ABSTRACT Title of Document: A BIOSOCIAL APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION: THE JOINT ROLE OF ESTRADIOL AND OPPONENT GENDER. Laura Elizabeth Severance, M.S., 2011 Directed By: Profesor Michele Joy Gelfand, Department of Psychology The current study advances a biosocial model of negotiation, in which the efects of estradiol and opponent gender on competitive behavior are examined. Sixty-four female participants engaged in a computer-mediated negotiation simulation and completed measures asesing psychological distance, negotiation goals, opponent perceptions, and self-presentation concerns. Results demonstrated that psychological distance, estradiol, and opponent gender interact to predict competitive and conciliatory negotiation behavior. This study carries substantial implications for conflict management theory and practice as it ilustrates the joint influence of biological and social situational factors on negotiation behavior. A BIOSOCIAL APROACH TO NEGOTIATION: THE JOINT ROLE OF ESTRADIOL AND OPONENT GENDER. By Laura Elizabeth Severance Thesis submited to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science 2011 Advisory Commite: Profesor Michele Gelfand, Chair Profesor Cheri Ostroff Profesor Jens Herberholz ? Copyright by Laura Severance 2011 ii Acknowledgements This research was supported by a Clara Mayo Grant awarded by the Society for Psychological Study of Social Issues, to whom the author is very grateful. The author would like to thank her advisor, Dr. Michele Gelfand for her guidance and support in conducting this research. The author would also like to thank her thesis commite members, Dr. Cheri Ostroff and Dr. Jens Herberholz for their valuable insights. Finaly, the author would like to thank research asistants Gregory Mandel, Kathryn Burnet, Hannah Kim, and Alison Chande for their help with data collection. iii Table of Contents Acknowledgements ?????????????????..???..????.. ii Table of Contents ??????????????????..????..??? ii List of Tables ????????????????????..?..?????.. iv List of Figures ????????????????????...???...??? v Chapter 1: Introduction ???????????????????????.... 1 Evolutionary perspectives on psychology ???????????...????? 4 The Good Genes Hypothesis ?????????????..?????. 5 The Biosocial Approach in the Current Study ??????????.?.??.? 10 Hypotheses ????????????????????????..???... 11 Exploratory Factors ??????????????????????..??.. 12 Psychological Distance ??????????????????..?? 12 Perceptions of the Opponent ?????????????..?? 13 Self-Presentation Concerns ????????????..?..?? 13 Overview of the Study ??????????????????????...? 13 Chapter 2: Method ????????????????????????.? 14 Participants ???????????????????????....? 15 Procedure ????????????????????????..? 16 Materials ?????????????????????????? 17 Opponent Gender Information ??????????????.. 17 Negotiation Task ???????????????????.... 17 Measures ?????????????????????????.... 19 Asesment of Estradiol Levels ??????????????. 19 Perceptions of the Opponent ?????????????????.?. 20 Self-Presentation Concerns ????????????..??.?. 20 Psychological Distance ???????????????????.?. 21 Anxiety Toward Negotiation ???????????????...?.?. 21 Negotiation Intentions ????????????.???????.?.. 21 Objective Negotiation Outcomes ????????.???????.?. 21 Demographics ?????????????????.??????... 22 Chapter 3: Results ???????????????????????..?? 22 Descriptive Statistics and Tests of Hypotheses ??????????.? 22 Exploratory Analyses ???????????????..?????... 23 Negotiation Ofers ??????????????????..... 24 Minimum Point Goal ????????????????..?... 25 Anxiety, Warmth, Opponent Strength, and Desired Contact ???. 25 Chapter 4: Discussion ???????????????????????? 27 Objective Evidence for Competitivenes?????????????.... 27 The Role of Psychological Distance ???????????????.. 28 Negotiator Atitudes and Cognitions ??????????????..... 30 Limitations ?????????????????????...???.. 31 Implications ??????????????????????.??.. 33 Future Research ?????????????????????...?.. 36 Conclusion ???????????????????????...?.. 37 iv Appendices ???????????????????...???????? 38 Tables ????????????????????????????...? 49 Figures ????????????????????????????..? 55 References ?????????????????????.????...?? 66 v List of Tables Table 1. Participant Payoff Chart. Table 2. Descriptive Statistics, Reliability Estimates, and Inter-correlations. Table 3. Summary of Opponent Gender Main Efects Table 4. Summary of Regresion Analyses for Three-Way Interaction betwen Gender, Psychological Distance, and Estradiol Predicting Dependent Variables. Table 5. Summary of Slopes and Regresion Analyses for Psychological Distance Predicting Dependent Variables Moderated by High and Low Levels of Estradiol for Male and Female Opponent Conditions. vi List of Figures Figure 1. Graph Depicting Hormonal Fluctuations Across Days of the Menstrual Cycle. Figure 2. Figure of hypothesized gender by estradiol interaction. Figure 2. Picture of the Male Negotiation Opponent. Figure 3. Picture of the Female Negotiation Opponent. Figure 4. Screenshot of Negotiation Simulation. Figure 5. Graph Depicting Mean Negotiation Ofers Made to Female Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. Figure 6. Graph Depicting Mean Negotiation Ofers Made to Male Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. Figure 7. Graph Depicting Minimum Point Goal Specified with Female Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. Figure 8. Graph Depicting Minimum Goal Point Specified with Male Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. Figure 9. Graph Depicting Anxiety Toward Negotiating with Female Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. Figure 10. Graph Depicting Anxiety Toward Negotiating with Male Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. Figure 11. Graph Depicting Perceptions of Opponent Warmth Made to Female Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. Figure 12. Graph Depicting Perceptions of Opponent Warmth for Male Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. Figure 13. Graph Depicting Perceptions of Opponent Strength Made to Female Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. Figure 14. Graph Depicting Perceptions of Opponent Strength for Male Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. Figure 15. Graph Depicting Desired Contact with Female Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. Figure 16. Graph Depicting Desired Contact with Male Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. 1 Chapter 1: Introduction Negotiation, or the ways in which individuals manage their interdependence (Walton & McKersie, 1965) pervades interpersonal exchanges, extending into both formal (e.g. organizational) and informal (e.g. personal) contexts. Not surprisingly, a substantial body of literature examines factors that afect negotiation proceses and outcomes. The field has explored factors such as the social context of negotiation (e.g., negotiator relationships; Fry, Firestone, & Wiliams, 1983), cognitions (e.g. biases; Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985), motivation (e.g. prosocial versus proself; De Dreu, 2004), content isues (e.g., interests versus values; Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002), emotions (e.g. positive versus negative emotions; Barry & Oliver, 1996), power (e.g., equal versus asymetric power; Mannix & Neale ,1993), the temporal context (e.g., time presure; Carnevale, O'Connor, & McCusker, 1993), communication media (e.g. face-to-face versus electronic communication; McGinn & Croson, 2004), culture (e.g., intracultural versus intercultural negotiations; Gelfand & Bret, 2004), and gender (e.g.,Smal, Gelfand, Babcock, & Getman, 2007), among others. However, one factor that has remained neglected is biology. Organizational psychology arguably prioritizes social-contextual (e.g., group composition) and individual diference (e.g., personality) factors as predictors of behavior. However, recent work has shown the promise of biological factors also predicting a wide range of phenomena. Indeed, biological factors are increasingly being applied to fields such as social psychology and organizational behavior. For example, within the social psychological literature, biological approaches have been applied to diverse topics such as personality (Bouchard, 1999), interpersonal 2 atraction (Buss, 1994), and race bias (Navarete, Fesler, Fleischman, & Geyer, 2009). Within industrial and organizational psychology, biological approaches have been applied to entrepreneurship (White, Thornhil, & Thompson, 2006), leadership (Zhang, Ilies, & Arvey, 2009), and salary decisions (Senior, Lau, & Butler, 2007). The recent surge in work relating evolutionary theory to various facets of organizational behavior speaks to the growing acknowledgment of biological influences on social behavior (for a more comprehensive review, se the 2006 Journal of Organizational Behavior Special Issue: Darwinian Perspectives on Behavior in Organizations). The goal of this research is to move the negotiation literature beyond just social contextual factors to examine negotiation behavior as a function of both biological and social factors, or what I refer to as a biosocial approach to negotiation. My central thesis is that neither biological nor social factors alone are adequate to predict negotiation behavior, but that they interact predictably to produce unique paterns of behavior. This thesis is consistent with Gottlieb?s (2007) metatheoretical model of probabilistic epigenesis, which emphasizes the reciprocal nature of the gene- environment interaction on afecting behavior. Much research shows that environmental factors influence the expresion of genes, ultimately afecting phenotypic (physical or behavioral) outcomes (se Rutter, 2007). Likewise, genetic factors predispose individuals to certain paterns of behavior as she or he engages in their environment. This approach begets a ?nature through nurture? model (Shonkoff & Philips, 2000) in which situational factors constrain or facilitate the expresion of biological factors. Employing this approach to study organizational phenomena 3 entails tailoring the biological and social factors under examination to the exact nature of the topic of interest, and moreover, must be theoreticaly driven. In the current study, the biological factor under examination is the hormone estradiol. Estradiol levels fluctuate across the menstrual cycle (se Figure 1), hence providing a suitable avenue for the examination of hormonal variation. Morever, estradiol has been linked to traits that may exert a considerable influence on negotiation behavior, such as aggresion, dominance, and competitivenes (Cashdan, 1995; Michael & Zumpe, 1993; Stanton & Schultheis, 2007; Zumpe & Michael, 1989). The social factor under examination in the current model is the gender of the negotiation opponent, which I asert operates in conjunction with biological factors to influence behavior. In this biosocial approach to negotiation, I argue that estradiol levels interact with negotiation opponent gender to produce varying levels of competitive and conciliatory cognitions, motives, and behavior. More specificaly, evidence from the evolutionary psychology literature suggests that near ovulation (when estradiol levels peak), women should behave more competitively toward other women and les competitively toward men due to distaly situated reproductive presures during periods of high fertility. In contrast, during menstruation (when estradiol levels drop), women should behave equaly competitively toward women and men due to a decrease in reproductive presures as a result of low fertility at this time. These predictions highlight the dynamic nature of biological and social influences on behavior. In what follows, I provide a roadmap of the literatures relevant to this biosocial approach. First, I discuss a review of evolutionary psychology and its relevance to 4 the organizational sciences and the current study. Subsequently, I present a review of the literature on estradiol and the menstrual cycle in relation to negotiation-related constructs. Finaly, I present the biosocial model of negotiation advanced by the current study, discuss the study conducted, and end with theoretical and practical implications of this research. Evolutionary Perspectives on Psychology Evolutionary psychology explains human cognitions and behavior as produced by psychological mechanisms evolved to suit a specific (and usualy, but not necesarily, ancestral) environment (Buss, 1995). Such mechanisms are selected for because they increase an organism?s likelihood of survival under the constraints of a given environment (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). Hence, an individual?s behavior can be explained as a result of proximal (imediate) and distal (ancestral) influences. In the current study, hormones operate as a proximal mechanism while the motivation to reproduce serves as a distal, and likely subconscious, motivation. Evolutionary psychological arguments have been applied to several topics of study in psychology, including gender diferences (Cramer, Lipinski, Meter, & Houska, 2008), altruism (Webster, 2008), and competition versus cooperation (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981), among others. Gender diferences in jealousy are a good example of a phenomenon that is elegantly explained by evolutionary psychology. Numerous studies have demonstrated that while men become more distraught over a partner?s sexual infidelity, women become more distraught over emotional infidelity (Buss, Larsen, Westen, & Semelroth, 1992; Buss et al., 1999). Evolutionary psychology offers a compeling explanation for this finding, positing 5 that gender diferences in jealousy arise from the diferential