four forms of civil resistance, they performed as expected. Of note, the largest consistent relationship was that between political ideology and civil resistance. In every case, political liberals participated at much higher levels than conservatives.

One other finding from the individual level of analysis is worth mentioning. Overall levels participation decrease as civil resistance becomes more costly and more risky. The highest levels of participation occur with petition signing and peaceful demonstrations, but drops with boycotts or strikes. This suggests that individuals calculate risk, and that increased risk leads to decreased willingness to participate in these more intensive forms of civil resistance. It also suggests that actions, such as petitions require less resources than something like strikes to encourage mobilization.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

In this project I considered the micro-foundations of civil resistance because, although recent empirical civil resistance research has primarily focused on larger units of analysis, such as campaigns and organizations, it has not addressed and tested micro-foundational explanations. Especially given the newer emphasis on micro-foundations in comparative politics and international relations (see Kertzer 2017 for an example in international relations), there civil resistance research needs to fill this gap. Therefore, by drawing from both political science and psychology, I constructed a five-pronged political psychology theory of civil resistance based on emotions, efficacy, identification with a movement and other people, message frames, and political ideology.

In this theory, I argued that (a) happiness and anger increase civil resistance support, but fear decreases it; (b) pragmatic message frames will increase civil resistance support; (c) identification with the movement or with other people increases support; (d) high personal and group-efficacy increases civil resistance support, and (e) political liberals show higher levels of support than political conservatives.

I empirically tested my theory in three contexts. Chapter three tested prongs (a) through (e) in the context of the environmental movement in the U.S., chapter four tested prongs (a), (c), (d), and (e) in the context of environmental activism around the globe, and chapter five tested prongs (a), (c), (d), and (e) in the context of civil resistance around the world. As a result of testing prong (a), I found that emotions generally did influence civil resistance preferences, although not always in the expected direction. Anger and fear both made environmental civil resistance more risky in the US context. In the global environmental context, happiness correlated with environmental activism. In the global

arena, happiness correlates with petition signing but unhappiness corresponds with peaceful demonstrations and boycotts.

By testing prong (b), I found that different message frames generally had only a minimal impact on individuals' evaluations of environmental civil resistance, which is particularly interesting given the emphasis on pragmatic civil resistance in the literature (Ackerman 1796; Ackerman & Kruegler 1994; Ackerman and Duvall 2000; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). However, a notable exception to this finding was the effect of fear on the effectiveness of message frames. When participants were afraid, both message frames increased participation willingness. This suggests that civil resistance messages can counteract some of the effects of fear and warrants further research.

In all three empirical chapters, I found strong support for prong (c)'s hypotheses on identification. Increased identification with the environmental movement corresponded with higher levels of participation intentions for the People's Climate March. It also corresponded with increased environmental activism in the cross-national comparison and with three out of four types of civil resistance participation in Chapter 5 (petitions, peaceful demonstration, and boycotts but not strikes).

I also found compelling support for the efficacy hypothesis in prong (d). In Chapter 3, increased group-efficacy corresponded with lower perceptions of risk. Increases in self and group-efficacy also increased participation intentions. Looking at environmental activism and the other four measures of participation, increased efficacy correlated with greater participation.

Finally, I found substantial evidence supporting the political ideology hypothesis in prong (e), which argued that political liberals would be more supportive of civil resistance. I found that liberals were less likely to view participation as risky and were more likely to participate in the People’s Climate March. I then found that for both environmental and general civil resistance, political liberals more frequently engaged in civil resistance.

In light of these findings, and given the need for additional micro-foundational research in the field, there are several avenues for possible additional research. I highlight five of them below.

First, new research could further explore the interaction between civil resistance and civil society as the micro-foundational level. On one hand, civil society membership can affect subsequent participation in protests (della Porta 2011 and Diani 2011; Corrigan-Brown 2012). For example, the Nashville Student Movement during the U.S. Civil Rights Movement explicitly prepared students in Nashville for the Nashville sit-ins and Solidarity was instrumental in challenging the repressive communist government in Poland. More recently, we see that large-scale protest events are frequently sponsored by civil society groups. As mentioned earlier, over 1,500 participating organizations participated in the 2014 People’s Climate March.⁷⁹

More specifically, future research could examine how emotions make civil society formation possible. In writing about East-Central European countries in the 1970s, Tismaneanu (1992) writes that “the main psychological element that made Stalinism possible, the universalized sense of helplessness of the individual, had vanished almost completely” (115). Tismaneanu (1992) also writes that:

⁷⁹ [People's Climate Movement](#)

“[t]he main battlefield in the 1970s and 1980s was the restoration of hope for social change – people became convinced that the rules of the game were not eternal, that it was worth fighting for human dignity, and that success in fighting such a fight has a real chance” (115).

The psychology of helplessness, and in particular how to overcome helplessness through hope, could be particularly important to political science research on civil society and civil resistance.

Experimentally, this could be examined through testing various message frames in a variety of contexts. Qualitatively, interviews with members of civil society could help uncover this. In a recent book on social movement organization, Corrigan-Brown (2012) investigated trajectories of participation, including disengagement. Researchers could test trajectories, such as disengagement, by interviewing individuals that have (a) left civil society organizations and (b) have never belonged to civil society organizations. This would allow researchers to better understand why individuals leave civil society and why some individuals never join civil society while also better addressing uncertainties caused by selecting cases based on the dependent variable (i.e., participation).

Second, microlevel explanations of civil resistance emphasizing other state and trait emotions deserve greater attention. As shown in these empirical investigations, happiness, anger, and fear play an important role in civil resistance attitudes and behaviors and both state and trait emotions influence civil society considerations. However, existing civil resistance research has yet to consider both emotion aspects simultaneously.

In particular, research could study how the intensity of emotions relates to civil resistance preferences. To illustrate this, I will highlight one of the other findings from my survey experiment. I ran OLS regressions to examine how state emotional intensity

corresponded with risk perceptions of participating in the 2017 People's Climate March and influenced participation intentions. The dependent variables were risk perception and intended participation and the independent variables were three emotional manipulation check questions. I asked: "To what extent did you feel angry after completing the writing exercise?"; "To what extent did you feel fearful after completing the writing exercise?"; and "To what extent did you feel relaxed after completing the writing exercise?" (Tsai and Young (2010). Response options for the three questions ranged from "Not at all" (coded as 1) and "Extremely" (coded as 5). Overall, I found strong evidence that increased feelings of relaxation, anger, and fear corresponded with increased risk perceptions. I also found that increased feelings of being relaxed, angry and fearful corresponded with increased willingness to participate in the march. The findings are all significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. Table 6.1 shows the results.

