

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: TRANSACTIONAL ALLIES: THE CASE OF
U.S.-SAUDI ARABIA RELATIONS

Hamad Althunayyan
Doctor of Philosophy, 2020

Dissertation directed by: Dr. Shibley Telhami
Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development
Department of Government and Politics

This research (1) probes the argument that the regional level of analysis explains Saudi external behavior better than the global level of analysis, and (2) evaluates whether the degree of alignment of policy preferences provides a better explanatory power in understanding U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations than does the independent effect of the security hierarchy between the two. Applying the four hypothesis on the security hierarchy advanced by David Lake (2009) to qualitative case studies examining eight exogenous shocks to U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations over the span of 43 years, I present the following findings: (1) The global level played a more significant role than did the regional level in shaping the Saudi external behavior to regional events as well as influencing the geopolitics of the Gulf. (2) The level of security hierarchy between Riyadh and Washington does not explain Saudi Arabia's defense behavior. (3) The alignment of policy preferences has a more explanatory

power than does the level of security hierarchy in explaining the likelihood of Saudi Arabia joining the U.S. wartime coalition and explaining American support to the Kingdom in an interstate conflict, as well as Saudi Arabia's compliance with U.S. oil requests. Overall, the level of security hierarchy between Riyadh and Washington does not fully explain Saudi external behavior. Finally, this work challenges the explanatory power of the notion of security hierarchy and highlights the importance of assessing state preferences beyond those emanating from the distribution of power.

TRANSACTIONAL ALLIES: THE CASE OF U.S.-SAUDI ARABIA
RELATIONS

by

Hamad Althunayyan

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2020

Advisory Committee:

Dr. Shibley Telhami, Chair

Dr. Gregory Gause

Dr. Ernesto Calvo

Dr. Calvert Jones

Dr. Sahar Khamis, Dean's Representative

© Copyright by
Hamad Althunayyan
2020

Dedication

To my parents, Nawal and Anwar.

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor and head of dissertation committee, Dr. Shibley Telhami. His relentless guidance and feedback were key in developing the direction of my dissertation. He always went the extra-mile to provide useful resources and introduce me to policy-makers relevant to my dissertation topic and beyond. Throughout the many years of my graduate career, I have always found the wise advice and solid support from him. I was fortunate to have Dr. Telhami as my advisor and mentor, and I am very much grateful for that.

I would also like to thank Dr. Gregory Gause for his outstanding assistance in moving my dissertation forward. His insight on U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations was extremely helpful in choosing the qualitative cases used in the dissertation as well as framing the argument. He was gracious with his time and advice along the way.

In addition, I would like to give my outmost gratitude to the other three committee members: Dr. Ernesto Calvo, Dr. Calvert Jones, and Dr. Sahar Khamis (Dean's Representative). Their valuable time and important suggestions were instrumental for my project. It is truly an honor to have all these five esteemed scholars serve on my dissertation committee.

Moreover, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to the faculty at the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland-College Park for the enriching educational journey as a graduate student. I also like to extend a special thank you to Ann Marie Clark, former coordinator at Graduate Studies, and Brittany Kyser, Program Coordinator and Executive Assistant at The Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development. They have always gone above and beyond to facilitate the administrative work, and I would have been lost without them.

Last but not least, I would like to acknowledge the Kuwait University's generous sponsorship during my PhD career. Their trust and support is very much appreciated.

Finally, I would like to say big thank you to my family and friends for their unwavering support throughout the past years. My parents played an integral role in achieving what I have accomplished. I cannot finish this acknowledgment without recognizing my dear friend and colleague, Amal Altwaijri. Her help was extremely useful and heartfelt.

Table of Contents

Dedication	ii
Acknowledgements	iii
Table of Contents	v
List of Tables	vii
List of Figures	viii
List of Abbreviations	ix
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
1.1 Organization of Dissertation Project	7
Chapter 2: Literature Review, Theory, and Alternative Test	8
2.1 Level of Analysis: Regional Versus Global	8
2.1.1 Critique to Arguments of the Regional Level of Analysis	8
2.1.2 Critique of Regional Theories	12
2.1.3 The Impact of the Regional and Global Levels on the Gulf Cooperation Council	17
2.2 International System: Hierarchy Versus Anarchy	20
2.2.1 Explaining Hierarchy in the International System	22
2.2.2 Critique of Hierarchy	26
2.3 Alternative Test: Alignment -or No alignment- of Policy Preferences	33
2.3.1 Presenting the Four Hypotheses	39
Chapter 3: Research Design	41
3.1 Qualitative Case Study: Why Focus on the U.S.-Saudi Arabia Relations?	41
3.2 Methodology and Data	47
3.3 Coding for the Level of Security Hierarchy	52
Chapter 4: Case Studies	55
4.1 The 1973 Arab-Israeli War	55
4.1.1 Policy Preferences: Not Aligned	55
4.1.2 Discussing the Four Hypotheses	63
4.2 The 1975 Soviet Intrusion in the Arab World and Sub-Saharan Africa	67
4.2.1 Policy Preferences: Aligned	67
4.2.2 Discussing the Four Hypotheses	76
4.3 The 1979 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan	83
4.3.1 Policy Preferences: Aligned	83
4.3.2 Discussing the Four Hypotheses	87
4.4 The 1990 Iraq Invasion of Kuwait	96
4.4.1 Policy Preferences: Aligned	96
4.4.2 Discussing the Four Hypotheses	104
4.5 Pre-2003 Iraq War (Israeli-Palestinian Conflict) and Post-Saddam (Increasing Iranian Influence in Iraq)	112
4.5.1 Policy Preferences: Aligned in Pre-Iraq War and Not Aligned in Post- Saddam	112
4.5.2 Discussing the Policy Preferences	123
4.6 The Obama Factor: Iran Nuclear Program and the Arab Spring	130
4.6.1 Policy Preferences: Aligned	130

4.6.2 Discussing the Four Hypotheses	137
Chapter 5: Main Findings, Conclusion, and Future Research	141
5.1 Assessing the Regional Versus the Global Analysis	141
5.2 Assessing the Security Hierarchy Versus Alignment of Policy Preferences ..	144
5.2.1 First Hypothesis	146
5.2.2 Second Hypothesis.....	150
5.2.3 Third Hypothesis.....	151
5.2.4 Fourth Hypothesis	152
5.3 Conclusion	157
5.4 Future Research	161
Appendices.....	162
Bibliography	164

List of Tables

Table 1. Summary of Argument.....	33
Table 2. Coding for the Level of Security Hierarchy for the Periods Under Study.....	54
Table 3. Testing the impact of Security Hierarchy Level in comparison to the alignment of Policy Preferences on the Four Hypotheses	145

List of Figures

- Figure 1.** Time Series of Total Saudi Defense Spending and Total Saudi Arms Imports from 1969 to 2018.....148
- Figure 2.** Tanks, Aircrafts, and Military Personnel for Saudi Arabia from 1970 to 2020.....148
- Figure 3.** Saudi Oil Production, U.S. Oil Imports from Saudi Arabia, and World Oil Price from 1973 to 2019 with Reference to the Exogenous Shocks.....155

List of Abbreviations

AWACS - Airborne Warning and Control System

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

EIA – Energy Information Agency

GCC – Gulf Cooperation Council

OAPEC – Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries

OIC – Organization of Islamic Cooperation

OPEC – Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

RSC – Regime Security Complex

SIPRI – Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

WMEAT – World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer

Chapter 1: Introduction

U.S.–Saudi Arabia relations have always been a subject of debate in political science (Bronson 2008; Cordesman 1981 and 2003; and Gause 2009). Some in the Arab region believe that the United States' clout to a large degree affects the Kingdom's policy, but another view in the United States holds that Riyadh influences American foreign policy. These two views, however, hinder us from examining the transactional nature of the relationship. Evidence from real events suggest this puzzling relationship; for example, why did King Faisal decide to place an oil embargo on the U.S. and the West after they supported Israel in the 1973 war with the Arab States? Why were the Saudis more responsive to U.S. demands regarding oil policies during the Soviet war in Afghanistan? Why did King Fahad accommodate U.S. requests after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait? Why was the Saudi government less responsive to President Bush's oil requests in the aftermath of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq?

Although the two countries are on opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of values, many questions that arise only highlight the strategic importance of each country for the other. This paradox sheds light on the complex relationship between them. It also raises the following question: *Why is a regional ally to a great power more compliant with the great power's*

demands at certain times, and not at others? In other words, how does the external behavior of a great power influence the external behavior of its regional ally?

These questions are at the core of the research agenda on state behavior in international relations. However, there is a division in political science. The first divergence in opinion relates to whether regional politics supersedes external actors' influence. Regionalists believe that the politics of any given region is the product of, first and foremost, the regional actors that comprise it (Buzan and Waever 2003). This approach, however, does not fully explore the impact of a great power on the behavior of its regional ally or on the outcome of regional events as a whole. It treats all regions equally, with no particular attention to specific traits, such as regions with high reserves of natural resources.

The second divergence revolves around whether state preferences could be explained in terms of the security hierarchy in the international system. Almost all schools of international relations view the international system as anarchic, and a central authority over any given state is lacking (Waltz 2010; Art and Jervis 2015). While neorealism, for instance, is not a theory of foreign policy, the premises of this school often fall short of explaining why the dynamic relations between a great power and its regional ally often change solely based on the relative distribution of capabilities (i.e., power; see

Telhami 2002 and Waltz 1996). It agrees with the notion that there is “no government over governments” in the international system (Clause 1971, p. 14; also see Mearsheimer 2001). However, the realist school’s approach toward foreign policy does not preclude us from probing state preferences. In fact, we cannot understand U.S.–Saudi Arabia relations merely by the distribution of power— a point that is crucial for this dissertation, as I discuss later.

David Lake (2009) has argued that hierarchy could exist dyadically in the international system, and the relationship between State A (dominant) and State B (subordinate) could construct a social order in which the former gains authority and influence over the latter, who reciprocates with what he calls “symbolic obeisance.”¹ This relationship creates a “relational authority,” which, for State A, is deemed to be legitimate and self-enforcing by State B.² A higher security hierarchy corresponds to more compliance from State B with State A’s demands and vice versa. In conceptualizing the security hierarchy, Lake uses two measurements: (1) the presence of State A’s (the great power’s) military troops in State B and (2) the presence of independent alliances in State B. His work, however, fails to explore the preferences of states and the leverage State B has over State A.

¹ According to Lake, symbolic obeisance is an act(s) performed by State B to State A. It can take different forms, but it is public and costly.

² Throughout this paper, I refer to the great power as “State A” and “the dominant state”. The terms “State B” and “the subordinate state” are used to describe the regional ally of State A.

This research is directly applied to eight historical exogenous shocks on U.S.–Saudi relations from 1973 to 2016 for the following reasons. First, this approach probes the impact of the regional level versus the global level in these events. Second, it tests Lake’s notion of the level of security hierarchy in reference to his four hypotheses to explore (1) the Saudi defense spending pattern, (2) Saudi Arabia joining the U.S. wartime coalition, (3) the U.S. supporting Saudi Arabia militarily or diplomatically in an interstate conflict, and (4) Saudi compliance with U.S. oil demands. Third, I introduce a new independent variable, the alignment—or non-alignment—of policy preferences between the two states.

My main argument is as follows: *The alignment of policy preferences between State A and State B better explains State B’s behavior than does the level of security hierarchy. When their policy preferences converge, State B is more likely to comply with State A. When their policy preferences diverge, State B is less likely to comply. I contend that the degree of policy preferences’ alignment better captures compliance by consent. Hence, higher levels of security hierarchy, as presented by Lake, do not necessarily result in higher compliance from State B. Lower levels of security hierarchy do not necessarily lead to lower compliance from State B. I also present theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence to show different patterns of behavior from those predicted in Lake’s book Hierarchy in International Relations.*

Using a qualitative methodology to understand the causal mechanisms, I examine how eight exogenous shocks to U.S.–Saudi relations affected the alignment of policy preferences between the two states. I then explore how they altered Saudi and American behavior in response to the four hypotheses presented. This research is focused on the expressed policy preference of both countries before and after the events under study. Nonetheless, this work does neither deal with the sources of the policy preference of the respective states nor offer a theory about the origin of preferences.

The main theoretical contribution of this research is that it uses a qualitative case study to test the hierarchal argument, and it demonstrates that cooperation between states is better explained by examining the state preferences outside of the distribution of power and the measures put forward by the security hierarchy argument. I contend that examining the alignment of policy preferences validates the emphasis on state preferences. Even realists acknowledge that state preferences (whatever they might be) are important (Walt 1990). This research bridges the gap between the two approaches. It also notes that cooperation between states is more likely when their policy preferences are aligned, regardless of how both sides shape these preferences. This dissertation highlights the importance of state preferences in international relations and contributes to that body of research.

In addition, it shows the utility of a qualitative methodology that delves into the preferences of states to illuminate better the understanding of relations between states. Further, this project updates the scholarly work on U.S.–Saudi relations to understand their historical context. More than 100 original archival documents and interviews with former Saudi and U.S. officials were used in this work. It contributes to our understanding of Saudi foreign policy and of the role of the U.S. in the Middle East.

1.1 Organization of Dissertation Project

Chapter 2 delivers a critique of the literature on regional arguments and hierarchy in the international system, and it provides an alternative test by which to understand the relations between a great power and its regional ally in relation to the four hypotheses under study.

Chapter 3 discusses the research design and why I chose to conduct a qualitative case study on U.S.-Saudi relations; it also addresses the methodology and data, as well as codes for the level of security hierarchy between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia as conceptualized by Lake.

Chapter 4 offers an analytical overview of eight case studies (i.e., exogenous shocks) on U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations over more than 43 years. This overview discusses the alignment or lack thereof of policy preferences between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and how it relates to the four hypotheses presented in chapter 2.

Chapter 5 highlights the main findings in the previous chapter in relation to the regional versus global level of analysis. It then analyzes the four hypotheses in light of the security hierarchy argument compared to the alignment of policy preferences. It concludes with an overview of the research conclusion and several suggestions for future research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review, Theory, and Alternative Test

The main question we try to answer in the field of international relations is why states behave the way they do. This section reviews the academic scholarship on regionalism, anarchy in the international system, Lake's hierarchy in international relations theory, and its limitations.

2.1 Level of Analysis: Regional Versus Global

The study of regionalism in scholarly work in the field of political science has increased in recent decades. As Mansfield and Solingen (2010) have noted, however, scholars have not agreed on a single definition of the concept of "region." While most academics characterize regions in terms of geographical closeness, common cultural and political affinities, a high level of interaction, and shared threats (Russett 1967 and Thompson 1973), others resort to behaviorally constructed measures derived from social norms and domestic actors decision-making (Risse-Kappen 1995; Solingen 1998; Katzenstein 2005).

2.1.1 Critique to Arguments of the Regional Level of Analysis

Many regionalists have attempted to analyze security through a regional perspective (Buzan and Waever 2003; Lake 1997; Lemke 2002). They have argued that the regional level of analysis is the most significant in explaining the politics of a region (Buzan and Segal 1996; Buzan and Waever 2003; also

see Stein and Lobell 1997). Their argument puts more weight on regional actors than on global players in explaining the politics of a region. We now discuss the main reasons for which, according to Kelly (2007), regionalists affirm the importance of using regional level analysis.

The first argument claims that a state is more concerned with other states in its vicinity because threats travel less over distance. This leads to a vibrant regional dynamic. However, some threats can transcend regions and impact the interests of great powers. Several studies (Cha 2000; Barkawi, and Lafey 1999) have argued that international actors can be drawn into regions due to aspects of globalization (e.g., wars, terrorism, the pursuit of natural resources). The greater Middle East, home of more than a third of the world's hydrocarbon reserves, the land of three major wars in contemporary history, and the birthplace of Al-Qaeda and ISIS, falls into this category. It is true that not all states can project power and hegemony over distance. Nevertheless, history has shown us that few capable states have been able to exercise power far from home (e.g., Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union).

Secondly, regionalists rightly contend that systemic theories often omit the regional states' ability to draw great powers into their own regional battles (Acharya 1992). In their view, regional states can use many tactics to impose their preferences on great powers. While I agree that this imposition is possible, this argument assumes that all regime types use the same means in

forming alliances with an external great power and for the same end goals. We also need to consider two main elements: (1) the preferences of the great power and (2) the ability of the great power to shape the regional environment in a way that alters the preferences of local actors. A great power does not fight on behalf of any regional state with no interests attached. For this reason, I assert the importance of exploring the policy preferences of both the great power and its regional ally state.

The third claim is that the indifference to regional dynamics implicitly echoes colonialism. Some have argued that this echo indicates the bias of mainstream American political scientists, which is based on a preconceived notion of an American superiority in the international system (Buzan and Waever 2003). The view on the U.S. hegemony in the region is also prevalent in the work of many Middle Eastern scholars. This argument, however, disregards regions that were susceptible to a long history of colonization and dependency on a foreign power for protection. These regions are more likely to be easily penetrated by great powers (e.g., the Middle East). In turn, this gives external powers more leverage in shaping regional politics. Hence, the global level is directly involved in shaping the security constellation of the region.

Finally, regionalists argue that the primacy of the regional level of analysis stems from great powers' increasing inability to project sustainable power and hegemony over regions, citing domestic opposition to power overlay within

great power states and social mobilization within regional states as reasons for this trend (See Buzan and Waever 2003 and Katzenstein 2005). They also give credit to the decline of superpower rivalry after the end of the Cold War (Buzan and Waever 2003; Lake 1997; Stein and Lobell 1997), when many great powers became more invested in their own domestic politics (Buzan and Segal 1996). Hence, great powers became less and less interested in penetrating other countries.

This argument, however, do not pay close attention to regional variation in terms of material resources, security environment, and importance to external powers. In other words, it treats the U.S. meddling in the South Asian region (e.g., U.S.-Japan relations) the same way the U.S. was involved in the Gulf region (e.g., U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations). The assumption Buzan and Waever (2003) have advanced, for example, that the conditions of the post-Cold War world will increase the significance of the regional level of analysis for security, is null when applied to the Gulf Security environment; how can one explain the 2003 Iraq War without the United States? In addition, this argument overlooks modern warfare tactics (e.g., unmanned drones and cyberwar) that make domestic opposition within great powers less costly. The U.S. campaign against Al-Qaeda in Yemen is an apt example. It is not likely that this approach is generalizable to all regions.

2.1.2 Critique of Regional Theories

The above discussion concerns the arguments for the regional level of analysis. Let us briefly discuss three main theories of regional security (Buzan and Waever 2003; Lake and Morgan 1997; Lemke 2002).

First, Buzan and Waever (2003) introduced the regional security complex (RSC) theory, defining such a complex as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (p. 44). The regional security constellation is derived from (1) domestic factors (degree of stateness),³ (2) state-to-state relations, (3) the relationship between neighboring RSCs, and (4) the relationship between the RSC and the global level. While Buzan and Waever (2003) shy away from systemic theory, they still employ some basic neorealist assumptions.

The RSC is defined by both the distribution of power and the level of enmity and amity. RSCs are also anarchic in nature because they consist of two or more autonomous units. Territoriality is key for defining the boundaries of RSCs, and adjacency increases security interaction between states. In addition, the traditional view of RSCs revolves around securitization because

³ The degree of stateness is defined as strong or weak in response to the stability of the domestic order and sociopolitical cohesion between civil society and governmental institutions within a state (Buzan and Waever 2003).

“most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones” (Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan and Waever 2003, p. 12).

Each RSC is composed of the “fears and aspirations of the separate units” (Buzan and Waever 2003, p.43). Hence, RSCs are to be examined through the “lens of security.” Security interdependence among regionally clustered units makes them a security complex. Security is defined by the regional actors (how they interpret it), and security practices are mapped accordingly. Their definition of security, however, precludes us from incorporating non-territorial security issues (e.g., the safe flow of Gulf oil to global markets) in their theoretical framework and how these issues might incentivize outside great powers to engage a region more actively.

Great powers do have the capability to penetrate these RSCs. Buzan and Waever (2003) have described the mechanism of penetration as when outside powers “make security alignments with states within an RSC” (p. 46, see also Buzan et al. 1998). Therefore, external powers are more likely to penetrate regions with high levels of rivalry to establish a balance of power. However, they do not allow outside great powers to be part of the RSC. I think this is quite problematic, as the Gulf security complex cannot be explained without including the United States.

Buzan and Waever (2003) have suggested that the RSC theory is useful in combatting the tendency to overemphasize the effect of great powers to grant the regional factors proper attention in security analysis. While this could be true for several regions, I think their main caveat is that they overlook regions where geopolitics is more impacted by the global level.

In contrast to Buzan and Waever (2003), I argue that outside powers can sometimes define, securitize, or reorganize the region and ultimately define the pattern of conflict. While Buzan has argued that regional actors shape the pattern of amity and enmity, I argue that Gulf regional politics are the product of great-power interventions. The security practice of the regional actors does construct the RSC (Buzan and Waever 2003), but I contend that outside great powers could influence the practices of regional actors.

In the second theory Lake and Morgan (1997) have advanced, the RSC is composed of a group of states marked by security interaction over a certain threat (see also Lake and Morgan 2010). This interaction produces what Lake and Morgan (1997) have called security “externalities.” Their approach dismisses the territorial proximity definition of a region as presented by Buzan and Waever (2003). The strong aspect of Lake and Morgan’s (1997) systemic theory is that they allow outside great powers to be part of the regional security externality. Hence, they free themselves from Buzan and Waever’s (2003) mechanism of penetration and overlay. In addition, they do not advocate for

the regional level of analysis. Their theoretical framework, however, could produce an endless number of “regions” over many security issues. This production not only blurs the line between the global and regional levels, but it also questions the foundational aspect of what comprises a region.

Third, Lemke (2002) has revised Organski’s (1958) power transition theory and applied it to regional subsystems. He identifies them as multiple local hierarchies, each composed of adjacently clustered states with high security interaction, within the international system. In every local hierarchy, there is a “local dominant state supervising local relations, by establishing and striving to preserve a local status quo” (Lemke 2002, p. 49). Peace is highly likely to be maintained when the local dominant state’s power is superior to all others. The chance of war, however, increases when a locally dissatisfied state’s power reaches a state of power parity with the dominant member.

While Lemke (2002) agrees with Buzan and Waever’s (2003) condition of territorial proximity for a region as well as supporting the regional level of analysis, he also shares Lake and Morgan’s (1997) emphasis on security interaction and the state’s power-projection capabilities. Lemke also acknowledges that outside great powers could intervene in the region to change or maintain the status quo. He clearly acknowledges that outside great powers must be neutral toward the local hierarchy so that its dynamic behavior parallels the great power’s behavior within the international system. I find his

close attention to how outside great powers can impact the balance of power within a region to be consistent with my line of argument.

In sum, Buzan and Waeber (2003) do not consider great powers to be members of a regime's security complex. Other scholars, however, have emphasized the importance of outside great powers' role in regional politics, considering them part of the RSC (Gause 2009 and Lake 1997).⁴ Lake (1997, p. 36), for example, has shown that some RSCs are more susceptible to outside parties' intervention and to being "highly competitive and conflict prone." Indeed, we cannot explain the outcome of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the 1991 Gulf War that followed without considering the global level enshrined in the U.S. role and in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

I think it is equally important to explore the policy preferences between the outside great power and the regional actors. The latter captures the relationship between great (outside) power and regional powers within the complex. The more the regional state needs a great power for survival (i.e., security), the more influence this great power exerts on the RSC. Hence, I believe this account captures the interchange between global and regional levels.

⁴ Gause (2009) considers the U.S. to be a member of the Gulf security complex.

While I agree with the regionalists that regional actors are important, I think that, sometimes, regional geopolitics could be the product of great-power intervention. The Middle East falls into this category. In fact, not only is it the case that external foreign powers are still interested in the oil-rich Gulf region, but also all six Arab Gulf states are dependent, to varying degrees, on security relations with foreign powers.⁵ In fact, Saudi external behavior cannot be explained without putting the different U.S. regional policies into perspective (see Gause 2009).

2.1.3 The Impact of the Regional and Global Levels on the Gulf Cooperation Council

To elaborate more on the impact of an outside great power on a regional international organization, I would like to briefly discuss how the United States affected the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Doing so shows us how an outside great power influences the security practices of regional actors.

The GCC is a regional international organization comprised of six states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain. It was established in 1981 out of fear of their two neighbors: Iraq under Saddam Hussein and the newly born Islamic Republic of Iran. As stated in its charter, the main purpose of the GCC is to achieve “coordination, cooperation, and integration in all fields in order to reach unity between them [all

⁵ Gulf States: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar.

members]” (GCC Charter, Article IV). It was an early attempt to build a collective security body.

The establishment of the GCC stemmed from regional dynamics, where the balance of power favored both Iraq and Iran. The membership of the GCC excluded two capitals, Baghdad and Tehran, due to the perception that they posed a potential threat to their own security. Taking the Cold War rivalry into consideration, the six Gulf leaders decided to have the first GCC secretary from Kuwait because this country had positive diplomatic relations with both Washington and Moscow. The GCC leaders tasked the Kuwaiti foreign minister, then Sh. Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, with traveling to Moscow in order to assure the Soviets that the GCC was not an anti-Soviet bloc. This series of events demonstrates that the GCC leaders sought to remain neutral in the eyes of great powers in the early stages of GCC formation.

While the balance of power theory can predict the GCC states’ balancing act against their neighbors, it cannot help explain their behavior (see Walt 1990). For example, it cannot explain why the GCC states viewed the American military presence as less threatening than that of the Egyptian or Syrian armies. The theory also presumes that weak states are more likely to bandwagon with an emerging external threat. However, the six Arab Gulf states opted to form a regional security arrangement to balance their neighbors. They also established the Peninsula shield force in 1984, but it

proved ineffective in deterring the Iraqi military's aggression on Kuwait in 1990.

The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the most significant challenge to the GCC as a regional security organization. While all GCC states opposed the invasion, they lacked the ability to reverse it. Here, the global level reveals its importance. If the U.S. and UK did not signal a credible military commitment to liberate Kuwait and defend GCC states, the GCC might not have been able to achieve the Doha Declaration stating their commitment “to pursue the liberation of Kuwait by all necessary means according to UNSC resolutions, the refusal to award aggression, the full withdrawal from Kuwait, and the return of legitimacy [to the Government of Kuwait]” (Bishara 2005, p. 436). This event convinced the GCC leaders of two factors: (1) the importance of bolstering security partnership with an outside great power, and (2) the inadequacy of their regional security arrangement in combatting threats (Koch 2010). Without U.S. and Western intervention, the security practices (i.e., responses) of the GCC states would have differed due to their own power limitations.

In the following section, I discuss the international relations debate on anarchy and hierarchy in the international system.

2.2 International System: Hierarchy Versus Anarchy

In terms of hierarchy, almost all scholars of international relations perceive global politics as anarchic (Lake 2009a). As Schmidt (1998, p. 16) has noted, “international relations have always been guided by a conception of politics without central authority.” According to Waltz (1979, p. 88), “none are entitled to command, none are required to obey.” All different brands of realism and liberalism subscribe to this notion. The former school stresses that states seek power, self-preservation, and influence (Morgenthau 1950; Waltz 1979; Walt 1990; Zakaria 1999; Mearsheimer 2001). This last aspect highlights that international institutions that facilitate economic cooperation can overcome anarchy (Oye 1985 and Keohane 2011). The constructivists, on the other hand, see anarchy as a social construct that depends on states’ interpretations of it (Wendt 1999). Almost all of these schools consider the state to be the higher authority in a system that lacks authority; put differently, no state can have a central authority over another.

Early attempts to highlight the hierarchal nature of the international system have appeared in power transition theory. Organski (1958) divides states into four types: dominant, great, medium, and small. The dominant state, he argues, has the resource capability to determine the rules and norms of the international system due to its position of power. Conflict is more likely when a dissatisfied state reaches power parity with the dominant state (Kugler and Organski 1989). Otherwise, peace is likely to be maintained. Some studies

have also applied this hierarchal concept to regional conflicts (Lemke and Werner 1996; also see Lemke 2002); see also Gilpin's (1988) work on the "hierarchy of prestige" as it reflects the dominant's state credibility and the distribution of power within a system.

