

Homosexual Investigations: The CIA's Contribution to the Lavender Scare from the 1950s to the
1980s

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Introduction

In 1981, a CIA investigator asked John Green, an aerospace engineer, about the security-check his long-term partner underwent as part of his employment with TRW, a contractor that employed both Green and his partner. In response, Green revealed to the investigator that he and his partner, who is unnamed in historical sources, “live[d] together, and no one [knew] him better than” Green.¹ However, this revealed a shocking piece of information to the investigator about Green: he was a homosexual.² Upon discovering that Green and his partner were in a relationship, the investigator revisited Green’s partner and asked, “Are you and he [Green] having a homosexual affair?”³ The answer was “yes.” The investigator then spoke to two of Green’s friends in their offices and homes, who confirmed that Green was a homosexual. For Green, this inquiry was surprising since his sexuality was not, in fact, a secret. He had been open about his homosexuality the entire 13 years that worked for TRW though neither TRW nor the CIA had ever explicitly asked a question about his sexuality in his five previous security clearances.⁴

The CIA’s justification for removal of security clearances, including Green’s, stemmed from the agency’s view that homosexuality was a character defect and that homosexuals, in particular, could be blackmailed into divulging state secrets. In the eyes of the CIA,

¹ Katharine Macdonald, “CIA Sued by Homosexual for Removal of Security Clearance,” *Washington Post*, November 24, 1983, CIA-RDP90-00552R000202360009-1, CREST.

² A Note on Language: I decided to use the term “homosexual” throughout my paper rather than more modern, socially accepted words today such as “queer” or “gay,” because I felt it was important to use the language of the period. In my primary sources, gay people were most often referred to as homosexuals (among a plethora of offensive terms), in my experience. Additionally, I think it’s important to use consistent language with the period (barring offensive language) to point other researchers in the right direction for search terms. Lastly, the term “homosexual” is consistent with other scholarship on the Lavender Scare, as demonstrated by David K. Johnson’s well-known book on the subject.

³ Macdonald, “CIA Sued by Homosexual.”

⁴ Macdonald, “CIA Sued by Homosexual.”

homosexuals were essentially viewed as security risks. Additionally, because homosexuality was viewed as an immoral identity, the CIA believed that homosexuals should not be allowed to deal with issues of national security. Whether an employee was open about their sexuality or not, if the CIA did not know as soon as an employee began working with the CIA or as CIA contractor, the agency assumed that employee was trying to hide their sexuality, making them even less reliable as an employee of national security, as was exemplified in Green's case.⁵

This attitude within the CIA was part of a broader homophobic attitude within the federal government from 1950 to 1975 (and even longer for some agencies). Termed by historians as the "Lavender Scare," the federal government of the United States deemed homosexuals as unfit to work for the government based on the idea that homosexuals were both security risks and "immoral." Though this attitude was widespread throughout the government, the press, popular media, the American public, and Congress specifically focused on rooting out homosexuals in the State Department.⁶ The Central Intelligence Agency was, however, another prominent federal agency that contributed to employment discrimination of homosexual people from the 1950s to the 1980s. Based on their own documents as well as employee accounts, newspaper articles, and congressional hearings, it's clear that the CIA promoted the misconception that homosexuals posed a security risk and were unreliable and immoral individuals and employees. Although the "Lavender Scare" in the State Department would begin to wane, the CIA primarily continued to treat homosexuals as undesirable employees largely through the agency's use of polygraph

⁵ Macdonald, "CIA Sued by Homosexual."; Julie Dubbs, and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Central Intelligence Agency, et al., Defendants-Appellees, 866 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1989), <https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F2/866/866.F2d.1114.86-2826.html>; CIA, "Homosexual Investigations," April 21, 1980, CIA-RDP78-04007A000700110005-8, CREST; other supporting sources throughout.

⁶ David K. Johnson, *The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal Government* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 15-39.

exams for potential employees, which the agency claimed allowed them to efficiently root out homosexuals. A lack of internal and external control or oversight over the CIA's hiring practices enabled the agency to continue its discriminatory practice for longer than other federal agencies.

Historiography and Background

Historians who have studied the Lavender Scare have focused primarily on the State Department. This is partly justified given the widespread concern over the State Department at the time. For example, in David K. Johnson's book, *The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal Government*, he focuses largely on the State Department to describe the Lavender Scare.⁷ Joseph McCarthy, a Wisconsin senator, also specifically attacked the State Department in his aggressive anti-communist purges.⁸ However, it's important to acknowledge that the Lavender Scare was a widespread issue across the federal government and not only within the State Department. In fact, the Central Intelligence Agency was even aware of the emphasis placed on the State Department. In one letter from April 1951 between two unknown people, presumably CIA employees, the sender explained to the recipient that he has "had the necessary psychological exams," calling them "rather amusing." He joked that they (the CIA) should "recommend that [he] apply for work with the State Department" if they found "strong homosexual tendencies."⁹ This quote illustrates the expansiveness of the perception that the State Department was the department with the most homosexual infiltration, even by other agencies involved in the Lavender Scare like the CIA. In reality, the CIA was a major contributor to the Lavender Scare, an argument supported by their own documents,

⁷ Though the CIA is mentioned as having a part in Johnson's book, it was only briefly.; Johnson, *The Lavender Scare*.

⁸ Johnson, *The Lavender Scare*, 1.

⁹ CIA, "Letter (Sanitized)," April 28, 1951, CIA-RDP80R01731R003000200133-4, CREST.

statements from employees, newspapers, and Congressional hearings from the era. Despite there only being a few pieces of scholarship that discuss the CIA's involvement in the Lavender Scare, the topic has received slight attention from new sites, such as in *MuckRock*, that file Freedom of Information Act Requests (FOIA) aimed at improving historical and contemporary government transparency.¹⁰ My paper explicitly addresses the gap in historical scholarship by demonstrating the CIA's significant role in perpetrating the Lavender Scare against homosexuals.