Table 6.1: Emotional Intensity and the 2017 People’s Climate March

VARIABLES	(1) Risk	(2) Participation
Relaxed	0.178*** (0.0384)	0.154*** (0.0305)
Angry	0.278*** (0.0428)	0.117*** (0.0340)
Fear	0.309*** (0.0444)	0.201*** (0.0353)
Constant	1.143*** (0.175)	1.267*** (0.139)
Observations	1,061	1,061
R-squared	0.101	0.057

One-Test, Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Future work could also explore this relationship with other momentary emotions and with a wide variety of state emotions.

Third, future work could consider message frames in the context of civil resistance preferences. In particular, further work is needed to untangle the influence of pragmatic or principled messages. Although I found only limited support for the hypothesis that message frames matter, this was only in the environmental context, and further research is warranted. For example, future research should examine civil resistance for other causes, such as struggles for racial equality and increased working wages. Research could also look at framing effects in less developed countries. Recall that Norman (2010) found that framing civil resistance as a strategic choice increased support for it in Palestine. In addition, research could look at other types of message frames to examine how they impact civil resistance attitudes.

Another avenue for framing research on civil resistance could draw from Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) identifies five overarching and “universally available psychology systems”⁸⁰ to explain moral preferences across individuals and cultures. The five foundations are (1) harm/care, (2) fairness/reciprocity, (3) in-group/loyalty, (4) authority/respect, and (5) purity/sanctity. Recent work in social science research finds that liberals and conservatives rely on different moral foundations to inform their attitudes and behaviors (Haidt 2001; Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009). Conservatives may be receptive to all five moral channels, but show greater acceptance of in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity than liberals do. Political liberals, on the other hand, only operate on ‘two channels’ -- ‘harm/care’ and ‘fairness/reciprocity’ (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009).

In a series of surveys, Kertzer and colleagues (2014) find that different moral foundations correspond to competing foreign policy preferences: ‘individualizing foundations’ of ‘harm/care’ and ‘fairness/reciprocity’ motivate cooperative internationalism, but ‘binding foundations’ of ‘authority/respect’, ‘in-group/loyalty’, and ‘purity/sanctity’ predict militant internationalism. In the same study, they demonstrate that political liberalism is positively correlated to cooperative internationalism, but negatively associated with militant internationalism. Conversely, political conservatism negatively relates to cooperative internationalism but positively correlates with militant internationalism. This suggests that different moral foundations, and different message frames emphasizing various moral foundations may influence civil resistance attitudes and behaviors.

⁸⁰ See: Moralfoundations.org

Fourth, there is room to expand experimental studies on civil resistance attitudes and behaviors in other consolidated democracies and in the developing world. In coauthored work, I have considered how international publics view strategies by rebel group (Arves, Cunningham, and McCulloch n.d) and the relationship between gender and nonviolent contentious politics (Bond, Simmons, and Arves n.d). Both projects rely on U.S. samples but it would be important to test these arguments in other political consolidated democracies. Some qualitative work has examined the aftermath of the Arab Spring (Norman 2010; Pearlman 2013) and one survey examined attitudes of citizens in Egypt in 2013 (Ayanian and Tausch 2016). Additionally, Davenport and Trivedi (2013) collected survey data on 98,316 Dalits from Gujarat, India.

Fifth, we will not uncover civil resistance micro-foundations through experimental work alone. Experiments should be coupled with other methods of research, such as participant observation at civil resistance events and surveys of participants during civil resistance events.⁸¹

In conclusion, I tested a new theory for civil resistance preferences at the micro-level and found that individual preferences influenced civil resistance risk perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. In doing so, I emphasized an understudied part of civil resistance research: that individual preferences matter for civil resistance.

⁸¹ I thank Erica Chenoweth for this suggestion.

Chapter 3 Appendix A: Figure 3A.1 IRB Approval Letter [792000-1]



1204 Marie Mount Hall
College Park, MD 20742-5125
TEL. 301.405.4212
FAX. 301.314.1475
irb@umd.edu
www.umresearch.umd.edu/IRB

DATE: April 17, 2017

TO: Stephen Arves, MA
FROM: University of Maryland College Park (UMCP) IRB

PROJECT TITLE: [792000-1] Life Events and Current Events Study
REFERENCE #:
SUBMISSION TYPE: New Project

ACTION: APPROVED
APPROVAL DATE: April 17, 2017
EXPIRATION DATE: April 16, 2018
REVIEW TYPE: Expedited Review

REVIEW CATEGORY: Expedited review category # 7

Thank you for your submission of New Project materials for this project. The University of Maryland College Park (UMCP) IRB has APPROVED your submission. This approval is based on an appropriate risk/benefit ratio and a project design wherein the risks have been minimized. All research must be conducted in accordance with this approved submission.

Prior to submission to the IRB Office, this project received scientific review from the departmental IRB Liaison.

This submission has received Expedited Review based on the applicable federal regulations.

This project has been determined to be a Minimal Risk project. Based on the risks, this project requires continuing review by this committee on an annual basis. Please use the appropriate forms for this procedure. Your documentation for continuing review must be received with sufficient time for review and continued approval before the expiration date of April 16, 2018.

Please remember that informed consent is a process beginning with a description of the project and insurance of participant understanding followed by a signed consent form. Informed consent must continue throughout the project via a dialogue between the researcher and research participant. Unless a consent waiver or alteration has been approved, Federal regulations require that each participant receives a copy of the consent document.

Please note that any revision to previously approved materials must be approved by this committee prior to initiation. Please use the appropriate revision forms for this procedure.

All UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS involving risks to subjects or others (UPIRSOs) and SERIOUS and UNEXPECTED adverse events must be reported promptly to this office. Please use the appropriate reporting forms for this procedure. All FDA and sponsor reporting requirements should also be followed.

All NON-COMPLIANCE issues or COMPLAINTS regarding this project must be reported promptly to this office.

Please note that all research records must be retained for a minimum of seven years after the completion of the project.

