# THE ADMINISTRATION OF OTTOMAN ALGERIA
# (1517-1830)

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ABSTRACT

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In the early sixteenth century Aruc and Ḫayru'd-Dīn Barbarossa established themselves as successful pirate captains in the western Mediterranean Sea. Aruc, the leader of their enterprises until his death in 1518, became aware of the political vacuum which existed in the Maǧrib and as a result worked to establish a personal kingdom. In 1517, he was invited to Algiers to drive out the Spanish and was killed fighting to maintain his position there. Ḫayru'd-Dīn then assumed control of Algiers and brought that city and all the territory he subsequently conquered into the Ottoman Empire.

Barbarossa was unable to consolidate his position in North Africa and he withdrew to Cicelli because of the opposition of Spain and the rebellious tribes in the area around Algiers. By 1525 Ḫayru'd-Dīn was in a position to return to Algiers and fight successfully against his Spanish adversaries. In a series of military engagements the corsair reduced the Spanish Empire in North Africa to one enclave, Oran, and defeated the Spanish fleet. The Ottoman Sultan, Suleymān I, took notice of these accomplishments and made Barbarossa Ḳaptan Paşa (admiral) of the Turkish fleet. With Ḫayru'd-Dīn as admiral, the Ottoman navy dominated the

Mediterranean Sea.

Following Ḫayru'd-Dīn's death in 1546, control of Algiers passed quickly from the Barbarossa family to the Janissaries stationed in the Paşalik (province). While the province continued to recognize the Turkish Sultan as suzerain, political control remained in the hands of the Janissaries until the French conquest of Algeria in 1830. The fiction of direct Ottoman control was eventually abandoned when in 1710 the Sultan issued a firman (decree) that vested executive authority in a Dey elected by the Turkish soldiers stationed in Algeria.

Despite the dominant role played by the Janissaries in Algeria, their economic dependence on the activities of the Ṭā'ifa ul-Ru'asa (corporation of corsair captains) forced them to share some political power with that body. The Ṭā'ifa ul-Ru'asa was ultimately responsible for the institution of the Deylik in 1671 when the army failed to keep order in the Paşalik.

The country did not suffer greatly from the political changes that occurred throughout this period, since the administration of the state remained in the hands of a bureaucracy which competently carried out the duties of government and maintained law and order. Indeed, though over half of the thirty elected Deys were assassinated, Algeria still functioned as a solvent, effective and generally well-ordered state. Eventually, however, the

Paşalik's preoccupation with piracy and the designs of an Empire-conscious French minister led Ottoman Algeria to the fatal conflict with France and to ultimate extinction.

"The region which later became known as Algeria presents a framework not readily acceptable to the historian of Muslim North Africa. The frontiers which are shown on the map cannot set bounds to his field of study; they only assume any significance with the establishment of the Turkish regency of Algiers in the course of the sixteenth century."

George Marçais, "Algeria," Encyclopaedia of Islam, ed. H. A. R. Gibb et al. (London: Luzac & Company, 1960), I, 366.

# PREFACE

This study of the ruling institutions and the ruling hierarchy of Algiers from 1517-1830 is based on French, English and American travellers' accounts and secondary sources. Although British and American documents were examined, they revealed very little pertinent information. Because of the limitations posed by the nature of these sources, many of the conclusions drawn herein are tentative, pending examination of the Arabic and Turkish archival materials at a later date.

Spelling of Arabic and Turkish names and administrative terms conforms to the system used by H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen in Islamic Society and the West, 2 parts, London: Oxford University Press, 1950, 1957. Because Algiers adopted a lingua franca which combined words from various Romance languages, terms like Mezouard and armadores are spelled in this text as they were found in the sources.

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# CHAPTER I

## ARUC AND ḤAYRU'D-DĪN BRING ALGERIA INTO THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Mytilene, capital of the island of Lesbos, was a bustling harbor which served both as a center for ship building and a refuge for Aegean pirates. Aruc and Ḥayru'd-Dīn Barbarossa[1] served their apprenticeship in this environment during the last quarter of the fifteenth century. There has been some historical controversy over the ethnic origins of the Barbarossas. Contemporary Christian writers maintained that they were Greeks whose ancestors had been converted to Islam when the Ottomans conquered the island. A more plausible version is that Aruc and Ḥayru'd-Dīn's father, Yaḳūb, was a Sipahi (Turkish cavalryman), who served in Mytilene after Lesbos fell to Muḥammad al-fatih.[2]

At the beginning of the sixteenth century the two brothers, under Aruc's leadership were successful pirates in the Aegean Sea where they quickly came into conflict with the Ottoman navy. Thereupon they decided to move their operations

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[1]Aruc and Ḥayru'd-Dīn became known in the west by the surname Barbarossa, given originally to Aruc because of his flaming red beard. Aruc was the older of the two.

[2]This controversy is discussed in Stanley Lane-Poole, The Barbary Corsairs (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1890), p. 31. See also R. Tourneau, "ʿArudj," Encyclopaedia of Islam (London: Luzac, 1960), I, 678.

to the western Mediterranean.[3] After spending some time looking for a secure base, Aruc and Ḫayru'd-Dīn made an agreement in 1504 with ᶜAbd Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan (1494-1526), the Hafsid ruler of Tunis. In return for a fifth of their booty, al-Ḥasan granted the Barbarossas the use of the Halk al-Vad fortress near Tunis harbor, and guaranteed them his protection should they need it.[4]

The Barbarossas realized immediate success in their new surroundings because they were outstanding seamen who put the element of surprise to good use. Their initial voyages were so profitable that Aruc's fleet increased from two to eight ships.[5] This additional strength made the Barbarossas loom as a potential threat to al-Ḥasan's position in Tunis. The Hafsid ruler felt that putting distance between Tunis and his erstwhile allies would remove this threat. In 1510, al-Ḥasan was able to get the Barbarossas out of the Halk al-Vad by making Aruc ka'id (ruler) of the nearby island of Cerba.[6]

When Aruc and Ḫayru'd-Dīn had first come to the central Maǧrib (Maǧrib al-Awsat), they were chiefly concerned with making money as pirates. But gradually they became aware of

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[3]Lane-Poole, p. 32.

[4]Hacci Ḫalīfa, The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks, trans. James Mitchell (London: Oriental Translation Fund, 1831), p. 29. See also Lane-Poole, p. 35, and Tourneau.

[5]Lane-Poole, p. 39.

[6]Tourneau.

the political anarchy which gripped the North African coastal area. It therefore became apparent to them that an enterprising man, capable of gathering the requisite military strength, could carve out a personal kingdom in the Maǧrib. Once he became aware of this political situation, Aruc spent all of his time and energy creating a kingdom for himself, while Ḥayru'd-Dīn took charge of his brother's pirate interests. The elder brother first wanted to gain control of one of the coastal town with a good harbor. This would serve both as a base from which Aruc could expand his political domain and a center for corsair activities.

Barbarossa's first opportunity came when the former Hafsid ruler of Bicāya (Bougie), asked Aruc in 1512 for assistance in retaking his town from the Spanish.[7] The elder Barbarossa agreed in the hope that he would be able to assume complete control of the town once the Spanish had been driven out. After failing in two attempts against Bicāya, Aruc returned to Cerba to reconsider his military position.[8] Once there, the corsair decided to bypass Bicāya temporarily and attack a more vulnerable town. With this in mind, the corsair leader conquered Cicelli (Shershell).[9] Now that he was established on the Maǧribi coast, Aruc worked to gain the strength necessary to drive the Spanish out of Bicāya. He consolidated his position at Cicelli by giving grain to the rebellious

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[7] Ibid.

[8] Lane-Poole, p. 40.

[9] Hacci Ḥalīfa, p. 30.

tribes in the area during a famine.[10] With the support of these tribes, Barbarossa then marched a third time against Bicāya and succeeded in taking the town. Now that he was firmly established in two Maǧribi towns, Barbarossa felt secure enough to break completely with the Hafsids in Tunis.

The great success of the Barbarossas attracted to their cause lesser known pirate captains (Ru'asa, sing. Re'is), including Kurd Oǧli and Mussalih al-Dīn Re'is, who flocked with their ships to join the brothers.[11] Aruc and Hayru'd-Dīn, at the head of a twenty-eight ship fleet and with secure bases at Bicāya and Cicelli, were now in a position to challenge Spanish power further to the west at Algiers and Tlemsen.

At the beginning of the fifteenth century, Algiers was within the dominion of the ruler of Tlemsen but had after many years transferred its allegiance to the King of Cicelli, a city closer and better equipped to assist Algiers if the need arose. At this time, the people of Algiers began to sail the Mediterranean Sea as pirates, attacking the southern coast of Spain as well as most western Mediterranean islands.[12] This activity was intensified after 1492, when many Moriscos (Spanish Muslims) settled in Algiers to escape the religious persecution of the Christian ruler. They soon engaged in

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[10]Tourneau.

[11]Hacci Halīfa, p. 31.

[12]Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes (20 vols; Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1905), VI, 116.

piratical activities, and burning for revenge against the Spanish, they connived with the Moriscos still remaining in Spain to plunder the villages on the Andalusian coast.[13]

The combined efforts of the Algerian pirates and the resourceful Moriscos threatened Spain's position in the Mediterranean world. To check the activities of these Algerian pests, King Ferdinand sent a joint land and naval force to construct a fortress in the harbor opposite the city, the Penon d'Alger. From this position, the Spanish could now control all sea traffic moving in and out of the city and thereby undermine Algiers' economic existence. Consequently, the inhabitants had no alternative but to submit to Spanish control. "The unfortunate Algerines were . . . obliged to submit to them [the Spanish] and pay tribute . . ."[14]

King Ferdinand's death in 1516 cast the administration of Spain's North African dominions into a temporary state of confusion. Sālim al-Tūmī, ṣeyḥ of Algiers, immediately took the initiative and sent a letter to Aruc Barbarossa at Cicelli in which he asked the corsair for assistance against Spain.[15] The opportunity the elder Barbarossa had long awaited now arrived. If he could establish himself at Algiers he would be in an excellent position to carve out a sizeable kingdom. Leaving Ḥayru'd-Dīn in charge of Cicelli,

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[13]Roger B. Merriman, Suleiman the Magnificent (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944), pp. 206-7.