In addition to highlighting the CIA's role in the Lavender Scare, my research is attentive to the ways that homosexual women were affected by the Lavender Scare. Johnson's book on the Lavender Scare mentions that lesbians were affected, but they are not a major focus of his scholarship and, in general, lesbians are often obscured or not discussed in research today.¹¹ Although the CIA's own documents tend to use masculine pronouns when discussing homosexuals, lesbians were also deeply impacted by the Lavender Scare.¹² For example, Julie Dubbs, a lesbian woman, even brought her experience to a federal district court after she was denied a security clearance for her sexuality.¹³ As such, I will also be bringing in specific evidence that the Lavender Scare was a sinister event for lesbians, just like gay men, though—because the employees of the CIA tended, at least in the early Cold War, to be men—the effect the Lavender Scare had on lesbians is not the central focus of my research.

¹⁰ MuckRock is a “non-profit, collaborative news site that brings together journalists, researchers, activists, and regular citizens to request, analyze, and share government documents, making politics more transparent and democracies more informed.” “About MuckRock,” *MuckRock*, accessed December 16, 2022, <https://www.muckrock.com/about/>.

¹¹ Johnson, *The Lavender Scare*, 12.

¹² For an example of this see: CIA, “Homosexual Investigations,” April 21, 1980, CIA-RDP78-04007A000700110005-8, CREST.

¹³ William Carlsen, “Lesbian Wins a Point In Case Against CIA,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, November 29, 1985, CIA-RDP90-00552R000201640001-9, CREST.

The Lavender Scare as a whole is also less emphasized in historical scholarship on mid 20th century security or “loyalty” based government investigations. As David K. Johnson outlines, the Lavender Scare is often viewed as a minor offshoot of the more well-known Red Scare. He argues that “historians of the McCarthy era have given stunningly little attention to the Lavender Scare.”¹⁴ When it is mentioned, it’s viewed “as a minor byproduct of the Red Scare, one so seemingly natural and inevitable as to need no explanation.”¹⁵ As such, my intention is to bring more light to the understudied and underrepresented Lavender Scare by focusing more deeply on a specific agency that upheld it—the CIA.

The Lavender Scare began in February of 1950 after Joseph McCarthy, a senator from Wisconsin, gave a speech in which he alleged that 205 communists were working for the State Department. Partly in response to this accusation, Deputy Undersecretary of State, John Peurifoy, explained that the State Department did not employ communists, and, in fact, the State Department had forced “security risks” out of the department, including 91 homosexuals.¹⁶ As a result, both federal government officials and American people perceived that homosexuals had infiltrated the government. In fact, many politicians, journalists, and Americans thought that homosexuals were more of a threat to national security than Communists.¹⁷ This perception led to a purge of homosexual people from federal employment on the belief that homosexuals were immoral, unreliable, and susceptible to blackmail.¹⁸ Adding to the fear that homosexuals were a threat to national security was the pathologizing of homosexuality in the 1940s and 1950s, as it

¹⁴ Johnson, *The Lavender Scare*, 2.

¹⁵ Johnson, *The Lavender Scare*, 2.

¹⁶ Johnson, *The Lavender Scare*, 1.

¹⁷ Johnson, *The Lavender Scare*, 2.

¹⁸ Johnson, *The Lavender Scare*, 1-2.

began being viewed as a psychological disorder by psychiatrists, further condemning it.¹⁹ The Lavender Scare as described by Johnson ended in 1975.²⁰ However, the CIA's Lavender Scare lasted much longer.

Investigations of homosexuals in the federal government occurred under the Truman administration with the introduction of a "loyalty security program" in 1950 in response to Republican attacks based on Peurifoy's testimony. The goal of this program was to "weed out Communists and 'homosexuals and other sex perverts'," and it ultimately led to hundreds of "civil servants" being investigated, fired, or led to resign. In 1953, President Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10450, which expanded on Truman's "loyalty security program." It added "sexual perversion" as official justification for investigation and firing of federal employees and "every agency and department of the federal government" became covered by the Executive Order.²¹ In section 3 of this executive order, it stated that "the appointment of each civilian officer or employee in any department or agency of the Government shall be made subject to investigation." Additionally, it said that any employee who "may not be clearly consistent with the interests of national security," should be "immediately suspend[ed]," and eventually "terminat[ed]" if an investigation deemed it necessary to protect "national security." This executive order identified several categories of people as threats to national security including people who prove to be unreliable, those who tell "deliberate misrepresentations, falsifications, or omissions of material facts," anyone with "criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, sexual

¹⁹ Michael Bronski, *A Queer History of the United States* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2011), 166-167, 218.

²⁰ Johnson, *The Lavender Scare*, 210-211.

²¹ Brad Sears, Nan D. Hunter, and Christy Mallory, "Documenting Discrimination in State Employment," UCLA School of Law Williams Institute, published September 2009, <https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/lgbt-discrim-state-employment/>, 2-6.

perversion,” and someone who “may be subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure which may cause him to act contrary to the best interests of the national security.”²² This executive order clearly outlined several justifications that the federal government and specifically the CIA used during the Lavender Scare: immorality, unreliability, possibility for blackmail, and most specifically “sexual perversion.” In the two years following the signing of this Executive Order, around “800 federal employees resigned or were terminated.”²³ Executive Order 10450 set the stage for the Lavender Scare and provided further justification for the CIA to discriminate against homosexuals in their agency.

Security Risks, Immorality, and Unreliability

Though the State Department was the primary focus of the homosexual purges during the early 1950s, the Central Intelligence Agency didn't fly completely under the radar in popular discussions of the issue, as described in Johnson's *The Lavender Scare*. As an intelligence agency within the federal government, the leadership of the CIA had the unique ability to speak to the issue of national security and the potential dangers homosexuals posed. During the 1950 Hoey Committee Hearings, for example, one of the lead witnesses was the director of the CIA, Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter. As the CIA was a new agency within the government because of the 1947 National Security Act that created it, Hillenkoetter had to explain what exactly the CIA did—that is, gather foreign intelligence.²⁴ His testimony was of particular interest to the committee because Hillenkoetter was able to provide just one piece of evidence that the committee found crucial for supporting the idea that homosexuals in the government threatened

²² “Executive Orders,” *National Archives*, last modified August 15, 2016, <https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/10450.html>.

²³ Sears, Hunter, and Mallory, “Documenting Discrimination in State Employment,” 6.