If you have any questions, please contact the IRB Office at 301-405-4212 or irb@umd.edu. Please include your project title and reference number in all correspondence with this committee.

This letter has been electronically signed in accordance with all applicable regulations, and a copy is retained within University of Maryland College Park (UMCP) IRB's records.

Chapter 3 Appendix B: Experimental Materials

Autobiographical Emotion Memory Task

Participants randomly assigned to complete one of the following emotion induction tasks.^{82}

Relaxed Prompt (Control):

Now we would like you to describe situations that generally⁸³ make you feel relaxed. It is okay if you do not remember all the details, just be specific about what exactly it is that makes you relaxed and how it feels to be relaxed. Please describe in more detail the one situation that makes you feel the⁸⁴ most relaxed as vividly as possible.⁸⁵ These experiences could have occurred in the past or will happen in the future. Write⁸⁶ your description so that someone reading it might even feel relaxed. Take a few minutes to write out your answer.⁸⁷

Anger Prompt:

Now we would like you to describe situations that generally make you feel angry. It is okay if you do not remember all the details, just be specific about what exactly it is that makes you angry and how it feels to be angry. Please describe the events that make you feel the most angry as vividly as possible. These experiences could have occurred in the past or will happen in the future. Write your description so that someone reading it might even feel angry. Take a few minutes to write out your answer.

Fear Prompt:

“Now we would like you to describe things that generally make you feel afraid. It is okay if you do not remember all the details, just be specific about what exactly it is that makes you afraid and how it feels to be afraid. Please describe the events that make you feel the most afraid as vividly as possible. These experiences could have occurred in the past or will happen in the future. Write your description so that someone reading it might even feel afraid. Take a few minutes to write out your answer.

⁸² Emotion Induction methods adopted from Banks and Valentino (2012); Banks and Hicks (2016); and Valentino et al. (2011)⁸²

⁸³ Replaced “in general things that” with “things that generally”

⁸⁴ Most of this line from Lerner and Keltner 2001

⁸⁵ “as vividly as possible” from Valentino et al. 2011, I also added a period to make this the end of a sentence.

⁸⁶ “If you can” in the original from Banks and Valentino (2012), but removed for this emotion induction task.

⁸⁷ “Take a few minutes to write out your answer” also from Valentino et al. 2011

News Story Texts

Control News Story

People’s Climate Movement Plans Major Marches for This Week

WASHINGTON –Activists are slated for environmental protests this week

Environmentalists in the US are demanding that government and industry take action to address the “climate crisis,” saying that the time for nonviolent mass citizen action is “now.”

Supporters are calling on members of the public to join them in peaceful protests in Washington DC later this week. Organizers have also planned satellite events worldwide for people unable to travel.

“On April 29, let’s march for the world we want to build — for our jobs and for the climate. Together we can send a powerful message that we want a clean energy economy that works for everyone,” Kim Martinson, an Associate Director at 350.org, a leading environmental group, said.

Organizers have also set up an online petition calling on the White House to weigh-in and are asking people to sign it.

The calls to action correspond with the environmental movement’s commitment to nonviolence.

“The activists are using explicitly nonviolent actions in the struggle for climate action” Nicholas Bryant, Senior Analyst with the Center for Nonviolent Resistance Research (CNRR), a leading think tank, said.

The recent wave of protests began in September 2014, when over 400,000 activists in New York City took to the streets and an additional 2,646 events simultaneously occurred in 162 countries. Demonstrators demanded, among other things, policies addressing rising temperatures and increasing carbon dioxide emissions.

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“On April 29, let’s march for the world we want to build — for our jobs and for the climate. Together we can send a powerful message that we want a clean energy economy that works for everyone,” Kim Martinson, an Associate Director at 350.org, a leading environmental group, said. “Nonviolent action, such as marching, is the most sensible option we have to coerce people to stop polluting and wasting.”

Organizers are also calling on the public to sign their online petition urging the White House to take immediate action to address climate change.

The calls to action correspond with the environmental movement’s tactical commitment to nonviolence.

“The activists are using explicitly strategic nonviolent actions in the struggle for climate action” Nicholas Bryant, Senior Analyst with the Center for Nonviolent Resistance Research (CNRR), a leading think tank, said.

He cited research indicating that these actions, such as the planned protest and petition signing, are two-times more effective than their violent counterparts.

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“On April 29, let’s march for the world we want to build — for our jobs and for the climate. Together we can send a powerful message that we want a clean energy economy that works for everyone,” Kim Martinson, an Associate Director at 350.org, a leading environmental group, said. “Nonviolent action, such as marching, is only ethical option we have to persuade people to fulfill their moral duty to make the world a better place.”

Organizers are also calling on the public to sign their online petition urging the White House to take immediate action to address climate change.

The calls to action correspond with the environmental movement’s moral commitment to nonviolence.

“The activists are using explicitly principled nonviolent actions in the struggle for climate action” Nicholas Bryant, Senior Analyst with the Center for Nonviolent Resistance Research (CNRR), a leading think tank, said.

He cited research indicating that these actions stand in contrast to their violent counterparts as positive expressions of spiritual, physical, and moral strength.

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Figure 3B.1 Sample of Neutral Frame Prompt.

Note: All versions of the prompt included this BBC backdrop and the photograph below



People's Climate Movement Plans Major Marches for This Week

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Supporters are calling on members of the public to join them in peaceful protests in Washington DC later this week. Organizers have also planned satellite events worldwide for people unable to travel.

"On April 29, let's march for the world we want to build — for our jobs and for the climate. Together we can send a powerful message that we want a clean energy economy that works for everyone," Kim Martinson, an Associate Director at 350.org, a leading environmental group, said.

Organizers have also set up an online petition calling on the White House to weigh-in and are asking people to sign it.

The calls to action correspond with the environmental movement's commitment to nonviolence.

"The activists are using explicitly nonviolent actions in the struggle for climate action" Nicholas Bryant, Senior Analyst with the Center for Nonviolent Resistance Research (CNRR), a leading think tank, said.

The recent wave of protests began in September 2014, when over 400,000 activists in New York City took to the streets and an additional 2,646 events simultaneously occurred in 162 countries. Demonstrators demanded, among other things, policies addressing rising temperatures and increasing carbon dioxide emissions.