Other scholars have acknowledged the presence and importance of hierarchy in understanding relations within the international system (see Mattern et al. 2016). For example, Frieden (1994) has shown that stronger forms of hierarchies (e.g., colonialism) were formed when states sought to protect their international investments. Hancock (2006) has argued that Belarus was more willing to sacrifice some of its sovereignty rights to the Russian neo-empire because of its need for Russian fuel and the economic profits of the oil pipeline passing through its territory. Thus, higher forms of hierarchy result from related, specific assets. Cooley (2005) has also shown that the level of hierarchy between Russia and post-Soviet states influences the development of these state's domestic institutions. Ikenberry (2009) has argued that U.S. hegemonic power facilitated the creation of an international institution, which led to what he calls a "constitutional order."

In *Hierarchy in International Relations*, David Lake (2009a) argues that hierarchal relations could exist within the anarchic international system. For the purpose of this study, I now explain Lake's theory and highlight its main assumptions and argument.

2.2.1 Explaining Hierarchy in the International System

Lake (2009a) agrees with the notion that the international system is anarchic in its entirety. However, he argues that this anarchic nature does not preclude us from exploring various forms of hierarchy that could exist between states within the anarchic international system. The anarchic nature of the international system does not mean that the relations between all units are necessarily anarchic. Lake (2009a) is critical of the formal-legal conception of authority in international relations because it assumes that all states are the main actors and are equal.

In the formal-legal approach, authority is the product of law, and a ruler has the right to issue laws over the ruled due that ruler's lawful authority (Flathman 1980). However, as Lake notes, this logic is flawed because it does not explain whether authority precedes law or vice versa around. The formal-legal conception cannot explain the origins of authority. As discussed above, many international relations scholars view the international system as anarchic because it lacks the formal-legal order present in nation-states. This view has resulted, Lake concludes, in a false inference that authority can never be present among the units of the international system. Instead, he advocates applying social contract theory to unmask hierarchies and authority relations in the international system.

In relational authority, authority is based on a contract between State A (dominant) and State B (subordinate), and it derives from the consent of subordinate states in the international system (Lake 2009a, 2009b, and 2009c). State A (great power) provides State B (small to medium power) with a favorable social order (i.e., security environment). This enables State A to gain legitimate authority over State B and to obtain varying levels of influence over a set of matters relating to State B. In return, State B offers State A “symbolic obeisance” recognizing its authority, with consent. The actions State B provides are public and could be costly (e.g., joining an alliance, joining a war, ceremonial reception of State officials).

The relational authority between State A and State B can be an equilibrium or a self-enforcing contract. Social order is what binds them together. The more State B depends on and invests in that social order, the more likely it is that it will try to maintain it. This makes the authority of State A more legitimate. Hence, the legitimacy of State A’s authority is enshrined in maintaining the social order, but both State A and State B benefit from the relationship.

While State A must endure the cost of maintaining the social order, State B must sacrifice some aspects of its autonomy and agree to a set of demands State A presents. Hence, State B’s sovereignty is divisible in Lake’s relational authority. The relationship’s benefits are not necessarily equal, though. State B might be able to acquire a favorable bargain (see Keohane 1971 on how

weak states could exploit great powers). State A (dominant), however, probably gains more due to its ability to shape the political order in which State B (subordinate) resides. Nevertheless, State A's ability to write the rules might come at the cost of making State B indifferent or even opposed to the status quo. Fairness is not a requirement for legitimacy in relational authority; the only requirement is that both State A and State B fare better with the relationship (Lake 2009a; Lake 2009b; Lake 2009c).

Let me emphasize three aspects of authority in Lake's relational authority. First, State A has no authority without State B's compliance by consent. The consent of State B is conditional upon State A refraining from abusing authority, and it can be withdrawn in such instances. Therefore, the invested interest of State B is what governs State A's legitimate authority. This differentiates consent derived from legitimate authority and coercion through the mere relative distribution of power. Second, the relational authority variable differs in strength. The more demands State A can obtain from State B, the stronger the relational authority, but it is never absolute. In addition, authority is always dynamic, not static. Third, State A must credibly commit to certain policy actions that are acceptable to State B for the authority to be given. Some scholars believe that democratic great power states are more able to show credible commitments and signal intentions due to their own domestic, liberal institutions (Lake 2009a; also see Ikenberry 2009).

According to Lake (2009a, p. 9), State A's authority over State B produces different sets of hierarchy, which is the "extent of the authority exercised by the ruler over the ruled." This hierarchy, a continuous variable, correlates with the number of demands State A can voluntarily obtain from State B. A higher degree of hierarchy means that State A can attain more demands from State B, and lower degree of hierarchy means the opposite. At any given time, there is no complete hierarchy. Anarchy is the state in which State A has no authority over any of State B's decisions. These different types of hierarchies are differentiated by the number of sovereign decisions delegated to State A (dominant). Lake divides State's B decisions into two groups: (1) security policies (e.g., diplomatic, military, and security-oriented economic decisions), and (2) economic policies.

Lake uses four indicators to measure the two hierarchies. The security hierarchy includes the following: the presence of military personnel from State A (dominant) in State B (subordinate), and the number of independent alliances State B has. The economic hierarchy consists of the exchange rate regime and relative trade dependence. For the purpose of this research, however, I focus only on the security hierarchy and evaluate its impact on the different patterns of behavior, as I discuss below.⁶

⁶ I contend that the exchange rate regime and relative trade dependence could reflect the security hierarchy. For example, the Saudi riyal was pegged to the U.S. dollar in 1975 after the two states reached an understanding on lowering oil prices and cementing their military relations. In addition, State B could increase trade with State A as leverage to pursue certain policy action. I also note that Lake measures relative trade dependence as State B's total trade with the U.S. divided by its GDP minus similar ratios of State B's trade with other UNSC Permanent Members. I think excluding other countries, such as

In my view, Lake's main theoretical contribution lies in depicting legitimacy as deriving from maintaining this mutually beneficial relationship by consent and reciprocity. Through relational authority, states are bound by a social contract that allows hierarchies and sovereignty rights to be divisible. His focus on performance legitimacy, as opposed to sheer power, is insightful in exploring the relations between the two states. However, Lake's theoretical conception and empirics have some limitations.

2.2.2 Critique of Hierarchy

Although Lake's theory provides a systematic approach to measuring hierarchy between two states, it nevertheless has shortcomings due to its underlying assumptions and operationalization of variables.

First, the theory measures the hierarchy impact of the dominant state on the compliance of the subordinate state without considering the specific policy actions of the two states. This in turn may result in neglecting certain dynamic changes in the relationship. Lake argues that State B may be willing to concede some autonomy in return for protection from external threats. The more hierarchical the relationship, the more autonomy the state forfeits. As

Japan and South Korea, impedes us from looking at general shifts in State B's trade relations. Finally, I would like to note that Lake agrees that the military spending behavior of State B is substantially linked to security hierarchy, not economic hierarchy.

such, that State B will comply with State A's demands in a higher hierarchical relationship, even when their policy preferences do not align.

This claim is problematic because it does not explore how these demands could impact the security environment of the regional ally to a great power. If State B complies with State A's demands only when their policy preferences align, then their hierarchical relationship does not exert an independent effect on State B's external behavior. This fundamentally calls into question whether hierarchy exerts any influence on State B's behavior, and if so, how and when. Therefore, I argue that it is important to explore how State A's policy preferences affect State B's security and investigate how the subordinate complies. The hierarchy, as Lake has said, is largely the result of the compliance of the ruled. Hence, his theory would be better if he considered State B's preferences because regime survival and security concerns supersede all other state interests.

Second, the statistical model Lake uses does not clearly differentiate between power and legitimacy. It does not explore hierarchical relations that employ both consent and coercion, and he does not address the possibility of having a relationship that could benefit only one side, either the dominant or subordinate state. This could be the result of the dominant state's use of coercion over or exploitation of subordinate state (see Keohane 1971). In addition, the idea of a legitimate authority devoid of power does not address

the fact that State B would have not conceded some of its authority to State A without the former's capability to project power in its security environment.

Third, I do not think that Lake's indicators of the security hierarchy reflect State B's compliance by consent. Proxying the level of security hierarchy by the number of military forces is problematic for several reasons. State B's compliance under the larger military presence of State A within its territories or in neighboring countries does not necessarily reflect State B's consent. This point is crucial to distinguish between compliance by coercion and compliance by consent. In fact, the basis of relational authority is rooted in the consent of State B, which gives State A its legitimacy. Likewise, accounting for the level of hierarchy based on the number of independent alliances State B possesses treats the outcome of alliances as the same. State B might be allied with other states for different reasons, but its alliance with State A accounts for its security. Hence, deducing the level of hierarchy, as Lake asserts, from troops' deployment as well as the number of independent alliances could provide a distorted picture of State B's patterns of behavior. In all, these two proxies are tested while accounting for the alignment of policy preferences, or the lack thereof, between State A and State B.

Fourth, Lake infers that a subordinate state is more willing to accept the dominant state authority when it shares a region with another group of subordinate states. In other words, the regional hegemonic status of the

dominant state induces legitimacy. However, due to data limitations, his work fails to test whether the political authority dyad (dominant state-subordinate state) would be affected when the dominant state is also a regional hegemon (see Lake 2009a, p. 162). The Saudi refusal of Soviet authority in the Middle East is a clear example that contradicts his claim, as is Japan's insistence on resisting Chinese authority in the South Asia seas. One other major drawback in Lake's work is that he does not account for rising global powers; one would assume this oversight would give State B more leverage in bargaining with State A.

Fifth, there are inconsistencies in some of Lake's findings. For example, Lake assumes that a higher security hierarchy leads to decreased defense spending in subordinate states. This is not the case in Saudi Arabia.⁷ In fact, the increase in defense spending could be a signal of growing security relations between State A and State B when military purchases are used to leverage the relationship (i.e., buying insurance from State A). He also concludes that the presence of military forces in the subordinate state is an indicator of a stronger security hierarchy. In the case of the Rapid Deployment Forces in the Gulf during the 1980s, though, Saudi Arabia was wary of being used to seize its own oil fields (Cordesman 1984). It is important to highlight that other countries in the Gulf exhibit the same outcome. For example, Qatar, home of

⁷ As Lake (2009a, p. 89) mentions, the indicators used to do not fully capture the American security hierarchy over Saudi Arabia. He also casts both Iraq and Saudi Arabia as outliers due to their high trade dependency and high defense expenditures.

the largest U.S. military base in the region has sometimes indulged in actions contrary to the United States' interests (e.g., Aljazeera TV broadcasting Osama Bin Laden tapes during 9/11 and Saddam Hussein tapes during the 2003 Iraq war; see also Kamarava 2015).

Lake also proposes that a dominant state could implicate a subordinate state in war when the former uses its military bases in the latter to launch an attack on a neighboring country. He uses the 1991 Gulf War as an example of how the U.S. dragged Saudi Arabia into the war (see Lake 2009a, p. 68). His statement is factually false, however. Saudi Arabia demanded the liberation of Kuwait by force from the start and agreed to host the U.S. forces only after receiving security assurances from President George H. W. Bush (see Haass 2009 and White House 5).

Sixth, Lake claims that the presence of military troops from State A in State B is legitimate because it is based on consent and voluntary exchange. However, he does not distinguish between the regime and other elements within the state. For example, his theory would consider the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan following the invasion to be legitimate because the interim government led by Hamid Karazi approved it. Several elements, most notably the Taliban, opposed this presence, though, and this ultimately led to an ongoing insurgency in the country. The Trump administration determined

that the best solution was to sign a peace deal with the Taliban after 19 years of conflict.

Finally, Lake underscores the hierarchy argument in the ability of State A to provide a favorable “political order” to State B. However, I question the sustainability of this order; how long will it last? Lake claims that the hierarchal relationship changes continuously over different bargaining rounds between the two states. However, what initiates the bargaining process, and to what ends? I assert that the bargaining process is, by itself, an element of the anarchic nature of the relationship between the two states. Lake argues that State B will always bandwagon with State A because it is a natural reflection of the hierarchical relationship. However, we saw many U.S. allies shy away from joining the military alliance to invade Iraq in 2003. His hierarchal relation is an exchange between two states, but he does not explore the authority State B acquires over State A. If what he describes is merely a reciprocal exchange based on an alignment of policy preferences, the relationship does not seem to be a hierarchal. I propose that using his measurements of the level of security hierarchy as an explanatory variable to predict compliance, without considering the states’ policy preferences, is problematic in an assessment of the relations between a great power and its regional ally.

In the next section, I outline why the alignment or non-alignment of policy preferences between two states can more accurately explain the external behavior of State B than can Lake's hierarchy theory.

2.3 Alternative Test: Alignment -or No alignment- of Policy Preferences

I argue that we should explore whether the great power (State A) and its regional ally (State B) share the same policy preference on a certain security issue (i.e., an exogenous shock to the bilateral relation) relating to the former. When their policy preferences converge, State A provides security to State B. In return, State B is more likely to be comply with State A’s demands (e.g. economic interests). This relationship also signals common interests and cooperation between the two states. When their policy preferences diverge, State A’s policy does not enhance the security of State B; hence, it is likely to reject State A’s requests. This shows us that the lack of common interest hindered cooperation between the two states. I believe that this approach more fully grasps compliance by consent and the transactional nature of the relations between the two states. I now discuss why a state’s policy preference is important.

Table 1- Summary of Argument

Alignment of policy preferences Between State A and B		State B’s level of security		Compliance of State B to State A’s Demands
Aligned	⇔	More secure	⇔	More Compliant
Not Aligned	⇔	Less Secure	⇔	Less Compliant

This policy preference reflects the state's interest. Without understanding the policy preference of a state, we would not be able to understand its external behavior (Fearon 1998; Morgenthau 1949; Powell 1999; Snyder and Jervis 1999; Snyder 2007). We also cannot verify whether its actions were based on mutual consent or coercion. Equally important, State A and State B must communicate their preferences in order to decrease information asymmetry and uncertainty. While states are responsible for defining their interests, I argue that the distribution of power puts restrictions on the policies pursued.

Telhami (1992, p. 87) has argued that "states desire at a minimum a stable and predictable environment, and at a maximum they seek to have the ability to shape the order of the environment." He also notes that states cannot escape a degree of interdependence with other states, and regional states prefer to depend on superpowers for two main reasons: (1) the relationship is more stable and rewarding, and (2) the hegemonic status of the superpower on the regional state is never absolute (Telhami 1992). What does this tell us about the preferences of State A and State B?

I argue that the primary objective of State B is to increase its security regarding external threats. For instance, the main goal of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy was regime security through maintaining domestic stability and neutralizing external threats (Gause 2009). It is crucial to note that Saudi Arabia has traditionally sought a security relationship with foreign powers, first the

British and then the Americans. The Saudis pivoted toward the American security umbrella only after they viewed the British as favoring the interests and security of Iraqi Hashemites over their own (Citino 2002; Gause 2003b). While the Saudi military capabilities were strengthened over time, the Saudi defense doctrine remains dependent on varying degrees of support from the U.S. military. This makes Saudi foreign policy an instrument of its own security. While regime security is a priority for the Saudi state in dictating its external behavior, other factors are also important, such as domestic elements and enhancing its posture in the region. We should also not eliminate preferences derived from each ruler's personal convictions and principles. Furthermore, even though I acknowledge that preferences could be shaped at the national, regime or leadership levels, the sources of this preferences are beyond of this research. While this is not a theory on the formation of state preferences, future research will consider it. This work focuses on the expressed policy preference of state before and after the exogenous shocks discussed later.

Regarding State A, the main objective of its policy preference is to increase economic gains and to decrease mutual security threats in State's B region. These two goals are not mutually exclusive. Sometimes, State A must counter security threats to State B to ensure the sustainability of economic gains. For example, as a great power, the United States has many interests in the Middle East, ranging from access to oil to security threats from other the Soviet Union

as well as regional states and non-state actors in the Middle East. The U.S. interests in the region have continuously changed over the last 80 years. The U.S. also has many other key regional partners, such as Iran under the Shah, Iraq, Egypt, and Israel, in addition to Saudi Arabia over different periods of time. Therefore, we would expect that the preferences of both State A and State B are not always aligned.

This lays the foundation for what I call transactional relations in the international system. I define such relations as voluntary exchange between two states based on mutual interest. The exchange could be material in terms of military and economic support or immaterial, such as diplomatic support. This exchange is (1) beneficial to both states and (2) occurs by consent. This exchange occurs when the policy preferences of State A and State B align; when their policy preferences are not aligned, there is no voluntary exchange. In this case, both State A and State B could be indifferent or punish each other. In fact, the ability of State B to penalize State A is a direct criticism of the validity of the explanatory power of hierarchal relations in the international system. An alignment of policy preferences between the two states might entail a military presence from State A in State B's territory or region, but a mere military presence does not always signal an alignment of policy preferences.

Contemporary research shows that alliances are not perfectly credible (e.g., Snyder 2007 and Morrow 2017). Although alliances increase the probability of intervention in wars, many allies do not honor their alliances in wartime (Morrow 1994). Sabrosky (1980) has reported that only 27% of alliance commitments were honored during conflicts. Therefore, we should expect that, when allies perceive their partner as acting against their security preferences in peacetime, they are less likely to comply with partner demands. This decreases the great power's leverage over its regional ally, and I expect that this will alter the regional ally's behavior to meet their own security interests.

It is important to note that non-alignment in policy preferences between the two states does not necessarily mean that the great power deliberately undermines State B's security. The U.S. regional policy may not always align with Saudi interests. While this policy is not necessarily intended to undermine the Saudi regime, it has consequences and could trigger an unfavorable Saudi reaction to U.S. policy or perhaps even inaction concerning U.S. demands.

Additionally, lower levels of compliance from State B do not mean that it has become fully independent of State A. It also does not necessarily mean that the State B deliberately undermines State A's interests in the region. Likewise, higher levels of compliance do not mean that State B concedes all

political authority to State A. Rather, it simply means that its policy preferences are aligned on a certain security issue. In other words, State A's policies enhance State B's security, leading to more compliance with State A's demands; it is a simple transaction between two states within the international system. This does not necessarily mean that State B will not condone some actions State A considers unfavorable. However, State A might exercise power restraint over State B due to preference priority (See Nye 1990 and Ikenberry 2009).

2.3.1 Presenting the Four Hypotheses

While accounting for the alignment or non-alignment of policy preferences between State A and State B, I test Lake's hypotheses on the empirical evidence derived from the historical U.S.–Saudi Arabia case studies. Unlike Lake, I expect State B to be more responsive to State A's demands when their policy preferences are aligned. State B is likely to be less responsive when their policy preferences are not aligned.

As Lake (2009a) hypothesizes, we would expect the following when the security hierarchy is higher:⁸

- 1- *State B is more likely to decrease defense spending.*
- 2- *State B is more likely to join State A's wartime coalition.*
- 3- *State A is more likely to support (diplomatically or militarily) State B in interstate conflict.*
- 4- *State B is more likely to comply with State A demands.*⁹

As Lake (2009a) hypothesizes, we would expect the following when the security hierarchy is lower:¹⁰

- 1- *State B is less likely to decrease defense spending.*
- 2- *State B is less likely to join State A's wartime coalition.*
- 3- *State A is less likely to support (diplomatically or militarily) State B in interstate conflict.*
- 4- *State B is less likely to comply with State A demands.*

Lake has also indicated, that “the average correlations within the dimensions of security and economic hierarchy are relatively high ... and it remains a matter of judgment whether to treat the indicators of hierarchy as single or multiple dimensions” (Lake 2009a, p. 92). Therefore, I do not differentiate

⁸ Note: I use the same hypotheses predicted by Lake when the security hierarchy is at higher levels.

⁹ Example: oil pricing.

¹⁰ Note: I use the same hypotheses predicted by Lake when the security hierarchy is at lower levels.

between economic and security hierarchies, as Lake does. This study is meant to examine how the degree of alignment in policy preferences between State A and State B impacts State B's external behavior. Everything else, including economic means, is built around this ordering principle.

Finally, I note that my approach views that state's sovereignty could be divisible. However, I disagree with Lake's conception of relational authority. He claims it is based on an exchange between State A and State B, in which "State A provides a political order of value to be sufficient to offset the loss of freedom incurred in his subordination to A" (Lake 2009a, p. 29). His approach does not encompass how State B is beneficial to State A. This precludes us from understanding State B's leverage (i.e., authority) over State A. Thus, I argue that my approach performs better in grasping these dynamics and in terms compliance by consent. This contradicts Lake's conception of hierarchy as the level of authority exercised by State A over State B. I discuss why I chose to test this argument using the U.S.-Saudi historical relations in Chapter 3.

Chapter 3: Research Design

3.1 Qualitative Case Study: Why Focus on the U.S.-Saudi Arabia Relations?

Lake acknowledges that using large statistical models could have a negative impact on context. I believe qualitative case studies can inform us regarding states' policy preferences as well as their external behavior by paying attention to context. The U.S.–Saudi Arabia relationship spans a long period of time before and after the Cold War. The two countries have different cultures, religions, and regime types. While the premise of their relationship was based on the oil-for-security doctrine, it later evolved to include many security and economic aspects. The goal of Saudi foreign policy is security, and its long relation with the United States helps us study how the dynamic of their relationship has varied overtime. A detailed case study is essential to understanding how the actions of a great power affect the external behavior of its regional ally, Saudi Arabia.

The relations started in 1931 when the United States granted a full diplomatic acknowledgment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The relations were bolstered when U.S. President Roosevelt met with Saudi King Abdulaziz bin Saud on board the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal of Egypt in 1945. This was mainly due to a shift in Saudi strategic thinking that an alliance with the United States should replace the alliance with British Empire to safeguard their security interests (Citino 2002). U.S.-Saudi relations were initially cemented

on one core doctrine, oil for security. The Saudis provided access to oil and other hydrocarbons, and President Roosevelt declared that the “defense of Saudi Arabia was vital to the defense of the United States” in return (Grayson 1982).

Saudi Arabia contained approximately half of the global oil stocks and more than one-third of its natural gas. President Roosevelt’s policy circle noted, “who controls this [oil-rich Gulf] region will have substantial control of the world” (Diplomatic Papers 1945). President Eisenhower called it “the strategically most important part of the world.” The State Department referred to it as “a stupendous source of strategic power ... one of the greatest material prizes in world’s history” (Diplomatic Papers 1945). This powerful categorization shows the strategic importance of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region to American policy makers (also see Telhami 2002).

Saudi Arabia has a prominent role in the national security doctrine of every U.S. president from Roosevelt to Trump (see Gause 2002 and Riedel 2017). The objective has been to secure the Kingdom from external threats to maintain the supply of oil and to influence oil prices. Eisenhower offered economic aid and military assistance to any country, including Saudi Arabia, facing international aggression. Truman, on the other hand, was clearer in denying the Soviets access to oil resources in the Gulf region. Nixon established the “twin pillar” strategy, in which Saudi Arabia and Iran were

two key partners in the stability of the region. Carter declared that any outside, foreign power's attempts to gain control of the Gulf region were an "assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and would be repelled by any means, including military force" (United States 9). Reagan intensified the rapid deployment forces strategy, which aimed to swiftly intervene in case of a military aggression on the Gulf, by allocating permanent troops to fulfill this mission when necessary. Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, conveyed to King Fahad in 1990, "[W]e [the U.S. government] can defend you, but we cannot liberate you [from Iraq under Saddam]" (Haass 2009). George H. W. Bush assembled the largest international military coalition at that time to repel the Iraqi military from Kuwait in 1991 and to safeguard Saudi Arabia from a possible Iraqi invasion. Obama sold more military weapons, around \$116 billion more, to Saudi Arabia than any other U.S. president. However, U.S.-Saudi relations soared under the Obama administration following the Arab Spring and the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. More recently, Trump chose Riyadh, capital of Saudi Arabia, as his first official visit as President of the United States and completed an arms deal worth \$110 billion. While the oil-for-security doctrine is still prevalent today as it was 70 years ago, the two countries have encountered many opportunities and challenges in updating their interests. As a result, the American-Saudi strategic partnership experienced shifting periods of alignment and misalignment in their policy preferences.

I now present this puzzle in real-life examples. Why did King Saud strengthen cooperation with the United States only after President Eisenhower condemned the French-British war on Egypt in 1956? Why did King Faisal decide to place an oil embargo on the U.S. and the West after they supported Israel in the 1973 war with Egypt? Why did the Saudis decide to support the U.S. in arming the Afghani mujahideen fighting the Soviets in 1979? Why did King Fahad allow a U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, despite domestic opposition, after the liberation of Kuwait? Why did Saudi Arabia take a more active role with the U.S. in fighting terrorism only after Al-Qaeda bombed the al-Khobar towers in 1996? What explains the assertive regional behavior of Saudi Arabia after the 2003 Iraq war bolstered Iranian influence in the region? Why did King Abdullah unilaterally decide to support Bahrain militarily after the Obama administration supported the ouster of long-time ally Hosni Mubarak in Egypt? Why did the Saudi government intensify its international partnerships and regional alliances after Obama declared that the Saudis and their regional rival, Iran, should “share the region”? Why did the Saudis strengthen economic and military relations with China after the Obama administration’s policy of inaction toward the Assad regime in Syria? What explains the first Saudi military intervention in Yemen despite limited reservations from the U.S.? Over 70 years, why were the Saudis sometimes more willing to cooperate with the U.S. in lowering oil prices but hesitant at other times?

As MacDonald (1980) has shown, four factors influenced U.S. policy toward the Gulf: (1) U.S.-Soviet rivalry, (2) the Arab–Israeli conflict, (3) the conflict between oil importers and oil exporters, and (4) the competition between oil importer states over access to oil. I would like to note that countering non-state terrorism (e.g., Al-Qaeda and ISIS) and security threats from states (e.g., Iraq under Saddam and Iran after the fall of the Shah) was added to U.S. interests in the region. Hence, it would only be logical to see variation in the behavior of the Saudi Kingdom when the U.S. policy departs from Saudi interests.

Much academic scholarship focused on U.S.-Saudi relations as well as the published classified documents on WikiLeaks show that the Saudis view U.S. actions in terms of their own security; this assessment affects Saudi compliance with U.S. interests in the region. I argue that regime security drives the strategic thinking of the Saudi ruling elites, and U.S. actions in the region shape Saudi behavior (e.g., decisions on oil production, intelligence transfer, lobbying efforts, diplomacy, and military cooperation).

Saudi behavior is meant to safeguard the country's interests in the region. When the U.S. is perceived to condone a policy that is counterproductive to its security interests, however, the Kingdom's policy preference will consider its security independent of U.S. interests. The Saudi regime understands *realpolitik* quite well; they are throughgoing realists (Gause 2009). In

addition, they have always taken the U.S. position under careful consideration. When the U.S. policy could result in undermining the Saudi regime stability, however, they yet not shied away from complying less with U.S. interests.

The U.S. actions in the region impact the way Saudis view U.S. reliability in terms of securing their regime (MacDonald 1980). Other U.S.-Saudi communication highlights the importance of credibility. For example, King Abdullah told Brennan, President Obama's advisor on counterterrorism, that the U.S. needed to restore its reliability in the region. He also said, "both President Bushes were his friends, but the recent President Bush didn't take his advice on dealing with issues in the region, and they found their problems compounded" (Embassy Riyadh 10). Furthermore, he stated "thank God for bringing Obama to the Presidency" (Embassy Riyadh 10).

Ironically, the U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations deteriorated even further during the second half of Obama's first term. When President Obama sided with the 2011 Egyptian uprising against long-time ally Hosni Mubarak, this decision signaled to the Saudis that the U.S. was willing to abandon its regional allies. This case, for instance, led the Saudis to express their shaken confidence in U.S. reliability, but the two countries were still committed to increasing economic pressure on Iran at that time. However, the Obama administration's rapprochement with Iran, the regional rival of Saudi Arabia, over the nuclear issue and Obama's later remarks that the Saudis should share the region with

the Islamic Republic of Iran dented the relations even further. This led to a lower U.S. leverage over the Saudis. Hence, U.S. regional actions have a significant effect on regime security in Saudi Arabia. They impacts U.S. leverage over the Saudi Kingdom, and it will ultimately cause Saudi compliance to vary overtime. In the following section, I discuss the methodology and data.