implications of sexual versus emotional infidelity. A man?s reproductive succes is compromised when his partner is sexualy unfaithful because he risks investing substantial resources in a child that is not his own. In contrast, a woman?s reproductive succes is threatened if she loses her partner?s resources and asistance in raising her children, such as when he develops an emotional bond with another. This example ilustrates how evolutionary presures (i.e., the need to procreate) may guide individual behavior. Although stil in its embryonic stage in the organizational behavior literature (Sewel, 2004), recent work has begun to shed light on the applicability of the evolutionary perspective to various facets of organizational life (Colareli, 1998; Hantula, 2003; Ilies, Arvey, & Bouchard, 2006; Markc?zy & Goldberg, 1998; Nicholson, 1998; Nicholson, 2010; Nicholson & White, 2006; Pierce & White, 1999; Shane, 2009; White, Thornhil, & Hampson, 2006). For example, White, Thornhil, and Hampson (2006) found that, in an examination of over 100 male MBA students, those with higher testosterone were more likely to pursue entrepreneurship, an inherently risky undertaking. This asociation was likely selected for because in an ancestral environment, males high in testosterone tended to achieve greater succes (than those lower in testosterone) when taking risks due to the benefits of high testosterone such as physical strength, enhanced visuo-spatial ability, and ease of mate atraction. The God Genes Hypothesis One of the most widely discussed theoretical paradigms in the evolutionary psychology literature, and which is most relevant to the current study, is the good 6 genes hypothesis (Fisher, 1930). A focal claim of evolutionary theory is that individuals are motivated to produce healthy offspring, so as to ensure the perpetuation of their genes. Hence, mating with a desirable partner is a particularly important pursuit from an evolutionary point of view (Buss, 1995). The good genes hypothesis proposes that females are motivated to mate with desirable males during periods of high fertility (Gangestad, Thornhil, & Garver, 2002). This generaly results in the increased use of mate-atraction tactics, such as sending sexualy receptive signals to males during ovulation (Haselton, Mortezaie, Pilsworth, Beske- Rechek, & Frederick, 2007; Gu?guen, 2009). In contrast, females generaly behave competitively towards other females during ovulation, as they represent competition and a threat to mate procurement (Cashdan, 1995; Fisher, 2004). As the cycle progreses, females become les interested in mating as the likelihood of conception decreases, reaching its lowest point during menstruation. During menstruation, females engage in fewer mate-atraction tactics towards males, report lower interest in sexual activity, and exhibit decreased intrasexual competition (Haselton et al., 2007). The good genes hypothesis ilustrates an important interaction betwen menstrual cycle phase and women?s behavior towards men versus women. Several studies within the psychological and biological sciences find ample support for the good genes hypothesis (Buss, 2004; Gangestad & Cousins, 2001; Gangestad, Thornil, & Garver, 2002; Gangestad, Thornhil, & Garver-Apgar, 2005; Gangestad, Garver-Apgar, Simpson, & Cousins, 2007; Haselton & Gangestad, 2006; Pilsworth & Haselton, 2006). For example, empirical work has demonstrated that women report higher sexual interest (Bullivant et al., 2004; Regan, 1996; Stanislaw & 7 Rice, 1988), prefer more masculine features in men (Feinberg et al., 2006; Gangestad et al., 2007), wear more revealing clothing (Durante, Le, & Hasleton, 2008; Haselton et al., 2007), are more receptive to male advances (Gu?gen, 2009), and exhibit more intrasexual competition- in other words- competition toward other females (Cashdan, 1995; Fisher, 2004) during ovulation. For example, in a recent field study, Gu?guen (2009) examined women?s responses to male advances across the cycle. Male confederates approached young women at a nightclub during a slow song and asked to dance. Upon leaving the club, women provided information about their cycles. Results showed that women in the fertile phase agreed more favorably to the dance request than did women in luteal or menstrual phases. Additional research shows that women exhibit increased interest in men other than their partner (Gangestad, Thornhil, & Garver, 2002), fel sexier (Haselton & Gangestad, 2006), and report a higher interest in atending social gatherings (Haselton & Gangestad, 2006) during ovulation. Furthermore, women are more likely to compete with other women when ovulating. For example, Fisher (2004) found that when asked to evaluate other women?s atractivenes, women derogated each other significantly more during ovulation than during menstruation, ilustrating increased intrasexual competition betwen females at periods of high fertility. Numerous studies have also demonstrated a link betwen estradiol and aggresive behavior (Cashdan, 1995; Michael & Zumpe, 1993; Stanton & Schultheis, 2007; Zumpe & Michael, 1989). For example Stanton and Schultheis (2007) and Stanton and Edelstein (2009) found a positive relationship betwen estradiol levels and 8 implicit power motivation (a preference for having influence and dominance over others). In a similar vein, Cashdan (1995) investigated the hormonal correlates of dominance and status in college-age women. Participants? nonverbal behavior was examined for indicators of dominance, which were examined in conjunction with hormone levels and peer rankings of a dominance hierarchy. Results showed that estradiol was related to nonverbal behaviors indicating dominance and an enhanced perception of one?s own social status among other women. Other studies have linked estradiol to dominating and aggresive behaviors, such as asertive posture, in non- human animals (Gandelman & Simon, 1980; Mayer, Monroy, & Rosenblat, 1990; Mayer & Rosenblat, 1987; Michael & Zumpe, 1993; Rosenblat Hazelwood, & Poole, 1996; Zumpe & Michael, 1989). In addition, the literature regarding person perception across the menstrual cycle has also uncovered substantial findings regarding gender salience, which likely contribute to an increased motivation to atract or compete for a mate (Johnston, Arden, Macrae, & Grace, 2003; Macrae, Alnwick, Milne, & Schloerscheidt, 2002; Senior, Lau, & Butler, 2007). In general, masculinity and femininity tend to be more salient during ovulation. Acording to the good genes hypothesis, this increased salience serves the purpose of further intensifying mate-atraction or competition techniques. For example, Macrae et al. (2002) found evidence that gender, especialy masculinity, is more salient to women during ovulation. Participants were asked to identify 100 faces as male or female and to categorize 64 terms as typicaly masculine or feminine at two points in the cycle, high fertility and low fertility. Participants? responses times were fastest, both when identifying male faces and when categorizing 9 typicaly masculine terms, during ovulation. Likewise, Senior, Lau, and Butler (2007) found that menstrual cycle phase and perceptions of masculinity afected social decision-making in an organizational context. Female participants engaged in a resource asignment task during either ovulation or menstruation. The task involved considering dominant- or non-dominant looking male employees for social status job packages. The theory underlying this paradigm stems from the notion that dominant features in males generaly indicate good health and therefore an atractive mating partner. As predicted, ovulating women were more likely to asign high- status job packages to dominant-looking men as opposed to non-dominant looking men. Other work provides evidence that femininity is also more salient to women during periods of high fertility (Brinsmead-Stockham, Johnston, Miles, & Macrae, 2008), although the literature remains mixed (Johnston, Arden, Macrae, & Grace, 2003). To date, one study has employed evolutionary theory to the examine negotiation behavior. Lucas, Koff, and Skeath (2007) examined changes in women?s monetary offers to other women in an ultimatum game across the menstrual cycle. Results demonstrated that during ovulation women made lower offers and rejected opponent offers more frequently than menstruating women and women in a control group (contraceptive users). These findings are consistent with increased intrasexual competition during ovulation as predicted by the good genes hypothesis. Although the Lucas, Koff and Skeath (2007) study was wel-designed, it sufered from uneven sample sizes and only examined female-female pairs, and only included self-reported cycle information. Nonetheles, their work provides preliminary data for a 10 relationship betwen fertility risk and bargaining, upon which the current study builds by incorporating social contextual factors. The Biosocial Approach in the Current Study The above review has ilustrated how both biological factors and aspects of the situation exert an important influence on individuals? behavior. In this model, I propose that hormonal fluctuations across the menstrual cycle interact with opponent gender to influence the negotiation dynamic. The evolutionary perspective proposes that time in the cycle should dictate women?s motivation to atract a desirable male partner while competing with other females. I propose that, during ovulation, women wil atempt to atract male partners by engaging in cooperative, rather than competitive behavior. The use of cooperative as opposed to competitive tactics to foster interpersonal atraction is supported by Eagly?s (1987) social role theory. Social role theory posits that men and women occupy diferent roles in society as dictated by norms, expectations, and social sanctions. Individuals who deviate from their prescribed role are often subject to criticism and punishment from others (Bem & Lenney, 1976). Following this, logic dictates that if one?s goal is to atract another, it is best to behave in a gender- congruent manner. Feminine roles are generaly described as warm, nurturing, and soft, while masculine roles are more strong, forceful, and asertive. Hence, behaving in a gender-congruent manner for a woman entails being cooperative as opposed to competitive, which I expect to occur in negotiations with male opponents. In contrast, women?s motivation to compete with other females should manifest in the form of aggresive negotiation behavior with female opponents. When reproductive 11 presures are minimal, such as during menstruation, behavior towards male and female opponents is expected to be more similar. Hypotheses The hypotheses of the present study hinge on an important interaction betwen women?s estradiol levels and the gender of the negotiation opponent. Consistent with extant research (Van Klef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004), I concentrate on both competitive intentions and actual offer behavior in a negotiation simulation. I propose that women should behave les competitively toward a male negotiation opponent, and more competitively toward a female negotiation opponent during ovulation, when estradiol levels are high. In contrast, women should behave equaly competitively and cooperatively towards male and female negotiation opponents during menstruation, when estradiol levels are low. Competitive behavior is asesed using measures of negotiation intentions, minimum point goals for the negotiation, and actual offer behavior in a negotiation task, thereby generating three general hypotheses: Hypothesis 1a: During ovulation, women wil report les competitive intentions when negotiating with a male opponent and more competitive intentions when negotiating with a female opponent. Hypothesis 1b: During menstruation, women wil report equaly competitive intentions when negotiating with a male or female opponent. Hypothesis 2a: During ovulation, women wil specify lower (les competitive) point goals when negotiating with a male opponent and higher (more competitive) point goals when negotiating with a female opponent. 