Survey Questions⁸⁸

Dependent Variables

1. Which of the following options best describes your opinion about the statement below?
“It is risky to participate in the 2017 People’s Climate March?”⁸⁹
 - Strongly Agree (7), Agree (6), Somewhat Agree (5), Neither Agree nor Disagree (4), Somewhat Disagree (3), Disagree (2), Strongly Disagree (1)
2. How likely are you to participate in the 2017 People’s Climate March, either in Washington, DC or in a city closer to you?⁹⁰
 - Definitely Will Not Participate (1), Probably Will Not Participate (2), Might or Might Not Participate (3), Probably Will Participate (4), Definitely Will Participate (5)

Environmentalist Identification Question

3. Which of the following options best describes your opinion about the statement below?
“I am a member of the environmental movement.”⁹¹
 - Strongly Agree (7), Agree (6), Somewhat Agree (5), Neither Agree nor Disagree (4), Somewhat Disagree (3), Disagree (2), Strongly Disagree (1)

Efficacy Questions

4. Which of the following options best describes your opinion about the statement below?
“I can help prevent the negative consequences of climate change”⁹²
 - Strongly Agree (7), Agree (6), Somewhat Agree (5), Neither Agree nor Disagree (4), Somewhat Disagree (3), Disagree (2), Strongly Disagree (1)
5. Which of the following options best describes your opinion about the statement below?
“Together, people can prevent the negative consequences of climate change.”⁹³
 - Strongly Agree (7), Agree (6), Somewhat Agree (5), Neither Agree nor Disagree (4), Somewhat Disagree (3), Disagree (2), Strongly Disagree (1)

⁸⁸ Full questionnaire on file with the author.

⁸⁹ Based on “How risky is this decision?” from Tsai and Young 2010

⁹⁰ based on: “I would like to do something together with others to fight the climate crisis (Van Zomeren, Spears, and Leach 2010), used own scale

⁹¹ Similar to identification question from Van Zomeren, Leach, Spears (2010)

⁹² Based on question from Van Zomeren, Spears, and Leach (2010)

¹⁶ Based on question from Van Zomeren, Spears, and Leach (2010)

Knowledge Questions –Composite variable combining responses from both questions used.

6. Which of the following options best describes your opinion about the statement below?

“We contribute to the greenhouse effect every time we use coal or gas.”⁹⁴

- Strongly Agree (7), Agree (6), Somewhat Agree (5), Neither Agree nor Disagree (4), Somewhat Disagree (3), Disagree (2), Strongly Disagree (1)

7. Which of the following options best describes your opinion about the statement below?

“Most scientists agree that humans are causing climate change”⁹⁵

- Strongly Agree (7), Agree (6), Somewhat Agree (5), Neither Agree nor Disagree (4), Somewhat Disagree (3), Disagree (2), Strongly Disagree (1)⁹⁶

Emotion Manipulation Check Questions

8. “To what extent did you feel angry after completing the writing exercise?”⁹⁷

- Extremely (5), Very (4), Moderately (3), Slightly (2), Not at All (1)

9. “To what extent did you feel fearful after completing the writing exercise?”⁹⁸

- Extremely (5), Very (4), Moderately (3), Slightly (2), Not at All (1)

10. “To what extent did you feel relaxed after completing the writing exercise?”⁹⁹

- Extremely (5), Very (4), Moderately (3), Slightly (2), Not at All (1)

Demographic Questions

11. What is your sex?

- Male (1), Female (2), Transgender (3), Prefer not to respond (.)

12. What do you expect your 2017 family income from all sources before taxes to be?

- Under \$25,000 (1), \$25,000 - \$39,999 (2), \$40,000 - \$49,999 (3), \$50,000 - \$74,999 (4), \$75,000 - \$99,999 (5), \$100,000 - \$124,999 (6), \$125,000 - \$149,999 (7), Over \$150,000 (8)

13. Please select the category that includes your current age:

- 18-24 (1), 25-34 (2), 35-44 (3), 45-54 (4), 55-64 (5), 65 and above (6)

⁹⁴ Based on “Every time we use coal or gas, we contribute to the greenhouse effect. How true is this?” from Albertson and Busby (2015), own scale constructed

⁹⁵ Certainty question from Spence et al. (2012).

⁹⁶ Also from Spence et al. 2012. I used a 7 point instead of a 5 point scale.

⁹⁷ Question from Tsai and Young (2010); scale from Searles and Mattes (2015)

⁹⁸ Tsai and Young (2010); I used a different 7 point scale though

⁹⁹ Based on Tsai and Young (2010); I used a different 7 point scale though

14. Where would you place your own political views on this scale?
- Extremely liberal (1), Liberal (2), Slightly liberal (3), Moderate (4), Slightly conservative (5)
Conservative (6), Extremely Conservative (7), Don't know / Haven't thought about it (.)
15. What is the highest level of education that you have completed?
- Some high school, but did not finish (1), Completed high school (2), Some college, but did not finish (3), Two-year college degree / A.A / A.S. (4), Four-year college degree / B.A. / B.S. (5), Some Masters or professional-level degree work, but did not finish (6), Completed Masters or professional degree (7), Some advanced Graduate or PhD-level work (8), Completed Advanced Graduate work or Ph.D. (9)

Chapter 3 Appendix C: Emotion Manipulation Checks

Table C1: Emotion Manipulation Checks¹⁰⁰

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Feeling Angry</i>					
Anger Prompt	356	2.716	1.166	1	5
Fear Prompt	347	1.666	1.022	1	5
Relax Prompt	358	1.251	0.777	1	5
<i>Feeling Fearful</i>					
Anger Prompt	356	1.559	0.955	1	5
Fear Prompt	347	2.412	1.197	1	5
Relax Prompt	358	1.251	0.758	1	5
<i>Feeling Relaxed</i>					
Anger Prompt	356	2.357	1.153	1	5
Fear Prompt	347	2.375	1.208	1	5
Relax Prompt	358	3.547	1.134	1	5

¹⁰⁰ Statistical analysis shows that the emotion manipulations worked for each of the three emotion inductions. Feelings of anger in anger group (M=2.716, SE=0.075) are higher than either the relaxed (M=1.251, SE=0.053) or fear (M=1.666, SE=0.075) groups. Feeling of fear in fear group (M=2.412, SE=0.074) higher than feeling of fear in either the anger (M=1.559, SE=0.074) or relaxed (M=1.251, SE=0.052) groups. Feeling relaxed in relaxation group (M=3.547, SE=0.062) is higher than relaxed feelings in the angry (M=2.357, SE=0.087) or fear (M=2.375, SE=0.088) groups. All differences are statistically significant at $p < 0.000$.