3.2 Methodology and Data

I qualitatively test Lake's four hypotheses in his security hierarchy theory, as well as my proposed alignment of policy preferences on eight exogenous events in U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations. The eight exogenous shocks are (1) the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, (2) the 1975 Soviet intrusion in the Arab World and Sub-Saharan Africa, (3) the 1979 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, (4) the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, containing (5) Iraqi military provocations in the 1990s during Clinton's presidency, (6) the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict prior to the 2003 Iraq War, (7) the aftermath of the Iraq war and the increasing Iranian influence in Iraq in 2005, and (8) the treatment of Iran's nuclear program under Obama. The eight case studies capture more than 43 years of changing dynamics in U.S.-Saudi Arabia bilateral relations during and after the end of Cold War. One would expect to see variation in the behavior of the Saudi Kingdom in the eight case studies as a response to U.S. policy positions.

The impact of U.S. external behavior on the Saudi security environment is examined qualitatively through comparative historical analysis. Historical

comparative research allows the creation of generalizable analytical frameworks by exploring historical events via comparison (Adams et al. 2005). Mahoney (2003) has argued, “the use of process analysis to explore intervening processes has led comparative historical researchers to elaborate, modify, and occasionally reject the findings of statistical research” (p. 89). Few concise cases should be used in this approach (Mahoney 2004).

The historical explanation might have disadvantages through the loss of important information, but, as George and Bennett (2005, p. 225) have said,

Information loss does occur when this is done, and the investigator should be aware of this and consider the implications for his or her study of the fact that some of the richness and uniqueness of the case is thereby lost. But ultimately we justify the practice of converting historical explanations into analytical theoretical ones by emphasizing that the task of the political scientist who engages in historical case studies for theory development is not the same as the task of this historian.

However, the historical explanation can help through “tracing the sequence of events that brought them about” (George and Bennett 2005; also see Collier 2011). My cases are appropriate for this approach.

Lake accounts for the level of security hierarchy through a security index that combines the presence or absence of both military troops and independent alliances. I code for Lake's security hierarchy index for all eight cases, as shown in the following section.

I introduce policy preferences between State A and State B and whether they are aligned, as a second independent variable. For each case, I clearly define the expressed policy preference of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia in response to the exogenous event. I then establish that the two parties communicated their preferences to each other. Finally, I discuss whether their policy preferences were aligned or not. I probe these preferences using public official statements as well as private official discussions. The data come from original, declassified documents, Wikileaks, as well as secondary sources. My fieldwork also included one-on-one interviews with several former politicians and experts from the U.S. and Gulf region. I am fully aware that most political elites want to tell the story from their perspective, but I have consulted other sources, including archival research, to verify the accuracy of information.

The inclusion of policy preferences between State A and State B tells us whether it has a better explanatory power of Saudi external behavior than the level of security hierarchy, proxied with Lake's two indices. I then examine how they correspond to the four hypotheses presented earlier.

The first hypothesis regards whether State B decreased its defense spending when the security hierarchy is higher. I analyze Saudi Arabia's defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) and actual defense spending in current U.S. dollars before and after each exogenous event. I also consider changes in Riyadh's total military manpower, number of medium tanks and combat aircraft, and arm imports. This data was combined from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) military expenditure data, Cordesman's work (1984 and 2003), the Annual Military Balance journal series, and the World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer (WMEAT), published by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and by the State Department from 1999 onward.

The second hypothesis is whether State B joined State A's wartime coalition, and the third concerns whether State A supported State B in an interstate conflict via diplomatic or military means. Both of these actions are costly and visible. By examining the period in each case, I will be able to assess both hypotheses based on the original declassified documents as well as secondary sources whenever applicable.

The fourth hypothesis assesses State B's compliance with State A's demands. I code the demand as the U.S. request to Saudi Arabia to increase (or decrease) oil production to lower (or increase) oil prices or a request to put a price freeze

on oil. There is overwhelming evidence that oil prices were a concern to many U.S. administrations through all eight cases discussed (see Bronson 2008, Cooper 2012, and Cordesman 1984). In addition, studies have indicated that lower oil prices lead to a higher presidential favorability rate in the U.S. (Harbridge et al. 2016; Wood 2011). The data shows that presidents are more likely to be punished by U.S. public opinion when gasoline prices are high (Wood 2011). Gasoline prices impact the average American on a daily basis, and they are easily monitored. In addition, high oil prices slow the economy, decrease purchasing power, and increase unemployment rates. There were also instances where considerably lower oil prices tempted the U.S. administration to ask the Saudis and other oil producers to cut output in order to prop up prices. This was due to the negative impact lower oil prices had on U.S. oil producers as well as other U.S. allies, such as Mexico in 1999. The norm, however, has been U.S. requests to Saudi Arabia to increase oil production or put a price freeze within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

Coding the U.S. demands in terms of oil-related requests from Saudi Arabia seems sensible, and it provides consistency across cases. Original documents as well as U.S. governmental agencies' assessments and secondary sources are used to establish that the U.S. asked the Saudis to intervene in the oil market and to note the Saudi response. I examine changes in Saudi Arabia's total crude oil production and oil exports to United States. I also analyze

variation in oil prices. Data was obtained from macro trends, the Energy Information Agency (EIA), and the Saudi Monetary Fund.

In the next section, I code for the level of security hierarchy using Lake's proxies, military presence and independent alliances, for all eight cases. Chapter 4 examines the degree of the alignment of policy preferences between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. for each case and how it relates to the four hypotheses.

3.3 Coding for the Level of Security Hierarchy

While the security hierarchy is a continuous variable, I conceptualize it in two range groups, high and low, for each period. This conception allows us to operationalize the impact of security hierarchy on compliance more effectively for the respective events under study. The level of security hierarchy consists of two indices: U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia's independent alliances that are not shared with the United States. I also consider U.S. military presence in the countries neighboring Saudi Arabia. I acknowledge that Lake considers U.S. military presence in only state B, but this inclusion provides further support for Saudi Arabia's compliance by consent when we map their policy preferences in response to each case.

The U.S. did not have a significant military presence in Saudi Arabia or its neighbors between 1973 and 1990. Following the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. had around half a million troops stationed there (Cordesman 1984 and Haass 2009). The U.S. military presence in the region has continued to be significant until today; it is evident in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE from 1990 onward, and in Iraq following the 2003 Iraq War. Saudi Arabia enjoyed an independent alliance in three of the eight cases, two of them with Egypt and Syria in 1973 and 1975, and one with Iraq in 1979 (Cordesman 1984 and Gause 2003). A high level of security hierarchy is when there is a military presence and no independent alliance, while a low level of security hierarchy is when there is no military presence, coupled with the existence of independent alliances. A low level of security hierarchy was noted in the first three case studies: 1973, 1975, and 1979. The other five case studies exemplify a high level of security hierarchy, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2- Coding for the Level of Security Hierarchy as conceptualized by Lake.

Exogenous Event	Is there U.S. Military Presence in Saudi Arabia?	Does Saudi Arabia have Independent Alliances?	Level of Security Hierarchy as Conceptualized by Lake
<u>1973 Arab-Israeli War</u>	No	Yes	Low
<u>1975 Soviet Intrusion in the Arab World and Sub-Saharan Africa</u>	No	Yes	Low
<u>1979 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan</u>	No	Yes	Low
<u>1990 Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait</u>	Yes	No	High
<u>Iraq Containment Under Clinton</u>	Yes	No	High
<u>Prior to 2003 Iraq War and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict</u>	Yes	No	High
<u>Aftermath of Iraq war: 2005 Iranian Growing Influence in Iraq</u>	Yes	No	High
<u>Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Program Under Obama</u>	Yes	No	High

Chapter 4: Case Studies

4.1 The 1973 Arab-Israeli War

4.1.1 Policy Preferences: Not Aligned

On October 6, 1973, Riyadh and Washington found themselves at odds when Egypt and Syria along other Arab countries, launched a military attack against Israel. As proclaimed by the Egyptian president at that time, Anwar Sadat, the stated objective of this war was to recover all Arab territories that were occupied after the 1967 war with Israel at a maximum and, at a minimum, to recover the Sinai Peninsula (Bean and Gerrard 2001). For Saudi Arabia, it was necessary to support the war efforts as a means of furthering the “Arab cause,” which the country adopted as a pillar of its foreign policy. Given that, the Saudis participated with 1,500 troops and 10 medium tanks in this war (Cordesman 1984). Moreover, the Saudis secretly helped train Egyptian pilots inside the Kingdom prior to the war (Al-Saud 2019).

This war, in the Saudi view, was also linked to the question of a future Palestinian state. Saudi support of the Palestinian Liberation Movement (PLO) was necessary to exert influence on their leadership and to prevent the radicalization of the Saudi population (Cordesman 1984), which would put the Kingdom’s stability at risk in the medium to long term. In fact, many Saudi nationals were highly sympathetic to the Arab cause and the fate of

Jerusalem around that time. The Saudi leadership also thought that its relations with the West, mainly the United States, would be difficult to sustain if radicalized elements climbed the ranks within the PLO. Although the Saudi decision to support Egypt and Syria in this war accounted for domestic concerns, it also reflects a principled, consistent position on this issue.

It is important to shed light on the fact that King Faisal of Saudi Arabia felt empathy towards Jerusalem, the home of the third holy mosque in Islam. A month after the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem was attacked, he called for the 1969 Rabat conference. This conference led to the creation of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to strengthen Muslim countries' support of the Palestinians (Vassiliev 2013). Faisal was wary that the U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict was under what he called the "Zionism influence." On January 25, 1971, the U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Nicholas Thacher, sent a cable to the State Department to warn, "Faisal is bitterly critical of our policies towards Israel, but I detect a feeling also that the U.S. may not be quite responsible for what it is doing since without realizing it we have lost control of our Middle East policies to Zionist influence. What he is trying to say, I suppose, is that however illogical it may seem to us, we are playing the Communist game by allowing ourselves to be 'controlled' by the Zionists" (United States 10).

In May 1971, when President Nixon received King Faisal in Washington, the Saudi leader's focus was mainly centered on the U.S. pressuring Israel to withdraw from all Arab territories seized after 1967, as well as Jerusalem. The King told Nixon that Communism and Zionism were two sides of the same coin, and they both actively sought to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the Arab world. He later revealed to Nixon that Saudi Arabia's "ultimate aim is that there be established the State of Palestine, which is neither Arab/Moslem nor Jewish nor anything else, but a state where the Palestinians will be able to live on equal footing with everybody else, where there will be no discrimination between Muslim, Christian, or Jew," coupled with the Palestinian right to return to their homeland. Bruce Riedel has proposed that King Faisal exemplifies the part of the Saudi establishment that believed the Palestinian cause was their own cause (Riedel 2020). President Nixon assured him that the U.S. policy would be "fair to all concerned and not tilted in a direction in favor of one country," and U.S. Secretary of State Rogers was tasked with formulating a plan to solve the matter (United States 11).

Later, in August 1971, Faisal sent Nixon a letter laying out the political scene in Egypt including the prospects of peace with Israel and relations with the United States. He explained that President Sadat was willing to reach a peaceful settlement with Israel, but there was also another group within the government that wanted to "begin the battle with Israel" to seek revenge from their defeat in the Six-Day War in 1967. Both groups, however, were

convinced that Israel would not seriously engage in peace talks without U.S. pressure (e.g., withholding aid to Israel). The president responded with the usual talking point that work was in progress toward a settlement (United States 12). Prince Turki Al-Faisal also told me that the Saudi King instructed Omar Saqqaf, the Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and Saudi Oil Minister Zaki Yamani to orchestrate a lobbying campaign in Western capitals to pressure Israel to withdraw (Al-Faisal 2019).

The following month, Prince Fahad came to the White House with another letter from the King to President Nixon. This time, he proposed that President Sadat was “willing to reduce his relationship with the Communist countries [mainly the Soviet Union] if there could be a settlement” (United States 13). He also conveyed that Egypt wanted to strengthen its relations with the United States. The Saudis were working relentlessly to move Egypt out of the Soviet Communist camp, and they thought this proposal would solve the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as weaken Soviet influence in the region.

In addition, Yamani proposed a special oil relationship with the United States in mid-1972. This deal had two main features: (1) The U.S. would give Saudi oil a preferential treatment, and (2) the Saudi government would invest in the U.S. energy sector (see United States 14 and 15). The Kingdom’s objective was to cement closer U.S.–Saudi security relations via economic means. The

U.S. administration continued considering the Yamani offer, but with no concrete outcome at that time.

In Saudi Arabia, the pressure was building on King Faisal from other members in the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) to use oil as a political weapon to pressure U.S. policy on Israel. This was against his belief that “oil and Politics do not mix” (Graf 2012, p. 6). By December 1972, however, Faisal informed two U.S. officials on separate visits to Saudi Arabia that there would be no improvement in U.S.–Saudi economic relations nor increase in oil production if the Arab-Israeli conflict remained unsettled (United States 16). He also mentioned that the pressure from “radical Arabs” was increasing. It is clear that the King was appalled at the Nixon administration’s lack of interest in the Palestinian issue (Riedel 2020).

Saudi Petroleum Minister, Yamani, along with Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal, arrived in Washington on April 17, 1973. The visit came a week after the Israeli commando conducted Operation Spring of Youth in Lebanon, which targeted three officials associated with Yaser Arafat. The Israeli government viewed them as responsible for the 1972 Summer Olympics attacks in Munich. For the first time, Yamani warned both privately and publicly that Saudi Arabia would not be able to continue producing more oil without the U.S. providing the appropriate “political atmosphere” in reference to the Arab–Israeli conflict (United States 17; see also Ottaway and Koven

1973). Saud Al-Faisal also told Kissinger that “the continued flow of aid and arms to Israel gives the impression of an unbreakable bond between the US and Israel” (United States 17). Both Saudi ministers echoed King Faisal’s concern that he would be obliged to enforce an Arab oil embargo if another war broke out between Israel and Arab countries.

The UNSC passed Resolution 332 on April 21, 1973. It condemned “all acts of violence” that endangered innocent lives as well as “the repeated military attacks conducted by Israel against Lebanon and Israel’s violation of Lebanon’s territorial integrity and sovereignty” (Resolution 332). Even though the U.S. abstained from the vote, it appears that the Saudi government viewed the absence of an American veto favorably. Three days after the UNSC resolution, King Faisal conveyed to Nixon that the Saudi policy was to cooperate with the U.S. by immediately increasing oil production (United States 18). However, he also urged Nixon to condemn the Israeli raid on Lebanon “strongly and publicly.”

By mid-1973, the Nixon administration sensed unease in Saudi political circles over Faisal’s use of oil in politics. The U.S. side believed that some high-ranking Saudi princes feared King Faisal’s public statements could “antagonize the United States” and jeopardize the U.S.-Saudi Arabia relationship (United States 19). But the American ambassador in Jidda also noted that only King Faisal dictated Saudi policy. This provides us a glimpse

of what the Saudi political elites thought was at stake in relation to their alliance with the United States.

Given what he perceived as an American reluctance to pressure Israel, the King tired of sending repeated letters to President Nixon. Kissinger advised the president in late August 1973 to send the Saudi ruler another letter emphasizing American vital interest to the “stability, security, and prosperity of Saudi Arabia” (United States 20). Kissinger’s intent was to separate Saudi Arabia’s oil production from the Arab–Israeli conflict. It became apparent to the Saudis, though, that Secretary Roger’s plan to bring a settlement between Egypt and Israel continued to no avail. The Saudi monarch went public, decrying, “What are we waiting for? The international conscience? Where is it?” (King Faisal 1973). On the Egyptian side, Sadat firmly believed that a limited military action was necessary to advance peace negotiations.

Following the outbreak of war, on October 17, 1973, the Saudi minister of state for foreign affairs, Omar Saqqaf, told President Nixon that “the Arabs have no ill feelings; they are not your enemy, but do not accept the occupation of their land” (White House 2, p. 2). He also stated, “[Y]our [U.S.] help to Israel is seen as hostile to the Arab world” (White House 2, p. 3). The president assured him and the other three Arab foreign ministers in the meeting that the U.S. goal was to reach a ceasefire and find long-lasting peace

settlement in the region. However, it is evident that the Saudis emphasized the U.S. policy to resupply Israel with arms and assessed it as hostile.

On the U.S. side, the outbreak of war took the Nixon administration by surprise. The Saudi Oil minister, Zaki Yamani, hinted that U.S. military support to Israel would cause a cutback in oil production (Israelyan, 2010). Secretary Kissinger, however, downplayed this threat to the administration (United States 3). There was a spirited debate within the Nixon administration on whether the U.S. should provide Israel with military aid. Three days after the war started, however, President Nixon approved Operation Nickel Grass, which provided Israel with more than 100,000 tons of military material via air and sea lift (Haber and Schiff 2003).

Different reasons have been presented for why the U.S. decided to provide military aid to Israel. Declassified information shows that Israel's defeat would not serve U.S. interests (United States 3; also see White House 1). Secretary Kissinger also suggested that military aid could be used as leverage to influence Israel's post-war diplomacy and peace negotiations (Lenczowski 1990). Some evidence suggests that Israel could have used nuclear weapons in the absence of U.S. military support (Far 1999). Another reason was that the Soviet Union was resupplying Egypt and Syria with arms (Colby et al. 2013). President Nixon also pointed out that Soviet weapons should not defeat American arms used by Israel. Regardless of the reason behind the decision,

U.S. military aid to Israel provoked Saudi Arabia and brought their interests to a crossroads. This led to the single most effective economic attack on the United States by any foreign government with what is known as the 1973 oil embargo (Riedel 2020). The divergence in their policy preferences became quite apparent.

The next section discusses how the non-alignment of policy preferences between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. relate to the four hypotheses.

4.1.2 Discussing the Four Hypotheses

As discussed above, the 1973 Arab–Israeli war pushed Washington and Riyadh not only to adopt different policy preferences, but also to position the two countries in a state of antagonism. Several indicators show how this event affected Saudi state behavior.

First, as a percentage share of GDP, the Saudi defense budget changed from 10.8% (\$930 million) in 1972 to 15.1% (\$1.565 billion) in 1973, and to 12.7% (\$3.182 billion) in 1974 (SIPRI; Cordesman 1984). The actual defense spending in current U.S. dollars shows that the budget more than tripled between 1972 and 1974. The country's arms imports increased from \$80 million in 1973 to \$340 million in 1974 (Military Balance). The number of medium tanks the Saudi military owned increased from 25 in 1973 to 55 in 1974 (Military Balance). The total Saudi military manpower and the number

of its combat aircraft increased by approximately 28% from 1973 to 1974 (Military Balance). In this case, then, the Saudi defense spending increased significantly.

The second hypothesis concerns whether Saudi Arabia joined the U.S.-led wartime coalition. Saudi Arabia did not join the U.S war efforts in Vietnam in 1973. While the U.S. supported Israel with arms at the beginning of the war, it did not lead or initiate the war efforts. Regarding the third hypothesis, it is quite evident that the United States did not support Saudi Arabia diplomatically or militarily at the beginning of this conflict; rather, they provided arms to the opposing side with Operation Nickel Grass.

Finally, for the fourth hypothesis, Saudi Arabia was not responsive to initial U.S. demands. On the October 17, 1973, Arab oil-producing countries led by Saudi Arabia imposed a 5% cut in oil production and placed an oil embargo on a group of countries, including the United States, that was perceived as favoring Israel (Cordesman 1984). Saudi Arabia's oil production decreased to 6.5 mbd from 8.3 mbd (Cordesman 1984). This announcement came as a response to the Nixon administration's decision to ask Congress to approve \$2.2 billion in aid to Israel (Lenczowski 1990). On November 5, 1973, Saudi Arabia, alongside other Arab countries, announced a further 25% production cut (Lenczowski 1990). A memorandum of a conversation at the State Department on October 10 indicates that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait signaled

their use of oil as a weapon in this conflict, and the Nixon administration was fully aware of this threat (United States 4; see also White House 2).

The Arab oil embargo on the United States and others lasted from October 1973 to March 1974. The price of an oil barrel increased four-fold, from \$3 to \$12 by the end of the embargo (MERIP Reports 1974). The price of a gallon of oil in the U.S. increased by 43% (Frum 2008). In addition, more than 120,000 barrels of oil per day that the Gulf region supplied to the U.S. seventh fleet in the Pacific and the U.S. sixth fleet in the Mediterranean were cut. Saudi oil exports to the U.S. decreased from 781,000 barrels per day in October 1973 to 21,000 barrels per day in January 1974 (EIA). The U.S. military establishment was outraged, and the Secretary of Defense, Schlesinger, devised a plan to seize the oil field in Abu Dhabi to intimidate the Arab oil producers (Cooper 2012). On November 19, 1973, Secretary Kissinger publicly threatened that “countermeasures” would be taken if the oil embargo was not resolved within a reasonable timeframe. The Saudi foreign minister’s response was that the oil fields “will be blown up” (Cooper 2012, p. 132). However, the United States took no military action to break the oil embargo.

During the embargo, the U.S. administration tried to persuade the Saudis and others to halt the embargo and reverse the production cuts (United States 5). However, Saudi Arabia and other members of the OAPEC, with the exception

of Iraq, insisted that the embargo would only be lifted if the U.S. managed to effectively reach a ceasefire between Israel on the one side and Egypt and Syria on the other one (United States 2). King Faisal informed Secretary Kissinger that the embargo would not be lifted unless progress was made on occupied Arab territories (Cordesman 1984). Secretary Kissinger was able to produce an Egyptian-Israeli disengagement treaty in January 1974. A month later, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, and Syria announced that the embargo would end “if the U.S. makes constructive progress” (Cordesman 1984, p. 26). The embargo was lifted in March 1979, and the Israeli–Syrian ceasefire was reached two months later (United States 2).

This case shows that Saudi Arabia adopted an antagonistic policy toward the United States when it perceived the U.S. military’s aid to Israel as a hostile act. As the Saudi Foreign minister stated on October 17, their policy goal was to reach a ceasefire at a minimum and an Israeli withdrawal from pre-1967 Arab territories at maximum (White House 2). The Saudis, along other boycotting OAPEC members, did not concede to U.S. demands to lift the oil embargo and increase oil production until a ceasefire was achieved. The Saudis were responsive to the U.S. demand of lifting the embargo only when the U.S. aligned its policy preference to reaching a ceasefire between the combatants.

4.2 The 1975 Soviet Intrusion in the Arab World and Sub-Saharan Africa

4.2.1 Policy Preferences: Aligned

Following the lifting of the oil embargo in 1974, tensions remained in U.S.-Saudi relations. The Ford administration, especially Henry Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, were concerned that oil weapon might again be used as leverage if another Arab–Israeli war broke out. Sending a message to Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil-producing countries, Kissinger stated in January of 1975 that a military action would only be taken “where there is some actual strangulation of the industrialized world” (Looney 2012). Two months later, an article appeared in *Harper’s Magazine* advocating the seizure of Arab oil by violent means (Ignotius 1975). The former Saudi Director of Intelligence, Omar Shams, conveyed to the U.S. embassy that this article “is part of a USG plan to soften up the American people for attempted occupation of the Arabian Peninsula” (United State 23). On television, the U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, James Akin, said, “anyone who would propose that is either a madman, a criminal, or an agent of the Soviet Union” (Dreyfuss 2003). Shortly after, he learned that his boss, Secretary Kissinger, was behind this article and several others. He was abruptly relieved of his post in Saudi Arabia several months later (see United States 34, 35, and 36). Along with the threats, Secretary Kissinger worked on an oil agreement with Iran to purchase one billion barrels over a period of a year for the strategic reserve. He said that the purpose of this deal was political, not economic, and stated, “I want the Saudis to weep and I want them to be uncertain. ... I want there to

be a visible gap between the price we're paying for oil and the OPEC price. I want the Shah to break the OPEC line" (United States 54 and 55). The declassified documents reveal that Kissinger used this tactic to turn OPEC member states against each other.

In early April 1975, King Faisal was assassinated by his nephew. King Khalid ascended to the throne, but he gave full executive authority to Crown Prince Fahad. The latter was eager to renew the U.S –Saudi Arabia alliance. In a meeting with a senior U.S. official on April 8, Fahad told him, "I am determined that the policy of close working relations with the United States which I began and which has become known as my policy, shall be implemented promptly and fully now that I am in charge" (United States 25). However, he also emphasized that he expected all projects and programs discussed between the two states to be implemented in return. A month later, though, Schlesinger said the U.S. would use all "political, economic, and even military" measures to diffuse any future oil embargo (United States 26). This increased the Saudi suspicion of U.S. intentions. Fahad rejected a U.S. invitation to visit the White House in July of the same year. The U.S. embassy in Saudi Arabia, as well as the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Scowcroft, advised President Ford to publicly voice concern over the statement made by the U.S. Secretary of Defense and completely reject it (United States 26, 27, 28, and 29). They argued that this step was critical to receiving Saudi economic help on the oil front. On May 23, 1975, President

Ford publicly announced that military action would not be used in a future oil embargo. This action helped smooth U.S.-Saudi relations and allowed them to focus efforts on a common adversary, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

The USSR had been actively increasing military presence as well as supporting communist-leaning governments in South Yemen as well as in several African countries. In a meeting with Secretary Kissinger, Crown Prince Fahad voiced concern over the Soviet Base in Somalia, Soviet arms to Ethiopia and South Yemen, and Soviet influence in Iraq (United States 21). Fahad justified their need for the “most sophisticated [U.S.] weapons possible ... aircraft and air defense system” based on these premises. “You cannot be a Wahhabi and not be an anti-communist. ... [A]ll the Saudi kings are Wahhabis,” Riedel recalled (2020). Kissinger assured him that the United States considered “the Kingdom’s enemies to be our enemies,” and he also noted the Ford administration’s willingness to cooperate on this evolving communist threat (United States 21). The Saudi strategy to combat the communist threat centered on three main efforts: (1) requesting U.S. arms to modernize the Saudi military, (2) requesting that the U.S. replace Soviet arms in communist-leaning countries with Saudi financing, and (3) providing financial support to these countries to drive a wedge between them and the Soviet Union.

In the aftermath of Nixon's Watergate scandal, the Ford administration and the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) hands were tied by the 1974 Hughes-Ryan amendment. The U.S. Congress expanded its oversight of covert operations and required the President to seek prior approval. This was followed by the 1976 Presidential Executive Order 11905, from Ford, which put more restrictions on covert U.S. operations at home and abroad. With domestic restrictions, the Ford administration actively sought help from its allies to combat Soviet influence in Africa and elsewhere. This led to the establishment in 1976 of the Safari Club, which consisted of France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Morocco. This group helped arm and finance anti-communist factions all over the world. Viewing the USSR as a threat to the Kingdom, Saudi Arabia was willing to finance anti-Soviet operations. For example, Riyadh agreed to Kissinger's request to provide \$30 million to Jonas Savimbi of Angola to curb the influence of communist factions within the country (Bronson 2008).

Regarding Somalia, Turki Al-Faisal informed the U.S. ambassador that the activation of the Soviet base in Berbera would be "a direct and immediate threat" to the security of the Kingdom, and it would "significantly undercut our efforts to keep the region free of communist military influence" (United States 30). He also added that an active Soviet military base with armed missiles in Somalia might "weaken the PDRY [People's Democratic Republic of Yemen] Government's resistance to Soviet demands for naval base rights

at Aden” (United States 30; also see 32). In that case, the USSR would surround the Kingdom from the south and the west. Riyadh wanted assurances from Washington that it was willing to provide arms to the Somalian government in order to circumvent Soviet meddling. On July 14, 1975, the Saudi foreign minister, Saud Al-Faisal, asked if the U.S. would be willing to supply Somalia with Saudi-financed weapons (United States 32). The Ford administration, however, was reluctant to provide arms due to sensitivities that doing so might arouse in Kenya and Ethiopia. The U.S. administration opted to encourage Riyadh to “leverage economic assistance on the Somalis toward the end of reducing and ultimately removing the Soviet presence from Somalia” (United States 32). The Saudis were successful in distancing the Somali government from Moscow by 1976. There is no doubt that both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia viewed the Soviet military presence in Somalia with grave concern. The U.S. arms sales to Somalia occurred in July 1977 under President Carter to help aid the Somalis in their fight against Ethiopia, which was receiving military aid from the USSR.