[14]Hacci Ḥalīfa.

[15]Lane-Poole, p. 46; Tourneau; Hacci Ḥalīfa.

Aruc marched to Algiers and quickly occupied the city. Once there, Barbarossa used his army to seize the government of Algiers from the ruling tribesmen. The quarrelsome Beduin were too weak and disorganized to resist so Aruc quickly staged a coup d'état and murdered al-Tūmī. He then let it be known that he had no intention of compromising his position in the city by risking an attack on the Penon d'Alger. The fortress was too small to threaten Algiers militarily, despite its continuous bombardment of Algerian shipping. But the Penon was strong enough to resist any army Aruc had at his disposal. If he had attacked in 1517, the corsair would had sapped his small army's strength and it would have been unable to defend Algiers successfully against the force the Spanish had sent from Tlemsen to drive Barbarossa out of the city.[16]

With the Spanish threat temporarily removed Aruc turned to the problems of organizing his enlarged kingdom. When Barbarossa had assumed control of Algiers, the number of problems involved in the consolidation of his position in North Africa had increased. The only possible threat to his occupation of Bicāya and Cicelli came from the recalcitrant Arab and Berber tribes who generally opposed all forms of government. These had been easily subdued. At Algiers, on the other hand, in addition to dealing with the rebellious tribes in the immediate area, Aruc was confronted by the

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[16]Tourneau.

forces of the Spanish. They were well entrenched in western Maġrib al-Awsat. Aside from their strategic position in the Penon d'Alger, they ruled Tlemsen and Oran. If Aruc Barbarossa wanted to maintain his kingdom he would have to terminate effective Spanish power in North Africa. But before Aruc attempted to deal with the Spanish, he subordinated the Thelebis, the tribe which dominated the area surrounding Algiers.[17]

Having accomplished this, Barbarossa gradually spread his influence along the coast by adding Meliana and Tinnis to his kingdom. With most of the central Maġribi coast now under his rule, Aruc sent for Hayru'd-Dīn who had remained at Cicelli with a reserve force. The elder brother then divided his kingdom. He gave Hayru'd-Dīn the area east of Algiers with its center at Dellys, and kept the western half, including Algiers, for himself.[18]

Aruc now felt that his position in North Africa was secure enough to risk a frontal attack on Spain's Maġribi possessions. This took the form of an attack on Tlemsen, whose ruler, Abu Zaiyan,[19] paid tribute to Spain. Tlemsen and its port Oran, the latter under direct Spanish control, were historically the launching points for Spanish penetration

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[17]J. Leo Africanus, The History and Description of Africa, trans. John Pory, ed. Robert Brown (3 vols.; London: Printed for the Hakluyt Society, 1896), I, 149-50.

[18]Tourneau.

[19]Leo Africanus, II, 660.

into the Maǧrib. They were, in addition, the supply centers for the Penon d'Alger. Barbarossa marched with the backing of the local Arab and Berber tribes and succeeded in taking Tlemsen in 1518. Later the same year, Aruc was defeated by the troops sent against him by the Marquis of Comares, Governor of Oran. In an abortive attempt to reach Algiers, Barbarossa was captured and killed by a pursuing Spanish force.[20]

Aruc failed because he over-extended himself before thoroughly consolidating his position at Algiers by removing the Spanish from the Penon d'Alger and completely subordinating the tribes of the interior to his rule. He also lacked the military strength to attack Spain's most formidable African enclave successfully.[21] Despite his defeat under the walls of Tlemsen, the corsair nevertheless made some contributions to the ultimate unification of Maǧrib al-Awsat under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. By welding together the Morisco and Turkish corsairs he created a naval force that eventually identified with the Empire and significantly influenced Algerian history for three centuries. Aruc also succeeded in subordinating several towns to one government when they had formerly been in the hands of feuding, disunited Beduins. Despite his failures, Barbarossa's accomplishments gave his successor, Hayru'd-Dīn, a foundation on which he

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[20]Tourneau.

[21]Ibid.

built a united and well organized state.

Hayru'd-Dīn had played only a subordinate role in his brother's political maneuvers, largely confining his activities to leading pirate raids against the southern coast of Europe. He had observed the obstacles encountered by his brother in his attempt to establish a personal state in North Africa. Aruc's difficulties made Hayru'd-Dīn realize that he needed outside support to keep Algiers under his control. As a result, he decided that it would be to his best advantage to ally with the Ottoman Empire. It is the opinion of Hacci Halīfa that Hayru'd-Dīn contacted the Ottoman Sultan in 1517, when he was at Cicelli. "About this time Sultan Selim having conquered Egypt, Kurd Oghli went to meet him with magnificent presents . . ."[22] Other accounts relate only that Barbarossa sent emissaries to pay homage to the Porte after Aruc's death when he realized that outside help would be necessary if he were to remain at Algiers.[23]

Algiers became a tributary of the Ottoman Empire in 1518, and until 1830 the Ottoman Sultan's name was given in the Hutba (bidding prayer), and all Algerian coins were struck in his name. Barbarossa was named beylerbeyi (governor) of

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[22]Hacci Halīfa, p. 32. This version has only been accepted by Elizabeth Stone /Sutherland Menzies/, Turkey Old and New (2 vols; London: 1880), I, 205.

[23]H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West (2 parts; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950, 1957), I, 92. See also Merriman, p. 208; and Lane-Poole, p. 54. Another version is that Selim I asked Aruc and Hayru'd-Dīn to drive the Spanish out of Algiers. Robert L. Playfair, The Scourge of Christendom (London: Smith, Elder, 1884), p. 3.

the province (Beylerbeyilik or Paşalik)[24] in return for bringing Algiers into the Empire. Along with this he received a force of two thousand Janissaries (Ottoman infantry) to help him govern.[25] The Sultan gave Hayru'd-Dīn two additional privileges. First, he was permitted to recruit four thousand Turkish volunteers who would be in his personal service; secondly, he was allowed to maintain military recruiting agents at Istanbul and Izmir who would send replacements for deceased Janissaries.[26]

The Ottomans recognized the advantage of acquiring a province in North Africa. Egypt would be partially protected on its western flank. But even more important to Turkish strategy was Hayru'd-Dīn Barbarossa who himself possessed great naval power and was master of the western Mediterranean.[27] He was probably the most capable sea captain of his era and was supported by many of the most able seamen of the period. Selim I had built a large navy, but it lacked the necessary leadership to fight effectively against the combined navies of Charles V allied with some Italian states, or to compete

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[24]Algiers was ruled by a beylerbeyi from 1518 to 1587, and from 1587 to 1830 by a Paşa. For uniformity the term Paşalik is used throughout.

[25]Merriman. Plantet agrees that two thousand troops were sent, but claims that this occurred during the reign of Suleyman. E. Plantet, Les Correspondance des Deys D'Alger avec la cour de France (2 vols.; Paris: Felix Alcan, 1889), I, xv.

[26]Plantet, p. xvi; Merriman.

[27]Lane-Poole, p. 56. This view has been accepted by most writers on the subject.

with Venice in the Aegean Sea. Barbarossa's position in the western Mediterranean, his personal abilities, and the excellent qualities of his subordinates, made his navy a welcome addition to Ottoman sea power.

Before Ḫayru'd-Dīn could take an active role in the Ottoman navy, he had first to deal with the pressing problems confronting him in North Africa. Many of the areas that had succumbed to Aruc now rose in revolt, while Spain, refusing to be reconciled to the establishment of an alien state in the Maǧrib, encouraged the Beg (ruler) of Tlemsen to attack Khayr al-Din. Barbarossa crushed the Beg when the latter led a combined force of Moors and Spaniards against Algiers. The corsair immediately took advantage of this situation by organizing an expedition against Spanish-controlled Tlemsen. One of the corsair's prisoners, Ḥasan, the Ser Asker (military leader) of Tlemsen, agreed to attempt the seizure of that city to add to Barbarossa's kingdom in return for a share of the spoils of battle. Ḫayru'd-Dīn agreed, sending Ḥasan with loyal Turkish troops to attack Tlemsen and drive out its pro-Spanish leaders. When the Ser Asker arrived at the town he discovered that the city had already revolted against the Spanish and driven them out of the city.[28] Shortly thereafter, Ḫayru'd-Dīn added Tlemsen to his kingdom.

Tlemsen was far from Algiers, however. Ḫayru'd-Dīn's success there had little effect on his position in the Maǧrib.

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[28]Hacci Ḫalīfa, p. 34.

In fact, the towns of Cicelli and Tinnis had taken advantage of Barbarossa's preoccupation with Tlemsen to rebel against the central authority, while Ibn al-Kādi, ruler of Kūko, had deserted him. These events made the corsair's position extremely critical. With most of his kingdom in a state of rebellion and the Spanish in control of Algiers' harbor, Hayru'd-Dīn felt that it was unsafe for him to remain in the city.

