ABSTRACT 
Title of Thesis: EVA LUA  TING DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATION IN 
VOLUNTARY RIPARIAN BUFFER PROGRAMS: A CASE STUDY 
OF MARYLAND'S BUFFER INCENTIVE PROGRAM 
Name of degree candidate: Patrick Thomas Hagan 
Degree and Year: Master of Science, 1996 
Thesis directed by: Professor Dennis M. King 
Marine, Estuarine, and Environmental Sciences Program 
Forest or grass buffers planted along streams or other waterbodies are receiving 
considerable attention by policy makers as a way of providing a range of environmental 
benefits for society, especially prevention of non-point source water pollution from 
agricultural land. The current emphasis of riparian buffer discussions focuses on 
voluntary rather than regulatory initiatives, both nationally and in the Chesapeake Bay 
region. 
This is not a project about the behavior of buffers; rather, it is about the behavior 
of people. Why would a landowner plant a riparian buffer on his land if he bears many of 
the costs, while the benefits might occur largely downstream? This project compares the 
decision-making process of a sample of landowners who are participating in Maryland's 
voluntary Buffer Incentive Program and a sample of farmers who are not in the program. 
More than 600 telephone interviews were conducted to gather original data about the 
landowners' demographic characteristics, their awareness of the riparian buffer concept, 
and the weight they gave to various economic and attitudinal factors during their riparian 
buffer adoption decision-making process. 
Water quality or other environmental benefits to the community, creation of fish 
and wildlife habitat, control of erosion, and the grant from the Buffer Incentive Program 
were the most important factors in the adoption decision for Buffer Incentive Program 
participants interviewed. Non-participating farmers cited most often erosion control, 
water quality or other environmental benefit to the community, compliance with current or 
future land use regulations, and the grant payment from the Buffer Incentive Program. 
EVALUATING DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATION IN VOLUNTARY 
RIPARIAN BUFFER PROGRAMS: A CASE STUDY OF MARYLAND'S 
BUFFER INCENTIVE PROGRAM 
by 
Patrick Thomas Hagan 
Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of The University of Maryland in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Science 
1996 
~. 
Advisory Committee: 
Professor Dennis M. King, Chairman/A dvisor 
Adjunct Professor Curtis M. Bohlen 
Adjunct Professor Russell Brinsfield 
Professor Ivar Strand 
c Copyright by 
Patrick Thomas Hagan 
1996 
PREFACE 
Gonna plant a weeping willow 
By the bank's green edge, it will grow, grow, grow 
Robert Hunter, "Brokedown Palace" 
ii 
DEDICATION 
To my parents 
ill 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Many people helped me develop this research project. Space precludes listing 
everyone who provided guidance, materials, and various types of support to me, but I 
would especially like to recognize the members of my faculty committee and of the 
Chesapeake Executive Council's Riparian Forest Buffer Technical Panel, notably Rick 
Cooksey, John Lipman, and Tom Simpson. Data collection and analysis would have been 
impossible without the support received from the following people. Don VanHassent of 
the Maryland Department of Natural Resources provided access to information about the 
Buffer Incentive Program, and 53 participants in the program provided valuable insights 
about their experience during telephone interviews with me. Erik Lichtenberg and Ivar 
Strand allowed me to use demographic data they had collected from a survey of a sample of 
farmers in Maryland on their use of best management practices. Bruce West, Harry 
DeLong, and their colleagues at the Maryland Agricultural Statistics Service went beyond 
the call of duty in carrying out a follow-up survey to these farmers with regard to riparian 
buffers. Their comments improved the quality of the survey instrument tremendously. 
More than 600 landowners or farm operators were interviewed for this project: Much of 
what I now know about the adoption of riparian buffers I learned from them. 
Finally, thanks to Jan Mazurek, Allen Blackman, and Tim Ward for their guidance 
on research and computer matters and for putting up with my frequent panic attacks. 
The people mentioned above share the credit for anything that is good about this 
project. As for anything that is incorrect in this thesis, as B.B. King once said, "It's my 
own fault, baby." 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Section 
List of Tables vii 
Introduction 1 
Chapter 
1: Background 4 
Policy Context for Riparian Buffers 4 
Potential Benefits of Riparian Buffers 9 
Potential Costs for Landowners 18 
Problem Statement 25 
2: Literature Review 27 
The Diffusion and Adoption of Innovations 28 
The Adoption of Agricultural Technologies 31 
The Adoption of Best Management Practices 33 
Determinants of Participation in Land Set-Aside Programs 35 
3: Analytical Framework: The Adoption Process 39 
4: General Approach 41 
Project Scope 41 
Narrowing the Scale of Investigation 41 
Maryland's Buffer Incentive Program 44 
Identification of Research Questions 46 
Stated Hypotheses 46 
Evaluation of Models and Analytical Techniques 48 
Design of the Survey Instrument 49 
Buffer Incentive Program Participants Interview Description 50 
Random Sample of Maryland Farm Operators Interview Description 51 
Survey Implementation 54 
Data Analysis 58 
5: Interpretation of Results 60 
Land Parcel Features 60 
Landowner Personal Characteristics 67 
Step One in the Adoption Process: Awareness 71 
Perceived Benefits, Perceived Costs, and Attitudinal Factors 77 
Attitudes About Longer-term Programs 94 
General Comments from Surveys 96 
6: Conclusions 98 
V 
Appendix 
1: Buffer Incentive Program Participant Survey Instrument 105 
2: Farm Operators Survey Instrument 113 
3: Letter of Introduction to Buffer Incentive Program Participants 118 
4: Explanation of Variable Codes 119 
5: T-tests 121 
6: Mann-Whitney U-Tests: Adoption, by Landowner and 
Land Parcel Characteristics 125 
7: Mann-Whitney U-Tests: Awareness, by Landowner Characteristics 127 
8: Mann-Whitney U-Tests: Perceived Costs and Benefits 129 
9: Spearman Correlation Coefficients 132 
References 165 
vi 
LIST OFTA BLES 
Table 
1. Riparian Buffer Cost Analysis (18.5 Acre Forest Buffer) 23 
2. Telephone Survey Disposition Table 57 
3. Weights for Sample of Maryland Farmers 58 
4. Perceived Riparian Land Ownership, by County 61 
5. Width of Stream or Body of Water, in Feet 62 
6. Previous Riparian Land Use 63 
7. Land Ownership, in Acres 64 
8 . Land Ownership by Property Size, in Acres 65 
9. Age of Landowners 67 
10. Educational Level of Landowners 68 
11. Gross Revenue from Farming 68 
12. Percent Net Income from Farming 69 
13. Awareness of the Concept of Riparian Buffers by Riparian Landowners 
not in the Buffer Incentive Program, by Educational Level, Age, and County 72 
14. Sources of Information About Riparian Buffers 73 
15. Aesthetic Factors 77 
16. Lost Agricultural Income from Land Along the Stream 78 
17. The Creation of Fish and Wildlife Habitat 79 
18. Erosion 80 
19. Possible Loss of Moisture to Adjacent Agricultural Fields 81 
20. Possible Increased Deer Population 82 
21. Water Quality and Other Environmental Benefits 
to the Landowner's Community 83 
22. Compliance with Current or Future Land Use Regulations 84 
23. The Time of Year That a Buffer Would Need to be Planted or Maintained 85 
Vll 
Table Page 
24. The Length of Time Needed for Planting and Maintenance 86 
25. Planting and Maintenance Time for Buffer Incentive Program Participants 88 
26. The Cost-share Payment from Maryland's Buffer Incentive Program 89 
27. Other Cost-share Programs or Technical Assistance, for Instance, 
to Purchase Seedlings 91 
28. Time Spent on the Application Process for Cost-share Funds 92 
29. Means of Responses to Perceived Cost and Benefit Questions 93 
30. Willingness to Accept Payment for Various Term 
Forest or Grass Buffer Programs 94 
viii 
INTRODUCTION 
Riparian buffers are receiving considerable attention by policy makers as a way of 
providing a range of environmental benefits for society, especially prevention of non-
point source water pollution from agricultural land. These buffers consist of trees, grass, 
or other vegetation planted in the riparian zone, defined as the land adjacent to streams or 
other waterbodies. Depending on the landscape or type of vegetation planted, riparian 
buffers can range from a few feet to more than 100 feet in width on one or both sides of 
the body of water. 
Both nationally and in the Chesapeake Bay region, riparian buffers are being 
examined for their potential for production of environmental functions, and of economic 
and social benefits derived from those functions that may or may not outweigh the costs. 
While many studies have focused on the potential environmental benefits of buffers, little 
attention has been paid to what factors may influence a landowner to put a riparian buffer 
on his or her land. These factors are particularly important in the case of agricultural land, 
because of its predominance as a nonpoint source of water pollution and because it may 
also provide some of the best opportunities for habitat and other environmental 
improvements. 
This is not a project about the behavior of buffers~ rather, it is about the behavior 
of people. Why would a landowner plant a riparian buffer on his or her land if he or she 
bears many of the costs, while the benefits might occur largely downstream? This project 
compares the decision-making process of a sample of landowners who are participating in 
Maryland's voluntary Buffer Incentive Program and a sample of Maryland farm owners 
who are not in the program. More than 600 telephone interviews were conducted to 
gather original data about the landowners' demographic characteristics, their awareness of 
the concept of riparian buffers, and the relative weight they gave to various possible 
economic and attitudinal factors during their riparian buffer adoption decision-making 
process. 
Understanding the farmer's process for adopting this conservation behavior is 
essential in order to design and implement effective riparian buffer policies, for two 
reasons described in greater detail in a policy context section in Chapter 1. First, the 
current political prominence of property rights advocates suggests that economic 
1 
incentives and voluntary programs, rather than environmental regulations, may provide 
the most promising opportunities for establishment of buffers. Second, budgetary 
constraints limit the availability of funds for outright purchase of riparian lands, and other 
voluntary programs must use their limited resources for public outreach, cost-sharing, 
grants, and technical assistance in the most cost-effective way. 
Following a description of the riparian buffer policy context, Chapter 1 continues 
with a discussion of the possible costs and benefits of buffers, particularly as they are 
perceived by landowners. To what extent do farmers not participate in voluntary riparian 
buffer programs simply because they are unaware of their availability and of the benefits 
of buffers? To what extent are farmers driven by attitudinal factors, such as dislike for 
government programs, as opposed to perceived "pure" economic costs, such as the 
possible row-crop income lost by taking riparian land out of production? 
When it comes to analysis of riparian buffer policy around the United States, one 
size does not fit all. Chapter 1 includes a discussion of how riparian buffers provide 
different environmental functions and values in different ecosystems, and how 
landowners from state to state present different attitudinal and economic issues that 
policy-makers need to address when promoting buffers. Thus the most useful policy 
insight is apt to come from examination of programs on a state or local scale, the approach 
taken in this study. 
Chapter 2 summarizes a review of agricultural economics, rural sociology, and 
other literature that was undertaken to learn about previous work on the factors 
influencing voluntary planting of riparian buffers. A number of studies have examined 
how landowner attributes such as age, percentage of income from farming, wealth, and 
commitment to conservation affect the willingness of a landowner to adopt innovative 
conservation practices on agricultural lands. Little attention has been focused on adoption 
of tree or grass planting exclusively in the riparian zone, particularly in the case of trees, 
pointing to the need for original data collection and analysis on voluntary planting of 
riparian buffers. 
Chapter 3 describes this study's analytical framework, which is based to a large 
degree on the adoption research on other land set-aside programs reviewed in Chapter 2. 
Adoption of riparian buffers is described as a decision-making process including an initial 
awareness stage followed by a weighing of perceived costs and benefits. 
Chapter 4 describes the general approach taken in this study, including the 
development of hypotheses about the extent to which a combination of attitudinal and 
"pure" economic factors drive the behavior of farmers with regard to voluntary riparian 
buffer programs. Based on the literature for other land set-aside and best management 
2 
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practices programs, these hypotheses predict that the behavior of farmers is not always 
driven solely by economic considerations. Chapter 4 also includes a description of the 
telephone survey instruments developed for this study to gather original data from more 
than 600 farmers on riparian buffer adoption decisions. 
The results of these interviews are described in Chapter 5. Key research findings 
include the following: 
Awareness 
? Thirty-one percent of farm owners interviewed for this study who are not in the 
Buffer Incentive Program said that they do not own riparian land. Many of these 
responses were from farm owners on Maryland's Eastern Shore, where one 
would expect a much higher percentage of eligible riparian land. 
? Eighty-five percent of non-adopting farm owners interviewed are aware of the 
riparian buffer concept, but this awareness comes from contact with different 
sources than for Buffer Incentive Program participants. 
Perceived Costs and Benefits 
? Buffer Incentive Program participants interviewed earn a much smaller percentage 
of income from farming than do non-participants interviewed. 81 % of Buffer 
Incentive Program participants indicated that lost agricultural income from the land 
along the stream was not a factor or not a very important factor in their decision, 
while 42% of farmers interviewed who have not planted a forest or grass buffer 
indicated that lost agricultural income was a critical or somewhat important factor. 
? Water quality or other environmental benefits to the community was the most 
important factor in the adoption decision for Buffer Incentive Program participants 
? interviewed, followed by creation of fish and wildlife habitat, control of erosion, 
and the grant from the Buffer Incentive Program. 
? For non-adopters, erosion control was the most important factor, followed by 
water quality or other environmental benefits to the community, compliance with 
current or future land use regulations, and the grant payment from the Buffer 
Incentive Program. 
? There is some evidence that non-adopting farm owners prefer grass buffers rather 
than forest buffers, and that land owners are less willing to participate in riparian 
buffer set-aside programs if they require that the buffer be kept in place for longer 
periods of time or permanently. 
These findings may have important policy implications for cost-share, 
grantmaking, and outreach programs designed to promote forest and grass buffers. In 
Chapter 6, conclusions are drawn from this research and recommendations are made for 
development of public policy and future research programs. 
3 
CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND 
Policy Context for Riparian Buffers 
In 1996, for some environmental policy makers, "riparian forest buffers" is the 
buzzword of the day, joining the hallowed ranks of acid rain, greenhouse warming, 
biological diversity, environmental justice, and ecosystem management from previous 
years. Nationally, the immediate interest in riparian forest and grass buffers is a result of 
debates over the 1995 Farm Bill and reauthorization of the Clean Water Act (which 
continued into 1996 as part of federal budget negotiations). The Farm Bill addresses the 
expiration of the first set of IO-year land set-aside contracts in the Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP); targetting CRP funds toward riparian forest and grass buffers is a 
prominent alternative proposed by legislators to provide more environmental protection 
while tying up less farmland and spending less taxpayer dollars than the existing CRP 
approach. In the Chesapeake Bay watershed, riparian forest buffers (and, to a lesser 
degree, grass buffers) are being promoted by elected leaders to help meet the 1987 
Chesapeake Bay Agreement goal of a 40% reduction in nutrient loadings in the Bay by the 
year 2000. 
Agricultural land has been a focal point of riparian buffer policy debates, both in 
the Chesapeake Bay and nationally, because of its predominance as a nonpoint source of 
water pollution. Agriculture has been identified as a major or minor contributor to water 
quality problems in 72 percent of river miles and 43 percent of estuarine waters 
nationwide (United States Department of Agriculture, 1994). Agriculture, including 
conventional cropland, conservation cropland, pasture, and animal waste facilities, 
accounts for 69 percent of total nitrogen non-point source loadings and 79 percent of total 
phosphorus non-point source loadings in the Chesapeake Bay watershed (Lowrance, et 
al. 1995). While reductions in N and P loadings are only two of the possible 
environmental benefits of riparian buffers, these examples nonetheless point to the need 
for riparian buffer programs geared toward agricultural land. 
4 
The political support for riparian forest or grass buffers is remarkably bi-
partisan.I For example, buffers received special emphasis in the Agricultural Resources 
Conservation Act of 1995 (S854, also known as the Conservation Title of the Farm Bill), 
which was co-sponsored by Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind) and Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.). 
In Congressional testimony concerning the Conservation Title, a range of interest groups 
urged policies to assist the restoration of riparian buffers, including the American Farm 
Bureau Federation, the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies, and the National 
Audubon Society (U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry). 
Emphasis on Voluntary Buffer Programs 
The bipartisan support of buffers comes with a caveat largely shared across the 
political spectrum: efforts should focus on voluntary initiatives for landowners. In his 
introduction to S854, Sen Leahy cited a poll of 10,000 farmers in 15 leading agricultural 
states. Of the farmers polled, 43% agreed that the government should insist they plant 
filter strips along stream banks to protect water quality, but 40% disagreed. In Sen. 
Lugar's introductory comments, he noted that the legislation creates no new 
environmental mandates for farmers (U.S. Congress. Senate. Agricultural Resources 
Conservation Act of 1995). In testimony supporting many of the concepts of S854, 
Deputy Secretary of Agriculture Richard Rominger said that voluntary and flexible 
incentive-driven programs are the "centerpiece" of the Clinton Administration's I 995 
Farm Bill proposals (U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry). Clearly, past debates, including those surrounding wetlands policy, have 
struck a property rights chord that resonates with riparian buffer policy makers. 
The Clean Water Act 
The current interest in riparian buffers can be traced back to non-point source 
water pollution reduction requirements of Section 208 and Section 319 of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) of 1972 and amendments made in 1977. 
That act stated as its first goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters of 
I. At the 1995 annual meeting of the Chesapeake Executive Council, Virginia 
Governor George Allen, a Republican, and Maryland Governor Parris Glendening, a 
Democrat, both urged policies to promote riparian forest buffers, with Governor Allen 
calling riparian forest buffers "a top priority" for his administration. 
5 
the United States be eliminated by 1985. Five additional goals in the act described ways 
in which that ambitious first goal might be achieved. While progress was made in 
cleaning up pollution from "point" sources such as factories and wastewater treatment 
plants, by 1987 the elimination of pollutant discharge into navigable waters was still not a 
reality. In the 1987 Clean Water Act re-authorization, Congress added a seventh goal 
emphasizing the need for control of nonpoint sources of pollution, such as urban and 
agricultural run-off. Section 319 describes ways in which nonpoint source reduction can 
be achieved, including identification of best management practices. Section 319 also 
suggests the need for voluntary measures to control nonpoint source pollution, because of 
the pervasive nature of the problem and the difficulty in regulating land use (Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act. 1977). 
The Conservation Reserve Program 
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), an agricultural land retirement 
program established in 1985, was originally designed primarily to control erosion and 
soon also emphasized water quality and wildlife habitat goals. The Conservation Reserve 
Program has generally received high marks from policy-makers, environmentalists, and 
the agricultural community, but at a cost of more than $1 billion per year in rental 
payments to farmers (Stevens 1995; Lovejoy and Lee 1995). The 1995 Farm bill debate 
recognized the current federal budget realities, and thus the Lugar/Leahy bill proposed that 
the Conservation Reserve be capped at 36 million acres, its current level of enrollment at 
the time of the bill (U.S. Congress. Senate. Agricultural Resources Conservation Act of 
1995). 
In preparation for the expiration of the first set of CRP 10-year contracts in 1995, 
policy-makers began to explore land set-aside alternatives that would improve upon the 
environmental benefits of CRP, but at less taxpayer expense. In introducing the bill, Sen 
Lugar also noted that too much land currently in the Conservation Reserve could be 
farmed without harming the environment and thus should be returned to agricultural 
commodity production. Targetting CRP funds to more environmentally sensitive lands is 
a goal stated by both the bill's sponsors and the Clinton Administration (U.S. Congress. 
Senate. Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry). 
One way in which the Lugar/Leahy bill proposes to meet this targetting goal is by 
instructing the Secretary of Agriculture to enroll in CRP by the year 2000 at least 4 million 
acres of land for water quality purposes, primarily buffer strips along permanent water 
bodies and intermittent streams. By comparison, only 52,000 acres of riparian buffers 
6 
had been planted in CRP through 1993 (Osborn, Schnepf and Keim 1993). While the bill 
does not specify whether these buffers should be planted in grass or in trees, the bill 
emphasizes trees by suggesting that, to the maximum extent practicable, not less than 1/8 
of the land in the Conservation Reserve be devoted to hardwood trees (U.S. Congress. 
Senate. Agricultural Resources Conservation Act of 1995).2 
The increased emphasis on riparian buffers is also reflected in the thirteenth CRP 
sign-up held in September 1995. Bids involving riparian buffers received a IO percent 
higher bid cap, which caused the enrollment of buffers to jump from 1,227 acres in 1994 
. to 33,900 acres in 1995, a 2,700% increase (Kinsley 1995). 
The Chesapeake Bay Agreement 
While Maryland has a relatively small percentage of its land in the Conservation 
Reserve Program, it has an additional factor driving interest in buffers: the 1987 
Chesapeake Bay Agreement. That agreement, signed by the governors of Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, and Virginia, the mayor of the District of Columbia, the administrator of 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the chair of the Chesapeake Bay 
Commission, stated as its principal goals the restoration of water quality and living 
resources in the Chesapeake Bay. To meet that goal, the signatories agreed to reduce 
nutrients in the main stem of the Chesapeake Bay by 40% by the year 2000. The 
signatories, who comprise the Chesapeake Executive Council, issued a directive in June 
1994 to develop riparian forest buffer policies for the Bay watershed, citing their finding 
that riparian forest buffers "deliver the greatest range of environmental benefits of any 
type of stream buffer." The Council convened a panel to recommend riparian forest 
buffer policy by December 1996 (Chesapeake Executive Council 1994). 
Regulatory Initiatives 
Despite the current emphasis of policy-makers (and this research project) on 
voluntary initiatives, there are examples of regulation in the riparian zone at the national, 
2. A recent study by John Lee and Stephen Lovejoy of Purdue University 
suggests that the farm bill's four million acre goal for riparian buffers on agricultural land 
may be difficult to attain. Using a geographic information system, the authors estimated 
that only two million acres (o r about five per cent of the total 36 million acres in CRP) of 
agricultural cropland and pasture may be potentially available nationwide for riparian 
buffers (Lee and Lovejoy 1995). 
7 
state, and local level.3 Nationally, Section 6217 of the 1990 Coastal Zone Act 
Reathorization Amendments included the first federally mandated program requiring 
specific measures to deal with agricultural nonpoint source pollution (Heimlich and 
Barnard 1995). Although the Act does not specifically require forest or grass buffers, it 
does provide leeway for states to include buffers as a component in a required 
management plan (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1990). 
Statewide regulatory initiatives include Maryland's Chesapeake Bay Critical Areas 
Act, which was established in 1984 to control development within 1,000 feet of tidal 
waters. A mandatory 100-foot vegetated buffer is required for all tidal waters, tidal 
wetlands, and tributary streams in the Critical Area, including both perennial and 
intermittent streams. Buffers on agricultural land may be reduced to 25 feet; agricultural 
buffers may be reduced further if a Soil Conservation and Water Quality Plan with best 
management practices is approved for the property (Chesapeake Bay Commission 1995). 
Sixty local jurisdictions in Maryland are affected by this law (Plummer 1993), including 
the easternmost 16 of Maryland 23 counties. 
Some local governments have also considered regulations to protect riparian areas. 
For example, Carroll County, Maryland is considering a proposed ordinance for cluster 
zoning which would require buffers of 100 feet on either side of a stream (Conaway 
1995). 
Why have policy-makers expressed such an interest in voluntary and regulatory 
riparian buffer initiatives? The next section summarizes the environmental benefits that 
might be achieved by planting riparian forest or grass buffers and discusses the challenges 
and opportunities for incorporating those environmental benefits into policy analyses. 
3. For a summary of riparian forest buffer policies in Maryland, Pennsylvania, 
and Virginia, see Chesapeake Bay Commission 1995. For a national overview of state 
wetlands and riparian area protection programs, see Steiner, et al. 
8 
Potential Benefits of Riparian Buffers 
Policy-makers are interested in riparian forest or grass buffers largely because of 
an increasing body of literature about the ability of buffers to carry out biological, 
chemical, and physical functions or processes for streams and riparian land. This section 
includes only a summary of those environmental functions, as well as a brief discussion 
of the opportunities and challenges for translating the environmental functions into an 
economic framework for policy analysis.4 This research project is about the behavior of 
people, not buffers, and so the section concludes with a discussion of how a landowner 
might perceive the possible environmental, economic, and other benefits of voluntarily 
planting a riparian forest or grass buffer on his or her property. 
What is a Riparian Buffer? 
It is important to recognize that there are no standard definitions of the words 
"riparian," "forest buffer," and "grass buffer" used across the board by policy-makers. 
How these terms are defined can have implications for what environmental benefits might 
be achieved, for landowner perceptions of both benefits and costs, and, ultimately, for 
development of policy. 
Webster's Dictionary defines "riparian" as "relating to or living or located on a 
bank of a natural watercourse (as a river) or sometimes of a lake or a tidewater." Bohlen 
and King describe riparian zones as "the lands along surface waters that are closely tied to 
surface water systems through flooding, groundwaters flows, physical transport, and 
biotic exchanges" (Bohlen and King 1996). The Chesapeake Executive Council's 
Riparian Forest Buffer Panel defines the riparian area as "streams, rivers and other bodies 
of water and the land adjacent to them, which serves as a transitional environment and 
directly affects or is affected by the presence of that water" (Chesapeake Executive 
Council Riparian Forest Buffer Panel 1995). 
Some authors have used the word "streamside" as a synonym for riparian in order 
to make debates about riparian buffer policy more understandable to policy-makers and 
the general public (see for example Lowrance, et al. 1995; Welsch 1991; Alliance for the 
Chesapeake Bay 1993). Reconciling the "streamside" definition with the others described 
4. For comprehensive reviews of the literature on riparian buffer environmental 
performance, see Bohlen and King 1996; Lowrance et al. 1995. 
9 
here, especially the Maryland Buffer Incentive Program reference to land adjacent to water 
"flowing for any one-month period during the year" reminds one of the "when it's wet, 
it's wet" comment of Vice President Dan Quayle during the wetlands delineation 
controversy. A landowner may be unlikely to perceive that land adjacent to an ephemeral 
first order stream is in fact riparian and thus apt to provide environmental benefits if 
planted in trees or grass. A case study of the German Branch watershed in Queen Anne's 
County, Maryland found that many "blue line" streams on U.S.G.S. maps were actually 
farmed as part of row-crop fields (Bohlen and King 1996). 
A riparian forest buffer was defined in 1995 by the Chesapeake Executive Council 
buffer panel as "a forested area situated between a land use and adjacent body of water" 
which is designed and maintained to provide several environmental functions 
(Chesapeake Executive Council Riparian Forest Buffer Panel 1995). The panel at that 
time had not stated explicitly the required buffer width or what types of trees or land uses 
are allowed within the forest buffer. 
A more elaborate three-zone Riparian Forest Buffer System has been proposed in 
a report prepared by David J. Welsch of the U.S. Forest Service. The first zone of the 
buffe r system extends 15 feet from the top of the stream bank and is designed to create a 
stable ecosystem adjacent to the water's edge. The dominant vegetation in this zone is 
composed of native riparian tree and shrub species that are not harvested. A 60-foot wide 
Zone 2 is also forested, but periodic harvesting and timber stand improvement are allowed 
to provide environmental benefits such as removal of nutrients sequestered in tree 
branches. Zone 3 consists of grazed or ungrazed grasslands and should be at least 20 feet 
in width. The purpose of Zone 3 is to provide sediment filtering, nutrient uptake, and the 
space necessary to convert concentrated flow to uniform, shallow sheet flow (Welsch 
1991 ). 
Zone 3 of the Riparian Forest Buffer System is a grass buffer, also known as a 
"vegetated filter strip." Many of the environmental goals that proponents of riparian 
forest buffers or the 95-foot Riparian Forest Buffer System hope to attain might also be 
achieved by planting grass buffers. Grass buffers should not be confused with "grassed 
waterways," which are constructed to provide drainage for fields. Some landowners may 
find grass buffers to be a more palatable alternative to forest buffers, as described in 
Chapter 5. Thus the benefits of both forest and grass riparian buffers are discussed in 
this section. 
Since this project is examining the determinants of participation in Maryland's 
Buffer Incentive Program, the definitions from that program's guidelines are used in the 
survey instruments described in Chapters 4 and 5. Buffer Incentive Program guidelines 
10 
state lands must meet one of the following criteria to be considered riparian and thus 
eligible for the program: The land must be within 300 feet of a stream, river, pond, tidal 
or non-tidal wetland, or other open water, and additional land may be eligible in highly 
sloped areas. The water must appear on a U.S. Geological Survey 7.5 minute quad map 
(a "blue line" stream) or have flowing water for any one-month period during the year. 
Wetlands must appear on a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service wetlands map or be otherwise 
classifiable as a wetland based on current State of Maryland criteria. Land within a 100-
year floodplain is also eligible (Maryland Department of Natural Resources). The Buffer 
Incentive Program requires a minimum 50-foot width and does not allow Christmas tree 
or orchard planting in the buffer; harvesting of trees in the buffer is not allowed during the 
term of the contract. For more details on the eligibility requirements of the Buffer 
Incentive Program, see page 44. 
Possible Environmental Benefits of Riparian Buffers 
Bohlen and King use the terms "functions, processes, and values" to describe the 
performance of riparian buffers. "Functions and processes" refer to the physical, 
biological, and chemical phenomema that occur due to riparian buffer implementation. 
"Values" refer to more subjective experiences that might also depend on ethical, 
economic, and other systems. Values are addressed primarily in later parts of this chapter 
through discussion of economic benefits and landowner perceptions of benefits (Bohlen 
and King 1996). 
Bohlen and King separate the functions or processes of riparian buffers into the 
following eight categories: 
1. Sediment Retention 
2. Nitrogen removal 
3. Phosphorus removal 
4. Thermal effects on streams 
5. Effects on physical structure of streams 
6. Effects on the energetics of streams 
7. Direct effects on preservation of biodiversity 
8. Establishment of movement corridors across the landscape 
The extent to which environmental benefits can be gained in these eight categories 
depends upon a number of factors, such as stream width, buffer slope and width, 
subsurface hydrology, soil drainage, existing land use (upstream, downstream, and on 
the landowner's property), and complementary use of other best management practices. 
11 
Because these factors and the relative importance of each of the eight categories of 
functions vary widely from watershed to watershed, it is difficult to generalize about the 
opportunities for environmental improvement from buffers (Bohlen and King 1996). 
This is the case even within the Chesapeake Bay watershed. Lowrance et al. describe 
three distinct physiographic regions of the Chesapeake Bay watershed (coastal plain, the 
Piedmont, and valley and ridge), each with different physical and land use characteristics 
that can have an impact on the performance of riparian buffers (Lowrance et al. 1995). 
The first three environmental functions Bohlen and King list for buffers--sediment 
retention, nitrogen removal, and phosphorus removal--receive high priority nationally, 
through initiatives such as the Conservation Reserve Program, and in the Chesapeake Bay 
area, because of the commitment there to a 40% reduction in nutrients by the year 2000. 
These functions are listed together here because the literature suggests that, depending on 
the situation, grass buffers may perform as well or better than forest buffers in providing 
these functions (Lowrance et al. 1995). In the Chesapeake Bay watershed, where the 
40% nutrient reduction goal is to a large extent driving the policy discussions on buffers, 
grass buffers may be a particularly important option for landowners who might resist 
planting trees. 
Buffers affect sediment, nitrogen, and phosphorus input into streams in the 
following ways. Sediment is controlled largely by converting channelized flow outside 
the buffer to sheet flow within the buffer, thus slowing its rate of transport. In this 
respect, grass may be superior to trees. Lowrance et al. cite studies suggesting that grass 
buffers can remove up to 98% of incoming sediment and that they are effective 
immediately after establishment. The down side, however, is that these studies also 
conclude that grass buffers probably have a relatively short useful life span, thus 
requiring periodic removal of vegetation or other maintenance (Dillaha et al. 1989; 
Magette et al. 1989; Lowrance et al. 1995). This may be an important consideration for a 
landowner, as discussed in the next section. By trapping sediment, a buffer can also be 
effective in trapping sediment-bound phosphorus. Nitrogen can be removed by bacteria 
to the atmosphere as less available nitrogen gas, and can be sequestered by plants and 
microorganisms within living biomass (Bohlen and King 1996). 
The literature suggests that the five other environmental functions cited by Bohlen 
and King favor forest buffers over grass buffers, on balance. 
The first of these functions is the ability of a buffer to provide shade over a 
stream, thus moderating temperature variations and improving conditions for trout and 
other wildlife. This function is particularly valuable for lower order (smaller) streams, 
since higher order streams are often too wide to be effectively shaded. (Overall, the 
12 
Lowrance panel's report suggests that buffers are likely to be most beneficial around 
headwaters and lower order streams.) A mature forest buffer has a clear advantage over a 
grass buffer in providing shade to the stream, but these benefits may take years or 
decades to develop. 
This benefit lag-time is also true in the case of aquatic habitat and stream 
geomorphology benefits. A forest buffer may provide important habitat and 
geomorphological functions through development of overhanging banks, debris tangles, 
and riffle-pool complexes, and through input of coarse woody debris, which may 
dissipate stream energy and reduce sediment transport. There is stiII considerable 
uncertainty about the role of woody debris; in any case, input of coarse woody debris to a 
stream may require an even longer time span than that needed for the development of 
effective shading. 
A buffer might also provide a useful function for the energetics of a stream, which 
can come from a combination of in-stream and terrestrial production. For a forest buffer, 
this function is provided in part by production of leaf litter, which might take as long as a 
decade to have an appreciable impact on stream energetics (Bohlen and King 1996). 
The final two functions of buffers that Bohlen and King outline--biodiversity 
preservation and wildlife movement corridors--also depend a great deal on land use both 
upstream and downstream. For example, is a buffer linking other areas providing habitat 
for wildlife? For some wildlife, a forest buffer is likely to provide more opportunities for 
movement than a grass buffer. It is important to remember, however, that the relative 
benefits for wildlife from grass or forest buffers depend a great deal on the area of the 
country in which they are established. 
The possible provision of wildlife corridors points to a question that is relevant for 
all of the possible functions of a riparian buffer: To what extent is it essential to have 
contiguous buffers upstream and downstream? If a stream is seriously degraded 
upstream or downstream, a buffer may make little or no headway in providing functions 
for the stream and adjacent riparian land. When examining a voluntary program (like 
Maryland's Buffer Incentive Program), this is a particularly relevant question. Pritchard, 
Lee and Engel note that a problem with voluntary participation in any water quality 
program is the enlistment of enough participants to make it successful. They suggest that 
it may be more cost-effective to require 100 percent participation in a riparian buffer 
program in a watershed than to allow partial participation in a group of watersheds 
(Pritchard, Lee and Engel 1993). 
13 
Economic Benefits of Riparian Buffers 
The environmental benefits of buffers, described above as categories of functions 
and processes, are not the same as the benefits of buffers viewed through the lens of an 
economist, who would measure the benefits of buffers through the aggregate amount 
society would be willing to pay for the resulting changes in water quality, habitat, and the 
other functions of buffers (Krupnick 1988). The possible environmental functions of 
riparian buffers present problems for policy analysis using an economic cost/benefit or 
cost-effectiveness framework, since these functions include both market and non-market 
benefits and on-site and off-site benefits, many of which are difficult to measure. 
Many of the benefits to society of buffers accrue downstream from the landowner, 
while the costs may be borne primarily by the landowner. This is complicated further by 
the difficulty in monitoring accurately the contribution of each landowner to the complex 
environmental functions described in the previous section. Griffin and Bromley have 
described this situation as one with a "non-point externality" (Griffin and Bromley 1982; 
Lovejoy, Lee and Beasley 1985; Crutchfield, Feather, and Hellerstein). A rational 
landowner in a competitive market might act in a way that does not take the downstream 
effects into account, thus not maximizing collective social welfare, defined as the 
aggregate of individual preferences (Krupnick 1988). This is a classic case of "market 
failure" described in the environmental economics literature, and thus may be grounds for 
intervention by the government (Pearce and Turner 1990). 