Chapter 3 Appendix D: Predicted Probabilities

Predicted Probabilities for Risk Perceptions

Figure 3D.1

Risk Perceptions for Control Group




Figure 3D.2

Risk Perceptions for Anger/Moral Group





Figure 3D.3

Risk Perceptions for Fear/Works Group



Predicted Probabilities for Intention to participate in The People's Climate March

Figure 3D.4

March Participation for Fear/Control




Figure 3D.5

March Participation for Relaxed/Moral




Figure 3CD.6

March Participation for Fear/Works




Figure 3D.7

March Participation for Fear/Moral





Figure 3D.8

March Participation for Relaxed/Works



Chapter 4 Appendix: Survey Questions

World Values Survey Wave 6 Dependent Variables

1. During the past two years have you participated in a demonstration for some environmental cause? (WVS V83)
 - Yes (1)
 - No (0)
2. During the past two years have you given money to an ecological organization? (WVS V82)
 - Yes (1)
 - No (0)

World Values Survey Wave 6 Independent Variables

1. Taking all things together, would you say you are...(V10)
 - Very happy (1), rather happy (2), not very happy (3), not at all happy (4)
2. Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means "no choice at all" and 10 means "a great deal of choice" to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out: (V55)
 - No choice at all (1) to a great deal of choice (10)
3. Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organization. For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization? "Environmental organization" (WVS V30)
 - Don't belong (0), Inactive Member (1), Active Member (2)

World Values Survey Wave 6 Individual Level Controls

4. In political matters, people talk of the "left" and the "right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (WVS V95)
 - Left (1), Right (10)
5. Code respondent's sex by observation (WVS 240)
 - Male (1), Female (2)
6. This means you are _____ years old (WVS V242)
 - Under 25 (1), 25-34 (2), 35-44 (3), 45-54 (4), 55-64 (5), 65+ (6)¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ The age measure on the WVS survey included separate categories for each numerical age. I created a 6 category age variable instead, because similar measures are common in social science research.

7. What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [Note: if respondent indicated to be a student, code highest level s/he expects to complete] (WVS V248)
 - No formal education (1); Incomplete primary school (2); Complete primary school (3); Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type (4); Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type (5); Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type (6); Complete secondary: university-preparatory type (7); some university-level education, without degree (8); University-level education, with degree (9)

Country Level Controls

8. Polity IV Score
 - -10 (heredity monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy)
9. GDP/capita, World Bank World Development Indicators, in current US dollars
10. Population, World Bank World Development Indicators

Country Level Environmental Indicators (only used as robustness checks)

11. CO₂ emissions, metric tons per capita (not available for 2014), World Bank World Development Indicators
12. Land area in Square kilometers, World Bank World Development Indicators
13. Percentage Urban, World Bank World Development Indicators

Appendix 4B: Summary Statistics for Models with additional country-level variables for robustness checks

Table 4B.1: Summary Statistics for Environmental Demonstrations Models, with robustness check country-level variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Donations	58,594	0.084	0.277	0	1
Happiness	58,594	1.842	0.756	1	4
Environmental Membership	58,594	0.163	0.463	0	2
Life Control	58,594	7.105	2.171	1	10
Ideology	58,594	5.749	2.299	1	10
Gender	58,594	1.507	0.500	1	2
Age Category	58,594	3.200	1.597	1	6
Education	58,594	5.723	2.369	1	9
GDP/capita	58,594	14,716.980	17,000.900	667.415	67,646.100
Polity	58,594	6.104	5.056	-9	10
Population	58,594	158,000,000	337,000,000	1,116,644	1,260,000,000
CO ₂	58,594	5.981	5.531	0.068138	36.07374
Country Size	58,594	1,595,989	3,023,425	5,130	16,400,000
Percentage Urban	58,594	61.137	20.028	9.092	94.612

Table 4B.2: Summary Statistics for Environmental Donations Models, with robustness check country-level variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Donations	58,781	0.141	0.348	0	1
Happiness	58,781	1.843	0.756	1	4
Environmental Membership	58,781	0.164	0.464	0	2
Life Control	58,781	7.104	2.171	1	10
Ideology	58,781	5.748	2.299	1	10
Gender	58,781	1.506	0.500	1	2
Age Category	58,781	3.200	1.597	1	6
Education	58,781	5.716	2.373	1	9
GDP/capita	58,781	14,673.330	17,019.400	667.415	67,646.100
Polity	58,781	6.112	5.051	-9	10
Population	58,781	162,000,000	342,000,000	1,116,644	1,260,000,000
CO ₂	58,781	5.972	5.538	0.068138	36.07374
Country Size	58,781	1,606,121	3,024,259	5,130	16,400,000
Percentage Urban	58,781	60.991	20.061	9.092	94.612

Appendix 4C: Countries in Analysis

Countries in Environmental Demonstration Model

Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, India, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Zimbabwe

Countries in Environmental Donation Model

Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, India, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Zimbabwe

Countries in Environmental Demonstration Model, with environmental robustness checks

Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Germany, Ghana, India, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Zimbabwe

Countries in Environmental Donation Model, with environmental robustness checks

Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Germany, Ghana, India, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Zimbabwe

Appendix 4D: Robustness Check Models

Table 4D.1: Demonstration Participation and Donations with Robustness Checks
Country-Level Variables

VARIABLES	(3) Demonstration Participation	(4) Donations
Happiness	-0.0945** (0.0465)	-0.190*** (0.0360)
Environmental Membership	0.937*** (0.0500)	0.936*** (0.0798)
Life Control	0.0357** (0.0167)	0.0372* (0.0231)
Ideology	-0.0252* (0.0165)	-0.0310** (0.0179)
Gender	-0.159*** (0.0484)	-0.0352 (0.0420)
Age	-0.0751*** (0.0247)	0.0798*** (0.0234)
Education	0.0882*** (0.0160)	0.113*** (0.0154)
GDP/capita	-1.63e-05** (9.35e-06)	2.60e-05*** (5.12e-06)
Polity Score	0.0445** (0.0238)	0.0215* (0.0167)
Population	6.73e-10*** (2.59e-10)	5.26e-10*** (1.47e-10)
CO ₂	-0.0337 (0.0324)	-0.00795 (0.0132)
Country Size	1.08e-08 (4.14e-08)	-7.94e-08*** (2.47e-08)
Percentage Urban	0.00497 (0.00794)	-0.00789** (0.00345)
Constant	-3.004*** (0.474)	-2.688*** (0.411)
Observations	58,594	58,781
Countries	47	47
Models	Logit	Logit