As a result, Barbarossa went to Cicelli in 1520, regained political control over the rebels, and used the port as a base from which to continue his pirate activities.[29] At the same time he worked to regain the rest of his kingdom by carefully consolidating his position, gradually building up his military strength and taking the coastal towns of Kol, Bona and Konstantine.[30] During the five years Hayru'd-Dīn spent at Cicelli, he worked fro the time when he could establish himself permanently at Algiers. He neutralized the position of the King of Kuko by allying with the Kabyl Chief, ᶜAbd ul-ᶜAziz, Ibn Kādi's chief rival. This alliance allowed the corsair to re-enter Algiers in 1525.

The beylerbeyi then took immediate steps to increase the size of his army. He used the recruiting powers granted him by the Porte in 1518 and enlisted a personal bodyguard

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[29]George Yver, "Khair al-Din (Barbarossa)," Encyclopaedia of Islam, ed. M. Th. Houtsma, et al. (4 vols.; (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1913-36), II, 871.

[30]Lane-Poole, p. 55.

of five hundred Spanish renegades and an army of seven to eight thousand Greeks, Albanians, and Kabyles whom he separated from the regular Janissary force by placing the new recruits under the command of the Ru'asa.[31]

Hayru'd-Dīn now completed the consolidation of his position in the city of Algiers by successfully storming and taking the Penon d'Alger in 1529. This had been an essential move for the beylerbeyi, for the fortress had controlled the harbor and neutralized Barbarossa's position in Algiers.[32] This was naturally a serious blow to the Spanish Empire, for it meant that Oran was Spain's only remaining possession in Maġrib al-Awsat. An even more crushing blow to Spanish prestige came in October of 1529 when Caccia Diabolo Re'is defeated the Spanish navy off the island of Formentera.[33] Both the Mediterranean world and the local population were awed by these two significant victories and Hayru'd-Dīn's position became greatly strengthened. "The Arabs now attached themselves to him . . ."[34] and ". . . all Mohammedan pirates in the western Mediterranean, most of them European renegades, flocked to serve under his orders . . ."[35]

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[31]Yver, 872.

[32]Roger B. Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire in the Old World and the New (4 vols; New York: The MacMillan Co., 1936), III, 295.

[33]Merriman, Suleiman the Magnificent, p. 209.

[34]Hacci Halīfa, p. 39.

[35]Merriman, Suleiman the Magnificent.

Most of the towns in Maġrib al-Awsat recognized Ḫayru'd-Dīn as their ruler and paid a yearly tax to their sovereign. Cicelli paid three thousand ducats per year in tribute.[36] Even Tlemsen, where Abdullah, its ruler had responded to Spanish pressure to reject Ottoman suzerainty by having his name read in the Ḫuṭba, was finally subdued and forced to pay an indemnity of twenty thousand ducats plus a yearly tribute of ten thousand.[37] Barbarossa also succeeded in subordinating the tribes of the interior to the government in Algiers. They were organized into federations loosely tied to the central administration. By this device, Ḫayru'd-Dīn succeeded in ending the factional strife which formerly dominated the area outside the city.[38]

It had taken the beylerbeyi twelve years, but he had systematically secured his position at Algiers. At the same time he had increased his navy with which he had both fought against the Porte's enemies and continued his piratical activities. Barbarossa's demonstration of astute political leadership in the subjugation of the central Maġrib and his success as a pirate made a deep impression on Istanbul. The Turkish navy was ineffective when it sailed out of the Aegean, and the Sultan recognized that the Ottoman navy could become a formidable power only if directly joined with Ḫayru'd-Dīn's

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[36]Leo Africanus, 679.

[37]Hacci Ḫalīfa.

[38]Yver.

fleet. Indeed, Suleymān clearly saw the advantages of combination. He knew that Barbarossa could teach the Empire's navigators and shipbuilders much they should know. As a result, Grand Vizir Ibrahīm strenuously urged closer relations between the Turkish naval forces in the eastern and western Mediterranean.[39]

In 1533, an imperial messenger arrived at Algiers bearing Suleymān's command for Ḫayru'd-Dīn to present himself before the Porte in Istanbul. The beylerbeyi responded slowly, for he feared that if he appeared eager, it would cheapen his worth in the Sultan's eyes. Finally in August, 1533, after naming Ḥasan Ağa (Kahya Ağa of Barbarossa's troops) his viceroy (Ḫalīfa),[40] Barbarossa sailed for the capital.[41] He was well received by both the Sultan and the Grand Vizir and the latter proclaimed Ḫayru'd-Dīn Ḳaptan Paşa (admiral) of the Ottoman navy. Instead of being granted the Sancaḳ of Gallipoli as was customary for holders of this office, Barbarossa obtained a far more important assignment. The nineteenth Vilāyet of the Empire was placed under his control as well as thirteen Sancaḳs. He also received an annual income of 885,000 akçes. In recognition of Barbarossa's outstanding abilities as a statesman and a sea captain, he was also made a member of the Imperial Divan with a position

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[39]Lane-Poole, pp. 74-75.

[40]Yver.

[41]Lane-Poole, p. 81.

equal to the Ser Asker, a rank just below the Grand Vizir and the Şeyhu'l-Islam (head of the Ottoman religious institution).[42]

Ottoman history from the fall of 1533, until Hayru'd-Dīn's death in 1546 is full of accounts of Suleymān's land campaigns and the Ḳaptan Paşa's exploits at sea. During this period the admiral returned to Algiers only for logistical purposes. The city's government had in fact passed into the hands of Ḥasan Aǧa, although Barbarossa maintained the title beylerbeyi until his death when he was succeeded by his son Ḥasan.

Hayru'd-Dīn Barbarossa was of great importance to the Ottoman Empire. From 1533 to 1546, the Turkish fleet under his command controlled the Mediterranean Sea. This was recognized in 1538 when the Ḳaptan Paşa defeated the renowned Genoese Admiral, Andrea Doria, and the Spanish fleet at Prevesa off the Albanian coast. Even after Hayru'd-Dīn's death, the corsair tradition continued in the Ottoman fleet. His lieutenants, Kurd Oğli, Torğud, Ochialy, Sinan Paşa, and Salah Re'is, all former pirates, made the Sultan's navy the most efficiently led in the Mediterranean world. This Ottoman mastery of the Mediterranean lasted until 1571, when the Ottoman fleet, under Ḳaptan Paşa Ochialy, was defeated at Lepanto.

Barbarossa's great ability, however, led indirectly

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[42]Gibb and Bowen, 94-95.

to the decline of the Turkish navy. When he was named Ḳaptan Paşa, he was also given the rank of Vizir because of his ability as a political leader. After Ḫayru'd-Dīn's death, the Porte continued to combine the Divan position with the office of Ḳaptan Paşa. Because of the structure of the Ottoman ruling institution, one of the Ḳapi Ḳul (slaves trained for administrative positions in the palace school), was usually made Ḳaptan Paşa, although there were few Ḳapi Ḳulus with naval experience.[43] As a result able naval leaders were ignored by the Porte. This development, the loss of thousands of trained sailors at Lepanto, and the gradual decline in the quality of the corsair Ru'asa, led to the eventual collapse of Ottoman sea power.

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[43] Ibid., pp. 95-96.

## CHAPTER II

## THE EVOLUTION OF ALGERIAN-OTTOMAN RELATIONS

The Janissary Corps emerged as the political power in Algiers as early as 1556, however, it was not until 1689 that the Ocak (military contingent in Algiers) was firmly established as the ruling hierarchy.[1] Throughout the Ottoman period in Algerian history, military influence in the government changed frequently, and each of these changes lessened the tie between Algiers and the Porte. Despite the degree of local autonomy achieved by the Paşalik there was no significant change in the structure of the province's local government. Whether Paşa, Ağa or Dey ruled, the administrative organization remained unaltered. The only significant political change was in the amount of influence exerted on the government by the Turkish soldiers.

In the seventeenth century, Ottoman rule broke down throughout the Middle East. After the Battle of Lepanto, 1571, the Osmanlis lost the ability to regulate their peripheral provinces. In Egypt, Mamluke Emirs assumed control of the political administration, and more significantly took possession of the Mukata'at (a form of land holding). They were able to use the land taxes derived from these estates

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[1]The Janissaries and the Tā'ifa ul-Ru'asa will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three.

for personal enrichment much as the Janissaries and Ru'asa in Algiers used the revenues of that province.[2] During the middle of the same century in Tunis, hereditary Beys, elected by the Janissaries, usurped Ottoman power.[3] What occurred in Egypt and Tunis reflected earlier events in Algiers. In all three Paşaliks, the absence of strong Ottoman government gave rise to power struggles among indigenous groups that rejected Istanbul's authority. Although the provinces copied Turkish administrative institutions, they developed them independently, adapting local government to meet local needs. A military government evolved in Algiers because there was no other group, internal or external, capable of assuming control of the province.

The evidence does not indicate that the Ottoman Empire limited the growing political power of the Janissaries in Algiers, and it is unlikely that the Sultan was ever capable of enforcing his will in the distant Paşalik. The Algerians, however, never completely severed their connections with the Ottoman Empire. Through an evolutionary process, the province became completely independent of the Porte's political influence while copying Ottoman institutions and identifying with the Empire. This was only natural. First, the ruling

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[2]Stanford J. Shaw, The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 1-12.

[3]Thomas MacGill, An Account of Tunis, Its Government Etc. (Glasgow: J. Hedderwick, 1811), pp. 1-5.

hierarchy in Algiers was composed of Turkish soldiers; second, the Algerians were Muslims and recognized the Turkish Sultan-Caliph; and third, there were many diplomatic advantages to be gained from claiming allegiance to the Sultan. Because of these ties Algeria remained nominally an Ottoman province from 1518 until the French conquest of 1830. Yet the constitutional relationship between the Empire and province changed frequently during the Ottoman period. To understand Algerian government during this period it is important to examine these changes.