Since these environmental benefits are not necessarily traded in markets, indirect 
methods of estimation, such as contingent valuation surveys, travel cost calculations, and 
hedonic pricing, are often used for economic analysis. A number of studies have 
attempted to estimated the net social benefits that could be gained from water quality 
improvements, the primary focus of riparian buffer implementation (for a review of these 
studies, see Crutchfield, Feather and Hellerstein). For land retirement programs, one 
study of particular relevance is Ribaudo's 1989 estimate that reducing erosion by retiring 
40 to 45 million acres of cropland through the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 
would generate $3.5 to $4.5 billion in annual water quality benefits. The CRP also 
includes land outside the riparian zone, and riparian buffers may provide benefits beyond 
the reduction of erosion, but this study nonetheless gives some indication of the on- and 
off-site benefits that a land retirement program might achieve, including those to 
recreational fishing, navigation, water storage and treatment, and flood control (Ribaudo, 
Osborn, and Konyar 1994). 
14 
i. 
Such estimates for a particular riparian buffer may be very difficult to calculate: as 
described earlier in this chapter, the benefits of a buffer depend not only on what is 
planted, but where it is planted, and what the conditions are both upstream and 
downstream. (For a discussion of these complications for reducing agricultural non-point 
source pollution in the Chesapeake Bay watershed through best management practices, 
see Krupnick 1988) 
The Landowner's Perception of Riparian Buffer Benefits 
This project is based on the premise that policy-makers are already moving 
forward with initiatives to promote buffers as a cost-effective environmental 
improvement, both in the Chesapeake Bay region and nationally. The question being 
addressed is not, "Are buffers a good thing for society?" (Or, from an economist's 
perspective, "Do they improve net social benefits?") Rather, this project follows the lead 
of policy-makers in assuming that this is likely to be the case, and thus addresses the 
question of how to get a landowner to put a riparian buffer on his or her land if one does 
not already exist. To do that, it is necessary to understand the benefits of planting a 
riparian buffer that a landowner might perceive. It is important to understand these 
perceptions in order to help target public funds to voluntary programs in areas that are 
likely to provide the most cost-effective investments in environmental improvements 
through implementation of buffers. 
When viewed from the landowner's perspective, the environmental and economic 
benefits described by natural scientists or economists might look very different, or even 
be ignored. But like a natural or social scientist, a landowner is likely to think of the 
possible benefits of buffers in terms of where they occur and when they occur: Do the 
benefits accrue to the landowner, to his immediate community, or to society in general? 
Do the benefits occur now, or at some point in the distant future? 
Farmers might perceive both market and non-market on-site benefits from a 
riparian buffer. Young farmers in particular might perceive that a buffer could provide 
future income from harvesting grass or trees, but this would most likely be weighed 
against the alternative best use of the riparian land, as discussed in more detail in the next 
section. A farmer might have a different perception of the possible on-site benefits from a 
forest buffer than a residential or commercial landowner; the presence of trees might 
actually increase the immediate value of residential or commercial property, which might 
not be the case on agricultural land. Provision of fish and wildlife habitat might also 
provide on-site benefits for a farmer interested in providing recreational access to his 
property. On the Eastern Shore of Maryland, some farmers earn income by providing 
15 
"'.>''\). -
I 
access for waterfowl hunting in the winter. A grass buffer might be perceived as superior 
for that on-site use. 
For other wildlife, especially deer and endangered species, the increased habitat 
possibly provided by a forest buffer might provide an aesthetic benefit to some 
landowners, but to others this might be seen as a negative factor, as discussed in the next 
section. Erosion control is one possible on-site benefit of riparian buffers, particularly for 
farmers with a long-term investment in the property, but this might best be achieved in 
combination with conservation tillage practices, rather than solely relying on trucing land 
out of production altogether. 
Another possible perceived on-site benefit of riparian buffers might come from the 
psychological effects of restoration discussed in the restoration ecology literature. A 
landowner might feel a strong sense of personal renewal from the act of restoration on his 
or her property, although research on this topic in the field of environmental psychology 
has focused largely on urban environments and factors such as noise and crowding 
(Hartig, Bowler, and Wolf 1994). But even in a more open agricultural setting, a farmer 
might perceive benefits from activities taken as a steward of his property, which in some 
cases may have been owned by his family for generations. 
Although a landowner might perceive on-site environmental and economic 
benefits from buffers, benefits are likely to accrue primarily to the community and to 
society at large. How would a landowner perceive these landscape-wide benefits? Will 
he think that he is bearing a disproportionate burden for environmental protection that 
others in his community are not? In this sense, the benefits of riparian buffers are similar 
to the problems that Curtis Bohlen has described for wetlands protection: some 
landowners might not recognize that other landowners in the community also pay for 
environmental protection measures through taxes for sewage treatment and other 
environmental facilities (Bohlen 1992). Mark Sagoff has described individual decision-
ma1cing as being based on a combination of private and public values, or those made as a 
consumer and those made as a citizen (Sagoff 1988). The weight given to the perceived 
community benefits of riparian buffers by a landowner can be seen as the extent to which 
those public values are driving his or her decision. 
Most people probably want to be good citizens. Would a landowner perceive that 
planting a forest or grass buffer is part of being a good citizen? How would a landowner 
learn about the environmental and economic benefits to his community and society 
described above? Public outreach and the experience of neighbors and peers are two 
likely ways in which a landowner would learn about the possible benefits of buffers and 
form opinions about them. A landowner in a watershed with well-publicized water 
16 
quality and environmental problems might give much greater weight to the community 
benefits of a riparian buffer than would a landowner in a watershed with little or no 
publicity about such problems. The perception of benefits might be greatly affected by 
the way in which environmental and economic benefits have been presented to the 
landowner: Did a landowner first learn about buffers from a government representative 
he views as a regulatory adversary, rather than as a resource for technical assistance? 
Were buffers described in an inflexible way that did not take into account the landowner's 
unique situation? A landowner who has seen the environmental benefits of buffers 
planted by neighbors and peers might be more likely to plant one himself. 
The benefits of planting a riparian buffer that a landowner perceives are likely to 
depend upon his age, education, income, percentage of income from farming, the location 
of his farm, the effectiveness of local outreach efforts, and other factors. Chapter 3 
describes the litetature on the effects of these and other perceived benefits in determining 
participation in other best management practice or land set-aside programs. These 
perceived benefits are, of course, only part of the equation for a landowner considering 
participation in a voluntary riparian buffer program. In the next section, some of the 
perceived costs that might influence a landowner's decision are described, as well as other 
possible attitudinal factors. 
17 
Potential Costs for Landowners 
The landowner's decision-making process includes comparing perceived benefits 
of buffers to perceived costs. While many of the benefits of buffers may go to the 
community at large, the landowner is likely to weigh those benefits against costs that he 
perceives as being borne primarily by himself. Attitudinal factors may also heavily 
influence the relative weight given to various costs in the decision-making process. The 
perceived private costs for a landowner can be divided into three categories: opportunity 
costs, planting and maintenance costs, and transactions costs. 
Opportunity Costs 
Ideally, implementing a cost-effective voluntary riparian buffer program might 
simply involve identifying the land parcels likely to provide the most environmental 
benefits from buffer establishment, then providing economic incentives to the owners of 
those identified land parcels, starting with those who are willing to accept the lowest 
compensation for use of his riparian land. Opportunity costs for riparian buffers can be 
seen as the foregone earnings from other possible uses of that land; thus they are a good 
measure of what landowners might be willing to accept for use of their riparian land, once 
planting, maintenance, and transactions costs are taken into consideration. 
The policy context and possible environmental benefits of riparian buffers, 
described in previous sections, point to some difficulties in calculating opportunity costs 
of land set aside as riparian buffers. For a discussion of these difficulties and how they 
affect the research approach taken in this project, see "Problems with Calculation of 
Opportunity Costs" on page 20. 
Perceived opportunity costs include possible reduction in current or future income 
from agricultural use of riparian land set aside as a buffer, as well as possible lost or 
reduced potential income from conversion of the land to residential or commercial 
development. For some farmers, the opportunity cost of riparian land may be quite high 
if that is the most productive land for row crops or if extensive water access is needed for 
animals. Some farmers might be more receptive to buffers if they were allowed to earn 
some income by occasionally harvesting grass or trees in the buffer area farthest from the 
stream. For farmers involved in commodity support programs, buffers may also reduce 
base acreage for calculation of commodity support program payments, although this may 
now be a moot point because of the Farm Bill legislation in 1996. 
18 
Fanners might also perceive numerous problems that a forest buffer might present 
for adjacent land. For example, added habitat might lead to destruction of crops by deer. 
Trees might shade adjacent fields or draw moisture or nutrients from them, thus lowering 
yields. Tree limbs might fall into adjacent fields, and buffers might cut into existing field 
configurations in a way that makes it difficult to operate fann machinery. 
The second area of perceived opportunity costs for a fanner concerns the ability to 
convert riparian and adjacent land to other land uses. Property rights are an important 
element of these opportunity costs. Fanners might perceive that buffers would provide. 
new habitat for rare or endangered species, thus subjecting the fanner to increased 
regulation and limiting future land use options. In addition, some areas that are left 
unfanned for five years may be subject to regulation because they have reverted to 
wetlands (Alliance for the Chesapeake Bay 1993). If a forest buffer is planted, any future 
development of that land might be subject to tree replacement laws (such as Maryland's 
Forest Conservation Act). Depending on the location of the buffer and size of the 
stream, a lost or hindered scenic view might also be an important concern with regard to 
future residential development values. One study of the impact of parcel characteristics on 
the cost of development rights to farmland in New England estimated the per-acre cost of 
development rights to be 53 percent higher on farmland parcels that have a panoramic 
view of water than on parcels that have no water view (Wichelns and Kline 1993). 
Buffers might provide opportunities for tax relief from federal, state, or local 
authorities, but property tax disincentives might also present costs to landowners. 
Property taxes are traditionally the domain of local governments, providing funding for 
schools and other community services. Some counties base their property tax formulas 
on soil type rather than land cover, thus discouraging taking productive soils out of 
production. Some counties might actually raise assessments on land put in buffers by 
changing its tax category from "agriculture" to "developable." Starting in 1995, 
landowners taking advantage of a 15-year special tax assessment through Maryland's 
Forest Conservation and Management Program were required to pay $100 every three 
years for a verification from the forester of continued compliance with program 
requirements. 
A final opportunity cost issue relates to both future agricultural and development 
land uses. Since trees may need to grow for a period of longer than 10 years to begin to 
provide a full range of environmental benefits, farmers may be encouraged to set aside 
their land for a longer term or even permanently. Yet farmers may be unwilling to give up 
alternate uses of riparian land by placing it in a longer or permanent conservation 
easement. 
19 
Problems with Calculation of Opportunity Costs 
The policy context and possible environmental benefits ofr iparian buffers point to 
some difficulties in calculating opportunity costs ofl and set aside as riparian buffers. The 
Conservation Reserve Program debate about targetting land set-asides to riparian land, 
rather than whole fields or fanns, indicates that opportunity costs should be calculated 
specifically for the riparian land. As Senator Lugar pointed out in his remarks introducing 
the Conservation Title to the 1995 Fann bill, a reason for targetting riparian land is that 
there may be a Jot ofp roductive land that is not being farmed because it is in the 
Conservation Reserve (U.S. Congress. Senate. Agricultural Resources Conservation 
Act of 1995). Also, as discussed in the environmental benefits section, it is difficult to 
generalize about the environmental benefits across watersheds. In some areas. such as 
the valley and ridge physiographic zone ofwestem Maryland, the riparian land might be 
the only land that can be farmed; in others, it might be so wet as to be unproductive as 
cropland. For an individual farmer, is his land within 25, 50, 100, or 300 feet ofa  
stream his most productive or least productive? 
Ideally, calculation of opportunity costs ofp lanting riparian buffers would in valve 
detennining the rental value of that riparian land. Land values are essentially capitalized 
rents, and thus are a measure ofa  buyer's willingness to pay for the future productivity of 
that soil, although there are other factors that affect land values (Miranowski and Cochran 
1993). The problems with generalizing about land values and riparian buffer benefits 
point to a need for farm-level data about the opportunity costs ofr iparian land in different 
watersheds. This level of detail is not readily available from public sources. Land sales. 
being public transactions, would be a source ofi nformation. But only 3% of farmland 
nationwide is transferred in a given year, and that includes gifts and inheritance; for land 
values at a county level, there are so few farms sold in a given year in a county that 
appraisers often have to go to surrounding counties to get estimates, according to John 
Jones of the U.S. Department ofA griculture's Economic Research Service. Jones noted 
in an interview with the author that the agricultural census has a line item on amount paid 
for rent, but it is not broken down by land type or by acreage associated with the rent. 
One problem with collecting farm level data is that if farmers knew what other farmers 
were saying in opinion surveys like the agricultural census, they would change their bids 
for government programs accordingly. Since the census figures reflect just one person's 
opinion, and are not based on any farm-by-farm appraisal, the USDA cannot provide that 
information to the public. The agricultural census only surveys 20% of farmers, anyway, 
so it might be ofl ittle value at the county level. USDA 's National Agricultural Statistics 
20 
Service (NASS) has begun a June Agricultural Survey that includes some more specific 
information, but that is designed to come up with state-by-state numbers, not county-level 
information. The Farm Costs and Returns Survey only breaks down information by 
region of the country. Within that, farm values would vary widely, depending on option 
value for development and other factors (Jones 1995). 
The Maryland Agricultural Statistics Service (a joint program between NASS and 
Maryland Department of Agriculture) conducts a survey for MDA in support of land 
preservation programs and has a series dating back to 1988. MASS estimates county 
averages for cash rents, not weighted by soil type. MASS contacts farm operators and 
ask them how much they pay in rent. The surveyors ask about the entire parcel, which 
might also include other uses, but the focus of the land use is on cropland. MASS also 
has statewide figures for pasture land, which don't vary greatly from county to county in 
Maryland, according to State Statistician Bruce West (West 1995). While not at the level 
of detail that would provide estimates of opportunity costs solely in the riparian zone, the 
county- and state-wide information collected by MASS should at least provide an initial 
determination of riparian land values if coupled with information about land use in various 
counties. For example, if data collected for Maryland's western counties indicated that 
riparian land is used as prime cropland, then this could be coupled with the county-level 
rental estimates compiled by MASS. If research finds that the impact of a buffer on 
adjacent land is a widespread perceived opportunity cost for a farmer in a watershed, then 
these county-level estimates might be considered more adequate, since they would give an 
indication of rental value of land that is actually used as cropland as opposed to riparian 
land that may or may not be farmable. 
Planting and maintenance costs 
Depending on the size and type of buffer, a farmer can incur significant planting 
and maintenance costs. Additional up-front and maintenance costs would be incurred if 
streambank crossings are needed for animals. Even if buffer cost-share or grant 
programs eventually cover a farmer's out of pocket expenses, the initial outlay may deter 
some farmers from considering participation if there is a lag time between planting and 
reimbursement. In addition, some programs may require planting at an inconvenient time 
of the year for a farmer. Maintenance to ensure survival of the trees during the first 
several years may require a significant time commitment for mowing and herbicide 
application. Grass buffers may require occasional maintenance throughout their life. As 
may be the case with planting, maintenance may be required at particularly busy times of 
21 
year for a fanner. In addition, forest and grass buffers may present problems with 
noxious weed control, which is required by law to protect other fanners. 
A program in Ohio called "TREES" was started in 1993 specifically to deal with 
this time-of-planting problem, according to Ohio Department of Natural Resources 
forester Kathy Smith. TREES is a contract service to help landowners plant and maintain 
healthy trees in riparian and other areas. Because the optimal time for planting coincides 
with com and bean planting, Smith asked, "Who has the time, and who will do the 
work?" The landowner, in consultation with the forester, pays a flat fee to the local 
Resource Conservation and Development Council for a three-year planting and 
maintenance contract. In some cases, state or federal cost share programs, such as the 
Stewardship Incentive Program, help offset costs (Smith 1995; Terrene Institute 1995). 
Michael Huneke, a Maryland Department of Natural Resources forester, prepared 
the following cost analysis for one Buffer Incentive Program project in Harford County, 
which is reprinted with his permission. While buffer implementation projects vary widely 
from property to property, this analysis provides some indication of the up-front costs a 
successful project might require. In this example, the labor and seedlings for the tree 
planting itself are a relatively minor up-front expense. Fencing and stream crossings 
added considerably to the up-front, out-of-pocket costs. State and federal cost-share 
programs covered almost all of these costs in this example, perhaps thanks in part to the 
forester's knowledge of these programs. 
22 
Table 1. Riparian Buffer Cost Analysis (18.5 Acre Forest Buffer) 
by Michael Huneke 
Maryland Department of Natural Resources Forester, Harford County 
Component Out-of-Pocket Cost Share Source 
Cost or Grant 
Planting: 
Willow Posting (600 linear feet) 
willow material $400 
contractor 269 
farm laborers 400 
Willow Posting Total $1,069 $695 SIP 
Fencing (8,000 linear feet) 
material $1,634 
farm laborers 2,340 
Fencing Total $3,974 $1,987 SIP 
Tree Planting (18.5 acres) :1( 
seedlings $1,645 ,,' I 
flagging 92 ,: 
contractor 1.660 
Tree Planting Total $3,397 $2,148 SIP 
TOTALS $8,440 $4,830 SIP 
grant: 5,550 BIP 
TOTAL FUNDING $10,380 
i 
I 
Estimated Maintenance Costs I 
herbicide applications (2 per year) $1,000 total (two years) t 
reinforcement plantings $750 
Stream Crossings (8 feet wide) (estimated costs) 
crossing #1 $4,969 $4,347 
crossing #2 2,676 2,341 
crossing #3 2,441 2,136 
TOTAL $10,086 8,824 MACS 
Summary: 
Buffer Establishment $8,440 $10,380 BIP, SIP 
Estimated Maintenance Costs $1,750 (first two years) 
Stream Crossings $10,086 $8,824 MACS 
TOTALS $20,276 $19,204 
SIP: Stewardship Incentive Program (65% cost share) Goint federal/state) 
BIP: Buffer Incentive Program ($300/acre grant) (Maryland DNR) 
MACS: Maryland Agricultural Cost Share (87.5% cost share) (Maryland Department 
of Agriculture) 
23 
Transactions Costs 
The scale of the up-front costs in the previous example demonstrates why some 
landowners would be hesitant to participate in a voluntary program: perceived 
transactions costs. This category of costs for a farmer concerns the "hassle factor" of 
participating in a voluntary buffer program. While there may be cost-sharing, grants, or 
technical assistance benefits for participating, perceived difficulty and delays in obtaining 
these services may prevent a landowner from considering involvement in the program. 
Previous experiences a farmer has had with government agencies may have a considerable 
influence on the relative weight given to perceived transactions costs. The importance of 
these experiences is discussed in greater detail in the literature review of studies of 
diffusion and adoption of environmental innovations on agricultural land. 
24 
Problem Statement 
The previous sections have outlined the case for riparian buffers: policy-makers 
see in buffers the potential for the production of a range of environmental functions, and 
of economic and social benefits derived from those functions that may or may not 
outweigh the costs. While many studies have focused on the potential environmental 
benefits of buffers, little attention has been paid to what factors may influence a 
landowner to put a riparian buffer on his or her land. These factors are particularly 
important in the case of agricultural land, because of its predominance as a nonpoint 
source of water pollution and because it may also provide some of the best opportunities 
for habitat and other environmental improvements. 
Understanding the farmer's process for adopting this conservation behavior is 
essential in order to design and implement effective riparian buffer policies, for two 
reasons. First, the current political prominence of property rights advocates suggests that 
economic incentives and voluntary programs, rather than environmental regulations, may 
provide the most promising opportunities for establishment of buffers. Second, 
budgetary constraints limit the availability of funds for outright purchase of riparian lands, 
and other voluntary programs must use their limited resources for public outreach, cost-
sharing, grants, and technical assistance in the most cost-effective way. 
To what extent do farmers not participate in voluntary riparian buffer programs 
simply because they are unaware of their availability and of the benefits of buffers? To 
what extent are farmers driven by attitudinal factors, such as dislike for government 
programs, as opposed to perceived "pure" economic costs, such as the possible row-crop 
income lost by taking riparian land out of production? 
When it comes to analysis of riparian buffer policy around the United States, one 
size does not fit all. Riparian buffers provide different environmental functions and 
values in different ecosystems, and landowners from state to state present different 
attitudinal and economic issues that policy-makers need to address when promoting 
buffers. Thus examination of programs on a state or local scale is apt to provide the most 
useful policy insight. 
A review of agricultural economics, rural sociology, and other literature showed 
that a number of studies have examined how landowner attributes such as age, percentage 
of income from farming, wealth, and commitment to conservation affect the willingness 
of a landowner to adopt innovative conservation practices on agricultural lands. Similar 
adoption-of-innovation research is needed for riparian buffers, but little attention has been 
25 
focused on adoption of tree or grass planting exclusively in the riparian zone, particularly 
in the case of trees. 
Empirical research is needed to test hypotheses about the extent to which a 
combination of attitudinal and "pure" economic factors drive the behavior of farmers with 
regard to voluntary riparian buffer programs. Based on the literature for other land set-
aside and best management practices programs, these hypotheses predict that the behavior 
of farmers is not always driven solely by economic considerations. The extent to which 
that is true has important policy implications for cost-share, grantmaking, and outreach 
programs designed to promote forest and grass buffers. 
26 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This research project addresses the following question: why would someone 
voluntarily plant a riparian buffer on his or her agricultural land? To help answer that 
question, an analytical framework is developed that extends an adoption-of-innovation 
approach used in the agricultural economics literature. A review of the broader adoption-
of-innovations and diffusion-of-innovations literature provided guidance toward 
development of this framework. This discussion of that literature suggests possible 
strengths and limitations of the approach taken in this study. 
Adoption and diffusion of innovation have been studied in a variety of academic 
disciplines besides agricultural economics, including rural sociology, communication, and 
marketing. While there are differences among these approaches, diffusion researcher 
Everett Rogers has found that they nonetheless produced many similar findings about the 
adoption process (Rogers 1983). 
The synthesis and analytical framework used by Rogers provides a useful starting 
point for reviewing the literature on adoption of innovation. Discussion of the diffusion-
of-innovation framework is followed in this review by examples of that framework being 
applied to diffusion of conservation practices by farmers. The second part of this 
literature review refers primarily to a 1985 analysis by Feder, Just and Zilberman, who 
discussed the literature on adoption of agricultural innovations in developing countries 
and provided a useful synopsis of the applicability of various adoption frameworks to 
agricultural issues. This discussion is followed by a summary of relevant studies in the 
agricultural economics literature on adoption of various sustainable agriculture, soil 
conservation, or best management practices in the United States. These models address a 
number of factors also important in models used for analysis of land set-aside 
conservation programs. The fourth part of this literature review focuses on several 
studies looking exclusively at such land set-asides. 
27 
The Diffusion and Adoption of Innovations 
Planting riparian buffers to provide environmental benefits can be considered an 
"innovation," which Rogers defines as an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new 
by an individual or other unit of adoption. An innovation presents an individual or an 
organization with a new alternative or alternatives for solving problems. 
According to Rogers's framework, for something to be considered an innovation, 
it does not need to be "new in an objective sense or involve new knowledge~ rather, if the 
individual perceives it is new in a particular setting, then it is an innovation" (Rogers 
1983). For example, someone may have known about planting trees along streams, but 
may have not been aware of the extent of the potential benefits when framed within the 
context of nutrient control or environmental benefits for the Chesapeake Bay. 
Rogers defines diffusion as a process by which an innovation is communicated 
over time through certain channels among members of a social system. He recognizes 
that the diffusion of an innovation is a process that may take many years between the 
innovation's first introduction and eventual widespread adoption. Economic, 
sociological, institutional, and psychological factors are part of the decision-making 
process for potential adopters of the innovation. The process is described as having five 
steps: initial knowledge, the formation of a favorable or unfavorable attitude about the 
innovation through persuasion, the decision to adopt or reject the innovation, 
implementation of the innovation, and confirmation, whereby the individual may reverse 
the earlier decision to adopt or not adopt. Rogers also describes the attributes of 
individuals in a series of categories of potential adopters, including innovators, early 
adopters, the early majority, the late majority, and laggards. 
Rogers notes that the diffusion of innovation involves the twin concepts of 
information and uncertainty. He summarizes a literature finding that information typically 
comes from the subjective evaluations of peers or near-peers who have experimented with 
the innovation, rather than from scientific analysis. The role of "change agents" such as 
agricultural extension personnel are particularly important in providing this information. 
The successful change agent is described as someone who devotes a great deal of effort to 
initiating contact with potential adopters about the innovation, has empathy with the 
potential adopters about their needs, and has developed a degree of trust with the potential 
adopters. Rogers notes that for some government personnel, establishing trust may be 
particularly difficult, perhaps because they are seen as regulators as well. Zube and 
Sheehan focused on desert riparian area landscape perceptions and attitudes in Arizona, 
noting differences between resource managers and other interest groups such as farmers, 
28 
suggesting that this disconnect between managers and landowners might be particularly 
important in the case of voluntary riparian buffer programs (Zube and Sheehan 1994 ). In 
part because of this problem, the role of trusted opinion leaders in the community is also 
important. The experiences of opinion leaders helps individuals who are motivated to 
seek further information about the innovation to cope with the uncertainty innovation 
creates. 
The diffusion of innovation approach described by Rogers has also been tested 
specifically with regard to environmental innovations on farms, with some debate in the 
rural sociology literature over its applicability. Articles by Pampel and Van Es (1977) and 
Nowak (1987) provide a useful summary of this debate. 
Pampel and Van Es found that environmental innovation by farmers is not 
predicted well by the demographic variables commonly used in diffusion-of-innovation 
research. Rather, diffusion theories are better at explaining adoption of commercial 
agricultural practices. The authors distinguished between farm practices designed 
primarily to protect environmental and natural resources and those designed primarily to 
increase farm output. 
Pampel and Van Es examine three explanations of adoptive behavior for these two 
categories of innovations. In the first explanation, the authors cite previous work by 
Rogers and other diffusion researchers which states that the most important causes of 
innovative behavior are psychological traits including attitudes about change and risk. 
This theory suggests that innovative farmers will try many new practices, with profit and 
environmental impact only secondary considerations. Thus both adoption of commercial 
agricultural practices and conservation innovations would be explained by this theory. 
The second theory is that a farmer's behavior is explained more by attitudes about profit 
than attitudes about risk. Thus a farmer would adopt profitable environmental practices, 
but not unprofitable ones. The third explanation the authors examine is the possible 
distinction between farmers who view farming as a business and farmers who view it as a 
way of life. Business-oriented farmers would adopt profitable and less profitable 
commercial practices alike that involve close participation in the agribusiness system; less 
business-oriented farmers would be less likely to adopt commercial practices and more 
likely to use environmental practices. 
Pampel and van Es found that the orientation-to-farming explanation works best 
for environmental innovations. The authors concluded that the predictors of profitable 
innovations were different than predictors of unprofitable innovations (for example, land 
set-asides). Farm experience best explained adoption of conservation practices, while 
variables relating to farm size best explain adoption of commercial practices. In 
29 
particular, the authors question the extent to which the diffusion process is relevant for 
public benefit-oriented rather than private benefit-oriented innovations, since the perceived 
costs of most conservation innovations are apt to exceed the perceived short- and long-
term benefits. 
Nowak argues that the economic perspective taken by Pampel and Van Es 
complements the "information" perspective of adoption-diffusion.research, which 
suggests that a farmer must be made aware of the need for the innovation, be able to 
obtain valid information to evaluate the consequences, and receive sufficient technical 
assistance to implement it. Nowak also adds ecological factors to the mix, noting that 
adoption of conservation innovations depends also on their appropriateness for a 
particular farm. To test this hypothesis, Nowak initiated a series of four contacts with 
farmers in two watersheds over a two-year period. Nowak asked about these farmers' 
use of four conservation practices seen as unprofitable, including buffer strips, and one 
seen as profitable, the use of conservation tillage. 
The information factors discussed by Nowak refer to work by Rogers and others 
suggesting that a farmer's integration into local assistance and information networks and 
the credibility of change agents in the community can be major factors in an adoption 
decision. He collected data on the number of times farmers contacted extension personnel 
during the past year. Economic factors discussed by Nowak include farm size, amount of 
non-farm income, and credit use. He refers to a literature noting that operators with off-
farm income have more flexibility to invest in conservation practices and that large-scale 
farmers should also be willing to invest in environmental innovations because they have 
more discretionary resources, flexibility, and ability to deal with risk and uncertainty. 
Nowak concludes that both economic and information factors are important in the 
adoption of conservation innovations on farms. Information factors tended to increase in 
importance as the complexity of the innovation increases and decrease in importance as 
risk is reduced through cost-share or other institutional support. Nowak argues that the 
traditional economic perspective is insufficient in that it ignores insights from sociological 
research such as the implications of community networks and attitudes. He also 
recognizes limitations of research that he and others have done, noting that adoption and 
diffusion are processes occurring over time, and that research in this field needs to move 
beyond reliance on perceptual and aggregate economic and ecological data. 
30 
The Adoption of Agricultural Technologies 
In a 1985 article, Feder, Just and Zilbennan discuss the strengths and weaknesses 
of a range of studies in the agricultural economics literature on adoption of agricultural 
innovations in developing countries, particularly the adoption of high-yielding varieties of 
grain. While their examples are different in so~e respects from land set-aside programs, 
the authors outline various analytical frameworks used in the diffusion-of-agricultural 
innovation literature that are relevant for riparian buffer adoption. In the agricultural 
economics literature, the authors find that, generally, the innovation adoption decisions of 
a farmer in a given period are assumed to be derived from the maximization of expected 
utility or profit, subject to whatever constraints on land or other factors under which the 
farmer is operating (Feder, Just and Zilbennan 1985). 
The authors also describe different equations of motion that have been used to 
address the intertemporal nature of diffusion of innovations. These equations are 
particularly important to help understand changing perceptions of an innovation. One 
approach is the use of Bayesian learning rules, a statistical approach which helps describe 
the ways in which individuals operating under initial uncertainty change their behavior as 
they get more observations on which to base their perceptions. These Bayesian models 
also help explain the time lag between initial awareness of an innovation and actual 
adoption. The authors refer to studies by O'Mara and Lindner that build on concepts on 
experimentation developed by Rogers to address the question of risk and uncertainty. 
These studies show that in many cases farmers experiment with innovations on a small 
portion of their land. 
This approach may be particularly useful in the study of riparian buffer diffusion, 
where the perception of costs to a farmer may be based to some degree on the experiences 
of peers and the extent of their opportunity costs, planting and maintenance costs, and 
transactions costs. For instance, if a farmer learns from his neighbor there is little red 
tape involved, that the upfront costs and ongoing maintenance were minimal, and that the 
buffer did not produce other regulatory problems or threats to adjacent fields, he might 
change his perception over time and consider planting a buffer at a future time. 
Another approach that Feder, Just, and Zilbennan note from the diffusion 
literature is one that recogn:zes explicitly the effects of extension efforts and human capital 
differences in changes in perception over time. Again, this approach has important 
relevance for riparian buffc rs, since many public agencies are involved in their promotion, 
and each agency is faced with limited funds for outreach and cost share budgets. Feder, 
Just and Zilberman also note the influence of perception of the extension service, citing a 
31 
l 
1972 study by Harriss that indicated that lack of confidence in extension efforts may in 
some cases lead farmers to look to the success of neighbors, friends and relatives in \ 
adopting an innovation, rather than following the lead of an extension agent. 
Feder, Just and Zilberman review a number of theoretical diffusion models, 
pointing out some key components of them. One already mentioned is the role of 
uncertainty and the degree of risk aversion for a farmer. A second is the possible 
relationship between farm size and fixed transactions costs, citing two studies showing 
that smaller farms are less likely to adopt agricultural innovations because of these fixed 
costs. A third is the extent to which innovations are adopted as part of a package. Again, 
this is a particularly important question in the case of riparian buffers, since additional 
best management practices on the farm may provide some of the same environmental 
benefits as the buffer and may reduce stress on the buffer, thus improving its 
performance. Other aspects of the diffusion literature that Feder, Just and Zilberman 
review include the effect that educational level, age, off-farm income, and extension effort 
have on a farmer's likelihood of adoption. 
The authors also note that different conclusions may result from studies of 
different regions or countries because of different social, cultural, or institutional 
environments "aside from 'pure' economic factors." 
32 
l 
___ ..,. __ _ 
The Adoption of Best Management Practices 
The agricultural economics literature includes many articles about the adoption of 
various conservation practices on agricultural land. For many of these practices, the 
determinants ofa doption may differ from those for land set-aside progrmns. A brief 
discussion of these studies is included here because they influenced the developrnent of 
the analytical framework used for this study and others on participation in land set-aside 
programs. 
Ervin and Ervin examined factors affecting the use of voluntmy erosion control 
practices, developing a theoretical model based on institutional, personal, physical, and 
economic characteristics for the land and landowner. The authors found that education 
and the awareness of the degree ofe rosion play the most important roles in detennination 
of a farmer's decision to invest in soil conservation practices. These variables were found 
to be inversely related to the number ofy ears fanning, thus younger fanners might be 
more apt to adopt conservation practices (Ervin and Ervin 1982) . 
Norris and Batie examined soil conservation decisions in Virginia. They found 
that financial factors, including higher incomes, larger fann size, and lower debt levels, 
were the most important element of such decisions, with awareness of erosion, 
educational level, and level of off-farm income also important (Norris and Batie 1987). 
D'Souza, Cyphers and Phipps examined factors affecting the adoption of 
sustainable agricultural practices, including integrated pest management and rotational 
grazing. The authors describe a framework based on the agricultural technology adoption 
literature, with factors affecting technology adoption grouped into four categories: human 
capital including age and educational level; structural and financial, including fann size, 
debt/asset ratio, and off-fann employment; institutional. including participation in fann 
commodity programs; and environmental, including factors such as ground water quality. 
The authors found that detenninants ofa doption differ from those for conventional 
agricultural technologies. The likelihood ofa doption was found to most influenced by an 
"awareness effect," with regard to the severity ofg roundwater problems on the fann. 
Human capital characteristics were also found to be significant, while structural and 
institutional characteristics were not. Age and off-fann employment were negatively 
correlated with the adoption decision; educational level and level ofg roundwater 
contamination were positively correlated with the decision (D'Souza, Cyphers and Phipps 
1993). 
Feather and Cooper examined components of the U.S. Department of 
A . 1 ' 
gncu ture s Water Quality Program designed to encourage the use of best management 
33 
practices. Feather and Cooper found that adoption of these practices was most strongly 
determined by the farmer's perception of their effect on profitability and that familiarity 
with conservation programs and a belief that the practices will help on-site water quality 
were also important in the decision (Feather and Cooper 1995). 
34 
',,,?/./! 
Determinants of Participation in Land Set-Aside Programs 
Planting a forest buffer is more akin to a land set-aside program like the 
Conservation Reserve Program than to many of the agricultural innovations described in 
the previous sections. It is particularly important to examine land set-aside programs, 
since the long-term benefits of taking land out of production may be perceived to accrue 
primarily to the community at large, whereas certain soil conservation practices may be 
perceived as being in the farmer's direct long-run interest. 
Morris and Potter extend the diffusion of innovation framework to analyze 
participation in England's Environmentally Sensitive Areas Programme (ESA) (Morris 
and Potter 1995). The authors describes their survey of a cross-section of 101 farmers in 
South East England who are participating or not participating in ESA. Building on 
Rogers's conceptual framework, the authors place farmers on a participation spectrum 
ranging from resistant non-adopters to conditional non-adopters to passive adopters to 
active adopters. Resistant non-adopters are described as people who would not 
participate in the voluntary program under any circumstances. Conditional non-adopters 
would consider participating if the subsidy was made more attractive. Passive adopters, 
also called "the new conservationists," are attracted by financial inducements and would 
participate as long as they can do so with minimal cost and inconvenience. Active 
adopters tend to have a history of environmental innovation already. The authors also cite 
a literature describing the importance of enhancing conservation advice to farmers, in 
addition to financial incentives. 