²⁴ Johnson, *The Lavender Scare*, 108.

national security.²⁵ This piece of evidence involved Colonel Alfred Redl, who was the head of Austrian intelligence before World War I. Hillenkoetter testified that Redl was discovered as a potential homosexual by the Russians, who then “supplied him with an attractive “newsboy,” and burst in on them in a hotel room engaged “in an act of perversion.”²⁶ Because homosexuality was barred from the Austrian army, Russia used this secret as leverage against Redl to force him into becoming a traitor to his country to help Russia. Redl’s contributions as a spy, Hillenkoetter claimed, meant that “Austrian intelligence was “completely neutralized” at the start of World War I.”²⁷ Hillenkoetter described this example as a “classic case of sexual perversion leading to espionage” one that shows “what can be done to a country’s security by a homosexual strategically placed.”²⁸ Despite the fact that the Redl incident occurred many years prior, not in the United States, and not in the civil service, Hillenkoetter used this as an example that could apply to “the average American civil servant in the Cold War.” Hillenkoetter, moreover, also “exaggerated” parts of this example, namely that the circumstances of the beginnings of his “espionage” were unclear as Redl had committed suicide hours after his discovery.²⁹

Hillenkoetter was the only government official to offer any evidence to support the idea that homosexuals were susceptible to blackmail in his testimony to the committee. Other intelligence officers also testified at the Hoey Committee, but no others could provide any trace of evidence, even though they continued to assert homosexuals were a security risk.³⁰ For example, a representative of the Office of Naval Intelligence claimed that their concern was less

²⁵ Johnson, *The Lavender Scare*, 109.

²⁶ Johnson, *The Lavender Scare*, 108.

²⁷ Johnson, *The Lavender Scare*, 109.

²⁸ Johnson, *The Lavender Scare*, 109.

²⁹ Johnson, *The Lavender Scare*, 111.

³⁰ Johnson, *The Lavender Scare*, 112.

on blackmail, and rather on the psychological defects homosexuality was believed to bring.³¹ Though a major aspect of Hillenkoeter's testimony referenced the security risk aspect of homosexuality, he also mentioned that "homosexuals were particularly likely victims [of blackmail] because they were intrinsically weak, cowardly, unstable, neurotic, and lacking in moral fiber," speaking to the view of immorality on homosexuals by the CIA.³²

One of the most well-known CIA employees fired under the Lavender Scare was Carmel Offie. Offie had a long career within the CIA and in various other federal positions including the State Department.³³ Offie was "clever and discrete," particularly well connected, capable, and efficient in his CIA position that he began in 1947 when Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter was the director.³⁴ In 1948, he began working for the "deputy to Frank Wisner, the head of the Office of Policy Coordination in the CIA."³⁵ However, shortly after he began this position, Joseph McCarthy had "somehow" discovered from Washington police in February 1950 that Offie had been arrested and charged with "loitering for immoral purposes."³⁶ In front of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee in April 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy accused the Central Intelligence Agency of having employed a "homosexual" that had previously worked at the State Department.³⁷ Allen W. Dulles, the director of the CIA in 1953, learned that Offie was the man McCarthy referred to in his speech and he almost let him keep his job.³⁸ Offie argued, "Why

³¹ Johnson, *The Lavender Scare*, 110.

³² Johnson, *The Lavender Scare*, 112.

³³ Burton Hersh, *The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992), 245-6, 442.

³⁴ Will Brownell and Richard N. Billings, *So Close to Greatness: A Biography of William C. Bullitt* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), 149, 297.

³⁵ Brownell and Billings, *So Close to Greatness*, 297-298.

³⁶ Thomas Powers. *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms & the CIA* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1979), 60.

³⁷ Hersh, *The Old Boys*, 442.

³⁸ Brownell and Billings, *So Close to Greatness*, 298.

revoke my security clearance? I don't deny it. I'll stand up on the roof and admit it. Nobody can blackmail me." Once a Washington journalist found out Offie's name from police records, though, he was forced out of the CIA by Dulles because of his homosexuality and the bad press the CIA director felt the case would bring.³⁹ Offie later went to work for the AFL-CIO in Europe and was killed in 1972 in an airplane crash in London.⁴⁰

Offie did not bring his case to court, though some employees in later decades, like the aforementioned John Green and Julie Dubbs, did. Julie Dubbs's case is exemplifies how the the justifications that the CIA used during Lavender Scare impacted lesbians as well as gay men. Though the CIA primarily referred to men when addressing homosexuals, her case demonstrates that lesbians were just as much an issue to the agency. Julie Dubbs worked for SRI International, a scientific research institute based in Menlo Park, CA that had contracts with various government agencies, as a senior technical illustrator.⁴¹ Since November 1981, Dubbs had "a Top Secret industrial security clearance from the Department of Defense."⁴² Dubbs's case occurred in the 1980s after her security clearance was revoked from the CIA once she revealed she was a homosexual. This decision by the CIA impacted Dubbs, and other gay CIA employees similarly, because without her security clearance, she would have had trouble getting better, higher paying positions and struggle to get even temporary positions because of the CIA's "security requirements."⁴³ Like John Green, Dubbs was particularly confused by her revoking

³⁹ Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, 61.

⁴⁰ Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, 319.

⁴¹ "About SRI International," SRI International, accessed March 11, 2023, <https://www.sri.com/about-us/>; "Our contract vehicles," SRI International, accessed March 11, 2023, <https://www.sri.com/our-contract-vehicles/>.

⁴² Julie Dubbs, and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Central Intelligence Agency, et al., Defendants-Appellees, 866 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1989), <https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F2/866/866.F2d.1114.86-2826.html>.