Suleymān and his Grand Vizir Ibrahīm did not attempt to establish close ties between Algiers and Istanbul. The Sultan recognized that this distant province could not be directly controlled. In fact, the ties between the Ottoman Empire and Algiers were so loose that the Porte gave Hayru'd-Dīn and his successors direct control over all regions they could conquer and govern.[4] This arrangement was similar to the ones established with the Hanate of the Crimea and the Şerifate of Mecca.

The Algerians were never seriously obligated to the Porte. The tribute, set at 500,000 dollars every three years, was to be paid only in times of "prosperity." At first, Algiers paid the money knowing that naval stores, a ship, and general military supplies would be received in return. This

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[4]Merriman, Suleiman the Magnificent, p. 230.

[5]Gibb and Bowen, p. 25.

irregular payment of tribute also allowed the Paşalik to maintain its recruiting agents in Anatolia.[6] Even this financial arrangement did not long continue. Indeed, money was only sent to Istanbul when the Ocaḳ wanted to obtain a favor.[7]

This loose relationship was convenient for the Turks during Suleymān's reign. Barbarossa and the Ru'asa who succeeded him as leaders of the Ottoman fleet netted great financial advantage as long as they were in the Turkish navy. Their first loyalty, therefore, was to the Empire and not to the city in which most of them first began as pirates. The Algerians, on the other hand, respected these captains, since the city was a center for pirates, and most of these captains had spent their early careers sailing out of Algiers. The corsairs' success with the Turkish fleet brought both wealth and prestige to Algiers. This led to the development of a chain of command in which the Ru'asa were a middle link between Istanbul and Algiers. The Maġribi city felt some loyalty to these corsair captains who in turn served the Sultan. During the few periods when Algiers responded to the Porte's wishes, it was because these requests were made by a prominent corsair. The best example of the role of the Ru'asa in the Ottoman administration of Algeria in the

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[6]William Shaler, Sketches of Algiers (Boston: Cummings, Hilliard and Company, 1826), p. 18.

[7]Filippo Pananti, Narrative of a Residence in Algiers, trans. Edward Blaquiere (London: Printed for Henry Colburn, 1818), p. 107.

sixteenth century occurred in 1582. In that year Ḳaptan Paşa Ochialy controlled Ottoman affairs in North Africa. He directed the activities of the Maġribi corsairs who acted independently of the Turkish navy and had great influence in the selection of the beylerbeyis sent to govern Algiers. Any political tie between Algiers and Istanbul in this period was due solely to Ochialy's position in the Ottoman government.[8]

Several prominent corsairs served in a dual capacity as admirals or captains in the Ottoman fleet and as either beylerbeyi or some other political position in Algiers.[9] But even the power and prestige of the Re'is beylerbeyis was insufficient to tighten the bond between Algiers and Istanbul. An Italian observer commented as follows on the 1550's:

> . . . when, upon any occasion they [beylerbeyis] became too intolerable at Algiers, the janizaries sent deputations to Constantinople, for the double purpose of complaint and solicitation to have another appointed in their place.[10]

Then, soon after the crushing defeat at Lepanto, the Turks lost both their naval supremacy in the Mediterranean and the force which tied Algeria to the Empire. The great distance between Algiers and Istanbul could no longer be overcome.[11] Without their powerful navy the Ottomans could

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[8]Great Britain, Public Records Office, Calendar of State Papers, Reign of Elizabeth, 1553 and Addenda, p. 645. See also: CSP, Reign of Elizabeth 1583-84, pp. 40, 108.

[9]J. Kramers, "Ochialy," Encyclopaedia of Islam, ed. M. Th. Houtsma et al. (4 vols; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1913-1936), III, 970.

[10]Pananti, p. 107.

[11]Merriman, Suleiman the Magnificent.

not exercise any authority over their Maǧribi Paşalik. The history of the Regency from the 1571 battle until 1830 was partially concerned with the working out of a constitutional relationship between Istanbul and Algiers that matched the actual political position of the Paşalik in the Ottoman Empire. Algiers' legal status went through two centuries of evolution before it corresponded to the political realities that should have been apparent to the Porte after 1571. These various changes fit into distinct periods of Algerian history.

Between 1518 and 1587, a beylerbeyi appointed by the Porte ruled all Ottoman territory in the Maǧrib. The Turkish Empire in North Africa was significantly enlarged during this period. In 1551, Sinan Paşa captured Tripoli from the Knights of Malta,[12] and in 1555, Salih Re'is took Bicāya from the Spanish.[13] Finally, in 1573, Sinan further diminished the Spanish Empire in the Maǧrib when he defeated the Spanish puppet in Tunis and added that city to the Ottoman Empire. Simultaneously, the corsair-led Turkish navy demonstrated its strength when it defeated a Christian navy composed of ships from most Southern European states in a battle off the island of Cerba in 1561. The Turkish navy's influence in North African politics was then demonstrated when the Porte made

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[12]F. Lopez de Gomara, Annals of the Emperor Charles V, trans. Roger B. Merriman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912), p. 145.

[13]Leo Africanus, II, 745.

Torğud Paşa of Tripoli and Sinan Paşa of Tunis. Both Paşas were theoretically subordinate to the beylerbeyi in Algiers, and both adopted the administrative system used in that city. All three Mağribi cities were governed by a Divan composed of leading civil, religious and military officials, which served in an advisory capacity to the executive appointed by the Porte.[14]

Within Mağrib al-Awsat, the beylerbeyis concerned themselves with expanding the province's boundaries and maintaining order among the tribes. The size of the Paşalik increased after a series of wars with the Şarifian dynasty of Fez.[15] At the same time Algiers conducted campaigns against the tribes in the interior. During the 1560s, Ottoman Algeria reached its maximum size.[16]

The military frequently rejected these beylerbeyis, although some of the governors, notably the corsairs already mentioned, were able to rule in peace. The Paşalik had however, achieved enough independence by the end of Suleymān's reign to negotiate its own treaties.[17]

In 1583, the English complained that Algiers refused to heed the Porte's command that the city cease its attacks

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[14]Alexander M. Broadley, The Last Punic War: Tunis Past and Present (2 vols; London: Blackwood and Sons, 1822), I, 48.

[15]Lane-Poole, p. 185; Kramers, III, 970.

[16]Playfair, p. 26.

[17]Emil Lengyel, Turkey (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 265.

on English shipping.[18] The Porte, without its powerful navy, was incapable of controlling the pirate activities of the province. This was because Algéria and her rulers grew wealthy from the spoils. The Paşalik disregarded the Sultan's frequent commands to stop the raids conducted against the Ottoman Empire's European allies. By 1586, the beylerbeyis were unable to put the Sultan's commands into effect and their authority was so negligible that Laurence Aldersey observed from Algiers that, ". . . the King [beylerbeyi], doth onely beare the name of a King, but the greatest government is in the hands of the soldiers."[19]

The Porte attempted to reassert some measure of authority when it replaced the beylerbeyi at Algiers with a Paşa in 1587. This Paşa was equal in rank to his counterparts who already sat at Tunis and Tripoli and was chosen for a three year term from the ranks of the trained administrators in Istanbul.[20] The Porte believed these trained Paşas would be better equipped to rule Algeria than the beylerbeyi who were frequently renegade corsairs. The Ottoman Empire failed in this attempt to deal with the independent ideas and actions of the rebellious Janissaries.

The Sultan had made an unfortunate change, for although Paşas were intended to be chosen from trained Kapi Kul the

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[18]Playfair.

[19]Hakluyt, III, 358.

[20]Colombe, I, 368.

Paşalik immediately became caught up in the corrupt practices of the Ottoman Empire, and the office of Paşa often went instead to the highest bidder.[21] These wealthy governors were as ineffective as their predecessors, for the Janissaries who dominated the political situation in Algiers could exert pressure on the Porte to remove an unpopular Paşa from office. "Once the complaints of the soldiery were listened to, the future chiefs named by the Porte were little more than ambassadors."[22] In sum, when the Porte replaced the beyler-beyis, the era of corsair rule ended, but although authority had nominally passed into the hands of the Turkish Paşa, it actually belonged to the Algerian Janissaries.

The growth of the Janissaries' power continued to compromise the position of the Paşa until the office was finally combined with that of the Dey in 1710. But before it officially recognized the political status of the Janissaries, the Porte took the Paşalik through several steps. Meanwhile, the Janissaries limited the Paşa's powers to such an extent that the governors contented themselves with getting rich on their share of the corsair's booty. They became so obsessed with wealth that they seldom took the time to try and punish the Janissaries for ignoring the Porte's commands.[23]

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[21]Lane-Poole.

[22]Pananti.

[23]Jean Blottiere, L'Algerie (Paris: Societe d'Editions Geographique, Maritime et Coloniales, 1948), p. 23.

In 1618, the Porte allowed the Janissaries in Algiers to nominate their own Paşa. By this act, the Algerians then gained almost complete independence even though the Sultan reserved the right to confirm the Ocak's choice.[24] And by the beginning of Murad III's reign in 1623, the three barbary states were overtly rejecting the Sultan's firmans, for the Maǧribis had no intention of heeding the Sultan's wishes in any matter that was not in their interest.[25]

Algeria's attitude towards Anglo-Turkish amity reflected the Sultan's lack of power in the Paşalik. Sir Thomas Roe, England's ambassador at Istanbul, wrote in 1624: "The Pirates of Algiers and Tunis have cast off all obedience to his [the Sultan's] empire not only upon the sea where they are master, but presuming to do many insolences even upon the land . . ."[26] Roe convinced the Sultan to recall the Paşa from Algiers in 1622 when the province defied the Porte's command to stop raids on English vessels. This had no effect on the corsairs, whose activities neither England nor the Ottoman Empire were able to restrain.[27]

England also became concerned over the safety of her Consuls at Algiers, and wanted the capitulations negotiated

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[24]Playfair, p. 7.