Bell, Roberts, English and Park investigated the likely effect of cost-share 
incentives on participation in the Tennessee Forest Stewardship Program and identified 
other factors that may contribute to participation. The authors developed a random utility 
model to determine the probability that a landowner will choose to participate in the 
program. Their model states that the indirect utility received by an individual for 
participating or not participating in Tennessee's Forest Stewardship Program is a function 
of the landowner's current income from all sources, the out-of-pocket costs associated 
with planting the trees, personal characteristics including age and occupation, farm 
features including size, current land use, and ownership type, and attitudes and beliefs 
about conservation practices. Their results indicate that attitudes and knowledge about 
forestry programs may be more influential than monetary incentives in a landowner's 
decision to participate. The results suggest that a negative attitude toward the program's 
goals could outweigh the program's monetary benefits to a landowner, to the point where 
the landowner would not participate, regardless of the cost share offered. The authors 
35 
suggest that resources might best be used by focusing on outreach efforts to change 
attitudes, rather than increasing the level of cost share (Bell, Roberts, English and Park 
1994). 
Studies of participation in the Conservation Reserve Program also provide an 
important source of guidance toward developing a conceptual framework for study of 
adoption of riparian buffers, although, like Tennessee's Forest Stewardship Program, the 
Conservation Reserve Program is not focused exclusively on riparian areas. 
Esseks and Kraft conducted a survey of farmers in four diverse mid western sites 
to learn why some eligible farmland owners participated or did not participate in the first 
four annual sign-ups of the Conservation Reserve Program. The survey included a series 
of closed- and open-ended questions to understand participation factors, comparing the 
results with information about the owner's personal and farm background. They found 
that, depending on the survey site, from one-third to one-half of the nonparticipating 
owners did not know they were eligible for the program and were unaware of the 
prevailing per-acre rent and other benefits of the program. A comparison to soil maps 
found that this perception was untrue in almost all cases. The authors indicate that this 
pointed to a need for better outreach, contradicting the findings of an earlier, national 
survey of county-level ASCS, SCS, and Cooperative Extension personnel, in which 
these agency representatives indicated that perception of erosion by the landowner was 
not an important reason for nonparticipation. Esseks and Kraft also note that their 
conclusions suggest that an increase in the per-acre rental rate and the right to graze or hay 
enrolled land would have increased participation. The authors' analysis noted several 
other significant determinants of participation, depending on the survey location. The 
most quantitatively important determinant was whether or not a landowner had received 
cost-sharing or conservation technical assistance during the past two years, suggesting 
that these landowners were thus more aware of the benefits of CRP. For one site (in 
Wisconsin), the authors also found level of education to be positively related to CRP 
bidding, and that the larger total revenues, the lower estimated probability of CRP 
bidding. The authors attribute this to the fact that higher incomes in that area tend to be 
associated with dairying, and if farmers do not intend to reduce the size of their herds, 
they may believe that they have little or no cropland to spare (Esseks and Kraft 1988). 
Esseks and Kraft resurveyed participants in their 1987 survey to determine the 
success of U.S. Department of Agriculture outreach efforts. Since the time of the first 
survey, CRP eligibility requirements had been expanded in two important respects for 
riparian buffers. Before the sixth CRP sign-up, two-thirds of a field had to be considered 
highly erodible to be eligible for CRP per-acre rental payments. Starting with the sixth 
36 
sign-up, fields that were only one-third highly erodible could be included, as long as the 
applicant intended to plant trees. In addition, grass or forest filter strips (buffers) were 
included, even if that land was not highly erodible, as long as the filter strips promised to 
"reduce sediment substantially." Depending on the sample site, the authors found that 
from 39% to 58% were unaware of the filter strip option, and even bigger proportions 
(6 9% to 80%) were unaware of the liberalized conditions for tree planting. The authors 
found that there was increased awareness of CRP eligibility since the initial survey, and 
they concluded that awareness of CRP eligibility is related to the number of visits by a 
landowner to a USDA office. This relationship did not hold for awareness of the new 
tree planting or riparian filter strip options, suggesting a need for better outreach materials 
(Esseks and Kraft 1989). 
McLean-Meyinsse, Hui, and Joseph focused on the determinants of small farmers 
in Louisiana's awareness, participation, and willingness to participate in the Conservation 
Reserve Program. Their analysis is based on the assumption that a farmer's participation 
is determined by weighing his or her perceived costs and perceived benefits, and that the 
expected utility from participating exceeds the expected utility from not participating. The 
authors surveyed 69 farm operators by mail. They used a binomial logit model to analyze 
their hypothesis that participation was a function of age, education, income, full- or part-
time farming status, race, percentage of acres operated that are owned by the operator, 
and average return in dollars per acre of land farmed. The authors found that participation 
depends on whether payments per acre were comparable to the opportunity costs of 
removing cropland from production. In addition, farmers with higher incomes and more 
education were more aware of the Conservation Reserve Program (McLean-Meyinsse, 
Hui, and Joseph 1994 ). 
Olmstead and McCurdy analyzed factors affecting Conservation Reserve Program 
tree planting in Southern Illinois. The authors surveyed by mail participants in the 
Conservation Reserve Program. Of the landowners who planted trees, 62% cited 
conservation and 52% cited wildlife, recreation, and aesthetics as a motivation for 
planting. The number of participants interested in habitat increased with age. Twenty-
four percent cited timber as a motivation, and only 9% cited full reimbursement for stand 
establishment. CRP participants who did not plant trees cited most often the length of 
timber rotation between harvest, a lack of information, and insufficient rental rate per acre 
as the reasons for not planting trees. 43% of tree planting owners believed that the forest 
land would increase the value of their ownership, while 51 % of non-tree planting owners 
believed that the forest land would decrease the value of their ownership. Only 2% of the 
tree planting participants listed timber production exclusive of other objectives, however. 
37 
I. 
The authors found no statistically significant difference in educational levels of tree 
planting and and non-tree planting participants. The authors also examined information 
sources, finding that tree planters cited the Forest Service and Illinois Department of 
Conservation more frequently than non-tree planters, who in turn cited neighbors, friends 
and relatives as a source of information more often than the tree planters (Olmstead and 
McCurdy 1989). 
Lant conducted a contingent choice survey of farmers in Fayette County, Illinois 
and found that farmers were less likely to enroll streamside land in the Conservation 
Reserve Program if tree planting were required and if the contracts were extended to 20 
years. Lant found that farmers were constrained by the economic trade-offs they would 
have to make between crop production and conservation on their riparian land. At the 
same time, he found that farmers use non-economic factors when deciding the use of their 
riparian lands, with soil conservation, water quality, and wildlife habitat benefits being 
important considerations. In addition, farmers wished to avoid government control over 
management of their farms (Lant 1991 ). 
38 
CHAPTER 3 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: THE ADOPTION PROCESS 
This research project attempts to answer the following questions: Why do people 
participate or decline to participate in voluntary riparian buffer programs, and what are the 
factors driving this behavior? Empirical research will test the hypothesis that a combination of 
attitudinal and "pure" economic factors determine this behavior, with the relative importance of 
each factor varying with age, size of farm, percentage of income from farming, and other 
independent variables. 
For this project, an adoption-of-innovation model for riparian buffers is developed 
and tested by examining one state-wide initiative, Maryland's Buffer Incentive Program, 
an undertaking focused exclusively on voluntary implementation of forest buffers. Data 
gathered from interviews with more than 500 landowners in Maryland provides an 
empirical test of the model. This research project is designed to gain some understanding 
of what it might take to get various types of landowners in various land uses to implement 
riparian buffers on their land. While Maryland differs from other states in many 
environmental, economic, sociological, and institutional respects, this project is designed 
to provide a framework for analysis that might be useful for riparian buffer policy-makers 
in other parts of the country as well. 
The central premise of this research project is that three steps take place for a 
landowner to participate in a voluntary riparian buffer program: 
1) The landowner is made aware of the concept of riparian buffers and of the 
existence of cost-share or grant-making programs like the Buffer Incentive 
Program. 
2) The landowner perceives that the benefits of riparian buffers outweigh the costs. 
Perceived benefits may include environmental functions and values occurring on 
the owner's land, those accruing to the community at large, possible tax or 
financial advantages, and psychological rewards of conducting environmental 
restoration. Perceived costs may include opportunity costs of other land uses, 
planting and maintenance costs, and transactions costs. 
3) The landowner makes "the buffer deal" with or without the help of cost-share 
funds, grants, technical assistance, and other programs and policies designed to 
encourage implementation of buffers. 
39 
This thesis focuses only on the first two steps in this adoption process, through 
which conclusions and subsequent recommendations will be made for policies to facilitate 
the third step. 
The theoretical framework used to determine the factors determining participation 
in Maryland's Buffer Incentive Program was developed with guidance from previous 
analyses of participation in other land set-aside or agricultural conservation programs, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
The landowner participation in the Buffer Incentive Program can be seen as a 
function of the following factors: 
A. land parcel features (including current land use and size) 
B . personal characteristics of the landowner (including educational level, age, 
percentage income from farming, gross income from farming, and commitment to 
conservation) 
C. the landowner's awareness of the concept of buffers and of the Buffer Incentive 
Program 
.r. 
D. perceived benefits from the landowner's point-of-view, including incentive ,,: 
payments, on-site benefits, and community benefits 'yi'.  
""  
E. perceived costs to the landowner, which can be broken down into three I,, 
subcategories: 
1. opportunity costs, including loss of income from the current land use 
and in the future from reduced development potential 
2. planting and maintenance costs, including up-front costs for planting 
and subsequent costs for maintaining the buffer in forest or grass 
3. transactions costs, or "who bears the brunt of the 'hassle factor'?" 
This study has been undertaken with the recognition that decisions about adoption of 
an innovation are made over a period of time, and that an individual's perceptions and attitudes 
are not cast in concrete forever. This empirical analysis takes a snapshot of the motivations of 
farmers from November 1995 to January 1996. For policy-making purposes, how those 
motivations might change over time is perhaps the more important question, requiring a 
dynamic model, as discussed in the next chapter. 
40 
CHAPTER 4 
GENERAL APPROACH 
Th_e following st~p_s we.re taken in the development of this research project and are 
described m greater detail m this chapter: 
1 . Defined scope of project 
2. Limited scale of investigation 
3. Identified research questions 
4. Evaluated models and analytical techniques 
5 . Designed survey instrument 
6. Implemented survey 
7. Analyzed data 
Project Scope 
The first task in this project was a review of literature on the determinants of 
participation in voluntary riparian buffer programs. Because forest buffers in particular 
have received emphasis only in the past several years, there is very little peer-reviewed, 
published research on this topic. Three steps were taken as next-best alternatives. First, 
the literature on adoption of agricultural innovations and conservation practices was 
reviewed. This literature describes research on many factors that might also play a role in 
a landowner's decision to set aside riparian land for forest or grass buffers. Second, 
interviews with people from the public and private sector who are knowledgeable about 
riparian buffers highlighted additional concerns that farmers have voiced in various 
forums addressing the issue. Third, government reports, testimony, and other grey 
literature were reviewed, especially for guidance on the current riparian buffer policy 
debates. The dearth of published research on riparian buffer adoption, as well as insights 
provided through telephone and personal interviews, pointed to the need for original data 
collection in this project. 
Narrowing the Scale of Investigation 
Interviews and a review of peer-reviewed and grey literature pointed to a need to 
narrow the scale of investigation by focusing on a program that met the following criteria. 
41 
First, the program had to address riparian buffers, preferably without the confusion of 
having other land eligible for planting that lies outside the riparian area. Second, the 
program had to be voluntary, not regulatory, because such voluntary approaches are at the 
heart of current policy debates on riparian buffers. Third, the program should address 
agricultural land uses, because of agriculture's predominance as a nonpoint source of 
water pollution. Because riparian zones in different regions of the country offer 
significantly different ecological and economic values, it is difficult to generalize on a 
nationwide scale about the costs and benefits a landowner might perceive from buffer 
implementation. Thus the program being analyzed should be statewide, which should 
provide a manageable scale for comparison. 
Maryland's Buffer Incentive Program fit the bill as the focus of study for several 
reasons. First, its sole purpose is to provide a voluntary incentive only for planting 
riparian forest buffers. Unlike other programs that include a tree-planting component, 
such as the Conservation Reserve Program or Forestry Incentive Program, land outside 
the riparian zone is ineligible for grants from the Buffer Incentive Program. In addition, 
the program focuses only on planting trees, not grass. Grass buffers are an important 
alternative or complement to forest buffers, however, so landowner perceptions about 
grass buffers are included as part of this research. The number of participants appeared to 
be large enough to provide some insight on determinants of participation, yet conducting 
interviews with all the participants appears to be a feasible goal. The program is 
statewide, with participants in 16 counties. A review of public records indicated that 
previous land uses of buffered areas in this program were primarily for row crops or 
pasture, so the study provides an opportunity for insight into determinants of riparian 
buffer adoption on agricultural land. 
Adoption behavior for other best management practices has been shown to vary 
because of economic, institutional, and cultural differences in different regions (Feder, 
Just and Zilberman 1985). Agriculture in Maryland, while different in many respects 
from other states, offers a reasonable scale for comparison of determinants of 
participation in a riparian buffer program. The counties of the Eastern Shore of Maryland 
(the peninsula east of the Chesapeake Bay) lead the state in production of com, soybeans, 
barley, and wheat, while western counties lead the state's dairy, hay, and tobacco 
production (Maryland Department of Agriculture 1995). Institutional factors also vary 
across the state. For example, the easternmost 16 counties are subject to stricter riparian 
zone regulation because of Maryland's Chesapeake Bay Critical Areas Act. Culturally, 
the Chesapeake Bay can be seen as the literal great divide for Maryland. The state was 
founded three centuries before construction of the Chesapeake Bay Bridge, which now 
42 
provides easy access between the eastern and western parts of the state. It may take 
longer to bridge the cultural differences that developed in those three centuries, and this 
may be reflected in different attitudes from east to west about private property rights or 
government programs in general. 
43 
Maryland's Buffer Incentive Program 
Maryland's Buffer Incentive Program is a voluntary initiative coordinated by the 
state's Department of Natural Resources to awards grants for successful planting and 
maintenance of riparian forested buffers. The program's stated goal is to serve as an 
incentive for the planting of these buffers on private land and to help defray the 
landowner's costs of establishing and maintaining them. 
The Buffer Incentive Program helped establish a total of 665 acres in forest 
buffers during the period of 1992 to 1994, the three years included in this study. 
Twenty-six landowners participated in 1992, 22 in 1993, and 34 in 1994. Some 
landowners planted buffers in more than one year, so the working total for this study is 
80 landowners. During that time the program helped establish riparian forest buffers in 
16 of Maryland's 23 counties. 
The previous use of the riparian land converted to forest buffers through the 
Buffer Incentive Program has been primarily agricultural: of 82 buffers established 
through the program in 1992 to 1994, 21 were on land previously used as pasture and 48 
as row cropland or for some other agricultural use. Guidance to DNR foresters notes that 
one of the groups DNR is most interested in reaching through the program is the 
agricultural community, and suggests that the best way to reach farmers is through the 
local Soil Conservation District manager. 
Buffer Incentive Program eligibility requirements include the following: 
? any area of privately owned land of at least one acre and not more than 50 acres 
which is a crop field, pasture field, other open area of bare ground, or early 
successional vegetation 
? in addition to meeting one of the qualifications above, eligible lands must meet one 
of the following criteria: be within 300 feet of a stream, river, pond, tidal or non-
tidal wetland, or other open water. The water must appear on a U.S. Geological 
Survey 7.5 minute quad map (a "blue line" stream) or have flowing water for any 
one-month period during the year. Wetlands must appear on a U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service wetlands map or be otherwise classifiable as a wetland based on 
current State of Maryland criteria. Land within a 100-year floodplain is also 
eligible. 
Policies and conditions of Buffer Incentive Program requirements include the 
following: 
? the minimum proposed buffer width is 50 feet, although existing forest can be 
incorporated into the buffer. For example, if a 20-foot buffer already exists, a 30-
foot buffer may be planted to create the minimum 50-foot buffer. 
44 
? one acre is the minimum planting size; there is no minimum length along the 
stream 
? grant awards were $200 per acre in 1992, $500 per acre in 1993 and 1994, and 
are currently $300 per acre. 
? to receive full grant payment, 65% of the planted trees must survive until the fall or 
winter following planting, based on an inspection by the local forester. Survival 
rates of 50% to 65% are eligible for a 50% grant, with the remainder paid upon 
successful replanting that brings survival up to the 65% rate. 
? Landowners must comply with the terms of the approved planting plan for at least 
ten years, or DNR may bring an action to require restoration of the practice or 
payment of the money received. 
? The program does not apply to recently cleared forestland, nor to any planting 
required by law or regulation, nor to establishment of orchard or Christmas trees 
? Landowners are also eligible for cost-share funding from programs such as the 
Agricultural Conservation Program, the Forestry Incentive Program, the 
Stewardship Incentive Program, and the Conservation Reserve Program. 
? Grass buffers are not eligible for grants under the Buffer Incentive Program 
guidelines. 
45 
Identification of Research Questions 
Once a suitable program had been identified as a case study, a group of testable 
hyphotheses was developed with regard to the determinants of participation in this 
program. Development of these hypotheses was guided by the findings of similar 
adoption studies for other best management or agricultural technology practices and by 
farmer concerns about buffers reflected in the grey literature and in interviews with 
knowledgeable parties. Hypotheses relate to land parcel features, landowner personal 
characteristics, awareness of the concept, perceived benefits, and perceived costs. 
Stated Hypotheses: 
1 . Land parcel features 
A) current land use: landowners with row crops in riparian area will be less likely to 
participate than landowners with pasture or other land uses in riparian area 
B) size: landowners with larger properties will be more likely to participate than 
landowners with smaller properties 
2. Landowner personal characteristics 
A) gross revenue: the higher the gross revenue, the more likely the landowner will 
be to participate 
B) age: younger landowners will be more likely to participate than older farmers 
C) education: landowners with education beyond high school will be more likely to 
participate than landowners with less education 
D) percent net income from farming: landowners who earn less than 50% of their 
income from farming will be more likely to participate than landowners who earn 
more than 50% of their income from farming 
E) commitment to conservation: landowners who indicate that water quality and 
other environmental benefits to the community were important in their decision 
will be more likely to participate than landowners who did not indicate that this 
was a factor 
3. Landowner's awareness of riparian buffers and the program : 
A) landowners who were initially approached personally by a Maryland Department 
of Natural Resources Forester are more likely to participate than landowners who 
were not 
B) landowners who had contacts with more than one source of information (neighbor, 
DNR, NRCS, etc.) about buffers were more likely to participate than those who 
did not 
46 
:L Perceived benefits 
A) ~ost-share: landowners are more likely to participate as cost share payment 
mcreases 
B) cost-share: non-participants are more likely to participate if grass buffers are also 
eligible for BIP cost-share 
C) on-site benefits: landowners who said that creation of fish and wildlife habitat 
was important in their decision will be more likely to participate than landowners 
who did not 
D) on-site benefits: landowners who said that erosion was an important factor in their 
decision will be more likely to participate than landowners who did not 
E) on-site benefits: landowners who said that aesthetic factors such as a scenic view 
were important in their decision are less likely to participate than landowners who 
did not 
F) community benefits: landowners who indicate that water quality and other 
environmental benefits to the community were important in their decision will be 
more likely to participate than landowners who did not indicate that this was a 
factor 
G) community benefits: the higher the gross revenue,the more likely the landowner 
will be to indicate that environmental benefits to the community were important in 
his decision 
H) community benefits: landowners with education beyond high school will be more 
likely to indicate that environmental benefits to the community were important in 
his or her decision 
.5.. Perceived costs 
A) opportunity costs (current income): landowners w~th row crops in riparian area 
will be less likely to participate than landowners with pasture or other agricultural 
land uses in riparian area 
B) opportunity costs (curren~ income): landow_ners with r?w crops will be more 
likely to cite deer populat10n and loss of moisture to adJacent fields as a factor in 
their decision 
C) opportunity costs (future devel?p~ent poten_tial): landowners ~ho said that 
aesthetic factors such as a scemc view were important are less hkely to participate 
than landowners who did not 
D) opportunity costs (future devel?p~ent poten!ial): landowners ~ho said that 
aesthetic factors such as a scemc view were nnportant are less hkely to have very 
small order streams 
E) pla~ting and maintenance c?sts: non-participant_s will_ be m?~e likely to ci!e. length 
of time for planting and mamtenance as a factor m thetr dec1s10n than participants. 
47 
F) planting and maintenance costs: non-participants will be more likely to cite time of 
year of planting and maintenance as a factor in their decision than participants 
G) planting and maintenance costs: non-row crop farmers will be less likely to 
indicate that timing is a factor than row-crop farmers 
H) planting and maintenance costs: landowners will be less willing to accept 20, 30, 
or permanent maintenance requirements or easements than they are for a 10 year 
maintenance requirement 
I) planting and maintenance costs: landowners are willing to accept longer-term 
easements for a higher cost-share 
J) transactions costs: non-participants are more likely than participants to cite time 
spent on the application process as a critical factor in their decision 
Evaluation of Models and Analytical Techniques 
Once hypotheses specific to riparian buffer adoption had been developed, an 
adoption framework was developed, based on similar analyses described in the literature 
,11?11 
',.,,'1  
on the adoption and diffusion of environmental innovations on agricultural land. T-tests :.:::?) 
,.,,~ 
and Mann-Whitney U-tests were used to compare the means of responses by adopters and 
non-adopters to the survey questions. 
The framework, outlined in Chapter 3, hypothesizes that a landowner decision to 
participate or not participate in the Buffer Incentive Program can be seen as a function of 
land parcel features, personal characteristics of the landowner, the landowner's awareness 
of the concept and program, and the landowner's perceived costs and benefits from 
participation in the program. 
This framework was chosen with a recognition that it nonetheless has analytical 
limitations. Feder, Just and Zilberman discussed some of those limitations with regard to 
other dichotomous choice analyses. One is that describing the adoption choices as simply 
"adoption" or "non-adoption," not taking into account the percentage of eligible land for which 
the innovation is adopted, may not tell the complete story. Also, there may be a problem of 
simultaneous equations bias since buffers may be just one of a set of complementary 
innovations (including other best management practices) that are introduced simultaneously 
(Feder, Just and Zilberman 1985). Finally, the process-oriented nature of adoption of 
innovations may not lead itself to the static, "snapshot" approach of landowner behavior used 
in this model. The model developed for this study was guided especially by approaches used 
by Bell, et al. (1994) and D'Souza, Cyphers and Phipps (1993) in part because of the 
snapshot approach taken in those studies. Testing a dynamic model through empirical 
research would require a period of years, following perhaps the approach used by Esseks and 
48 
Kraft (1988; 1989) or Nowak (1987). Such a project by researchers with the resources to do 
so would be a valuable contribution to furthering the understanding adoption of riparian 
buffers. 
Design of the Survey Instrument 
Once the model had been constructed, empirical data collection was necessary to 
test it. The difficulty in gathering farm level economic level about riparian areas, as well 
as the subtleties of attitudinal factors and perceived benefits and costs, suggested that a 
survey would be the most effective method of gathering data. 
Two survey instruments were developed. The first was designed for participants 
in the Buffer Incentive Program; the second was developed as a follow-up to a survey in 
the fall of 1995 of a random sample of farm operators in Maryland with regard to best 
management practices. The earlier survey had asked questions concerning the use of best 
management practices by these operators and gathered data about the farm operator's age, 
gross income from farming, and other demographic characteristics. Many of these 
questions were similar to questions planned for the Buffer Incentive Program participant 
survey, so wording and format of the participant survey was adjusted to match the 
already-completed best management practices survey. 
The survey follows the Total Design Method, an approach commonly used in the 
agricultural economics and rural sociology literature (Dillman 1979; Salant and Dillman 
1994), to the extent that time and financial resources allowed. 
Survey questions were developed with input from faculty committee members and 
others involved in riparian forest buffer policies or programs in Maryland, most notably 
from the Maryland Department of Natural Resources Forestry and Coastal Zone 
Management Divisions, Maryland's Agricultural Extension Service, the Chesapeake Bay 
Program, and the Chesapeake Bay Commission. Beth Webb of the University of 
Maryland's Survey Research Center provided particularly helpful changes in question 
wording and ordering. Additional wording changes were made after test interviews with 
three participants in the Buffer Incentive Program and training sessions for paid callers 
from the Maryland Agricultural Statistics Service. Needless to say, any errors of 
omission or commission in the survey instruments are the author's responsibility and 
should not be a reflection on the many people who provided valuable guidance as it was 
developed. 
49 
The questions were arranged as much as possible to follow the adoption process 
proposed in this thesis. Questions about initial awareness were asked first, followed by 
factors considered when evaluating the costs and benefits of participation in a forest 
buffer program. Hypothetical and more sensitive questions were left to the end of the 
interview, after rapport between interviewer and respondent and a clearer understanding 
of the issue were likely to have been established, as suggested by Dillman. 
Buffer Incentive Program Participants Interview Description 
The first two questions in the interview protocol for Buffer Incentive Program 
participants attempted to elicit responses about the first step in the adoption process: 
awareness. Following an approach suggested by Dillman, the first question is multiple 
choice, followed by an open-ended question to moderate the pace of the interview. This 
open-ended question was also designed to address a particularly difficult but important 
issue in streamside buffer adoption: the ability of agents on the ground to sell the idea of 
buffers to a landowner. While this may be difficult to measure in a rigorous statistical 
fashion, the responses to this open-ended question may nonetheless offer useful insights 
about the importance of one-on-one or other outreach methods. From a policy and 
funding perspective, this may be particularly relevant. Also, the question design 
recognizes that many people may learn about buffers from more than one source and over 
a period of time, as described in the adoption-of-innovation literature (see literature 
reviews in Rogers 1983; Feder, Just and Zilberman 1985). 
Questions 3 through 5 address physical properties of the stream and riparian area, 
including the width of the stream, slope of the land, and possible limitations the land 
might present for further implementation of buffers. 
Question 6 is the heart of the interview. In this multi-part question, the 
respondent is asked to rate on a four-point scale the extent to which 13 factors played a 
role in his or her decision to put a buffer on his or her land. The survey was developed 
with the recognition that it would be impossible to query landowners about every 
conceivable factor in a decision. The 13 factors included in this question cover a range of 
possible perceived costs, benefits, and attitudinal influences and may lead to identification 
of other possible factors worth examination in future research projects. 
Landowners were then asked to recall their actual planting and maintenance costs, 
which may differ from what they originally perceived those costs to be when deciding to 
participate. 
50 
The next section of the interview (Questions 14 and 15) includes two multi-part 
hypothetical questions about willingness to accept payments for various length land use 
restrictions for both forest and grass buffers. The questions are based on similar 
questions asked in a 1993 survey of a nationwide sample of Conservation Reserve 
Program participants (Osborn, Schnepf and Keim 1993). As with Question 6, the desire 
to keep interviews to a reasonable length precluded inclusion of a longer introduction that 
might have strengthened these questions and provoked more concise responses. These 
questions were included despite these limitations, with the expectation that many 
landowners would offer comments about compensation or various term easements that 
might provide a useful starting point for more in-depth research. 
Questions 16 to 21 requested information about the farm and farm owner. 
Following Dillman, these questions were left until the end because they addressed 
income, age, educational level, and other possibly sensitive issues. 
The question about the landowner's education was asked differently in the two 
surveys. Following Dillman, the BIP landowner survey asked the respondent to choose 
among four categories (high school or less, some college, college degree, some graduate 
school). Answers in the best management practices survey were compiled showing the 
number of years beyond high school that a landowner attended school. These answers 
were adjusted to show that 4 years of additional schooling earned a bachelor's degree, 
and any additional years of schooling indicated work toward a graduate degree. 
The interview ended with an open-ended question to elicit opinions about forest 
and grass buffers and the Buffer Incentive Program. 
Random Sample of Maryland Farm Operators Interview Description 
Because of funding and timing constraints, the survey was kept to four 8 1/2 by 
11 pages, thus limiting the time devoted to definitions and other elaboration that might 
have strengthened the interview process. 
The interview began with a screening question to establish whether or not the 
operator owned any riparian land. Since the survey of Buffer Incentive Program 
participants dealt with landowners, not operators, it was necessary to weed out of the 
comparison survey any operators who do not own any land. Of those operators in the 
sample who do own land, it was also necessary to establish whether or not they owned 
any riparian land. If the farmer indicated that he or she does not own any riparian land, 
51 
the interview was terminated. Respondents were asked to address only land they owned 
in the interview, not any other land that they might rent. 
The definition of "riparian" used in the survey instrument is the same as the one 
used in the Buffer Incentive Program guidelines ("within 300 feet of a stream, river, 
pond, tidal or non-tidal wetland, or other open water"). There are a number of definitions 
of "riparian land" that have been offered, as discussed in Chapter 1. However, to ensure 
that the respondent was discussing land that is actually eligible for the Buffer Incentive 
Program, that program's definition was used. At least one other study, of farmers in 
Dickinson County, Kansas, has recognized that a landowner's perception of streamland 
importance is influenced to some degree by his or her perception of what constitutes 
streamland (Schrader 1995); this study in Maryland also recognizes the potential of this 
problem occurring. Callers were given the full Buffer Incentive Program guidelines to 
help respondents if there was some confusion about whether or not their land is eligible 
for the program. Without consulting a U.S. Geological Survey map or visiting the site, it 
is difficult to determine all eligible lands with precision. However, the wording of the 
question and the background materials provided to callers should have given a reasonable 
definition as a basis for conducting the interview. 
Question 2 established the farmer's awareness of the concepts of forest or grass 
buffers. The survey was designed with the expectation that most farmers in Maryland 
have at least a rudimentary awareness of forest and grass buffers. If not, the interview 
was terminated, since its focus is on the reasons a farmer decided to participate or not 
participate in a forest or grass buffer program. 
Questions 3 and 4 were designed to elicit responses about the physical 
characteristics of the land and stream, as well as the current land use of the riparian area. 
They follow the wording of questions 3 and 17 in the survey of Buffer Incentive Program 
participants. Another BIP participant survey question about physical characteristics, 
concerning land slope, had already been asked of the BIP non-participants in the earlier 
best management practice survey. Again following Buffer Incentive Program guidelines, 
300 feet was used as the width of the riparian zone. Interviewers were instructed to check 
off multiple categories for riparian land use, if necessary, recognizing that the area within 
300 feet of a stream could include both cropland and pasture, or even some forest or grass 
buffers. Question 4, with regard to stream width, poses a problem in cases where more 
than one stream or other water body is on the property. Callers were instructed to 
emphasize that the question relates to the width of the stream on average. This should at 
least give a reasonable approximation of stream order to help determine the relative 
52 
importance of the value of a view and, possibly, of the opportunities for buffer 
implementation along different order streams. 
Questions 5 and 6 are the same as Questions 1 and 2 in the BIP participant survey. 
One possible problem for data analysis was the inclusion of grass buffers as an option. 
While Buffer Incentive Program participants were asked only about their motivations for 
participating in that forest buffer program, the non-participants were asked at the same 
time about their motivations for participating in a forest or grass buffer program. 
Question 7 established whether or not the farmer had planted a forest or grass 
buffer on his or her land since 1990. That cut-off point was used as an approximate time-
frame for the current interest in promoting fore~t buffers and of the availability of grants 
from the Buffer Incentive Program. If respondents answered yes, interviewers were 
instructed to follow up by asking if the buffer planted was of grass or trees. 
In Question 9, interviewers asked the same 13 questions of non-participants as 
were asked of BIP participants in Question 6 of that survey. There are a number of 
possible problems with this question that were addressed as the survey instrument was 
developed. First, the inclusion of the grass buffers option posed an opportunity for some 
confusion. If the respondent indicated in Question 7 that he or she had planted a grass 
buffer, then he or she was asked to answer Question 9 with regard to his or her I'i ' 
motivations for establishing the grass buffer. If the respondent noted in Question 7 that ,:: 
he or she had planted a forest buffer, then Question 9 addressed that forest buffer. All 
other respondents were asked Question 9 with regard to forest and grass buffers together. 
This wording may weaken the question's ability to elicit information about motivations 
for both forest and grass buffers. The survey included both the grass and forest buffer 
options because of the potential in some cases for grass buffers to provide environmental 
benefits in a more palatable way for farmers. Since, ultimately, this study is about 
opportunities for environmental benefits, not about forest buffers for forest buffers' sake, 
inclusion of both the forest and grass buffer options was important in the survey. 
Another possible problem with Question 9 is that it was immediately preceded by 
the question about awareness of Maryland's Buffer Incentive Program. Since part of 
question 9 refers to that program, it was necessary to include the Buffer Incentive 
Program awareness question earlier in the interview. To avoid the perception by 
respondents that Question 9 referred only to the Buffer Incentive Program (and thus, tree 
planting), callers were instructed to make it clear to respondents that Question 9 referred 
to any forest or grass buffer program, not just the Buffer Incentive Program. 
As with the BIP participant survey, this survey was developed with the 
recognition that it would be impossible to query landowners about every conceivable 
53 
factor in a decision. Follow-up surveys might also want to address factors including 
possible loss of yield to adjacent fields because of nutrient loss, noxious weeds, or 
difficulty in operating farm machinery; question 9E, about loss of moisture to agricultural 
fields, should, however, provide some insight on this possible perceived problem for 
adjacent land. In addition, loss of base acreage for establishment of support through farrn 
commodity programs might have been a useful addition, particularly in states other that 
Maryland which have much larger scale agriculture. However, with Farm Bill 
developments that have occurred since the surveys were conducted, the loss of base 
acreage may now be a moot point. 
Question 9 also did not address the relative importance of up-front, out-of-pocket 
expenses for the farmer as a consideration in planting a buffer. This would have been 
useful information in addition to knowing the relative importance of Buffer Incentive 
Program grants and other cost-share and technical assistance (Questions 9K and 9L), 
especially since there had been a year's lead time from planting to receiving Buffer 
Incentive Program grants. 
Finally, Question 9 does not ask the farmer point-blank if unwillingness to 
participate in government programs was a factor in his or her decision. Questions 9H 
(about compliance with current or future land-use regulation) and 9M (about the amount 
of time spent on application for cost-share funds) were designed, however, to shed some 
light on this attitudinal question. 
Questions 10 and 11 address the landowner's willingness to accept lump-sum :::) :::?;::, 
payments for planting forest and grass buffers for 10-year, 20-year, 30-year, or {::; l 
?? 1: :i ' 
permanent terms. They are identical to Questions 14 and 15 of the BIP participant (';'.? ..~..??   
survey. Callers were given background materials to clear up any misunderstandings .,., , 
about the meaning of these questions. 
The interview ended with an open-ended question to elicit information about the 
farmer's motivation that was not covered elsewhere in the interview. This open-ended 
question is seen as even more important in the non-participants survey than in the BIP 
participants survey, mainly because of the possible problems described for Question 9. 
Survey Implementation 
The participant survey contacted everyone who signed a contract with Maryland's 
Buffer Incentive Program in 1992, 1993, and 1994, a total of 80 landowners. Although 
there were some participants in the program before 1991, the records for those years at 
the Department of Natural Resources were not as thorough as those for subsequent years. 
54 
Also, landowners were considered less likely to remember the details of their participation 
in the program. 1995 participants were not included because the landowners would not 
have had enough time in the program to answer questions about the success or failure of 
planting and maintenance. 
An introductory letter signed by the author on University of Maryland letterhead 
was sent on November 3rd to let the Buffer Incentive Program landowners know the 
purpose of the survey (see Appendix 3). An introductory letter was not sent to the non-
participants because it would have delayed considerably the data collection. Survey 
instruments were under development in November 1995 at the same time that interviews 
were still being conducted for the best management practices survey. Only farmers who 
completed this survey were to be interviewed for the subsequent riparian buffers survey. 
At that time, an opening existed in the Maryland Agricultural Statistics Service survey 
schedule for mid-December, with other surveys already scheduled for future months. 
Thus there was not enough lead time to send a letter to the farmers who replied to the best 
management practices survey. Since these landowners had been contacted recently by the 
Maryland Agricultural Statistics Service (MASS) for the best management practice survey 
and in many cases knew the callers personally, it was believed at the time that an 
introductory letter was not absolutely necessary. However, a letter similar to the one sent 
to Buffer Incentive Progr~ participants might have provided a better understanding and 
response from landowners contacted. 
According to Bruce West, state statistician for MASS, the initial population from 
which the best management practice sample was drawn consisted of a list of farm 
operations in Maryland compiled continuously by MASS. Because of changes in farm 
ownership and operation, the list typically records current data for about 85% of farm 
operations in Maryland. An initial sample of approximately 1,000 names was drawn 
from this population in 1990 for a best management practice survey. That sample was 
compared to the list of current Maryland farm operators in 1995 for the best management 
practice survey conducted in the fall of 1995. Additional operators were selected 
randomly from the current population of farm operators in Maryland to make up for any 
attrition of operators from the first list. 