12 Hypothesis 2b: During menstruation, point goals wil be approximately equal when negotiating with a male or female opponent. Hypothesis 3a: During ovulation, women wil make higher (les competitive) offers to male opponents and lower (more competitive) offers to made to female opponents. Hypothesis 3b: During menstruation, offer levels wil be approximately equal for male and female opponents. Figure 2 ilustrates the expected interaction betwen menstrual cycle phase and opponent gender on the general construct of competitivenes (note that the intercept of the two lines, i.e. the relationship betwen absolute levels of competitivenes betwen ovulating and menstruating women, is unknown). Exploratory Factors Although the primary dependent variable in the current study is competitivenes in a simulated negotiation context, I explore numerous other factors that may play a role in the proposed biosocial model. These factors include psychological distance, perceptions of the negotiation opponent, self-presentation concerns, and anxiety toward negotiation. Psychological Distance. Psychological distance is defined as, ?a subjective experience that something is close or far away from the self, here, and now? (pp. 117, Trope & Liberman, 2010). Psychological distance may exist across various dimensions, including temporal distance, spatial distance, hypotheticality, and social distance. In the current study, psychological distance is asesed by asking the participant how close they fel to their opponent. A large body of literature demonstrates the efects of psychological 13 distance on numerous constructs such as interpersonal atraction (Cialdini et al., 1976), social comparison proceses (Teser & Campbel, 1982), and self-evaluation (Teser, 1988) among others. As such, psychological distance serves as an important exploratory factor in the current study. Perceptions of the Oponent. Given the importance of person perception in the development of interpersonal atraction (Buss, 1994), I examine whether estradiol interacts with the gender of the opponent to predict perceptions of the opponent (e.g., strength, warmth) and desired interpersonal contact. For example, it is likely that women have an increased desire for interpersonal contact with male opponents during ovulation, as opposed to menstruation, which may contribute to more conciliatory offers as a mate atraction technique. Self-Presentation Concerns. Self-presentation concerns indirectly tap into an individual?s motivation to atract or compete with her negotiation opponent. In order to ases motivation to atract versus compete, participant desire to be perceived by their opponent as warm versus strong wil be measured, which presents interesting opportunities for exploration. For example, I argue that ovulating women may atempt to atract male negotiation partners by behaving in a gender-congruent manner (consistent with Eagly, 1987). If this is the case, ovulating women should report atempting to appear warm as opposed to strong when negotiating with a male. Anxiety Toward Negotiation. A substantial body of literature examining gender and negotiation has demonstrated that women often fel anxious toward negotiation (Kray & Gelfand, 14 2009; Smal, Gelfand, Babcock, & Getman, 2007). Given that my sample was comprised of al women, anxiety toward negotiation sems an important construct to ases. Furthermore, it is possible that women experience more anxiety when negotiating with a male opponent given the general perception of negotiation as a masculine task (Bowles, Babock, & McGinn, 2005) and/or due to the general anxiety that often acompanies felings of interpersonal atraction (Rose & Frieze, 1993). Alternatively, perceptions of a female opponent as a threat could similarly contribute to anxiety toward negotiation. Overview of the Study The current study employed a lab-based paradigm in which the participant engaged in a computer-mediated negotiation task that has been widely used to study competition and cooperation in negotiation (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Hilty & Carnevale, 1993; Van Klef & C?t?, 2007; Van Klef & Van Lange, 2008), ostensibly with another participant. The gender, atractivenes and masculinity/femininity of the negotiation opponent were controlled using a picture and endorsement of gender-consistent activities. This design alowed for an examination of naturaly occurring negotiation behavior in a systematicaly controlled environment. The use of a computer agent is preferred over the use of human confederates, as the later can introduce a great amount of variability into the experiment via subtle diferences in confederate atractivenes, masculinity, or femininity (among other factors). A unique aspect of this study is that estradiol levels were measured in addition to self-reported menstrual cycle dates. Participants were scheduled to participate during 15 ovulation or menstruation and estradiol samples were collected upon arrival at the lab. This resulted in a 2 (opponent gender: male or female) x 2 (menstrual phase: ovulation or menstruation) design. After being presented with information regarding their negotiation opponent, participants completed measures designed to ases perceptions of the negotiation opponent, self-presentation concerns, psychological distance, anxiety, intentions, and goals for the upcoming negotiation. Participants then engaged in the computer-mediated negotiation task. This methodology alows for a clean yet comprehensive examination of individuals? hormone levels, cognitions, atitudes, and behavior in negotiation situations. Chapter 2: Method Participants Participants included 62 University of Maryland female undergraduates. Nine participants were excluded from final analyses due to failing a suspicion check, while an additional seven were excluded due to the unavailability of saliva samples, leaving a final sample size of 46 individuals. Participants? mean age was M=19.14 years, SD=1.54 years and the racial composition was 47.8% White, 21.7% African American, 8.7% Asian, 8.7% Hispanic, 2.2% multi-racial, 2.3% other and 4.3% unreported. Participants were screened for eligibility in the study using the following criteria: 1) female, 2) not pregnant, 3) not using hormonal birth control (currently and for at least 3 months prior to the experiment), 4) having a regular menstrual cycle, and 5) able to report with relative confidence (5, 6, or 7 on a 7-point scale of confidence) the date of the first day of their last menstrual cycle. A complete version of the eligibility 16 questionnaire is available in Appendix B. Participants were asked to come into the lab during menstruation (days 1-5) or ovulation (day 14) as calculated by self- reported cycle dates. Procedure Twenty-four hours before the experiment, participants were sent a reminder e- mail that instructed them not to 1) consume alcohol 12 hours prior to the study, 2) eat a major meal or brush their teth within one hour of study, and 3) chew gum, eat candy, or drink soda/juice within 20 minutes of the study (as suggested by Salimetrics, 2007). Upon arrival at the lab, participants were placed alone in a room to provide the saliva sample. Subsequently, the participant was asked to provide information about their three favorite hobbies and to have their picture taken, both for the purposes of reducing suspicion (this mirrors the information that participants would receive about their ostensible opponent). At this point, the experimenter started a computer program, which presented instructions regarding the negotiation task. After these instructions, a screen instructed the participant to notify the experimenter. Upon being notified, the experimenter provided the participant with information regarding their negotiation opponent (a list of hobbies and a picture displayed on the computer screen) and instructed the participant to continue. The computer program continued and asked participants to complete measures asesing perceptions of the opponent, self-presentation concerns, psychological distance, anxiety, and negotiation intentions and goals. After these questionnaires, the participant engaged in the negotiation task, provided demographic information and underwent a suspicion check. 17 Materials Opponent Gender Information. Opponent gender and masculinity/femininity were controlled using a picture of an atractive college-aged man (Figure 3) or woman (Figure 4), siting in a room similar to that of the participant, and a list of gender-specific hobbies. The male and female pictures were selected from a larger set of 12 pictures that were rated on atractivenes (using a 1 to 7 scale, 7 being ?extremely atractive?) by 39 undergraduate students. The male (M=5.00, SD=1.04) and female (M=5.14, SD=1.21) photos were both rated as significantly above average, and similar to each other, on atractivenes. The male hobbies included ?rock climbing, working out, and hanging out with friends,? while the female hobbies included ?dancing, fashion, and hanging out with friends.? These hobbies were selected from a longer list of 14 hobbies that were rated on masculinity and femininity (using a 1 to 7 scale, 7 being ?extremely masculine/feminine? depending on the hobby) by 20 undergraduate students. Rock- climbing (M=4.9, SD=1.02) and working out (M=5.7, SD=0.80) were among the most masculine, while dancing (M=6.2, SD=0.70) and fashion (M=5.65, SD=0.99) were among the most feminine. One gender-neutral activity, ?Hanging out with friends? was chosen to increase believability of the stimuli. These hobbies were also selected because they do not impart an inordinate amount of information about socioeconomic status, inteligence, or other confounding variables. These stimuli were designed to represent a desirable potential male partner and a formidable potential female competitor via their highly gender-stereotypic nature. Negotiation Task. 18 The negotiation task, adapted from Van Klef, De Dreu, & Manstead (2004), was designed to measure competitive negotiation behavior with a standardized opponent. Although computer-mediated, the task shares many similarities with real-life negotiation (e.g., multiple isues difering in utility to the negotiator, information about one?s own payoffs only, and the typical offer?counteroffer sequence; Van Klef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). Such computer-mediated negotiation simulations are commonly used in the literature and have shown substantial real- world applicability (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Hilty & Carnevale, 1993; Van Klef & C?t?, 2007; Van Klef & Van Lange, 2008). The negotiation involved a conversation betwen a buyer and seler of a consignment of mobile phones who are instructed to negotiate about three isues: 1) price, 2) warranty period, and 3) contract duration. Al participants were asigned to the seler role. Prior to negotiating, participants were presented with a payoff chart that specified a point value for each option within the negotiation (Table 1). This table alows the participant to se what their best outcome would be (the highest number of points). As specified in the table, price for Level 9 ($110) yields a 0 payoff and for Level 1 ($150) yields a 400 payoff (i.e., increments of 50 points per level). For warranty period, Level 9 (9 months) yields a 0 payoff, and Level 1 (1 month) yields a 120 payoff (i.e., increments of 15 points per level). Finaly, for duration of service contract, Level 9 (9 months) yields a 0 payoff, and Level 1 (1 month) yields a 240 payoff (i.e., increments of 30 points per level). Participants were explicitly told what their best and worst outcomes would be (maximum versus 19 minimum number of points) and completed a brief quiz to ensure that they understood. After taking time to review role information and instructions, participants were given 15 minutes to negotiate with their ostensible opponent over six rounds of offers. In acordance with Van Klef, De Dreu, and Manstead?s (2004) paradigm, once the negotiation started, the buyer (i.e., the computer) made a first offer. Over the negotiation rounds, the buyer proposed the following levels of agreement (for price - warranty - service): 8?7?8 (Round 1), 8?7?7 (Round 2), 8?6?7 (Round 3), 7?6?7 (Round 4), 7?6?6 (Round 5), and 6?6?6 (Round 6). Past research has shown that this preprogramed strategy has face validity and is sen as intermediate in cooperativenes and competitivenes (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Van Klef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). The negotiation terminated if a demand by the participant equaled or exceded the offer the computer was about to make in the next round. Thus, for example, if the participant demanded 7?6?6 in Round 4, this demand resulted in a termination of the negotiation because the buyer?s next offer (in Round 5) would have been 7?6?6. After the sixth round, the negotiation wil be stopped regardles of whether participants reach an agreement (cf. De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Van Klef et al., 2004). Figure 5 depicts a screenshot of the negotiation program and instructions for the negotiation task are available in Appendix A. Measures Assesment of Estradiol Levels. In order to avoid suspicion on the part of the subjects, participants were told that saliva samples would be used to ?examine normal body chemistry.? Participants were asked to pasively salivate through a straw into a vial, which was then stored in 20 a freezer at -80?C. These samples were later sent to the Kirschbaum lab at the Technical University of Dresden for analysis. The Kirschbaum lab is a global leader in the development of salivary analysis techniques and is frequently entrusted with samples from universities around the world. Using salivary asays for estradiol analysis is a common and acurate technique (Gramer, Renninger, & Fischer, 2004; Jasienska et al., 2006; Mead & Hampson, 1997; Rantala, Erikkson, Vainikka, & Kortet, 2006). Perceptions of the Oponent. Following the presentation of information about their negotiation partner, participants completed various measures regarding their perceptions of the opponent. Maximum likelihood factor analysis using varimax rotation identified two factors, one tapping into perceptions of opponent strength (8 items: strong, competitive, powerful, aggresive, asertive, masculine, weak (reverse-coded), feminine (reverse- coded)) and another tapping into opponent warmth (3 items: kind, warm, friendly) as wel as two single-item measures for opponent attractivenes and inteligence. Descriptive statistics and reliability estimates for al measures are available in Table 2. Desire for interpersonal contact was measured using a single factor, three item measure (?how much do you think you would enjoy talking/going to a party with/having dinner with your opponent?). Self-Presentation Concerns. Imediately after asesing their negotiation partner, participants completed measures asesing how they would like to be perceived by the negotiation partner. Maximum likelihood factor analysis using varimax rotation identified two 21 dimensions, one of self warmth (3 items: kind, warm, understanding) and one of self strength (3 items: strong, aggresive, competitive). Psychological Distance. The psychological distance measure was based on Bogardus?s (1947) social distance scale. Participants were asked to think about a person that they felt the