[25]Stanley Lane-Poole, The Story of Turkey (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1888), p. 217.

[26]Thomas Roe, Letters, pp. 241-43. From: A. C. Wood, The History of the Levant Company (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 16n.

[27]George J. Eversley, The Turkish Empire 1288-1914 (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1923), p. 158.

with the Porte enforced in the Maǧrib. The Algerians refused to heed the Sultan's treaty commitments, and a judicial arrangement had to be directly negotiated between London and Algiers in 1623.

Algerian administration under the Paşas was highly incompetent. The Paşas, unable to maintain order in the province, and incapable of subordinating the Janissaries to Ottoman control, exercised little authority. In fact, during this period the Ocaḳ increased its political power. The administrative situation, however, deteriorated because of the conflict between military and executive. This created a crisis in 1659 because the government was not effectively dealing with the tribal conflicts in the interior. The army took this opportunity to further its political position when one of the Boluk Başis (captains) led a revolt against the Paşa in 1659. The army replaced the Paşa as head of state with the Aǧa (general) who became the executive in Algiers and presided over the Divan of army officers. The Paşas nevertheless continued to come from Istanbul, although they could exercise no political power when they arrived.

During the next twelve years (1659-1671), five Aǧas ruled successively. None succeeded in solving the crisis that had led to their appointment, and because of this failure the Janissaries murdered each of them. Anarchy gripped the interior, but the recalcitrant Janissaries were unwilling to give up their independence for the sake of administrative harmony. Finally in 1671, the Ṭā'ifa ul-Ru'asa,

(corporation of corsair captains) tired of the disorder, brought about the most durable change in the ruling institution. This guild, acting on behalf of the corsairs, brought about the adoption of a system of government based on the one that existed in Tunis. A Divan dominated by army officers for life a Dey who had absolute power during his reign.[28] Unable to control the Algerians and convinced by the army that the change could financially benefit Istanbul, the Porte concurred with the change and therefore issued a firman giving legal sanction to the elections.[29]

At the time of the Dey's assumption of power all army officers were in the Divan, but this proved to be too unwieldy. To strengthen their position, the Deys changed its membership; for most of the Deylik period (1671-1830) the Divan included the thirty principal Janissary officers plus the Mufti, the Ḳaḍi, and the Grand-Marābiṭ (ascetic or monk who headed a derwiş order). The first few Deys consulted the Divan on all important matters. As time passed, however, the executive began to assume more and more power with the Dey and his Council of Ministers eventually operating the government alone. The only limitation on the power of the Deys was the threat of assassination by the army,[30] and, in fact, over half of the thirty Deys died because they defied

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[28]Plantet, p. xxiii.

[29]Eugene Hatin, Histoire Pittoresque de L'Algerie (Paris: Au Bureau Central de la Publication, 1840), p. 80.

[30]Ibid., p. 81.

the Ocak's wishes.

During the first forty years of the Dey's rule, the Paşas attempted to obtain political power, and reassert the authority of the Ottoman Empire. To this end, they tried to meddle in affairs of state and frequently plotted against the Deys. This was an easy task, for the army was always ready to rebel and the Paşas made use of this situation.[31]

> . . . though the Janissaries were permitted to choose their own governor or Dey, who was invested with supreme power, yet the Sultan continued to send his Pasha, an officer who was supposed to be his representative, and to be engaged in looking after his tribute and general interest. It was easy to see that this separate jurisdiction and establishment of an independent power with foreign views and connections, must prove injurious to the state; and it had been productive of a long series of heart-burnings, discontents, and intrigues, the Pasha interfering in affairs that in no way concerned him, which the Janissaries were sure to resent.[32]

Baba ᶜAli Dey (1710-1718), seized complete control of the government and threw out the plotting Paşa. He then wrote to the Sultan that the Paşa had conspired with Christians and Arabs against the best interests of the Ottoman province. The Dey having sent the appropriate bribes with his dispatch, the Sultan responded quickly by issuing a firman investing him with the title of Paşa and permanently removing the Turkish official from the city.[33] This act ended the fiction of Ottoman control. From this

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[31]Plantet, p. xxiv.

[32]Percival B. Lord, Algiers with Notices of the Neighbouring States of Barbary (2 vols.; London: Printed for Whitaker and Company, 1835), I, 35-36.

[33]Ibid. See also Plantet, pp. xxii-xxiii.

time forward, the Sultan automatically sent a firman of confirmation upon the selection of a new Dey.

Following this, the Porte meddled in Algerian affairs only in response to pressures from European powers. The Europeans were primarily concerned with terminating piracy in the Maġrib and used the Porte to accomplish this end, but to no avail. In 1718, the Ottoman Empire agreed in the Treaty of Passarowitz to terminate Algerian pirating in the Mediterranean, but this proved to be but another of the Sultan's many failures in his attempt to regulate the Algerians.[34] Of its own accord, Istanbul also attempted to return Algiers to the old system of Paşa over Dey. The Empire was unable, however, to threaten seriously the oligarchy. Between 1710 and 1830, the only representatives of the Sultan who appeared in Algiers were the Ḳapici Başi (officers in the Imperial household), sent by the Sultan to handle special matters.[35]

Despite their political independence, the Paşalik frequently used the Porte for diplomatic protection. In 1815, the United States tried to force the Dey to sign a peace treaty. Algiers procrastinated and claimed that it had to obtain the Porte's permission before the Dey could sign a treaty.[36] Again in 1816, the Algerians avoided trouble in this same manner. The Congress of Vienna having

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[34]Eversley, p. 201.

[35]Lord, pp. 36-37.

[36]Ibid., p. 63.

decreed the abolition of the slave trade, Lord Exmouth, an English admiral, tried to carry out the wishes of the Congress by leading an Anglo-Dutch fleet against Algiers. The Dey, attempting to resist this naval pressure, maintained that he could not agree to stop capturing Christians and making them slaves without the concurrence of the Sultan.[37]

In summary, the Ottoman Empire never held political power in Algiers. This was as true in 1556, when the Janissaries in the city first revolted as it was in 1787 when the American Consul at Algiers wrote: "The Algerians are in no measure depending on the Grand Siegnor. They reverence him on account of his being head or protector of their religion."[38] By the early eighteenth century the Porte had lost all semblance of control over the Maǧribi Paşalik. The evolution of Algiers' status within the Empire revealed several characteristics: First, political power was usually held by the Ocaḳ. The army chose the executive and influenced his policies. Second, the Algerian Divan, unlike its counterpart in other Paşaliks, emerged as a quasi-legislative body. The Divan, composed primarily of army officers, became the dominate factor in the Paşalik's government. Third, the various constitutional changes did not alter the basic administrative structure. The bureaucracy apparently functioned almost without a change between 1556 and 1830.

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[38]U. S., Department of State, Consular Reports: Algiers. Richard O'Bryen to Secretary of State, April 27, 1787.

## CHAPTER III

## THE JANISSARIES AND THE ṬĀ'IFA UL-RU'ASA

When Ḥasan Barbarossa succeeded his father as *beylerbeyi* of Algeria, he held that office from 1546-51 and from 1557-61. Ḫayru'd-Dīn had obtained the office for his son, probably hoping to establish his family as the dynastic rulers of the *Paşalik*. While *beylerbeyi*, Ḥasan incorporated the Janissaries with the *Levends* (men trained in the Ottoman navy that were of Greek, Dalmatian, and Albanian origin). This joint Turkish army in Algiers was still referred to as the Janissary Corps. This combination allowed the Turkish soldiers in Algiers to emerge as a military force independent of the Porte's control[1] and allowed it to exercise indirect control over the provincial government following Ḥasan's deposition in 1561.

Although the army did not assume direct control of the administration until the middle of the seventeenth century, it was nonetheless the dominant political influence in the *Paşalik*, especially after 1556. In that year the Turkish soldiers murdered the *beylerbeyi* appointed by the Sultan. Again in 1561, the army expressed its independent attitude when it sent the governor back to Istanbul in

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[1]John Foss, *A Journal of the Captivity and Sufferings of J. Foss; Several Years a Prisoner at Algiers* (Newburyport: Angier March, 1798), p. 103.

chains.[2] The army accepted and rejected at will the beylerbeyis sent by the Porte. Thus, the government of Algeria passed from the Barbarossa family to the Janissaries while both the indigenous population and the Ottoman Empire helplessly observed the transition.

The army emerged as the ruling elite in the Paşalik and embedded itself in the administrative structure of the province to such an extent that it is necessary first to examine the army in order to understand the civil government. This was especially important for the period of direct military government, 1659-1671, when the Ağa of the Janissary Corps assumed direct control of the state. Even after 1671, when the Deys replaced the Ağas as head of state, the Janissaries controlled the government. Each Dey's ability to placate the Turkish soldiers determined the length and effectiveness of his reign. The Dey accomplished this either by bowing to the wishes of the army dominated Divan, or periodically bribing the Turkish soldiers. In fact, the officers' corps had become the political power in Algiers, and neither the Ottoman Empire nor any other force could do anything about it.

The Janissary Corps at Algiers expanded from the two thousand men that Suleymān the Magnificent had sent Hayru'd-Dīn in 1518, to an army of approximately six thousand Ottoman troops.[3] Only these Janissaries, brought yearly from

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[2]Blottiere, p. 23.

[3]Playfair, p. 17.

Anatolia, could aspire to reach the top positions in the bureaucracy. A Turkish soldier reached high office by moving through the ranks of the officer's corps where rank was based on length of service in the army. As a result, every soldier with ambition and a long life could hope to reach the top.[4] This was particularly true between 1671 and 1830, when any Turk born in Anatolia was eligible to be elected Dey.