A comparison of the Buffer Incentive Program participants and the best 
management practices sample found one landowner who appeared on each list. That 
landowner was surveyed as part of the participant survey. An additional screening 
question in the non-participant survey determined if those operators owned any riparian 
land. If not, they were considered ineligible for the Buffer Incentive Program or other 
riparian buffer programs, and thus not interviewed. The farm operators sample is 
55 
representative of fanns in Maryland, a state in which 88% of operators own at least some 
of the land they fann (Lichtenberg, Howar, Strand, and Lessley 1989). Landowners in 
the participants survey were also asked if they rent land to others; if so, they were asked 
to provide the operator's name to avoid possible duplication of effort with the non-
participant survey. 
Two two-hour training sessions were held for MASS telephone interviewers, 
resulting in additional wording changes suggested by the interviewers attending those 
sessions. The first of these sessions was held in Easton on November 28th, the second 
in Frederick on November 29th. While it would have been valuable to have conducted 
test interviews of the survey instrument for nonparticipants, the lead time needed for 
distribution of the questionnaires to the interviewers precluded doing so. Training 
sessions highlighted possible problems, including confusion over land eligibility for 
riparian buffers and confusion over the difference between Maryland's Buffer Incentive 
Program and other programs. Also, a fanner could already have a forest or grass buffer 
on some, but not all, of his eligible land. While the survey instrument attempts to elicit 
this information, this nonetheless may present difficulties for analyzing the true obstacles 
and opportunities for maximum benefits from buffers. The multi-part question about the 
relative importance of various factors in the fanner's decision-making process posed a 
particular challenge in the non-participant survey, since the fanner could be answering 
about establishment of a forest or grass buffer. The respondents in the participant survey 
were only responding with regard to forest buffer establishment. Because of funding 
limitations, the survey was kept to four 8 1/2 x 11 pages. Thus additional skip pattern 
questions that might have clarified certain answers were not included in the survey 
instrument. 
56 
A 
Table 2. Telephone Survey Disposition Table 
B_uffer Incentive Program Interviews 
? 53 of 80 landowners who participated in the Buffer Incentive Program in 1992 
1993, or 1994 were interviewed by telephone between November 15, 1995 and 
January 15, 1996 
? of the remaining 27 landowners: 
13 were contacted at least 3 times but were inaccessible 
6 were companies or organizations with insufficient contact information 
5 introductory letters were returned for insufficient address 
2 interviews were refused 
1 landowner ended up not participating in the program 
Survey of Random Sample of Farm Owners in Mmyland 
590 landowners were interviewed by telephone between July 1995 and November 
1995 by the Maryland Agriculture Statistics Service (MASS) for a study of the use of best 
management practices in Maryland. Demographic data including age, educational level, 
gross income from farming, and net percentage income from farming were gathered as 
Part of the survey. 
Participants in the best management practices survey were called again between 
November 28th and December 22, 1995 by MASS to elicit additional information about 
riparian buffers. The 590 attempted follow-up interviews break down as follows: 
284 own riparian land (but 19 did not provide data on acres owned) 
140 own land but do do not own riparian land 
23 own no land 
143 (follow-up interview not conducted): 
45 refused 
98 inaccessible (at least 3 attempted calls or unable to 
obtain current working telephone number) 
57 
Data Analysis 
Data from the best management practices survey, the follow-up survey on riparian 
buffers, and the survey of Buffer Incentive Program participants were combined and 
entered into SPSS, a statistical software package. Additional comments made by 
respondents were cross-referenced with identification numbers for easy reference to 
demographic data and recorded separately in a Microsoft Word file. 
Farmers with less gross income from farming were undersampled in the MASS 
survey, and farmers with higher levels of gross income were oversampled. To provide a 
better representation of farm owners in Maryland, the data from the survey carried out by 
the Maryland Agricultural Statistics Service were weighted for statistical analyses, using 
the "weight" function in SPSS. A weighting variable was developed, based on gross 
income from farming. Fifty-seven farm owners did not provide gross income data and so 
Were dropped from statistical tests, leaving 348 cases of Buffer Incentive Program non-
adopters for means comparisons with Buffer Incentive Program adopters. Stratified data 
on gross income from farming was obtained from the 1992 Agricultural Census, and 
Weights were developed as outlined in Table 3. 
Table 3. Weights for Sample of Maryland Farmers 
Value of Sales Farms in (%) Farms in (%) (%11%2) Weight 
Maryland MASS Sample 
Less than $1,000 1691 12.98 19 5.46 12.98/5.46 2.38 
$1,000-$19,999 6231 47.79 127 36.49 47.79/36.49 1.31 
$20,000-$30,999 1148 8.81 45 12.93 8.81/12.93 0.68 
$40,000-$99 ,999 1257 9.64 39 11.21 9.64/11.21 0.86 
$100,000-$249,999 1436 11.01 65 18.68 11.01/18.68 0.59 
$250,000 or more 1274 9.77 53 15.23 9.77115.23 0.64 
Total 13037 100.00 348 100.00 
Four of the 53 Buffer Incentive Program participants interviewed were dropped 
from the analysis because their property did not have a recent agricultural land use. One 
of these land parcels was owned by a quarry, two were in established housing 
developments, and one was owned by a land trust that did not provide gross income data. 
58 
A review of Department of Natural Resources records revealed that of the 85 buffers 
planted through the Buffer Incentive Program from 1992 to 1994, 69 were in an 
agricultural land use before planting. Participation in the Buffer Incentive Program by 
some landowners represents part of an effort to get out of farming altogether, but these 
landowners were included in the analysis. 
Because of the categorical recording of most of the variables in the survey data, 
some of the assumptions of parametric tests are not met, so nonparametric tests were used 
to analyze correlation between variables and to compare distributions (SPSS Inc.1993 
and 1994; Daniel 1978; Gibbons 1993). Spearman rank correlation coefficients for all 
variables are listed in Appendix 9. T-tests were used for variables not recorded in 
categorical form, and thus appropriate for parametric means comparisons. These 
Variables include acres owned, years farming, years managing a farm, number of animals 
per acre on the property, and willingness to accept payment for various term buffer 
programs. Mann-Whitney U-tests are used for non-parametric comparisons of 
distributions for categorical data. For a more detailed description of the Mann-Whitney 
U-tests, see Appendix 6. 
Results of both weighted and unweighted tests are described in Chapter 5 and are 
listed in Appendices 5 to 7. The use of weights did not change the results appreciably; of 
38 T-tests or U-tests conducted, in only 2 instances did the weighted test fail to reject a 
null hypothesis at the .05 level that was rejected in an unweighted test, and in only one 
instance did a weighted test fail to reject when an unweighted test rejected the null 
hypothesis. 
. ,,;,:"'-?? 
CHAPTER 5 
INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
Results of the surveys are discussed in the same order as the analytical framework 
described in Chapter 3. Differences in land parcel and landowner characteristics between 
Buffer Incentive Program participants and non-participants are discussed first, followed 
by awareness of the concept and the relative importance of perceived benefits and 
perceived costs for the landowner when making the decision to participate or not 
participate in a riparian buffer program. This is followed by a discussion of the 
landowners' willingness to accept payment for various length programs for forest or 
grass buffers. Other comments that landowners made in response to an open-ended 
question at the end of the interview are also described. Descriptive statistical data are 
unweighted throughout this chapter and include 57 Buffer Incentive Program non-
adopters who did not provide gross income data. 
Land Parcel Features 
For the farmers interviewed in the Maryland Agricultural Statistics Service survey, 
it was necessary first to determine whether or not they owned any riparian land at all. 
Thus an initial screening question was included: 
Question 1: "Do you own any riparian land. in other words. land that borders a 
stream. river. pond, tidal or non-tidal wetland. or other open water?" 
The responses of the 140 individuals who said they own land but do not own 
riparian land are separated by county in the following table. This is worth noting, 
because on the Eastern Shore, where one could expect most if not all landowners to own 
some riparian land, many of the landowners said they did not. One landowner from 
Dorchester County went so far as to say that this initial screening question was "stupid, 
because anyone knows that if you live in lower Dorchester County, you have to be on a 
marsh or some waterway." Yet five of the eight landowners contacted in Dorchester 
County said that they did not own any riparian land. Perhaps the word "riparian" triggers 
60 
a negative reaction in a landowner making him decline to participate in the interview; 
perhaps an individual owns land that is eligible for riparian buffer programs but he does 
not perceive that it is. Both of these explanations need closer examination, as they might 
have important implications for development of effective outreach and incentive 
programs. 
Table 4. Perceived Riparian Land Ownership, by County 
County N Do Not Own Own Riparian Land 
Own Riparian Land (%) 
(%) 
Allegany 14 28.6 71.4 
Anne Arundel** 12 33.3 66.6 
Baltimore** 24 8.3 91.7 
Calvert** 9 22.2 77.8 
Caroline* 19 47.4 52.6 
Carroll 53 24.5 75.5 
Cecil* 14 28.6 71.4 
Charles** 7 14.3 85.7 
Dorchester* 8 62.5 37.5 
Frederick 67 17.9 82.1 
Garrett 24 29.2 70.8 
Harford** 29 41.4 58.6 
Howard 10 10.0 90.0 
Kent* 14 57.1 42.9 
Montgomery 16 25.0 75.0 
Prince George's (no data)** 
Queen Anne's* 8 50.0 50.0 
St. Mary's** 8 37.5 62.5 
Somerset* 10 30.0 70.0 
Talbot* 7 28.6 71.4 
W~shington 44 43.2 56.8 
Wicomico* 10 80.0 20.0 
Worcester* 18 72.2 27.8 
Total 140 
*Eastern Shore 
**Western Shore but county in Chesapeake Bay Critical Area 
61 
The following hypotheses were stated with regard to land parcel features: 
? landowners with row crops in the riparian area will be less likely to participate 
than landowners with pasture or other land uses in the riparian area 
? landowners with larger properties will be more likely to participate than smaller 
properties 
How does the land of the 284 farmers who said they own riparian land compare 
With the land parcels of the 49 Buffer Incentive Program participants interviewed? Tables 
5 
through 8 provide a basis for discussion of possible difference in type of farm operation 
and in farm size. 
Table 5. Width of Stream or Body of Water on the Property, in Feet 
Width of stream BIP Participants All Other Riparian 
(average) Other Riparian (%) Landowners Landowners 
(N=48) (%) Who Have Not 
(N=191) Planted Buffers 
(%) 
(N=73) 
1-10 feet 37.5 63.9 84.9 
11-20 feet 16.7 9.9 4.1 
21-50 feet 8.3 6.3 2.8 
51 feet or greater 37.5 19.9 8.2 
Lowrance et al. and Bohlen and King emphasize the added benefits that forest 
buffers can provide when planted by small streams. These streams provide an 
opportunity for fuJl shade from a forest buffer, for leaf litter, and eventually for input of 
Woody debris that is important for habitat. The difference in stream sizes reported by 
landowners in interviews in Table 5 is quite dramatic, particularly when looking 
separately at those properties without any buffered riparian land. The overwhelming 
majority of farm owners interviewed who are not in the Buffer Incentive Program have 
streams of less than 1o  feet in width on their property. Mann-Whitney U-tests (see 
Appendix 6) rejected at the .05 level the null hypothesis of no difference in distribution 
between the stream sizes on farms participating in the Buffer Incentive Program and those 
not Participating in the program. 
62 
---- ~- ~L/- ~-?--_-.-,-_---_~_- --
Table 6. Previous Riparian Land Use 
RIP Participants All Other Riparian Other Riparian 
(%) Landowners Landowners 
(N=49) (%) Who Have Not 
(N=265) Planted Buffers 
(%) 
(N=78) 
All ~ow Crops 30.6 2.3 
Partially in Row Crops 5.1 10.2 21.9 
All Pasture 9.0 14.3 14.3 37.2 
Partially Pasture 8.2 39.6 44.9 
Grass Lawn or Field 
Not Used as Pasture 41.5 15.5 20.5 
Idle Row Crop Field 4.1 2.3 
Forest Buffer 1.3 47.5 
Grass Buffer 29.5 
or Filter Strip 43.4 
Other Use 21.8 2.0 0.8 1.3 
Note: totals do not equal 100%, because landowners could choose more than one 
category if there were multiple riparian land uses on their property. 
The survey results reported in Table 6 do not support the working hypothesis that 
landowners with row crops in the riparian area will be Jess likely to participate than 
landowners with pasture or other land uses in the riparian area. In fact, 41 % of Buffer 
Incentive Program participants indicated that the land now buffered was previously all or 
Partly in row crops; 82% of the farmers with unbuffered riparian land indicated that the 
current riparian land use is for pasture, at least in part. These findings may suggest that 
Participation in the Buffer Incentive Program represents part of an effort to get out of 
fanning, as discussed previously in this paper. This point is discussed again during the 
examination of the importance of lost agricultural income from farming in the adoption 
decision (See Table 16). 
The type of farm operation was examined further by collecting data on type of row 
crops in the riparian area and the type and number of animals per acre on the farm. Of the 
19 Buffer Incentive Program adopters who provided information about row crops 
Previously grown in the now-buffered area, 14 indicated that the riparian land was 
Previously in a com/wheat/beans rotation, three said that land was all in soybeans, and the 
remainder said the land was in com and hay, respectively. Of the 58 non-adopters who 
Provided crop type information, 31 said their riparian land is in a com/beans/wheat 
63 
rotation, 14 said the riparian land is in hay, six in corn, and three in vegetables. Of the 
six Buffer Incentive Program participants who provided information about type of 
animals in riparian pasture land that is now buffered, five said they had beef cattle there 
before, two had horses, and one had sheep. Of the 96 non-adopters who have pasture on 
their riparian land, 64 have beef cattle, 34 have dairy cattle, 11 have horses, and four have 
sheep. Landowners could choose more than one category. The weighted mean of 
animals per acre was 1.7 for Buffer Incentive Program adopters and 2.5 for non-
adopters. Weighted and unweighted t-tests failed to reject at the .05 level the null 
hypothesis that the population variances of animals per acre for adopters and non-adopters 
are the same. 
Table 7. Land Ownership, in Acres 
N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
BIP Participants 49 138.47 265.91 3 1480 
All Other Riparian Landowners 265 197.73 208.19 2 1200 
Interviewed 
Other Riparian Landowners 
Without Buffers 78 175.87 142.41 10 700 
64 
Table 8. Land Ownership by Property Size, in Acres 
Acres Owned BIP Participants All Other Riparian No Buffer Planted Grass 
Landowners Planted Buffer 
N=53 N=265 N=78 N=55 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
1-10 18.9 2.3 1.3 1.8 
11-20 13.2 3.8 5.1 5.5 
21-30 5.6 5.7 6.4 3.6 
31-40 7.5 4.9 7.7 0.0 
41-50 7.5 4.2 7.7 1.8 
51-60 3.8 4.2 1.3 5.5 
61-70 3.8 1.9 1.3 1.8 
71-80 1.9 3.4 3.8 0.0 
81-90 1.9 1.9 0.0 3.6 
91-100 1.9 7.2 3.8 3.6 
101-110 0.0 3.0 3.8 3.6 
111-120 0.0 2.3 3.8 0.0 
121-130 3.8 2.6 0.0 0.0 
131-140 0.0 3.8 9.0 5.5 
141-150 1.9 4.5 6.4 1.8 
151-160 5.6 4.5 2.6 5.5 
161-200 5.6 11.7 9.0 14.5 
201-300 5.6 11.3 14.1 9.1 
301-400 7.5 6.4 5.1 9.1 
401-500 0.0 3.4 6.4 3.6 
501-700 0.0 3.8 2.6 1.8 
701 or more 3.8 4.2 0.0 12.7 
Feder, Just and Zilberman refer to a literature which suggests that smaller farms 
are less likely to adopt agricultural innovations because of fixed costs. One would 
suspect that landowners with very large parcels would be more willing to give up the 
minimum of one acre required by the Buffer Incentive Program than would landowners 
with relatively small properties. 
T-tests for acres owned by Buffer Incentive Program adopters and non-adopters 
failed to reject at the .05 level the null hypothesis that the population variances of acres 
owned for adopters and non-adopters are the same (see Appendix 5). The alternative 
hypothesis stated that adopters have larger properties than non-adopters. In fact, an initial 
look at the survey data provides some evidence that the mean size of properties for Buffer 
Incentive Program participants may be smaller than for the population of non-adopters. 
Nineteen percent of the Buffer Incentive Program participants interviewed own ten acres 
or less. Of the riparian landowners interviewed by MASS who do not have a buffer, only 
one of the 78 who provided acreage ownership data indicated that he owned ten acres or 
65 
less, although this may be because smaller farms are underrepresented in the sample. 
Table 7 illustrates the acres owned by Buffer Incentive Program participants, all the 
riparian landowners in the MASS sample, and those landowners in that sample who do 
not have a buffer on their riparian land. 
At first glance, this does not make a lot of sense. Why would a landowner 
concede a significant portion of his or her land for a minimum of ten years? Is the grant 
provided by the Buffer Incentive Program so appealing that a landowner would be willing 
to give up the income that land could provide? The next section provides some answers 
for landowner motivations by examining their personal characteristics including age, 
education, and income from farming. 
66 
Landowner personal characteristics 
How do the landowners participating in the Buffer Incentive Program differ from 
the farm owners interviewed by MASS with regard to demographic variables such as age, 
education, gross revenue from farming, percentage of net income from farming, years 
farming, and commitment to conservation? The short answer: most Buffer Incentive 
Program participants are not farmers. 
While the Buffer Incentive Program is not targetted solely at agricultural land, 
information on previous riparian land use for properties now in the Buffer Incentive 
Program indicates that most riparian properties were previously in some agricultural land 
use. The Maryland Department of Natural Resources has not collected data on the level of 
farm effort by these landowners. 
The following hypotheses were stated with regard to landowner personal 
characteristics: 
? age: younger landowners will be more likely to participate in BIP than older 
landowners ,,,, I ::;: : 
1\ I ' ~ 
? education: landowners with education beyond high school will be more likely to 
participate in BIP than landowners with less education 
? gross revenue from farming: the higher the gross revenue from farming, the 
more likely the landowner will be to participate 
? net percent income from farming: landowners who earn less than 50% of their 
income from farming will be more likely to participate in BIP than landowners 
who earn more than 50% of their income from farming 
Table 9. Age of Landowners 
BIP Participants All Other Riparian No Buffer 
Landowners 
N=49 N=277 N=80 
(%) (%) (%) 
60 or more 30.6 43.0 41.3 
50-59 28.6 29.6 30.0 
40-49 28.6 17.3 18.7 
30-39 12.2 9.0 10.0 
20-29 0.0 1.1 0.0 
67 
TabJe 10. Educational Level of Landowners 
BIP Participants All Other Riparian No Buffer 
Landowners 
N=49 N=181 N::44 
(%) (%) (%) 
High school or less 18.4 47.5 47.7 
Some college, business 
school, or vocational 
training 14.3 12.7 15.9 
Bachelor's degree 30.6 26.5 20.5 
Master's or doctorate 36.7 13.3 15.9 
Table 11. Gross Revenue from Farming 
BIP Participants All Other Riparian No Buffer 
Landowners 
N=49 N=243 N::74 
(%) (%) (%) 
Less than $1,000 55.1 5.8 5.4 
$ l ,000-$19 999 26.5 36.6 27.0 
$20,000-$39 999 6.2 11.9 10.8 
$4o,ooo-$99 '999 10.2 11.1 12.2 
$Ioo,ooo-$249 999 0.0 20.6 21.6 
$250,000 or mdre 2.0 14.0 23.0 
68 
TabJe 12. Percent Net Income from Farming 
BIP Participants All Other Riparian No Buffer 
Landowners 
N=49 N=222 
(%) N==67 (%) (%) 
Zero 
1% to 24% 51.0 0.0 0.0 
25% to49% 36.7 26.6 20.9 
5 8.2 0% to 99% 5.9 3.0 
100% 4.1 13.5 14.9 
0.0 54.0 61.2 
Mann-Whitney V-tests between BIP adopters and non-adopters rejected at the .05 
~eve} null hypotheses of no difference in population distributions for age, education, gross 
Income from fanning, and net percentage income from farming between BIP adopters and 
non-adopters (see Appendix 6). The survey results present a somewhat different profile 
th
of e Buffer Incentive Program participant than the one presented in the alternative 
hypotheses. 
. Of the six landowners under the age of forty participating in BIP who were 
tnterviewed, two indicated that they planned to harvest the trees at some point after the ten 
Year term of the program. One of these landowners noted that he viewed the trees as a 
retirement fund: "I don't want to sound anti-environmental, but I'm in it for the money." 
Tbis does not support the working hypothesis that younger landowners are apt to 
Participate more because of stronger environmental awareness. There are very few 
landowners under the age of 40 in both surveys, however, so it would have been difficult 
to draw very strong conclusions about these individuals in any case. 
Data was also collected on the number of years farming and the number of years 
rnanaging a fann. The unweighted mean of years farming for 48 Buffer Incentive 
Prograrn Participants interviewed is 13.6, compared to 38.6 for 154 non-adopters 
~roviding this information. The unweighted mean of years managing a farm for adopters 
15 7
.6, compared to 25.6 for non-adopters responding to this question. Weighted and 
unweighted t-tests rejected at the .05 level the null hypotheses that the population 
Variances for years farming and years managing a farm are the same for adopters and non-
adopters (see Appendix 5). 
The Buffer Incentive Program participants are a highly-educated group of people, 
With 36. 7% of those participants interviewed holding master's or doctoral degrees. This 
69 
~ay also be an indicator of the level of fanning effort and total income: these individuals 
in most case earn little income from farming their land. As one BIP participant put it 
~ ' 
. ma gentleman farmer: this is a hobby." Since most of the BIP participants receive 
little or no net income from farming, it is understandable that many of them have set aside 
~and for buffers on properties that are relatively small. Of these "hobby" farmers, several 
mdicated that planting trees was an excellent way to reduce the commitment needed to 
m? 
. amtain the property. Two of these landowners learned of the program because of their 
interest in tax breaks for keeping the land in an agricultural or forestry use, one of whom 
said that he "originally wanted to keep his land agricultural in a tax break program, but 
didn't Want the hassle of animals or crops." Five landowners indicated that their whole 
property is now wooded. In one instance, the landowners inherited the farm and could 
not manage it from another state. The assistance from the Department of Natural 
~esources helped them reduce their maintenance commitment while keeping the property 
In the family. With the average age of farm owners in Maryland increasing, such 
inheritances may provide an excellent opportunity for implementation of buffers on 
agricultural land in Maryland. Spearman rank correlation coefficients listed in Appendix 9 
show the same sign as the one hypothesized, with a negative correlation between BIP 
adoption and net percentage of income from farming; there is a somewhat weaker negative 
correlation between education level and net percentage of income from farming. 
Unlike the net-income-from-farming hypothesis, the survey results suggest that 
the alternative gross-income-from-farming hypothesis would be rejected. The sign of the 
Speannan rank correlation coefficient between GROSFARM and BIPADOPT in 
Appendix 9 does not agree with the stated alternative hypothesis. The stated hypotheses 
With regard to net income from farming and gross income from farming might seem 
contradictory, yet there is support in the literature for both hypotheses: individuals with 
higher gross income and off-farm income are thought to have more resources to 
experiment with innovations like riparian buffers. But it is clear from the survey results 
that most Buffer Incentive Program participants generate very little in farm sales, while 
the riparian landowners surveyed by MASS and Maryland farmers overall surveyed by 
the Agricultural Census tend to have much more significant farm operations. The survey 
findings suggest that the "orientation to farming as~ way of life" hypothesis that the 
Pampel and Van Es study supported for other environmental innovations on farmland 
(Pampel and Van Es 1977) may have some merit with regard to riparian forest buffers. 
70 
Step One in the Adopti~n Process: Awareness 
The demographic characteristics described in the previous two sections provide an 
initial explanation about what type of landowner would or would not be willing to plant a 
buffe r on his or her land. But they don't tell the whole story of how a landowner 
progresses from learning about the concept to weighing the benefits and costs of 
participation to deciding to take part in a buffer program. The first step in this adoption 
process, as described by Rogers and others, is awareness of the concept and of the 
particular buffer program (Rogers 1983 ). If a landowner is not aware of the innovation, 
it follows that he or she will not adopt it. Following the screening question about riparian 
land ownership in the survey conducted by MASS, riparian landowners were then asked: 
Are you familiar with the concept of forest or grass buffers on riparian land to control 
nutrient and sediment runoff into waterbodies and to provide other environmental 
benefits? 
N Aware of Concept Not Aware of Concept 
(%) (%) 
283 85.2 14.8 
These responses are summarized by age, educational level, and county in Table 
13. Younger farmers and those with more years of formal education were hypothesized 
to have a greater awareness of the riparian buffer concept. Farmers in this sample, across 
all educational and age groups, are aware of the buffer concept. This is not a surprising 
finding for Maryland, where agricultural nonpoint source pollution controls to reduce 
nutrients in the Chesapeake Bay have received a great deal of attention in recent years. 
Mann-Whitney U-tests (see Appendix 7) were conducted of awareness of the 
concept of riparian buffers by age, educational level, gross income from farming, and net 
percentage income from farming. The null hypothesis that the populations of landowners 
who are aware and who are not aware of the concept have the same distribution was 
rejected at the .05 level for the net percentage income from farming variable. The U-tests 
failed to reject the same null hypotheses for age, educational level, and gross income from 
farming. In an unweighted analysis, the U-test rejected the null hypothesis for the gross 
income from farming variable. These tests were also conducted for awareness of the 
Buffer Incentive Program. The null hypothesis that the populations of landowners who 
are aware and those who are not aware of the program have the same distribution was 
rejected for the age, education, and net income from farming variables in weighted 
analyses. U-tests failed to reject at the .05 level the same null hypothesis with regard to 
gross income from farming. 
71 
Table 13. Awareness of the Concept of Riparian Buffers by Riparian 
Landowners not in the Buffer Incentive Program, by Educational Level, 
Age, and County 
N Aware of Concept Not Aware of Concept 
(%) (%) 
Educational Level 
High School diploma or less 86 82.6 17.4 
Some college, business, 
or vocational school 23 91.3 8.7 
Bachelor's degree 48 85.4 14.6 
Graduate degree 24 87.5 12.5 
Age 
60 or above 119 81.5 18.5 
50-59 82 92.7 7.3 
40-49 48 83.3 16.7 
30-39 25 88.0 12.0 ,?t11t'II 
20-29 3 66.7 33.3 1? ~ ,1 J ,. ?.,  ;f: I' ~ 'I~ I :i" 
1\, - ?'. ~ ~: ,;: 
County :, 1)1\t 
::',t,.?~J 
Allegany 10 90.0 10.0 ,,1?"'.:) ,?1 ,? ,r1? 11 ,,., 
Anne Arundel** 8 87.5 12.5 :;: ,, :: ::~ ?,~?. 
Baltimore** 22 100.0 0.0 ', ... ??t"1' ,. 1,t;Hil 
Calvert** 7 71.4 28.6 ,,i?nru :? 1 :Ii :,11 
Caroline* 10 100.0 0.0 ,I, ,? 1. ..... 1? '\ ,. .. 1?'?'!'1? 
I ,,1 ? ~.~ .. 
Carroll 40 80.0 20.0 I' ??"'" 
;i ?l..,p,1? 
:i \\.1(:: 
Cecil* 11 81.8 18.2 i' ::t:::~, 
Charles** 6 83.3 16.7 :~ 1~:1.,1? 
Dorchester* 3 100.0 0.0 ?''"'""''' 
Frederick 55 76.4 23.6 
Garrett 17 100.0 0.0 
Harford** 17 100.0 0.0 
Howard 8 75.0 25.0 
Kent* 6 100.0 0.0 
? Montgomery 12 75.0 25.0 
Prince George's (no data)** 
Queen Anne's* 4 100.0 0.0 
St. Mary's** 5 100.0 0.0 
Somerset* 7 100.0 0.0 
Talbot* 5 100.0 0.0 
Washington 24 70.8 29.2 
Wicomico* 2 0.0 100.0 
Worcester* 4 100.0 0.0 
Total 283 85.2 14.8 
*Eastern Shore **Western Shore but county in Chesapeake Bay Critical Area 
72 
How a landowner learns about the concept might also affect his or her willingness 
to adopt the innovation. Does the landowner learn from a respected neighbor? From a 
representative of a government agency who might be seen as a regulatory adversary? 
From an environmental group whose views the landowner may or may not espouse? 
Buffer Incentive Program participants and other riparian landowners were asked 
to describe how they learned about the concept and about buffer programs, as illustrated 
in Table 14. 
TabJe 14. Sources of Information About Riparian Buffers 
~ did you first learn about the concept of putting forest or grass buffers along rivers or 
~ams? Was it through ... 
BIP Participants Other Riparian Landowners 
(N=47) (N=174) 
(%) (%) 
jYn ?tten materials received in the mail 
1 14.9 21.8 p e ephone call 4.3 2.9 
fu~r>nal m~eting or conversation 42.6 40.8 
In 1c m~etmg 4.3 11.5 
.f ormat10n in the media 17.0 33.3 
OLiterature picked up at a USDA office 0.0 1.2 ther 21.3 13.2 
~ you talk briefly about who had the first contact with you about putting a buffer 
.filQngjhe river or stream, and how that contact came about? 
BIP Participants Other Riparian Landowners 
(N=47) (N=265) 
(%) (%) 
t7n Department of Natural Resources 70.0 3.4 
N S_DA Natural Resources Conservation Service 23.4 14.0 
lJ eighbor, family member or peer 12.8 11.3 
spA Consolidated Farm Services Agency . 6.4 10.6 
~niver~ity of MD Cooperative Extension Service 2.1 7.5 
lJ 1? soil district conservationist 0.0 19.2 
a n!versity of MD Agricultural Experimen~ Station 0.0 7.8 
Fgncu1tura1 chemical company representative 0.0 0.8 
attn Bureau 0.0 0.4 
environmental or land conservation organization 2.0 0.0 
0 ther 10.6 4.9 
no contact with anyone 0.0 15.5 
73 
More than one category could be checked for both of these questions, since in 
some cases landowners recalled more than one source of infonnation or described a 
sequence of contacts, which might reflect the importance of interagency cooperation or 
multiple methods of outreach. 
. Nine fanners interviewed through the MASS survey noted that they learned about 
np . 
anan buffers because they were a part of the way they were raised to fann. Leaming 
about buffers "from caring for the land," "tradition," "because it was always done that 
Way" d "~ 
' an 1rom my father or grandfather" were among the comments fanners offered. 
An add"? 
ltlonal 7 fanners noted that buffers were just common sense. Five fanners noted 
th
at the Soil Conservation Service (now NRCS) visited their property to discuss best 
management practices, including forest or grass buffers. One f anner said he learned 
;bout buffers in college, another in high school, and another in elementary school. One 
armer noted that he became aware of buffers because they were mentioned as a 
requirement for other cost-share programs; another fanner mentioned U.S. Environmental 
Prote c t?1 0n Agency regulations. 
. Of the 47 Buffer Incentive Program participants who answered the question, six 
tndicated that a forester from Mruyland's Department of Natural Resources initiated 
contact about participation in the program, which DNR administers. Thirty-four of the 47 
BIP Participants made the initial contact with a government agency after learning about the 
concept of riparian buffers: 
22 called DNR 
8 called NRCS 
1 called CFSA 
1 called his state senator 
1 called Maryland's Critical Areas Commission 
1 called the Mruyland Department of Agriculture 
Clearly the Buffer Incentive Program participants and the random sample of 
f anners are gathering infonnation about buffers from different sources. The use of the 
Department of Natural Resources as the point-of-contact is understandable for Buffer 
Incentive Program participants, since the program is, of course, coordinated by DNR. 
There is also some indication that cooperation between other agencies and DNR helped 
st
eer landowners toward the program, as the eight landowner contacts with the Natural 
Resources Conservation Service suggest. 
The random sample of farmers, however, points to the important role of the Soil 
Conservation District and state and federal agricultural agencies in improving awareness 
of buffers, as guidance to foresters from DNR has suggested. For grass buffers, the 
effons of these agricultural agencies appears to have paid off: of the 55 landowners who 
74 
had planted a grass buffer since 1991, 20 cited the soil conservation district as their point 
of contact, 15 cited NRCS or CFSA, and only three cited DNR. In addition, six of those 
landowners made comments about the efforts of NRCS or CFSA to help them implement 
their grass buffers. For those farmers who had planted a forest buffer, one mentioned 
ASCS assistance and four noted help from the district soil conservationist. Of all riparian 
landowners surveyed, only nine cited DNR as a point of contact, and one commented that 
DNR "just has no common sense." Since DNR might be seen as a regulator by some 
farmers, the suggestion by DNR of the need for cooperation with other agencies appears 
to have some merit. 
One Buffer Incentive Program landowner noted this difference in the 
communication channels described by Rogers and others in the diffusion-of-innovations 
literature, suggesting that "there might be more people like us who know nothing about 
the Soil Conservation District, etc. DNR should use that angle, should try to find a way 
to get to people who are environmentally oriented, like Sierra Club members." Another 
described himself in terms Rogers might have used for an innovator. He expected that the 
interviewer would "find a distinct gap in opinions between 'white forehead farmers' and 
farmers like myself. I was one of the first in Harford County to do this--one reason was 
as a demonstration for other farms." 
Once awareness of the concept had been established in the MASS interviews, the 
next step was to determine whether or not a farmer had already planted a buffer on his 
property, and, if not, why he had not done so. These questions were necessary to 
determine which of the 241 farmers who were aware of the concept were in a position to 
make a decision to participate in Maryland's Buffer Incentive Program or another forest or 
grass buffer program. As with the previous questions, some farmers gave more than one 
reason for their decision to plant or not plant a buffer. Riparian landowners were asked 
the following questions: 
Have you planted a forest or g;rass buffer on any of your riparian land since 1991? 
IF NO: Why haven't you done so? 
Of the 241 riparian landowners asked this question, 70 said that they had planted a 
forest or grass riparian buffer since 1991. Fifteen of those buffers are forest buffers 
planted without Buffer Incentive Program support; fifty-five are grass buffers. The 
remaining 171 landowners indicated that they had not planted a riparian buffer since 
1991. They gave the following reasons for not doing so: 
75 
? No, because a natural buffer was already there 68 
? No, I planted it before 1991 15 
? No, I have not planted a buffer and I refuse to 
participate in government programs 2 
? No, I have not planted a buffer and I have 
unbuffered riparian land 81 
b Of those f anners in the last category, thefo llowing reasons fornot p! anting a 
uffer were given as additional comments. Again, some farmers gave more than one 
reason. 
? No need, cattle not near the stream, 
they have another water source 9 
? No need, land not steep or erodible 3 
? No, I need a crossing and water source for cattle 3 
? No, it's pasture 3 
? No, not enough land to spare 4 
? No, the land is fenced off 7 
? No need, "not much of a stream" 4 
General comments noted in more than one interview included variations on "It 
planted itself, just didn't mow, " "more trouble than it's worth-fence!" and "inconvenient-
-I need catt1 e  crossm. gs." Of those who had planted grass buffers, four commented that 
they had done so to combat erosion problems. 
Awareness of the Buffer Incentive Program 
The next step in the MASS interviews was a determination of which farmers were 
Maryland's Buffer Incentive Program. The landowners who are aware of the 
aware 0 f 
program, have unbuffered riparian land, and who have not planted a buffer would make 
the ideal comparison for an analysis of deternu?n ants of  part1? c1? pat1? on m?  th e  program. Of 
the 284 riparian landowners in the survey, only 67 were aware of Maryland's Buffer 
Incentive Program. Of the 81 Jandowners who have unbuffered riparian land and who 
have not p! anted a buffe r, only 21 were aware ofBIP, 58 said they were not aware of the 
progra m, and two did not give an answer. 
Eleven of the 49 Buffer Incentive Program participants interviewed commented 
that they thought one of the main barriers to participation in the program was simply that 
Peopl e weren't aware of it; six of those people suggested that fa nners m?  part1? cu 1a r need to 
be educ ated about the concept. ? 