The U.S. and Saudi Arabia also saw eye to eye on ending the Soviet influence in South Yemen. Fahad conveyed to the Ford administration that the Kingdom was “trying to convince South Yemen (PDRY) that cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf is better for them than with the communists” (United States 21). However, the Soviets had more leverage with PDRY. The Ford administration wanted a “firm Saudi commitment to the modernization

of the armed forces of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR)” to balance the Soviet influence in South Yemen (United States 32); the YAR is North Yemen. In May 1975, the Saudi government made a pledge to provide the YAR with \$100 million to relieve their fiscal budget as well as \$360 million dollars in development aid (Safran 2018). Several months later, however, the YAR government was negotiating an arms deal with the Soviet Union in an attempt to play the two sides against each other (United States 38). The U.S. was successful in persuading Hamdi against this action, as they believed it would have negative consequences for American interests as well as the Saudi aid to YAR. In April and June 1976, the Kingdom increased its aid to YAR, and it financed \$140 million dollars of U.S. arms to YAR. When U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements met with the Saudi Defense Minister in October 1976, the former warned that “there are many elements still within the Yemeni armed forces capable of stirring up problems and who have a leaning toward the Soviets” (United States 52). They agreed that both countries should show support for North Yemen and deliver the arms as soon as possible. Regarding the PDRY, the Saudis provided economic aid to drive them away from the USSR. Riyadh and Washington thoroughly collaborated to decrease the communist threat in the two Yemens.

On the subject of Jordan, the Ford administration started developing a joint U.S.-Saudi plan to supply the Jordanian government with a U.S. air defense system financed by Riyadh (United States 41). The common concern was that

Jordan could acquire Soviet arms instead. Both the U.S. and Saudi governments agreed that it is in their interest to prevent Arab states from adopting a pro-Soviet stance (United States 39). When the U.S. proposal was sent to Riyadh in March 1976, the Saudis were surprised that the \$300 million deal initially agreed upon became more than \$700 million that included 14 Hawk batteries and 100 Vulcan guns. Initially, they stumbled over the bill, and the State Department continued to send letters warning the Saudi government that this arms sale was essential to maintaining a stable Jordan free of Soviet influence (United States 42), a goal that both countries shared. In April 1976, the U.S. Ambassador to Jidda, William Porter, met with Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan and conveyed to him that “turning to the Soviets would not be in Jordan’s interest” (United States 43). Several months later, the Saudis agreed to cover the bill when the cost was lowered to around \$500 million (see also United States 46).

Another main objective of the Kingdom was to receive arms (including prized F-15 jets) from the United States to secure its borders when necessary (see United States 40). In addition, the Kingdom conveyed two justifications: (1) strengthening the Saudi military was essential to stabilize the Arabian Peninsula, and (2) this would help Saudi Arabia in steering oil-producing countries from “radical policies” (i.e., high oil prices; United States 22). In September 1975, King Khalid told Kissinger, “[W]e don’t want Sultan [Saudi Defense Minister] to be annoyed, so don’t forget about our arms” (United

States 36; also see 37). This meeting also showed that Saudi efforts to encourage Pakistan and Afghanistan to fight Communism were ongoing. However, U.S.-Saudi relations were under fire by some “anti-Arab,” as Fahad put it, elements in Congress and within the Ford administration (United States 39). In December 1975, the Crown Prince complained that Saudi Arabia was not receiving enough U.S. support even though they did not recognize any communist states. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Atherton assured the Saudi leadership that the U.S. would preserve its relations with the Kingdom at all costs. These assurances were met with some Saudi concerns.

I find that the memorandum from Scowcroft to President Ford in June 1976 provided an accurate description of the opportunities and challenges facing U.S.-Saudi relations (United States 44). While the Kingdom’s main concern was its own security, Scowcroft determined that Saudi Arabia could influence Middle Eastern countries by using aid or withholding it. This influence was evident, as we saw in Somalia, South Yemen, Jordan, and elsewhere. He also noted that the Saudi leadership was concerned with the U.S. commitment to its allies’ security, the congressional proposal to halt arms transfers, and the Palestinian issue. The Saudis were concerned with what they saw as the Soviet march toward Africa and the Middle East (Riedel 2020).

The head of the Saudi National Guard, Prince Abdallah, echoed these concerns when he visited Washington the following month. He urged

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to speed up the delivery of arms to Saudi Arabia and told him, “the Saudis feel they are the only country in the region opposing Communism; they were disturbed by the turn of events in Southeast Asia, Pakistan, and Angola” (United States 45). He criticized what he saw as the lack of U.S. leadership on these matters, but Rumsfeld replied that President Ford was determined to combat Soviet adventurism and that the tides were shifting favorably within Congress to recognize the communist threat. Two days later, Abdallah carried the same message to Kissinger, telling him, “[W]e must be concerned that the Russians [do] not penetrate into the Middle East” (United States 46). Kissinger replied, “[W]e oppose it,” but he cited congressional opposition to U.S. covert actions. Abdallah said, “I know this, but this Congress, it is like a disease” (United States 46).

Some members of Congress voiced objections over the sale of Sidewinder and Maverick missiles to Saudi Arabia in July and August of 1976. Secretary Kissinger instructed the U.S. embassy to reassure the Saudis that the U.S. has “every intention of fulfilling the transaction” despite congressional objection (United States 47). On September 2, 1976, President Ford sent a letter to King Khalid stating that his administration would submit the sale proposal to Congress (United States 48). However, the number of missiles would have to be reduced to avoid congressional rejection. By October 1976, Congress approved the sale, and both sides were satisfied (United States 51).

While the U.S.–Saudi relations suffered after the 1973 oil embargo, they managed to survive and to be strengthened in the face of what they both perceived a growing communist threat. We saw their policy preferences align on diminishing Soviet influence in states in the Arab world and Sub-Saharan Africa. Saudi Arabia gave around \$6 billion in military and foreign aid by 1977 (Bronson 2008). In addition, the Saudi government viewed the passage of the arms sale as a renewed U.S. commitment to the Kingdom’s security.

4.2.2 Discussing the Four Hypotheses

Regarding the first hypothesis, Saudi defense spending as a percentage of GDP increased from 12.7% (\$3.182 billion) to 15.9% (\$7.105 billion; SIPRI; Cordesman 1984). From 1974 to 1976, actual Saudi defense expenditure almost tripled, reaching a staggering \$9.288 billion (Cordesman 1984). The total number of Saudi military personnel increased from 69,000 in 1974 to 97,000 by 1977 (Military Balance). The number of medium tanks went from 55 in 1974 to 475 in 1977, and the number of fighter jets increased by more than 50% in the same time period (Military Balance). Saudi arms imports tripled between 1974 and 1977 (Military Balance).

The second hypothesis relates to whether Saudi Arabia joined the U.S. wartime coalition. I argue that this was the case. Saudi Arabia actively joined the U.S. Cold War efforts to diminish the Soviet influence in the Arab world and Sub-Saharan Africa. This was evident in Angola, Somalia, Ethiopia, the

two Yemens, and Jordan. In addition, Saudi Arabia was a member of the Safari Club, which was tasked with reversing Soviet expansionism. When it was under the leadership of George H.W. Bush, a main objective of this group was to conduct CIA objectives without congressional oversight (Cooley 2005). Even though these efforts were mainly covert, I think it is important to consider them within the Cold War context between the U.S. and the USSR.

Concerning the third hypothesis, the U.S. did provide military support to the Kingdom, as I discussed earlier. The U.S., under both Presidents Ford and Carter, provided military weapons and training to Saudi Arabia. In fact, Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor under President Carter, said, “If Ethiopia and South Yemen [PDRY] become Soviet associates, not only will access to Suez be threatened, and this involves the oil pipeline from Saudi Arabia and Iran, but there will be a serious and direct political threat to Saudi Arabia. This is something we simply cannot ignore” (Brzezinski 1983, p. 181). If the Soviets maintained a foothold in Somalia and South Yemen, then this could not only create a barrage of pro-Soviets regimes in the Arab world and beyond, but also constitute a threat to the Kingdom's security within its own borders. Therefore, the evidence shows that the U.S. supplied Riyadh as well as other anti-Soviet government with arms.

In terms of the fourth hypothesis, Saudi Arabia was responsive to the U.S. requests to increase oil prices, but only when their policy preferences were

aligned on fighting what they both perceived as radical elements in the Arab world and Sub-Saharan Africa and preserving the Kingdom's security through rearmament. The declassified documents show that Secretary Kissinger was the main opponent of asking the Saudis to help on the oil matter. His view was that the Saudis "want to be our [U.S.] sole supplier so they can squeeze us when they want" (Cooper 2012, p. 188). He also asserted that the Saudis did not have the "guts" to confront oil-producing countries. Instead, he was convinced that Iran under the Shah would be the most suitable to lead the effort in lowering oil prices. The U.S. Secretary of treasury, William Simon, disagreed with his assessment, and he encouraged the administration to seek Saudi assistance on oil matters. When the Shah visited Washington in May 1975, he publicly stated that Iran would push for an increase in oil prices; some Iranian officials stated that it might be as high as 35% (Cooper 2012). At that point, Ford's White House started to lose patience with the Shah's oil policy.

Further, the economic situation in the United States and elsewhere was not ideal in 1976. Scowcroft sent a memo to President Ford telling him that a "15% increase in oil prices would cost the developed countries \$15 billion directly and \$32 billion in reduced GNP" (United States 58; also see 57). This would have an adverse effect on the unemployment rate, and it posed the possibility of an economic recession. With the Shah unwilling to compromise

on prices, President Ford had to turn to Riyadh as the 1976 Doha OPEC meeting approached (see United States 59 and 60).

In September 1976, Ford told the Saudi Foreign minister, “[L]ast year when you were here, we were at the bottom of a recession. We are moving out now, but it is still fragile. ... [A]ny increase this December or for ’77 would be extremely damaging” (United States 49). The President realized that a bad economy would not result in a high favorability rating and could hurt his re-election chances. The response from Saud Al-Faisal was, “One of the important subjects for us is the matter of improving our armed forces ... and our ability [to oppose an increase in oil prices] depends strongly on the overall state of U.S.-Saudi relations, not only in military supplies but in other things” (United States 49). The Saudi foreign minister clearly linked U.S. military sales to Saudi relations and the overall state of the bilateral relations to their willingness to cooperate with the U.S. on opposing oil price increases. A memorandum by the National Security Staff also concluded that congressional disapproval of the arms sale to Saudi Arabia could lead to the inability of U.S. to exert influence on “holding down prices” (United States 50). They also warned that it might shake Saudi trust in the U.S. commitment to its security interests. The Ford administration was able to pressure Congress to pass the arms sale to Saudi Arabia and to block the boycott legislation in October of 1976. Equally important, the two countries

cooperated side by side on reducing the Soviet influence in the Arab world and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Shortly after Carter became President-elect, Democratic Senator James Abourezk arrived in Riyadh to have an audience with King Khalid on November 17, and he specifically requested the Saudi Oil and Petroleum Minister to be present (Embassy Jidda 1). Abourezk's goal was to ask the Saudis to avoid oil price increases to achieve a positive impact on the incoming President and improve the U.S.–Saudi friendship. U.S. Ambassador Porter insisted on accompanying him to the audience with the King. When they both arrived at the Royal Diwan separately, the Senator refused his company and had a fierce discussion at the King's door. It ended with Abourezk telling him, “[D]o you want to get your nuts cut off?” (Embassy Jidda 1). He went inside alone. Later, Ambassador Porter informed the Saudis that Senator Abourezk represented the views of President-elect Carter.

With the Doha OPEC meeting one month away, the U.S. administration grappled with its strategy (United States 59 and 60). President Ford summoned Saudi Ambassador Ali Reza on November 29, 1976. The President conveyed three main points: (1) both he and President-elect Carter opposed an increase in the oil price, (2) he fought Congress's disapproval of the arms sale to Saudi Arabia and approved the boycott bill, and (3) he argued that an increase in oil prices might jeopardize U.S. attitudes toward the

continuing efforts to diminish the Soviet influence in the Middle East (United States 62). It appears that the Saudi Ambassador was not authorized to deliver an answer, but he reaffirmed the Kingdom's position on fighting Communism. A week later, the Iranian Ambassador told President Ford that the price increase was inevitable (United States 62).

On December 14, a day before the Doha OPEC meeting, President Ford was pleased to hear from the Saudi Ambassador that King Khalid promised to seek "a reasonable and acceptable minimum increase" (Cooper 2012, p. 358). In the meeting, Yamani officially proposed a six-month freeze on oil prices, but the OPEC cartel managed to vote on increasing the price of oil in two stages; 10% in January 1977 and another 5% in July 1977, while Yamani was absent in Riyadh for several hours. Shortly after his return to Doha, Saudi Oil Minister Yamani stated that his country would not accept the 15% increase in crude exports by 1977. Instead, the Saudi oil price would increase by only 5%, effective in January 1977, and they would attempt to increase their oil production to 11.8 million barrels from 8.5 million (Cooper 2012). This move led the CIA to assess that Saudi Arabia was the leading player in energy markets (Riedel 2017).

This meeting shifted the balance of power within OPEC in favor of Riyadh. The Iranian Court Minister Alam wrote to the Shah, "[W]e have squandered every cent we had only to find ourselves checkmated by a single move from

Saudi Arabia” (Cooper 2012, p. 369). The Saudi government also agreed to discreetly help the U.S. build a six-month strategic oil reserve (Cordesman 1984). The price of a barrel of oil went from \$62 in December 1976 to \$59 in July 1977, and the U.S. oil imports from Saudi Arabia went from 1.4 million barrels to 1.724 million during the same time period. President Ford thanked the Saudi King, telling him, “Your Majesty’s determination to stand firmly against the many pressures for a larger price rise and to increase your country’s oil production has made an important contribution to the cause of international cooperation, which is an important goal for both our nations” (United States 63). In fact, the Saudi government was also responsive to President Carter’s demands regarding oil prices in 1977 and 1978 (see United States 66 and Embassy Jidda 2).

In sum, the Saudis were responsive to U.S. demand to prevent an even larger increase in oil prices set by OPEC in the Doha meeting and later on. The Saudis made this responsiveness conditional upon joint U.S.–Saudi efforts to decrease Soviet influence in the region as well as receiving the U.S. arms to aid the Kingdom’s security. They also sought strong cooperation with the incoming President Carter on matters of regional security. As I discussed in the first section, their policy preferences were aligned on these issues.

4.3 The 1979 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

4.3.1 Policy Preferences: Aligned

In December 1979, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were caught off-guard when the Soviet Union ordered its 40th Army to invade Afghanistan. The Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin, was immediately executed, and the pro-Soviet Babrak Karmal was installed in his place. The Soviets justified their action with the 1978 treaty that allowed the Afghan government to call upon the Soviet Union to intervene militarily (Harrison 1995). Released Soviet documents show that their military intervention had three main causes: (1) Amin's government lacked the ability to defeat the Afghani mujahidin groups, (2) the Soviets suspected that Amin would switch to the U.S. camp, and (3) they feared that the Iranian Revolution could inspire the spread of theocracy into Afghanistan and Soviet territories (Wolf 2008).

Following the invasion, the Pakistani President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq immediately called King Khalid of Saudi Arabia to inform him that he would send his head of intelligence to brief him on the situation on the ground. Turki Al-Faisal received him at the airport and took him to meet the King in the presence of Princes Fahad, Abdullah, and Sultan, among others. Akhtar Khan, Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence, told the Saudi political leadership that they feared Pakistan would be the next target for the Soviets. The Saudis reacted by asking, “[W]hat did your American allies tell you?” (Al-Faisal 2019). He replied that they were still not sure. To the Saudis,

American cooperation would be instrumental in deterring the Soviets from invading Pakistan.

Even though the Soviet Union was the first country to fully recognize the Saudi state diplomatically in 1932, the countries' relations were cut off in 1938 after the Saudi leadership accused Moscow of inciting revolutionary movements in the Arab world (Ismael 2004). Several decades later, the Soviet Union actively supported anti-Saudi armed communist groups in Yemen and Africa in the 1970s (Cordesman 1984). In Riyadh, the Kingdom viewed the 1979 Soviet intrusion into Afghanistan as a "campaign to encircle the Arabian Peninsula with radical regimes and subvert the oil-rich monarchies" (Bronson 2008, p. 154). As Saudi Arabia's former Saudi Intelligence chief, Turki Al-Faisal, put it, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was "completing something they had started in Africa ... by godless communists" (Bronson 2008, p. 148). He told me, "[T]he Soviet aggression was considered by us as an existential threat to the Kingdom's security, as well as to global peace" (Al-Faisal 2019). According to Bruce Riedel, the Saudi government also thought that the USSR was behind the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which ousted the Shah of Iran (Riedel 2020).

About a month after the invasion, Carter's National Security Advisor, Brzezinski, visited Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in February 1980. The Pakistanis promised him logistical support to train and provide arms to Afghan

mujahideen, while the Saudis pledged significant economic assistance (Riedel 2014). The King of Saudi Arabia promised that he would match every dollar the U.S. government spent on combatting the Soviets in Afghanistan (Bronson 2008). Brzezinski recalls that the Saudi leadership took the Soviet threat quite seriously.

The Carter administration defined the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the Cold War context. It constituted a threat to U.S. influence in the Gulf region and potential Soviet access to the Indian Ocean (Gates 1996). This initiated Carter's doctrine, which stated that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force" (United States 9). The possibility of an overthrow of Iran's Shah regime, an American ally, weighed in the U.S. decision to intervene, as well. According to Brzezinski, the former National Security Advisor, "If they [Soviets] succeed in occupying it [Afghanistan], Iran would be even more vulnerable to the Soviet Union, and in any case, the Persian Gulf would be accessible even to Soviet tactical air force from bases in Afghanistan. Therefore, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was viewed by us as of serious strategic consequence, irrespective of whatever may have been the Soviet motives for it" (Brzezinski 1997; see also 1983).

The U.S. objective was then to make Afghanistan the Soviet version of Vietnam and to make them “bleed for as much and as long as is possible” (Brzezinski 1983 and 1997; see also Gates 1996 and Hedley 2005). The British and Chinese were in agreement as well (Riedel 2020). To achieve this goal, the U.S. placed a long list of sanctions against the Soviets and reached out to the Saudis and Pakistan to coordinate a plan to arm the Afghan mujahidin (Riedel 2014).

In that context, Saudi Arabia and the United States took parallel measures. For instance, they both boycotted the 1980 Olympics in Moscow; the OIC led by Saudi Arabia passed a resolution condemning the Soviet invasion and demanding immediate, full withdrawal (Ismael 2004); and the United Nations General assembly voted in favor of protesting Soviet aggression with an overwhelming majority. It became clear that the U.S. would not allow Moscow’s adventurism in Afghanistan to go unchecked (Gates 1996), and the circumstances pushed for closer U.S.–Saudi cooperation.

The result was a 10-year covert operation to arm and train the Afghan mujahidin to defeat the Soviets. This operation was accelerated under President Reagan, whose doctrine intended to “reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world” (Bronson 2008, p. 153). The CIA was, by then, also more capable of conducting covert operations abroad (Al-Faisal 2019). The joint U.S.-Saudi policy had expanded from

protecting Pakistan to expelling the Soviets from Afghanistan. It is estimated that the U.S. spent a total of around \$3 billion (Riedel 2014) in Afghanistan. The Saudi government provided the Afghani fighters with an estimated total of \$4 billion in official aid, and more funding arrived from charities and mosques through unofficial means (Bruno 2009).

Turki Al-Faisal, former Saudi intelligence chief, has noted, “Afghanistan, of course, is a perfect example of cooperation between Saudi and American intelligence agencies. The principal aim was opposing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and further to prevent the Soviets from invading Pakistan” (Al-Faisal 2010). It is possible that Washington and Riyadh had different motives in countering the Soviets, but there is no doubt that this case shows an alignment of policy preferences between the two states.

The next section examines the four hypotheses within the context of the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

4.3.2 Discussing the Four Hypotheses

First, a pattern of increased military spending followed the Soviet invasion. For instance, Saudi Arabia’s defense budget as a share of GDP increased from 15.9% (\$17.6 billion) in 1979 to 17.2% (\$20.6 billion) in 1980 (SIPRI). Their defense budget went from \$24.4 billion in 1981 to \$27.1 billion in 1982 (SIPRI). The number of medium tanks increased from 350 in 1979 to 380 in

1980 and 630 in 1981 (Military Balance). The number of combat aircraft increased from 171 in 1979 to 180 in 1980 and 192 in 1982 (Military Balance). The total Saudi military manpower increased from 65,000 in 1979 to 82,000 in 1981 (Military Balance). Saudi arms imports increased from \$925 million in 1979 to \$1.4 billion in 1980 (Military Balance).

Second, I argue that Saudi Arabia joined the U.S. wartime coalition, and that the U.S. led a covert international effort to defeat and reverse Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia, as well as Pakistan and Egypt, agreed to be part of Operation Cyclone (Riedel 2014). The former Saudi foreign minister, Saud Al-Faisal, told Brzezinski that the Kingdom was ready “to be cooperative both inside their country and outside” (Bronson 2008, p. 149). Saudi nationals were encouraged and allowed to join ranks with the Afghan mujahidin (Riedel 2014). It is estimated that they numbered approximately 10,000 fighters, one of whom was Osama Bin Laden (Bergen 2006). Some might argue that the U.S.–led operation against the Soviets would not qualify as a wartime coalition. A valid response to this argument is that the nature of the operation is not relevant, as the coalition had a specific military objective. The primary purpose of this coalition was to defeat and expel the Soviets by providing a network of arms supplies and training to Afghan mujahideen. The U.S.–led coalition’s goal was achieved when the last Soviet soldier withdrew from Afghani territories in February 1989.

With the third hypothesis regarding U.S. support to Saudi Arabia in interstate conflict, it appears that a degree of support was present both diplomatically and militarily. If the Soviets successfully controlled Afghanistan, they could have easily invaded Pakistan. This would give them access to the warm Gulf waters and put Saudi Arabia's security at risk. The Saudi leadership, as discussed above, saw the Soviet move as part of an orchestrated plan to surround their country; they considered it a direct threat to their security. The American military, diplomatic, and financial support to the Afghan mujahideen advanced Saudi security interests. In fact, Reagan's Secretary of Defense, Weinberger, stated, "[W]e want to do everything we can to assist [the Saudis] in providing the additional security that they need" against the Soviets (Bronson 2008, p. 160). The Reagan administration was able to approve the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), air defenses, deal to the Kingdom despite some congressional objections. In addition, Saudi Arabia played a key role in the war efforts in terms of financial and military aid, intelligence support, and recruits.

In terms of the fourth hypothesis, some evidence shows that President Carter was concerned about high oil prices, and he sent a messenger to Saudi Arabia before assuming office. In November 1976, Democratic Senator James Abourezk arrived in Riyadh, and he requested an audience with King Khalid and his oil minister, Zaki Yamani, as discussed earlier (Embassy Jidda 1). In 1977, a declassified memo also shows that Carter's cabinet considered oil

prices to be “at the top of their agenda,” and the Saudis were to be pressured to prevent even a “moderate” oil price increase, as it would have “serious economic as well as political ramifications” for the United States (United States 6). Saudi Arabia’s position in OPEC was to have a 5% price increase in both 1977 and 1978 (Cordesman 1984).

The crude oil prices per barrel remained close to \$15 from 1977 to mid-1979 (Saudi Arabian Monetary Fund, SAMF). However, the Iranian revolution erupted in 1979, and Iran’s oil exports fell from 6 million to 1.5 million barrels of oil (Cordesman 1984). This decrease created a shockwave in the oil market, and the price of a barrel of oil doubled to around \$33 (SAMF). In May 1979, the Carter administration assessed that it was imperative to strike a deal with Saudi Arabia to increase its oil production and capacity (United States 7 and United States 8).

On November 14, 1979, Secretary of Treasury William Miller met with King Khalid in Riyadh. The Saudi King told him, “[N]owadays, the Russians are closer than ever in Afghanistan. We supply you with oil, and Russian warships are threatening the Gulf. Why don’t you sink them?” (Embassy Riyadh 1). It was clear that the King linked Saudi oil policy to U.S. policy on Soviet activities in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Two months later, President Carter announced his doctrine of not allowing any foreign aggression against the Gulf region, and Operation Cyclone against the Soviets was put into

action. There is no doubt that the U.S. had its vested interests in Afghanistan, but these could not be divorced from Saudi oil policy.

Saudi average oil production increased from 7 million oil barrels in 1979 to 8.5 million in 1980 and 9.5 million in 1981 (Cordesman 1984). The U.S. oil imports from Saudi Arabia increased from 1.16 million barrels of oil in November 1979 to approximately 1.5 million in September 1980 (EIA). The price of a barrel of oil, however, decreased to only \$35 by November 1980. The increase in Saudi oil production did not offset the supply decrease resulting from the Iran-Iraq war. Most oil shipments from both countries were suspended when war broke out in September 1980. Carter succeeded in convincing Saudi Arabia to increase production and to limit price increases, but did not secure his second term. Nevertheless, the Saudis were more responsive to U.S. oil requests after their policies were aligned on halting Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

After President Reagan resumed office in 1981, the oil prices consistently dropped, reaching \$27 by November 1985 (SAMF). The continual price decrease was due to significant oil output increase from non-OPEC members and quota-cheating practices from OPEC members (Bronson 2008). Oil prices were not a priority to the Reagan administration, as the market drove prices down regardless. Saudi Arabia, as the only swing producer, continued to cut production in order to stabilize the oil market and keep the barrel at a

suitable price. By 1985, their oil production cut around 2.2 million barrels of oil per day (Gross 2019). The Saudi oil strategy of production cuts caused them to lose market share significantly.

There was also a change in Soviet leadership in March 1985. Mikhail Gorbachev became the general secretary of the Soviet Communist party, and he appointed General Mikhail Zaitsev to lead their war in Afghanistan. In 1968, General Zaitsev ruthlessly oppressed the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia (Bronson 2008). The Reagan administration determined that the new Soviet leadership would want to win the Afghan war within a two-year framework (Bronson 2008). President Reagan increased U.S. efforts in Afghanistan with U.S. National Security Decision Directive 166 in March 1985 (Cogan 1993). This directive highlights interim objectives to reach “the ultimate goal” of removing the Soviet forces from Afghanistan (White House 4). The U.S. wanted to raise the costs of war for the Soviets in Afghanistan.

The Soviets had already spent around \$16 billion through the first five years of the war (Central Intelligence Agency 1). Their economy depended heavily on revenues from oil exports. The Reagan administration adopted three central economic policies to damage the Soviet economy. First, they devalued the dollar to decrease the worth of Soviet exports by 25%. Second, Reagan issued U.S. National Security Decision Directive 155 to restrict U.S. energy sales equipment to the Soviets (White House 3). Third, the Reagan

administration approached the Saudis to increase oil production to lower the prices further (Schweizer 1994 and Central Intelligence Agency 2).

When I met with former Saudi spy Chief Turki Al-Faisal in his office at Georgetown University, I asked him directly if he had discussed using oil as a weapon against the Soviets with former CIA director William Casey; he answered in the affirmative. He added that the impact of low oil prices on the Soviet economy was discussed in combination with other military elements to hurt the Soviet military's position in Afghanistan (Al-Faisal 2019). This was the first time the former Saudi Head of Intelligence, or any former Saudi official, for that matter, acknowledged on the record that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia used oil as a weapon against the Soviets. He also emphasized that his primary concern with his U.S. counterpart was to arm the Afghan Mujahideen. In fact, Saudi Arabia and the U.S., as Bandar Bin Sultan likes to say, became the largest importers of donkeys, as they were the most viable way to transport weapons through Afghanistan's difficult terrain (Simpson 2006).

Although the Saudi oil minister, Zaki Yamani, opposed any production increase and called it "suicidal" (Bronson 2008), the gains outweighed the risks, and the Saudi King made the decision to raise production. The Soviet Union, as discussed earlier, was considered an existential threat to the Saudi state. Turki Al-Faisal informed me that he determined that the best way to preserve the Kingdom was the downfall of the Soviet Union (Al-Faisal 2019).