The officers' corps was organized on the basis of a twelve-thousand-man army, although the Turkish force in Algeria was never that large.[5] The soldiers with the longest service automatically became Çavuşes (literally messengers, but in this instance they were comparable to sergeants). After six years in this position they were promoted to Boluk Başi (captain).[6] Between these two ranks were the Wakil Harci (intendant), and the Oda Başi (lieutenant).[7] The forty eldest Oda Başis served as follacks (guards of the Divan).[8] Of the eight hundred Boluk Başis, twenty-four Yaya Başis (colonels), were chosen on the basis of length of service, and the senior Yaya Başi became Kahya Ağa, second in command of the army. The Kahya Ağa always succeeded the

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[4]Plantet, pp. xvi-xvii.

[5]Playfair, p. 18.

[6]Francis Knight, Relation of Seven Years Slavery under the Turks of Algiers (2 vols.; London: Thomas Osborne's Collection of Voyages and Travels, 1745), I, 489.

[7]Plantet.

[8]Knight.

Aǧa (general) upon the latter's retirement. The Aǧa served as commander of the Janissaries for two months. He then retired and became Musal Aǧa (pensioner), an official who advised the government in emergency situations and ruled on matters of legal precedence when experience could help the ruling institution make a decision.[9] In addition, the Aǧa was one of the permanent members of the Dey's Council of State, and served as Minister of War.[10]

All Oda Başis, Boluk Başis, Yaya Başis, the Kahya Aǧa, the Aǧa, and the Musal Aǧas were originally members of the Divan. This became too unwieldy so the Divan's size was reduced to include only the Yaya Başis, the Kahya Aǧa, and the Aǧa from the army, plus the Mufti, the Kadi and the Grand-Marabit.[11] As members of the Divan the army officers controlled affairs of state.

This military-dominated ruling hierarchy excluded all other groups from its councils. Even the Kul Oğlu (Turks born in Algiers), were regarded as second-class citizens and relegated to the lower ranks in both the army and the civil bureaucracy. They were not permitted to sit in the Divan. A few of the more fortunate Kul Oğlu reached the rank of provincial Bey or were named ka'id of one of the rural

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[9]Ibid., pp. 482-83.

[10]Nevill Barbour, A Survey of North West Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 213.

[11]Hatin, p. 81.

districts, but this was as high as they ever rose.[12]

At the beginning of the seventeenth century there were sufficient Kul Oğlu in Algiers, to make them a faction large enough to challenge the position of the military ruling clique. The Kaşba (the city's fortress), was blown up on June 20, 1634, and the government charged the Kul Oğlu with plotting against the position of the army. The Divan then banished the Kul Oğlu from the Paşalik without a trial, sending them in small groups to Bicāya. The Kul Oğlu believed they would be brought back to Algiers after a brief exile, but the government had other plans. The Divan eventually sent the Kul Oğlu to Tunis where they became part of the army of that city. They then attempted to subvert the Tunisian government by encouraging the army to revolt against the Beys hoping to join the two Paşaliks into one province under Algerian domination.[13] They failed to achieve their objective, however.

Aside from their function as the ruling oligarchy of Algeria, the army was important to the Paşalik's government in the sphere of provincial administration. The Janissaries were the only link between the capital at Algiers and the three interior provinces of Titterie, Oran and Constantine.

> The Dey's absolute domination extends four days journey from the capital. Beyond that, until you reach Biludelgerid, is inhabited by wandering tribes who merely pay tribute when the army takes its annual

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[12]Shaler, p. 30.

[13]Knight, p. 467.

tour through the country.[14]

Any order that existed in the interior during the three hundred years of Ottoman rule, was primarily a result of the army's ability to dominate the interior.

The government only maintained two thousand Turkish troops regularly in the capital.[15] Half of the remaining four thousand Janissarieshad an inactive status, and the other half were garrisoned in towns throughout the country. Their prime function was to create order out of the chaos in the interior. This disorder resulted from both the extensive tribal rivalries and the tendency of the natives to resist any form of government. Another factor complicating the situation was that the areas outside the coastal towns had never completely submitted to the Turkish government in Algiers. Hayru'd-Dīn had come closer than any other Algerian ruler to maintaining a stable relationship with the various tribes, but this had been based on a lack of regulation rather than on an administration that bound the local leaders to the central government.

The purpose of Turkish regulation was to facilitate the collection of taxes. Because the local population consistantly resisted these exactions, the soldiers often treated the subject peoples harshly. The government maintained interior fortresses or military colonies (zumul), similar to the Anatolian Yoldaş (interior fortresses and

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[14]Pananti, p. 108.

[15]Shaler, p. 52.

resting places for travellers), at Bicāya, Borc Lehaou, Constantine, Medea, Miliana, Mazuna, Maskara and Tlemsen. Using a divide-and-rule policy to cope with tribal conflict and resistance,[16] the Turkish garrisons stationed in the zumuls fostered already existing rivalries or created new ones. The army played one group of nomads against another, and the Paşalik gained the ultimate advantage. The Janissaries organized the Beduins into two categories of tribes. One group of tribes was given tax immunities in return for their co-operation in the suppression of the more rebellious Reᶜaya (subject) tribes. The government in Algiers frequently broke these agreements and shifted the tribes from one category to another.[17]

The government neither demanded nor expected anything from the subject population as long as there were no serious signs of rebellion and the nomads paid their taxes. The Dey farmed out the right to collect these taxes to members of the Janissary Corps under the direction of four ka'ids (generals of garrisons and district rulers), in the main military camps. These ka'ids made fortunes, for the Dey allowed them to bleed the Reᶜaya tribes of all they could get. They paid the Dey in Algiers the tax annually levied and kept the remainder.[18]

The government lacked any real concern for the

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[16]Playfair, p. 17.

[17]Colombe, p. 368.

[18]Knight, p. 482.

effective subjugation and administration of the area outside Algiers, as it was largely preoccupied with deriving full benefit from the chief source of wealth--the Mediterranean Sea. Whether one accepts the traditional view that Algiers was primarily concerned with the money she made from piracy and exacting tribute from European nations, or the more recent interpretation of Sir Godfrey Fisher, that Algerian finance was tied to a commerce that averaged seven million pounds sterling each year, there is no doubt that Algiers' Turkish rulers looked to the sea for the economic sustenance of their regime.[19] This meant that the ruling Janissary oligarchy depended financially on the success of the corsairs. If the pirates had a good season, the city prospered and the Ru'asa were heroes. It was out of necessity then that the military ruling class occasionally deferred to the wishes of the corsair captains. Algiers' corsair navy had been important to the city's political life since Hayru'd-Dīn's era when the pirates brought fame and fortune to both the Ottoman Empire and the Paşalik. With this prestige, the Ṭā'ifa ul-Ru'asa could turn in emergency situations from their duties as pirates to meddle in affairs of state.[20]

The corsairs were able to exercise political influence

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[19]All sources previously cited agree that Algiers was preoccupied with piracy. For Fisher's thesis, based almost entirely on the English archives, see Godfrey Fisher, Barbary Legend (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 1-16.

[20]Augustin Bernard, L'Algerie (Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1931), p. 50.

because they were organized in the Ṭā'ifa ul-Ru'asa, which served as a guild to protect their interests. The Dey appointed a Minister of Foreign and Naval Affairs from the ruling Ocaḳ, who served as a member of the Council of State[21] and held a seat in the Divan. This minister was to direct naval matters although this generally was done by the Ṭā'ifa ul-Ru'asa. He was the only naval official who had to be Turkish and as a result held a high position in the ruling hierarchy.[22] None of the other naval personnel were members of the Ocaḳ. The corsairs were either Turks recruited directly from Anatolia or renegade Christians and the ship crews were made up of Arabs and Berbers from the Magrib.

The Dey attempted to limit the corsair's independence at sea by appointing an Ağa Başi whosailed with each ship to make sure that each Re'is conducted himself properly and to guarantee that accurate records were kept of the prizes taken. Despite this attempt at regulation, the captain was absolute on board ship.[23]

Throughout the history of Ottoman Algeria, the Ṭā'ifa ul-Ru'asa occasionally influenced the ruling military clique. In these political maneuverings, the corsair captains had the support of the renegade army, organized by Ḫayru'd-Dīn to serve as a military supplement to the Janissaries, who

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[21]See Chapter IV.

[22]Plantet, p. xvii. Plantet refers to the Minister of Marine and "Le commandant du port . . ." as the Wakil Kardji.

[23]Hatin, pp. 113-14.

sailed on pirate expeditions and fought in landing parties. It should be noted, however, that the navy never developed as a permanent political power in the city. During the first hundred years of Ottoman rule the leading corsairs had been involved in the Turkish navy and their primary loyalty had belonged to the Sultan. After 1571, the Ru'asa were generally inferior in caliber to those captains who had sailed with Barbarossa. Since the Ottoman fleet was no longer attractive to the corsairs, many of them had returned to Algiers and to the profitable piracy they knew so well, but in the middle of the seventeenth century, the Algerian pirate navy entered a stage of permanent decline. This was due to the concomitant collapse of Ottoman sea power, England and Holland's increased interest in Mediterranean commerce, and the lack of competent Ru'asa to lead the corsair fleets. Without sufficient prestige and limited by their itinerant lives from engaging in extensive political activities, the Ṭā'ifa ul-Ru'asa failed to develop as the dominant political force in the city. Only in periods of crisis when the army appeared incapable of maintaining order did the Ṭā'ifa ul-Ru'asa emerge as a power factor. In the absence of this competition, the Janissaries were able to seize the Paşalik's administration and rule as they chose.