76 
Perceived Benefits, Perceived Costs, and Attitudinal Factors 
Recognizing that many, if not most, of the landowners in the survey would not be 
e of the Buffer Incentive Program or that they would have already planted a forest or 
awar ~ r the next, 13-part questi? on was word  e d to e1 1? c1? t responses ab  out any of those 
grass b u fie ' 
. t still be compatible with the Buffer Incentive Program interviews for 
choices, ye . . 
. n purposes. Tables 15 to 29 surnrnanze the answers to this 13-part question. 
companso 
It was as ked 
as follows of all landowners surveyed: 
? a critical factor in your decision to plant a buffer on your land 
? somewhat important 
? not a very important factor 
? or was not a factor 
Table 15. Aesthetic Factors 
N Critical Somewhat Not Very Not a Factor 
Important Important 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
BIP participants 49 
16.3 51.0 10.2 22.4 
All other riparian landowners: 162 8.6 29.6 9.9 51.9 
Planted forest buffer 14 0.0 21.4 14.3 64.3 
Planted grass buffer 44 13.6 31.8 11.4 43.2 
Has not planted a buffer 72 9.7 32.0 5.5 52.8 
Planted buffer before '91 7 14.3 28.6 14.3 42.8 
Aware ofBIP 54 7.4 37.0 9.2 44.4 
The majority of BIP landowners considered aesthetic factors critical or somewhat 
important in their decision to participate in the program~ a majority of the other riparian 
landowners surveyed who responded to this question indicated that aesthetic factors were 
not very important or not a factor in their decision. Three BIP participants noted that they 
cannot see the buffer, two like the privacy it affords, including not seeing neighbors' 
lights, and three "like trees." One of these landowners noted that he "deliberately made 
his buffer aesthetically pleasing." He commented further that the buffer is "a great source 
of satisfaction and beauty" for him and that it is "just gorgeous: one of the prettiest things 
77 
You've ever seen." On the other hand, four BIP landowners noted that their buffer 
nd
hi ers their view. One landowner who participated in BIP because of insistence on a 
st 
fore buffer by the Critical Areas Commission noted that his buffer now blocks his view 
of a 350-foot wide river and asked, "Why have waterfront property if you can't have the 
view?" 
Of the other riparian landowners, two who indicated that aesthetic factors such as 
a scenic view were critical to their decision noted that their riparian land is very close to 
th . . 
eir house. Another f anner planted a grass buffer around h1s pond more for aesthetic 
reasons than any others. 
Mann-Whitney U-tests (see Appendix 8) rejected at the .05 level the null 
hypothesis that the populations of adopters and non-adopters have the same distribution 
th 
Wi regard to attitudes about the importance of aesthetic factors in the buffer adoption 
decision. Spearman correlation coefficients (see Appendix 9) did not indicate a strong 
correlation between width of stream and importance of aesthetic factors. 
TabJe 16. Lost Agricultural Income from Land Along the Stream 
N Critical Somewhat Not Very Not a Factor 
Important Important 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
BIP Participants 49 6.1 12.2 10.2 71.4 
Apll othe ? ? pf  r npanan landowners: 166 18.0 
19.9 19.3 42.8 
anted forest buffer 14 14.3 21.4 14.3 50.0 
Ii anted grass buffe r 44 18.2 20.5 18.2 43.1 
Pl as not planted a buffer 76 21.1 21.1 17.1 40.7 
A anted buffe r before '91 7 14.3 28.6 14.3 42.8 
Ware ofBIP 55 14.5 14.5 16.4 54.6 
Thirty-five of the 49 Buffer Incentive Program participants interviewed indicated 
that lost agricultural income from the land along the stream was not a factor in their 
decision; only three indicated this factor was critical. This is not surprising, since the 
fllajority of these landowners earn little or no income from farming sources. Somewhat 
rnore suiprising is the finding that less than half of the riparian landowners interviewed by 
78 
MAss ? . 
, mcludmg those who had not planted a buffer, said that lost agricultural income 
Was critical or somewhat important in their adoption decision. 
Mann-Whitney U-tests (see Appendix 8) rejected at the .05 level the null 
hypothesis that the populations of adopters and non-adopters have the same distribution 
With regard to attitudes about the importance of lost agricultural income from the land 
along the stream in the buffer adoption decision. Spearman correlation coefficients (see 
Appendix 9) did not indicate a strong correlation between the importance of lost 
agricultural income and gross income from farming, net percentage of income from 
fanning, or type of previous riparian land use. These results suggest a need for further 
research that examines more closely the importance of the riparian area to the overall farm 
ope ? 
ration, and how that might change from farm to farm. 
Table 17. The Creation of Fish and WildJife Habitat 
N Critical Somewhat Not Very Not a Factor 
Important Important 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
Bip Participants 49 40.8 40.8 2.0 16.4 
APUl  othe ?r np an?a n landowners: 162 8.0 34.0 19.1 38.9 
Pl anted forest buffer 14 7.1 35.7 14.3 42.9 
FI anted grass buffer 43 14.0 30.2 16.3 39.5 ,:,1,,~!'I: 1:1;:ii 
Pl as not planted a buffer 73 4.1 31.5 23.3 41.1 
A anted buffer before '91 7 42.8 42.8 14.3 0.0 
Ware ofBIP 55 9.1 32.7 29.1 29.1 
It is striking that 40 of the 49 Buffer Incentive Program participants indicated that 
creation of fish and wildlife habitat was critical or somewhat important in their decision to 
~articipate, while the majority of the riparian landowners interviewed by MASS, 
~ncluding those who had not planted a buffer and those who had planted grass buffers, 
;ndica~ed that habitat was not very important or was not a factor. Nin~ of the :9 Buffer 
;rn cent1ve Program participants made additional comments related to this quest10n. Three these landowners indicated that it was the primary reason or one of the primary reasons 
or Planting the buffer. Another landowner, a dedicated birdwatcher, was excited that, 
79 
since the buffer had been planted, they had seen the first pheasant on their property in 
quite some time. 
Mann-Whitney U-tests (see Appendix 8) rejected at the .05 level the null 
hypothesis that the populations of adopters and non-adopters have the same distribution 
with regard to attitudes about the importance of fish and wildlife habitat creation in the 
buffer adoption decision. 
Table 18. Erosion 
N Critical Somewhat Not Very Not a Factor 
Important Important 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
BIP participants 49 44.9 28.6 4.1 22.4 
All other riparian landowners: 167 40.7 31.1 8.4 19.8 
Planted forest buffer 14 50.0 28.6 0.0 21.4 
Planted grass buffer 45 51.1 24.4 8.9 15.6 
Has not planted a buffer 76 27.6 36.8 13.2 22.4 
Planted buffer before '91 7 85.7 14.3 0.0 0.0 
Aware ofBIP 55 41.8 36.4 54.4 16.4 
People do not like erosion. That is the short explanation of these numbers. The 
numbers also show that there are many landowners who believe that grass buffers are 
more effective than forest buffers in controlling erosion: 34 of the 45 farmers who 
planted a grass buffer and answered this question indicated that erosion control was 
critical or somewhat important in their decision to do so. Three of the Buffer Incentive 
Program participants, however, commented that erosion control was the principal reason 
for planting the buffer, with one noting that a previous grass buffer could not handle the 
volume of water coming down a steep hill. The grass-versus-forest debate with regard to 
erosion control was the most common comment from the 113 farmers who made general 
comments at the end of the interview, with nine farmers offering their view that grass 
buffers outperform forest buffers. 
Mann-Whitney U-tests (see Appendix 8) failed to reject at the .05 level the null 
hypothesis that the populations of adopters and non-adopters have the same distribution 
with regard to attitudes about the importance of erosion in the buffer adoption decision. 
80 
Table 19. Possible Loss of Moisture to Adjacent Agricultural Fields 
N Critical Somewhat Not Very Not a Factor 
Important Important 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
BIP participants 49 0.0 10.2 0.0 89.8 
All other riparian landowners: 164 8.5 12.8 14.7 64.0 
Planted forest buffer 14 21.4 7.1 7.1 64.4 
Planted grass buffer 44 9.1 15.9 15.9 59.1 
Has not planted a buffer 75 6.7 9.3 14.7 69.3 
Planted buffer before '91 7 14.3 28.6 0.0 57.1 
Aware ofBIP 55 5.4 10.9 16.4 67.3 
This question was asked to gain some understanding of the perceived opportunity 
costs from reduced productivity in adjacent fields caused by a buffer. Loss of moisture is 
only one of the ways that the possible effects of forest buffers on adjacent fields have 
been cited, with loss of nutrients, as well as shading or limbs on adjacent fields, also 
possible sources of concern that have been raised in various forums. Loss of moisture 
does not appear to be on the radar screen for any of the categories of landowners 
interviewed, regardless of whether or not they have planted a buffer of any kind. This 
question does not really apply for people who planted a grass buffer, as two farmers who 
had planted grass pointed out. One noted that this was a "dumb question." One of the 
Buffer Incentive Program participants, however, noted that this was an "interesting 
question," which the author finds to be a much better answer. The landowner noted his 
father-in-law's experience in Illinois, where a windbreak helped with erosion but 
decimated yields from twenty to thirty rows adjacent to the trees, possibly from nutrient 
loss in his opinion. Another Buffer Incentive Program participant used this question as 
an opportunity to complain that most of his peers "are farming right up to the ditch banks. 
It's ridiculous. There will always be some lost revenue (from the buffer), but those 
perimeter crops don't do that well anyway." 
Mann-Whitney U-tests (see Appendix 8) rejected at the .05 level the null 
hypothesis that the populations of adopters and non-adopters have the same distribution 
for attitudes about the importance of loss of moisture to adjacent agricultural fields in the 
adoption decision. Spearman correlation coefficients (see Appendix 9) did not indicate a 
strong correlation between type of riparian land use and importance of loss of moisture. 
81 
Table 20. Possible Increased Deer Population 
N Critical Somewhat Not Very Not a Factor 
Important Important 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
BIP participants 49 10.2 30.6 8.2 51.0 
All other riparian landowners: 164 17.1 15.2 22.6 45.1 
Planted forest buffer 14 7.1 21.4 7.1 64.4 
Planted grass buffer 43 16.3 9.3 16.3 58.1 
Has not planted a buffer 75 22.7 20.0 20.0 37.3 
Planted buffer before '91 7 14.3 14.3 42.8 28.6 
Aware ofBIP 55 16.4 9.1 25.4 49.1 
This question was included because of the possible perception that establishment 
of forest buffers could lead to an increased deer population that would damage adjacent 
crops. This did not prove to be a concern for most of the landowners surveyed. But this 
question proved to be one of the most interesting in the survey: 14 of the 49 Buffer 
Incentive Program participants interviewed commented that increased deer population was 
not a major factor when deciding to participate, but buffer maintenance problems caused 
by deer are a major consideration for them now. Several discussed the benefits and costs 
of deer protectors for the trees, but three noted that at $1.25 to $3 apiece, they are cost-
prohibitive when 1,000 or more trees are planted. Another landowner expressed concern 
about the use of deer protectors, calling them "bluebird death traps." One property in the 
program is owned by a land trust and is in a conservation easement that prohibits hunting 
deer. The deer have decimated the buffer, and the land trust will not consider extending 
its commitment beyond the ten year requirement for the program. What is the solution to 
this problem? "Louisiana Hot Sauce, " according to one Buffer Incentive Program 
participant, "but not Tabasco." 
Mann-Whitney U-tests (see Appendix 8) failed to reject at the .05 level the null 
hypothesis that the populations of adopters and non,.adopters have the same distribution 
with regard to attitudes about increased deer population in the buffer adoption decision. 
82 
TLabnldeo w21n.e rw' a Cter Quah.!Y  and Other Environmental Benefits to the 
s ommumty 
N Critical Somewhat 
Not Very Not a Factor 
Important Important 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
4.1 12.5 
BIP part' 29.2 1c1. pants 48 54.2 
47.0 9.6 15.1 
APlll aonthteedr  f?p  an?a n landowners: 166 28.3 42.9 21.4 7 .1 28.6 
Pl orest buffer 14 38.6 41.0 
13.6 6.8 
H anted grass buffer 44 14.5 51.3 9.2 
Pl~n ot planted a buffer 76 25.0 42.8 0.0 28.6 
A ted buffe r before '91 7 28.6 10.9 54.5 9.1 
- Ware ofBIP 
55 25.5 
. This question was asked to gain some understanding of the relative importance of 
a0  n-s1te 'pn?v ate benefits versus off-site, public benefits. Since the benefits of buffers may 
Wchcir ue lar gely to the community, not on the landowner's property, the relative weight 
u dc h the lando wner gi.v es th e se bene fi ts m.  h'1 s or he r de c1.s 1. on 1. s 1. mpo rt ant to 
p~ erStand. Somewhat surprisingly, in each category, including those who have not 
anted a buffer, a majority of!andowners said that these community benefits were critical 
:;sb omewhat important in their decision. Twelve Buffe r Incentive Program participants 
b a orated on the benefits to the commum.t y of the buffer, wi.t h four saym? g that such 
enefits were th e pn?m ary mot1?v at1?o n ,r.o r partt?c 1? pau?n g m? th e  program. F'1 ve Bu  rr,.e r 
d1n  ce. ntiv e pr ogram part1.c 1. pants and two other landowners wi.t h natural buffers noted their 
es1re to protect a specific stream Two BIP part.ic i.p ants also noted that on-si.t e water 
qua1?t ty benefits were a major facto. r in their decision to plant a buffe r, with one of these 
1da  nctowners Pa rt1' cularly concerned for hi.s  catt 1e  about contanu.n au.o n fr om upstream 
evelopment. 
h Mann-Whitney U-tests (see Appendix 8) failed to reject at the .05 level the null 
Y. pothesis th at the populations of adopters and non-adopters have th e  same d'1 stn' b ut1? 0n 
bW ith re gard to atti.t udes about the importanee of wate. r quali.t y and other envr.r orunental 
enefits to the community in the buffer adoption decision. Spearman correlation 
coeffji ci?e nts indicate some correlat.i on between education and importance of water quality 
anct othe r envu? onmental benefits, one of the alternate hypotheses state d ear 11? er. 
83 
Table 22. Compliance with Current or Future Land Use Regulations 
N Critical Somewhat Not Very Not a Factor 
Important Important 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
BIP participants 49 24.5 16.3 8.2 51.0 
All other riparian landowners: 168 25.6 37.5 11.3 25.6 
Planted forest buffer 14 35.7 14.3 14.3 35.7 
Planted grass buffer 42 45.2 31.0 11.9 11.9 
Has not planted a buffer 74 18.9 48.6 10.8 21.6 
Planted buffer before '91 7 14.3 28.6 14.3 42.8 
Aware ofBIP 53 30.2 43.4 9.4 17.0 
This question was asked to understand the extent to which landowners are 
concerned about the potential for increased regulation that participation in a riparian buffer 
program might bring. Will planting the buffer provide habitat that might subject the 
landowner to endangered species regulation? Will the land use be changed so that the 
buffered property could be considered wetlands and thus restricted from future 
development or farming uses? 
Not surprisingly, a majority of the riparian landowners surveyed by MASS said 
that compliance with current or future land use regulations was critical or somewhat 
important in their decision to plant or not plant a buffer. Five made additional comments 
that there are too many regulations already, and two expressed concern about the potential 
for more control of their land and restrictions on cutting down the trees in the future if 
they participated in a program. Somewhat surprisingly, 20 of the 49 Buffer Incentive 
Program participants interviewed said that compliance with current or future land use 
regulations was critical or somewhat important in their decision. Two of these 
landowners noted that tree replacement laws or other regulations concerning subdivision 
of their land played a role in their decision. 
The Mann-Whitney U-test unweighted by gross income level (see Appendix 8) 
rejected at the .05 level the null hypothesis that the populations of adopters and non-
adopters have the same distribution with regard to attitudes about the importance of 
current or future land use regulation in the buffer adoption decision. When weighted by 
gross income, the Mann-Whitney test fails to reject the null hypothesis at a 5% 
significance level. 
84 
Table 23. The Time of Year That a Buffer Would Need to be Planted 
or Maintained 
N Critical Somewhat Not Very Not a Factor 
Important Important 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
BIP participants 49 6.1 12.2 4.1 77.6 
All other riparian landowners: 160 15.6 27.5 19.4 37.5 
Planted forest buffer 14 28.6 21.4 14.3 35.7 
Planted grass buffer 42 16.7 23.8 30.9 28.6 
Has not planted a buffer 72 15.3 36.1 13.9 34.7 
Planted buffer before '91 7 14.3 14.3 0.0 71.4 
Aware ofBIP 55 16.4 30.9 20.0 32.7 
This question was asked to gain some understanding of the extent to which 
conflicts with row crop-planting or other activities might influence a farmer's willingness 
to participate in a riparian buffer program. Just over half of those landowners interviewed 
who had not planted a buffer indicated that the time of year for planting and maintenance 
was critical or somewhat important to their decision. Thirty-eight of the 49 Buffer 
Incentive Program participants interviewed indicated that it was not a factor at all. 
Several BIP participants commented further about timing factors. One landowner 
who said that he was knowledgeable about forestry practices in the southeast United 
States questioned the Department of Natural Resources emphasis on springtime planting 
for the program, saying that he believes springtime planting leads to greater mortality than 
fall planting, which is more common in the southeast. He called this requirement a major 
negative factor and believes that the spring plantings lead also to greater costs and delayed 
tax advantages. 
Mann-Whitney U-tests (see Appendix 8) rejected at the .05 level the null 
hypothesis that the populations of adopters and non-adopters have the same distribution 
with regard to attitudes about the importance of time of year of planting in the buffer 
adoption decision. Spearman correlation coefficients (see Appendix 9) did not indicate a 
strong correlation between type of riparian land use and the importance of the time of year 
of planting. As was the case with the loss-of-moisture question, there is a somewhat 
surprising slightly negative correlation between importance of time of year of planting and 
riparian land that is all in row crops. 
85 
Table 24. The Length of Time Needed for Planting and Maintenance 
N Critical Somewhat Not Very Not a Factor 
Important Important 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
BIP participants 49 2.0 20.4 14.3 63.3 
All other riparian landowners: 158 14.6 30.0 13.3 42.4 
Planted forest buffer 15 20.0 26.7 20.0 33.3 
Planted grass buffer 39 18.0 20.5 17.9 43.6 
Has not planted a buffer 72 15.3 37.5 9.7 37.5 
Planted buffer before '91 7 0.0 14.3 14.3 71.4 
Aware ofBIP 53 20.8 24.5 15.1 39.6 
Is the perceived time commitment from planting and maintaining a riparian buffer 
a major concern for landowners when deciding whether or not to participate in a program? 
For riparian landowners interviewed by MASS, the answer is "yes," with the majority of 
landowners in each category saying this factor was critical or somewhat important in their 
decision. This is particularly noteworthy for landowners who have not planted a buffer, 
with 38 of 72 landowners saying this was critical or somewhat important in their decision 
not to plant. 
For Buffer Incentive Program participants interviewed, the answer is "no," with 
31 of the 49 landowners interviewed saying that the time commitment was not a factor in 
their decision. In hindsight, should it have been a factor for these landowners? In 
retrospect, 11 landowners said yes. Two landowners noted that maintenance has turned 
out to be "a pain in the neck." One landowner, a university professor, said that initial 
planting and maintenance turned out to be so time consuming that she would not have 
been able to take part in the program if she had not been on sabbatical that semester. 
Maintaining the buffe r through mowing, herbicide application, replanting to replace trees 
that died, and other activities has proved to be a major task for some landowners and 
suggests that this aspect of their participation has been played down somewhat by 
foresters promoting the program .. One noted that, "even with the forester doing most of 
the work, the landowner can't anticipate that time commitment." One landowner called 
first-year maintenance "a terrible ordeal," another said that weeding was required almost 
86 
every night the first summer, and another noted that his family did not go anywhere that 
summer because weekends were tied up by buffer maintenance due to drought conditions. 
Mann-Whitney U-tests (see Appendix 8) rejected at the .05 level the null 
h:'porbesis that the populations of adopters and non-adopters have the same diS(ribution 
W1th . . th 
regard to attitudes about the importance ofl ength of time needed for planting m e 
_nbduffer adoption decision. Speannan correlation coefficients (see Appendix 9) did not 
~ icate a S(rong correlation between type of riparian land use and the importance of the 
tune ofye O f 1 ? ? ? th is a 
ar P antmg. As was the case with the loss-of-moisture question, ere 
nseoemdeedw hfoart  surpr.i sing slig.h tly. n egative correlation between importance ofl eng of time 1 th 
P anting and npanan land that is all in row crops. 
. Buffer Incentive Program participants were asked if they hired out planting or 
maintenance. Twenty-eight of the 49 landowners interviewed said that someone else 
th
Planted e buffer, but only six said that maintenance was performed by paid contractors .. 
Buffer l ? ? kt 
ncentive Program participants were also asked to recall how many hours it too 
Plant the 0 buff d h ? d ? the 
ier an ow many hours per month were spent on maintenance urmg 
first and s d ? ld d 
thecon year, assuming that in many cases maintenance requirements wou rap 
of[ e fir5t aaftbeoru t t year. That assumption did not hold for some landownafter ?e rs who noted that 
requ1.r em t wTo'h y ears of tree growth, deer arrived, presenting a new maintenance "d 
en? ese findings (summarized in Table 25) and comments present a wi e 
st
range of e imates for planting and maintenance time. This suggests the need for further 
research It ? ? ?1 .,,:? 
? may also point to the need for a planting and maintenance program simi ar to ,,? 
the approach being used by the Ohio TREES program, whereby Jandowne,s contract out 
sPhlaarnet ipnrgo garnadm msa. intenance activities, with that expenditure possibly covered by other cost_ 
87 
i:~tli~ .25? Planting and Maintenance Time for Buffe r Incentive Program 
c1pants 
Maintenance After 
Maintenance 
Buffer Planting Time First Year First Year 
(acres) (hrs/mo.) (hrs/mo./acre) (hrs.Imo.) (hrs./mo./acre) 
(hrs.) (hrs.I acre) 
2.0 2 2.0 
1.0 45 45.0 
2 
5 5.0 
5 5.0 
4.0 
1.0 *- 15.0 4 0.0 
1.0 15 100 100.0 0.0 0 
1.0 20 20.0 
0 3.0 
3 3.0 
3 
8.0 3 3.0 1.0 8 3 3.0 0 0.0 1.0 72 72.0 12 12.0 9.0 1.0 60 60.0 9 9.0 
9 
8.0 
1.0 18 18.0 8 8.0 
8 
4.0 
1.0 *8 8.0 
4 
10.0 
1.0 30 30.0 11 10.0 
11 
6.7 
1.1 40 36.4 8 6.7 
8 
$11 
1.2 104.2 3.3 3 
2.0 _., 
125 13.3 ,!' 5 
1.5 *100 66.7 
20 
20 13.3 2.5 
1.5 60 40.0 8 5.0 
4 
0.5 
1.6 1 *20 12.5 1 0.5 
2.0 38.1 48 
22.9 
80 1.2 ?I~ 
2.1 300 142.9 3 1.2 
3 
2 0.8 
2.5 16 6.4 5 2.0 1 0.4 
2.5 *3 1.2 2 0.8 8.0 
2.6 85 32.7 
24 
16 5.3 0.0 
3.0 40 13.3 1 0.3 
0 
2 0.7 
3.0 *4 1.3 4 1.3 0.3 
3.0 16 5.3 1 0.3 
1 
*3 0.9 
3.0 20 6.7 *3 0.9 3 0.8 
3.5 *16 4.6 3 0.8 3 0.7 
4.0 *- 3 0.7 6 1.4 
4.1 50 12.2 15 3.4 
4.4 60 13.6 1.6 
4.8 *- 8 1.6 
8 
10 2.0 
5.0 *24 4.8 10 2.0 0 0.0 
5.1 *160 31.4 0 o.o 4 0.8 ' 
5.1 100 19.6 4 0.8 10 1.8 
5.2 *250 48.l 16 2.9 *4 0.7 
5.5 *20 36.4 *4 0.7 75 12.5 
6.0 *10 16.7 75 12.5 6.7 40 
6.7 
6.0 *8 13.3 40 8 1.3 
6.0 80 13.3 30 5.0 2 0.3 
6.0 4 1.5 2 0.3 1 0.1 
7.o *12 1.7 2 0.3 1 0.1 
7.0 *8 1.1 3 0.4 3 0.3 
8.0 35 4.4 3 0.3 
9.5 *100 10.5 
*P lanting or mam. tenance hired out 
88 
Table 25 (continued). Planting and Maintenance Time for Buffer 
Incentive Program Participants 
Buffer Planting Time Maintenance Maintenance After 
(acres) First Year First Year 
(hrs.) (hrs.lacre) (hrs.Imo.) (hrs.lmo.lacre) (hrs/mo.) (hrslmo./acre) 
9.6 *- 2 0.2 2 0.2 
1].5 *- *4 0.3 0 0.0 
lJ.7 *- 7 0.6 7 0.6 
12.6 *280 22.2 20 1.6 1 0.1 
14.0 *8 0.6 3 0.2 3 0.2 
16.5 *40 2.4 3 0.2 3 0.2 
19.4 *15 0.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 
20.1 16 0.8 15 0.7 JO 0.5 
27.2 *8 0.3 3 0.1 3 0.1 
35.0 *32 0.9 *l 0.0 *1 0.0 
50.0 *- *- *-
Mean 24.3 3.8 2.8 
*Plantin g or mam? tenance hi.r ed out 
ITncaeb let " 26?  The Cost-share Payment from Maryland ,s  Buffer 
n ive Program 
N Critical Somewhat Not Vezy Not a Factor 
Important Important 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
BJPpan1?c 1.p ants 49 26.5 42.9 14.3 16.3 
OtWhhe rripa .n?a n landowners 
0 a.re aware ofB IP: 53 13.2 45.3 7.5 33.4 
and Who have 
Planted forest b~ffer 5 20.0 60.0 0.0 20.0 
1:-ilanted grass buffer* 18 11.1 5.6 11.1 72.2 
ot planted a buffer 21 19.0 71.4 4.8 4.8 
*g rass buffers are not eligible for BIP grant 
89 
----
This question, and a more in-depth question on willingness to accept payment for 
various term programs, addresses the relative importance of a financial incentive for 
participation in a riparian buffer program. If in fact lost income from riparian land is an 
important factor for a landowner, one would expect that such incentive payments would 
be very important in the decision to adopt or not adopt a riparian buffer. Thirty-four of 
the 49 Buffer Incentive Program participants interviewed said that the BIP grant was 
critical or somewhat important to their decision. Seven landowners made additional 
comments about how important it was to have that financial incentive, with one noting 
that it was his main reason for participating. Four others commented that the grant was a 
bonus that they really appreciated, even if it was not crucial to their decision. One 
landowner said that he planted more trees than he would have without the incentive, and 
another indicated that it was particularly helpful in offsetting buffer fence-building 
expenses. Two landowners commented that it was the technical assistance from the 
forester, not the money, that was the biggest incentive. While these comments point to 
the need for continued grants through the program, it should also be noted that 12 of the 
49 landowners commented that they would have participated in the program even if no ,, 
cost share was provided. ,,' 
Mann-Whitney U-tests (see Appendix 8) rejected at the .05 level the null 
hypothesis that the populations of adopters and non-adopters have the same distribution 
with regard to attitudes about the importance of the Buffer Incentive Program grant in the 
buffer adoption decision. 
Of the 21 riparian landowners in the survey conducted by MASS who are aware 
of the Buffer Incentive Program and decided not to plant a buffer, 19 said that the cost 
,,, 
share payment was critical or somewhat important to their decision not to participate. ,,,,,,  
Mann-Whitney U-tests (see Appendix 8) failed to reject at the .05 level the null hypothesis 
that the populations of adopters and of non-adopters who are aware of the program and 
have not planted a buffer have the same distribution with regard to attitudes about the 
importance of the Buffer Incentive Program grant in the buffer adoption decision. The 
number of responses to this question may be too small to draw any strong conclusions, 
but it does suggest that a bigger grant payment would influence these landowners to 
participate. Perhaps the bigger determinant of participation in this case is that only 21 of 
the 81 landowners who had not planted a buffer had heard of the program at all. The 
issue of the level of grant payment that landowners would be willing to accept to 
participate in the program is addressed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
90 
Table 27. Other Cost-share Programs or Technical Assistance, for 
Instance, to Purchase Seedlings 
N Critical Somewhat Not Very Not a Factor 
Important Important 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
BIP participants 48 29.2 35.4 4.2 31.2 
All other riparian landowners: 154 11.0 42.9 8.4 37.7 
Planted forest buffer 14 28.6 42.9 7.1 21.4 
Planted grass buffer 40 12.5 37.5 10.0 40.0 
Has not planted a buffer 70 8.6 51.4 5.7 34.3 
Planted buffer before '91 7 14.3 0.0 28.6 57.1 
Aware ofBIP 51 11.8 47.1 5.9 35.2 
The third step in the adoption process suggested in this thesis concerns the ability 
of a "change agent" like the Department of Natural Resources forester to coordinate a 
package of other incentives or technical assistance to make participation in the program 
more attractive. For an illustration of a technical assistance and cost share package, see 
Table 1. 
The majority of Buffer Incentive Program participants and other riparian 
landowners interviewed said that other cost-share programs or technical assistance were 
critical or somewhat important in their adoption decision. Eight participants noted the 
importance of the availability of low-cost seedlings, with one hoping that this research 
would reach a conclusion suggesting that the state provide seedlings free of charge. Two 
landowners said that they could not have undertaken the project without the forester's 
assistance. Another landowner, however, said that lack of technical assistance and 
follow-up by the forester prevented him from getting other cost-share and caused 
problems for the survival rate of the buffer. This comment was the exception to generally 
high marks by Buffer Incentive Program participants for the technical assistance provided 
by the foresters. 
Mann-Whitney U-tests (see Appendix 8) rejected at the .05 level the null 
hypothesis that the populations of adopters and non-adopters have the same distribution 
with regard to attitudes about the importance of other cost-share or technical assistance in 
the buffer adoption decision. 
91 
Table 28. Time Spent on the Application Process for Cost-share Funds 
N Critical Somewhat Not Very Not a Factor 
Important Important 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
BIP participants 49 0.0 8.2 16.3 75.5 
All other riparian landowners: 158 10.8 35.4 12.7 41.1 
Planted forest buffer 14 28.6 21.4 0.0 50.0 
Planted grass buffer 38 10.5 31.6 18.4 39.5 
Has not planted a buffer 73 11.0 39.7 12.3 37.0 
Planted buffer before '91 7 0.0 14.3 14.3 71.4 
Aware ofBIP 53 13.2 39.6 9.4 37.8 
The reason this question was asked can be summed up by the comment of one 
riparian landowner interviewed by MASS: "Paperwork? Forget it!" To what extent are 
landowners turned off by perceived transactions costs to receive the grant payment, in 
other words, by the "hassle factor"? This was not a perceived problem for the Buffer 
Incentive Program participants, with 43 of the 49 landowners interviewed saying it was 
not very important or not a factor in their decision to participate. Only two BIP 
participants had negative comments about the amount of paperwork, while two others 
noted that the forester and extension personnel did almost all the paperwork for them. 
While the time that they would have to spend on the application process was of 
somewhat more concern for other riparian landowners interviewed, only just over half of 
those who have not planted a buffer said that this factor was critical or somewhat 
important in their decision not to participate. Four riparian landowners commented, 
however, about their unpleasant experiences with other best management practices, with 
one noting that "farmers are disgusted" with the delays in reimbursement. 
Mann-Whitney U-tests (see Appendix 8) rejected at the .05 level the null 
hypothesis that the populations of adopters and non-adopters have the same distribution 
with regard to attitudes about the importance of the time commitment to obtain grant funds 
in the buffer adoption decision. 
92 
Table 29 provides a summary of the comparison of perceived costs and benefits 
between B ffi I . . . 
u er ncentive Program adopters and non-adopters discussed m this section. 
Water qua1?t Y and  th . i a er environmental benefits to the commum.t y were the most u. nportant 
factor in the adoption decision for Buffer Incentive Program participants, followed by 
er ? 
eation of fish and wildlife habitat, control of erosion, and the grant from the Buffer 
Incentiv p . . ? 
e rogram. For non-adopters, usmg both weighted and unwe1ghted data, erosion 
control Was the most important factor in the adoption decision, followed by water quality 
and other envi?r onmental benefits to the community, comp1 1?  ance w1' th current or future 
lanct Use regulations, and the grant payment from the Buffer Incentive Program. 
TabJe 29. Means of Responses to Perceived Cost and Benefit Questions 
BJp Adopters BIP Non-Adopters BIP Non-Adopters 
(unweighted) (weighted by gross 
income from farming) 
Variable* Mean N Variable Mean N Variable Mean N 
~TERQUL 3.25 49 EROSION 2.93 138 EROSION 2.91 131 
ERofl'tT 3.06 49 WATERQUL 2.88 137 WATERQUL 2.84 130 
Sfi N 2.96 49 LAWS 2.65 133 LAWS2.60 125 
Sfi AREBIP 2.80 49 SHAREBIP 2.31 131 SHAREBIP 2.26 126 
AE~TH 2.63 49 SHAREOTH 2.21 126 SEASON 2.14 126 
LAWs 2 Tc 2.61 49 SEASON 2.18 132 SHAREOTH 2.14 120 
DEE .14 49 SHARETIM 2.17 129 HABITAT 2.12 128 
PL~ 2.00 49 JNCOMLOS 2.13 137 INCOMLOS 2.10 130 
INcoML 1.61 49 HABITAT 2.08 134 
SHARETIM 2.08 124 
SEASON OS 1.53 49 PLANTTIM 2.05 129 PLANTTIM 1.98 125 
SfiARET 1.47 49 DEER 2.03 135 
DEER 1.98 129 
AESTHETC I.90 128 
Mo1sTu& 1.33 49 AESTHETC 1.88 133 
1.20 49 MOISTURE 1.62 135 MOISTURE 1.64 129 
*Data are cod d .r ? t ale with 1 representing ''not a factor" in the adoption 
dee1? . e on a 1our-pom sc , 11 
dee iss.1 on ' 2 "n o t very 1. mportan t , " 3 "somewhat im. portant 
" d 
, an 4 en
? t1? ca 1" m?  th e a d opt1? 0n 
Ion. For a description of codes, see Appendix 4. 
93 
Attitudes About Longer Term Programs 
The samples of adopters and non-adopters cited the Buffer Incentive Program 
grant payment as one of the four most important factors in the adoption decision. The 
final section of the interviews was a series of questions to gain a better understanding of 
the amount that a landowner would accept for a 10-year, 20-year, 30-year, or permanent 
maintenance requirement for forest and grass buffers, in a lump-sum payment. The 
Buffer Incentive Program grant was $200 per acre in 1992, $500 per acre in 1993 and 
1994, and is now $300 per acre. Because of the time delay for some environmental 
benefits from forest buffers, longer-term commitments are an important policy 
consideration. The option to secure at least some environmental benefits from grass 
buffers makes the grass option an important consideration as well. 
Table 30. Willingness to Accept Payment for Various Term Forest or 
Grass Buffer Programs 
mean standard dev. minimum maximum number 
Forest Buffer 
49 BIP narticinants 
20 years 661.5 395.4 100 1500 13 
30 years 663.6 508.4 100 2000 11 ,,,, 
permanent 757.1 559.3 500 2000 7 ?( ;f,::~1; 
1.
I ,>,ti \':i 1P 
11 
'1]1?"