⁴³ Dubbs v. Central Intelligence Agency.

because she was openly gay at work and therefore had no reason to be blackmailed by “hostile intelligence services.”⁴⁴

In 1981, the CIA explained that Dubbs’ “homosexual activity” had “raise[d] serious doubts about [her] reliability and [her] susceptibility to compromise by a hostile intelligence service.”⁴⁵ This justification speaks to the CIA’s longtime trend of homosexual employment discrimination because of both morality (“doubts about...reliability”) and blackmail (“susceptibility to compromise”). Additionally, the CIA felt that, because she hadn’t revealed her sexuality to them upon her initial security clearance, it meant that she had “a willingness to engage in deceptive behavior.” The agency also applied their beliefs about the immorality and unreliability of homosexuals, writing that there was a “perception of vulnerability” around Dubbs.⁴⁶ She filed a lawsuit in July of 1985 arguing that the CIA had a policy in place that denied all homosexuals security clearances and, most importantly, that the CIA’s policy was unconstitutional. At the core of her argument, she believed that the CIA violated several constitutional amendments including the First Amendment and the Fifth Amendment.⁴⁷

The CIA fought the initial district court case that Dubbs brought against the agency as well as a subsequent Ninth Circuit court of appeals case. In their defense, the CIA claimed that the agency did not discriminate in employment solely based on sexual orientation nor did the violate Dubbs constitutional rights. The agency furthermore asserted that that the court did not have jurisdiction to rule on CIA hiring practices. U.S. District Judge Eugene Lynch denied the CIA’s motion to dismiss the case based on the claim that because the CIA was an executive

⁴⁴ William Carlsen, “Lesbian Wins a Point In Case Against CIA,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, November 29, 1985, CIA-RDP90-00552R000201640001-9, CREST.

⁴⁵ *Dubbs v. Central Intelligence Agency*.

⁴⁶ *Dubbs v. Central Intelligence Agency*.

⁴⁷ *Dubbs v. Central Intelligence Agency*.

branch agency, its employment practices lay outside of the court's jurisdiction. In his dismissal of the motion, Lynch ruled that the CIA did not have "unfettered discretion to ignore the civil rights of the United States citizens."⁴⁸ This was, of course, a ruling on a motion, not the final decision in the case. At the district court hearing, the court was tasked with addressing two questions: did the CIA discriminate in employment based on sexual orientation and if so, was it unconstitutional and, more broadly, if the CIA did not have an official policy against hiring homosexuals, would considering sexual orientation in deciding security clearances violate first and fifth amendment rights? The district court initially ruled in the CIA's favor.⁴⁹

Dubbs appealed her case to the Ninth Circuit, which relied partly on the results of the *Webster v. Doe*, a Supreme Court case involving the CIA's employment policies towards homosexuals, to make their decision.⁵⁰ The appeals court in part rejected and affirmed the rulings of the District Court. The appeals court, unlike the district court, found that the CIA did in fact have "a blanket policy of denying security clearances" to homosexuals. They also ruled that attention to the sexuality of an individual homosexual was not necessarily constitutional, which reversed the district court's decision that "individualized consideration of sexual orientation is not unconstitutional" and, as such, could be examined by a court.⁵¹

The CIA argued that their hiring practices were not discriminatory because they implemented a "whole person" process. Dubbs, however, refuted this claim using statements from two of the CIA's own people. Robert Gambino, a former CIA Security Director, testified that while the CIA did follow the "whole person" approach, meaning that "sexual orientation

⁴⁸ Carlsen, "Lesbian Wins a Point."

⁴⁹ *Dubbs v. Central Intelligence Agency*.

⁵⁰ For more information on *Webster v. Doe* see: Richard Carelli, "Supreme Court Limits CIA Firing Authority," *AP News*, last modified June 15, 1988, <https://apnews.com/article/d228d1e9eb3d61f97b848f90350d7a56>.

⁵¹ *Dubbs v. Central Intelligence Agency*.

[was] just one of the factors considered,” the fact remained that the CIA continued to view all homosexuals as potential security risks. The letter that denied Dubbs’s security clearance in the first place illustrated this point by stating that the CIA’s “concern about homosexual activity is that such activity may be exploitable in a manner which may put sensitive intelligence information at risk.” In other words, the CIA’s own language in defense of the agency’s firing of Dubbs reflected the agency’s view on “homosexual activity” in general, not simply Dubbs in particular. Therefore, the 9th circuit appeals court ruled that the CIA did, in fact, have a “blanket policy” on granting homosexuals security clearances.⁵² This case is important because it not only provides insight to the way lesbians in the CIA were affected by the Lavender Scare that extended into the 1980s—three decades after 1950s where most researchers have focused their attention—it also illustrates how the CIA continued to claim in federal court that homosexuals should not be employed by the agency.

Representative of the CIA’s continuing homophobia in employment practices into the 1980s is an agency memorandum from April 1980 titled “Homosexual Investigations.” This document outlined the CIA’s view of homosexuals for the purpose of educating agents how best to spot and investigate suspected homosexuals. The memo describes homosexuals as conniving and masters of blending, stating that homosexuals cannot be spotted “on sight...similar to recognizing a Communist.” As such, investigators needed to act with “the utmost in tact, discretion, and investigative ingenuity” to root them out. The CIA, described homosexuals as good at blending because of their ability to cover themselves in their everyday lives using various tactics, like coded language.⁵³ Because of this, investigators needed to be aware of the homosexual lingo such as “gay,” “straight,” and “bi.” By asking whether a candidate is either of

⁵² Dubbs v. Central Intelligence Agency.

⁵³ CIA, “Homosexual Investigations,” 1-2.

these three categories, the CIA believed that “any reaction or recognition of its true meaning will tell an investigator that the person he’s interviewing is probably a homosexual,” because of the specific wording. They also encouraged the use of coded questions, such as “Aren’t you Jack from the North” which would illuminate whether an interviewee was a homosexual even further if they responded with a coded answer, like “No, I’m Joe from the North.” According to the CIA, the word “North” (or any other directional term like West Coast) was a code word meaning homosexual.⁵⁴ Overall, “Homosexual Investigations” illustrates how, into the 1980s, the CIA continued to view and treat homosexuals employed by the federal government as a threat, in large part due to their assumed immorality. Homosexuals were “abnormal mentally and emotionally,” men “with problems,” and “psychological[ly] [deviant],” as described in this memo.⁵⁵ According to the CIA, homosexuals often lived double lives and hid their identities to the public and their employers, meaning they were immoral and unreliable. This document is crucial in understanding the morality perspective against homosexuals held by the CIA and the length of these perceptions.