Because the Ru'asa were always an outside influence on the ruling oligarchy, it is difficult to measure the extent to which they helped determine the government's policies. Their economic importance, however, can be seen

in figures for the period 1628-34. During those six years they captured eight French vessels with cargoes valued at 4,752,000 livres, plus 1,331 slaves.[24] Since the corsairs usually were active against the shipping of several European states simultaneously, these figures undoubtedly represent only a portion of the actual revenues obtained through piracy. Because the pirate's success varied depending on the date in question, their activities played a considerable role in the economic life of the city. Examination of William Shaler's (American Consul in Algiers 1806-16), budget figures reveal that the income in a given fiscal year depended on the success of the pirates.[25] The Ru'asa were also responsible for the thousands of Christian slaves residing in Algiers. To list the number of people involved in any way with the corsairs would indicate that a large portion of the city's population benefited from what might be referred to as Algiers' major industry. As the government and individual members of the ruling hierarchy received shares of the booty, successful pirate voyages were encouraged.

It is no wonder then that the Ṭā'ifa ul-Ru'asa exerted considerable influence on the political life of Algiers at key moments in the city's history. The corsair captains were primarily concerned with their work at sea, and only became involved in the government when a crisis developed in the Paşalik. Despite the fact that the

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[24]Lane-Poole, The Barbary Corsairs, p. 234.

[25]Shaler, pp. 33-35.

Janissaries had direct charge of the ruling hierarchy, it must be emphasized that the Ru'asa were often influential in determining the destiny of Algiers' ruling institution.

This influence became apparent in 1671 when the corsair captains, tired of the ineffective administration of the Ağas, replaced these generals by Deys, elected for life by the Divan, to serve as head of the government. For eighteen years the Ru'asa maintained control over the government and elected the ruler. However, in 1689, the officers of the Janissary Corps who sat in control of the Divan assumed this function.[26] Again in 1716, the corporation of corsairs exerted political influence. The military hierarchy had concluded peace treaties during that year with the three primary merchant countries, England, Holland and France. The corsairs, seeing the major portion of their prey taken from them, forced the Divan to declare war on the weakest of the three, Holland, to prevent an economic crisis from hitting the pirates.[27]

The reduction in the size of the navy from over thirty ships in Barbarossa's era to nine in 1786 had little if any effect on the routine of pirate life. The corsairs usually sailed three times each year between April and September. If each captain captured a vessel, the city considered the

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[26]George Yver, "Dey," Encyclopaedia of Islam, ed. M. Th. Houtsma et al. (4 vols.; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1913-1936), I, 953. The Divan was by this time little more than a council of military officers.

[27]Lord, p. 34.

voyage a success.[28]

The individual Re'is conducted his affairs in a businesslike manner. He usually built his own ship although the captains frequently went into partnership with speculative Algerian merchants (armadores) for financial reasons. Christian slaves provided the labor. The marine contingents that sailed with the pirates were made up of volunteer Turks or renegades (Levends), the Kul Oğlu, and when necessary, members of the Janissary Corps.[29] Pirate vessels usually belonged to the individual corsair captains or the armadores. In 1787, however, the government of the Paşalik owned one-third of the fleet; the rest belonging to high government officials such as the Hasnaçi (Treasurer and Prime Minister), the Wakil Harçi and the Ağa.[30] The Wakil Harçi served as captain of the ship belonging to the Dey.[31]

The following system of dividing the spoils pertained. The government of the Paşalik received all of the captured ships and one-eighth of the other booty.[32] Half of the remainder went to the armadores and the Re'is, and the other half to the sailors and soldiers of the vessel involved in the capture. The principal officers received three shares,

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[28]U.S., Richard O'Bryen to Thomas Jefferson, June 6, 1786.

[29]Lane-Poole, The Barbary Corsairs, pp. 220-21.

[30]U.S., Richard O'Bryen to Secretary of State, April 4, 1787.

[31]Hatin, p. 113.

[32]Purchas, VI, 154.

gunners and helmsmen two, soldiers and swabbers one, and Christian slaves one and one-half to three shares each.[33] The government also benefited from closely regulating the harbor. Each ship which sailed in paid forty piastres to anchor plus a 12 per cent impost.[34] The harbor master paid 10 per cent to the ruling oligarchy and 2 per cent to the Dey. In addition, merchant vessels paid a bribe to the port director (Liman Re'is) for permission to leave the harbor.[35]

The following brief survey of the role of Algeria's corsair fleet in the Paşalik's international relations gives another example of the navy's importance in the history of Ottoman Algeria. Throughout the Ottoman period, Algeria prospered from the booty she acquired from pirate raids conducted against the commerce of almost every European nation. The various victims of this piracy, England and France in particular, made frequent but halfhearted attempts to terminate this nuisance. These attempts failed for many reasons: first, Algiers was often used as an instrument of a particular continental power's foreign policy. A European state would pay a high price for peace with Algeria, and the Paşalik was then free to attack the tribute payer's continental enemies. Second, the naval expeditions sent against Algiers were sometimes excuses for displays of sea power.

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[33]Lane-Poole, The Barbary Corsairs, pp. 224-25.

[34]Plantet, p. xxi.

[35]Hakluyt, III, 122.

Third, a European nation would tolerate Algerian belligerence to protect a trade agreement with the Paşalik. And fourth, to conquer Algeria was almost impossible. No European state prior to the nineteenth century was willing to commit the requisite sea and land forces necessary to defeat the Algerians.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Algerian pirates prospered in a Mediterranean environment that all but approved of pirate raids and galley slaves. In the eighteenth century the Deys were able to weave a proper balance according to the stipulations described above by declaring war and making peace with the right power at the right time. Algiers became a part of the European balance of power.

The diplomatic changes wrought at the Congresses of Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle changed all of this. The result of the 1815 and 1819 meetings was a temporary spirit of unity among the major European states and a new antislavery, antipiracy morality. The rules had been changed by the major powers in the world, and the small Ottoman Paşalik with less than one million people was faced with inevitable overthrow. The Deys were not able to combat the united attitude of Europe for long and her corsair navy's persistent raids against these European states was one of the factors that brought the French army to Algeria.

The corsair navy created and helped sustain the Algerian province, but it also supplied the French with a

motive to attack the Ottoman Paşalik. Thus, the Ṭā'ifa ul-Ru'asa played a significant role in the history of Ottoman Algeria although political power rested largely in the hands of the Janissaries.

## CHAPTER IV

## THE BUREAUCRACY

The bureaucracy in Algeria functioned as though it had no connection with the Janissaries in the ruling hierarchy when in fact, many of the functionaries in the province were drawn from the ranks of the army corps. Almost as if a power struggle did not exist, the Algerian bureaucracy, patterned after that of the Ottoman Empire, collected taxes and dispensed justice, generally making sure that the day-to-day functions of government were performed efficiently. Despite the outward appearance of instability indicated by the number of Deys assassinated and the rebelliousness of the tribes in the interior, this bureaucracy continued to operate, almost impervious to the political upheaval which often engulfed Algeria. Ottoman Algeria possessed a characteristic uncommon to other areas of the Ottoman Empire. While corruption riddled the Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the administrative system collapsed in many provinces, the Algerian bureaucracy maintained its form and failed to disintegrate.

One criteria of administrative efficiency is the ability of a state to maintain law and order. If this is used to judge Ottoman Algeria, then the Paşalik's government was at least competent. William Shaler wrote as follows in

the 1820s: "There is probably no city in the world, where there is a more vigilant police, where fewer cognizable crimes are committed, or where there is better security for a person and property than in Algiers."[1] The Algerian bureaucracy did, in fact, consist of a complex, disciplined body of trained officials capable of maintaining this law and order.

The Dey was chief of state. He declared war, made peace, summoned the Divan, levied taxes and tribute, appointed all government officials, received the property of any official violently removed from office, and was the final judge in criminal cases.[2] He would have been an absolute monarch but for the threat of assassination held over his head by the army. Originally the Deys consulted the Divan on all important matters, but by the nineteenth century this body had dwindled to insignificance.[3] If the Janissaries were paid, the Ru'asa allowed enough freedom to pirate, and the Paşalik did not suffer a military setback, the Dey remained in office.[4] Each Dey was appointed by the Divan, automatically confirmed by a firman from Istanbul and subject to the whims of the army. After that he was absolute.

Required ceremony tempered this absolutism further. The Dey was expected to be available each day to receive

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[1]Shaler, p. 52.

[2]Pananti, p. 290-91.

[3]Shaler, p. 16.

[4]Pananti, p. 293.

petitions from his subjects. He was not permitted to have a seraglio,[5] or to live with his family. He was: ". . . a rich man but not master of his riches, a father without children, a husband without a wife, a despot without liberty, a king of slaves and the slave of his subjects."[6]

Each Dey appointed a Council of Ministers which was responsible to the executive rather than to the Divan. The most important of these ministers was the Hasnaci (Minister of Finance and first minister). Also in the Council were the Ağa, the Wakil Harci (Minister of Marine), the Şebit ul-Maci (keeper of state property) and the Khodjet al-Kheil [sic] (receiver of tribute).[7] When there was a vacancy, the Divan usually elected one of these ministers to serve as the Dey. Once the Deys had displaced the Divan, in mid-eighteenth century, the Council of Ministers became only a consultative body.[8]

An accountant and two Jewish bookkeepers assisted the Hasnaci,[9] and the ministers were generally served by eighty-four secretaries (hocas). Four of these hocas held a higher rank. One kept the government's accounts, paid the army and supervised the payment of expenses. A second recorded all imports. The third and fourth respectively accounted for

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[5]Foss, p. 73.

[6]Yver, "Dey," p. 953.

[7]Blottiere, p. 24.

[8]Shaler, p. 16.