One-Tailed Tests, Robust standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors clustered by country. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix 4E: Predicted Probabilities Tables

Table 4E.1: Environmental Demonstration Participation Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Happiness

Happiness	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: Very Happy	6.816%	5.672%	7.960%
2: Rather Happy	6.168%	5.096%	7.239%
3: Not Very Happy	5.577%	4.363%	6.791%
4: Not at All Happy	5.040%	3.612%	6.468%

Table 4E.2: Environmental Demonstration Participation Predicted Probabilities, Variations Environmental Membership

Membership	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
0: not a member	5.452%	4.494%	6.409%
1: inactive member	12.749%	10.715%	14.784%
2: active member	27.024%	22.414%	31.633%

Table 4E.3: Environmental Demonstration Participation Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Life Control

Life Control	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: no choice at all	5.053%	3.783%	6.322%
2	5.235%	4.033%	6.437%
3	5.423%	4.282%	6.563%
4	5.617%	4.528%	6.707%
5	5.819%	4.763%	6.874%
6	6.026%	4.983%	7.070%
7	6.241%	5.180%	7.302%
8	6.463%	5.351%	7.575%
9	6.692%	5.494%	7.891%
10: a great deal of choice	6.929%	5.610%	8.249%

Table 4E.4: Environmental Demonstration Participation Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Political Ideology

Independent Variable	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: Left	7.031%	5.542%	8.520%
2	6.862%	5.515%	8.209%
3	6.697%	5.467%	7.928%
4	6.536%	5.393%	7.679%
5	6.379%	5.292%	7.465%
6	6.224%	5.164%	7.285%
7	6.074%	5.010%	7.138%
8	5.927%	4.834%	7.020%
9	5.783%	4.641%	6.925%
10: Right	5.642%	4.437%	6.848%

Table 4E.5: Environmental Donations Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Happiness

Happiness	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: Very Happy	13.606%	11.925%	15.287%
2: Rather Happy	11.538%	10.141%	12.935%
3: Not Very Happy	9.749%	8.308%	11.189%
4: Not at All Happy	8.211%	6.617%	9.805%

Table 4E.6: Environmental Donations Predicted Probabilities, Variations Environmental Membership

Independent Variable	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
0: not a member	10.332%	8.990%	11.674%
1: inactive member	22.797%	20.231%	25.362%
2: active member	43.075%	37.036%	49.114%

Table 4E.7: Environmental Donations Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Life Control

Life Control	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: no choice at all	9.751%	7.078%	12.424%
2	10.068%	7.657%	12.479%
3	10.394%	8.247%	12.542%
4	10.730%	8.837%	12.623%
5	11.075%	9.411%	12.740%
6	11.430%	9.938%	12.922%
7	11.795%	10.380%	13.209%
8	12.170%	10.701%	13.638%
9	12.555%	10.893%	14.216%
10: a great deal of choice	12.950%	10.979%	14.921%

Table 4E.8: Environmental Donations Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Political Ideology

Ideology	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: Left	13.225%	10.594%	15.857%
2	12.921%	10.662%	15.181%
3	12.623%	10.689%	14.558%
4	12.331%	10.660%	14.002%
5	12.045%	10.557%	13.533%
6	11.764%	10.362%	13.167%
7	11.490%	10.071%	12.908%
8	11.220%	9.697%	12.744%
9	10.957%	9.267%	12.646%
10: Right	10.698%	8.804%	12.593%

Appendix 5A: Survey Questions and Codebook

World Values Survey Wave 6 Participation Dependent Variables

Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it (read out and code one answer for each action): ¹⁰²

1. Signing a petition (WVS V85)
 - Haven't done (0)
 - Have done (1)
2. Joining in boycotts (WVS V86)
 - Haven't done (0)
 - Have done (1)
3. Attending peaceful demonstrations (WVS V87)
 - Haven't done (0)
 - Have done (1)
4. Joining strikes (WVS V88)
 - Haven't done (0)
 - Have done (1)

World Values Survey Wave 6 Independent Variables

1. Taking all things together, would you say you are...(V10)
 - Very happy (1), rather happy (2), not very happy (3), not at all happy (4)
2. People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Using this card, would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see yourself?
 - "I see myself as a world citizen" (V212)
 - Strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), agree (3), strongly agree (4)
3. Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means "no choice at all" and 10 means "a great deal of choice" to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out: (V55)

¹⁰² Response options included "have done", "might do", and "would never do." I collapsed these into a "have done" and "haven't done" because I was interested in whether or not an individual had engaged in any form(s) of civil resistance.

- No choice at all (1) to a great deal of choice (10)
4. In political matters, people talk of the “left” and the “right.” How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (WVS V95)
 - Left (1), Right (10)

World Values Survey Wave 6 Individual Level Controls

1. Code respondent’s sex by observation (WVS 240)
 - Male (1), Female (2)
2. This means you are _____ years old (WVS V242)
 - Under 25 (1), 25-34 (2), 35-44 (3), 45-54 (4), 55-64 (5), 65+ (6)¹⁰³
3. What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [Note: if respondent indicated to be a student, code highest level s/he expects to complete] (WVS V248)
 - No formal education (1); Incomplete primary school (2); Complete primary school (3); Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type (4); Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type (5); Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type (6); Complete secondary: university-preparatory type (7); some university-level education, without degree (8); University-level education, with degree (9)

Country Level Controls

1. Polity IV Score
 - -10 (heredity monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy)
2. GDP/capita, World Bank World Development Indicators
 - in current US dollars
3. Population, World Bank World Development Indicators
 - World Bank World Development Indicators
4. UCDP Conflict Intensity¹⁰⁴
 - None (0), Minor: between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year (1), War: 1000 or more battle-related deaths in a given year (2)
5. Large Protest, variable created using Mass Mobilization Data Project¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ The age measure on the WVS survey included separate categories for each numerical age. I created a 6 category age variable instead, because similar measures are common in social science research.