Polygraphs, Privacy, and Employee Rights

The Central Intelligence Agency relied heavily on polygraph, or lie detector, tests throughout the 1950s to the 1980s to determine whether both prospective and current employees were homosexual. Though it wasn’t the only way that the CIA enforced discrimination employment of homosexuals, as demonstrated through cases like John Green and Carmel Offie, they were a common thread throughout discussions of homosexuality in internal memos circulated within the agency.

⁵⁴ CIA, “Homosexual Investigations,” 2.

⁵⁵ CIA, “Homosexual Investigations,” 2-3.

In the polygraph exams the CIA gave to prospective and current employees, investigators asked a variety of questions, often intrusive, to discern whether a person was a security risk to the United States and whether their character would make them a good fit for employment with the agency. The CIA often pointedly asked whether someone was a homosexual in these examinations, but also used several, more roundabout questions to figure out someone's sexuality, as described above.⁵⁶ As a result of this, anyone discovered to be homosexual would either not get a job in the agency, would lose their jobs, or would not gain and maintain security clearances. Because of this, instances of employee protests arose after damning polygraph examinations. For example, a 1964 newspaper article from the *Washington Post* outlined how a Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) employee was fired because he "admitted to committing several homosexual acts as a youth." The employee was fired in February of 1960, after a CIA polygraph, which the FAA employee took when he had previously worked for the CIA, revealed that he had previous "homosexual conduct." The polygraph exam was given to the employee for "top security clearance," and resulted in the employee discussing four previous "homosexual acts" at 13 years old. It's unclear whether this admission resulted in discharge from the CIA. What is clear, however, is that the results of the employees polygraph test were shared with the FAA. Although the Federal Aviation Agency Administrator "reinstated" the employee and gave him \$26,000 in backpay, the case nonetheless illustrates the effects of polygraph examinations, the CIA's role in the Lavender Scare, and the fact that homosexual "acts" found through polygraphs could hinder future employment in other areas of the federal government. Though the employee was reinstated, the firing was originally "upheld by the Civil Service Commission, the U.S. District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals." The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case,

⁵⁶ CIA, "Homosexual Investigations," 2-3.

but it was settled out of court upon further investigation of the employee.⁵⁷ This case is demonstrative of both the larger Lavender Scare, but also the large reaching effects the CIA and their polygraphs had on ensuring that homosexuals were unlikely to maintain employment in the federal government.

By the 1960s, the media began to run stories that criticized the use of polygraph tests. In one 1964 *Phoenix Gazette* article, the general federal government was criticized for their frequent and violating use of polygraphs. Though the article did not direct criticism specifically at the CIA, the piece demonstrates concerns that Americans had about how polygraph tests were being used in employment. This article described how a 17-year-old girl—who was being interviewed for a clerk position by a “minor government official”—was asked about her sexuality, specifically whether she was homosexual. This issue resulted in a congressional hearing which revealed the widespread, alarming usage of polygraphs in the federal government. Because of this hearing, representatives revealed their shock that polygraphs had any legitimate, accurate basis.⁵⁸

One reason for the inaccuracy of the tests is that “innocent but sensitive persons will give false positive results,” according to an Atomic Energy Commission report consulted by the House of Representatives Government Operations subcommittee. Additionally, people who are at peace with mistakes they made may not set off the polygraph, according to the report. The subcommittee also explored the constitutionality of the tests and while one witness, a Tennessee psychiatrist, argued that they violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendment, another witness, a law professor, argued that they didn’t due to the volunteer nature of the test. Ultimately, the

⁵⁷ Jack S. Laudau, “FAA Aide Fired in Morals Case Rehired With \$26,000 Back Pay,” *Washington Post*, October 3, 1964, CIA-RDP75-00001R000300260002-5, CREST.

⁵⁸ Lou Hiner, “Extensive Use of Lie Detectors by Federal Government Under Heavy Fire,” *Phoenix Gazette*, October 26, 1964, CIA-RDP67B00446R000500200045-6, CREST.

subcommittee did not come to a definitive conclusion about the tests, but they did make it clear they were concerned about the potential for “invasion” of Americans’ rights.⁵⁹ This subcommittee hearing demonstrates that by the 1960s there was awareness amongst members of Congress about the use of polygraphs in hiring and that there was a growing concern about their use.

While that example spoke to the entire federal government, another article from the *Washington Daily News* from 1964 titled, “CIA’s Lie Tests Are Called Unintelligent,” speaks specifically to concerns over the CIA’s use of polygraph tests. The article featured the opinion of a Stanford professor who “served 18 years in U.S. intelligence agencies” and was of the opinion that polygraphs could be particularly inaccurate on issues of sexuality. He argued that using polygraphs too frequently “helps open the way for drones and trained communist employment of homosexuals, agents,” meaning that “Russian spy schools know all about CIA use of lie detectors...and can be presumed to have no trouble at all training infiltrators to beat the machine.” Additionally, because polygraphs “primarily measure emotional reactions like fear,” they can be inaccurate in measuring the reactions to sexuality because it was often considered a “private matter,” even when the sexuality of the interviewee was considered “normal.” Fear about discussing sexuality registers doubt in the polygraph, “and in security cases doubts tend to be resolved against the applicant.” On the other hand, homosexuals, “who lack even the rudiments of guilty feelings about their sex life and actually may be very proud of it,” could potentially pass a polygraph easily.⁶⁰ Each of these examples from the Stanford professor explains some of the inaccuracies and issues with polygraphs. Though this article still doesn’t

⁵⁹ Hiner, “Extensive Use of Lie Detectors,” 1.

⁶⁰ Hiner, “Extensive Use of Lie Detectors,” 2.

speak favorably of homosexuals working for the CIA, it does give hints at some cracks in the CIA's defense of its use of polygraphs in employment.