[9]Hatin, p. 87.

receipts and recorded the Dey's decrees.[10] The less important hocas held minor posts such as keeping records in specific customs houses.

Aside from these ministers and their secretaries, there were several other important executive officials. A Kodjia singie [sic] disposed of the government's share of the pirate booty, and a dragoman who spoke both Arabic and Turkish was the Dey's official interpreter.[11] In addition there was a Pitremelgi [sic] who registered burials,[12] and a Hoca de Cavallas (Adjutant General).[13]

Algerians who violated the city's criminal law were tried by the Dey and punished by the Ağa. Civil law, cases concerning divorce and inheritance, was ruled on by the Kadi,[14] who used the Kur'an as the civil code. There were two Kadis, one who tried Turks and another for the subject population. In cases involving a Turk and a Moor, the Turk chose the court in which the case would be decided.[15] Each Kadi was assisted by agents who traveled on circuit throughout the province. Algiers had a Mufti who approved all new laws in his fetwa (pronouncement) and heard appeals from the Kadi's court. The Sultan and the Seyhu'l-Islam appointed the Mufti

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[10]Pananti, p. 303; Hatin, p. 86.

[11]Hatin, p. 88.

[12]Pananti, p. 304.

[13]Shaler, p. 17.

[14]Hatin, p. 92.

[15]Shaler, p. 22.

for Algiers. This Mufti in turn consulted with the Sultan and they selected Algiers' Ḳaḍis from one of the religious schools in Istanbul or Cairo.[16]

If the Dey wanted to circumvent the decisions of the Mufti or the Ḳaḍi, he consulted the ᶜUlema (orthodox religious leaders). This practice became prevalent in periods when the Ḳaḍis were bribed and the Dey wanted an honest and inexpensive decision.[17] By the end of the eighteenth century disputes involving foreigners were settled either by the Consul[18] of the accused foreigner or by an assembly of all Consuls in Algiers.[19]

The Turks in Algiers had a privileged status in the courts. No matter how serious the crime, a Turk usually received no worse than the bastinado (lashes across the soles of the feet).[20] When a Turk committed treason or another serious crime he was led out of the city and privately strangled. The most serious crime a non-Muslim could commit was to speak out against Islam. Laws were harsh for subject population and convicted persons, Muslim, Christian or Jew, were frequently beheaded or mutilated as punishment for a minor crime. The Paşalik's legal attitude was that it was

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[16]Pananti, pp. 315-16. Pananti uses Tefta for fetwa.

[17]Pananti.

[18]Hatin.

[19]Shaler.

[20]Hatin.

better to punish the innocent than to allow the guilty to go free.[21] Algerians who committed lesser crimes were either bastinadoed or locked up in the city's bagnio (prison).

The Dey had twelve servants called çavuşes who served as his personal police. There was a group for both the Moors and the Turks in the city. The çavuşes were never armed and their function was to arrest Turks and Moors accused by the Dey. To resist a çavuş was punishable by death.[22]

Maġrib al-Awsat was administratively divided into four areas. There were three provinces: Oran in the west with its capital at Maskara until 1792, and then the city of Oran; Constantine in the east with its capital in Constantine; and Titterie in the center of Algeria with Medea as its capital.[23] The fourth area was the city of Algiers which was governed independently of the three provinces.

A Bey (governor) appointed by the Dey for a three term governed each province.[24] The Beys all had a complement of Janissaries under their command which they used to keep the peace among the tribes in the province. These Beys and the army kept the tribes loosely tied to the government and only harassed them when collecting taxes. The government allowed each tribe to elect its own şeyh who was responsible

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[21]Shaler, pp. 20-21.

[22]Pananti, pp. 213-13.

[23]Bernard, p. 52.

[24]Foss, p. 79.

to the Dey for the tribes' payment of taxes and its general conduct.[25]

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the nomads began to wander out of Algeria. They either went to Tunis or further south in the Sahara. Those who went to Tunis frequently plotted with the governor (Bey) of that Paşalik against the Dey in Algiers. This movement was a reaction against the harshness and oppression of the tax collectors. The government settled those nomads that remained in specific districts and allowed them to elect their own Emirs and council of elders.[26]

The presence of the Janissaries in the various towns in addition to their policy of playing upon tribal differences, kept most of the tribes peaceful. Only the Kabyles (a group of Berbers in the mountains between Algiers and Oran) were never completely subdued. It was widely believed in the early nineteenth century that if the Kabyles and semi-tributary tribes were to unite and simultaneously rebel, the Turks could have been easily defeated. But the nomads never had the wisdom to unite to free themselves from Ottoman rule.[27]

The Dey in Algiers never bothered the provincial Beys so long as the requisite tax was sent to the capital. After the Bey performed this task for his master, he was absolute in his province. Aside from his Janissary contingent, the

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[25]Shaler, pp. 85-88.

[26]Knight, p. 486.

[27]Shaler.

Bey was assisted by a halīf (intendant) appointed by the Dey,[28] and a courier (wakil-i sipanhiyan [sic]).[29] The Bey also chose ka'ids to govern each of the towns in his province.[30] The main function that these civil officials performed was to send Algiers the tax levied annually on each town.[31]

The Beys used tyranny and oppression to maintain themselves in their jobs, for the Dey would have regarded a mild ruler to be an ambitious man who was trying to become popular with the subject population and thus harmful to the central government. The Dey required each Bey to appear in Algiers to give an account of his rule at least once every three years when his term ended. At this time the Dey would decide on whether the Bey would be reappointed. When they made their triennial appearance before the Dey they would generally make a ceremonial entrance to his palace and lavish great sums of money upon various officials, including even the Dey himself and his Council of Ministers. In the nineteenth century it is reported that the Beys of Oran and Constantine paid as much as 300,000 dollars for this purpose.[32]

The city of Algiers, capital of the Paşalik, had an

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[28]Pananti, p. 311.

[29]Colombe, p. 368.

[30]Pananti.

[31]Knight, p. 484. Knight gives figures for the taxes levied on the various towns in the 1620s.

[32]Shaler, pp. 19-20.

independent status and was usually regarded as the Dey's personal province. The Şeyh el-Beled was the civil governor of Algiers and a Kihya commanded the city's militia. An Aga de Kul was superintendent of police and the Mezouard taxed and controlled the houses of prostitution. All of these officials were appointed by the Dey.[33]

Algiers was divided into quarters in which the inhabitants lived according to their occupation. The Ru'asa generally resided in large houses along the harbor. Artisans, organized in guilds that were led by powerful Emins, (leaders) usually lived in the same section of the city as the other members of their guild.[34]

The bulk of the city's population was composed of Arab and Berber tribes (Bani-Maza'ab was the principal tribe in the Paşalik) and Jewish artisans and merchants. Each ethnic group chose its own Emin who was responsible to the government for the group's conduct. The Jews in Algiers were severely oppressed. Although they were free to operate as businessmen and bankers, they suffered many disadvantages. Jews paid an annual poll tax to the Dey and were subject to the same customs regulations as foreigners. Jews in Algiers also had to wear distinguishing dress, usually a black robe.[35]

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[33]Shaler, p. 52. Pananti says the Mezouar was Lord Mayor. Pananti, p. 303.

[34]Shaler.

[35]Pananti, p. 159.

Despite these disadvantages, Jews were frequently chosen to serve in the government. They were also allowed to buy tax farms, own banks, and assume a leading role in Algerian commerce. By 1805, they had such a financial hold on the city that they became an important faction in the government. This angered the Janissaries who shot the Jewish Hasnaçi, Busnah, in June, 1805.[36] In the late 1820s the Jewish banking houses, concerned over the lack of order in the interior and their own position in the city, began to pressure France to intervene and establish a French colony in Algeria. This connection between the Jewish bankers and France may have contributed to the French decision to invade Algeria in 1830.

In 1830, the government of Algeria possessed an administration system that had functioned adequately for over three hundred years; it had an army and navy that gave the country some semblance of law and order; and, finally it was economically solvent. Although Algiers' budget for 1830 ran a deficit, the Paşalik had a treasury balance of ten million dollars.[38]

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[36]Playfair, pp. 116, 235.

[37]Blottiere, p. 25. See also, Jane S. Nickerson, A Short History of North Africa (New York: Devon-Adair, 1961), p. 98.

[38]Shaler, pp. 32-33.

## CHAPTER V

## EPILOGUE--THE FRENCH OCCUPATION OF ALGERIA

Unlike the situation in Tunis in 1881 and Egypt in 1882, the French occupied Algeria for reasons unrelated to conditions in the country or the position of the foreigners there. The July monarchy of Charles X was in its last days, and the French Prime Minister Polignac looked across the Mediterranean to Ottoman Algeria for a means of bolstering his unpopular King's throne. Polignac had long aspired to establish a French Empire for the restored Bourbons. He at first had wanted to expand France's northern borders to the Rhine River, but this was blocked by France's European rivals. As a result, the French minister plotted against the extremely vulnerable position of the Dey in Algiers.

Nineteenth century Europe viewed Algiers with a disapproving eye. The post-Napoleonic era had developed a moralistic brand of diplomacy that would have disavowed the machinations of a Talleyrand as it disapproved of the slavery and piracy that sustained Algeria. Europe's new morality, the amity that existed among the Concert powers, and his own thirst for a Bourbon Empire, motivated Polignac to attack Algiers.

When the Dey, insulted by the French Consul, responded by hitting the French official with a fly swatter, France demanded an apology, the termination of Algerian piracy, and

the payment of an indemnity. The Dey believed that Algeria would be able to ward off this threat as it had those in the past and refused to concede on any point. This refusal gave Polignac the opportunity he had been seeking. A French expedition was sent against the recalcitrant Algerian ruler and within a year (1830-31), Ottoman Algeria succumbed to the French.

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