King Fahad fired the oil minister and doubled oil production in 1986. Their oil output remained steady at around 5.5 million barrels until 1989 (EIA). The Saudi oil export to the United States increased from 40,000 barrels of oil in 1985 to around 1.5 million barrels in 1989. The price of a barrel of oil went from \$27 in 1985 to \$14 in 1986, and it averaged around \$16 until 1989 (SAMF). The Soviet leadership was infuriated with the new Saudi oil policy (Ottaway 2010). In 1986, Gorbachev sent a letter to King Fahad to reverse their oil policy. However, it does not seem that it had an impact on the Saudi position.

It is important to note that the Saudi decision to increase production also meant restoring its market share. However, they continued their policy of oil production cuts until 1985, when President Reagan asked them to pump more oil. This was not the first time Saudi Arabia used oil as a weapon. After William Simon, President Ford's Secretary of Treasury, made the request, the country lowered the Iranian Shah's revenues in 1976 by increasing oil production (Cooper 2012); thus, hurting the Soviet economy and gaining market share are not mutually exclusive goals.

From 1985 on, the Soviet economy lost around \$20 billion a year (Gaidar 2007). Their oil and gas revenues went from \$270 billion in 1981 to lower than \$100 billion after 1985 (Ermolaev 2017). The lower oil prices, as well as the rising cost of oil exploration and production, gave the Soviet economy

and its expansionism a fatal blow. The declining oil prices also would have benefited the U.S. economy and the Republican Party (Riedel 2020). However, the impact of low oil prices was also felt in the U.S. oil industry. This impact tempted Vice President Bush to ask the Saudis to increase oil production, and they temporarily did between 1986 and 1987 (Kennedy 2010 and SAMF). When President Reagan hosted the Afghan resistance leaders in the White House in November 1987, he said, “[L]et there be no mistake about it. The withdrawal of the Soviet forces is the key to resolving the Afghan crisis” (Reagan Library). The Soviet Union not only withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, but it ultimately collapsed in 1991. The U.S. and Saudi officials had not envisioned the latter consequence (Al-Faisal 2019). During both the Carter and Reagan administrations, we can see a pattern of Saudi responsiveness to U.S. oil demands when their policy preferences were aligned in Afghanistan.

4.4 The 1990 Iraq Invasion of Kuwait

4.4.1 Policy Preferences: Aligned

In 1989, the U.S. military establishment assessed that the direct threat to peace in the Arabian Peninsula emanated from regional actors' rivalry rather than from the Soviet Union. Following his meeting with the U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia in February 1990, the American General Norman Schwarzkopf started planning a joint U.S.-Kuwaiti military exercise that envisioned an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait scenario (Freeman 2020). The military exercise was supposed to take place between July 9 and August 4, 1990. Alarmed by the satellite imagery of the Iraqi Republican Guards mobilized on the Kuwaiti border, the CIA informed the White House and their counterparts in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia that an attack at a moment's notice was highly possible by July 17, 1990 (Riedel 2020). These warnings were not taken seriously, as all parties thought it was a bluff from Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. On August 2, 1990, however, the forewarned scenario took place, and the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait with more than 100,000 soldiers.

Saddam Hussein claimed that Kuwait was the 19th governorate of Iraq. All Kuwaiti institutions fell to the invading army within hours of the attack, and a puppet government was installed. Controlling Kuwait, Iraq then owned 19% of the world's oil reserves and an additional income of \$600 million per month (Bronson 2008). The government of Kuwait, led by Sheikh Jaber Al-Sabah and his Deputy Sheikh Saad Al-Sabah, was able to seek refuge in Saudi

Arabia. This decision proved consequential to the later restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty and its legitimate government.

On the day of the invasion, the UNSC passed Resolution 660, which condemned the Iraqi aggression and demanded full withdrawal from Kuwaiti territories (Resolution 660). It was a monumental event given that both the U.S. and the USSR stood together against this aggression. It not only signified the end of the Cold War, but it also sent a clear message to Saddam Hussein that he could not count on Soviet support.

In Washington, the outlook was not clear on the first day. The National Security Council Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs, Richard Haass, recalled that President Bush was worried in the first meeting when some in the room “seemed to suggest there was nothing we could do about it [Iraqi invasion of Kuwait] and that instead the focus of U.S. policy ought to be on making sure Saddam did not go any farther and do to Saudi Arabia what he’d done to Kuwait” (Haass 2009, p. 61). In a phone conversation with President Bush on August 2, King Fahad said, “I believe nothing will work with Saddam but use of force” (White House 5). However, the Bush administration was also worried that the Saudis might decide to appease Saddam rather than confront him (Bush and Scowcroft 2011).

The Saudi leadership, on the other hand, had its doubts about U.S. resolve (Sultan 1995). They were afraid that the U.S. would not provide a full military commitment to protect the Kingdom and to liberate Kuwait. Prince Turki Al-Faisal recalls, “[W]e wanted a full American disclosure about the extent of support they were willing to provide, and the Americans wanted to hear the answer to this question from us” (Al-Faisal 2019). He added that both sides needed clarification. According to the Saudi Commander of Joint Forces, Khaled Bin Sultan, “[W]hether or not Saddam attacked the Kingdom was in a sense irrelevant. On all important matters, particularly oil policy and foreign affairs, he would be in a position to dictate terms” (Sultan 1995, p. 19). Ambassador Freeman noted that Saddam’s goal was to dictate oil prices (Freeman 2020). The Saudis also perceived the invasion as an element of a larger conspiracy organized by Iraq, Jordan, Yemen, and Sudan to partition the Kingdom (Riedel 2020). In other words, the Saudi government saw the liberation of Kuwait as linked to the fate of Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty and autonomy—that is, an existential threat.

On August 3, 1990, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft opened the second NSC meeting with a Churchill-inspired speech, saying, “[M]y personal judgment is that the stakes in this for the United States are such that to accommodate Iraq should not be a policy option” (Haass 2009, p. 62). Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence

Eagleburger also stressed that Saddam could attack Saudi Arabia, OPEC, and Israel if the occupation of Kuwait stood undeterred (Haass 2009).

The third NSC meeting took place the following day at Camp David. The administration reviewed military plans General Schwarzkopf and General Powell presented (Haass 2009). The strategy was to send U.S. forces to the Saudi Kingdom and to place economic sanctions on Iraq. There were U.S. concerns, though, that Saudi Arabia might be reluctant to accept foreign troops on its soil. President Bush told King Fahad, “[W]e have to get those forces there soon or Saddam, flushed with victory, might grab the oil fields and the eastern province. ... We have no credible presence side by side with Saudi Arabia, and without enhanced air support, there is nothing to inhibit him militarily” (White House 6). The King insisted on receiving a U.S. delegation to “make a tight, coordinated plan so that the plan is 100% successful” (White House 6). The phone conversation either implicitly reflects King Fahad’s concern that it might be tapped by Iraqi intelligence or leaked to the U.S. press, or perhaps both. At the end of the conversation, Bush assured him that the security of Saudi Arabia was “vital—basically fundamental—to US interests” (White House 6).

Scowcroft, Cheney, General Powell, Chief of Staff Sununu, and Haass met with the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., Bandar Bin Sultan, on August 4. Bandar Bin Sultan asked them bluntly why the Kingdom should choose to be

protected by the United States (Haass 2009). It seems Bandar was using his method of diplomacy to receive U.S. assurances. The Saudis doubted the reliability of the U.S., and they knew that accepting U.S. forces would antagonize Saddam Hussein. Cheney presented the U.S. military deployment plan, and Scowcroft told him, “[N]o Saudi commitment, no U.S. envoy, no U.S. deployment” (Haass 2009, p. 66). This swayed the Saudi Ambassador in Washington to believe the U.S. was fully on board. Bandar phoned King Fahad on the spot, and the Saudis agreed to receive the U.S. envoy.

A day later, Cheney, Powell, Schwarzkopf, and U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Charles Freeman landed in Riyadh to meet with the King. Cheney told King Fahad, “[W]e can defend you, but we cannot liberate you” (Haass 2009). The King was worried that the American military deployment would be an empty gesture, but he was convinced otherwise after seeing the military plan General Schwarzkopf presented (Freeman 2020). In this meeting, King Fahad announced what was arguably the most important decision of his life when he allowed the U.S. troops inside the Saudi Kingdom. It is important to note that the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia resulted from the alignment of policy preferences between Riyadh and Washington rather than the other way around. In addition, the Saudis wanted U.S. military support from the very start, but they were concerned that the U.S. was not serious. King Fahad conveyed to Bush that he did not have the slightest doubt that Saudi Arabia would be Saddam’s next target (White House 10). After both sides were

confident that they shared the same policy preference, by August 5, they agreed on the U.S. military deployment to Saudi Arabia.

That day, President Bush clearly outlined the U.S. objective: “This will not stand, this will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait” (Bronson 2008, p. 194). The U.S. policy now clearly shifted from solely deterring further aggression to Saudi Arabia to liberating Kuwait. The U.S. decision-making process took into consideration the Iraqi invasion’s impact on oil supplies and prices and the security of Saudi Arabia. However, President Bush’s character was instrumental in reaching the decision (Bush and Scowcroft 2011; also see Haass 2009). With King Fahad at his side, President Bush said, “[T]here are voices in the United States that say we’ve done enough and others should do more now. To which I say, world leadership requires we do more than anyone else. This is a responsibility that goes with being a world leader ... to stand up and do what is right” (White House 10). His response to the Iraqi aggression would shape the acceptable set of norms in the new global order. Ambassador Freeman has argued that the U.S. should not allow larger countries to swallow their smaller neighbors and preserve the nature of this order (Freeman 2020).

Over the next five months, the U.S. strategy consisted of the following: (1) increasing economic and military sanctions on Iraq, (2) increasing U.S. and international military presence in Saudi Arabia, and (3) building an

international consensus under the UN umbrella to use force against the Iraqi military. However, challenges arose along the way. On October 8, more than 20 Palestinians were killed, and many others were injured at the Temple Mount incident. The Saudis were concerned that Saddam's propaganda would use this for his own benefit and risk friction within the Arab members of the coalition. Saud Al-Faisal told the U.S. administration, "I see two mischief-makers: Iraq and Israel," and he pressed them to condemn the assault (White House 9).

The second main challenge was to show both the U.S. Congress and the international community that all peaceful means to resolve the situation were exhausted (see White House 10). On November 30, 1990, President Bush informed the Saudi monarch that Jim Baker would meet with an Iraqi delegation. He said that this was "one final step to get to peace after the UNSC resolution (678)" (White House 11). Nothing fruitful came from Baker's meeting with the Iraqi foreign minister, Tariq Aziz. Ambassador Freeman was fairly confident that sanctions would not work in expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait (Freeman 2020).

Another phone call between Bush and Fahad took place the next month. The President provided his assessment that Saddam would not withdraw from Kuwait, and the King told him, "Mr. President, you are fully authorized to do what you think will achieve the objectives of truth and justice. This is my

opinion and the opinion of all the people and government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” (White House 12). He also casually suggested that members of Congress, who opposed the military option, should go to Baghdad to learn the impossibility of reasoning with Saddam. Both countries were determined to use all means necessary to reverse the invasion.

The UNSC ultimatum in resolution 678 for Iraq to unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait expired on January 15, 1991. Two days later, the U.S.–Saudi policy materialized when operation Desert Storm took place to liberate Kuwait (Brands 2004). At that time the largest global military coalition in human history, it was able to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait by February 28 1991. The mission was accomplished. Saudi Arabia was safe, and Kuwait was free; the U.S.-Saudi strategic partnership was at its peak. The operation, however, stopped short of ousting President Saddam, and most U.S. troops returned home after the end of military efforts.

Even though it was contained, the Iraqi threat to Saudi security continued throughout the Clinton era, and it remained an issue of a mutual interest for the two countries (Riedel 2020). In 1994, Saddam ordered the Republican Guards to amass on the Kuwaiti border in an apparent test of the new administration’s resolve. The Saudi security concerns emanating from Baghdad surfaced again. Clinton ordered the U.S. military to send around 6,000 troops to the Gulf region in what was called Operation Vigilant Warrior,

and the Gulf countries pledged more than \$370 million in return (Bronson 2008). The Iraqi army retreated shortly after. The number of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia increased from fewer than 1,000 in 1994 to more than 7,000 by 2000 (Bronson 2008). Another confrontation occurred in December 1998, when Clinton ordered a four-day bombardment campaign on Iraq that operated from bases in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This was due to the Iraqi government's interference with UN weapons inspections. The Iraqi regime remained in power until 2003, and the role of the U.S. continued to be vital for Saudi security.

As has been shown, the policy preferences of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were perfectly aligned in the face of the 1990 invasion and throughout the 1990s. The next section discusses how this alignment relates to the four hypotheses.

4.4.2 Discussing the Four Hypotheses

First, the Saudi defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP increased from 8% in 1989 to 14% in 1990 and 12.5% in 1991 (SIPRI). The military budget increased by approximately \$4 billion from 1989 to 1991 and remained around \$16.355 billion in 1992 (SIPRI). Those figures do not include an additional \$16.8 billion Saudi Arabia contributed to the Gulf War efforts (Cordesman 2003). The total Saudi land forces increased by 57% from 1989 to 1992, and 250 additional tanks were added to the Saudi military inventory in 1991 (Military Balance). More than 20 combat aircraft were acquired by 1992 (Military Balance), and their arms imports increased by approximately 33%

from 1989 to 1990 (Military Balance). The increase in Saudi defense figures is predicted to be a result of the Gulf War.

Second, Saudi Arabia joined the 39-country-strong military coalition led by the United States to expel the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. When King Fahad informed Cheney that Saudi Arabia would host U.S. forces on August 5, he ultimately sided against Saddam Hussein. Saudi Arabia participated with a force of 50,000 military personnel, 270 tanks, and more than 100 combat aircraft (Cordesman 2003). In addition, both the Saudi and the Kuwaiti financial aid to some of the participating countries was pivotal in assembling the coalition (Bronson 2008).

Third, the United States supported Saudi Arabia militarily and diplomatically in this conflict. President Bush made public statements that this aggression would not stand as part of multilateral efforts that concluded with UNSC resolution 661, which authorized the use of force against Iraq (Resolution 678). The U.S. diplomatic strategy led by Secretary of State James Baker was instrumental in building an international consensus, that also included the Soviet Union (Haass 2009). The first U.S. military deployment to Saudi Arabia occurred on August 8, 1990. Before Operation Desert Storm commenced, the U.S. had more than half a million soldiers stationed inside Saudi Arabia. The U.S. military support to Saudi Arabia was essential to decisively win the Gulf War.

Finally, I contend that Saudi Arabia was responsive to U.S. demands that related to increasing oil production to reduce prices. The price of a barrel of oil soared from \$40 in July 1990 to almost \$80 in September 1990 (Macrotrends, in current US dollars). Roubini and Setser have argued that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait caused an economic recession until the mid-1990s (2004). In an August 6 NSC meeting, the Director of the Office of Budget and Management, Richard Darman, told the President that “unless the Saudis [oil] increase production, the effect on us will be recession” (National Security Council). The President was also under pressure from members of Congress regarding the spike in oil prices (Haass 2009).

In response, President Bush asked King Fahad to increase oil output to bring the prices down (Aarts 1994). The U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Charles Freeman, conveyed that he received instructions to ask the Saudis to increase their oil production early on, and the Department of Energy was primarily in charge of this issue (Freeman 2020). The King agreed between late September and early October. Freeman also worked closely with Saudi authorities to secure ARAMCO’s oil output. Riyadh quickly increased oil production from 5.5 million barrels of oil per day to over 8 million by late 1990. Shortly afterwards, President Bush expressed his gratitude to King Fahad, telling him, “a decision to increase oil production on your part was very good and we are very grateful, and it will ease the burden on oil-importing countries” (White

House 13). There is no doubt that this output increase benefited Saudi revenues, as well. Production remained around 9 million barrels of oil per day in 1991 and 1992 (EIA). The U.S. oil imports from Saudi Arabia increased from 1.189 million barrels per day in August 1990 to 2.258 million barrels in May 1990 (EIA), and Saudi oil exports to the U.S. more than doubled in nine months. The President assured several members of Congress that “increasing oil production from oil producers will contribute to alleviating this problem [high prices]” (White House 6, p. 9).

On another occasion, Bush phoned Fahad about oil in October 25, 1990. This time, however, he sought a favor for Turkish President Turgut Ozal, who complained about the economic impact of sanctions on Iraqi oil. The Saudi King replied, “[W]e will do everything we can to reassure him and to make him feel comfortable” (White House 9). James Baker also noted, “[T]here have been many times in our history where we have been really concerned about the activities of OPEC to increase the price of oil and adversely affect our economy. Now, oftentimes, we're able to work through the Saudis, who are the biggest producers, in order to alleviate that” (Baker 2001). It is crucial to highlight the Saudi responsiveness to President Bush’s requests amid the alignment of their policy preferences in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

Throughout most of the 1990s, the price of a barrel of oil was relatively moderate, averaging around the \$20 range (Gause 2000). The U.S. economy

was experiencing 4% economic growth on average, and the real GDP increased by more than 25% in 1998, when Clinton assumed the presidency (Snyder 1998). The unemployment rate declined significantly (a 24-year low), and the U.S. economy was booming. All of these economic indicators meant that the Clinton administration and U.S. policy makers did not have to raise the issue of oil prices with producers, mainly Saudi Arabia with its role as a swing producer in the oil market, throughout most of the 1990s. During Clinton's presidency, the U.S. requested two oil requests from Saudi Arabia. However, they were different in nature.

The first oil-related request from the Clinton administration to Saudi Arabia came in late 1998, to decrease their production in order to increase oil prices to stabilize the oil market. The price of a barrel of oil plummeted to around \$10 for two reasons: (1) oil demand declined in response to the 1997 Asian financial market crisis, and (2) oil supply increased as OPEC members maintained production levels, and, in some cases, increased them (Elass and Jaffe 2010). The U.S. oil industry as well as that of Mexico, a U.S. ally, were hit hard financially. As the U.S. Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson noted, the \$10 oil barrel would affect U.S. oil producers (e.g., New Mexico) and lead to major shutoffs of rigs and the interruption of offshore oil operations (Richardson 2007).

Several months after he became the Secretary of Energy, Richardson flew to Riyadh to talk to Crown Prince Abdullah about cutting oil production. The Saudi Oil Minister Ali Alnaimi joined Richardson in a press conference shortly after to announce the Kingdom's pledge to restore stability in the oil market "to avoid harming the global economy" (Elass and Jaffe 2010, p. 58). It was also in Saudi Arabia's interest to increase oil prices, as they were financially strained. Saudi Arabia worked with OPEC and non-OPEC members to take 1.5 million of barrels of oil out of the market. The Saudi government accepted an additional 8% cut to its OPEC quota in March 1999. Their production fell by approximately 600,000 barrels from 1998 to late 1999, but U.S. imports of Saudi oil rose by around 350,000 barrels (EIA). The price of the oil barrel reached \$26 by the December of 1999. The problem was solved, but another one arose; OPEC members agreed to maintain the oil production cuts in their September 1999 meeting.

By January 2000, the oil price increased beyond the \$20–\$25 range the Clinton administration had expected. It was an election year, and the American taxpayer started to feel the financial toll at gas stations and in heating bills. Members of Congress were furious that the administration did not use its leverage with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to increase production. Congressman Dana Rohrabacher of California proclaimed on the floor, "[W]e are defending them, whether it is Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, friends of ours. We have troops over there right now defending them. And this administration

does not use that as leverage” (Congress 2000. p. 225). Even the Republican presidential candidate at the time, George Bush, affirmed, “[O]urs is a nation that helped Kuwait and the Saudis, and you’d think we’d have the capital necessary to convince them to increase the crude supplies” (Seelye 2000).

However, the Clinton administration did appeal to the Saudis and other OPEC members to increase oil production. On February 26, 2000, Richardson flew to Riyadh for that purpose, and the Saudi oil minister promised to increase oil output to maintain market stability (Richardson 2007; also see Ignatius 2000, Learsy 2005 and Yetiv 2015). Richardson’s target was to bring the barrel price to \$25. Apart from Iraq and Iran, Saudi Arabia, along with other OPEC members, agreed to increase oil production by about 1.5 million barrels in their March 28 meeting. In June, the OPEC members agreed again to increase output by 708,000 barrels, but the barrel price remained above \$30. The Saudi oil minister Alnaimi announced that they were ready to add 500,000 barrels of oil if prices did not reach the \$22–\$28 range. The Saudis added more than 600,000 barrels of oil in 2000, compared to the previous year, and their oil exports to the U.S. increased by 500,000 between January and December of 2000 (EIA). Crown Prince Abdullah assured the U.S. administration that the Kingdom was committed to increasing output to maintain global economic growth in January 2001. The price of the oil barrel did not decline below \$30 until early 2001.

In sum, the Saudi government was responsive to the Clinton administration's oil requests on two occasions, as the Kingdom's security was guaranteed under the American umbrella throughout the 1990s.

4.5 Pre-2003 Iraq War (Israeli-Palestinian Conflict) and Post-Saddam (Increasing Iranian Influence in Iraq)

4.5.1 Policy Preferences: Aligned in Pre-Iraq War and Not Aligned in Post-Saddam

In November 2000, George W. Bush won the U.S. presidential election. Senior Saudi officials thought that their relations with the U.S. would echo the heyday of his father's time. Soon, however, they discovered otherwise. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict, as well as Bush's decision to invade Iraq in 2003, had significant repercussions on U.S.–Saudi relations. While they hesitantly managed to align their policy preferences on the use of military force to oust the Iraqi leader Saddam from power and further U.S. commitment to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, their policy preferences on how to handle the increasing Iranian influence in Iraq gradually diverged.

The drums of war were apparent in President Bush's 2002 State of the Union speech when he declared that Iraq, along with Iran and North Korea, constituted what he called the Axis of Evil. At home, public opinion surveys showed that support for the war was above 50%. However, many security experts, including Brent Scowcroft, advised against the war. Most notably, a group of 33 International Relations scholars published an ad arguing that the U.S.'s interest was in containing Iraq rather than attacking it (New York Times 2002). In fact, as in Saudi Arabia, as I discuss later, there was a faction within the Bush administration that warned against going to war with Iraq

(Haass 2009). Abroad, the Bush administration sought to create international consensus on the war. The State Department correctly assessed that the United Kingdom would be the only European country to support a military action (United States 71). In the Middle East, the U.S. found most of its allies cautious about being publicly entangled in a new war in the region. It was important, however, to have tacit Saudi support for military action against Iraq.

The administration engaged the Saudis after a decision about the war was reached in Washington. When Crown Prince Abdullah met President Bush at his Crawford estate in April 2002, the latter informed him that he planned to confront Saddam, without giving further details (Riedel 2017). The Saudi Crown Prince echoed King Fahad's 1994 proposal to develop a \$1 billion covert program aiming to stage a coup in Iraq. Riedel has argued that their proposal did not provide enough evidence to prove its effectiveness in removing Saddam (Riedel 2020). Turki Al-Faisal has asserted that "certain elements within the CIA convinced President Clinton to perform coup attempts without informing us, but we knew, and probably Saddam did, too" (Al-Faisal 2019). Abdullah's primary concern in that meeting, however, was the situation in Palestine (Haass 2009). Following the Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount in September 2000, a cycle of violence erupted between the Palestinians and the Israelis. This action triggered a second Palestinian intifada that lasted for almost five years. This

brought the Palestinian issue to the fore again for Saudi policymakers, especially Crown Prince Abdullah. In 2001, King Abdullah sent a letter that threw the National Security Council into chaos, as one member recalled to me. He told President Bush that their interests were coming to a crossroads in reference to the lack of U.S. action on the Palestinian issue (Al-Faisal 2019). This letter and the 2002 meeting pushed Bush to reconsider his policy shortly after and to become the first president to endorse a two-state solution in UNSC resolution 1397 in March of that year. The U.S. president also introduced his roadmap for peace in June 2002. However, nothing concrete was agreed upon in relation to Iraq. By August 2002, however, the Saudi government realized that Bush was determined to go to war.

The Bush administration, driven by his neoconservative circle, provided three public justifications for war: (1) Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, (2) the Iraqi government was linked to the September 11 Al-Qaeda attacks on U.S. soil, and (3) Iraq's non-compliance with UNSC resolutions (Clarke 2008). The first claim was based on an intercepted aluminum tubes shipment to Iraq that the U.S. intercepted in June 2001. A CIA analysis indicated that they could be used as uranium enrichment centrifuges to produce nuclear weapons (Battle 2010). An independent scientific assessment by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory argued otherwise. Before the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspected these shipments, a declassified document from the State Department in late June indicated, "[W]e will work with

UNMOVIC and IAEA to try to ensure that their report to the Security Council (or whatever device they use) will help us in our efforts to revise UN controls in Iraq” (United States 67; also see 68).

A week after the 9/11 attacks, an NSC memo concluded, “[O]nly some anecdotal evidence linked Iraq to al Qaeda. ... [T]here was no compelling case that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks” (United States 70, p. 334). Richard Clarke, National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism, reached the same conclusion in a memo to President Bush (Clarke 2008). He also noted that President Bush ordered his agencies to develop military plans and to enhance intelligence on Iraq in the first month of his presidency (Clarke 2008), which was eight months before the 9/11 attacks. Gause (2009), however, has asserted that the “cataclysmic event” of 9/11 pushed the President’s thinking toward unseating Saddam.

The claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction became the principal reason for the invasion, while ties to Al-Qaeda were secondary, and Secretary Powell advocated at the UNSC in February 2003 to start a war with Iraq. A declassified memo from Rumsfeld to Rice noted, “[T]he risks of a serious regime-change policy must be weighed against the certainty of the danger of an increasingly bold and nuclear-armed Saddam in the near future” (United States 69). He also indicated that the removal of Saddam’s regime would advance U.S. interests and bolster its credibility in the region and

beyond. Richard Haass has also noted that the Iraq war was President Bush and his close advisers' "message to the world that the United States was willing and able to act decisively" following the events of 9/11 (Haass 2009, p. 234). The justifications the Bush administration offered were constructed to pave the road to war and to gain international and domestic support, he concluded (Haass 2009).

While the Saudi government shared the U.S. goal of toppling Saddam, some factions were concerned that a military action was not the correct path. Their first concern related to the future political system in Iraq. They believed an election would bring a Shia-majority government that would be closely aligned with Iran (Riedel 2017), which would create a new geopolitical danger for the Kingdom. The second concern, in my opinion, is whether the U.S. would be completely committed militarily until Saddam was out of power. If the U.S. stopped short of reaching Baghdad, Saudi Arabia would suffer the consequences on its border. Prince Turki Al-Faisal recalls that the Saudi position was to cooperate with their Iraqi contacts to oust Saddam from within the regime (Al-Faisal 2019). However, the U.S. was not convinced that the Saudi plan was achievable.

In October 2002, Congress authorized the President to use force against Iraq. Secretary Powell worked vigorously in the UN Security Council to pass the resolution giving Iraq "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament

obligations” on November 9, 2002 (Resolution 1441, p. 3). On November 15, Bandar arrived at the White House to deliver Crown Prince Abdullah’s message congratulating Bush on the resolution and seeking a clarification on his intentions toward Iraq. The Saudi Ambassador affirmatively told him, “If you have a serious intention, we will not hesitate in giving you the right facilities that our two military people can then implement and discuss in order to support the American military action or campaign” (Woodward 2004, p. 229-230). Bandar made sure to underscore the Saudi expectation of having a role in forming the new Iraqi regime. Bush was not ready to share his full plan with the Saudis yet (Riedel 2017), but he promised to consult with them as soon as a decision was reached.

On January 11, Cheney and top defense officials briefed the Saudi Ambassador about the full military plan to topple Saddam. His main concern was to assess “if Bush was really serious about going all the way” (Riedel 2017, p. 141). Bandar was concerned that the U.S. would stop short of removing Saddam (Woodward, 2004), which would create a major security risk for the Kingdom. The answer he heard from Cheney and Rumsfeld was an affirmative “yes,” and Bandar was reassured. President Bush formally asked Bandar two days later to carry a request for Saudi support to the Saudi leadership.