closest to in their life and asign a +5 to that person. Then, they were asked to specify how close they felt to the opponent using a -5 to +5 scale. Anxiety Toward Negotiation Anxiety toward negotiation was asesed using a single factor, 5-item measure (anxious, embarrased, nervous, comfortable (reverse-coded), relaxed (reverse- coded)). Negotiation Intentions To tap into participants? objective negotiation goals, they were asked to specify the total minimum number of points they would deem aceptable. Participants also completed measures tapping into more subjective goals and priorities, which varied along dimensions of cooperating (5 items: reaching agreement, cooperating, achieving a good outcome for both parties, achieving the best outcome for myself (reverse-coded)) and competing (3 items: trying to compete, doing beter than the other participant, not losing the negotiation), as identified by maximum likelihood factors analysis with varimax rotation. Objective Negotiation Outcomes. The point values asociated with offers in the negotiation task provides an objective measures of competitivenes. In acordance with Van Klef, De Dreu, and Manstead (2004), the offers made by participants in each round were transformed into 22 an index revealing the negotiator?s total level of demand across rounds (e.g., mean levels of offers for price, warranty, and service). Demographics. After the negotiation exercise, participants were asked to provide information regarding their age, race, relationship status (single or in a relationship), and the first day of their last menstrual cycle (for reliability purposes). Al measures are available in Appendix B. Chapter 3: Results Descriptive Statistics and Tests of Hypotheses As a first step in analyses, correlations among variables were examined. Several predictable relationships emerged, such as a positive correlation betwen strong-self presentation and competitive intentions. Descriptive statistics and item inter- correlations are presented in Table 2. Control variables (race, relationship status, and age) did not afect variables of interest and wil therefore not be further discussed. Main efects of opponent gender and estradiol on dependent variables were examined as a subsequent step in analyses. There was an approximately equal number of participants in the male (N=24) and female (N=22) conditions. Opponent gender has a significant efect on perceptions of opponent strength (Male: M=5.78, SD=.47; Female: M=4.05, SD=.71.; t(44)=-9.78, p=.00.) and the desire to be perceived as warm (Male: M=5.77, SD=.79; Female: M=5.06, SD=1.07; t(44)=-2.587, p=.013; se Table 3 for additional opponent gender analyses). Estradiol is negatively correlated with warm-self presentation, but does not have a relationship with any other variables. 23 To test my hypotheses, the gender and estradiol interaction was examined across multiple variables using linear regresion. There were no significant two-way gender by estradiol interactions on any variables of interest. Hence, hypotheses were not supported. Exploratory Analyses Subsequently, analyses were conducted to probe interactions betwen gender, estradiol, and exploratory factors. A three-way interaction emerged betwen gender, estradiol, and psychological distance on mean offers made in the negotiation simulation (?=5.305, p=.04), acceptable minimum goal (?=-6.158, p=.016), anxiety toward negotiating (?=6.431, p=.051), perceptions of opponent warmth (?=4.482, p- .075), perceptions of opponent strength (?=4.189, p=.004), and desired contact with the opponent (?=4.277, p=.084). Please refer to Table 4 for comprehensive statistics. In order to probe the nature of the three-way interactions betwen gender, estradiol, and psychological distance, graphs were created to ilustrate within-gender efects of psychological distance as moderated by high and low levels of estradiol across multiple dependent variables (se Figures 6-17). High and low levels of estradiol are defined as one standard deviation above or below the mean, respectively (Aiken & West, 1991; Dawson & Richter, 2006). Subsequently, simple slopes analyses (Aiken & West, 1991; Friedrich, 1982) were conducted to further probe the nature of these interactions and regresion analyses were conducted to determine the significance of within-gender psychological distance by estradiol interactions (se Table 5). Graphs depicting within-gender two-way estradiol by psychological distance interactions were chosen over graphs depicting the three-way interactions 24 betwen gender, estradiol, and psychological distance as the former provides a clearer visualization of the patern of results. Negotiation offers made during the simulation and minimum point goals specified prior to negotiating provide an objective measure of competitivenes, while anxiety toward negotiation, perceptions of opponent warmth, perceptions of opponent strength, and desire for interpersonal contact with the opponent tap into more subjective aspects of the negotiation experience. Between- and within-gender findings across these variables are discussed below. Negotiation Offers When negotiating with a female opponent, low estradiol levels are linked to less competitive offers as psychological distance decreases (or in other words, as closenes increases; ?=-1.245, p=.094). In contrast, high estradiol levels trend towards predicting more competitive offers as psychological distance decreases (? =.190, p=.464). This interaction is ilustrated in Figure 6. Put simply, women with low estradiol levels are les competitive towards female opponents they perceive as being close than with female opponents the perceived as being distant. In contrast, women with high estradiol trend towards being more competitive with female opponents they perceive as close than with those they perceive as distant. The overal psychological distance by estradiol interaction for female opponents is significant (? =.717, p=.088). Ofers made to male opponents exhibit nearly the exact opposite patern, as low levels of estradiol are linked to more competitive offers as psychological distance decreases (?=-.771, p=.035), while high levels of estradiol trend towards predicting les competitive offers as psychological distance decreases (?=.279, p=.30). The 25 psychological distance by estradiol for male opponents is significant (?=-.525, p=.03; Se Figure 7). As noted, these results demonstrate the opposite patern demonstrated in negotiations with female opponents, a trend that replicates across other dependent variables of interest. Minimum Point Goal Results for minimum goal exhibit a similar patern to mean offers. In negotiations with a female opponent, low estradiol is linked to less competitive goals as psychological distance decreases (? =1.349, p=.038), while high estradiol is linked to more competitive goals (? =-.436, p=.06) as psychological distance decreases (se Figure 8). The two-way interaction for female opponents is significant (? =-.893, p=.017). As is the case with mean offers, negotiations with a male opponent exhibit a markedly diferent patern. While high estradiol trends toward predicting less competitive goals as psychological distance decreases (?=.568, p=.124), low estradiol trends toward predicting more competitive goals (? =-.345, p=.218) as psychological distance decreases (se Figure 9). This within-gender two-way interaction is also significant (? =.457, p=.065). Anxiety, Opponent Warmth, Opponent Strength, and Desired Contact Anxiety toward negotiation, opponent warmth, opponent strength, and desired contact demonstrate fascinating paterns in negotiations with a female opponent. Consistent with findings for mean offer and minimum goal, results across these variables suggest a link betwen prosocial atitudes and closenes in low-estradiol women, but a link betwen competitive atitudes and closenes in high-estradiol women. However, these variables do not vary not vary as a function of estradiol and 26 psychological distance when negotiating with a male opponent, which wil be further discussed below. (se Figures 11, 13, 15, and 17). In the case of the female opponent, results for anxiety toward negotiation demonstrate that low estradiol is positively related to anxiety levels as psychological distance decreases (? =-1.829, p=.07), while high estradiol levels are unrelated to anxiety (?=.049, p=.851). The two-way interaction betwen estradiol and psychological distance is significant (? =.939, p=.074; se Figure 10). Perceptions of female opponent warmth demonstrate a similar patern, as low estradiol links positively to opponent warmth as psychological distance decreases (? =-1.314, p=.063), while no interaction emerges for high estradiol (?=-.005, p=.983). This two- way interaction is significant (? =0.654, p=.098; se Figure 12). With regard to perceptions of female opponent strength, low estradiol links to higher perceptions of strength as psychological distance decreases (? =-1.566, p=.029), while high estradiol trends toward predicting lower perceptions of strength (? =.338, p=.172) as psychological distance increases. The two-way interaction is significant (? =.530, p=.20; se Figure 14). Finaly, low estradiol is positively linked to desired contact with a female opponent as psychological distance decreases (? =- 1.368, p=.048), while high estradiol is negatively linked to desired contact as psychological distance decreases (? =.521, p=.038). This interaction is also significant (? =-.570, p=.018; se Figure 16). The lack of a significant estradiol by psychological distance interaction across these variables in the case of the male opponent prompted further analyses. A significant correlation emerged betwen psychological distance and perceptions of 27 male opponent warmth (r=-.413, p=.045) and strength (r=-.348, p=.095), and the desire for interpersonal contact (r=-.404, p=.050), thereby suggesting that the influence of psychological distance on these variables appears to override the influence of estradiol. Chapter 4: Discusion Biology is a word rarely mentioned in the organizational psychology literature, and the field remains skeptical of work incorporating biological factors into models of organizational behavior (Sewel, 2004). However, this study provides compeling evidence of the influence of biological and social influences on negotiation behavior. This research demonstrates that opponent gender interacts with psychological distance and estradiol to predict multiple aspects of negotiation behavior, cognitions, and atitudes. In general, results demonstrate that when negotiating with female opponent, low levels of estradiol predicts les competitive behavior while high levels of estradiol predict more competitive behavior as psychological distance decreases, or as psychological closenes increases. In contrast, when negotiating with a male opponent, low estradiol predicts more competitive behavior while high estradiol is linked to less competitive behavior as psychological distance decreases. Objective Evidence for Competitivenes Perhaps most compeling are the findings regarding two objective measures of competitive behavior- mean offers made during the negotiation simulation and minimum goals specified prior to negotiating. Mean offers made during the negotiation reflect actual negotiation behavior, hence providing a behavioral measure of competitivenes while the report of minimum point goal reflects intentions to 28 behave competitively. As noted, participants high in estradiol demonstrate a patern of increased competitivenes toward female opponents as psychological distance decreases. Looking at estradiol in isolation, these findings are consistent with previous literature linking estradiol to aggresive, dominant, and competitive behavior . High estradiol levels may have predisposed these participants to view the female negotiation opponent as a substantial threat, mirroring findings of intrasexual competition during ovulation (Fisher, 2004). Results from negotiations with male opponents exhibit the exact opposite patern, showing that women high in estradiol behave les competitively as psychological distance decreases. The finding of conciliatory behavior toward males during ovulation is consistent with literature demonstrating an increased use of mate atraction techniques during the luteal phase . However, it should be emphasized that estradiol alone does not drive behavior but that it interacts with psychological distance to influence behavior toward male and female opponents, a point that wil be further discussed below. The findings regarding women low in estradiol are fascinating. These women negotiated les competitively with a female opponent but more competitively with a male opponent as psychological distance decreased. It was originaly hypothesized that the gender of the opponent would be irrelevant in this case, so it is especialy interesting that psychological distance moderates participant reactions to male and female opponents. A more comprehensive discussion of psychological distance may shed further light on these findings. The Role of Psychological Distance 29 As mentioned, psychological distance concerns the experience that something is ?close or far away from the self? (pp. 117, Trope & Liberman, 2010). Drawing on Lewin?s (1952) notion of a ?life space,? the locus of an individual?s subjective reality, it may be inferred that psychologicaly close others are sen as more relevant to the self. Hence, reactions to close others might be especialy intense while reactions to distant other might be more benign in nature. The finding that decreased psychological distance exacerbates competitive intrasexual but conciliatory intersexual behaving in ovulating women is especialy fascinating. When perceived as psychologicaly close, it is likely that a