241 rinarian landowners ,1'?::i1:,:'.'.1 
??:" ,,,,11 i 
10 years 730 1994 60 15000 56 
20 years 2760 7402 0 30000 16 
30 years 6820 18692 300 60000 10 
permanent 8560 21642 300 70000 10 
Grass Buffers 
49 BIP narticinants 
10 years 366.4 349.6 50 1000 11 
20 years 870.0 1004.2 50 3000 9 
30 years 871.4 816.4 50 2000 7 
permanent 1060.0 894.0 50 2000 5 
241 rinarian landowners 
10 years 1121 1994 60 15000 34 
20 years 3133 6531 300 25000 15 
30 years 6360 12636 300 40000 10 
permanent 2120 2311 300 7500 10 
94 
These questions test two hypotheses: 
? that landowners will participate in longer-tenn programs, but will require a 
higher grant payment to do so 
? that landowners will require a lower grant payment for participation in grass 
buffer programs than for forest buffer programs 
Most landowners declined in telephone interviews to give dollars-and-cents 
answers to these admittedly difficult questions. Appendix 5 summarizes t-tests using 
both weighted and unweighted data that compared the variances of responses by adopters 
and non-adopters to these questions. In all cases, the t-tests fail to reject at the .05 level 
the null hypothesis of no difference between population variances with regard to lowest 
acceptable lump-sum payment for various tenns for forest and grass buffer programs. 
The following comments suggest that these questions are worth continued consideration: 
? Eleven of the 49 Buffer Incentive Program participants surveyed plan to keep 
their buffer permanently, regardless of additional financial incentives 
? Nine of the 49 BIP participants surveyed indicated that they would not commit 
for longer than the current 10 year commitment 
? Four of the 49 BIP participants surveyed indicated that they would consider a 
longer commitment but would not commit on a pennanent basis 
? of 113 other riparian landowners who commented on various tenn programs, 14 
indicated that they would not commit beyond 10 years for forest or grass. 
? Nine of the 113 riparian landowners who commented indicated that they would 
not participate in a forest or grass buffer program at any price, with six of those 
landowners further commenting on their unwillingness to participate in 
government programs 
? of those comments on buffers in general, the most common was that grass is 
viewed as a better buffer than forest, with 10 farmers emphasizing this point in 
their comments. 
There is a mixed bag of messages included in these bullet points. While 
interviews suggest that there is an opportunity to secure longer-tenn commitments from 
some Buffer Incentive Program participants, there still may need to be flexibility in the 
program for shorter commitments. For landowners not in the program, there is some 
evidence that grass is a preferred option. But there is also some evidence that for some 
landowners, the issue is not forest versus grass; rather, the concerns are tieing up or 
taking that land out of production for any reason or participation in government programs. 
95 
General Comments from Surveys 
Each survey instrument was designed to include a combination of closed- and 
open-ended questions. While closed ended questions would provide data for statistical 
analysis, several open-ended questions were seen as necessary because of the subtleties 
of adoption determinants that might not have been captured in closed-ended questions. 
These comments offer additional insights into the awareness of the concept and the 
perceived costs and benefits of adoption. Each interview ended with the following open-
ended question: 
I would be grateful for your comments about buffers and the Buffer 
Incentive Program. including any barriers to participation that you see in 
your case, and any ways that a buffer incentive program could be made 
more attractive for someone like yourself. Is there anything more you 
would like to say about riparian buffers? 
Awareness 
The Buffer Incentive Program participants interviewed overwhelmingly expressed 
support for the program: 18 of the 49 landowners interviewed offered additional 
comments about how pleased they are with the program. Twelve landowners also singled 
out their county forester for praise. The forester's assistance in obtaining other cost-share 
or low-price seedlings, as well as planting and maintenance advice and assistance, were 
noted by several landowners. Only one Buffer Incentive Program participant expressed 
dissatisfaction with the program or the level of effort by the county forester. This 
landowner also happened to be the only participant from his county in the three-year 
period under study. These comments offer strong evidence of the importance of the 
forester as a "change agent" for this innovation. Several of the landowners fit the mold of 
the innovator or community leader that Rogers and other diffusion researchers have cited 
in the adoption process, with eleven landowners noting that the biggest barrier to 
participation in general is that more people should know about the program. Several 
indicated that they have either participated as a model for the community or that they have 
spread the word about riparian buffers to neighbors or business acquaintances. 
The riparian landowners interviewed by the Maryland Agricultural Statistics 
Service offered many perspectives on buffers, ranging from one farmer whose general 
comments were recorded simply as "not printable" to four landowners who expressed 
interest in talking to the county forester about their eligibility for the program. Seven 
96 
landowners said that they think forest buffers are a good idea, with two more landowners 
offering further that the idea needs more publicity. 
Perceived Costs and Benefits 
Replies to open-ended questions also yielded insights into the range of perceived 
costs and benefits of participation in buffer programs. Effects on both the land that would 
be buffered and land adjacent to the buffer were addressed. Two riparian landowners in 
the MASS survey thought that riparian buffers were a good idea if not too wide. Ten 
landowners, however, believed that grass is a better option. This was the most 
commonly-heard general comment. Stream or pond access is a concern for many 
farmers. One farmer expressed interest in grass, but only if cattle had access to the 
buffer. Others expressed concerns about the maneuverability of farm machinery and the 
effects of shading on adjacent fields. No one commented on loss of moisture or nutrients 
to adjacent fields. The issue of passive versus active restoration was addressed by several 
farmers; two said that planting buffers was more trouble than it is worth, and that 
streambank fencing is a better solution. 
Attitudes About Government Programs 
Not surprisingly, many farmers offered opinions about government programs. 
Eight of the 113 farmers who offered additional comments said that they want nothing to 
do with government programs; three of these farmers refused to participate in the survey 
for that reason. Five farmers noted that government programs are too demanding, three 
said that the "government messes things up," and four expressed concern about allowing 
more government control on their land. One farmer noted that he refuses to deal with the 
Department of Natural Resources, a contrast to the positive interaction that Buffer 
Incentive Program participants have had with their county foresters. Two farmers 
expressed disappointment with the permitting and reimbursement process. While one 
farmer believed that the government should not be paying for these programs, three others 
said that there should simply be a tax credit for planting a buffer. 
In the following chapter, conclusions are presented about the determinants of 
participation in this government program, based on the data presented in this chapter. 
These conclusions are followed by recommendations for development of public policy 
and future research programs. 
97 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
This research project was undertaken to address the following question: Why 
would someone plant a riparian buffer if he or she were not required to do so? Empirical 
research was conducted to test hypotheses about the extent to which attitudinal and "pure" 
economic factors drive the behavior of farmers with regard to voluntary riparian buffer 
programs. 
Conclusions outlined in this chapter follow the adoption process analytical 
framework used in this study. Landowner and farm characteristics are discussed first, 
followed by awareness of the concept and program, and the landowner's evaluation of 
perceived costs and benefits of participation. The chapter ends with recommendations for 
the Buffer Incentive Program, riparian buffer policy, and future research. 
The Landowners 
Who are these people? In short, the typical farmer in the Buffer Incentive 
Program is not really a farmer. Survey results suggest that Buffer Incentive Program 
participants earn less gross income from farming and less percentage net income from 
farming than do farm owners in Maryland who are not participating in the program. 
Buffer Incentive Program participants are also younger, have more years of formal 
education, and less years of experience working on and managing farms than farm 
owners not in the program. In contrast to results from some studies of other agricultural 
best management practices, and to one of the working hypotheses of this study, the 
survey results suggest that farmers with higher gross income from farming are less likely 
to participate in the Buffer Incentive Program than those with a lower gross income from 
farming. Forty-nine of 69 Buffer Incentive Program participants from 1992 to 1994 who 
had a recent agricultural land use on their property were interviewed for this study. Over 
half of those 49 participants interviewed earn less than $1,000 per year from farming, and 
82% earn under $20,000 per year. 
98 
-
Physical Characteristics of the Farm 
What about the streams and riparian land being buffered or not being buffered? 
Ultimately, this is the reason for the interest in buffers in the first place. Is the land being 
set aside through the Buffer Incentive Program in areas where it will have the most impact 
from the eight environmental functions of buffers described by Bohlen and King? Both 
Bohlen and King and Lowrance, et al. recognize the difficulty in answering that question 
across watersheds and different land uses. Nonetheless, however delicate it is to raise 
this point in policy forums, it is pretty obvious what is driving the riparian buffer debate, 
especially in the Chesapeake Bay watershed: there is a 40% nutrient reduction goal for 
the Chesapeake Bay on the table, great strides have been made in reducing point-source 
discharges to the Bay, the focus now is on non-point sources, and agriculture accounts 
for 69% of those non-point source discharges. Is the Buffer Incentive Program getting 
through to those large-scale farm operations that are apt to generate more non-point source 
discharges? No. Although 42% of Buffer Incentive Program participants indicated that 
the previous riparian land use was for row crops (a higher percentage than for other 
riparian landowners interviewed), the level of farming effort on that land, as indicated by 
gross revenue from farming, suggests that these are not the farms generating the most 
non-point source discharges. Statistical tests failed to reject the null hypothesis that the 
distributions of farm sizes for adopters and non-adopters is the same. There is some 
evidence, however, that the stated alternate hypothesis that landowners with larger 
properties will be more likely to adopt is not supported: the mean size of properties of 
Buffer Incentive Program participants interviewed is less than the size of farms owned by 
non-participants interviewed. It is important to note that while analysis in this study was 
limited to riparian properties on agricultural land, the farming community is not the sole 
target of the Buffer Incentive Program, nor is reduction of sediment, nitrogen, and 
phosphorus loads into streams. 
Bohlen and King outline these and other environmental functions of buffers, such 
as thermal effects on streams and wildlife habitat. Lowrance et al. emphasize the 
importance of forest buffers on smaller, first and second order streams, where the trees 
can provide full shade and other benefits for fish and wildlife habitat in particular. Is 
there any evidence that these smaller streams are being protected through the Buffer 
Incentive Program? While 38% of Buffer Incentive Program participants have streams of 
10 feet or less on the property, 85% of the riparian landowners interviewed who have 
properties without forest or grass buffers have streams of 10 feet or less. Statistical tests 
rejected the null hypothesis of no difference in distribution between stream sizes for 
99 
adopters and non-adopters. The prevalence of smaller order streams on the land of 
individuals who have no buffers whatsoever provides a convenient transition to the next 
section of these conclusions: awareness of the riparian buffer concept and the Buffer 
Incentive Program. 
Awareness 
How important is the "awareness stage" in the hypothesized adoption process? 
Interviews with non-participating landowners suggest that there is a real lack of 
awareness of the Buffer Incentive Program. Of the 81 landowners interviewed who have 
unbuffered land and have not planted a buffer, only 21 were aware of the Buffer Incentive 
Program, thus ruling out adoption of the innovation before they can mull over perceived 
costs and benefits of participation. 
How do adopters and non-adopters differ with regard to their awareness of the 
concept and program, and of the means through which they became aware of them? 
Eighty-five percent of riparian landowners interviewed who are not in the Buffer 
Incentive Program stated that they are aware of the concept of riparian buffers. This is 
not surprising, given the emphasis on best management practices in Maryland in recent 
years. What is somewhat surprising is the number of farm owners who said that they do 
not own any riparian land. The negative responses from Maryland's Eastern Shore were 
especially interesting, with the comment from one farmer in Dorchester County 
particularly telling: "The question is stupid, because anyone knows that if you live in 
lower Dorchester County, you have to be on a marsh or some waterway." Yet five of 
eight landowners interviewed in Dorchester County who are not in the Buffer Incentive 
Program said that they do not own riparian land. Perhaps, as may be the case with small 
streams, land may be unbuffered because the landowner does not perceive that it is 
eligible for support through grants, cost-share, or technical assistance. Perhaps the word 
"riparian" signals "government regulation" and thus these landowners declined to provide 
information through an interview. 
Participants and non-participants differ in the way in which they become aware of 
the concept of riparian buffers. Participants learn about riparian buffers from the 
Department of Natural Resources foresters; non-participants cite the soil district 
conservationist and the Natural Resources Conservation Service most often. This is no 
great surprise, and perhaps just another indication that Buffer Incentive Program 
participants are not really farmers. But it does point to the need for close collaboration 
between the different agencies at the very least. It also suggests that the most cost-
100 
effective social and economic improvements from buffers would be gained by 
establishing a program similar to BIP run by an agencies or agencies more trusted by 
farmers. This would be a better strategy to buffer the intensive farming operations where 
there is the most capacity and opportunity for environmental improvements. 
Twelve of the 49 Buffer Incentive Program participants interviewed made 
additional comments praising their county forester, offering strong evidence of the 
importance for these landowners of the forester as the change agent cited in adoption 
research. It should also be noted that, historically, the Buffer Incentive Program has 
spent its annual budget for buffer implementation grants. Without increased funding for 
more grants, as discussed later, it makes little sense to focus on increased outreach by 
foresters or other change agents from the soil conservation district or another agency to 
promote the program. 
Perceived Costs and Benefits 
How do landowners' motivations differ between the Buffer Incentive Program 
participants and non-participants? Water quality or other environmental benefits to the 
community was the most important factor in the adoption decision for Buffer Incentive 
Program participants interviewed, followed by creation of fish and wildlife habitat, 
control of erosion, the grant from the Buffer Incentive Program, and other cost-share or 
technical assistance. For non-adopters, erosion control was the most important factor, 
followed by water quality or other environmental benefits to the community, compliance 
with current or future land use regulations, the grant payment from the Buffer Incentive 
Program, and a tie between other cost-share or technical assistance and the time of year 
that a buffer would need to be planted. 
The responses to questions about perceived costs and benefits in the adoption 
decision highlight the widespread concerns that Maryland farmowners have about water 
quality and erosion. They also point to the important role that the grant payment from the 
Buffer Incentive Program plays, as well as technical assistance. The concern by non-
adopters about compliance with current or future land use regulation may suggest the need 
for increased outreach by individuals not seen by farmers as regulatory adversaries. 
Surprisingly, lost agricultural income from the land along the stream was not one 
of the top reasons cited by both Buffer Incentive Program participants and non-
participants in the adoption decision. Non-participants did have a higher mean score for 
this question than did participants, and the null hypothesis for this question of no 
difference in distributions between the two groups was rejected. Nonetheless, the relative 
101 
-------.~---.-.... -- -.- --.- ---- -- - ------ -::r=:::-:-7...r...-
mean ranking (eighth out of thirteen) of this factor for non-adopting landowners was 
unexpected. The difficulty in generalizing across farms and watersheds about the 
agricultural viability of riparian land suggests that this question is best asked during on-
site interviews of farm owners to gain a better understanding of that farm's 
characteristics. 
Recommendations for the Buffer Incentive Program and Riparian Buffer 
Policy 
The results of this study suggest several areas worthy of consideration by policy-
makers involved with the Buffer Incentive Program and riparian buffers issues. First? the 
leve  1 O f grant payment by the Buffer Incentive Program needs further examm? atw? n. 
Nineteen of 21 non-adopters who have unbuffered land, are aware of the Buffer Incentive 
Program, and have not planted a buffer indicated that the grant from the Buffer Incentive 
Program was critical or somewhat important in their decision not to participate, 
suggesting that it is too low. Follow-up questions about the amount farmers would be 
willing to accept for participation in various term buffer programs were inconclusive. But 
there is some weak evidence that non-adopters would participate in a ten-year program if 
the grant payment were increased. If the governors of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and 
Virginia produce a policy in the coming year setting a mileage or acreage goal for riparian 
forest buffers, they may have to put their money where their mouths are and increase 
grant payments to reach non-adopting farmers. Whether those costs exceed the 
program's benefits is another question altogether. 
Further study is also needed on the question of what farmers would be willing to 
accept for longer-term obligations for buffer maintenance, because buffers cut down after 
ten years may never provide the full range of benefits for which they are being promoted. 
Eleven of the 49 BIP participants interviewed indicated that they never plan to cut down 
their buffer. A government agency or land conservation organization should seize this 
opportunity and work with BIP participants to put their land in permanent conservation 
easements, which may also provide federal and state tax benefits to the landowner. 
Neither the Buffer Incentive Program nor the Chesapeake Executive Council's 
Riparian Forest Buffer Panel is charged with promoting the notion of grass buffers. Yet 
there is evidence that some farmers prefer the grass option: the most frequent comment 
from non-adopting farmers interviewed was that grass is better than forest as a buffer. If 
the literature cited by Lowrance et al. and Bohlen and King is correct about the 
effectiveness of grass buffers for sediment, nitrogen, and phosphorus control, then 
fanners should be given that option when forest buffers are promoted. 
102 
The Department of Natural Resources foresters were singled out for praise by BIP 
participants, and the landowners themselves deserve some recognition as well for being 
guinea pigs of sorts in this endeavor. Rogers describes the adoption process as having 
five steps: initial knowledge. the formation of a favorable or unfavorable attitude about 
the innovation through persuasion. the decision to adopt or reject the innovation, 
implementation of the innovation, and confirmation, whereby the individual may reverse 
the earlier decision to adopt or not adopt. The BIP participants from 1992 to 1994, whom 
Rogers might call "innovators" and Morris and Potter might call "active adopters," may 
now be in the "confirmation" stage and in a position to influence Morris and Potter's 
passive adopters, conditional non-adopters, and resistant non-adopters down the road. 
Many participants commented about the time commitments for planting and maintenance, 
as well as the problems for buffer survival caused by deer. These comments suggest a 
need for more technical assistance, reduced-cost wildlife protectors, and other resources 
to ensure the long-term viability of the investment in these buffers. Success in cultivating 
these initial buffers will also help cultivate a corps of successful voluntary buffer planters 
to sell the idea to neighbors and peers. Ohio's TREES programs should be examined for 
adaptation in Maryland to help ease the planting and maintenance burden on landowners. 
There is also some evidence that it is not the type of buffer planted, but the 
commitment to tie up the land for a period of time or participate in a government program 
that is of most concern to some farmers. These concerns are difficult ones to address. 
Perhaps the best approach is to focus on the passive adopters and conditional non-
adopters, and let the attitudes of the resistant non-adopters change over time. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
This last policy recommendation suggests an area for further research. A sample 
of landowners in Maryland should be tracked over a several-year period to understand 
how adoption behavior changes over time. If the adoption process proposed by Rogers 
and others holds, then eventually the resistant non-adopters will become adopters. 
Ideally, this research would include on-site interviews to gain a more thorough 
understanding of a farm's physical characteristics, the scale of the farm operation, the 
type of stream, and the adjacent land uses upstream and downstream. This would also 
help answer questions that arose in this study about landowner perceptions of riparian 
land and about the extent to which the operation had already experimented with these 
innovations on parts of his or her land. Focusing on one or two counties might provide 
the most workable scale for such a study. 
103 
Esseks and Kraft (1988; 1989) used soil maps to compare farmers' eligibility for 
the Conservation Reserve Program with actual soil conditions. Zube and Sheehan ( 1994) 
focused on desert riparian area landscape perceptions and attitudes in Arizona, noting 
differences between resource managers and other interest groups such as farmers. Both 
approaches would be useful supplements to this study. 
104 
Appendix 1. Buffer Incentive Program Survey Instrument 
CallI D# !_ ___________ _ 
Call #2 ________  
Call #3_-_-_--_-_-_-_--_-_-_::_- 
77=N0 OPINION 
88=D0ES NOT APPLY 
99=REFUSED 
My name is Pat Hagan. I am a graduate student at the University of 
Maryland College Park conducting research for my master's thesis on 
forest and grass buffers along rivers and streams. Have you received the 
letter I sent you about the study? 
I understand that you are participating in Maryland's Buffer Incentive 
Program. I would be grateful if you were to spend 10 to 15 minutes 
discussing the program and answering a few questions about your interest 
in buffers. This interview is completely voluntary and confidential. 
Is now a good time for us to talk? ,",', 
:i 
:;; 
IF NO: When would be a better time to call you back? ,,, 
DATE111ME: 
To help my analysis, many of these questions are in a multiple choice 
format. 
First, I would like to get some sense of how you became interested in 
putting a forest buffer on your land. 
Q 1) How did you first learn about the concept of riparian buffers? Was it 
through: 
written materials received in the mail ........ 1 
a telephone call . .. . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
a personal meeting or conversation 3 
a public meeting . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
information in the media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
105 
Q2) Could you talk briefly about who had the first personal contact with 
you about putting a riparian buffer on your land, and how that contact 
came about? 
CATEGORIES NOT READ ALOUD 
forester from Maryland Department of Natural Resources .. 1 
USDA Consolidated Farm Service Agency . . . ... . . .. . .. . . . 2 
USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service ........... 3 
Maryland soil district conservationist ........................ ~ 4 
University of Maryland Cooperative Extension Service .... _ 5 
University of Maryland Agricultural Experiment Station ... _ 6 
an agricultural chemical company or other company .. . ... . 7 
a non-profit conservation organization or land trust 8 
a neighbor who has put a buffer on his or her land 9 
another source (SPECIFY)_________ 10 
COMMENTS: 
Q3) I am trying to get some sense of the width of the stream at the point 
where you have planted a forest buffer. On average, how wide is the 
stream where it is now buffered on your property? 
feet 
,d 
rli, 
:1: 
,:1 
Q4) What percentage of your land is 
moderately sloped, with a 2-8% slope) ........................... . % I,.'  
highly sloped, with a greater than 8% slope) ................... . -- % 
Q5) Have you considered putting additional forest or grass buffers 
elsewhere on your property? 
no.... 0 
yes... 1 
Why haven't you done so? (OR) Why not? 
106 
Q6) I am interested in the extent to which the following factors played a 
role in your decision to put a riparian buffe r on your land. I will read a 
list of 13 possible factors. Please indicate whether each was 
a critical factor in your decision to put a buffer on your land 
was somewhat important 
was not a very important factor 
or was not a factor 
Q6A) The cost-share payment from the Buffer Incentive Program? 
critical 1 
somewhat important _ 2 
not very important _ 3 
not a factor 4 
Q6B) Other cost-share programs or technical assistance, for instance, to 
purchase seedlings? 
critical 1 
somewhat important _ 2 
not very important _ 3 
not a factor 4 
Q6C) Aesthetic factors such as a scenic view? 
critical 1 
somewhat important _ 2 ,, 
,,,, 
not very important _ 3 ,,I' 
not a factor 4 ,1.?' I  
Q6D) Lost agricultural income previously generated from your land along ,,1 l!I 
the stream? :1: ,,?,,:  
critical 1 ,, ,, 
somewhat important _ 2 
not very important _ 3 
not a factor 4 
Q6E) The creation of fish and wildlife habitat? 
critical 1 
somewhat important _ 2 
not very important _ 3 
not a factor 4 
Q6F) Erosion? 
critical 1 
somewhat important _ 2 
not very important _ 3 
not a factor 4 
Q6G) Time spent on the application process to receive cost-share funds? 
critical 1 
somewhat important _ 2 
not very important _ 3 
not a factor 4 
107 
Q6H) The time of year that a buffe r would need to be planted or 
maintained? 
critical I 
somewhat important _ 2 
not very important _ 3 
not a factor 4 
Q6I) The length of time needed for planting and maintenance of a buffer? 
critical 1 
somewhat important _ 2 
not very important _ 3 
not a factor 4 
Q6J) Possible loss of moisture to adjacent agricultural fields? 
critical 1 
somewhat important _ 2 
not very important _ 3 
not a factor 4 
Q6K) Possible increased deer population? 
critical I 
somewhat important _ 2 
not very important _ 3 
not a factor 4 
,, 
Q6L) Water quality and other environmental benefits to your community? ,,,,,  
,,,,,  
critical 1 1?: 
somewhat important _ 2 
not very important _ 3 
not a factor 4 
Q6M) Compliance with current or future land use regulations? 
critical I 
somewhat important _ 2 
not very important _ 3 
not a factor 4 
Q7) About how much out-of-pocket did it cost you to plant the buffer? 
$ _____  
Q8) About how much was cost-shared by programs other than the Buffer 
Incentive Program? 
$ _____  
108 
Q9) Have you ever received cost sharing funds for other best management 
practices? 
no.... 0 
yes... 1 
Q 10) Did you do the planting and maintenance yourself, or did someone 
else? 
myself ....... 0 
someone else 1 
Q 11) Can you give me an estimate of how many hours were spent planting 
the buffer? 
___ hours 
Q12) Can you give me an estimate of how many hours per month were 
spent on maintenance of the buffer during the first year? 
___ hours per month 
Q13) Subsequent to the first year, can you give me an estimate of how 
many hours per month have been spent on maintaining the buffer as 
forest? 
__ hours per month 
The terms of your contract with the Buffer Incentive Program state that 
your buffe r must be maintained as forest for 10 years. A one-time cost 
share payment of ($ __ per acre) would be provided once the buffer 
had been successfully established. 
Q 14) What is the lowest total price per acre that you would accept for a 
20-year maintenance requirement, in a lump-sum payment? 
$_ __ per acre 
for a 30-year maintenance requirement?.................... $_ __ per acre 
for a permanent maintenance requirement?................. $_ __ per acre 
109 
Q 15) What is the lowest total price per acre that you would accept for a 
10-year maintenance requirement for a 1:rass buffer, in a lump-sum 
payment? 
$ ___ per acre 
for a 20-year maintenance requirement?.................... $ ___ per acre 
for a 30-year maintenance requirement?.................... $_ __ per acre 
for a permanent maintenance requirement?................. $_ __ per acre 
Q16) As of June 1st, how many acres did you own? ....... . acres 
use free from others? ____ acres 
rent to others? ....... . ---- acres 
17) Before you planted a buffe r along the river or stream on your 
property, how was that portion of your land used? Was it 
all in row crops . . . . .. .. . .. . . . . . . .. . .. . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . I 
partially in row crops .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 2 
all pasture .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . 3 
partially pasture .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 4 
a grass lawn or field not used as pasture .. _ 5 
an idle row crop field .. .... .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 6 
in another use (specify) 7 
(IF ROW CROPS) 
Could you specify the crop or crops previously grown on the area that is now buffered? 
(IF PASTURE) 
What 
animals? 
How many animals per acre? ------- animals/acre 
110 
Q18) Of your total net income (from both off-farm and on-farm sources), 
which of the following categories best represents the percentage of your 
total income that came from farming? 
zero 1 
1% to 24% 2 
25% to 49% 3 
50% to 99% 4 
all of my income is from farming 5 
The following information will help my analysis and, again, it will be 
kept strictly confidential: 
(IF APPLICABLE): 
Q18) How many years have you been working on a farm? ..... ____ years 
managed a farm? ........ ____ years 
Q 19) In which of the following categories would you estimate your gross 
revenue from farming sources to be in 1994? 
less than $1,000 1 
$1,000 - $19,999 2 
$20,000-$39,999 3 
$40,000-$99,999 4 
$100,000-$249,999 5 
$250,000 or more 6 
Q20) In what age range are you? 
20-29 years old 1 
30-39 2 
40-49 3 
50-59 4 
60 or more 5 
Q21) What is the highest grade you completed in school? 
high school or less .. . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . ... .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
some college, business school, or vocational training..... _ 2 
bachelor's degree............ ........................................... 3 
master's or doctorate degree........................................ _ 4 
111 
That covers all the specific questions I wanted to ask you in this 
interview. I would be grateful for your comments about buffers and the 
Buffer Incentive Program, including any barriers to participation that you 
ran across in your case, and any ways that a buffe r incentive program 
could be made more attractive for someone like yourself. 
Is there anything more you would like to say about the Buffer Incentive 
Program or buffers? 
I plan to visit ___ County later this month as part of my research. If 
it is convenient for you, would you mind if I paid you a brief visit to see 
your buffer? 
Thank you for spending some time with me. The information you have " 
provided will be valuable for my research and, I hope, may someday help :;. 
improve buffer programs and policies in Maryland. 
112 
Appendix 2. Farm Operators Survey Instrument 
I am calling from the Maryland Agricultural Statistics Office to follow up 
our recent survey on best management practices. 
Q 1) Do you own any riparian land, in other words, land that borders a 
stream, river, pond, tidal or non-tidal wetland, or other open water? 
no .. . 
yes ... _ 
IF NO, TERMINATE INTERVIEW 
Q2) Are you familiar with the concept of putting forest or grass buffers on 
riparian land to control nutrient and sediment run-off into waterbodies and 
to provide other environmental benefits? 
no .. . 
yes ... _ 
IF NO, TERMINATE INTERVIEW 
Q3) How is the land along the river or stream on your property used? Is it 
all in row crops ..................................... . 
partially in row crops ............................. . 
all pasture ............................................. . 
partially pasture ..................................... . 
a grass lawn or field not used as pasture .. . 
an idle row crop field ............................. . 
forest buffer ......................................... . 
grass buffe r or filter strip ...................... . 
in another use (specify) ............................ . 
(IF ROW CROPS) 
Could you specify the crop or crops currently grown on the area along the river or stream 
on your 
ro ert ? 
(IF PASTURE) 
What 
animals? 
How many animals per acre? ............................... _______  animals/acre 
(IF FOREST OR GRASS BUFFER) 
Q3E: What is the width of your buffer, width feet 
Q3F: and the length of the buffer along the stream? length __ feet 
113 
Q4) I am trying to get some sense of the width of body of water on your 
property. On average, how wide is the stream or other water body on 
your property? 
one to ten feet 
11 to 20 feet 
21 to 50 feet 
greater than 50 feet _ 
Q5) How did you first learn about the concept of putting forest or grass 
buffers along rivers or streams? Was it through: 
written materials received in the mail .... . 
a telephone call. ................................ .. 
a personal meeting or conversation ...... .. 
a public meeting ................................ .. 
information in the media ...................... . 
Q6) Could you talk briefly about who had the first contact with you about 
putting a riparian buffer on your land, and how that contact came about? 
CATEGORIES NOT READ ALOUD 
forester from Maryland Department of Natural Resources .. .. 
USDA Consolidated Farm Service Agency .................... . 
USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service .............. . 
Maryland soil district conservationist.. ........................ .. 
University of Maryland Cooperative Extension Service ...... . 
University of Maryland Agricultural Experiment Station .... .. 
agricultural chemical company or other company ............ .. 
non-profit conservation organization or land trust.. .......... . 
neighbor who has put a buffer on his or her land ............ .. 
another source (SPECIFY) _________  
COMMENTS: 
114 
Q7 A) Have you planted a forest or grass buffer on any of your riparian 
land since 1991? 
no ... . 
yes ... . 
IFNO: 
Q7B: Why haven't you done so? OR Why not? 
Q8) Are you aware of Maryland's Buffer Incentive Program, which 
provides cost-share funds of $300 per acre for implementation of riparian 
forest buffers? 
no ... . 
yes ... . 
Q9) I am interested in learning why you decided whether or not to 
participate in a riparian forest or grass buffer program. Please indicate 
whether each of the following was 
? a critical factor in your decision not to put a buffer on your land 
? somewhat important 
? not a very important factor 
? or was not a factor 
Q9A) The cost-share payment from the Buffer Incentive Program? 
critical not very important _ 
somewhat important-= not a factor 
Q9B) Other cost-share programs or technical assistance, for instance, to 
purchase seedlings? 
critical not very important _ 
somewhat important-= not a factor 
Q9C) Aesthetic factors such as a scenic view? 
critical not very important _ 
somewhat important-= not a factor 
115 
Q9D) Lost agricultural income previously generated from your land along 
the stream? 
critical not very important _ 
somewhat important _ not a factor 
Q9E) The creation of fish and wildlife habitat? 
critical not very important _ 
somewhat important _ not a factor 
Q9F) Erosion? 
critical not very important _ 
somewhat important _ not a factor 
Q9G) Time spent on the application process? 
critical not very important _ 
somewhat important _ not a factor _ 
Q9H) The time of year that a buffer would need to be planted or 
maintained? 
critical not very important _ 
somewhat important _ not a factor _ 
Q9I) The length of time needed for planting and maintenance of a buffer? 
critical not very important _ 
somewhat important-= not a factor _ 
Q9J) Possible loss of moisture to adjacent agricultural fields? 
critical not very important _ 
somewhat important-= not a factor _ 
Q9K) Possible increased deer population? 
critical not very important _ 
somewhat important _ not a factor _ 
Q9L) Water quality and other environmental benefits to your community? 
critical not very important _ 
somewhat important _ not a factor 
Q9M) Compliance with current or future land use regulations? 
critical not very important _ 
somewhat important-= not a factor 
116 
As I mentioned before, a one-time cost-share payment of $300 per acre is 
provided by Maryland's Buffer Incentive Program once a forest buffer has 
been successfully established. The terms of contracts in the Buffer 
Incentive Program state that the buffers must be maintained as forest for 
10 years. 
Q 10) What is the lowest total price per acre that you would accept for a 
10-year maintenance requirement for a forest buffer, in a lump-sum 
payment? 
$_ __ per acre 
for a 20-year maintenance requirement? .................... $ ___  per acre 
for a 30-year maintenance requirement? .................... $ ___  per acre 
for a permanent maintenance requirement? ................. $ ___  per acre 
Q 11) What is the lowest total price per acre that you would accept for a 
10-year maintenance requirement for a 2rass buffer, in a lump-sum 
payment? 
$_ __ per acre 
for a 20-year maintenance requirement? .................... $___ per acre 
for a 30-year maintenance requirement? .................... $ ___ per acre 
for a permanent maintenance requirement? ................. $ ___  per acre 
That covers all the specific questions I wanted to ask you in this 
interview. I would be grateful for your comments about buffers and the 
Buffer Incentive Program, including any barriers to participation that you 
see in your case, and any ways that a buffer incentive program could be 
made more attractive for someone like yourself. Is there anything more 
you would like to say about riparian buffers? 
COMMENTS: 
117 
Appendix 3. Letter of introduction to Buffer Incentive Program 
participants 
(on letterhead of Chesapeake Biological Laboratory) 
November 3, 1995 
Name 
Address 
Address 
Dear (name): 
I am a graduate student at the University of Maryland and am currently doing 
research for my master's thesis on forest buffers along rivers and streams. As part of my 
research, I am talking to landowners, government representatives, and other people 
interested in buffers in the State of Maryland. 
A review of public records at Maryland's Department of Natural Resources 
showed that you are participating in Maryland's Buffer Incentive Program. A key 
element of my thesis research is discussions with participants in this program from 1992-
1994, a total of 85 landowners. I would be grateful if you were to spend ten to fifteen 
minutes discussing the program with me by telephone and answering a few questions 
about your interest in riparian forest buffers. 
This interview is voluntary and confidential. If you are interested, the results of 
my research can be sent to you. 
I will call the week of November 6th to see if there is a convenient time for our 
conversation. Your participation is important to the success of my research project, and I 
would appreciate any assistance you can provide. 
Sincerely, 
Patrick Hagan 
118 
Appendix 4. Explanation of Variable Codes 
BIPADOPT l=participating in program 
O=not participating in program 
RIPARYES l=landowner says he owns some riparian land 
AWA REYES l=riparian landowner aware of concept 
AWARENO l=riparian landowner not aware of the concept of riparian buffers 
BIPA  WYES 1= riparian landowner aware of Buffer Incentive Program 
BIPAW NO l=riparian landowner not aware of Buffer Incentive Program 
OWNA CRES number of acres owned 
YRSFA RM number of years farming 
YRSMANAG number of years managing a farm 
AGE 1=20-29 years old 
2=30-39 years old 
3=40-49 years old 
4=50-59 years old 
5=60 or more years old 
EDUCATE l=high school or less 
2=some college or trade school 
3=bachelor's degree 
4=graduate degree 
GROSFARM l=less than $1,000 in gross income from farming in 1994 
2=$1,000-$19,999 
3=$20,000-$39,999 
4=$40,000-$99 ,999 
5=$100,000-$249 ,999 
6=$250,000 or more 
NETPFA RM 1= zero net percentage income from farming in 1994 
2=1-24% net percentage income from farming 
3=25-49% 
4=50-99% 
5=100% 
ROWA LL l=landowner says all his riparian land is in row crops 
ROWPART l=riparian land (within 300 feet of stream) partially in row crops (more 
than one answer possible) 
PASTALL l=riparian land all in pasture 
PASTPART l=riparian land partially in pasture 
LAWN l=grass lawn or field not used as pasture 
ROWIDLE 1= riparian land is an idle row crop field 
BUFFORES l=riparian land has forest buffer 
BUFGRASS l=riparian land has grass buffer 
BUFFWIDE width of the buffer (repeated as BUFWIDTH a few columns later) 
OTHERUSE l=riparian land is/was in some other use 
ANIMACRE # of animals per acre on the property 
BUFWIDTH width of the buffer, on average 
BUFLENGT length of the buffer along the stream 
STRMWIDE l=stream width, on average is 1-10 feet 
2=11-20 feet 
3=21-50 feet 
4=51 feet or greater, on average 
119 
AW MAil.... l=became aware of the concept initially by mail 
AWPHONE l=by phone 
A WPERMTG 1= in a personal meeting 
A WPUBMTG l=in a public meeting (farm bureau, for instance) 
AW MEDIA l=through the media 
A WOTHER l=through another source 
CONTDNR l=DNR had first personal contact with landowner about buffer planting 
CONTCFSA l=Consolidated Farm Service Agency (formerly ASCS) 
CONTNRCS l=Natural Resources Conservation Service (formerly SCS) 
CONTSOIL l=soil district conservationist 
CONTCES 1= Cooperative Extension Service 
CONTA ES l=U. of M. Agricultural Experiment Station 
CONT.CHEM l=an agricultural chemical or other company 
CONTNEIG l=a neighbor ? 