When Bandar conveyed the request to the Crown Prince and assured him of the U.S. commitment and determination to reach Baghdad, Abdullah asked that it be kept top secret (Woodward 2004). Within the Royal Court, however, Saudi policymakers debated the consequences. Bandar led the pro-war argument to reinvigorate U.S.–Saudi relations, while Turki Al-Faisal warned of its possible repercussions, as discussed earlier (Ottaway 2010). The events that followed show that Bandar’s side of the argument prevailed. Dick Cheney’s visit to Riyadh in March 2003 did not result in a total Saudi military commitment to the war efforts; however, basing, refueling, and a supportive oil policy to stabilize the market were assured, as Bandar had promised (Elass and Jaffe 2010; Ottaway 2010).

On March 15, 2003, Bandar visited the White House to meet with President Bush. The message from Crown Prince Abdullah was the following: (1) A covert action to oust Saddam was better than starting a war, (2) The delay in starting the war was worse than avoiding a war, and (3) Saudi support for this war was linked to further U.S. efforts to resolve the Palestinian issue (Woodward 2004; also see Riedel 2017). The Ambassador was frustrated with the delay. The President repeatedly assured Bandar that he was determined. Bandar replied, “[I]f it had to happen, do it quickly” (Riedel 2017, p. 141). President Bush gave Saddam and his two sons an ultimatum to leave Iraq within the next 48 hours on March 17, 2003. The U.S. invasion of Iraq took place two days later.

Compared to its role in the 1991 Gulf War, Saudi Arabia provided limited military support to the 2003 U.S. military operations in Iraq (Gause 2009). It permitted U.S. military operations from three airbases, mainly Prince Sultan base, and it hosted a small contingent of U.S. Special Forces operating in Iraq (Bronson 2008; Gause 2009). It even provided fuel to the U.S. army (Bronson 2008), but the Saudi government never publicized this military cooperation. From my interview with Prince Turki Al-Faisal, it appears that the Saudi decision to align with U.S. policy was driven by three main considerations: (1) The removal of Saddam Hussein was in Saudi Arabia's interest, (2) their participation in the war efforts would give them a say in shaping the political system in post-Saddam Iraq, and (3) preserving the U.S.-Saudi alliance was strategically important for the Kingdom's security (Al-Faisal 2019). After all, they both agreed that Saddam needed to be ousted. The subsequent events that unfolded in post-Saddam Iraq, however, drew the houses of Bush and Al-Saud apart.

Next, I discuss how certain U.S. policies in Iraq emboldened Iranian influence and thus led the Saudis to withdraw their support.¹¹ First, the temporary Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), a transitional government for Iraq led by Paul Bremmer, disbanded the Iraqi army and instituted the de-Baathification policy in mid-2003. This policy fired all public workers

¹¹ Gause (2009, p. 155-168) provides a detailed analytical summary of U.S. policy in post-Saddam Iraq.

affiliated with the Baath party and prohibited them from resuming positions in the public sector. This ultimately put experienced Iraqi army men on the job market for hire and sent thousands of Iraqi civilian workers home with no source of income, which, in turn, alienated certain Sunni factions within Iraq. The Saudi leadership was deeply troubled and concerned with the consequences of this policy, as many of their contacts were Baathists (Al-Faisal 2019). The de-Baathification policy was reversed a year later, but subsequent Iraqi governments used some of its elements to discriminate against former Baathist or political opponents.

Second, the CPA paid little attention to the growing influence of Iranian-backed militias. The Iranian government was sending recruits, weapons, and financial aid to affiliated militias in Iraq. A GCC intelligence officer who accompanied the U.S. forces told me that they received many intelligence reports about Iranian-backed militias crossing into Iraq from Iranian borders, but his American counterparts ignored them and focused on finding wanted Baathi officials. Fearing that it would be the next target, the Iranian government actively sought to enhance its influence inside Iraq. In fact, many Iranian-backed militias joined the Iraqi security apparatus, and it was difficult to contain the scope of their activities and influence.

From 2003 to 2006, the Saudis saw the security situation deteriorate in Iraq due to the insurgency, on one hand, and the Iranian government increasing its

influence on the other. To make matters worse, Al Qaeda-linked terrorism within the Kingdom increased dramatically (Riedel 2017). King Abdullah told a U.S. official, “[T]he short-term result of Iran’s meddling in Iraq is trouble for America, but in the long-term, it is we who will suffer the consequences” (Embassy Riyadh 2; also see 3). He distrusted the 2005 Iraqi government and thought of its members as Iranian tools (see Embassy Riyadh 5 and Gause 2009). At one point, he told President Bush, “[I]t would be very wise to co-opt the former Baathist elements into the new Iraqi government” (Embassy Riyadh 4). The Saudi government was dissatisfied with the way U.S. handled Iraq, as Iran gradually gained the upper hand (see Embassy Riyadh 5 and 6).

Clearly, the turning point for the Saudis on U.S. policy toward Iraq occurred in late 2005. When the Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal visited Washington in September 2005, he said that the Bush administration was “handing over Iraq on a golden platter to Iran” (Ottaway 2010). He refused to retract this statement when U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice urged him to do so. In that year, the Saudi government also shifted its initial position on the U.S. leaving Iraq as quickly as possible. As some reports indicated possible U.S. withdrawal from Iraq as early as 2008, the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. at the time, Turki Al-Faisal, said, “Since America came into Iraq uninvited, it should not leave Iraq uninvited” (Cooper 2012, p. 1). Saudi

Arabia believed that it was important for the U.S. to remain in Iraq in order to balance the Iranian influence.

In sum, the Saudi leadership's frustration with President Bush was that they did not have a role in shaping the new Iraqi regime, as Bandar outlined to the White House. They saw Saddam's regime replaced with a government perceived to be aligned with their archrival Iran. Terrorist attacks had taken place on their own turf, and fears of a U.S. military withdrawal loomed. In addition, the April 2003 two-state solution announced by Bush hit a stalemate before it began. One month after Abdullah ascended to the throne in 2005, he replaced Bandar with Turki Al-Faisal as his Ambassador to Washington. Gause (2009) has noted that the Saudis were adopting a somewhat more independent policy toward Iraq by the end of 2006. In reference to Iran, King Abdullah urged U.S. officials to "cut off the head of the snake" to stop them from acquiring nuclear weapons and to curb their influence in Iraq (Embassy 7).

In this section, I have discussed two distinct periods: before and after the 2003 U.S. war on Iraq. In the pre-Iraq war period, the Bush administration was able to persuade the Saudis to align their policy preference on the use of military force to topple Saddam's regime. The Saudi government, for their part, determined that this support would allow them to shape the U.S. policy in post-Saddam Iraq and to shift the Bush administration's policy on the

longstanding Israeli–Palestinian conflict. In the post-Iraq war period, however, they found that the U.S. policy in Iraq worked against their interests, as the Iranians’ foothold in Iraq became stronger, and there was no progress on the Palestinian issue. Their security was at stake. This does not mean that the Bush administration deliberately undermined the Saudi security, but its policy toward Iraq did not consider the scope of Saudi grievances. Both the U.S. and Saudi governments shared the goal of eliminating Iranian influence in Iraq, but they disagreed on the means. In this case, this disagreement caused their policy preferences to diverge by late 2005.

4.5.2 Discussing the Policy Preferences

This section discusses the four hypotheses for the two periods discussed earlier: pre-Iraq war and post-Saddam.

Saudi defense spending went from \$18.5 billion (5.4% of Saudi GDP) in 2002 to \$18.8 billion (6.2% of Saudi GDP) in 2003 (SIPRI), and the defense budget increased to \$20.1 billion in 2004. The number of Saudi military personnel, medium tanks, and fighter jets remained relatively stable in the 2002–2004 period, but arms imports increased by 64% (Military Balance; WMEAT).

From 2004 to 2006, the Saudi military expenditure increased from \$20.1 billion (5.5% of Saudi GDP) to \$30 billion (4.4% of Saudi GDP) (SIPRI). While there was a decrease in the defense spending as a percentage of GDP, Saudi military spending in actual dollars increased by almost 33%. This was

due to an increase in the revenues of the Kingdom from high oil prices. This increase was also evident in 2007, when the \$35.5 billion defense budget constituted about 4.1% of their GDP (SIPRI). While the number of military personnel increased by 20,000 between 2004 and 2007, there was no significant change in the number of medium tanks and fighter jets (Military Balance). Saudi arms imports, however, increased by 36% (WMEAT).

Regarding the second hypothesis, Saudi Arabia joined the U.S. military coalition in the 2003 Iraq war. Even though they did not commit troops, they provided the U.S. with military bases and allowed the coalition's fighter jets into their airspace; they also supplied them with fuel. The support was limited and unpublicized yet crucial for the coalition's operations. Five months after the war started, however, the U.S. troops relocated from the Prince Sultan base to the Al-Udeid base in Qatar. Operation Southern Watch, which oversaw the no-fly zones in Iraq, ended, and the Saudis wanted to distance themselves from the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Only several hundred U.S. military personnel remained in Saudi Arabia to oversee the management of the joint training programs. After 2005, there is tangible evidence that Saudi Arabia supported the Awakening movement among Iraqi Sunnis. These groups had ideal traits in the Saudi view: "anti-al-Qaeda, anti-Iranian, and willing to work with the United States" (Gause 2009, p. 180). In addition, while the Bush administration urged GCC states to support the Al-Maliki government, the Saudis supported Iyad Allawi to gain a majority in the Iraqi parliament.

In terms of the third hypothesis, I argue that the U.S. did support Saudi Arabia by removing Saddam Hussein in the 2003 Iraq war. There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia supported his removal. In the aftermath of the Iraq war, however, they opposed the disintegration of the Iraqi army and state institutions. These actions allowed Iran to expand its influence in Iraq through the political parties and militias it backed. In this sense, after 2005, one can argue that the Bush policy in Iraq did not support Saudi efforts to thwart Iranian influence in Iraq and beyond.

The fourth hypothesis discusses whether the Saudi government was responsive to U.S. oil requests. While the Saudis were responsive to U.S. demands between 2003 and 2004, I claim that the Saudis were unresponsive after 2005, as the situation in Iraq jeopardized their national interest.

As President Bush prepared to go to war with Iraq, “the adequacy of the oil market” was a major concern (Woodward 2004, p. 324). Bandar assured him that Saudi oil would make up for every barrel lost from the Iraqi supply to stabilize markets and to increase the U.S. economy ahead of the 2004 elections (Ottaway 2010; Woodward 2004). On Larry King’s CNN show, Bandar went on the record saying, “[W]e hoped the oil prices would stay low. ... [There was] nothing unusual. ... I can go back to 1979, President Carter asked us to keep the prices down to avoid the malaise” (Hancock 2004). This statement

led Democratic Senator Schumer to ask Bush to declare Bandar a persona non-grata (Ottaway 2010).

From 2003 to 2005, the Saudi responsiveness to U.S. oil demands materialized in three actions. First, Saudi Oil Minister Alnaimi worked closely with U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham to ensure that the March 11 OPEC communiqué resulted in a commitment from the cartel to offset any shortages in the world oil supplies (Elass and Jaffe 2010). When OPEC met again in April, after the war started, they raised the production quota by a total of 900,000 barrels, most of which came from Saudi and Kuwaiti oil. Second, one day before the war, the Kingdom announced that it had stockpiled about 50 million barrels to make up for any disruption (Elass and Jaffe 2010). Third, U.S. oil imports from Saudi Arabia reached a record high of 2,305,000 barrels of oil on May 2003 (EIA). This was temporarily successful in calming the markets and reducing the price of the oil barrel from \$40 to \$30 at the start of the war (Elass and Jaffe 2010).

At the June 2004 OPEC meeting in Amsterdam, with the Presidential elections nearing, the Saudi oil minister pushed to increase the production quota by 2 million barrels, with 600,000 coming from Saudi Arabia (Ottaway 2010). Sensing the urgency of the matter, Bush instructed Secretary Abraham to fly to Amsterdam to secure a much larger production quota from the Saudi oil minister. After consultation with leadership, the latter confirmed Saudi

Arabia's readiness to produce as much as 2 million barrels to meet their OPEC quota agreed upon. The Saudi oil production increased from 8.8 million barrels in 2002, 10 million barrels in 2003, and 10.8 million barrels in 2004 to 10.5 million barrels in 2005 (EIA). Their oil exports to the U.S. increased significantly, as discussed earlier. With the increase in demand from China and the decrease in supply from Nigeria and Venezuela, the price of the oil barrel continued to increase from \$25 in 2002, \$29 in 2003, and \$38 in 2004 to \$54 in 2005. If the Saudi oil policy were not responsive to the Bush administration, the prices could have dramatically increased during this period. In this period, however, where the policy preferences of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia aligned, we saw strong Saudi compliance with U.S. oil demands.

Yet by 2005, however, their policy preferences in Iraq diverged, and Bush's two-state solution plan fell apart. While the U.S. administration asked regional states to support Prime Minister Almaliki, Riyadh ushered support for Iyad Allawi to gain a majority in the Iraqi parliament (Gause 2009). A poll conducted by Shibley Telhami shows that the Saudi public's confidence in the United States declined to as low as 4% starting in 2004, compared to around 60% four years earlier (Telhami 2013). By 2008, 66% of Saudis thought Iraq would be able to bridge their differences if the U.S. withdrew (Telhami 2013).

In total, the policy differences resulted in Saudi non-compliance with Bush's oil requests on three occasions. In Crawford in April 2005, the President urged the Saudi Crown Prince to increase oil production (Ottaway 2010), but these appeals were ineffective. While they provided plans to increase production capacity, the actual Saudi output later fell. In fact, starting in late 2005, Saudi Arabia and OPEC ignored President Bush's multiple requests to increase the oil supply (Elass and Jaffe 2010). The Saudi oil barrel production declined from 11.5 million in 2005 and 11 million in 2006 to 10.7 million in 2007 (EIA). Saudi oil exports to the U.S. continuously decreased from 2005 onward (EIA); the price of a barrel of oil fell from \$54 in 2005 to \$72 by 2007.

The second oil request came in November 2006, when Cheney visited Riyadh to convince King Abdullah to increase production (Cooper 2012). The Saudis not only led OPEC production decrease the month before this visit, but also the month after (Gause 2009). Saudi oil production was cut by almost 700,000 barrels. Finally, in 2008, President Bush made a personal plea to King Abdullah to increase production, but it was to no avail (Elass and Jaffe 2010; Yetiv 2015); OPEC continued producing at the same output level. In the State of the Union Speech, the President blasted OPEC's efforts at raising oil prices (Elass and Jaffe 2010). Gause (2009, p. 182) has noted that the Saudis were "far from being price moderates during this period."

In sum, the Saudis were initially responsive to the Bush administration's oil requests when their policy preferences on Iraq were aligned from 2003 to 2004. When their policy preferences diverged by 2005, the Saudis paid little attention to these requests.

4.6 The Obama Factor: Iran Nuclear Program and the Arab Spring

4.6.1 Policy Preferences: Aligned

In 2009, in reference to President Obama's predecessor policies in the region, King Abdullah told a U.S. official, "Thank God for bringing Obama to the Presidency. ... [It is] critically important to restore America's credibility in the world" (Embassy Riyadh 10). This sentiment resonated with the hearts and minds of the Arab world as they watched President Obama's intentions to restore relations with the region. His first call to a foreign official was with the head of the Palestinian Liberation Authority. This gave a hopeful indication of the new President's priority of resolving the Palestinian issue. Most important for the Saudi leadership, the Obama administration expressed its commitment to reversing Iranian destabilizing activities in the region and to preventing them from acquiring nuclear weapons (Embassy Riyadh 10). While their policy preferences were aligned in confronting Iran during most of Obama's first term, their tactical priorities later shifted.

On June 28, 2008, almost five months after he endorsed the Democratic presidential candidate, Barack Obama, Senator John Kerry visited Riyadh to meet with several Saudi officials, the most notable of whom was King Abdullah. In all the meetings, the Saudi officials pointed their finger at Iran's expansionist policies in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, other Asian countries, and Sub-Saharan Africa (Embassy Riyadh 8). Prince Mohammed Bin Naif, the Assistant Interior Minister for Security Affairs at that time, also floated

“the possibility of Iran gaining control of Mecca and Medina, Islam’s two holy cities, that could occur if the Saudi government were toppled” (Embassy Riyadh 8). The Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud Al-Fasial, also conveyed their concerns on Iranian activities to Bruce Riedel, who served as an adviser to the Obama campaign (Riedel 2017). On January 25, 2019, a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh shows that the Saudis were wary that the incoming administration would “strike a grand bargain with Iran without prior consultations” (Embassy Riyadh 9). The Saudi government’s alarm toward Iran’s role in the region was real, and it waited to see how President Obama would respond.

John Brennan, the White House Counterterrorism Adviser, met with King Abdullah on March 2009 to deliver President Obama’s letter, which stated, “[W]e needed to test Iran’s intentions to cease its destabilizing behavior and live up to its international obligations” (Embassy Riyadh 10). Brennan also assured the King that President Obama would counsel him on matters related to Iran, and that the United States was as committed to confronting Iran’s “destabilizing activities” as they were to the security of Saudi Arabia. This commitment was also underscored in President’s Obama meeting with King Abdullah in June 2009. Both the Obama administration and the Saudi leadership were concerned with Iran’s hegemonic role in the region as well as its nuclear program (Riedel 2017). While Obama was determined to deny Iran

a path to a nuclear weapon, Abdullah was more concerned about Iran's regional activities.

Obama's successful maximum pressure campaign on Iran from 2009 to 2013 included four dimensions: (1) issuing U.S. sanctions against Iranian entities, financial institutions, and companies; (2) pushing European and Asian countries to halt financial transactions with Iran and to reduce oil imports from Iran; (3) urging oil producer states, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to increase oil production to compensate for the Iranian output; and (4) a 2010 cyberattack on Iranian nuclear infrastructure named Stuxnet (see Davenport 2019 for a complete overview of the timeline of nuclear diplomacy with Iran). The agreement between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia on "increasing economic pressure on Iran" was also evident in the meeting between Secretary of Treasury Geithner and King Abdullah as early as July 2009 (Embassy Riyadh 12).

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton affirmed to the Saudi Foreign Minister that the "U.S. commitment to Saudi Arabia's security was unwavering" that year (Yetiv and Oskarsson 2018, p. 36). In fact, a clear signal of strengthened U.S.—Saudi military ties appeared in 2010, when King Abdullah agreed to purchase more than \$60 billion in American arms in his meeting with Secretary of Defense Gates (Riedel 2017). Even during Obama's first term,

however, the U.S.–Saudi relations reached what Bruce Riedel has called “a near death experience” with the Arab Spring outbreak.

A police officer’s slap in the face of Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, in late 2010 sent waves of protests throughout the Arab world. It threatened the long-time rule of many Arab regimes, the geopolitics of the Middle East with them, and the fundamental roots of U.S –Saudi Arabia relations. For Saudi Arabia, it was positive to see the protests spread to Syria and Libya. The calculus was quite different for Egypt and Bahrain, however. The White House was also taken by surprise as the events unfolded.

On Egypt, the Obama team was divided. Vice President Biden, Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Gates, and National Security adviser Tom Donilon advised caution against endorsing the departure of Mubarak, while other Obama aides strongly advocated embracing the protesters (Clinton 2014). King Abdullah urged the Obama administration not to embarrass President Mubarak and pledged that he would compensate for any American aid lost to Egypt. The Obama administration initially assured Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak that he had their support but reversed their position for a “peaceful, orderly transition to a democratic regime” shortly after, as the situation developed in Cairo (Al-Faisal 2019; Clinton 2014). The Saudi leadership was outraged, as they saw what they perceived as an American habit of abandoning its longtime allies. Turki Al-Faisal was appalled to see

the President asking Mubarak to leave, especially when he compared it to Obama's silence on the 2009 Green Movement protests in Iran (Al-Faisal 2019).

The fact, however, is that Mubarak would have left with or without pressure from President Obama. The magnitude of public anger with Mubarak's handling of the Egyptian economy had been building for several years, as CIA reports indicated (Riedel 2017). The Army was also dissatisfied with Mubarak propping up his son, Jamal, as the future President of Egypt. Jamal would have been the first civilian president outside of the military complex, which controls most of the Egyptian economy. There is also evidence that the White House directed the Department of Defense to inform Egypt's Vice President Omar Suleiman and top Egyptian military brass that "Mubarak's attempts to hold onto power was becoming self-destructive" (Panetta 2014, p. 303). On January 31, 2011, the army announced in a statement that force would not be used against protesters, and it forced Mubarak out 11 days later. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces ruled Egypt temporarily until June 2012, when the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Mohamed Morsi, won the Presidential race. He was thrown out of power by his Defense Minister, Abdelfattah Elsisi, a year later in a move that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates strongly supported. These two countries, along with Kuwait, immediately provided the Elsisi government with \$12 billion in aid. The Obama administration cut some of the military aid to Egypt but then allowed

it shortly after to secure its participation in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization in 2014.

In Bahrain, where protests took place at the home of the U.S. Navy 5th fleet in February 2011, the Saudis and Emiratis made clear that any U.S. efforts to jeopardize Al-Khalifa rule would not only withhold their military support for the Libya campaign, but also lead to a break in President Obama's relations with the Gulf (Clinton 2014; Riedel 2017). The Saudi government viewed Iran as being behind these protests in order to create problems in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, where the majority are Shias (Clinton 2014). Without consulting the Obama administration, and accepting a formal request from the Bahraini government on March 13, the Saudis and Emiratis sent troops to help the Bahraini security forces quell dissidence. The Kuwaiti Foreign Minister at the time, Sh. Mohamad Al-Sabah, also convinced his government to send a navy force to Bahrain. Secretary Clinton, in her own account, said that she had to compromise on Bahrain in order to secure military participation from some GCC states in Libya to oust Ghaddafi and in Syria to remove Assad from power (Clinton 2014).

There is no doubt that the Obama administration's 2011 reaction to the Arab Spring, especially in Egypt, dented its relations with Saudi Arabia, but it was not a total break between Washington and Riyadh. The U.S. security agencies

discovered an Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador, Adel Al-Jubeir, in one of Washington's most famous restaurants in late 2011. Even though tensions between the two countries rose, both prioritized their joint economic pressure campaign on Iran from 2009 until 2013 over their differences on Egypt and other issues.

By late 2013, however, their priorities on dealing with Iran and removing President Assad had shifted. The U.S., along with the other four permanent members of the UNSC (or EU3+3), reached a preliminary agreement with Iran on its nuclear program called the Joint Plan of Action on November 24, 2013 (Davenport 2019). This agreement was also enabled by a secret U.S.-Iran channel facilitated by the Sultan of Oman starting in 2011 (Clinton 2014). The Saudis felt that they were kept in the dark regarding these negotiations, but most importantly, they did not think that this agreement would curb Iranian adventurism in the region. To add more to their concerns, President Obama called off strikes against Iranian-backed Assad forces in Syria in late 2013, after they crossed his own red line of using chemical weapons. The former Saudi spy chief, Al-Faisal, said 2013 was the lowest point in U.S.–Saudi relations compared to 2011 (Al-Faisal 2019).

President Obama traveled to Riyadh in March 2014 to assure the Saudis of U.S. commitment to the security of the Gulf. On that trip, Ben Rhodes, an Obama aide, said, “[W]e will be making clear that even as we are pursuing

the nuclear agreement with the Iranians, our concern about other Iranian behavior in the region—its support for Assad, its support for Hezbollah, its destabilizing actions in Yemen and the Gulf—that those concerns remain constant. And we’re not in any way negotiating those issues in the nuclear talks” (United States 75). The negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran continued until a joint comprehensive plan was reached in July 2015. The Saudi government, then under the leadership of King Salman, welcomed it publicly and advised caution about it privately. Both governments agreed on facing Iranian regional policies. In April 2016, however, President Obama called them “free riders” and said that both Saudis and Iranians need to find a way to share the region (Goldberg 2016).

This section has explored the complex relationship between President Obama and two kings of Saudi Arabia. Despite the Arab Spring episode, the two sides were able to prop up their efforts in increasing the economic pressure on Iran from 2009 until late 2013. Later, it would be difficult not to notice how their priorities changed. While the Obama administration sought a deal with Iran to prevent them from having a nuclear weapon, the Saudis’ concern continued to be Iranian destabilizing activities in the region.

4.6.2 Discussing the Four Hypotheses

With respect to the first hypothesis, Saudi defense spending increased from \$41.2 billion in 2009 and \$48.5 billion in 2012 to more than \$67 billion in 2013 (SIPRI). From 2009 to 2015, the military budget more than doubled.

The increase in defense spending as a percentage of government spending was also notable during these years (SIPRI). Saudi military personnel also increased from 221,500 to 233,500 (Military Balance). Furthermore, the number of medium tanks and fighter jets also increased considerably during the period between 2009 and 2011 (Military Balance), and the Saudi arms imports almost doubled between 2009 and 2014 (WMEAT).

Regarding the second hypothesis, Saudi Arabia supported the U.S. military effort in both Libya and Syria. In Libya, they pushed the Arab League to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led military intervention. In Syria, with the tacit agreement of the Obama administration, they supplied the Syrian rebels with around \$1 billion between 2012 and 2016 (Clinton 2014; Riedel 2017). In 2014, the Kingdom joined the U.S. in the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. In terms of the third hypothesis, the U.S. provided weapons, intelligence, and logistical support for Saudi Arabia in the 2009 border skirmishes on the Yemeni border with the Houthis as well as in the 2015 Saudi Arabian-led military action in Yemen.

Most importantly, in reference to the fourth hypothesis, the Saudi oil policy was responsive to Obama's requests between 2009 and 2013. The first official request to increase oil production from President Obama occurred in March 2009, when he phoned King Abdullah. The phone call took place two days before an OPEC meeting (Elass and Jaffe 2010). Saudi Arabia and its Gulf

allies prevented the production cuts that Iran and Venezuela advocated in that meeting. President Obama also raised the subject of oil prices and asked Saudi Arabia to replace any production loss from Iran when he met with King Abdullah in June 2009, and in 2011 and 2012 (see United States 74; Bull and Alexander 2011; Khawaja 2012). The Saudi government replied favorably by increasing oil production and preventing any output cuts in the OPEC meetings between 2009 and 2013 (see Ellass and Jaffe 2010, Embassy Riyadh 13; Robinson 2012). In fact, Saudi Arabia increased its crude oil production from 8 million barrels in March 2009 to around 10 million barrels by August 2013 (EIA). Their oil exports to the U.S. increased significantly, from around 967,000 barrels per day in March 2009 to around 1,500,000 barrels per day in August 2013 (EIA). The oil barrel price, however, continued to increase from \$60 in 2009 to more than \$100 by late 2013. President Obama went as far as releasing more than 30 million barrels from the reserves in 2011 to calm the markets, with limited success in quelling prices.

During this period, the Saudi preference was aligned with President Obama's objective of increasing economic pressure on Iran, and the Kingdom along others were eager to replace the Iranian oil in the market. The Saudis increased oil production, and their commitment was welcomed by President Obama, the Secretary of Treasury Geithner, and Senator Schumer (Embassy Riyadh 11 and 12; Economic Times 2012; Restuccia 2012). Both countries

were pleased to see Iranian oil exports nearly cut in half between 2009 and 2014.

By late 2014, however, the price of oil started stumbling due to an increase in U.S. oil production and a decrease in demand from China and Asian markets. The Saudis decided to maintain their output levels, mainly to protect their market share (Gause 2015). The hit to Russian and Iranian revenues was also welcomed in Riyadh. Others have noted that the Saudi move may have been motivated by reducing the market share of high-cost oil producers in the United States.

Chapter 5: Main Findings, Conclusion, and Future Research

Building on the previous section, I first discuss all of the cases with respect to the regional level versus the global level. I then cross-examine them with the security hierarchy predictions for each of the four hypotheses in contrast to the alignment of policy preferences. I conclude with the main findings, theoretical contribution, and future research.