These cracks began to manifest as Congress took action in a 1967 subcommittee hearing. This Senate congressional hearing is indicative of growing concern over polygraphs in the CIA and the CIA's own unwillingness to see their faults in using them. This congressional hearing in August of 1967 featured the testimony of Senator Ervin, a Democrat from North Carolina, who was a major advocate for creating measures to ensure civilian employee rights. During the hearing, he spoke to the CIA's disregard for civilian employee rights, using the example of polygraphs.⁶¹ Senator Ervin spoke specifically to the S. 1035 bill at this hearing, a measure he was pushing to be passed to "protect the civilian employees of the executive branch of the US Government in the enjoyment of their constitutional rights and to prevent unwarranted governmental invasions of their privacy."⁶²

S. 1035 was not the first bill introduced that aimed to protect employee rights. In a predecessor bill, also supported by Ervin, the CIA made requests for amendments to the bill, which the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights—which fell under Committee on the Judiciary—added to the bill. For S.1035, when the CIA was given the opportunity to weigh in on the bill to the subcommittee, they had originally declined. At the last minute, the CIA requested to be exempted from the bill's regulations and requested a secret hearing with the subcommittee. Senator Ervin argued against the secret hearing and did not believe that the CIA should gain a full exemption from S. 1035 saying that "guarantees of the amendments [of the

⁶¹ "Why the CIA and NSA Should Not be Excluded from the Provisions of S. 1035, the Bill to Protect Employee Rights," August 29, 1967, CIA-RDP81-00818R000100060054-9, CREST.

⁶² "Why the CIA and NSA Should Not be Excluded," 1.

Constitution]...were meant to apply to all Americans; not to all Americans with the exception of those employed by the Central Intelligence Agency.”⁶³

Senator Ervin’s testimony is compelling because he described just how invasive CIA’s questioning could be for applicants and employees. Ervin gave examples of questioning such as “how her bowels are, if she has diarrhea, if she loved her mother, if she goes to church every week...”⁶⁴ Speaking to the point about the CIA’s treatment of homosexuality, he asks, “Why should Congress grant these agencies the right to...strap young applicants to machines and ask them questions about their family, and personal lives such as—Have you ever engaged in homosexual activities?”⁶⁵ Ervin’s bill, S. 1035, would have prohibited agencies like the CIA from asking questions about three topics: “personal relationships with members of own family, matters of religion, attitudes and practices in matters of sex.” On this requirement, the CIA did gain some exemptions, though they had asked for a complete exemption. The CIA’s exemption was, however, quite broad; if the director of the agency “finds it necessary” to the mission of “promot[ing] national security,” investigators would be allowed to ask questions restricted by the legislation.⁶⁶

In agreement with the previous newspaper articles regarding the efficacy of polygraph tests, Ervin argued that basically every other department and agency in the U.S. federal government had stopped using them other than the CIA and NSA. Courts also would not allow polygraph test to be used as evidence because they weren’t necessarily accurate: an operator had to interpret the results and liars could pass the test as long as they were secure in their lie.

Various states across the country had also, by 1967, made it illegal to use polygraphs in

⁶³ “Why the CIA and NSA Should Not be Excluded,” 1.

⁶⁴ “Why the CIA and NSA Should Not be Excluded,” 2.

⁶⁵ “Why the CIA and NSA Should Not be Excluded,” 2.

⁶⁶ “Why the CIA and NSA Should Not be Excluded,” 3.

employment or hiring decisions.⁶⁷ Above all, according to Ervin, polygraphs violated “fundamental rights of American citizens to personal privacy.”⁶⁸ Ervin’s testimony supports other critiques of polygraphs present at the time.

Richard Helms, then Director of the CIA, was concerned about what the growing criticism of polygraphs might mean for the CIA’s ability to ensure security of the agency and foreign intelligence in the United States. In a 1967 letter to L. Mendel Rivers, the chairman on the Committee on Armed Services in the House of Representatives, Helms expressed his concerns about several aspects of S. 1035 involving the CIA and other agencies within the “intelligence community.”⁶⁹ Helms was concerned specifically with the fact that applicants or employees could only be asked about their religious or sexual beliefs when the director found it to be necessary for national security on a case-by-case basis, though it is unclear in Ervin’s description of this exemption whether the directors had to formally report their request to question a specific candidate.

While Ervin and other senators argued that the CIA’s use of polygraphs violated the constitutional rights of Americans, Helms argued that the CIA was, in fact, enthusiastic about defending the rights of Americans as well as national security. “The survival of our country as a free and democratic state,” Helms, argued depended on the CIA’s “ability to protect the security of our defensive plans and dispositions” and that “nothing [was] more important than the integrity, the high morale, and the competence of the men and women who work for [the CIA].”⁷⁰ In this regard, Helms mentioned homosexuality specifically. Drawing on an argument

⁶⁷ “Why the CIA and NSA Should Not be Excluded,” 3-4.

⁶⁸ “Why the CIA and NSA Should Not be Excluded,” 2.

⁶⁹ Richard Helms, “My Dear Mr. Chairman:,” September 25, 1967, CIA-RDP69B00369R000100230077-6, CREST, 1.

⁷⁰ Helms, “My Dear Mr. Chairman:,” 2.

the CIA had first made in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Helm's claimed, "[i]f a man has a past record of homosexual activity, that vulnerability is exploited by ruthless blackmail." In Helms' reasoning, the CIA should have special exemption to ask about these issues because, as he argued, "employment in the field of intelligence is subject to special risks and pressures to which the average Federal employee is not subjected."⁷¹ Richard Helms's main argument was that S. 1035, "if enacted, would be a most serious obstacle to the effective protection of intelligence sources and methods."⁷² However, despite Helms's protest, the bill was passed by the Senate in 1967. The Senate voted in support of the bill 79 to 4, meaning that all "government job applicants' did not need to submit to questioning about sex, religion, and personal relationships." Though Senator Ervin believed that the CIA should receive no exemption under this bill, the CIA ultimately did receive the aforementioned exemption in which they could ask about the three categories as long as it was to protect national security.⁷³

S. 1035, though passed by the Senate, was ultimately never passed by the House. Additionally, this bill was part of a series of bills pushed forth by Senator Ervin to protect rights of government employees. For example, a subsequent bill, S. 782 was introduced by Ervin to "protect the civilian employees of the executive branch of the United States Government in the enjoyment of their constitutional rights and to prevent unwarranted governmental invasions of their privacy." This bill was not passed either, though the Privacy Act of 1974 was, "serving as a

⁷¹ Helms, "My Dear Mr. Chairman:," 2.

⁷² Helms, "My Dear Mr. Chairman:," 6.

⁷³ "Senate Passes Bill Guarding Privacy of U.S. Employees," *New York Times*, September 15, 1967, CIA-RDP75-00149R000200590026-1, CREST.