CONTOTHE l=some other contact about buffers 
CONTNONE l=didn't talk to anyone about buffers 
PLANTNO l=has not planted a buffer since 1991 of any kind 
PLANTNAT l=already had a natural buffer there, so didn't plant one 
PLANTNOR l=hasn't planted and no reason like natural buffer that would have 
precluded doing so given 
PLANTGOV l=hasn't planted a buffer and won't through any government program 
because opposed to government programs 
PLANT91 l=planted a forest or grass buffer before 1991 
PLANTGRA l=planted a grass buffer since 1991 
PLANTFOR l=planted a forest buffer since 1991, but not with BIP grant 
TREESlO lowest lump-sum payment they would be willing to accept for 
planting and maintaining forest buffer for 10 years 
TREES20 forest for 20 years 
TREES30 forest for 30 years 
TREESPER willingness to accept for keeping as forest permanently 
GRASSlO lowest lump-sum payment for a grass buffer for 10 years 
GRASS20 grass for 20 years 
GRASS30 grass for 30 years 
GRASSPER willingness to accept for keeping buffer as grass permanently 
the following questions use this format: 
1= was not a factor in the decision to adopt or not adopt a forest or grass buffe r 
2=not very important in the decision 
3=somewhat important in the decision 
4=critical in the decision 
AESTHETC aesthetic factors such as a scenic view 
DEER increased deer population 
EROSION erosion 
HABITAT creation of fish and wildlife habitat 
INCOMLOS lost agricultural income from the land along the stream 
LAWS current or future land use regulation 
MOISTURE loss of moisture from adjacent agricultural fields 
PLANTTIM the length of time for planting and maintenance 
SEASON the time of year that a buffer would have to be planted or maintained 
SHAREBIP the grant from the Buffer Incentive Program 
SHAREOTH other cost share or technical assistance, for instance, seedlings 
SHARETIM the length of time for application for grants, cost share, etc. 
WATERQUL water quality and other environmental benefits to the community 
120 
Appendix 5. T-Tests 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. SE of Mean Mean Levene's Test T-test 
Difference for Equal V ariance5 
F p T OF 2-tail 
sig. 
OWNACRES (unweighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 49 138.47 265.91 37.99 
BIPADOPTO 226 197.87 199.11 13.24 
59.41 .04 .834 1.78 273 .077 
OWNACRES (weighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 49 138.47 265.91 37.99 
BIPADOPTO 230 166.56 179.18 11.81 
28.09 1.02 .314 .91 277 .365 
N ANIMACRE (unweighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 6 1.67 1.75 .72 
BIPADOPTO 96 2.73 6.39 .65 
1.07 .16 .69 .41 100 .685 
ANIMACRE (weighted) 
BIPADOPT I 6 1.67 1.75 .72 
BIPADOPTO 94 2.47 5.30 .72 
.80 .09 .760 .37 98 .713 
5. Levene's test is used to test the hypothesis that the two population variances are equal. It is obtained by computing for 
each case the absolute difference from its group mean and then performing a one-way analysis of variance on these differences. 
If the observed significance level is small, the hypothesis that the population variances are equal is rejected, and a separate 
variance t-test for means is used. If the significance level for the Levene statistic is large, a pooled variance t-tcst is used, since 
using the separate variance t-test when the population variances are equal may result in an observed significance level somewhat 
larger than it should be. The pooled variance t-test is based on the assumption that the population variances in the two groups arc 
equal; it is obtained by using a pooled estimate of that common variance (SPSS 1993). 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. SE of Mean Mean Levene's Test T-test 
Difference for Equal Variance 
F p T DF 2-tail 
s1g. 
YRSFARM (unweighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 48 13.63 15.31 2.21 
BIPADOPTO 195 38.66 15.37 1.10 
25.03 .19 .663 10.12 241 .000 
YRSFARM (weighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 48 13.63 15.31 2.21 
BIPADOPTO 194 38.65 15.73 1.13 
25.02 .44 .507 9.92 240 .000 
YRSMANAG (unweighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 48 7.65 11.07 1.60 
BIPADOPTO 141 25.56 12.56 1.06 
17.91 2.17 .143 8.79 187 .000 
YRSMANAG (weighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 48 7.65 11.07 1.60 
BIPADOPTO 154 25.62 13.07 1.05 
N 17.97 3.30 .071 8.61 200 .000 
N 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. SE of Mean Mean Levene's Test T-test 
Difference for Equal Variance 
F p T DF 2-tail 
s1g. 
TREES20 (unweighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 13 661.54 395.36 109.66 
BIPADOPTO 11 3741.82 8875.02 2675.92 
3080.28 6.33 .020 1.15 10 .277 
TREES20 (weighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 13 661.54 395.36 109.66 
BIPADOPTO 9 5172.64 10996.80 3671.73 
4511.10 11.02 .003 1.23 8 .254 
TREES30 (unweighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 11 663.64 508.47 153.31 
BIPADOPTO 4 15525.00 29260.34 14825.17 
14861.36 27.68 .000 1.00 3 .390 
TREES30 (weighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 11 663.64 508.47 153.31 
BIPADOPTO 4 21123.95 32849.88 16851.63 
20460.31 86.52 .000 1.21 3 .317 
wN  
TREESPER (unweighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 7 757.14 559.34 211.41 
BIPADOPTO 6 13133.33 27882.73 11383.08 
12376.19 7.09 .022 1.09 5 .327 
TREESPER (weighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 7 757.14 559.34 211.41 
BIPADOPTO 5 19571.89 33718.06 15109.42 
18814.74 19.48 .001 1.25 4 .281 
GRASS JO (unweighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 11 366.36 349.64 105.42 
BIPADOPTO 25 1132.00 2160.77 432.15 
765.63 3.62 .066 1.16 34 .254 
GRASS10 (weighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 11 366.36 349.64 105.42 
BIPADOPTO 23 1141.30 2407.76 499.67 
774.94 3.39 .075 1.05 32 .300 
N Mean Std. Dev. SE of Mean Mean Levene's Test T-test Variable Difference for Equal Variance 
F p T DF 2-tail 
s1g. 
GRASS20 (unweighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 9 870.00 1004.17 334.72 
BIPADOPTO 9 4655.56 8228.32 2742.77 
3785.56 7.04 .017 1.37 8 .207 
GRASS20 (weighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 9 870.00 1004.17 334.72 
BIPADOPTO 7 6187.13 10100.75 37948.78 
5317.13 12.83 .003 1.39 6 .211 
GRASS30 (unweighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 7 871.43 816.42 308.58 
BIPADOPTO 5 11440.00 17119.81 7656.21 
10568.57 12.48 .005 1.38 4 .240 
GRASS30 (weighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 7 871.43 816.42 308.58 
BIPADOPTO 4 14353.60 19637.11 9319.36 
13482.18 19.34 .002 1.45 3 .233 
- GRASSPER (unweighted) N 
+"' BIPADOPT 1 
5 1060.00 894.01 399.81 
BIPADOPTO 6 1983.33 1539.37 628.45 
923.33 .271 .615 1.18 9 .. 268 
GRASSPER (weighted) 
BIPADOPT 1 5 1060.00 894.01 399.81 
BIPADOPTO 5 2248.39 1888.94 846.45 
1188.39 2.33 .165 1.27 8 .239 
~ ~. - - - - - " - ~ - -::: -~ -;_ - ~-_:;- :;-= .-c.:. --:..:;;. -:. 
..-
Appendix 6. Mann-Whitney U-Tests6 : Adoption, by Landowner and Land Parcel Characteristics 
Variable N Mean Mean Rank u w z 2-tailed P 
AGE BIPADOPTl 49 3.78 114.24 - 5598.0 
(unweighted) BIPADOPTO 228 4.11 144.32 4373.0 
-2.5421 .0110 
AGE BIPADOPTI 49 3.78 108.61 - 5322.0 
(weighted) BIPADOPTO 228 4.21 145.53 4097.0 
-3.1565 .0016 
EDUCATE BIPADOPTI 49 2.86 129.69 - 14555.0 
(unweighted) BIPADOPTO 155 2.08 93.90 2465.0 
-3.8994 .0001 
EDUCATE BIPADOPTl 49 2.86 129.21 - 14171.5 
(weighted) BIPADOPTO 153 2.10 92.62 2390.5 
-4.0205 .0001 
GROSFARM BIPADOPTI 49 1.80 87.00 - 4263.0 
(unweighted) BIPADOPTO 232 3.42 152.41 3038.0 
-5.3833 .0000 
GROSFARM BIPADOPTI 49 1.80 89.14 - 4368.0 
- (weighted) BIPADOPTO 228 2.81 150.83 3143.0 N -5.1172 .0000 
V, 
6. The Mann-Whitney U-test is a non-parametric version of the T-test that two independent samples come from 
populations having the same distribution. The test is computed by combining the two samples, then ranking them from smallest 
to largest value. A mean rank is determined, then a U score for the group with the larger number of observations and a W score 
for the group with the smaller number of observations. This is converted into a standard normal deviate, or "z" score of the 
number of standard deviations between a given measurement and the mean of the normal distribution (SPSS 1993; Schefler 
1988). In all U-Tests in this table, larger means and mean ranks indicate a higher value for that variable because of the way 
ordinal numbers were assigned during data input. Thus a value of" 1" for age indicates someone in the 20-29 age group, while 
"5" indicates someone who is over 60; "4" indicates an answer of "critical," while" 1' indicates an answer of "not a factor." For 
a complete explanation of data codes, see Appendix 4. 
Variable N Mean Mean Rank u w z 2-tailcd P 
NETPFARM BIPADOPTl 49 1.65 46.63 - 2285.0 
(unweighted) BIPADOPTO 185 3.88 136.27 1060.0 
-8.6514 .0000 
NETPFARM BIPADOPTl 49 1.65 47.04 - 2305.0 
(weighted) BIPADOPTO 175 3.58 130.83 1080.0 
-8.3903 .0000 
STRMW1DE7 BIP ADOPT 1 48 2.46 146.04 - 21670.0 
(unweighted) BIPADOPTO 191 1.82 113.46 3334.0 
-3.2930 .0010 
STRMWIDE BIPADOPTl 48 2.46 152.31 - 23814.0 
(weighted) BIPADOPTO 191 1.93 118.48 3513.0 
-3.2916 .0010 
N 
0\ 
7. Following the approach used in the Total Design Method (Dillman 1978), survey participants were given a choice of 
ranges for stream width, instead of being asked to estimate a specific width. This made the question somewhat easier to answer. 
As noted in Appendix 4, an answer of" I" equals a stream of 1-10 feet in width; "2" equals a stream of I 1-20 feet in width; "J" 
equals 21-50 feet in width; and "4" 51 feet or greater. Thus the mean of 2.46 does not indicate that the mean stream width is 2.46 
feet; rather, it indicates that the mean width is between the second and third categories. Since the stream widths are categorical 
variables, Mann Whitney U-Tests are used to analyze the data 
~ 
Appendix 7. Mann-\Vhitncy U-Tests: Awareness, by Landowner Characteristics 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable N Mean Mean Rank u w z 2-tailed P 
AGE AWAREYES 241 4.04 135.25 3434.5 
(unweighted) AW ARENO 31 4.10 146.21 - 32595.5 
-.7738 .4390 
AGE AWAREYES 37 3.78 133,64 - 31272.0 
(weighted) AWARENO 234 4.18 150.92 3770.0 
-1.3376 .1810 
AGE BIPAWYES 102 3.78 107.39 - 10953.5 
(unweighted) BIPAWNO 130 4.15 123.65 5700.5 
-1.9382 .0526 
AGE BIPAWYES 93 3.78 108.61 - 5322.0 
(weighted) BIPAWNO 142 4.24 145.53 4097.0 
-3.1565 .0016 
EDUCATE AWAREYES 172 2.31 97.99 1464.0 
- (unweighted) AW ARENO 20 2.00 83.70 - 1674.0 N -1.1456 .2520 
--i EDUCATE AWAREYES 173 2.31 102.40 2006.0 
(weighted) . AWARENO 27 2.07 88.30 - 2384.0 
-1.2331 .2175 
EDUCATE BIPAWYES 81 2.58 73.21 - 6223.0 
(unweighted) BIPAWNO 85 2.04 94.30 2568.0 
-2.9637 .0030 
EDUCATE BIPAWYES 79 2.61 86.94 - 7047.5 
(weighted) BIPAWNO 52 2.03 76.60 2769.5 
-2.7972 .0052 
Vmiablc N Mean Mean Rank u w z 2-tailcd P 
GROSFARM AWAREYES 244 3.18 139.56 2046.5 
(unweighted) AWARENO 31 2.81 125.73 - 25482.5 
-2.3765 .0175 
GROSFARM AWAREYES 237 2.68 139.99 3795.5 
(weighted) AWARENO 37 2.33 121.58 - 44948.5 
-1.3882 .1651 
GROSFARM BIPAWYES 103 3.01 109.98 - 11328.0 
(unweighted) BIPAWNO 132 3.25 124.26 5972.0 
-1.6395 .10 I I 
GROSFARM BIPAWYES 94 2.61 110.31 - 10369.0 
(weighted) BIPAWNO 144 2.68 125.50 5904.0 
-1.7528 .0796 
NETPFARM AWAREYES 216 3.35 117.97 2046.5 
(unweighted) AWA RENO 26 4.08 150.97 - 25482.5 
-2.3765 .0175 
NETPFARM AWAREYES 193 3.06 144.73 1606.0 
(weighted) AWARENO 26 3.94 105.32 - 20327.0 
-3.1261 .0018 
- NETPFARM BIPAWYES 96 2.88 86.98 - 8350.5 N 
::,c (unweighted) BIPAWNO 112 3.72 119.51 3694.5 
-4.0716 .0000 
NETPFARM BIPAWYES 82 2.63 78.91 - 6471.0 
(weighted) BIPAWNO 111 3.40 110.36 3068.0 
-4.0547 .0001 
~,. -~--= -.- .. -~--- -='cc"'c'-~ ?==.:__,----;-~.....:.- ?? e':.-::c.,~:: 
Appendix 8. Mann-Whitney U-Tests8 : Perceived Costs and Benefits 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable N Mean Mean Rank u w z 2-tailed P 
AESTHETC BIPADOPTl 49 2.61 82.77 - 11008.0 
(unweighted) BIPADOPTO 133 1.88 115.20 2097.0 
-3.9885 .0001 
AESTHETC BIPADOPTl 49 2.61 118.70 - 12138.5 
(weighted) BIPADOPTO 140 1.90 86.70 2268.5 
-3.8041 .0001 
INCOMLOS BIPADOPTl 49 1.53 72.47 - 3551.0 
(unweighted) BIPADOPTO 137 2.13 101.42 2326.0 
-3.4276 .0006 
INCOMLOS BIPADOPTl 49 1.53 75.68 - 3708.5 
(weighted) BIPADOPTO 142 2.10 103.01 2483.5 
-3.2263 .0013 
HABITAT BIPADOPTl 49 3.06 125.09 - 10706.5 
(unweighted) BIPADOPTO 134 2.88 79.90 1661.5 
-5.3419 .0000 
N HABITAT BIPADOPTl 49 3.06 127.65 - 11700.0 
\C (weighted) BIPADOPTO 140 2.12 83.57 1830.0 
-5.0639 .0000 
EROSION BIPADOPTl 49 2.96 95.92 - 12878.0 
(unweighted) BIPADOPTO 138 2.93 93.32 3287.0 
-.3060 .7596 
EROSION BIPADOPTl 49 2.96 99.39 - 13658.0 
(weighted) BIPADOPTO 143 2.91 95.51 3362.0 
-.4465 .6552 
8. For an explanation of Mann-Whitney U-Tests, see Appendix 6. For an explanation of variable codes, see Appendix 
4. All variables in Appendix 7 were recorded on a four-point scale according to the following answers: 4=critical, 3=somewhat 
important, 2=not very important, and l=not a factor in the decision to adopt or not adopt. 
~ 
N Mean Mean Rank u w z 2-tailcd P Variable 
MOISTURE BIPADOPTl 49 1.20 76.00 - 3724.0 
(unweight.ed) BIPADOPTO 135 1.62 98.49 2499.0 
-3.1757 .0015 
MOISTURE BIPADOPTl 49 1.20 79.31 - 3886.0 
(weighted) BIPADOPTO 140 1.64 100.49 2661.0 
-2.9732 .0029 
DEER BIPADOPTl 49 2.00 90.93 - 4455.5 
(unweighted) BIPADOPTO 135 2.03 93.07 3230.5 
-.2574 .7969 
DEER BIPADOPTl 49 2.00 95.02 - 4656.0 
(weighted) BIPADOPTO 141 1.98 95.67 3431.0 -.0756 .9397 
WATERQUL BIPADOPTl 48 3.25 109.94 - 11928.0 
(unweighted) BIPADOPTO 137 2.88 87.07 2475.0 
-2.7130 .0067 
WATERQUL BIPADOPTl 48 3.25 113.54 - 12695.0 
(weighted) BIPADOPTO 142 2.84 89.40 2542 
-2.7794 .0054 
- LAWS BIPADOPTl 49 2.14 76.87 - 3766.5 V
.,._....
J_  , (unweighted) BIPADOPTO 133 2.65 96.89 2541.5 
-2.3713 .0177 
LAWS BIPADOPTl 49 2.14 81.05 - 3971.5 
(weighted) BIPADOPTO 136 2.60 97.31 2746.5 -1.9054 .0567 
SEASON BIPADOPTl 49 1.47 66.43 - 3255.0 
(unweighted) BIPADOPTO 132 2.14 100.12 2030.0 -4.1362 .0000 
SEASON BIPADOPTl 49 1.47 69.35 - 3398.0 
(weighted) BIPADOPTO 138 2.18 102.75 2173.0 -4.0090 .0001 
~ 
Variable N Mean Mean Rank u w z 2-tailcd P 
PLANTilM BIPADOPTl 49 1.61 75.73 - 3711.0 
(unweighted) BIPADOPTO 129 2.05 94.73 2486.0 
-2.3898 .0169 
PLANTTlM BIPADOPTl 49 1.61 79.35 - 3888.0 
(weighted) BIPADOPTO 136 1.98 97.92 2663.0 -2.2691 .0233 
SHAREBIP BIPADOPTl 49 2.80 107.00 - 11047.0 
(unweighted) BIPADOPTO 131 2.31 84.33 2401.0 
-2.7575 .0058 
SHAREBIP BIPADOPTl 49 2.80 111.38 - 11747.5 
(weighted) BIPADOPTO 136 2.26 86.38 2431.5 -2.9604 .0031 
SHAREB1P9 BIPADOPTl 49 2.80 33.45 414.00 
(unweighted) BIPADOPTO 19 3.05 37.21 - 1639.0 
-.7610 .4467 
SHAREBIP9 BIPADOPTl 49 2.80 33.99 440.5 
(weighted) BIPADOPTO 20 3.04 37.47 - 1665.5 -.7185 .4724 
\-.,.) SHAREOTH BIPADOPTl 48 2.63 100.76 - 10388.5 (unweighted) BIPADOPTO 126 2.21 82.45 2387.5 -2.2862 .0222 
SHAREOTH BIPADOPTl 49 2.63 103.28 - 10973.5 
(weighted) BIPADOPTO 130 2.14 84.41 2458.5 -2.3028 .0213 
SHARETlM BIPADOPTl 49 1.33 61.60 - 3018.5 
(unweighted) BIPADOPTO 129 2.17 100.10 1793.5 -4.8226 .0000 
SHARETIM BIPADOPTl 49 1.33 63.54 - 3113.5 
(weighted) BIPADOPTO 134 2.08 102.41 1888.5 -4.7571 .0000 
9. The second unweighted and weighted U-Tests for SHAREBIP analyze means differences between Buffer Incentive 
Program adopters and only those non-adopters who are aware of the program and have unbuffered riparian land. 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
AGE -.0043 
N( 87) 
Sig . 969 
AlJIMACRE .0286 -.0533 
N( 70) N( 100) 
Sig .814 Sig .598 
Al?lAREYES -.0894 
N( 87) N( 123) N( 102) 
Sig. Sig .326 Sig 
AWMAIL .2154 .0006 .0523 
N( 72) N( 92) N( 76) N( 94) 
Sig .069 Sig .996 Sig .654 Sig 
AWMEDIA -.0540 .1241 .1584 .0167 
- N( 72) N( 92) N( 76) N( 94) N( 94) w Sig .652 Sig .239 Sig .172 Sig . Sig .873 
N 
AWOTHER .0296 -.1003 -.1079 -.2204 -.3488 
N( 72) N( 92) N( 76) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) 
Sig .805 Sig .341 Sig .354 Sig. Sig .033 Sig .001 
AWPERMTG .0839 -.0068 -.0062 -.0393 -.5022 -.3488 
N( 72) N( 92) N( 76) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) 
Sig .483 Sig .948 Sig .958 Sig. Sig .707 Sig .000 Sig .001 
AWPHONE -.1876 -.0548 -.0839 -.0884 -.1398 -.0822 -.1398 
N( 72) N( 92) N( 76) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) 
Sig .115 Sig .604 Sig .471 Sig. Sig .397 Sig .179 Sig .431 Sig .179 
AESTHETC AGE ANIMACRE AWAREYES AWMAIL AWMEDIA AWOTHER AWPERMTG 
(Coefficient / (Cases) I 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
AWPUBMTG .0467 -.0736 .0081 .0752 -.1435 -.1649 .0619 -.0661 
N( 72) N( 92) N( 76) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) 
Sig .697 Sig .486 Sig .945 Sig. Sig .472 Sig .168 Sig .112 Sig .553 Sig .527 
BIPADOPT .2893 .0074 -.0920 .0279 -.0802 -.1230 .2110 .0197 -.0626 
N( 87) N( 123) N( 102) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) 
Sig .007 Sig .936 Sig .358 Sig .757 Sig .442 Sig .238 Sig .041 Sig .850 Sig .549 
BIPAWYES .1644 .0417 -.0327 .0659 .0917 .0437 .0788 -.0195 - .1354 
N( 86) N( 120) N( 100) N( 122) N( 93) N( 93) N( 93) N( 93) N( 93) 
Sig .130 Sig .651 Sig .747 Sig . 471 Sig .382 Sig .678 Sig .453 Sig .853 Sig .196 
BUFFORES -.0352 .0701 .0656 .0733 .0506 .0101 .1566 -.1251 -.1463 
N( 87) N( 123) N( 102) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) 
Sig .746 Sig .441 Sig .512 Sig .416 Sig .628 Sig .923 Sig .132 Sig .230 Sig .159 
- BUFGRASS -.0066 - . 02 67 .0303 - .1177 -.0181 .0790 .0227 .0329 -.1335 \.,.) N( 87) N( 123) N( 102) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) 
\.,.) 
Sig .952 Sig . 770 Sig .763 Sig .191 Sig .863 Sig .449 Sig .828 Sig .753 Sig .199 
CONTAES -.0700 .1857 .0016 .1158 .0433 .1936 -.1507 
N( 74) N( 92) N( 77) N( 94) N( 7 5) N( 75) N( 75) N( 75) N( 7 5) 
Sig .553 Sig .076 Sig .989 Sig . Sig .322 Sig .712 Sig . 096 Sig .197 Sig 
CONTCES .2154 -.0549 .2617 .0601 -.0862 .0789 .0010 
N( 74) N( 92) N( 77) N( 94) N( 7 5) N( 75) N( 75) N( 7 5) N( 75) 
Sig .065 Sig .604 Sig .022 Sig. Sig .608 Sig .462 Sig .501 Sig .993 Sig 
CONTCFSA -.0732 -.2654 .1440 -.0366 -.0037 -.0950 .0571 
N( 73) N( 91) N( 7 6) N( 93) N( 74) N( 74) N( 74) N( 74) !I ( 7 4) 
Sig .538 Sig . Oll Sig .215 Sig. Sig .757 Sig .975 Sig .421 Sig .629 Sig 
AESTHETC AGE ANIMACRE AWAREYES AWMAIL AWMEDIA AWOTHER AWPERMTG AWPHONE 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
CONTCHEM .1017 -.1421 -.0980 .2232 -.0897 -.0429 .1277 
N( 74) N( 92) N( 77) N( 94) N( 7 5) N( 75) N( 75) N( 75) N( 75) 
Sig .389 Sig .177 Sig .397 Sig . Sig .054 Sig .444 Sig . 715 Sig .275 Sig 
CONTDNR .3390 -.0742 -.0485 - .1671 -.1529 .3047 -.0160 
N( 74) N( 92) N( 77) N( 94) N( 7 5) N( 75) N( 75) N( 75) N( 7 5) 
Sig .003 Sig .482 Sig .675 Sig. Sig .152 Sig .190 Sig .008 Sig .892 Sig 
CONTNEIG .0426 -.0805 - .1719 -.1392 -.2063 .2303 .0787 
N( 74) N( 92) N( 77) N( 94) N( 75) N( 75) N( 75) N( 75) N( 75) 
Sig . 718 Sig .445 Sig .135 Sig. Sig .234 Sig .076 Sig .047 Sig .502 Sig 
C0!1TNONE -.2987 .0461 -.0349 -.1537 .1842 .0679 -.2225 
N( 74) N( 92) N( 77) N( 94) N( 75) N( 75) N( 75) N( 7 5) N( 75) 
Sig .010 Sig .663 Sig .763 Sig. Sig .188 Sig .114 Sig .563 Sig .055 Sig 
CONTNRCS .0976 
~ -.1599 -.0351 .1613 -.0527 - .1146 .1250 
+:. N( 73) N( 91) N( 76) N( 93) N( 74) N( 74) N( 74) N( 74) N( 74) 
Sig .412 Sig .130 Sig .763 Sig . Sig .170 Sig .656 Sig .331 Sig .289 Sig 
CONTOTHE .1512 .1998 .1028 -.0745 .0905 -.1276 -.0544 
N( 74) N( 92) N( 77) N( 94) N( 75) N( 75) N( 75) N( 75) N( 7 5) 
Sig .198 Sig .056 Sig .374 Sig . Sig .525 Sig .440 Sig .275 Sig .643 Sig 
CONTSOIL -.1331 .0571 -.0708 .0708 -.1327 -.2151 .2701 
N( 74) N( 92) N( 77) N( 94) N( 75) N( 75) N( 75) N( 75) N( 75) 
Sig .258 Sig .589 Sig .541 Sig . Sig .546 Sig .256 Sig .064 Sig .019 Sig 
DEER .0716 .0304 .1846 .0166 .2489 -.0566 -.1193 -.2128 
N( 85) N( 88) N( 71) N( 88) N( 73) N( 73) N( 73) N( 73) N ( 73) 
Sig .515 Sig .778 Sig .123 Sig. Sig .889 Sig .034 Sig .634 Sig .315 Sig . 071 
AESTHETC AGE ANIMACRE AWAREYES AWMAIL AWMEDIA AWOTHER AWPERMTG AWPHONE 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
EDUCATE .2126 -.1213 .1409 .0993 .0641 .0615 -.0900 .1341 -.2110 
N( 53) N( 79 J N( 68) N( 81) N( 62) N( 62) N( 62) N( 62) N( 62) 
Sig .126 Sig .287 Sig .252 Sig .378 Sig .621 Sig .635 Sig .487 Sig .299 Sig .100 
EROSION .2650 -.0724 .0675 .0589 -.0746 . 0727 .0866 -.2871 
N( 87) N( 91) N( 74) N( 91) N( 76) N( 76) N( 76) N( 76) N( 76) 
Sig .013 Sig .495 Sig .568 Sig. Sig .613 Sig .522 Sig .533 Sig .457 Sig .012 
GRASSlO -.0486 -.3649 .1543 .2505 .1125 -.2925 .0739 
N( 14) N( 16) N( 15) N( 16) N( 14) N( 14) N( 14) N( 14) N( 14) 
Sig .869 Sig .165 Sig .583 Sig . Sig .388 Sig .702 Sig .310 Sig .802 Sig 
GRASS20 .2185 -.3477 .3704 . .5941 . 6642 -.5941 .3985 
N( 7) N( 8) N( 7) N( 8) N( 6) N( 6) N( 6) N( 6) N( 6) 
Sig .638 Sig .399 Sig .413 Sig. Sig .214 Sig .150 Sig .214 Sig .434 Sig 
- GRASS30 .0000 -.4867 .5526 . 7071 .8165 - . 7071 L,.) 
Vl N( 4) N( 5) N( SJ N( 5) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) 
Sig!. 000 Sig .406 Sig .334 Sig. Sig .293 Sig .184 Sig .293 Sig Sig 
GRASSPER . 4472 -.6325 .1539 .2582 -.2582 
N( 4) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) 
Sig .553 Sig .252 Sig .805 Sig . Sig .742 Sig . Sig .742 Sig Sig 
GROSFARM -.1800 -.1773 .1058 .0792 .1372 .0904 -.1544 .0817 -.0928 
N( 87) N( 123) N( 102) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) lJ ( 94) 
Sig .095 Sig .050 Sig .290 Sig .380 Sig .187 Sig .386 Sig .137 Sig .434 Sig .373 
HABITAT .5364 .0374 .0464 .3701 .0327 .0067 -.0355 -.2316 
N( 86) N( 88) N( 71) N( 88) N( 73) N( 73) N( 73) N( 73) tI( 7 3) 
Sig .000 Sig .730 Sig .701 Sig . Sig .001 Sig .783 Sig .955 Sig .766 Sig .049 
AESTHETC AGE ANIMACRE AWAREYES AWMAIL AWMEDIA AWOTHER AWPERMTG AWPHO!JE 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) I 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
I!JCOMLOS .0908 .1171 -.0197 -.0016 - . 0719 -.0074 .0418 -.2009 
N( 86) N( 90) N( 73) N( 90) N( 7 5) N( 75) N( 75) N( 75) N( 7 5) 
Sig .406 Sig . 272 Sig .869 Sig. Sig .989 Sig .540 Sig .950 Sig . 722 Sig .084 
LAWN .3180 -.0125 .2124 .0344 .0242 -.0750 -.0304 .1723 -.0760 
N( 87) N( 123) N( 102) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) 
Sig .003 Sig .891 Sig .032 Sig .703 Sig .817 Sig .473 Sig . 771 Sig .097 Sig .467 
LA1?iS .0501 .0111 .1535 -.0126 .1907 -.1850 .0684 -.2753 
N( 85) N( 89) N( 73) N( 89) N( 74) N( 74) N( 74) N( 74) N( 74) 
Sig .649 Sig .918 Sig .195 Sig. Sig .915 Sig .104 Sig .115 Sig .563 Sig .018 
MOISTURE -.0001 .1262 .0582 -.1334 .0715 .0021 . 0471 -.1450 
N( 86) N( 90) N( 73) N( 90) N( 75) N( 75) N( 75) N( 75) N( 75) 
Sig .999 Sig .236 Sig .625 Sig. Sig .254 Sig .542 Sig .986 Sig .688 Sig .215 
NETPFARM -.3177 -.0747 .0760 .1034 .0496 .0986 -.1767 .0515 -.0750 
(.;.l 
Cl'. N( 72) N( 104) N( 85) N( 106) N( 80) N( 80) N( 80) N( 80) N( 80) 
Sig .007 Sig .451 Sig .489 Sig .291 Sig .662 Sig .384 Sig .117 Sig .650 Sig .508 
OTHERUSE 
N( 87) N( 123) N( 102) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) 
Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig 
OWNACRES -.1439 -.0753 .0824 -.0996 .0648 .0276 .1320 -.0860 .0011 
N( 87) N( 123) N( 102) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) 
Sig .183 Sig .408 Sig . 411 Sig .269 Sig .535 Sig .792 Sig .205 Sig .410 Sig .991 
PASTALL -.1263 .0081 -.0897 -.1385 -.0805 -.1167 -.0474 .0276 .1464 
N( 87) N( 123) N( 102) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) 
Sig .244 Sig .929 Sig .370 Sig .123 Sig .441 Sig .263 Sig .650 Sig .791 Sig .159 
AESTHETC AGE ANIMACRE AWAREYES AWMAIL AWMEDIA AWOTHER AWPERMTG AWPHOHE 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance). 