¹⁰⁴ UCDP data accessed at: <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/> and the codebook is available at codebook available at: <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/dyadic/ucdp-dyadic-171.pdf>. "UCDP Dyadic Dataset version 17.1" was downloaded as a CSV. Conflict inclusion classified by location and side A/side A primary.

- 0 to 999 participants (0), 1000 or more participants (1)

¹⁰⁵ I used the Mass Mobilization Data Project (Clark and Regan 2015) to construct variable for the presence of a large protest in a given country-year. Mass Mobilization Data Project available at: <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/MMdata>. I created this variable based on the same threshold of a large scale campaign as Chenoweth and Stephan (2011). Less than 1000 participants is coded as 0 and 1000 and more participants =1. Instead of sustained campaigns, I looked at the presence of a large single event. The Mass Mobilization Data Project did not include data for Australia, Colombia, New Zealand, Trinidad and Tobago, or the United States. I used similar coding procedures as the Mass Mobilization Data Project to obtain data for these countries. A more detailed description of my coding procedures is on file with me.

Appendix 5B: Summary Statistics for Models with additional country-level variables for robustness checks

Table 5B.1: Petitions

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max
Petitions	57,326	0	0	0	1
Happiness	57,326	2	1	1	4
Cosmo ID	57,326	3	1	1	4
Life Control	57,326	7	2	1	10
Ideology	57,326	6	2	1	10
Education	57,326	6	2	1	9
Gender	57,326	2	0	1	2
Age Category	57,326	3	2	1	6
Polity	57,326	6	5	-10	10
Population	57,326	151000000	321000000	1116644	1.26E+09
GDP/capita	57,326	14738	16798	667.4146	67646.1
Conflict Intensity	57,326	0	0	0	2
Large Protest	57,326	1	0	0	1

Table 5B.2: Peaceful Demonstrations

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Peaceful Demonstrations	56,543	0	0	0	1
Happiness	56,543	2	1	1	4
Cosmo ID	56,543	3	1	1	4
Life Control	56,543	7	2	1	10
Ideology	56,543	6	2	1	10
Education	56,543	6	2	1	9
Gender	56,543	2	0	1	2
Age Category	56,543	3	2	1	6
Polity	56,543	6	4	-7	10
Population	56,543	158000000	330000000	1116644	1.26E+09
GDP/capita	56,543	14432	16820	667.4146	67646.1
Conflict Intensity	56,543	0	0	0	2
Large Protest	56,543	1	0	0	1

Table 5B.3: Boycotts

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Boycotts	56,095	0	0	0	1
Happiness	56,095	2	1	1	4
Cosmo ID	56,095	3	1	1	4
Life Control	56,095	7	2	1	10
Ideology	56,095	6	2	1	10
Education	56,095	6	2	1	9
Gender	56,095	2	0	1	2
Age Category	56,095	3	2	1	6
Polity	56,095	6	4	-7	10
Population	56,095	157000000	329000000	1116644	1.26E+09
GDP/capita	56,095	14419	16839	667.4146	67646.1
Conflict Intensity	56,095	0	0	0	2
Large Protest	56,095	1	0	0	1

Table 5B.4: Strikes

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Strikes	56,276	0	0	0	1
Happiness	56,276	2	1	1	4
Cosmo ID	56,276	3	1	1	4
Life Control	56,276	7	2	1	10
Ideology	56,276	6	2	1	10
Education	56,276	6	2	1	9
Gender	56,276	2	0	1	2
Age Category	56,276	3	2	1	6
Polity	56,276	6	4	-7	10
Population	56,276	157000000	329000000	1116644	1.26E+09
GDP/capita	56,276	14394	16806	667.4146	67646.1
Conflict Intensity	56,276	0	0	0	2
Large Protest	56,276	1	0	0	1

Appendix 5C: Countries in Analysis

Countries in Petition Model¹⁰⁶

Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, India, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Yemen, Zimbabwe

Countries in Boycott, Peaceful Demonstration, and Strikes Models

Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, India, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Yemen, Zimbabwe

¹⁰⁶ There are 48 countries in the petition model and 47 in the other three models. Bahrain in the additional country in the protest models.

Appendix 5D Robustness Check Models

Table 5D.1 Logit Regressions for Civil Resistance Participation, with conflict and protest controls¹⁰⁷

VARIABLES	(1) Petitions	(2) Peaceful Demonstrations	(3) Boycotts	(4) Strikes
Happiness	-0.0669* (0.0414)	0.0482* (0.0374)	0.0841** (0.0407)	-0.0342 (0.0587)
Cosmo ID	0.0785*** (0.0298)	0.0698** (0.0397)	0.130*** (0.0423)	0.115* (0.0858)
Life Control	0.0475*** (0.0141)	0.0275** (0.0141)	0.0218* (0.0156)	0.0353*** (0.0113)
Ideology	-0.0492*** (0.0175)	-0.0772*** (0.0226)	-0.0829*** (0.0252)	-0.0825*** (0.0211)
Education	0.156*** (0.0193)	0.135*** (0.0174)	0.148*** (0.0282)	0.0642*** (0.0206)
Gender	-0.0286 (0.0437)	-0.336*** (0.0631)	-0.345*** (0.0912)	-0.503*** (0.0547)
Age Category	0.0825*** (0.0256)	0.0640*** (0.0217)	0.00227 (0.0219)	0.0289 (0.0466)
Polity	0.0761*** (0.0190)	0.0577*** (0.0221)	0.0678** (0.0336)	0.0381 (0.0432)
Population	6.03e-10*** (1.78e-10)	6.49e-10*** (1.90e-10)	1.19e-09*** (2.15e-10)	1.23e-09*** (2.93e-10)
GDP/capita	3.87e-05*** (4.35e-06)	2.86e-06 (5.28e-06)	1.79e-05*** (5.76e-06)	5.28e-06 (4.89e-06)
Conflict Intensity	0.208 (0.166)	-0.137 (0.226)	0.253 (0.204)	-0.671** (0.387)
Large Protest	-0.206 (0.201)	0.117 (0.193)	-0.361* (0.264)	0.113 (0.236)
Constant	-3.911*** (0.305)	-3.034*** (0.292)	-4.143*** (0.403)	-2.561*** (0.377)
Observations	57,326	56,543	56,095	56,276
Countries	48	47	47	47
Models	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit

One-Tailed Tests, Robust standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors clustered by country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

¹⁰⁷ Dependent variables coded as binary, 0=have not done and 1=have done, originally from WVS Wave 6, questions V84-V88.