“compromise” bill.⁷⁴ As such, the CIA went relatively unregulated in their use of polygraphs against their current and prospective employees.

Because of the “proposed Ervin Bill, recent Civil Service Commission hearings as well as court cases” and the fact that “current legislation pending” could make it a “criminal offense to ask questions” regarding sexuality, the CIA began questioning their own use of polygraphs.⁷⁵ In the 1970s, internal documents regarding the use of polygraphs in the CIA in relation to both homosexuality and employee rights more generally circulated within the agency. An April 1974 memorandum titled “Polygraph Policy Review” from the chief of the Security Support Division to the Deputy Director of Security commented “on the policy directives applicable to the use of the polygraph in CIA.”⁷⁶ In reference to a separate memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to the Director of Security, the CIA office responsible for the agency’s security protocols, from 1970 that discussed “the basic policy guidance for use of polygraph in CIA,” this memorandum provided comments and proposals for change.⁷⁷ As one example, the document spoke to the policy statement that “[t]he Director of Security shall establish adequate safeguards designed to prevent the unwarranted invasion of privacy.”⁷⁸ As a suggestion for change, this memorandum argued that the “inquiry into [an] individual’s attitudes and conduct with respect to sexual matters” should be removed from the line of questioning.⁷⁹ At the least, it argued for a change in wording so that a “qualifier be included in a recasting of guiding policy

⁷⁴ Emma North-Best, “CIA objected to the Federal Employee’s Bill of Rights on grounds it would interfere with Agency’s gay witch hunt,” *Muckrock*, last modified August 14, 2017, <https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2017/aug/14/cia-bill-of-rights/>.

⁷⁵ CIA, “Polygraph Policy Review,” April 25, 1974, CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050036-9, CREST, 3.

⁷⁶ CIA, “Polygraph Policy Review,” 1.

⁷⁷ CIA, “Polygraph Policy Review,” 1.; CIA, “Office of Security Functional Statement Office of the Director,” accessed March 12, 2023, CIA-RDP83B00823R000700010081-1, CREST.

⁷⁸ CIA, “Polygraph Policy Review,” 2.

⁷⁹ CIA, “Polygraph Policy Review,” 3.

on the polygraph to reflect a more liberal approach to the whole matter of sex as an issue of suitability.”⁸⁰

In May of 1974, the chief of the Interrogation Branch raised further questions about the legalities of the CIA’s use of polygraphs. In a memorandum to the Deputy Director of Security titled “Legal Issues, Interrogation Branch,” the chief focused, in particular, on legal issues involving polygraphs. One question included, “What is the Agency position with regard to employment of homosexuals?” given that the Civil Service Commission had “recently ruled that homosexuality, per se, [was] not grounds to deny employment under Civil Service regulations.”⁸¹ Additionally, given that homosexuality was illegal in states like Virginia and DC, he asked whether, if someone confesses to a crime like “homosexual activity,” would that mean a person was “testifying against himself.”⁸² Other questions involved “invasion of privacy” and “relevance of the Fifth Amendment.”⁸³

The Civil Service Commission ruling mentioned in this memorandum was also discussed in a separate 1975 CIA memorandum. In this memorandum, the Office of Security thought that the CIA “should continue to maintain its current position on homosexuality thus giving the benefit of any doubt to the protection of the national interest and the Agency.”⁸⁴ The current position, of course, was that being homosexual was “grounds for denial of employment or discharge.”⁸⁵ In contrast, the Office of Personnel felt “less certain” on the issue. They argued that there should be different treatment for existing employees in the agency with a good track record

⁸⁰ CIA, “Polygraph Policy Review,” 3-4.

⁸¹ CIA, “Legal Issues, Interrogation Branch,” May 10, 1974, CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050044-0, CREST, 2.

⁸² CIA, “Legal Issues, Interrogation Branch,” 1.

⁸³ CIA, “Legal Issues, Interrogation Branch,” 3.

⁸⁴ CIA, “Civil Service Commission Guidelines on Homosexuality,” July 31, 1975, CIA-RDP79-00498A000200120049-3, CREST, 2.

⁸⁵ CIA, “Civil Service Commission Guidelines on Homosexuality,” 2.

who were homosexual and simply applicants, with no standing in the CIA, who were homosexual. Essentially, they believed there should be the possibility to continue employment for homosexual employees who have no apparent reason to not continue to do a good job, though homosexual applicants should continue to be treated as less reliable. Additionally, the Office of Personnel believed that a “‘total prohibition’ policy” on homosexuality would cause legal issues if a homosexual employee were to fight discharge, but if the employee were to continue working, it could impact their coworkers and the environment negatively. The Office of Personnel saw several conflicts in the homosexual policy. They thought that homosexual employees with a good track record should be considered in a more potentially positive way. Additionally, they thought that firing homosexual employees no matter what may cause legal action from the fired employee, but on the other hand, if a homosexual employee were to continue their position, it would affect the workplace negatively.⁸⁶ Because of these varying views, the Office of Personnel couldn’t decide whether the policy should continue. Despite this conflict between divisions of the CIA, questions from the media, and Congress, the CIA maintained their usage of polygraphs and employment discrimination of homosexuals.

An example of this continuation can be found in a 1985 document titled “Security Implications of Polygraph-Derived Homosexual Fantasies,” that consists of a speech by an unknown person, most likely a CIA psychiatrist. This document is important in analyzing how polygraphs fit into the enforcement of anti-homosexual employment practices in the CIA, as well as the longevity to the use of polygraphs. It outlines how, according to the CIA, “[e]vidence of...[adult homosexual] activity” was an “adequate basis for summary dismissal from Agency employment or for disqualification from consideration for such a position.” To support this, there

⁸⁶ CIA, “Civil Service Commission Guidelines on Homosexuality,” 2-3.

were “medical” and security reasons described as to why homosexuals may be unfit for their positions within the agency, such as “vulnerability to blackmail,” “security risk[s],” and “character defect[s].”⁸⁷ Therefore, the speaker argued that there were several reasons a homosexual should not be employed by the CIA. However, this document focuses less on the activity itself and more on what the *fantasies* of homosexual activity could mean for an individual. The speaker stated that “polygraph interviewers have elicited, from an increasing number of subjects, reports or post-adolescent homosexual fantasies in the absence of actual homosexual activity.” But because these polygraphs gained more information about the fantasies rather than the activity itself, this speaker didn’t say that the fantasies alone should require dismissal, but he did say that there is an “inherent significance” to them.⁸⁸