5.1 Assessing the Regional Versus the Global Analysis

All of the cases demonstrated that the global level had a significant role in shaping Saudi behavior as well as the outcomes of discussed regional events before and after the Cold War. The U.S. decision to resupply Israel with arms in 1973 was a response to the Soviets arming Egypt and an effort to create a regional balance. Nixon also stated that Soviet weapons used by the Egyptian army should not have a favorable outcome over U.S. weaponry employed by Israel. In addition, U.S. shuttle diplomacy was essential in achieving a ceasefire between Israel on one side and Egypt and Syria on the other. It is impossible to explain the outcome of the 1973 Arab–Israeli war and the end of the oil embargo without taking the global context into account.

The second case also details the joint U.S.–Saudi efforts to reverse the Soviet intrusion into the Arabian Peninsula and Sub-Saharan Africa. Both countries viewed the USSR, a global player, as a security threat. This case was unique

for the following reasons: (1) Saudi Arabia's assistance to the U.S. government in providing arms and financial aid to anti-Soviet operations when CIA activities were limited due to Congressional oversight, and (2) the establishment of the Safari Club, which included regional states as well as France. Similarly, the 1979 U.S.-led covert operation in Afghanistan meant to prevent Soviet access to the warm Gulf waters and to protect Pakistan was also unique. It would be highly unlikely that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan would fight the Soviets without U.S. support as a balancer. In addition, the United Kingdom and China were active parts of these anti-Soviet efforts. The impact of the global level is quite significant, and superpower rivalry was at its strongest in these cases.

Regarding the fourth case, the map of the Middle East would look different today if it were not for the U.S.-led coalition to liberate Kuwait and defend Saudi Arabia in 1991. In the absence of U.S. support, the Saudi Kingdom's policy preference could have been different. The situation would also have been quite difficult in 1990 if the Soviets vetoed UNSC resolutions against Iraq or decided to support Saddam Hussein with arms. The U.S. and USSR were on opposite sides in the first two cases but had a similar position on the third. The UNSC legitimized the actions of the largest global military coalition led by the United States at that time. As the threat of Iraq under Saddam to its neighbors continued into the 1990s, the presence of the United

States' security umbrella was critical to maintaining regional stability for Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries.

After George W. Bush became President in 2000, the United States continued to influence regional events in three ways. First, Saudi Arabia under Abdullah's leadership was able to sway Bush to recognize the two-state solution by 2002. This move put some pressure on Israelis as they responded to the Palestinian Intifada and relaxed the first siege on Arafat following the UNSC resolution 1397. Second, the United States, joined by the United Kingdom and France, continued the containment policy of Iraq under Operation Southern Watch from 2000 to 2003. Third, the 2003 Iraq war not only ousted Saddam's regime, but it also created a power vacuum in Iraq for other regional powers. Most notably, as I argued earlier, this allowed Iranian influence to increase in Iraq and created a new geopolitical reality that motivated Saudi Arabia's policies moving forward. The outcome of the 2003 U.S. war on Iraq continues to shape regional dynamics today.

The last case, Obama's handling of Iran's nuclear program, also marks the significance of the global level. The Obama administration's efforts included issuing economic sanctions on Iran and pressuring the European Union to adopt similar measures. These efforts were also instrumental in encouraging countries, such as China as well as European and other Asian countries, to reduce their consumption of Iranian oil, and in encouraging other oil-

producing countries, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to increase their output. Both the 2013 preliminary deal with Iran as well the final 2015 JCPOA were the result of a major global effort to exert economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In sum, all of the cases show that the international level is more significant than the regional level in shaping the discourse of political events. It also suggests that global powers should be considered part of the regional complex when global players' actions have a crucial impact on the region. However, this approach draws a thin line between what is regional versus global. In essence, it supports my assessment that regions with significant natural resources are more likely to be prone to global-level intervention. Below, I address arguments related to the security hierarchy and alignment of policy preferences in response to the cases under study.

5.2 Assessing the Security Hierarchy Versus Alignment of Policy Preferences

The empirical facts, as shown in Table 3, demonstrate that the alignment of policy preferences between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia better explains their overall relations than does the security hierarchy as conceptualized by Lake. I now present the main findings of each of the four hypotheses.

Table 3. Testing the impact of Security Hierarchy Level in comparison to the alignment of Policy Preferences on the hypotheses presented by Lake.

Event	<i><u>Independent Variables</u></i>		<i><u>Dependent Variables</u></i>			
	Level of Security Hierarchy as Conceptualized by Lake	Alignment of policy Preferences (Y/N)	Saudi Arabia defense spending (Increase/Decrease)	Saudi Arabia joins U.S. Wartime Coalition? (Y/N)	U.S. supports Saudi Arabia in interstate Conflict? (Y/N)	Was Saudi Arabia Responsive to U.S. oil Requests? (Y/N)
1973 Arab-Israeli War	Low	N	Increase	N	N	N
1975 Soviet Intrusion in the Arab world and Africa	Low	Y	Increase	Y	Y	Y
1979 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan	Low	Y	Increase	Y	Y	Y
1990 Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait	High	Y	Increase	Y	Y	Y
Iraq Containment Under Clinton	High	Y	Increase	Y	Y	Y

Prior to 2003 Iraq War and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	High	Y	Increase	Y	Y	Y
Aftermath of Iraq war: 2005 Iranian Growing Influence in Iraq	High	N	Increase	N	N	N
Obama: Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Program	High	Y	Increase	Y	Y	Y

5.2.1 First Hypothesis


Lake's security hierarchy reasoning would predict that Saudi Arabia's military expenditure should have increased in 1973, 1975, and 1979 and decreased after 1990. While the first three cases fit his prediction, all of the cases following 1990 contradict it. In fact, as shown in Figures 1 and 2 below, the main recurring theme for Saudi military expenditure was an increase in response to the events discussed in all cases. This was reflected in their spending in actual dollars and as a percentage of their GDP. Their arms imports as well as the number of tanks, fighter jets, and military personnel also increased. In 1990, for example, their policy preferences were aligned,

and the U.S. had half a million troops in the Kingdom, but Saudi defense spending increased. The level of security hierarchy between the United States and Saudi Arabia, as proposed by Lake, does not seem to have an effect on Saudi defense spending attitude.

I believe that the increase in the Saudi defense budget in 1975, 1979, the 1990s, 2003, and 2009 was not because they wanted to be less dependent on the United States. On the contrary, they increased their budget to buy leverage with the U.S. military and political establishments. For example, the Saudi dollar-matching program was meant to encourage U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and to facilitate CIA activities with little to no Congressional oversight. The Saudi King Fahad also accepted Secretary Baker's request to carry a significant burden of the 1991 Gulf War cost. This action facilitated U.S. military operations in the war. Further, Riyadh provided financial aid to several countries, including Turkey, Egypt, and Syria, to help assemble the military coalition in 1990. I argue that these cases provide evidence that an increase in State B's defense spending is meant to buy leverage with State A and to ensure their security. The 2005 case, where the two countries' policy preferences were not aligned, was the only case in which Saudi defense spending as a percentage of GDP decreased by almost 20%. Their defense spending in actual dollars, however, increased by almost 33%. The increase in Saudi defense spending could also be correlated with higher oil revenues. This can be seen in the periods between 1973 and 1981, 1997 and 2001, and


2003 and 2014. Most importantly, I do not find a correlation between the level of security hierarchy, as measured by Lake, and State B's defense spending behavior. The alignment or non-alignment of policy preferences does not seem to have a strong effect on Saudi defense spending in terms of actual dollars—acknowledging there was no model to estimate the Saudi defense spending independently.

Figure 1. Time Series of Total Saudi Defense Spending and Total Saudi Arms Imports From 1969 to 2018



Source: Combined from SIPRI and WMEAT.

Figure 2. Tanks, Aircrafts, and Military Personnel for Saudi Arabia from 1970 to 2020.



Source: Combined from The Military Balance Annual Series Journal

5.2.2 Second Hypothesis

My findings show that the alignment of policy preferences, rather than the level of security hierarchy, makes Saudi Arabia more likely to join the U.S. wartime coalition. However, Saudi participation is also conditional on the importance of the coalition to their security. In 1973, with the outbreak of war, the two countries' policy preferences were not aligned, and the level of security hierarchy was low. Saudi Arabia did not contribute to the U.S. war efforts in Vietnam or elsewhere. In fact, they temporarily stopped refueling part of the U.S. Navy fleets.

In 1990, their policy preferences were aligned, and their level of security hierarchy was high. Again, I would like to emphasize that the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia was the result of an alignment of their policy preferences. During the 1990s, Saudi Arabia (1) joined the U.S. coalition to liberate Kuwait and to enforce Operation Southern Watch, (2) participated in the U.S. military action in the 1992 Bosnian war through delivering arms and financial support to friendly Bosnian factions, and (3) supported the 1998 Operation Infinite Watch carried out by the United States in Sudan and Afghanistan. At the start of the 2003 Iraq war and Obama's 2009 economic pressure campaign on Iran, they enjoyed similar policy preferences and a high security hierarchy. Saudi Arabia provided limited support to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, and it also joined the 2014 U.S. global coalition against ISIS.

The security hierarchy argument would have predicted that Saudi Arabia would not have joined the U.S. covert coalition against the Soviet Union in 1975 and 1979. However, as their policy preferences aligned, I have shown that Saudi Arabia provided arms, weapons, and recruits in these two fights. In addition, the high level of security hierarchy enjoyed between Riyadh and Washington in 2004 would have predicted continued Saudi participation in the Iraq war efforts and the insurgency that followed. I have shown that the divergence in their policy preferences on handling the increasing Iranian presence in Iraq shifted their approach on that front. There are signs that the Saudis supported the Awakening movement in Iraq and supported Allawi instead of Al-Maliki. In sum, Saudi Arabia is more likely to join a U.S. military action when their policy preferences are aligned. Their participation is not due to a high level of security hierarchy, as Lake predicted.

5.2.3 Third Hypothesis

As with the previous hypothesis, the alignment of policy preferences has more explanatory power than does the security hierarchy level in predicting U.S. military and diplomatic support for Saudi Arabia in interstate conflicts. When their preferences were not aligned at the outset of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Nixon administration-initiated Operation Nickel Grass to rearm Israel. Saudi Arabia did not receive any U.S. assistance. For example, Lake would have predicted that the U.S. would not have supported Saudi Arabia in 1975 and 1979, when they had low security hierarchy. As I discussed in these cases, the U.S. provided diplomatic support, arms, intelligence, and training to Saudi

Arabia to thwart Soviet activities in the region. This was due to their alignment of policy preferences.

Since 1990, except for the 2005–2008 period, they both enjoyed an alignment of policy preferences and a high level of security hierarchy. The U.S. supported Saudi Arabia in every interstate conflict, as the case discussion shows. U.S. support was seen in the 1990 Gulf War, Operation Southern Watch, the 2003 Iraq war, the 2009 border skirmishes with Houthis, and the 2015 war in Yemen. The only exception was in 2005, when the Saudis perceived the U.S. policy as emboldening its archrival Iran in Iraq. While they both shared a concern about Iranian activities in Iraq, their preferences on how to handle this issue shifted.

5.2.4 Fourth Hypothesis

In my view, this is the most revealing hypothesis, as it explores Saudi compliance with U.S. oil demands. The data, as shown in Table 3 and Figure 3, clearly shows that Saudi Arabia is more willing to be responsive to U.S. oil requests when their policy preferences are aligned. The opposite holds true when their policy preferences are not aligned. I argue that the security hierarchy argument cannot explain Saudi behavior toward U.S. oil requests.

In 1973, the Saudi government and others imposed an oil embargo on the U.S. following Operation Nickel Grass. King Faisal delivered on his warnings that any U.S. support to Israel would influence the Kingdom's oil policy. The

Saudi government was not responsive to the repeated requests to end the oil embargo until the Nixon administration engaged in a constructive disengagement agreement between the warring parties. It is worth noting that the entire U.S. military was on high alert in 1973, and Secretary Kissinger threatened possible military action against Arab oil production (Paz 2015). However, the Saudi leadership did not back down until U.S. policy was in line with its own interests in reaching a ceasefire and further diplomatic efforts were made to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict.


Between 1975 and 1989, Lake’s argument would have predicted that Saudi Arabia would not comply with the U.S. oil requests due to their low level of security hierarchy. However, the Kingdom complied with (1) 1976’s Ford request to increase production, (2) Carter’s demands to increase output in 1977 and 1979, (3) Reagan’s 1984–85 request to flood the oil market to improve the U.S. economy and hurt Soviet revenues, and (4) Vice President Bush’s 1986 request to temporarily restrict production to alleviate the consequences for the U.S. oil industry. These cases highlight Saudi compliance with U.S. oil requests due to their alignment of policy preferences in fighting the Soviet presence in the Arab world, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Afghanistan. They both shared similar concerns about the Islamic Republic of Iran after the 1979 U.S. hostage situation in Tehran, and they supported Iraq in its war with Iran in 1982 to restore the military balance.

Between 1990 and 2000, the Saudi government was responsive to U.S. oil demands on three occasions. First, King Fahad agreed to George H. W. Bush's request to increase oil production as early as October of 1990 following the invasion of Kuwait. Second, the Saudis were responsive to the Clinton administration in orchestrating an agreement between OPEC and Mexico to decrease production in order to stabilize oil prices to a level that was bearable for the U.S. oil industry. Third, Riyadh also agreed to increase production in 2000, when the Clinton administration deemed the oil prices too high.

The advocates for security hierarchy argument would highlight the high level of security relations between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. as the reason Riyadh was responsive to U.S. oil requests during this period. I disagree. In 1990, the U.S. military deployment to Saudi Arabia followed the alignment of policy preferences between the two states. On the first day of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, King Fahad told President Bush that force must be used to repel Iraqi aggression if needed. When the Saudi decision-makers determined that the U.S. position was serious and credible, they allowed American troops on its soil. The Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia remained throughout the Clinton presidency. The alignment of policy preferences was key to Saudi reciprocity, not U.S. military presence in the region or the number of independent alliances enjoyed by the Kingdom.

Similarly, the Saudi decision to be responsive to the oil requests of President Bush in 2002 and 2003 followed their common understanding in resolving the Palestinian issue and shared interest in removing Saddam Hussein from power. However, the high level of security hierarchy did not sway the Saudis from rebuffing President Bush's repeated requests to increase oil production between 2005 and 2008, when their policy preferences on Iraq diverged. In 2009, though, when they shared President Obama's goal of eliminating Iran's Nuclear program, they eagerly participated in the U.S. economic pressure campaign on Iran. Based on U.S. requests, they increased their oil production to provide Iran's oil clients with an alternative supplier. It is the alignment of policy preferences between Riyadh and Washington that more accurately predicts Saudi responsiveness to U.S. oil demands, not the level of security hierarchy.

Figure 3. Saudi Oil Production, U.S. Oil Imports from Saudi Arabia, and World Oil Price from 1973 to 2019 with Reference to the Exogenous Shocks.



Source: Combined from Energy Information Agency (EIA) and Saudi Arabian Monetary Fund (SAMF).

5.3 Conclusion

The 43 years of U.S. –Saudi Arabia relations surveyed in this research depict the countries' transactional nature. From 1973 to 2016, Washington was dependent on Saudi oil policy, and Riyadh was dependent on U.S. security; they have shared many challenges and opportunities. The scope of their mutual interests expanded from the oil-for-security doctrine, as enshrined in the Ibn Saud–Roosevelt meeting in 1945, to include combatting Soviet threats, rogue regional actors, and terrorism under several kings and presidents that followed. The range of declassified documents shows that both countries have always considered each other's preferences on the issues they faced. When U.S. policy could undermine Saudi policy preference, as in 1973 and 2005, Riyadh did not comply with U.S. oil demands. However, when their policy preferences aligned, reciprocity often occurred. The realism and pragmatism of their relations allowed them to survive several setbacks over the years.

The findings of this research reveal four major points. First, the global level played a more significant role than the regional level in shaping the Saudi behavior in response to regional events as well as their outcomes. This was motivated by the U.S.–Soviet rivalry during the Cold War and the U.S. role in the region after. I argue that regions with vast natural resources (e.g., oil) that are critical for the global economy are more likely to be impacted by the global level. Second, while the correlation between the alignment of policy preferences and defense spending should be probed further, the data indicates

that the level of security hierarchy between Riyadh and Washington does not explain Saudi Arabia's defense behavior. Third, the alignment of policy preferences between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia provides relatively more explanatory power of whether Saudi Arabia would join a U.S. wartime coalition or of the former supporting the latter in an interstate conflict.

Finally, all of the cases show that Saudi Arabia is more willing to comply with U.S. oil-related demands when their policies converge and vice versa. The level of security hierarchy does not fully capture the Saudi responsiveness to U.S. oil requests. Considering the alignment of preferences between the two states could inform us about Saudi behavior. This paper does not argue that oil prices in all these events declined or increased due to the level of Saudi oil output. The impact of Saudi oil production levels on world oil prices is out of the scope of this research. Many factors affect oil prices, including world oil supply and demand, refinery capacities, and global recession. My argument is that the Saudis were responsive to U.S. demands when their policies were aligned. Another interesting finding is that Saudi oil exports to the United States have always increased when there is an alignment in policy preferences, and they have decreased when they are not aligned.

Using military presence and independent alliances as a proxy for the level of security hierarchy, as Lake did, would risk overlooking some patterns in the dynamics between the great power and regional ally. In fact, this research

challenges the explanatory power of hierarchy in the relations between states in the international system independent from considering state preferences. What is hierarchy when states only reciprocate when their policy preferences are aligned? Another shortcoming is that the security hierarchy argument does not address the leverage State B has over State A. In our case, the Saudi oil policy was instrumental in influencing U.S. decision-makers in each case study. I strongly argue that we should consider state preferences in assessing relations between states. I also believe that the alignment or lack thereof of policy preferences is a better indicator of State B's compliance "by consent."

Finally, some might argue that Saudi Arabia is not a formal ally of the United States. Indeed, Saudi Arabia has never signed a formal alliance with any permanent members of the UNSC, including the United States. However, an alliance could be characterized as a positive security guarantee provided by the stronger country, and this type of alliance could exist informally in the international system (Tertrais 2004; Also see Norrlof 2010 and Wilkins 2012). As Tertrais (2004, p. 136) has noted, "informal alliances do not take the shape of a treaty or accord but nevertheless imply a security guarantee—such as the relationship between the United States and Taiwan; the United States and Saudi Arabia." Indeed, Saudi Arabia has always been an informal ally to the United States, from 1943 until today. Lake notes that his work does not account for security agreements and informal alliances, and this gap could

neglect certain security hierarchies. This paper helps bridge this gap and provide further evidence of their importance.


In conclusion, allow me to reiterate the main theoretical contribution of this research. It sheds light on how the alignment of policy preferences is an important factor with respect to hierarchy to understanding relations between states. The results also show that a higher security hierarchy is not necessarily correlated with lower defense spending by State B. Hence, it challenges Lake's claim that State A endures the cost of maintaining the political order for State B. It highlights the importance of a great power's intervention in explaining regional politics. This does not necessarily mean that the domestic and regional levels are not relevant. However, a great power's intervention in a region, when applied to U.S.–Saudi relations, often shapes the security environment and could provide opportunities for Saudi Arabia to pursue specific regional policies that would not have been feasible without the impact of that global level. It is important to acknowledge that every region has a distinct history, culture, and events. There is no one-size-fits-all theory that can explain all regions of the world.

5.4 Future Research

The findings of this research can be applied or extended to several other areas. First, it would be worthwhile to expand this research design to include U.S. relations with other oil-producing countries, especially in the Gulf area. Second, I think it is important to conduct more research to understand how Saudi oil policy impacts world oil prices. Third, the first hypothesis deserves further research to better probe the correlation between defense spending and the alignment of policy preferences. Fourth, this study encourages the advocates of hierarchy to incorporate qualitative case studies to shed light on aspects not envisioned in large n-data.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Saudi Oil Production, U.S. Oil Imports from Saudi Arabia, and World Oil Price from 1973 to 2019



Source: Combined from Energy Information Agency (EIA) and Saudi Arabian Monetary Fund (SAMF).

Bishara, Abdullah. *Diaries of the Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council*. 2nd ed., Diplomatic Center for Strategic Studies, 2005.

Brands, H. W. "George Bush and the Gulf War of 1991." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34.1 (2004): 113-131.

Bronson, Rachel. *Thicker than oil: America's uneasy partnership with Saudi Arabia*. Oxford University Press, 2008.

Bruno, Greg. "Saudi Arabia and the future of Afghanistan." *Council on Foreign Relations, of_afghanistan. html*. Retrieved on 21 (2009).

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Power and principle: Memoirs of the national security adviser, 1977-1981*. Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski." *National Security Archive*. George Washington University, 13 June 1997.

<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-17/brzezinski2.html>

Bull, Alister and David Alexander. "Obama urges oil producers to increase output." *Reuters*, 26 April 2011.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-obama-oil-letter/obama-urges-oil-producers-to-increase-output-idUSTRE73P56O20110427>

Bush, George HW, and Brent Scowcroft. *A world transformed*. Vintage, 2011.

Buzan, Barry, and Gerald Segal. "The rise of" lite" powers: a strategy for the postmodern state." *World Policy Journal* 13.3 (1996): 1-10.

Buzan, Barry, et al. *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever. *Regions and powers: the structure of international security*. Vol. 91. Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Carter, Linwood B. "Iraq: summary of US forces." LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 2005.

Central Intelligence Agency 1. "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Five Years After". April 3rd, 1985

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000496704.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency 2. "Presidential Reflections on U.S. Intelligence: Ronald Reagan". Historical Document. April 30th, 2013.
<https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/presidential-reflections-reagan.html>

Cha, Victor D. "Globalization and the study of international security." *Journal of Peace Research* 37.3 (2000): 391-403.

Chubin, Shahram, and Charles Tripp. *Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order*. Routledge, 2014.

Citino, Nathan J. *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa'ūd, and the Making of US-Saudi Relations (Indiana series in Middle East studies)*. Indiana University Press, 2002.

Clarke, Richard A. *Against all enemies: Inside America's war on terror*. Simon and Schuster, 2008.

Claude, Inis L. *Swords into plowshares: the problems and progress of international organization*. Random House, 1971.

Clinton, Hillary Rodham. *Hard choices*. Simon and Schuster, 2014.

Cogan, Charles G. "Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979." *World Policy Journal* 10.2 (1993): 73-82.

Colby, Elbridge, et al. *The Israeli Nuclear Alert of 1973: Deterrence and Signaling in Crisis*. No. DRM-2013-U-004480-FINAL. CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA STRATEGIC STUDIES RESEARCH DEPT, 2013.

Collier, David. "Understanding process tracing." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44.4 (2011): 823-830.

Congress. Congressional Record H1226. U.S. Government Publishing Office. March 2000.
<https://www.congress.gov/crec/2000/03/22/CREC-2000-03-22-pt1-PgH1222-2.pdf>

Cooley, Alexander. *Logics of hierarchy: The organization of empires, states, and military occupation*. Cornell University Press, 2005.

Cooper, Andrew Scott. *The oil kings: how the US, Iran, and Saudi Arabia changed the balance of power in the Middle East*. Simon and Schuster, 2012.

Embassy Riyadh 1. "KING KHALID'S COMMENTS IN A MEETING WITH SECRETARY MILLER, NOVEMBER 24, 1979." Wikileaks Cable: 1979JIDDA08520_e. Dated December 10, 1979.
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1979JIDDA08520_e.html

Embassy Riyadh 2. "SAUDI KING PLEASED WITH PROGRESS AGAINST TERRORISTS, BUT WARNS OF IRANIAN INFILTRATION IN IRAQ." Wikileaks Cable:05JEDDAH3366_a. Dated September 13, 2005.
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05JEDDAH3366_a.html

Embassy Riyadh 3. "SAUDI LEADERS UPBEAT ON U.S.-SAUDI MILITARY RELATIONSHIP." Wikileaks Cable: 06RIYADH2146_a. Dated March 29, 2006.
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06RIYADH2146_a.html

Embassy Riyadh 4. "USD EDELMAN'S MEETINGS WITH THE KING AND CROWN PRINCE." Wikileaks Cable: 06RIYADH5042_a_a. Dated June 24, 2006.
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06RIYADH5042_a_a.html

Embassy Riyadh 5. "AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD MEETS WITH SAUDI CROWN PRINCE AND KING." Wikileaks Cable: 06JEDDAH450_a. Dated July 5 2006.
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06JEDDAH450_a.html

Embassy Riyadh 6. "AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD - SUCCESSFUL 9/12 MEETING WITH KING ABDULLAH." Wikileaks Cable: 06RIYADH7211_a. Dated September 16, 2006.
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06RIYADH7211_a.html

Embassy Riyadh 7. "SAUDI KING ABDULLAH AND SENIOR PRINCES ON SAUDI POLICY TOWARD IRAQ." Wikileaks Cable: 08RIYADH649_a. Dated April 20, 2008.
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08RIYADH649_a.html

Embassy Riyadh 8. "SEN. KERRY IN SAUDI - IRAN, IRAQ AND OIL." Wikileaks Cable: 08RIYADH1034_a. Dated July 6, 2008.
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08RIYADH1034_a.html

Embassy Riyadh 9. "SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL ENVOY MITCHELL'S FEBRUARY 1-2 VISIT." Wikileaks Cable: 09RIYADH158_a. Dated January 25, 2009.
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RIYADH158_a.html

Embassy Riyadh 10. "COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISER BRENNAN'S MEETING WITH SAUDI KING ABDULLAH." Wikileaks Cable: 09RIYADH447_a. Dated March 22, 2009.
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RIYADH447_a.html

Embassy Riyadh 11. "SAUDI OPEC GOVERNOR PROVIDES CODEL TOUR D'HORIZON." Wikileaks Cable: 09RIYADH903_a. Dated July 10, 2009.
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RIYADH903_a.html

Embassy Riyadh 12. "TREASURY SECRETARY GEITHNER MEETS WITH KING ABDULLAH OF SAUDI ARABIA." Wikileaks Cable: 09RIYADH986_a. Dated July 30, 2009.
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RIYADH986_a.html

Embassy Riyadh 13. "SAUDI OIL MINISTER REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO OIL PRICE/PRODUCTION STABILITY, NO EASY WAY TO ELIMINATE SPECULATION" Wikileaks Cable: 09RIYADH1068_a. Dated August 17, 2009.
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RIYADH1068_a.html

Ermolaev, Sergei. "The Formation and Evolution of the Soviet Union's Oil and Gas Dependence." *Carnegie Moscow Center* 29 (2017).
<https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/29/formation-and-evolution-of-soviet-union-s-oil-and-gas-dependence-pub-68443>

Farr, Warner D. *The third temple's holy of holies: Israel's nuclear weapons*. AIR WAR COLL MAXWELL AFB AL, 1999.

Fearon, James D. "Bargaining, enforcement, and international cooperation." *International organization* 52.2 (1998): 269-305.

Flathman, Richard E. "Authority and the Authoritative: The Practice of Political Authority." (1980).

Freeman, Chas. Personal Interview. 23 March 2019.

Frieden, Jeffry A. "International investment and colonial control: A new interpretation." *International Organization* 48.4 (1994): 559-593.

Frum, David. *How we got here: The 70's: the decade that brought you modern life (for better or worse)*. Basic Books, 2008.

Gaidar, Yegor. "The Soviet collapse: grain and oil." *American enterprise institute for public policy research* 9 (2007): 21440.