Appendix 5E Predicted Probabilities

Table 5E.1: Petition Signing Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Happiness

Happiness	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: Very Happy	17.463%	14.284%	20.643%
2: Rather Happy	16.433%	13.957%	18.909%
3: Not Very Happy	15.452%	13.182%	17.722%
4: Not at All Happy	14.519%	11.985%	17.054%

Table 5E.2: Petition Signing Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Cosmopolitanism

Membership	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: Strongly Disagree	14.472%	11.934%	17.010%
2: Disagree	15.473%	13.048%	17.897%
3: Agree	16.529%	13.988%	19.070%
4: Strongly Agree	17.643%	14.712%	20.574%

Table 5E.3: Petition Signing Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Life Control

Life Control	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: no choice at all	12.798%	10.391%	15.205%
2	13.362%	11.033%	15.691%
3	13.947%	11.670%	16.223%
4	14.553%	12.292%	16.815%
5	15.181%	12.888%	17.475%
6	15.831%	13.449%	18.213%
7	16.504%	13.972%	19.036%
8	17.199%	14.454%	19.943%
9	17.917%	14.900%	20.934%
10: a great deal of choice	18.658%	15.312%	22.005%

Table 5E.4: Petition Signing Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Political Ideology

Independent Variable	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: Left	20.007%	16.135%	23.879%
2	19.248%	15.809%	22.688%
3	18.512%	15.430%	21.594%
4	17.798%	14.988%	20.608%
5	17.105%	14.475%	19.735%
6	16.434%	13.891%	18.978%
7	15.785%	13.243%	18.326%
8	15.156%	12.547%	17.765%
9	14.548%	11.820%	17.276%
10: Right	13.961%	11.080%	16.841%

Table 5E.5: Peaceful Demonstrations Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Happiness

Happiness	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: Very Happy	10.411%	8.591%	12.230%
2: Rather Happy	10.908%	9.291%	12.524%
3: Not Very Happy	11.426%	9.748%	13.103%
4: Not at All Happy	11.965%	9.926%	14.003%

Table 5E.6: Peaceful Demonstrations Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Cosmopolitanism

Membership	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: Strongly Disagree	9.547%	7.779%	11.316%
2: Disagree	10.152%	8.603%	11.701%
3: Agree	10.790%	9.171%	12.410%
4: Strongly Agree	11.464%	9.424%	13.503%

Table 5E.7: Peaceful Demonstrations Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Life Control

Life Control	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: no choice at all	9.354%	7.408%	11.301%
2	9.581%	7.745%	11.418%
3	9.814%	8.074%	11.554%
4	10.051%	8.387%	11.715%
5	10.293%	8.678%	11.909%
6	10.541%	8.939%	12.142%
7	10.793%	9.166%	12.421%
8	11.051%	9.354%	12.749%
9	11.315%	9.505%	13.125%
10: a great deal of choice	11.584%	9.619%	13.548%

Table 5E.8: Peaceful Demonstrations Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Political Ideology

Independent Variable	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: Left	14.939%	11.305%	18.573%
2	13.977%	10.961%	16.993%
3	13.067%	10.575%	15.560%
4	12.209%	10.134%	14.283%
5	11.399%	9.624%	13.173%
6	10.636%	9.034%	12.238%
7	9.919%	8.370%	11.467%
8	9.245%	7.658%	10.831%
9	8.612%	6.932%	10.293%
10: Right	8.019%	6.220%	9.818%

Table 5E.9: Boycotts Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Happiness

Happiness	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: Very Happy	4.206%	3.225%	5.187%
2: Rather Happy	4.513%	3.557%	5.470%
3: Not Very Happy	4.842%	3.774%	5.911%
4: Not at All Happy	5.194%	3.866%	6.522%

Table 5E.10: Boycotts Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Cosmopolitanism

Membership	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: Strongly Disagree	3.454%	2.562%	4.346%
2: Disagree	3.914%	3.034%	4.794%
3: Agree	4.432%	3.487%	5.378%
4: Strongly Agree	5.016%	3.880%	6.152%

Table 5E.11: Boycotts Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Life Control

Life Control	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: no choice at all	3.867%	2.736%	4.998%
2	3.958%	2.886%	5.031%
3	4.052%	3.032%	5.073%
4	4.148%	3.169%	5.127%
5	4.246%	3.295%	5.197%
6	4.346%	3.406%	5.286%
7	4.449%	3.499%	5.398%
8	4.554%	3.572%	5.536%
9	4.661%	3.623%	5.699%
10: a great deal of choice	4.770%	3.654%	5.887%

Table 5E.12: Boycotts Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Political Ideology

Independent Variable	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: Left	6.446%	4.588%	8.304%
2	5.969%	4.414%	7.525%
3	5.526%	4.212%	6.839%
4	5.113%	3.982%	6.245%
5	4.730%	3.722%	5.739%
6	4.375%	3.435%	5.314%
7	4.044%	3.131%	4.958%
8	3.738%	2.821%	4.655%
9	3.454%	2.516%	4.393%
10: Right	3.191%	2.224%	4.158%

Table 5E.13: Strikes Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Life Control

Life Control	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: no choice at all	5.649%	3.492%	7.806%
2	5.825%	3.634%	8.016%
3	6.006%	3.775%	8.237%
4	6.193%	3.916%	8.469%
5	6.384%	4.056%	8.713%
6	6.582%	4.194%	8.970%
7	6.785%	4.330%	9.240%
8	6.994%	4.463%	9.525%
9	7.209%	4.594%	9.824%
10: a great deal of choice	7.429%	4.721%	10.138%

Table 5E.14: Strikes Predicted Probabilities, Variations in Political Ideology

Independent Variable	Predicted Probability	5% CI	95% CI
1: Left	9.997%	6.482%	13.513%
2	9.232%	6.030%	12.433%
3	8.519%	5.576%	11.463%
4	7.857%	5.122%	10.591%
5	7.242%	4.675%	9.809%
6	6.672%	4.238%	9.105%
7	6.143%	3.817%	8.470%
8	5.654%	3.415%	7.894%
9	5.202%	3.036%	7.369%
10: Right	4.784%	2.681%	6.887%

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