In support of his point that homosexual fantasies were important to polygraph examinations and determination of employment, he offered three (graphic) examples of interviews with people who confessed fantasies. For each example, other circumstances made the fantasies more important, meaning that homosexual fantasies were not the only factors considered. The homosexual fantasies, when paired with suspicious activity, such as drug or alcohol use, was cause for more concern, though the speaker acknowledges this may vary by case.⁸⁹ For example, one interviewee, “Miss D” traveled and communicated with individuals in “communist bloc countries” as well as had adult homosexual fantasies.⁹⁰ Overall, the speaker said that “to the best of [their] knowledge, to date, each recent applicant who has disclosed the presence of homosexual fantasies in the pre-polygraph interview or during the polygraph

⁸⁷ CIA, “Security Implications of Polygraph-Derived Homosexual Fantasies,” December 9, 1985, CIA-RDP88G00186R000400410003-4, CREST, 2.

⁸⁸ CIA, “Security Implications,” 2.

⁸⁹ CIA, “Security Implications,” 2.

⁹⁰ CIA, “Security Implications,” 2.

examination itself has, for one reason or another, been ultimately disqualified.” Even though other factors may impact the decision to hire or not fire a person with homosexual fantasies, the speaker believed that no one who had homosexual fantasies was able to be employed by the CIA. They said, “[t]he polygraph is a uniquely valuable tool for the elucidation of painful, embarrassing, shameful, or otherwise unwelcome issues that might otherwise not come to light.”⁹¹ Of course, this is one of the main arguments against the polygraph exam that was outlined by Senator Ervin and the newspaper articles, as well as the internal CIA memos. These polygraphs involved invasion of privacy for applicants and employees alike.

Conclusion

The Central Intelligence has a vast and aggressive history of contributing to the Lavender Scare, that is, employment discrimination of homosexual people on the basis that they believed them to be security risks, immoral, and unreliable from the 1950s through the 1980s. The evidence of their decision to not hire, fire, or deny security clearances to homosexuals is supported by the agency’s internal memorandums, newspaper articles, congressional hearings, and homosexuals, like Julie Dubbs, who challenged their treatment by the CIA. Polygraph exams as well as a lack of internal and external regulation of the agency’s hiring practices enabled the CIA to continue to rely on their beliefs about the character and practices of homosexuals three decades after the “Red” and Lavender Scare had become a part of U.S. political culture.

The history of employment discrimination is crucial to remember in light of the CIA’s recent push for inclusivity in their hiring process and the fact that discrimination based on sexuality, though not necessarily involving employment, in the CIA is still present. The

⁹¹ CIA, “Security Implications,” 9.

executive order that Eisenhower signed in 1953 that enabled the spread of the Lavender Scare was not revoked officially until 1995 when an executive order issued by President Bill Clinton stated that, “[n]o interference concerning standards [for government employment] may be raised solely on the basis of the sexual orientation of the employee.”⁹²

It’s crucial to remember just how recent the Lavender Scare occurred, at least officially marked by Eisenhower and Clinton’s executive order, especially given continuing discrimination in the CIA. In 2015, Brett Jones, a former Navy SEAL alleged that he faced homophobia, including slurs, derogatory remarks about gay marriage, and a “crass PowerPoint presentation,” during his time as a CIA contractor. The homophobia came from “a group of contractors and civil servants in the CIA’s Global Response Staff.” Because of the homophobic discrimination he faced, he “feared for his safety” and returned home from his deployment early. Though the CIA did come out and “condemn” this discrimination, saying that the agency had a “Zero Tolerance Policy” against “such behavior,” that the discrimination happened in an agency that had fought attempts to rollback its homophobic hiring practices is perhaps unsurprising. In many ways, Jones’ experience in 2015 is indicative of the ways that the homophobia that was deeply engrained in the agency from the 1950s through the 1980s lives on in the CIA.⁹³

The Central Intelligence Agency’s recent “Humans of CIA” campaign—an attempt to address the image of the CIA and who the agency is open to employing—is not explicit about the agency’s homophobic past. The campaign series, which sought to paint the agency as a diverse and accepting place to work, included an ad which featured a gay “agency librarian” who feared

⁹² Joey Del Ponte, “Well into the ‘80s, the CIA was still using polygraphs to root out gay employees,” *Muckrock*, last modified May 11, 2018, <https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2018/may/11/cia-polygraph/>.

⁹³ Joshua Stewart, “Former SEAL alleges anti-gay harassment in CIA,” *The San Diego Union-Tribune*, July 28, 2015, <https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/military/sdut-navy-seal-cia-anti-gay-harassment-deployment-2015jul28-story.html>.

he would not be able to be open about his sexuality in the workplace. To his surprise, as he describes in the ad, he felt very accepted, citing an anecdote when he took his “oath at the CIA and [he] noticed a rainbow on then-Director [John] Brennan’s lanyard.” Perhaps in recognition that rainbow pins can’t make up for several decades of discrimination, the librarian in the ad further claimed that “[o]fficers from the top down work hard to ensure that every single person, whatever their gender, gender identity, race, disability, or sexual orientation, can bring their entire self to work every day.” The “Humans of the CIA” campaign immediately received bipartisan criticism. From the right, criticism stemmed from homophobia. From the left, criticism stemmed from the CIA’s history of mistreatment of LGBTQ+ individuals.⁹⁴ Given the CIA’s recent push to seem more inclusive, including to members of the LGBTQ+ community, it’s crucial to remember the history behind these recent choices. The CIA’s history of discrimination against homosexuals cannot be forgotten in their road to redemption.

⁹⁴ Emma Powys Maurice, “Gay CIA employee ‘stunned’ by rainbow in another cringe-inducing recruitment ad,” *PinkNews*, last modified May 11, 2021, <https://www.thepinknews.com/2021/05/11/cia-woke-recruitment-advert-gay-librarian-humans-of-cia-video/>.

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