female opponent is appraised a realistic threat while a male opponent is perceived as a realistic potential mate, thereby intensifying participant reactions to these targets. Furthermore, a wealth of social psychological studies on social comparison proceses has demonstrated that individuals are especialy likely to compare themselves to close and similar others (Festinger, 1954; Heider, 1958; Pleban & Teser, 1981; Pritchard, 1969; Teser & Campbel, 1982). Engaging in such comparison proceses could easily lead to the evaluation of a female opponent as a threat, hence eliciting competitive reactions. Such comparisons would not be expected to occur with the male opponent given the lack of similarity based on gender. In the case of women low in estradiol, psychological closenes exacerbated conciliatory intrasexual behavior but competitive intersexual behavior. During menstruation, women do not face the same reproductive presures as during ovulation, which should dampen the motivation to compete with other women while atracting men. Findings certainly 30 support this conclusion. However, it remains unclear why low estradiol participants behaved competitively with close men but cooperatively with close women. Negotiator Atitudes and Cognitions Looking at the more subjective measure of the current study, findings from the female opponent condition regarding anxiety toward negotiation, evaluations of opponent warmth, strength, and desired contact are consistent with the estradiol by psychological distance interaction on mean offers and minimum goal. That is, women with low estradiol levels evaluate a female opponent as more warm and expres a greater desire for interpersonal contact as psychological distance decreases. This implies a more prosocial motivation on the part of these low-estradiol women. In contrast, women with high estradiol expres much lower interest in interpersonal contact with a female opponent as psychological distance decreases, hence implying a lack of interpersonal liking toward the opponent. In addition, women with low estradiol evaluated the female opponent as stronger and reported more anxiety toward negotiating as psychological distance decreased, while women high in estradiol evaluated a female opponent as weaker as psychological distance decreased, which may imply the use of opponent derogation as a competitive tactics (Fisher, 2004). The lack of an estradiol by psychological distance interaction across anxiety, opponent warmth, strength, and desire for contact with male opponents presents an interesting patern. While estradiol is uncorrelated with these variables, psychological distance is significantly correlated with warmth, strength, and desire for interpersonal contact. This diverges from findings on mean offer and minimum goal, which are jointly predicted by estradiol and psychological distance (and uncorrelated with either 31 in isolation). Furthermore, psychological distance is uncorrelated with these variables in the female opponent condition. The fact that these variables are influenced by diferent predictors in the male and female opponent conditions implies that negotiation anxiety, opponent warmth, and opponent strength are diferentialy related to perceptions of men and women. For example, strength is characteristic typicaly asociated with men but not women, while warmth is a construct typicaly asociated with women but not men. In addition, these findings may indicate that negotiators give priority to diferent types of information when negotiating with men and women. While compeling results emerged for several variables, many predicted results did not materialize. One possibility is that certain constructs are more sensitive to biosocial influences, while others are les sensitive. Another possibility is that some of the measures employed were not sensitive enough to pick up on subtle changes. An additional possibility concerns the smal sample size and acompanying smal power to detect diferences in the current study. Limitations The current study faces various limitations. One limitation is the smal sample size. Due to the stringent eligibility criteria for the current study, only approximately 19% of undergraduate psychology students were eligible to participate (as calculated by responses to a batery of tests administered at the beginning of each semester). Once a participant was deemed eligible (and expresed an interest in participation), scheduling presented additional obstacles. Participants in the ovulation condition were asked to come to the lab on day 14 of their cycle. If a participant was unable to 32 come on that day (or if that day fel on a Saturday or a Sunday), the participant needed to be rescheduled for the following month. Scheduling participants in the menstruation condition proved more manageable, as participants could come in betwen days 1 and 5. In addition, sporadic aces to the freezer in which saliva samples were stored contributed to the smal sample size. Ocasionaly, experimenters could not gain aces to the freezer to store the samples, thereby resulting in the exclusion of these participants. Finaly, although extensive measures were taken to increase the believability of the study, a few participants were excluded on grounds of suspicion. Another limitation concerns the use of estradiol to predict menstrual cycle phase. Although this method is used (e.g., Gramer, Renninger, & Fischer, 2004) some literature suggests that intra- and inter-individual variations in estradiol compromise the acuracy of this technique (e.g., Aliende, 2002). A beter approach would be to collect estradiol samples at multiple points through multiple cycles, which would provide information regarding individuals? basal levels of estradiol, ultimately resulting in greater acuracy. In addition, analyzing additional hormones (such as luteinizing hormone, which reliably predicts the onset of ovulation) could also result in a more acurate asesment of menstrual cycle phase. It should be noted that participant self-reported cycle data was not used in the current study due to a low (approximately 40%) agreement rate betwen cycle dates provided during eligibility screening and in lab. An additional concern is the possibility of participants either 1) beginning to taking hormonal birth control or 2) becoming pregnant betwen completing the 33 eligibility survey and participating in the study. In some cases, eligibility was asesed as long as three months prior to participation, but was not subsequently asesed in lab. Furthermore, although participants were instructed to avoid certain activities (e.g. eating a major meal within an hour of participation), they were not asked if they complied with these instructions, which may have compromised the acuracy of the salivary asays. A final factor that may have afected participant responses, but was not measured, is participant sexual orientation. It sems likely that sexual orientation would influence an individual?s desire to atract versus compete with a male or female opponent, which could have afected the results of the current study. One final limitation concerns the good genes hypothesis, which provides a substantial theoretical base for the current study. Despite the preponderance of studies supporting the good genes hypothesis, it is important to note that it remains controversial (Houle & Kondrashov, 2002). For example, some studies have found that the good genes hypothesis holds for some, but not al, populations within a species (e.g. birds in the tit family; Akcay & Roughgarden, 2007; Roughgarden, 2009). Other recent studies have failed to replicate previous findings, such as a diferential preference for masculine and symmetrical male faces and bodies across the menstrual cycle (Peters, Simons, & Rhodes; 2009), while other work has criticized the good genes hypothesis on theoretical grounds (Kirkpatrick, 1996; Kirkpatrick & Barton, 1997). Implications 34 The findings of this work are potentialy controversial in that some may jump to the conclusion that hormones override an individual?s ability to objectively consider al aspects of a negotiation situation. This is especialy dangerous when one considers that our examination is limited to women, who are already at a general disadvantage when negotiating (e.g., Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005; Curhan, Neale, Ross, & Rosencranz,-Engelmann, 2008; Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002) and in other organizational contexts (e.g. leadership, Bowles & McGinn, 2005; networking, Ibarra, 1993). The finding that women high in estradiol concede to men perceived as close could be damaging to women both within and beyond organizations. However, this work is not evidence that women behave solely on the basis of distal reproductive presures, failing to take into acount objective aspects of the situation; rather, this work indicates that biological and social factors predispose individuals to certain paterns of behavior. An awarenes of these behavioral predispositions can be imensely helpful to negotiators by enabling them to either correct for or continue these paterns of behavior, depending on their goal. Let?s take the example of a female vendor who needs to come to an agreement with a female purchaser. If the vendor knows that she is predisposed to be especialy competitive during ovulation, she can reign in these competitive tendencies in order to reach agreement. Similarly, if the vendor were to negotiate with a male purchaser, she would know that perhaps she should negotiate more aggresively than she is naturaly inclined in order to reach an optimal agreement. In sum, the knowledge of how biological and social factors afect negotiation dynamics can empower negotiators rather than impair them. 35 Furthermore, the diferences betwen the seting and sample of the current study and the real-world negotiation context should be taken into consideration. The current study was a one-time event conducted with female undergraduate students. Unlike real-world negotiators, participants did not have to consider the long-term efects of their negotiation behavior, nor did they have much to lose or gain in the negotiation simulation. It may be the case that negotiators who have more on the table are les sensitive to biological factors and more sensitive to other situational presures. The findings regarding psychological distance speak to the contingency of biosocial efects on extraneous variables. While biosocial factors may exert a considerable influence in some negotiation situations, they may be overridden in others. Identifying these situations is a logical next step. The current work also helps to iluminate to shed light on the gender and negotiation literature. Gender diferences have been demonstrated in negotiation styles, strategies, and tactics (Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005), goals and expectations (Stevens, Baveta, & Gist, 1993), and emotions and atitudes (Bowles, Babock, & Lai, 2007; Kray & Gelfand, 2009; Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001; Smal et al., 2007), among others. Nonetheles, the literature remains largely inconsistent as several studies report gender diferences in negotiation, while others report opposite findings, and stil others report no diferences at al betwen men and women (Rubin & Brown, 1975; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Thompson, 1990). Furthermore, when gender diferences are demonstrated, efect sizes tend to be smal and there tends to be large variability across studies (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). The examination of biological and social variables into future gender and negotiation 36 research may help to explain discrepant findings given the diferences in women?s negotiation behavior as a function of menstrual cycle phase and social factors. Future Research The present study also provides several forays for future research. The identification of psychological distance as a moderator of negotiation behavior has implications for other studies examining negotiation and asociated phenomena. The fact that diferences in behavior emerged only under conditions of low psychological distance suggest that psychological distance is a crucial factor to measure, especialy when using virtual paradigms, which arguably facilitate greater psychological distance betwen opponents than do face-to-face paradigms. Furthermore, psychological distance as a construct itself presents several avenues for future research. While some work has examined negotiations betwen friends and strangers (Fry, Firestone, & Wiliams, 1983; Thompson & DeHarpport, 1998; Thompson, Peterson, & Brodt, 1996), there remains litle work examining the broader role of psychological distance betwen negotiators. In addition, other hormones that may exert an influence on constructs relevant to organizational behavior should be examined. One possibility is testosterone, a hormone that has already been linked to organizational constructs like job type (Dabbs & Morris, 1990) and entrepreneurship (White, Thornhil, & Hampson, 2006). Given the strength of the link betwen testosterone and aggresion, it is an important hormone to examine in the negotiation context. For example, it is likely the case that men with higher testosterone levels negotiate more aggresively. Another potential avenue concerns pregnancy hormones (e.g. progesterone, prolactin). Given the 37 substantial hormonal fluctuations that acompany pregnancy, it would be fascinating to se what kinds of workplace behaviors this afects, especialy given the fact that increasing numbers of women continue to work wel into their third trimester. For example, pregnant women might be especialy protective of resources given the evolutionary importance of providing resources for offspring. It is therefore possible that pregnant women may negotiate more aggresively than non-pregnant women. Conclusion The current study represents the first atempt to advance a biosocial model of negotiation. Furthermore, it represents an important step for the organizational sciences as one of few studies to examine biology as a central favor in organizational decision-making. Hopefully, this work wil spark an interest in a broader integration of disciplines such as the evolutionary and biological sciences into organizational theory, research, and practice, as this interdisciplinary approach can lead to a more comprehensive understanding of existing phenomena as wel promising new directions. 