- Gates, Robert, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War.* New York: Simon and Schuster 114 (1996): 2008-02.
- Gause III, F. Gregory. "Saudi Arabia over a barrel." *Foreign Affairs* (2000): 80-94.
- Gause III, F. Gregory. "The foreign policy of Saudi Arabia." *The foreign policies of Middle East states* (2002): 196-99.
- Gause III, F. Gregory. "Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf." *Security Studies* 13.2 (2003a): 273-305.
- Gause III, F. Gregory. "From "Over the Horizon" to "Into the Backyard". The US—Saudi Relationship and the Gulf War." *The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment* (2003b): 357-70.
- Gause III, F. Gregory. *The international relations of the Persian Gulf.* Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Gause, F. Gregory. *Sultans of swing?: the geopolitics of falling oil prices.* Brookings Institution, 2015.
- GCC Charter. *Gulf Cooperation Council*, 20 Feb. 2020, www.gcc-sg.org/en-us/AboutGCC/Pages/Primarylaw.aspx.
- George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences.* Mit Press, 2005.
- Gilpin, Robert. "The theory of hegemonic war." *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18.4 (1988): 591-613.
- Goldberg, Jeffrey. "The Obama Doctrine" *The Atlantic*. April 2016. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>
- Graf, Rüdiger. "Making Use of the "Oil Weapon": Western Industrialized Countries and Arab Petropolitics in 1973–1974." *Diplomatic History* 36.1 (2012): 185-208.
- Grayson, Benson Lee. *Saudi-American Relations.* Univ Pr of Amer, 1982.

Gross, Samantha. "What Iran's 1979 revolution meant for US and global oil markets". Brookings Institution. March 5th, 2019.
<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/05/what-irans-1979-revolution-meant-for-us-and-global-oil-markets/>

Haass, Richard. *War of necessity, war of choice: A memoir of two Iraq wars*. Simon and Schuster, 2009.
Haber, Eitan, and Ze'ev Schiff. "Yom Kippur War Lexicon." *Or Yehuda (Israel: Zmora-Bitan-Divir, Publishers)* (2003).

Hancock, David. "The Tangled Web of U.S.-Saudi Ties." *CBS News*. 20 April 2004.
<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-tangled-web-of-us-saudi-ties/>

Hancock, Kathleen J. "The semi-sovereign state: Belarus and the Russian neo-empire." *Foreign policy analysis* 2.2 (2006): 117-136.
Harbridge, Laurel, Jon A. Krosnick, and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge. "Presidential Approval and Gas Prices." *Political Psychology: New Explorations* (2016): 246.

Harrison, Selig S. "How the Soviet Union Stumbled into Afghanistan." *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal* (1995): 13-44.

Hedley, John Hollister. "Learning from intelligence failures." *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 18.3 (2005): 435-450.

Ignatius, David. "Overreacting to Oil Prices." *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 8 Mar. 2000,
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2000/03/08/overreacting-to-oil-prices/e1c43f8c-7e9b-44dc-b9e3-4b423ed2c7fd/.

Ignotus, Miles. "Seizing Arab Oil." *Harper's Magazine* 250 (1975): 45-62.
<https://is.cuni.cz/studium/predmety/index.php?do=download&did=75435&kod=JMM705>

Ikenberry, G. John. *After victory: Institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major wars*. Princeton University Press, 2009.
Ismael, Tareq Y. *The communist movement in the Arab World*. Routledge, 2004.

Israelyan, Victor. *Inside the Kremlin During the Yom Kippur War*. Penn State Press, 2010.

Jervis, Robert, and Robert J. Art. *International politics: enduring concepts and contemporary issues*. Pearson Higher Ed, 2015.

Kamrava, Mehran. *Qatar: Small state, big politics*. Cornell University Press, 2015.

Katzenstein, Peter. "A world of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium." (2005).

Kelly, Robert E. "Security theory in the "new regionalism"." *International Studies Review* 9.2 (2007): 197-229.

Kennedy, Charles. Interview with William Cutler. *Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training*. 2010
https://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Cutler-Walter-L.toc_.pdf

Keohane, Robert O. "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics." *International organization* 23.2 (1971): 291-310.

Keohane, Robert. "Neoliberal institutionalism." *Security Studies: A Reader* (2011).

Khawaja, Moign. "US asks Saudis to raise oil output amid Obama approval ratings hit." *Arabian Gazette*, 13 Mar. 2012.
<https://arabiangazette.com/us-asks-saudis-oil-output/>

King Faisal. "1973 King Faisal: Where is the International Conscience?". *Youtube*, published by KSA KSA, 5 Oct. 2019.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HBRVgUj29_k

Koch, Christian. "The GCC as a regional security organization." *KAS International Reports* 11 (2010): 23-35.

Kugler, Jacek, and Abramo FK Organski. "The power transition: A retrospective and prospective evaluation." *Handbook of war studies* 1 (1989): 171-194.

Lake, David A. "Anarchy, hierarchy, and the variety of international relations." *International organization* 50.1 (1996): 1-33.

Lake, David A. "Regional security complexes: A systems approach." *Regional orders: Building security in a new world* 52 (1997).

Lake, David, and Patrick M. Morgan. "The new regionalism in security affairs." *Regional orders: Building security in a new world* 1 (1997): 3-19.

Lake, David A. *Hierarchy in international relations*. Cornell University Press, 2009a.

- Lake, David A. "Relational authority and legitimacy in international relations." *American Behavioral Scientist* 53.3 (2009b): 331-353.
- Lake, David A. "Regional hierarchy: authority and local international order." *Review of International Studies* 35.S1 (2009c): 35-58.
- Lake, David A. "Rightful rules: authority, order, and the foundations of global governance." *International Studies Quarterly* 54.3 (2010): 587-613.
- Lake, David A., and Patrick M. Morgan. *Regional orders: Building security in a new world*. Penn State Press, 2010.
- Learsy, Raymond J. *Over a barrel: breaking the Middle East oil cartel*. Thomas Nelson, 2005.
- Legrenzi, Matteo. "The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf." *Diplomacy, Security and Economy Co-ordination in a Changing Middle East, London/New York: IB Tauris* (2011).
- Lemke, Douglas, and Suzanne Werner. "Power parity, commitment to change, and war." *International Studies Quarterly* 40.2 (1996): 235-260.
- Lemke, Douglas. *Regions of war and peace*. Vol. 80. Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Lenczowski, George. *American presidents and the Middle East*. Duke Univ Press, 1990.
- Looney, Robert E., ed. *Handbook of oil politics*. Routledge, 2012.
- Lorimer, John Gordon. *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, 'Omān, and Central Arabia*. Vol. 2. Irish Academic, 1908.
- MacDonald, Charles G. *Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Law of the Sea: Political Interaction and Legal Development in the Persian Gulf*. No. 48. Greenwood Press, 1980.
- Macrotrends. Crude Oil Prices – 70 Year Historical Chart.
<https://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart>
- Mahoney, James. "Strategies of causal assessment in comparative historical analysis." *Comparative historical analysis in the social sciences* (2003): 337-72.
- Mahoney, James. "Comparative-historical methodology." *Annu. Rev. Sociol.* 30 (2004): 81-101.

Mansfield, Edward D., and Etel Solingen. "Regionalism." *Annual review of political science* 13 (2010): 145-163.

Mattern, Janice Bially, and Ayşe Zarakol. "Hierarchies in world politics." *International Organization* 70.3 (2016): 623-654.

Mearsheimer, John J. *The tragedy of great power politics*. WW Norton & Company, 2001.

MERIP Reports. "A Political Evaluation of the Arab Oil Embargo." *MERIP Reports*, no. 28, 1974, pp. 23–25. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/3011294. Military Balance Journal Series. <https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tmib20>

Morgenthau, Hans J. "The primacy of the national interest." *The American Scholar* (1949): 207-212.

Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. *Politics among nations*. New York: Knopf, 1950.

Morrow, James D. "On the theoretical basis of a measure of national risk attitudes." *International Studies Quarterly* 31.4 (1987): 423-438.

Morrow, James D. "Alliances, credibility, and peacetime costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38.2 (1994): 270-297.

Morrow, James D. "When Do Defensive Alliances Provoke Rather than Deter?." *The Journal of Politics* 79.1 (2017): 000-000.

National Security Council. "Minutes from NSC Meeting, August 6, 1990, on the Persian Gulf", (Washington DC: National Security Council, 1990) available at George Bush Presidential Library, Texas.

New York Times. "WAR WITH IRAQ IS NOT IN AMERICA'S NATIONAL INTEREST". New York Times, September 26 (2002). Retrieved from Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development Website. https://sadat.umd.edu/sites/sadat.umd.edu/files/iraq_war_ad_2002_2.pdf

Norrlof, Carla. *America's global advantage: US hegemony and international cooperation*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Nye, Joseph S. "Soft power." *Foreign policy* 80 (1990): 153-171.

Nyrop, Richard F. "Area handbook for Saudi Arabia." *Area handbook for Saudi Arabia*. 3. ed. (1977).

Organski, Abramo FK. *World politics*. Knopf, 1958.

Ottaway, David B., and Ronald Koven. "Saudis Tie Oil to US Policy on Israel." *Washington Post*, April 19 (1973): 1.

Ottaway, David B. *The king's messenger: Prince Bandar bin Sultan and America's tangled relationship with Saudi Arabia*. Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2010.

Oye, Kenneth A. "Explaining cooperation under anarchy: Hypotheses and strategies." *World politics* 38.1 (1985): 1-24.

Panetta, Leon, and Jim Newton. *Worthy fights: A memoir of leadership in war and peace*. Penguin, 2014.

Paz, Alon. "Transforming Israel's security establishment." *Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy* 69 (2015).

Powell, Robert. *In the shadow of power: States and strategies in international politics*. Princeton University Press, 1999.

Ramazani, Rouhollah K., et al. *The Gulf cooperation council: Record and analysis*. University of Virginia Press, 1988.

Ray, Julie. "Opinion briefing: US image in Middle East/North Africa." *The Gallup* (2009).

Reagan Library. "President Reagan's Remarks After a Meeting with Afghan Resistance Leaders on November 12, 1987". *Youtube*, published by Reagan Library. 20 Dec. 2017.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c9RWtx8myQc>

Resolution 332. United Nations Security Council Resolution 332 of 21 April 1973.
<http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/332>

Resolution 660. United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 of 2 August 1990.
<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/10/IMG/NR057510.pdf?OpenElement>

Resolution 661. United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 of 6 August 1990.

<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/10/IMG/NR057510.pdf?OpenElement>

Resolution 678. United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990.

<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/28/IMG/NR057528.pdf?OpenElement>

Resolution 1441. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 of 8 November 2002.

<https://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/1441.pdf>

Restuccia, Andrew. "Schumer: Saudi Arabia's plan to increase oil supply will lower gas prices." *The Hill*, 14 Mar. 2012.

<https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/216057-schumer-saudi-arabis-plan-to-increase-oil-output-will-lower-gas-prices?amp>

Richardson, Bill. *Between Worlds: The Making of an American Life*. Penguin, 2007.

Riedel, Bruce. *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-89*. Brookings Institution Press, 2014.

Riedel, Bruce. "Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States since FDR, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, (2017).

Riedel, Bruce. Personal Interview. 7 April 2019.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas. *Cooperation among democracies: The European influence on US foreign policy*. Vol. 70. Princeton University Press, 1995.

Robinson, Matthew. "Oil falls as Saudi Arabia seeks to calm markets." *Reuters*, 19 Mar. 2012.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-markets-oil/oil-falls-as-saudi-arabia-seeks-to-calm-markets-idUSBRE82B04920120320>

Roubini, Nouriel, and Brad Setser. "The effects of the recent oil price shock on the US and global economy." *Stern School of Business, New York University* (2004).

Russett, Bruce M. *International regions and the international system*. Greenwood Press, 1967.

SAMF. *Yearly Statistics of World Oil Prices*. Saudi Arabian Monetary Fund, 2019.

Sabrosky, Alan Ned. "Interstate alliances: Their reliability and the expansion of war." *The correlates of war II: Testing some realpolitik models* (1980): 161-98.

Safran, Nadav. *Saudi Arabia: the ceaseless quest for security*. Cornell University Press, 2018.

Schmidt, Brian C. *The political discourse of anarchy: a disciplinary history of international relations*. SUNY Press, 1998.

Schweizer, Peter. *Victory: The Reagan administration's secret strategy that hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union*. Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994.

Seelye, Katherine Q.. "Bush Would Use Power of Persuasion to Raise Oil Supply." *The New York Times*, 28 June 2000.
<https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/politics/camp/062800-wh-bush.html>

Simpson, Willam. *The Prince*. HarperCollins Publishers, 2006.

SIPRI. "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database." *SIPRI*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2018, www.sipri.org/databases/milex.

Snyder, Sherry. *The Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 1999-2008*. US Government Printing Office, 1998.
<https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/105th-congress-1997-1998/reports/eb01-98.pdf>

Snyder, Jack, and Robert Jervis. "Civil war and the security dilemma." *Civil wars, insecurity, and intervention* (1999): 15-37.

Snyder, Glenn H. *Alliance politics*. Cornell University Press, 2007.

Solingen, Etel. *Regional orders at century's dawn: global and domestic influences on grand strategy*. Vol. 77. Princeton University Press, 1998.

Stein, Arthur A., and Steven E. Lobell. *Geostructuralism and international politics: the end of the Cold War and the regionalization of international security*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.

Sultan, HRH General Khaled Bin. *Desert Warrior*. Lancer Publishers, 1995.

Telhami, Shibley. *Power and leadership in international bargaining: the path to the Camp David accords*. Columbia University Press, 1992.

Telhami, Shibley, Fiona Hill, and Abdullatif A. Al-Othman. "Does Saudi Arabia Still Matter?." *FOREIGN AFFAIRS-NEW YORK*- 81.6 (2002a): 167-178.

Telhami, S. "Kenneth Waltz, neorealism, and foreign policy." *Security Studies* 11.3 (2002b): 158-170.

Telhami, Shibley. *The world through Arab eyes: Arab public opinion and the reshaping of the Middle East*. Basic Books (AZ), 2013.

Tertrais, Bruno. "The changing nature of military alliances." *Washington Quarterly* 27.2 (2004): 133-150.

Thompson, William R. "The regional subsystem: a conceptual explication and a propositional inventory." *International Studies Quarterly* 17.1 (1973): 89-117.

United States 1. Dept. of State. "Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Secretary of State". *Foreign Relations of the United States in the Near East and Africa* Volume VIII. 1945.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d20>

United States 2. Dept. of State." Oil Embargo, 1973-1974." *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1969–1976.
<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo>

United States 3. Dept. of State (a). "Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger Staff Meetings, October 23 1973a. Box 1. Document 63.", National Security Archives, 1998.
nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-63.pdf.

United States 4. Dept of State (b) "Memcon between Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush and Petroleum Company Executives, 'The Middle East Conflict and U.S. Oil Interests,' 10 October 1973b.", National Security Archives, 1979. nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-26.pdf.

United States 5. Dept. of State (c). "Memcon between Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush and Petroleum Company Executives, 'The Middle East Conflict and U.S. Oil Interests,' 10 October 1973c.", National Security Archives, 2003. nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-82.pdf.

United States 6. Dept. of State." Memorandum for the Record on October 18, 1977." *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1969–1976. VOLUME XXXVII, ENERGY CRISIS, 1974-1980.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v37/d132>

United States 7. Dept. of State.” Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal and Henry Owen of the National Security Council Staff to President Carter on May 25, 1979.” *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976. VOLUME XXXVII, ENERGY CRISIS, 1974-1980.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v37/d209>

United States 8. Dept. of State.” Memorandum from the Secretary of Treasury Blumenthal to President Carter on June 7th, 1979”. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976. VOLUME XXXVII, ENERGY CRISIS, 1974-1980.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d194>

United States 9. Dept. of State. “Address by President Carter on the State of the Union Before a Joint Session of Congress on January 23rd, 1980”. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d138>

United States 10. Dept. of State. “Letter From the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (Thacher) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) on January 25th, 1971”. *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXIV, MIDDLE EAST REGION AND ARABIAN PENINSULA, 1969–1972; JORDAN, SEPTEMBER 1970.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v24/d147>

United States 11. Dept. of State. “Memorandum of Conversation between President Nixon and King Faisal on May 27th, 1971”. *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXIV, MIDDLE EAST REGION AND ARABIAN PENINSULA, 1969–1972; JORDAN, SEPTEMBER 1970.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v24/d151>

United States 12. Dept. of State. “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon on August 17th, 1971”. *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXIV, MIDDLE EAST REGION AND ARABIAN PENINSULA, 1969–1972; JORDAN, SEPTEMBER 1970.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v24/d154>

United States 13. Dept. of State. “Memorandum of Conversation Between President Nixon and Prince Fahad on September 21st, 1971”. *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXIV, MIDDLE EAST REGION AND ARABIAN PENINSULA, 1969–1972; JORDAN, SEPTEMBER 1970.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v24/d155>

United States 14. Dept. of State. "Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State on October 17th, 1972". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXIV, MIDDLE EAST REGION AND ARABIAN PENINSULA, 1969–1972; JORDAN, SEPTEMBER 1970.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v24/d166>

United States 15. Dept. of State. "Briefing Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff on December 14th, 1972". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXIV, MIDDLE EAST REGION AND ARABIAN PENINSULA, 1969–1972; JORDAN, SEPTEMBER 1970.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v24/d169>

United States 16. Dept. of State. "Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon on December 19th, 1972". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXIV, MIDDLE EAST REGION AND ARABIAN PENINSULA, 1969–1972; JORDAN, SEPTEMBER 1970.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v24/d170>

United States 17. Dept. of State. "Memorandum of Conversation between Kissinger, Yamani, and Saud Faisal on April 17th, 1973". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXXVI, ENERGY CRISIS, 1969–1974.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v36/d176>

United States 18. Dept. of State. "Message From King Faisal of Saudi Arabia to President Nixon on April 24th, 1973". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXXVI, ENERGY CRISIS, 1969–1974.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v36/d181>

United States 19. Dept. of State. "Memorandum of Conversation Transmitted to Kissinger on July 26th, 1973". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXXVI, ENERGY CRISIS, 1969–1974.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v36/d189>

United States 20. Dept. of State. "Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon on September 4th, 1973". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXXVI, ENERGY CRISIS, 1969–1974.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v36/d199>

United States 21. Dept. of State. "MEMCON Between Kissinger and Fahd on Feb 15th, 1975". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d127>

United States 22. Dept. of State. "Telegram From the U.S. Delegation to the Department of State on Feb. 16th, 1975". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d128>

United States 23. Dept. of State. "Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State on March 2nd, 1975". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d130>

United States 24. Dept. of State. "Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State on March 29th, 1975". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d132>

United States 25. Dept. of State. "Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) on April 16th, 1975". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d134>

United States 26. Dept. of State. "Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger in Cairo on May 19th, 1975". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d136>

United States 27. Dept. of State. "Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger on May 21st, 1975". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d138>

United States 28. Dept. of State. "Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State on May 22nd, 1975". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d139>

United States 29. Dept. of State. "Telegram From Secretary of State Kissinger to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia on May 23rd, 1975". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d141>

United States 30. Dept. of State. "Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State on June 14th, 1975". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d149>

United States 31. Dept. of State. "MEMCON Between Ambassador Akins, Sober, and Clements on June 24th, 1975". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d150>

United States 32. Dept. of State. "Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Atherton) to Secretary of State Kissinger on July 1975". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d155>

United States 33. Dept. of State. "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia on August 19th, 1975". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d156>

United States 34. Dept. of State. "Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State on August 20th, 1975". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d157>

United States 35. Dept. of State. "Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State on August 28th, 1975". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d158>

United States 36. Dept. of State. "MEMCON Between King Khalid, Fahd, and Kissinger on September 2nd, 1975". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d159>

United States 37. Dept. of State. "MEMCON Between President Ford and Prince Saud ibn Faisal on September 18th, 1975". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d163>

United States 38. Dept. of State. "Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State on November 17th, 1975". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d165>

United States 39. Dept. of State. "Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State on December 21, 1975". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d166>

United States 40. Dept. of State. "Paper Prepared in the National Security Council on January, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d170>

United States 41. Dept. of State. "Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State on March 5th, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d174>

United States 42. Dept. of State. "Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State on April 17th, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d177>

United States 43. Dept. of State. "Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State on April 28th, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d179>

United States 44. Dept. of State. "Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford on June 7th, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d180>

United States 45. Dept. of State. "MEMCON Between Prince Abdullah and Donald Rumsfeld on July 7th, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d182>

United States 46. Dept. of State. "MEMCON Between Prince Abdullah and Kissinger on July 8th, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d183>

United States 47. Dept. of State. "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia on August 1st, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d185>

United States 48. Dept. of State. "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia on September 2nd, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d187>

United States 49. Dept. of State. "MEMCON Between Ford and Saud Bin Faisal on September 17th, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d188>

United States 50. Dept. of State. "Memorandum From Robert B. Oakley, Catherine Desibour, and Robert B. Plowden, Jr. of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) on September 22nd, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d189>

United States 51. Dept. of State. "MEMCON Between Saud ibn Faisal and Kissinger on October 6th, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d190>

United States 52. Dept. of State. "MEMCON Between Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan and Clements on October 21st, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d191>

United States 53. Dept. of State. "Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State on December 28th, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–9, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, 1973–1976.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p2/d192>

United States 54. Dept. of State. "MEMCON Between Kissinger and Scowcroft on March 13th, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXXVII, ENERGY CRISIS, 1974–1980.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v37/d95>

United States 55. Dept. of State. "MEMCON Between Kissinger and Ansary Iranian Minister of Finance and Economy on March 29th, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXXVII, ENERGY CRISIS, 1974–1980.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v37/d96>

United States 56. Dept. of State. "Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger in Oslo on May 22nd, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXXVII, ENERGY CRISIS, 1974–1980*.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v37/d98>

United States 57. Dept. of State. "Memorandum by Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff on July 19th, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXXVII, ENERGY CRISIS, 1974–1980*.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v37/d101>

United States 58. Dept. of State. "Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford on October 28th, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXXVII, ENERGY CRISIS, 1974–1980*.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v37/d106>

United States 59. Dept. of State. "MEMCON Between Kissinger and State Officials on October 30th, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXXVII, ENERGY CRISIS, 1974–1980*.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v37/d108>

United States 60. Dept. of State. "MEMCON Between Kissinger and State Officials on November 8th, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXXVII, ENERGY CRISIS, 1974–1980*.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v37/d109>

United States 61. Dept. of State. "MEMCON Between President Ford and Saudi Ambassador Alireza on November 29th, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXXVII, ENERGY CRISIS, 1974–1980*.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v37/d111>

United States 62. Dept. of State. "MEMCON Between President Ford and Iranian Ambassador Zahedi on December 7th, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXXVII, ENERGY CRISIS, 1974–1980*.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v37/d112>

United States 63. Dept. of State. "Letter From President Ford to Saudi King Khalid on December 29th, 1976". *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXXVII, ENERGY CRISIS, 1974–1980*.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v37/d114>

United States 64. Dept. of State. “Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Katz) to Secretary of State Kissinger on January 3rd, 1977”. *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXXVII, ENERGY CRISIS, 1974–1980*.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v37/d115>

United States 65. Dept. of State. “Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State on January 12th, 1977”. *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXXVII, ENERGY CRISIS, 1974–1980*.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v37/d116>

United States 66. Dept. of State. “Telegram From Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal to the Department of State on October 28th, 1977”. *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1977–1980, VOLUME XVIII, MIDDLE EAST REGION; ARABIAN PENINSULA*.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d157>

United States 67. Dept. of State. “Update Efforts to Prevent Iraqi procurement of Aluminum Tubes on June 29th, 2001”. *George Washington University National Security Archive*.

<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB326/doc04.pdf>

United States 68. Dept. of State. “Update Efforts to Prevent Iraqi procurement of Aluminum Tubes on July 2nd, 2001”. *George Washington University National Security Archive*.

<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB326/doc05.pdf>

United States 69. Dept. of Defense. “Iraq Working Paper from Donald Rumsfeld to Condoleezza Rice”. *George Washington University National Security Archive*.

<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB326/doc06.pdf>

United States 70. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. “The 9/11 Commission Report”. *George Washington University National Security Archive*.

<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB326/doc14.pdf>

United States 71. Dept. of State. “Europe: Key Views on Iraqi Threat and Next Steps”. *George Washington University National Security Archive*.

<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB326/doc10.pdf>

United States 74. Office of the Press Secretary. "PRESS BRIEFING BY PRESS SECRETARY ROBERT GIBBS." The White House, 27 May. 2009. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/video/White-House-Press-Briefing-5/27/09#transcript>.

United States 75. Office of the Press Secretary. "Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Jay Carney and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes en route Riyadh, Saudi Arabia" The White House, 28 March. 2014. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/28/press-gaggle-press-secretary-jay-carney-and-deputy-national-security-adv>

United States 76. Office of the Press Secretary. "PRESS BRIEFING BY PRESS SECRETARY ROBERT GIBBS." The White House, 27 May. 2009. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/video/White-House-Press-Briefing-5/27/09#transcript>.

Vassiliev, Alexei. *King Faisal: Personality, Faith and Times*. Saqi, 2013.

Walt, Stephen M. *The origins of alliance*. Cornell University Press, 1990.

Waltz, Kenneth. "Theory of international relations." *Reading: Addison-Wesley* (1979): 635-650.

Waltz, Kenneth N. "International politics is not foreign policy." *Security Studies* 6.1 (1996): 54-57.

Wendt, Alexander. *Social theory of international politics*. Cambridge University Press, 1999.

White House 1. "Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger Staff Meetings, October 23 1973. Box 1. Document 63.", National Security Archives, 1998. nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-63.pdf.

White House 2. "William B. Quandt to Kissinger, 'Memoranda of Conversations with Arab Foreign Ministers,' 17 October 1973, with Memcon Attached.", National Security Archives, 2003. nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-34b.pdf.

White House 3. "U.S. National Security Directive 155: U.S.-SOVIET ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS on January 4, 1985" Ronald Reagan Library. <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/archives/reference/scanned-nsdds/nsdd155.pdf>

White House 4. “U.S. National Security Decision Directive 166: U.S. POLICY, PROGRAMS AND STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN on March 27, 1985” Ronald Reagan Library.
<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/archives/reference/scanned-nsdds/nsdd166.pdf>

White House 5. “Telecon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on August 2, 1990” George H. W. Bush Library.
<https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-08-02--Fahd.pdf>

White House 6. “Telecon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on August 4, 1990” George H.W. Bush Library.
<https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-08-04--Fahd.pdf>

White House 7. “Telecon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on August 31, 1990” George H.W. Bush Library.
<https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-08-31--Fahd.pdf>

White House 8. “Memcon of President’s Bush Meeting with Prince Saud Al-Faisal on October 9th, 1990” George H.W. Bush Library.
<https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-10-09--Al-Faisal.pdf>

White House 9. “Telecon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on October 25, 1990” George H.W. Bush Library.
<https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-10-25--Fahd.pdf>

White House 10. “Minutes of Bilateral Meeting with King Fahd on November 21, 1990” George H.W. Bush Library.
<https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-11-21--Fahd.pdf>

White House 11. “Telecon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on November 30, 1990” George H.W. Bush Library.
<https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-11-30--Fahd.pdf>

White House 12. “Telecon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on December 31., 1990” George H.W. Bush Library.
<https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-12-31--Fahd.pdf>

White House 13. “RESPONSE TO LTR FM REP DINGELL ON STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVES on August 10, 1990” George H. W. Bush Library.
<https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/persian-gulf/41-BE004-165801ss/41-be004-165801ss.pdf>

Wilkins, Thomas S. "'Alignment', not 'alliance'—the shifting paradigm of international security cooperation: toward a conceptual taxonomy of alignment." *Review of International Studies* 38.1 (2012): 53-76.

Wolf, Matt W. "Stumbling Towards War: The Soviet Decision to Invade Afghanistan." *Past Imperfect* 12 (2008).

Wood, Isaac. "What Fuels Presidential Approval? The Link Between Gas Prices and Presidential Approval Ratings 2011". Center for Politics (2011). www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/ITW2011042801/

Woodward, Bob. *Plan of attack*. Simon and Schuster, 2004.

World Military Expenditure and Arm Transfers Series. Published by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament and State Department. <https://www.state.gov/world-military-expenditures-and-arms-transfers/>

Yetiv, Steve A. *Myths of the Oil Boom: American National Security in a Global Energy Market*. Oxford University Press, 2015.

Yetiv, Steve A., and Katerina Oskarsson. *Challenged Hegemony: The United States, China, and Russia in the Persian Gulf*. Stanford University Press, 2018.

Zakaria, Fareed. *From wealth to power: The unusual origins of America's world role*. Princeton University Press, 1999.