38 Appendices Appendix A Negotiation Instructions Provided to Participants. A solid line below a paragraph indicates that the following section appears on a new scren. In this part of the experiment, we are interested in looking at behavior during negotiation betwen individuals who have asymmetrical amounts of information about each other. That is, while one person knows various facts about the other player, the other player doesn?t have any information. You are about to negotiate virtualy with another participant about the terms and conditions of the sale of a consignment of mobile phones. First, you wil receive instructions regarding the negotiation and wil be asked to answer some questions. _____________________________________________________________________ In the upcoming negotiation, you wil act as the seler of a consignment of mobile phones. The other participant wil act as the buyer. You wil communicate via the computer. The negotiation revolves around three isues: the price of the phones, the warranty period, and the duration of the service contract. As a seler, you wish to obtain the highest possible price for the phones. Further, you are interested in making a deal that involves the shortest possible warranty period and service contract. There are nine possible levels of agreement for each isue. You have to agree on one of these levels for each isues. As we wil explain over the next pages, the beter your deal, the more points you earn. If you do not reach an agreement, you receive no points. On the next page, you wil se a payoff table displaying how many point you receive for each level of agreement on the three isues under negotiation. [Payoff Chart- Se Table 1] Here you se a payoff table which shows how many points you wil receive for a given agreement. Your goal is to reach an agreement on three isues: the price of the phone, the warranty period, and the service package. There are 9 possible levels of agreement for each isue. The first column shows the payoffs for the price of the phones for each of the 9 levels of agrement. The second and third columns show the payoffs for warranty and service. For each isue, level 1 is more favorable to you than 2, 2 is more favorable than 3, and so forth. Level 9 is the most unfavorable option for you because it does not give you any points at al. 39 As you can se, for you agreement 1-1-1 yields the highest payoff, namely 400+120+240= 760 points, Pres ?ENTER? to continue Agreement 9-9-9 yields the lowest payoff, namely 0+0+0=0 points. Pres ?ENTER? to continue Your goal is to reach an agreement. You can propose any combination of numbers, for example: Your offer for price: 1 (meaning you ask 150 dollars per phone and get 400 points) Your offer for warranty: 2 (meaning you offer 2 months warranty and get 105 points) Your offer for service: 3 (meaning you offer 3 months service and get 180 points) Kep in mind! The payoff table of the buyer looks diferent! On level 1-1-1, where you get the highest payoff, the buyer gets nothing. One level 9-9-9, where you get nothing, the buyer gets the highest payoff. Your goal is to earn as many points as possible. The more points you earn, the beter. However, you should try to reach an agreement. The computer wil now randomly decide who receives information and who doesn?t. Please wait a moment. The computer has decided that you wil receive information about the other participant, (but they wil not receive any information about you). Please notify the experimenter. [Experimenter enters, presents picture and hobbies of ?other participant?. Participant completes measures of opponent perceptions, self-presentation concerns, psychological distance, negotiation heuristics, and goals). [Negotiation task resumes] Summary - In the upcoming negotiation you wil act as the seler of a consignment of mobile phones. - Your job is reach an agreement with the buyer about the price of the phones, the warranty period, and the service package. - Your goal is to earn as many points as possible. - On level 1-1-1, where you get the highest payoff, the buyer gets zero points. On level, 9-9-9, where you get zero points, the buyer gets the highest payoff. - If you do not reach an agreement you get zero points. 40 The computer has determined that the buyer wil make the first offer. You wil receive this offer shortly and you wil then be asked to make a counteroffer. The buyer wil then in turn react with a counteroffer, etc. This procedure wil go on until you reach an agreement or time runs out. [Payoff Chart] As soon as the buyer has made the first offer, this wil appear on your screen. Please wait? The buyer offers 8-7-8 Please enter your offer for price (1-9): Please enter your offer for warranty (1-9): Please enter your offer for service (1-9): Enter your offer and pres ?ENTER? to continue Your offer has been sent to the buyer. We are now waiting for the buyer?s counteroffer. As soon as they make an offer, it wil appear on your screen. [6 rounds total of negotiation] END OF EXPERIMENT 41 Appendix B. Measures 1. Eligibility Questionnaire Please indicate your gender: F M E-mail addres: ____________________________________ How old are you? _______ Are you currently pregnant? Y N Are you taking any kind of hormonal birth control (the pil, the patch, the shot, etc.)? If you are not currently taking hormonal birth control, have you within the last three months? Is your menstrual cycle usualy regular? (occurs every 26-35 days) When was the first day of your last menstrual period? Month: Day: How confident are you in your answer to the above question regarding when was the first day of your last menstrual period? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very 42 2. Perceptions of Negotiation Opponent We are interested in your perceptions of the other participant. Please use the scales below to indicate your answers to the following questions. Please note that this information wil not be sen by the other participant. How inteligent do you think the other participant is? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very How atractive do you think the other participant is? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very How kind do you think the other participant is? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very How strong do you think the other participant is? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very How competitive do you think the other participant is? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very How masculine do you think the other participant is? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very How feminine do you think the other participant is? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very How powerful do you think the other participant is? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very How aggresive do you think the other participant is? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very How friendly do you think the other participant is? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very 43 How warm do you think the other participant is? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very How weak do you think the other participant is? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very 44 3. Desire for Interpersonal Contact How much do you think you would enjoy talking to the other participant outside of class? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very How much do you think you would enjoy talking to other participant at a party? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very How much do you think you would like to go to dinner with the other participant? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very 45 4. Self-Presentation Concerns How important to you is it that the other participant perceives you as?? Please note that the other participant wil not se your answers. Kind 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very Aggresive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very Competitive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very Atractive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very Warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very Easygoing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very Strong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at all Somewhat Very Understanding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at al Somewhat Very 46 5. Psychological Distance (Reverse Scored) We are interested in your felings of closenes toward the other participant. Please think about a person that you fel the closest to in your life and asign a +5 to that person. Then, using this as a reference point, please how close you fel to the other participant on the following scale. -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 someone someone someone you intensely you fel you are dislike neutral closest to 47 6. Negotiation Goals What is the MINIMUM POINT VALUE that you are wiling to acept in the negotiation? _____ (please indicate the lowest number of points you are wiling to acept). 48 7. Demographic Questions Relationship status (circle one): Single In a Relationship Age: _____ years Race: _______________ When was the first day of your last menstrual cycle? ____________________________ 49 Tables Table 1 Participant Payoff Chart. Participant Payoff Chart Price of phones Warranty period Service contract Level Price ($) Payoff Warranty Payoff Service Payoff 1 150 400 1 month 120 1 month 240 2 145 350 2 months 105 2 months 210 3 140 300 3 months 90 3 months 180 4 135 250 4 months 75 4 months 150 5 130 200 5 months 60 5 months 120 6 125 150 6 months 45 6 months 90 7 120 100 7 months 30 7 months 60 8 115 50 8 months 15 8 months 30 9 110 0 9 months 0 9 months 0 50 Table 2 Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlations for Measures Note. N = 46. Internal reliability coeficients (alphas) appear in bold along the diagonal. Opponent gender is coded as 0 (females) and 1 (males). * p<.10. ** p<.05. *** p<.01. 51 Table 3 Opponent Gender Main Efects Variable Gen. Opp N Mean SD T Estradiol Female 22 3.638 2.298 0.711 Male 24 3.185 2.014 Psyc. Dist Female 22 -0.136 0.560 -1.638 Male 24 0.458 1.615 Opp. Strength Female 22 4.046 0.717 -9.784** Male 24 5.779 0.469 Opp. Warmth Female 22 4.030 0.997 -0.928 Male 24 4.278 0.809 Des. Contact Female 22 3.523 0.777 -1.527 Male 24 4.042 1.408 Cooperate Female 22 3.921 0.904 -0.706 Male 24 4.083 0.650 Compete Female 22 4.379 0.692 -0.503 Male 24 4.486 0.748 Anxiety Female 21 3.414 1.324 -1.622 Male 24 3.996 1.080 Self Warmth Female 22 5.057 1.069 -2.587* Male 24 5.771 0.794 Self Strength Female 22 4.318 1.270 0.478 Male 24 4.167 0.857 Offer Female 22 4.038 1.075 -0.348 Male 24 4.167 1.398 Minimum Female 22 372.727 99.160 -0.074 Male 24 375.208 124.512 Note. Degrees of freedom for T-tests is 44. * p< .05 **p<.01 52 Table 4 Summary of Regresion Analyses for Thre-Way Interaction between Gender, Psychological Distance, and Estradiol Predicting Dependent Variables. Variable B SE B ? T p f 2 Offer -0.825 0.388 -2.536 -2.125 0.04 0.119 Minimum Goal 86.233 34.055 2.945 2.532 0.016 0.169 Anxiety -0.974 0.482 -3.077 -2.021 0.051 0.11 Opponent Warmth -0.506 0.276 4.482 -1.832 0.075 0.088 Opponent Strength -0.555 0.182 -2.003 -3.048 0.004 0.245 Desired Contact -0.625 0.352 4.277 -1.775 0.084 0.038 Note. N=46. 53 Table 5 Summary of Slopes and Regresion Analyses for Psychological Distance Predicting Various Dependent Variables Moderated by High and Low Levels of Estradiol for Male and Female Opponent Conditions. Variable ? SE B df T p Offer Female Estradiol Low -1.245 0.704 18 -1.768 0.094 Estradiol High 0.190 0.254 18 0.747 0.464 Interaction 0.599 0.332 18 1.804 0.088 Male Estradiol Low 0.279 0.262 20 1.065 0.300 Estradiol High -0.771 0.340 20 -2.268 0.035 Interaction -.226 0.097 20 -2.334 0.030 Minimum Goal Female Estradiol Low 1.349 0.601 18 2.243 0.038 Estradiol High -0.436 0.217 18 -2.008 0.060 Interaction -68.747 26.172 18 -2.627 0.017 Male Estradiol Low -0.345 0.272 20 -1.271 0.218 Estradiol High 0.568 0.353 20 1.608 0.124 Interaction 17.486 8.945 20 1.955 0.065 Anxiety Female Estradiol Low -1.829 0.946 18 -1.934 0.070 Estradiol High 0.049 0.259 18 0.191 0.851 Interaction 0.966 0.507 18 1.906 0.074 Male Estradiol Low -0.170 0.292 20 -0.581 0.568 Estradiol High -0.214 0.380 20 -0.564 0.579 Interaction -.007 0.03 20 -0.088 0.930 Opponent Warmth Female Estradiol Low -1.314 0.664 18 -1.980 0.063 Estradiol High -0.005 0.240 18 -0.021 0.983 Interaction 0.507 0.290 18 1.746 0.098 Male Estradiol Low -0.418 0.271 20 -1.543 0.139 Estradiol High -0.412 0.352 20 -1.171 0.255 Interaction .001 0.058 20 0.013 0.990 54 DV B SE Df T p Opponent Strength Female Estradiol Low -1.566 0.659 18 -2.377 0.029 Estradiol High 0.338 0.238 18 1.422 0.172 Interaction 0.530 0.207 18 2.558 0.020 Male Estradiol Low -0.226 0.272 20 -0.466 0.417 Estradiol High -0.565 0.354 20 -1.595 0.126 Interaction -.024 0.034 20 0.724 0.477 Desired Contact Female Estradiol Low -1.368 0.644 18 -2.124 0.048 Estradiol High 0.521 0.233 18 2.240 0.038 Interaction 0.570 0.220 18 2.595 0.018 Male Estradiol Low -0.314 0.266 20 -1.183 0.251 Estradiol High 0.570 0.345 20 -1.650 0.115 Interaction -.055 0.099 20 -0.559 0.582 55 Figures Figure 1 Graph ilustrating hormone changes across days of the menstrual cycle (http://cindilamb.com/images/MenstrualCycle2.jpg). 56 Figure 2 Figure of hypothesized gender by estradiol interaction 57 Figure 3 Picture of male negotiation opponent. 58 Figure 4 Picture of female negotiation opponent. 59 Figure 5 Screnshot of Negotiation Simulation. 60 Figure 6 Graph Depicting Mean Negotiation Ofers Made to Male Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. Note. Lower offers indicate more competitive behavior. Figure 7 Graph Depicting Mean Negotiation Ofers Made to Female Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. Note. Lower offers indicate more competitive behavior. 61 Figure 8 Graph Depicting Minimum Goal Point Specified with Male Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. Note. Higher point goals indicate more competitive behavior. Figure 9 Graph Depicting Minimum Point Goal Specified with Female Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. Note. Higher point goals indicate more competitive behavior. 62 Figure 10 Graph Depicting Anxiety Toward Negotiating with Male Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. Figure 11 Graph Depicting Anxiety Toward Negotiating with Female Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. 63 Figure 12 Graph Depicting Perceptions of Opponent Warmth for Male Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. Figure 13 Graph Depicting Perceptions of Opponent Warmth Made to Female Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. 64 Figure 14 Graph Depicting Perceptions of Opponent Strength for Male Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. Figure 15 Graph Depicting Perceptions of Opponent Strength Made to Female Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. 65 Figure 16 Graph Depicting Desired Contact with Male Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. Figure 17 Graph Depicting Desired Contact with Female Opponents as a Function of Estradiol and Psychological Distance. 66 References Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regresion: Testing and interpreting interactions. Newbury Park, London, Sage. Akcay, E. & Roughgarden, J. (2007). Extra-pair paternity in birds: Review of the genetic benefits. Evolutionary Ecology Research, 9, 855-868. Aliende, M. E. (2002). Mean versus individual hormonal profiles in the menstrual cycle. Fertility and Sterility, 78, 90-95. Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science, 211, 1390 ? 1396. Barry, B., & Oliver, R. L. (1996). Afect in dyadic negotiation: A model and propositions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Proceses, 67, 127-143. Bazerman, M. H., Magliozzi, T., & Neale, M. A. (1985). Integrative bargaining in a competitive market. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Proceses, 35, 294-313. Bem, S. (1974). The measurement of psychological androgyny. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 42, 155-162. Bem, S. L. & Lenney, E. (1976). Sex typing and the avoidance of cross-sex behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33, 48-54. Bogardus, E. S. (1947). Measurement of personal-group relations. Sociometry, 10, 306?331. 67 Bouchard, T. J. (1999). Genes, environment, and personality. In Stephen J. Ceci & Wendy M. Wiliams (Eds.). The nature-nurture debate. Malden, MA: Blackwel Publishers, Inc. Bowles, H. R. Babcock, L. & Lai, L. (2007) Social incentives for gender diferences in the propensity to initiate negotiations: Sometimes it does hurt to ask. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Proceses, 103?84-103. Bowles, H. R., & McGinn, K. L. (2005). Claiming authority: Negotiating chalenges for women leaders. In D. M. Mesick & R. Moreland (Eds.), The psychology of leadership: New perspectives and research (pp. 191-208). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Asociates, Inc. Bowles, H. R., Babcock, L., & McGinn, K. L. (2005). Constraints and triggers: situational mechanics of gender in negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 951-965. Brinsmead-Stockham, K., Johnston, L., Miles, L. & Macrae, C. N. (2008). Female sexual orientation and menstrual influences on person perception. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 729-734. Broder, A. & Hohmann, N. (2003) Variations in risk taking behavior over the menstrual cycle: An improved replication. Evolution and Human Behavior, 24, 391-398. Browne, K. R. (2006). Evolved sex diferences and occupational segregation. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 27, 143-162. Bullivant, S. B., Slergren, S. A., Stern, K., Spencer, N. A., Jacob, S., Mennela, J. A., & McClintock, M. K. (2004). Women?s sexual experience during the 68 menstrual cycle: Identification of the sexual phase by noninvasive measurement of luteinizing hormone. The Journal of Sex Research, 41, 82- 93. Buss, D. (1995). Evolutionary psychology: a new paradigm for psychological science. Psychological Inquiry, 6, 1-30. Buss, D. M. (2004). Evolutionary psychology. In Gregory, R. (Ed.). The Oxford Companion to the Mind. London: Oxford University Pres. Buss, D. M., Larsen, R. J., Westen, D., & Semelroth, J. (1992). Sex diferences in jealousy: Evolution, physiology, and psychology. Psychological Science, 3, 251-255. Buss, D. M., Shackelford, T. K., Kirkpatrick, L. A., Choe, J. C., Lim, H. K, Hasegawa, M., Hasegawa, T., & Bennet, K., (1999). Jealousy and the nature of beliefs about infidelity: Tests of competing hypotheses about sex diferences in the United States, Korea, and Japan. Personal Relationships, 6, 121-150. Carnevale, P. J., O'Connor, K. M., & McCusker, C. (1993). Time presure in negotiation and mediation. In A. F. Stuhlmacher, T. L. Gilespie, & M. V. Champagne, M. V. (1998). The impact of time presure in negotiation: A meta-analysis. International Journal of Conflict Management, 9, 97-116. Cashdan, E. (1995). Hormones, sex, and status in women. Hormones and Behavior, 29, 354-366. Cashdan, E. (2003). Hormones and competitive aggresion in women. Aggresive Behavior, 29, 107-115 69 Chen, Y., Katuscak, P., and Ozdenoren, E. (2005). Why Can't a Woman Bid More Like a Man? CERGE-EI Working Paper No. 275. Available at SSRN: http:/srn. com/abstract=881748 Cialdini, R. B., Borden, R., Thorne, A., Walker, M. R, Freeman, S., & Sloan, L. R. (1976). Basking in reflected glory: Three (footbal) field studies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 366-37 Clark, M. L. (1983). Efect of confederate?s sex and status on competitive behavior of male and female college students. The Journal of Psychology, 113, 191?198. Colareli, S. M. (1998). Psychological interventions in organizations: an evolutionary perspective. American Psychologist, 53, 1044-1056. Colareli, S. M., Spranger, J. L., & Hechanova, M. R. (2006). Women, power, and sex composition in smal groups: An evolutionary perspective. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 27, 163-184. Cramer, R. E., Lipinski, R. E., Meter, J. D., & Houska, J. A. (2008). Sex diferences in subjective distres to unfaithfulnes: Testing competing evolutionary and violation of infidelity expectations hypotheses. The Journal of Social Psychology, 148, 389-405. Dabbs, J. M. & Morris, R. (1996). Testosterone social clas, and antisocial behavior in a sample of 4,462 men. Psychological Science, 1, 209-211. Daft, R. L. & Lengel, R. H. (1984). Information richnes: a new approach to managerial behavior and organizational design. In: Cummings, L. L. & Staw, B. M. (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior 6, 191-233. Homewood, IL: JAI Pres. 70 Dawson, J. F., & Richter, A. W. (2006). Probing three-way interactions in moderated multiple regresion: Development and application of a slope diference test. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91, 917-926. De Dreu, C. K. W. (2004). Motivation in negotiation: A social psychological analysis. In M. J. Gelfand & J. M. Bret (Eds.), Handbook of negotiation and culture (pp. 114 ? 135). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Pres. De Dreu, C. K. W., & Boles, T. L. (1998). Share and share alike or winner take al?: The influence of social value orientation upon choice and recal of negotiation heuristics. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Proceses, 76, 253- 276. De Dreu, C. K. W., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (1995). The impact of social value orientations on negotiator cognition and behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 1178-1188. Durante, K. M., Li, N. P., & Haselton, M. G. (2008). Changes in women?s choice of dres across the ovulatory cycle: Naturalistic and laboratory task-based evidence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 1451-1460. Eagly, A. H. (1987). Sex diferences in social behavior: A social-role interpretation. Hilsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Feinberg, D. R., Jones, B. C., Law Smith, M. J., Moore, F. R., DeBruine, L. M., Cornwel, R. E., Hilier, S. G., & Perret, D. I. (2006). Menstrual cycle, trait estrogen level, and masculinity preferences in the human voice. Hormones and Behavior, 29, 214-222. 71 Fisher, M. L. (2004) Female intrasexual competition decreases female facial atractivenes. Procedings of the Royal Society of London, 271, S283-S295. Fisher, RA (1930). The genetical theory of natural selection. New York, NY: Oxford University Pres. Friedrich, R. (1982). In defense of multiplicative terms in multiple regresion equations. American Journal of Political Science, 26, 797?833. Fry, W. R., Firestone, I. J., & Wiliams, D. L. (1983). Negotiation proces and outcome of stranger dyads and dating couples: Do lovers lose? Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 4, 1-16. Gandelman, R., & Simon, N. G. (1980). Postpartum fighting in the rat: Nipple development and the presence of young. Behavioral and Neural Biology, 28, 350-360. Gangestad, S. W. & Cousins, A. J. (2001). Adaptive design, female mate preferences, and shifts across the menstrual cycle. Annual Review of Sex Research, 12,145- 85. Gangestad, S. W., Garver-Apgar, C. E., Simpson, J. A., & Cousins, A. J. (2007). Changes in women?s mate preferences across the ovulatory cycle. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 151-163. Gangestad, S. W., Thornhil, R., & Garver-Apgar, C. (2005). Adaptations of ovulation: Implications for sexual and social behavior. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14, 312-316. 72 Gangestad, S. W., Thornhil, R., & Garver, C. (2002). Changes in women?s sexual interests and their partners? mate-retention tactics across the menstrual cycle: Evidence for shifting conflicts of interests. Proc. R. Soc. Lond., 269, 975-982. Gelfand, M. J. & Realo, A. (1999). Individualism-collectivism and acountability in intergroup negotiations. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 721-736 Gelfand, M. J., & Bret, J. M. (2004), Handbook of Negotiation and Culture. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Pres. Gelfand, M.J., Fulmer, A. F. & Severance. L. E. (forthcoming). The psychology of negotiation. In S. Zedeck (Ed.), The handbook of industrial and organizational psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Asociation. Gramer, K., Renninger, L., & Fischer, B. (2004). Disco clothing, female sexual motivation, and relationship status: Is she dresed to impres? Journal of Sex Research, 41, 66-74. Grifith, C. E. (1991). Personality and gender as factors in interpersonal negotiation. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 6, 915?928. Gu?gen, N. (2009). Menstrual cycle phases and female receptivity to a courtship solicitation: an evaluation in a nightclub. Evolution and Human Behavior, 30, 351-355. Gu?guen, N. (2009). Menstrual cycle phases and female receptivity to a courtship solicitation: an evaluation in a nightclub. Evolution and Human Behavior, 30, 351-355. 73 Haferkamp, C. J. (1991?1992). Orientations to conflict: Gender, atributions, resolution strategies, and self-monitoring. Current Psychology: Research and Reviews, 10, 227?240. Hantula, D. (2003). Evolutionary psychology and consumption. Psychology and Marketing, 20, 757-763. Haselton, M. G. & Gangestad, S. W. (2006). Conditional expresion of women?s desire and men?s mate guarding across the ovulatory cycle. Hormones and Behavior, 49, 509-518. Haselton, M. G., Mortezaie, M., Pilsworth, E. G., Bleske-Rechek, A., Frederick, D. A. (2007). Ovulatory shits in human female orientation: Near ovulation, women dres to impres. Hormones and Behavior, 51, 40-45. Havl??ek, J., Dvo??kov?, R., Barto?, L., & Flegr, J. (2006) Non-advertized does not mean concealed: Body odour changes across the human menstrual cycle. Ethology 112, 81?90. Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley. Hilty, J. A., & Carnevale, P. J. (1992). Black-hat/white-hat strategy in bilateral negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Proceses, 55, 444-469. Houle, D., & Kondrashov, A. S. (2002). Coevolution of costly mate choice and condition-dependent display of good genes. Proceding to the Royal Society of London, 269, 97-104. Ibarra, H. (1993). Personal networks of women and minorities in management: A conceptual framework. Academy of Management Review, 18, 56-87. 74 Ilies, R., Arvey, R. D., & Bouchard, T. J. (2006). Darwinism, behavioral genetics, and organizational behavior: a review and agenda for future search. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 27, 121-141. Jasienska, G., Lipson, S. F., Elison, P. T., Thune, E., & Ziomkiewicz, A. (2006). Symmetrical women have higher potential fertility. Evolution and Human Behavior, 27, 390-400. Johnston, L., Arden, K., Macrae, C. N., & Grace, R. C. (2003). The need for speed: The menstrual cycle and person construal. Social Cognition, 21, 89-100. Karakowsky, L., & Miler, D. L. (2006). Negotiator style and influence in multi-party negotiations: exploring the role of gender. Leadership & Organizational Development Journal, 27, 50-65. Kirkpatrick, M. & Barton, N. H. 1997 The strength of indirect selection on female mating preferences. Procedings of the National Academy of Science, 94, 1282-1286. Kirkpatrick, M. 1996 Good genes and direct selection in the evolution of mating preferences. Evolution 50, 2125-2140. Kray, K. L., Reb, J., Galinsky, A. D., & Thompson, L. (2004). Stereotype reactance at the bargaining table: The efect of stereotype activation and power on claiming and creating value. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 399-411. Kray, L. J., & Gelfand, M. (2009). Relief versus regret: The impact of gender and negotiating norm ambiguity on reactions to having one?s first offer acepted. Social Cognition, 27, 418-436. 75 Kray, L. J., Galinsky, A. D., & Thompson, L. (2002). Reversing the gender gap in negotiations: An exploration of stereotype regeneration. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Proceses, 87, 386-410. Kyl-Heku, L. M., & Buss, D. M. (1996). Tactics as units of analysis in personality psychology: An ilustration using tactics of hierarchy negotiation. Personality and Individual Diferences, 21, 497?517. Lieberson, S., & Bel, E. O. (1992). Children's first names: an empirical study of social taste. American Journal of Sociology, 98, 511-554. Lowe, P. (2008). Juliet Nierenberg on woman and the art of negotiation. The Negotiation Institute. Retrieved December 3, 2008. Lucas, M. M., Koff, E., & Skeath, S. (2007). Pilot study of relationship betwen fertility risk and bargaining. Psychological Reports, 101, 302-310. Macrae, C. N., Alnwick, K. A., Milne, A. B., & Schloerscheidt, A. M. (2002). Person perception across the menstrual cycle: Hormonal influences on social- cognitive functioning. Psychological Science, 13, 532?536. Major, B., Vanderslice, V., & McFarlin, D. B. (1984). Efects of pay expected on pay received: The confirmatory nature of initial expectations. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 14, 399?412. Mannix, E. A., & Neale, M. A. (1993). Power imbalance and the patern of exchange in dyadic negotiation. Group Decision and Negotiation, 2, 119?133. Markoczy, L. & Goldberg, J. (1998). Management, organization and human nature: an introduction. Managerial & Decision Economics, 19, 387-409. 76 Mayer, A. D., & Rosenblat, J. S. (1987). Hormonal factors influence the onset of maternal aggresion in laboratory rats. Hormones and Behavior, 21, 253-267. Mayer, A. D., Monroy, M. A., & Rosenblat, J. S. (1990). Prolong estrogen- progesterone treatment of non-pregnant ovariectomized rats: Factors stimulating home-cage and maternal aggresion and short-latency maternal behavior. Hormones and Behavior, 24, 342-364. McGinn, K. L., & Croson, R. (Eds.) (2004). What do communication media mean for negotiators? A question of social awarenes. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Pres. Mead, L. A., & Hampson, E. (1997). Turning bias in humans is influenced by phase of the menstrual cycle. Hormones and Behavior, 31, 65-74. Michael, R. P., & Zumpe, D., (1993). A review of hormonal factors influencing the sexual and aggresive behavior of macaques. American Journal of Primatology, 30, 213?241. Navarrete, C. D., Fesler, D. M. T., Fleischman, D. S., and Geyer, J. (2009) Race bias tracks conception risk across the menstrual cycle. Psyc Neu, J., Graham, J. L., & Gily, M. C. (1988). The influence of gender on behaviors and outcomes in a retail buyer?seler negotiation simulation. Journal of Retailing, 64, 427?451. Nicholson, N. (1997). Evolutionary psychology: toward a new view of human nature and organizational society. Human Relations, 50, 1053?1078. Nicholson, N. (1997). Evolutionary psychology: Toward a new view of human nature and organizational society. Human Relations, 50, 1053-1079. 77 Nicholson, N. (2001). An evolutionary perspective on change and stability in personality, culture and organization. In Erez, M., Kleinbeck U., & Henk, T. (Eds). Work motivation in the context of a globalizing economy (pp. 381-394). US: Lawrence Erlbaum Asociates Publishers. Nicholson, N. (2010). The design of work- an evolutionary perspective. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 31, 422-431. Nicholson, N. & White, R. (2006). Darwinism- a new paradigm for organizational behavior? Journal of Organizational Behavior, 27, 111-119. Papa, M. J., & Natale, E. J. (1989). Gender, strategy selection, and discussion satisfaction in interpersonal conflict. Western Journal of Speech Communication, 53, 260?272. Peters, M., Simons, L. W., & Rhoades, G. (2009). Preferences across the menstrual cycle for asculinity and symmetry in photographs of male faces and bodies PLoS ONE, 4, e4138. Pierce, B. D., and White, R. (1999). The evolution of social structure: Why biology maters. Academy of Management Review, 24, 843-853. Pierce, B. D., and White, R. (2006). Resource context contestability and emergent social structure: An empirical investigation of an evolutionary theory. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 27, 221-239 Pilsworth, E. G., & Haselton, M. G. (2006). Male sexual atractivenes predicts diferential ovulatory shifts in female extra-pair atraction and male mate retention. Evolution and Human Behavior, 27, 247-258. 78 Pinkley, R. L., & Northcraft, G. B. (1994). Conflict frames of reference: Implications for dispute proceses and outcomes. Academy of Management Journal, 37(1), 193-205. Pleban, R., & Teser, A. (1981). The efects of relevance and quality of another?s performance on interpersonal closenes. Social Psychology Quarterly, 44, 278-285. Pritchard, R. D. (1969). Equity theory: A review and critique. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 4, 176-211. Rantala, M. J., Eriksson, C. J. P., Vainikka, A., & Kortet, R. (2006). Male steroid hormones and female preference for male body odor. Evolution and Human Behavior, 27, 259-269. Regan, P. C. (1996). Rhythms of desire: the asociation betwen menstrual cycle phases and female sexual desire. The Canadian Journal of Human Sexuality, 5, 145-156. Rose, S. & Frieze, I. H. (1993). Young singles' contemporary dating scripts. Sex Roles, 28, 499-509. Rosenblat, J. S., Hazelwood, S., & Poole, J. (1996). Maternal behavior iin male rats: Efects o fmedial preoptic area lesions and presence of material aggresion. Hormones and Behavior, 30, 201-215. Roughgarden, J. (2009). The Genial Gene: Deconstructing Darwinian Selfishnes. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Pres. Rubin, J. Z., & Brown, B. R. (1975). The social psychology of bargaining and negotiation. US: Academic Pres. 79 Rudman, L. & Glick, P. (1999). Feminized management and backlash toward agentic women: The hidden costs to women of a kinder, gentler image of middle managers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 1004-1010. Rudman, L. & Glick, P. (2004). Prescriptive gender stereotypes and backlash towards agentic women. Journal of Social Issues, 57, 743-762. Rudman, L. A. (1998). Self-promotion as a risk factor for women: The costs and benefits of counterstereotypical impresion management. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 629-645. Rudman, L. A. & Fairchild, K. (2004). Reactions to counterstereotypic behavior: The role of backlash in cultural stereotype maintenance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 157-176. Rutter, M. (2007). Gene-environment interdependence. Developmental Science, 10, 12-18. Salimetrics, LLC. (2007). Collecting unstimulated whole saliva samples by pasive drool from human subjects (ages 5+). Senior, C., Lau, A., & Butler, M. J. R. (2007). The efects of the menstrual cycle on social decision making. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 63, 186- 191. Sewel, G. (2004). Yabba-dabba-doo! Evolutionary psychology and the rise of Flintstone psychological thinking in organization and management studies. Human Relations, 57, 923-956. Shane, S. (2009. Introduction to the special isue on the biological basis of busines. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Proceses, 110, 67-69. 80 Shonkoff, J. P. & Philips, D. A. (2002). Rethinking nature and nurture. In J. P. Shonkoff & D. A. Wiliams (Eds.), From Neurons to Neighborhoods (pp. 39- 56). Washington, DC: National Academy Pres. Slater, A. & Feinman, S. (1985). Gender and the phonology of North American first names. Sex Roles, 13, 429-440. Smal, D., Gelfand, M. J., Babcock, L., & Getman, H. (2007). Who gets to the bargaining table: The influence of gender and framing on the propensity to initiate negotiations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 600- 613. Stanislaw, H. & Rice F. J. (1988). Correlation betwen sexual desire and menstrual cycle characteristics. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 17, 499-508. Stanton, S. J., & Edelstein, R. S. (2009). The physiology of women?s power motive: Implicit power motivation is positively asociated with estradiol levels in women. Journal of Research in Personality, 43, 1109-1113. Stanton, S. J., & Schultheis, O. C. (2007). Basal and dynamic relationships betwen implicit power motivation and estradiol in women. Hormones and Behavior, 52, 571-580. Stevens, C. K., Baveta, A. G., & Gist, M. E. (1993). Gender diferences in the acquisition of salary negotiation skils: The role of goals, self eficacy, and perceived control. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78, 723?735. Stuhlmacher, A. F., & Walters, A. E. (1999). Gender diferences in negotiation outcomes: A meta-analysis. Personel Psychology, 52, 653-677. 81 Sutter, M., Bosman, R., Kocher, M. & van Winden, F. (2006). Gender pairing and bargaining-- Beware the same sex! Working Paper. University of Innsbruck. Symonds, CS., Galagher, P., Thompson, J. M., & Young, A. H. (2004). Efects of the menstrual cycle on mood, neurocognitive and neuroendocrine function in healthy premenopausal women. Psychological Medicine, 34, 93-102. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of inter- group behavior. In S. Worchel & W Austin (Eds.), Psychology of inter- group relations (pp. 7- 24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall. Teser, A., & Campbel, J. (1982). Self-evaluation maintenance and the perception of friends and strangers. Journal of Personality, 50, 261 - 279. Thompson, L. (1990). Negotiation behavior and outcomes: Empirical evidence and theoretical isues. Psychological Bulletin, 108, 515-532. Thompson, L., & DeHarpport, T. (1998). Relationships, goals incompatibility and communal orientation in negotiations. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 20, 33-44. Thompson, L., Peterson, E. & Brodt, S. (1996). Team negotiation: An examination of integrative and distributive bargaining. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 70, 66-78. Thompson, L., Peterson, E., & Brodt, S. E. (1996). Team negotiation: An examination of integrative and distributive bargaining. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 66-78. Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2010). Construal-level theory of psychological distance. Psychological Review, 117, 440-463. 82 Van de Poll, N., van Zanten, S., & DeJone, F. H. (1986). Efects of testosterone, estrogen, and dihydrotestosterone upon aggresive and sexual behavior in female rats. Hormones and Behavior, 20, 418-431. Van Klef, G. A., & C?t?, S. (2007). Expresing anger in conflict: When it helps and when it hurts. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92(6), 1557-1569. Van Klef, G. A., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2008). What other's disappointment may do to selfish people: Emotion and social value orientation in a negotiation context. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 1084-1095. Van Klef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2004). The interpersonal efects of emotions in negotiations: A motivated information procesing approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 510-528. Van Klef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., Pietroni, D., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2006). Power and emotion in negotiation: Power moderates the interpersonal efects of anger and happines on concesion making. European Journal of Social Psychology, 36, 557-581. Wade-Benzoni, K. A., Hoffman, A. J., Thompson, L., Moore, D. A., Gilespie, J., & Bazerman, M. H. (2002). Barriers to resolution in ideologicaly based negotiations: The role of values and institutions. Academy of Management Review, 27, 41-57. Walton, R. E., & McKersie, R. B. (1965). A behavioral theory of labor negotiations. New York: McGraw-hil. 83 Webster, G. D. (2008). The kinship, aceptance, and rejection model of altruism and aggresion (KARMA): Implications for interpersonal and intergroup aggresion. Group Dynamics, 12, 27-38. White, R. E, Thornhil, S., Hampson, E. (2006). Entrepreneurs and evolutionary biology: The relationship betwen testosterone and new venture creation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Proceses, 100, 21-34. Zhang, Z., Ilies, R., & Arvey, R. D. (2009). Beyond genetic explanations of leadership: The moderating role of the social environment. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Proceses, 110, 118-128. Zumpe, D., & Michael, R. P. (1989). Female dominance rank and behavior during artificial menstrual cycles in social groups if rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulata). American Journal of Primatology, 17, 287?304.