" "is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
PASTPART .1263 -.0081 .0897 .1385 .0805 .1167 .0474 -.0276 -.1464 
N( 87) N( 123) N( 102) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) 
Sig .244 Sig .929 Sig .370 Sig .123 Sig .441 Sig .263 Sig .650 Sig . 791 Sig .159 
PLANT91 .1283 -.0557 .1697 .0203 .1157 -.1256 -.0638 .2042 -.0301 
N( 76) N( 111) N( 96) N( 113) N( 84) N( 84) N( 84) N( 84) N( 8 4) 
Sig .269 Sig .562 Sig .098 Sig .831 Sig .295 Sig .255 Sig .564 Sig .062 Sig .786 
PLAJJTFOR -.1166 .0300 -.1080 .0203 .0265 .0491 .0685 -.0552 -.0430 
N( 76) N( 111) N( 96) N( 113) N( 84) N( 84) N( 84) N( 84) N( 84) 
Sig .316 Sig .754 Sig .295 Sig .831 Sig . 811 Sig .658 Sig .536 Sig .618 Sig .698 
PLANTGOV - . 0911 .0089 .2179 -.0883 -.0448 -.0839 - . 0211 
N( 76) N( 111) N( 96) N( 113) N( 84) N( 84) N( 84) N( 84) N( 84) 
Sig . Sig. Sig .377 Sig . 925 Sig .046 Sig .424 Sig .686 Sig .448 Sig .849 
w 
..._J 
PLANTGRA .1342 -.0948 .1270 .0425 .0746 -.0568 -.1015 .1587 -.0897 
N( 76) N( 111) N( 96) N( 113) N( 84) N( 84) N( 84) N( 84) N( 84) 
Sig .248 Sig .322 Sig .218 Sig .655 Sig .500 Sig .608 Sig .358 Sig .149 Sig .417 
PLANTNAT -.0253 -.0055 -.1087 -.1771 -.2349 -.0568 .3426 -.0989 -.0897 
N( 75) N( 110) N( 95) N( 112) N( 84) N( 84) N( 84) N( 84) N( 84) 
Sig .829 Sig .954 Sig .294 Sig .062 Sig .032 Sig .608 Sig .001 Sig .371 Sig .417 
PLANTNOR -.0604 .0830 -.0095 .0970 .0291 .1245 -.1860 -.0669 .1708 
N( 76) N( 111) N( 96) N( 113) N( 84) N( 84) N( 84) N( 84) N( 84) 
Sig .604 Sig .386 Sig . 927 Sig .307 Sig .793 Sig .259 Sig .090 Sig .546 Sig .120 
PLAllTTIM -.0012 -.1083 .1212 .2058 .1794 .0469 -.0994 -.2273 
N( 83) N( 86) N( 69) N( 86) N( 71) N( 71) N( 71) N( 71) N( 71) 
Sig .991 Sig .321 Sig .321 Sig . Sig .085 Sig .134 Sig .697 Sig .409 Sig .057 
AESTHETC AGE ANIMACRE AWAREYES AWMAIL AWMEDIA AWOTHER AWPERMTG AWPHOtlE 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
RIPARYES 
N( 87) N( 123) N( 102) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) 
Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig 
ROWALL 
N( 87) N( 123) N( 102) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) 
Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig 
ROWIDLE -.0973 -.0440 .1255 .0081 -.0505 -.0799 .2290 -.0799 -.0188 
N( 87) N( 123) N( 102) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) 
Sig .370 Sig .629 Sig .209 Sig .929 Sig .629 Sig .444 Sig .026 Sig .444 Sig .857 
ROWPART .0510 -.1316 .1693 .0392 -.0179 -.0760 .1549 -.0760 .0719 
N( 87) N( 123) N( 102) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) 
Sig .639 Sig .147 Sig .089 Sig .664 Sig .864 Sig .466 Sig .136 Sig .466 Sig .491 
- SEASON -.0640 -.0883 vJ .2024 .1584 .2344 .0000 -.1653 -.2314 
oc N( 83) N( 86) N( 70) N( 86) N( 72) N( 72) N( 72) N( 72) N( 72) 
Sig .566 Sig .419 Sig .093 Sig . Sig .184 Sig .047 Sigl.000 Sig .165 Sig .050 
SHAREBIP .2437 .0650 -.0400 .0146 .2289 -.0598 -.0601 -.2826 
N( 83) N( 8 6) N( 70) N( 8 6) N( 71) N( 71) N( 71) N( 71) N( 71) 
Sig .026 Sig .552 Sig .742 Sig. Sig .904 Sig .055 Sig .620 Sig .619 Sig . 017 
SHAREOTH .2156 -.1091 .0646 .1796 -.0089 . 0191 .0525 -.2743 
N( 80) N{ 83) N{ 68) N( 83) N( 69) N( 69) N{ 69) N{ 69) N( 69) 
Sig .055 Sig .326 Sig .601 Sig . Sig .140 Sig .942 Sig .876 Sig .668 Sig .023 
SHARETIM . 0955 -.1320 .1071 .0927 .0965 -.0758 .0216 -.2319 
N( 82) N{ 85) N( 70) N( 85) N( 70) N{ 70) N{ 70) N{ 70) N{ 70) 
Sig .394 Sig .229 Sig .377 Sig. Sig .445 Sig .427 Sig .533 Sig .859 Sig .053 
AESTHETC AGE ANIMACRE AWAREYES AWMAIL AWMEDIA AWOTHER AWPERMTG AWPHONE 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
STRMIHDE .1843 -.1068 -.0705 .0133 -.1846 .1731 .1083 -.1106 
N( 87) N( 121) N( 102) N( 123) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) 
Sig .087 Sig .244 Sig .481 Sig. Sig .899 Sig .075 Sig .095 Sig .299 Sig .289 
TREES10 .1526 .0180 .0476 .3413 -.3573 .0682 . 3118 
N( 25) N( 29) N( 26) N( 29) N( 26) N( 26) N( 26) N( 26) N( 26) 
Sig .467 Sig .926 Sig .817 Sig. Sig .088 Sig .073 Sig .741 Sig .121 Sig 
TREES20 .2200 -.2108 .4294 -.1037 -.6956 .1037 .6956 
N( 6) N( 8) N( 7) N( 8) N( 6) N( 6) N( 6) N( 6) N( 6) 
Sig .675 Sig .616 Sig .336 Sig. Sig .845 Sig .125 Sig .845 Sig .125 Sig 
TREES30 .5000 -.5000 .6325 .5000 -.5000 
N( 3) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 3) N( 3) N( 3) N( 3) N( 3) 
Sig .667 Sig .500 Sig .368 Sig. Sig .667 Sig. Sig .667 Sig Sig 
- TREESPER . 4472 -.6325 .1539 .2582 -.2582 w N( 4) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) 
\C 
Sig .553 Sig .252 Sig .805 Sig. Sig .742 Sig. Sig .742 Sig Sig 
WATERQUL .3068 -.0259 .0369 -.1263 .1001 .1271 -.0461 -.3322 
N( 87) H( 91) N( 74) N( 91) N( 76) N( 76) N( 76) N( 76) N( 76) 
Sig .004 Sig .807 Sig .755 Sig. Sig .277 Sig .390 Sig .274 Sig .693 Sig .003 
YRSFARM -.2380 .5459 .0418 -.1238 -.1459 .0192 -.0159 .0547 -.0342 
N( 80) N( 109) N( 90) N( 111) N( 86) N( 86) N( 86) N( 86) N( 86) 
Sig .033 Sig .000 Sig .696 Sig .196 Sig .180 Sig .861 Sig .885 Sig .617 Sig .754 
YRSMANAG -.0681 . 3968 -.0874 -.1815 -.0027 -.0649 -.0141 -.0389 .1180 
N( 50) N( 78) N( 66) N( 79) N( 59) N( 59) N( 59) N( 59) N( 59) 
Sig .638 Sig .000 Sig .485 Sig .109 Sig .984 Sig .625 Sig .916 Sig .770 Sig .373 
AESTHETC AGE ANIMACRE AWAREYES AWMAIL AWMEDIA AWOTHER AWPERMTG AWPHOIJE 
(Coefficient I (Cases) I 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
BIPADOPT -.1256 
N( 94) 
Sig .228 
BIPAWYES -.2020 .4345 
N( 93) N( 122) 
Sig .052 Sig .000 
BUFFORES .0454 -.2536 - . 0892 
N( 94) N( 125) N( 122) 
Sig .664 Sig .004 Sig .329 
BUFGRASS -.1291 -.2370 -.0533 .0880 
N( 94) N( 125) N( 122) N( 125) 
Sig .215 Sig .008 Sig .560 Sig .329 
CONTAES - . 0611 -.0661 .1036 .1250 -.0067 
N( 75) N( 94) N( 92) N( 94) N( 94) 
.~_,  Sig .602 Sig .527 Sig .326 Sig .230 Sig .949 
CONTCES .1948 -.0500 -.1334 .1024 -.0364 .1026 
N( 75) N( 94) N( 92) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) 
Sig .094 Sig .632 Sig .205 Sig .326 Sig . 728 Sig .325 
CONTCFSA .3067 -.1794 .0735 .1035 -.0220 .0646 .1165 
N( 74) N( 93) N( 91) N( 93) N( 93) N( 93) N( 93) 
Sig .008 Sig .085 Sig .489 Sig .324 Sig .834 Sig .538 Sig .266 
CONTCHEM .3148 -.0377 -.0840 -.0745 -.0763 -.0188 .2588 -.0511 
N( 75) N( 94) N( 92) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) 
Sig .006 Sig . 718 Sig .426 Sig .475 Sig .465 Sig .857 Sig .012 Sig .627 
AWPUBMTG BIPADOPT BIPAWYES BUFFORES BUFGRASS CONTAES CONTCES CONTCFSA 
(Coefficient I (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
CONTDNR -.1185 .4439 .1858 -.0812 -.0121 -.0591 . 0791 -.0683 -.0337 
N( 75) N( 94) N( 92) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) 
Sig . 311 Sig .000 Sig .076 Sig .437 Sig .908 Sig . 572 Sig .449 Sig .515 Sig .747 
CONTNEIG -.0987 .0612 -.0940 .0298 .0243 -.0430 -.0950 -.1168 -.0246 
N( 75) N( 94) N( 92) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) 
Sig .400 Sig .558 Sig .373 Sig .776 Sig .816 Sig .680 Sig .363 Sig .265 Sig .814 
CONTNONE -.1208 -.2132 -.1213 -.0088 -.0218 -.1063 -.2346 -.2889 -.0607 
N( 7 5) N( 94) N( 92) N( 94) N( 94) N( ~4) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) 
Sig .302 Sig .039 Sig .249 Sig .933 Sig .835 Sig .308 Sig .023 Sig .005 Sig .561 
CONTNRCS . 0781 .0411 .1676 -.1205 -.0243 -.0986 .0048 .0609 .1930 
N( 74) N( 93) N( 91) N( 93) N( 93) N( 93) N( 93) N( 93) N( 93) 
Sig .508 ?sig .696 Sig .112 Sig .250 Sig .817 Sig .347 Sig .964 Sig .562 Sig .064 
CO!JTOTHE .1382 .2448 .1478 -.0582 -.1445 -.0554 -.1222 .0438 -.0316 
+:. N( 75) N( 94) N( 92) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) 
Sig .237 Sig . 017 Sig .160 Sig ,577 Sig .165 Sig . 596 Sig .241 Sig .677 Sig .762 
CONTSOIL -.1208 -.2191 -.0392 .2281 .2130 .1647 -.1017 .0843 -.0624 
N( 7 5) N( 94) N( 92) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) 
Sig .302 Sig .034 Sig . 711 Sig .027 Sig .039 Sig .113 Sig .330 Sig .422 Sig .550 
DEER .1681 -.0799 -.0054 .1853 -.2349 .1959 .2252 .0591 .0844 
N( 73) N( 88) N( 87) N( 88) N( 88) N( 75) N( 75) N( 74) N( 75) 
Sig .155 Sig .459 Sig .960 Sig .084 Sig .028 Sig . 092 Sig .052 Sig .617 Sig .472 
EDUCATE -.2092 .3033 .1536 -.0357 -.3622 .1990 .0137 -.2485 -.0296 
N( 62) N( 81) N( 7 9) N( 81) N( 81) N( 57) N( 57) N( 56) N( 57) 
Sig .103 Sig .006 Sig .176 Sig .752 Sig .001 Sig .138 Sig . 919 Sig .065 Sig .827 
AWPUBMTG BIPADOPT BIPAWYES BUFFORES BUFGRASS CONTAES CONTCES COHTCFSA CONTCHEM 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
EROSION .1173 .1417 .0897 .1255 .1945 .0032 -.0085 .0801 -.0518 
N( 76) N( 91) N( 90) N( 91) N( 91) N( 78) N( 78) N( 77) N( 7 8) 
Sig .313 Sig .180 Sig .401 Sig .236 Sig .065 Sig .978 Sig .941 Sig .489 Sig .652 
GRASSlO -.1635 -.4389 .0857 -.1558 .3657 -.1463 -.1799 -.1089 -.1463 
N( 14) N( 16) N( 16) N( 16) N( 16) N( 16) N( 16) N( 16) N( 16) 
Sig .577 Sig .089 Sig .752 Sig .564 Sig .164 Sig .589 Sig .505 Sig .688 Sig .589 
GRASS20 -.2657 -.5808 .3293 -.0549 .6802 -.3319 -.5101 -.5070 
N( 6) N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) N( 8} 
Sig . 611 Sig .131 Sig .426 Sig .897 Sig .063 Sig .422 Sig .196 Sig .200 Sig 
GRASS30 .0000 - . 7255 .2962 - .1814 .7404 -.1814 - . 2962 - . 2962 
N( 4) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5} 
Sigl.000 Sig .165 Sig .628 Sig .770 Sig .152 Sig . 770 Sig .628 Sig .628 Sig 
GRASSPER .2582 -.7071 .2887 . .0000 . 5774 -.3536 -.2887 -.2887 
N( 4) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5} !J( 5) 
~ 
N Sig .742 Sig .182 Sig .638 Sigl.000 Sig .308 Sig .559 Sig .638 Sig .638 Sig 
GROSFARM .0320 -.2603 .1075 -.0188 -.0510 - .1163 .0969 .2584 .0195 
N( 94) N( 125) N( 122) N( 125) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) 
Sig .760 Sig .003 Sig .239 Sig .835 Sig . 572 Sig .264 Sig .353 Sig .012 Sig .852 
HABITAT .1396 .3533 ,3128 .0327 .0010 .1190 .1775 .0000 .1016 
N( 73) N( 88) N( 87) N( 88) N( 88) N( 75) N( 75) N( 74) N( 7 5) 
Sig .239 Sig .001 Sig .003 Sig .762 Sig .992 Sig .309 Sig .128 Sigl.000 Sig .386 
INCOMLOS .3069 -.2779 -.2157 .3330 .1546 -.0143 .1380 .0259 -.1220 
N( 75) N( 90) N( 8 9) N( 90) N( 90) N( 77) N( 77) N( 76) N( 77) 
Sig .007 Sig .008 Sig .042 Sig .001 Sig .146 Sig .902 Sig .231 Sig .824 Sig .290 
AWPUBMTG BIPADOPT BIPAWYES BUFFORES BUFGRASS CONTAES CONTCES CONTCFSA CONTCHEM 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
,...... 
~,.  
! 
/ i 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
LAWN .2195 -.0345 -.0260 .0293 .0056 .0940 .4383 .0982 .2479 
N( 94) N( 125) N( 122) N( 125) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) 11( 94) 
Sig .034 Sig .703 Sig . 776 Sig .745 Sig .951 Sig .367 Sig .000 Sig .349 Sig .016 
LAWS .0604 -.0865 .1763 .0406 .1368 .1747 .0342 .1776 .0137 
N( 74) N( 89) N( 88) N( 89) N( 89) N( 76) N( 76) N( 7 5) N( 76) 
Sig .609 Sig .420 Sig .100 Sig .706 Sig .201 Sig .131 Sig .769 Sig .128 Sig .907 
MOISTURE .0078 -.1677 -.1077 .3327 .1395 .1347 .0640 .0669 -.0757 
N( 75) N( 90) N( 89) N( 90) N( 90) N( 77) N( 77) N( 76) N( 77) 
Sig .947 Sig .114 Sig .315 Sig .001 Sig .190 Sig .243 Sig .580 Sig .566 Sig .513 
NETPFARM .2273 -.4461 -.0893 .1464 .0727 -.1215 .0078 .2560 -.0517 
N( 80) N( 106) N( 103) N( 106) N( 106) N( 80) N( 80) N( 79) N( 80) 
Sig .043 Sig .000 Sig .370 Sig .134 Sig .459 Sig .283 Sig .945 Sig .023 Sig .649 
- OTHERUSE 
w+:- N( 94) N( 125) N( 122) N( 125) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) 
Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig 
OWNACRES .0146 -.2610 .0125 .0880 .0956 -.0368 .1596 .1582 .1242 
N( 94) N( 125) N( 122) N( 125) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N ( 94.) 
Sig .889 Sig .003 Sig .891 Sig .329 Sig .289 Sig . 725 Sig .124 Sig .130 Sig .233 
PASTALL -.0200 .2316 .0849 -.4937 -.4.221 .0098 -.1342 -.024.9 -.0693 
N( 94) N( 125) N( 122) N( 125) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) 
Sig . 84.8 Sig .009 Sig .352 Sig .000 Sig .000 Sig . 926 Sig .197 Sig .813 Sig .507 
PASTPART .0200 -.2316 -.0849 .4937 .4221 -.0098 .1342 . 024.9 .0693 
N( 94) N( 125) N( 122) N( 125) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) 
Sig .848 Sig .009 Sig .352 Sig .000 Sig .000 Sig .926 Sig .197 Sig .813 Sig .507 
AWPUBMTG BIPADOPT BIPAWYES BUFFORES BUFGRASS CONTAES CONTCES CO!ITCFSA CO!JTCI!Et'I 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
PLAHT91 -.0606 -.0126 .1591 -.0031 -.0490 -.1041 -.0120 -.0280 
N( 84) N( 113) N( 111) N( 113) N( 113) N( 83) N( 83) N( 82) N( 83) 
Sig .584 Sig . Sig .895 Sig .092 Sig .974 Sig .660 Sig .349 Sig . 915 Sig .802 
PLANTFOR -.0868 .1553 .1591 -.1783 -.0436 -.0925 -.1201 -.0248 
N( 84) N( 113) N( 111) N( 113) N( 113) N( 83) N( 83) N( 82) N( 83) 
Sig .432 Sig . Sig .104 Sig .092 Sig .059 Sig .696 Sig .406 Sig .283 Sig .824 
PLANTGOV -.0426 -.0594 -.0827 -.0783 -.0214 -.0454 -.0589 -.0122 
N( 84) N( 113) N( 111) N( 113) N( 113) N( 83) N( 83) N( 82) N( 83) 
Sig .700 Sig . Sig .536 Sig .384 Sig .410 Sig .848 Sig .684 Sig .599 Sig .913 
PLAllTGRA -.0888 .1436 - . 0114 .4944 -.1019 -.0501 -.1389 -.0581 
N( 84) N( 113) N( 111) N( 113) N( 113) N( 83) N( 83) N( 82) N( 83) 
Sig .422 Sig . Sig .133 Sig .905 Sig .000 Sig .359 Sig .653 Sig .213 Sig .602 
PLANTNAT .0033 -.0986 .3917 .3042 .1394 .0754 .2835 -.0390 
- N( 84) N( 112) N( 110) N( 112) N( 112) N( 82) N( 82) N( 81) N( 82) t Sig .976 Sig . Sig .305 Sig .000 Sig .001 Sig .212 Sig .501 Sig .010 Sig . 728 
PLANTNOR .1312 -.0771 -.4341 -.5265 .0438 .0930 . 0072 .0990 
N( 84) N( 113) N( 111) N( 113) ? N( 113) N( 83) N( 83) N( 82) N( 83) 
Sig .234 Sig . Sig .421 Sig .000 Sig .000 Sig .694 Sig .403 Sig .949 Sig .373 
PLAJJTTIM .2421 -.2829 .0472 .2310 .0204 -.0327 -.0092 .3268 .0853 
N( 71) N( 86) N( 85) N( 86) N( 86) N( 73) N( 73) N( 72) N( 73) 
Sig .042 Sig .008 Sig .668 Sig .032 Sig .852 Sig .783 Sig .938 Sig .005 Sig .473 
RIPARYES 
N( 94) N( 125) N( 122) N( 125) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) 
Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig 
AWPUBMTG BIPADOPT BIPAWYES BUFFORES BUFGRASS CONTAES CONTCES CO!-ITCFSA CO!JTCI-IEM 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
ROl'lALL 
N( 94) N( 125) N( 122) N( 125) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) 
Sig . Sig . Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig Sig Sig Sig 
ROW IDLE -.0377 -.0279 -.0659 .1100 .1177 
N( 94) N( 125) N( 122) N( 125) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) 
Sig .718 Sig .757 Sig . 471 Sig .222 Sig .191 Sig Sig Sig Sig 
ROWPART .0009 .0955 -.0257 .1336 .1647 -.0695 .0314 -.1074 -.0397 
N( 94) N( 125) N( 122) N( 125) N( 125) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) 
Sig .993 Sig .289 Sig .778 Sig .137 Sig .066 Sig .506 Sig . 764 Sig .306 Sig .704 
SEJ,SON .2898 -.2756 . 0462 .3338 .0249 .0309 .0469 .3490 .0820 
N( 72) N( 86) N( 85) N( 86) N( 86) N( 73) N( 73) N( 72) N( 73) 
Sig .014 Sig .010 Sig .674 Sig .002 Sig .820 Sig .795 Sig .694 Sig .003 Sig .490 
SHAREBIP .0541 
~ .0052 .1528 .1086 -.1226 .0588 .0200 .1100 .0335 
Vi N( 71 J N( 86) N( 85) N( 86) N( 86) N( 73) N( 73) N( 72) N( 73) 
Sig .654 Sig .962 Sig .163 Sig .. 320 Sig .261 Sig .621 Sig .866 Sig .358 Sig .779 
SHAREOTH .1116 -.0397 .1696 .2219 -.0956 .0640 .1547 .2549 .0449 
N( 69) N( 83) N( 82) N( 83) N( 83) N( 70) N( 70) N( 69) N( 70) 
Sig .361 Sig . 722 Sig .128 Sig .044 Sig .390 Sig .598 Sig .201 Sig .035 Sig .712 
SHARETIM .2179 -.3555 . 0657 .2166 - .1424 -.0564 .2061 .3303 .0692 
N( 70) N( 85) N( 84) N( 85) N( 85) N( 72) N( 72) N( 71) N( 72) 
Sig .070 Sig .001 Sig .553 Sig .046 Sig .194 Sig .638 Sig .082 Sig .005 Sig .563 
STRMWIDE -.0868 .2738 .1050 .0532 .1173 .0420 .1013 .0317 -.0648 
N( 94) N( 123) N( 121) N( 123) N( 123) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) 
Sig .405 Sig .002 Sig .252 Sig .559 Sig .196 Sig .688 Sig .331 Sig .763 Sig .535 
AWPUBMTG BIPADOPT BIPAWYES BUFFORES BUFGRASS COHTAES CONTCES CotlTCFSA CONTCHEM 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
TREESlO -.0839 .0243 .0325 .0904 -.1163 .0531 -.1774 -.1163 
N( 26) N( 29) N( 29) N( 29) N( 29) N( 26) N( 26) N( 26) N( 26) 
Sig .684 Sig . Sig .900 Sig .867 Sig .641 Sig . 571 Sig .797 Sig .386 Sig .571 
TREES20 -.1391 -.0845 . 5196 .4041 .1291 -.0845 -.1291 -.1291 
N( 6) N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) N( eJ N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) 
Sig .793 Sig .842 Sig .187 Sig .321 Sig .761 Sig .842 Sig .761 Sig . 761 Sig 
TREES30 .5000 -.8165 .0000 .0000 .7071 .0000 .0000 .0000 
N( 3) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) 
Sig .667 Sig .184 Sigl.000 Sigl.000 Sig .293 Sigl.000 Sig 1. 000 Sigl.000 Sig 
TREESPER .2582 -.7071 .2887 .0000 .5774 -.3536 -.2887 -.2887 
N( 4) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) 
Sig .742 Sig .182 Sig .638 Sig 1. 000 Sig .308 Sig .559 Sig .638 Sig .638 Sig 
WATERQUL .1095 .2377 .2004 -.0543 .1653 .1062 .0566 .1386 -.0605 
N( 76) N( 91) N( 90) N( 91) N( 91) N( 78) N( 78) N( 77) N( 78) 
Sig .346 Sig .023 
- Sig .058 Sig .609 Sig .117 Sig .355 Sig .623 Sig .229 Sig .599 ~ YRSFARM .1456 -.3635 -.1671 .1165 .1299 .0291 -.0558 .0585 -.0665 
N( 86) N( 111) N( 108) N( 111) N( 111) N( 89) N( 89) N( 88) N( 89) 
Sig .181 Sig .000 Sig .084 Sig .223 Sig .174 Sig .786 Sig .603 Sig .588 Sig .536 
YRSMANAG .2657 -.3604 -.1221 .2609 .0242 .1190 -.0680 . 0626 
N{ 59) N{ 79) N( 76) N( 79) N( 79) N( 56) N( 56) N{ 55) N( 56) 
Sig .042 Sig .001 Sig .293 Sig .020 Sig .832 Sig. Sig .383 Sig .622 Sig .646 
AWPUBMTG BIPADOPT BIPAWYES BUFFORES BUFGRASS CONTAES CONTCES CONTCFSA CONTCHEM 
CONTNEIG .0840 
N( 94) 
Sig .421 
CONTDNR 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
j 
I 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N CORRELATION C O E F F I C I E ~ T S - - - - - - - - - -
CONTNONE -.1905 -.1388 
N( 94) N( 94) 
Sig .066 Sig .182 
CONTNRCS -.1768 -.1287 -.3185 
N( 93) N( 93) N( 93) 
Sig .090 Sig .219 Sig .002 
CONTOTHE -.0992 - . 0723 -.1786 -.1657 
N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N ( 93) 
Sig .341 Sig .489 Sig .085 Sig .112 
CONTS01.L . .04% -.0354 -.2972 - .14.22 -.0110 
lH 94) N ( 94) N ( 91.\.) N ( 93) N ( 94) 
Sig .635 Sig .135 Sig ? 001.\. Si.g .l11.\. Si.g .91.G 
D'E.'E.R - .0131 -.l31.\.5 .OSI.\.G -.222S .0631 -.012.S \ 
N ( 15) N ( 15) N ( 15) N ( 11.\.) N ( 15) N ( 15) 
Sig ? 530 Sig .250 Sig .1.\.10 Si.g ? 056 Sig .5S1 Sig .535 \ 
'E.D\JCAT'E. .051.\.9 -.05ll.\. - .Ol.1G -.011.1. ? 01.\.4.0 -.l.G6G .05S6 
~ N( 51) N( 51) N ( 51) N( 5G) 'N ( 51) 'N ( 51) N ( 52) 
-.l Sig .6S5 Sig .101.\. Sig ? S91 Si.g .603 Sig .11.\.5 Sig .21.6 Sig .6'2,0 
'E.ROS'I.ON .OS52 .1.l65 -.2290 .01.\.61. .0961. -.l.l.55 .OSS5 . 2151 
N( lS) N( lS) N ( l'a) 'N( 11) N( l'a) 'N( l'a) N( SS) N ( 51.\.) 
Sig . I.\.S'c Sig .31.0 Sig .01.\.1.\. Sig .690 Sig .1.\.03 Sig .31.1.\. Sig .1.\.1.2 Sig .01.\.4. 
GRASS 1.Cl .1.\.2.1'2, -.2.926 .1.2.10 . 261.1 -.1822 .2634. 
N( l6) N( l6) N( 1.6) 'N( 1.6) 'N( 1.6) N ( 1.6) N( 1.1.\.) N ( 10) N ( 14.) 
Sig Sig Sig .09'2, Sig .211. Sig Sig .639 Sig .366 Sig .614. Sig .363 
CONTDNR CONTNE'I.G CONTNONE CO'NTNRCS CONTOTHE CONTSO'I.L DEER EDUCATE EROSIOH 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
. "is printed it a coefficient cannot be computed 
J 
i 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
GRASS20 .3802 .0000 .2489 .0000 -.6325 .674? 
N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) N( 7) U( 4) N( 7) 
Sig . Sig . Sig .353 Sigl.000 Sig . Sig .552 Sigl.000 Sig .368 Sig .097 
GRASS30 .3627 .0000 .0000 .5000 
N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 4) N( 1) ll( 4) 
Sig . Sig . Sig .548 Sigl.000 Sig . Sig . Sigl.000 Sig . Sig .500 
GRASSPER .3536 .0000 1.0000 .2108 
N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 4) N( 2) N( 4) 
Sig . Sig . Sig .559 Sigl.000 Sig . Sig . Sig .000 Sig . Sig .789 
GROSFARM -.2233 - .1187 -.0689 .0998 -.0761 .2158 .0956 .0145 .1179 
N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) N( 94) N( 88) N( 81 l N( 91 l 
Sig .030 Sig .254 Sig .509 Sig .341 Sig .466 Sig .037 Sig .376 Sig .898 Sig .266 
HABITAT .3044 .0623 -.3808 .1017 .1888 -.1749 .1942 .3192 .3295 
~ 
co N( 75) N( 75) N( 75) N( 74) N( 75) N( 7 5) N( 86) N( 52) N( 88) 
Sig .008 Sig .595 Sig .001 Sig .389 Sig .105 Sig .134 Sig .073 Sig .021 Sig .002 
IHCOMLOS -.2188 .0125 .0290 -.0022 .0161 -.0132 .1727 -.1135 .1865 
N( 77) N( 77) N( 77) N( 76) N( 77) N( 77) N( 88) N( 53) N( 90) 
Sig .056 Sig .914 Sig .803 Sig .985 Sig .889 Sig .909 Sig .108 Sig .419 Sig .078 
LAWN -.0346 -.0992 -.1079 .2761 -.0205 -.0489 .1038 .0895 . 0783 
N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94 l N( 94) N( 88) N( 81) N( 91) 
Sig .741 Sig .342 Sig .301 Sig .007 Sig .844 Sig .640 Sig .336 Sig .427 Sig .460 
LAWS -.1435 -.0655 -.0914 .0700 .0874 .0227 .1518 -.0955 .1263 
N( 76) N( 76) N( 76) N( 75) N( 76) N( 76) N( 86) N( 52) N( 89) 
Sig .216 Sig .574 Sig .432 Sig .550 Sig .453 Sig .845 Sig .163 Sig .501 Sig .238 
CONTDNR CONTNEIG CONTNONE CONTNRCS CONTOTHE CONTSOIL DEER EDUCATE EROSI0!1 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance} 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
1 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
MOISTURE -.1918 .0637 .0289 .0851 .1369 .0802 .1819 -.1493 .2013 
N( 77) N( 77) N( 77) N( 76) N( 77) N( 77) N( 88) N{ 53) N{ 90) 
Sig .095 Sig .582 Sig .803 Sig .465 Sig .235 Sig .488 Sig .090 Sig .286 Sig .057 
NETPFARM -.3562 -.0499 .0922 .0441 -.1072 .1730 .1060 -.2783 .0704 
N( 80) N( 80) N( 80) N( 79) N( 80) N( 80) N( 74) N( 71) N( 76) 
Sig .001 Sig .660 Sig .416 Sig .699 Sig .344 Sig .125 Sig .369 Sig .019 Sig . 546 
OTHERUSE 
N( 94) N{ 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) N( 94) N( 88) N( 81) N( 91) 
Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig 
m-mACRES -.1672 -.0323 - .1124 .0915 -.1384 .0488 .0750 -.0137 -.0418 
N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) N( 94) N( 88) N( 81) N( 91) 
Sig .107 Sig .757 Sig .281 Sig .383 Sig .183 Sig .640 Sig .487 Sig .903 Sig . 694 
-+::- PASTALL .0175 -.1583 .1371 -.0741 .0439 -.1414 -.0331 .1518 -.2083 
'C N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) N( 94) N( 88) N( 81) N( 91) 
Sig .867 Sig .127 Sig .188 Sig .480 Sig .674 Sig .174 Sig .759 Sig .176 Sig . 048 
PASTPART -.0175 .1583 - .1371 .0741 -.0439 .1414 .0331 -.1518 .2083 
N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) N( 94) N( 88) N( 81) N( 91) 
Sig .867 Sig .127 Sig .188 Sig .480 Sig .674 Sig .174 Sig .759 Sig .176 Sig .048 
PLANT91 .1795 -.0570 -.1615 -.0120 -,0641 .1649 .0027 .2024 .1254 
N( 83) N( 83) N( 83) N( 82) N( 83) N( 83) N( 77) N( 70) N( 80) 
Sig .105 Sig .609 Sig .145 Sig .915 Sig .565 Sig .136 Sig .981 Sig .093 Sig .268 
PLANTFOR -.0506 -.0506 .1046 .1535 -.0570 -.1477 -.0596 -.0215 .0305 
N( 83) N( 83) N( 83) N( 82) N( 83) N( 83) N( 77) N( 70) N( 80) 
Sig .649 Sig .649 Sig .346 Sig .169 Sig .609 Sig .183 Sig .606 Sig .860 Sig .788 
CONTDNR CONTNEIG CONTNONE CONTNRCS CONTOTHE CONTSOIL DEER EDUCATE EROSIOH 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
j 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
PLANTGOV -.0248 -.0248 -.0704 .2095 -.0280 -.0725 .1409 
N( 83) N( 83) N( 83) N( 82) N( 83) N( 83) N( 77) N( 70) N( 80) 
Sig .824 Sig .824 Sig .527 Sig .059 Sig .802 Sig .515 Sig . Sig .245 Sig 
PLANTGRA .1546 .1546 -.1422 -.0677 -.0104 .2280 -.3016 .0978 . 2725 
N( 83) N( 83) N( 83) N( 82) N( 83) N( 83) N( 77) N( 70) N( 80) 
Sig .163 Sig .163 Sig .200 Sig .546 Sig . 926 Sig .038 Sig .008 Sig .420 Sig . 014 
PLANTNAT .1394 -.0795 .0314 -.0945 -.0895 .0217 -.0358 -.1661 .0174 
N( 82) N( 82) N( 82) N( 81) N( 82) N( 82) N( 76) N( 69) N( 7 9) 
Sig .212 Sig .478 Sig .780 Sig .401 Sig .424 Sig .847 Sig .759 Sig .173 Sig .879 
PLANTNOR ? -.2509 -.0245 .1443 .0072 .1252 -.2037 .2875 -.0303 -.2755 
N( 83) N( 83) N( 83) N( 82) N( 83) N( 83) N( 77) N( 70) N( 80) 
Sig .022 Sig .826 Sig .193 Sig .949 Sig .259 Sig .065 Sig .011 Sig .803 Sig .013 
-Vi PLANTTIM -.1058 -.0947 -.0436 -.0268 .0142 .1350 .1678 -.2156 .1051 ,-. 
~ N( 73) N( 73) N( 73) N( 72) N( 73) N( 73) N( 85) N( 50) N( 8 6) 
Sig .373 Sig .426 Sig . 714 Sig .823 Sig .905 Sig .255 Sig .125 Sig .133 Sig .335 
RIPARYES 
N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) N( 94) N( 88) N( 81) N( 91) 
Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig 
ROWALL 
N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) N( 94) N( 88) N( 81) U( 91) 
Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig 
ROWIDLE - .1114 -.0212 
N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) N( 94) N( 88) N( 81) tl( 91) 
Sig . Sig . Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig . Sig .302 Sig . Sig .842 
CONTDNR CONTNEIG CONTNONE CONTNRCS CONTOTHE CONTSOIL DEER EDUCATE EROSiotl 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
II 11 is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
t... 
- - - - - - - - - - - SPEARMAN CORREL AT ION C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - -
ROvlPART .3089 . 0514 -.0778 .0223 -.0024 . 2026 -.0361 -.0453 .0292 
N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) N( 94) N( 88) N( Bl) N( 91) 
Sig .002 Sig .623 Sig .456 Sig .832 Sig .981 Sig .050 Sig .738 Sig .688 Sig .784 
SEASON -.3348 -.1510 -.0660 .2132 .0879 .0865 .2102 -.1620 .0177 
N( 73) N( 73) N{ 73) N{ 72) N{ 73) N( 73) N{ 85) N( 52) N( 8 6) I 
! I 
Sig .004 Sig .202 Sig .579 Sig .072 Sig .460 Sig .467 Sig .054 Sig .251 Sig .871 : f 
SHAREBIP -.0876 -.0326 .0516 .0404 . 0745 - .1119 .3408 .1324 . 1782 
N( 7 3) N( 73) N( 7 3) N( 72) N( 73) N( 73) N( 85) N( 51) N ( 86) 
Sig .461 Sig . 784 Sig .665 Sig .736 Sig .531 Sig .346 Sig .001 Sig .354 Sig .101 
SHAREOTH -.1443 -.0148 -.1464 -.0638 .2133 -.0425 .2621 .4599 .3861 
N( 10) N( 10) N( 10) N( 69) N( 70) N( 10) N( 82) N( 49) N( 83) 
Sig .233 Sig .903 Sig .226 Sig .602 Sig .076 Sig .727 Sig .011 Sig .001 Sig .000 
SHARE.TIM -.3442 .0369 .0260 .0687 -.0440 - . 0819 .1725 .0837 .1683 
V\ N( 12) N( 12) N( 12) N( 11) N( 12) N( 12) N( 84) N( 50) N( 8 5) 
Sig .003 Sig .158 Sig . 829 Sig .569 Sig .114 Sig .463 Sig .117 Sig .563 Sig .124 
STRM\'HDE .1915 .1832 -.2129 .0119 -.0011 -.2251 - .1132 .1134 .1151 
N( 94) N( 94) N( 94) N( 93) N( 94) N( 94) N( 88) N( 80) N( 91) 
Sig .056 Sig .011 Sig .039 Sig . 458 Sig .946 Sig .029 Sig .294 Sig .316 Sig .215 
TREESlO -.3635 .2321 -.0823 .0063 -.1163 .4618 -.0112 -.0118 -.0242 
N( 26) N( 26) N( 26) N( 26) N( 26) N( 26) N( 26) N( 19) N( 21) 
Sig .068 Sig .253 Sig .689 Sig .916 Sig . 511 Sig .018 sig .?108 Sig .152 Sig .905 
TREES20 -.4226 .2535 -.0511 .4226 . 6196 .0000 . 3121 
N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) N( 1) N( 5) N ( 1) 
Sig .291 Sig Sig .545 Sig .892 Sig Sig .291 Sig .093 Sigl.000 Sig .411 
CONTDNR CONTNE1.G CONTNONE CONTNRCS CONTOTHE CONTSOIL DEER EDUCl\TE EROSIOll 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
. " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S 
- - - - - - - - - -
TREES30 .0000 .8660 .0000 
N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 3) N( l) N( 3) 
Sig. Sig. Sig , Sigl.000 Sig . Sig . Sig .333 Sig . Sigl.000 
TREESPER .3536 .0000 1.0000 .210fJ 
N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 4) N( 2) tJ( 4) 
Sig . Sig . Sig .559 Sigl.000 Sig . Sig . Sig .000 Sig . Sig . 789 
l'IATERQUL . 3064 -.0354 -.1674 .0155 -.0285 -.1226 .0905 .3014 .4187 
N( 78) N( 78) N( 78) N( 77) N( 78) N( 78) N( 88) N( 54) N( 91) 
Sig .006 Sig .759 Sig .143 Sig .893 Sig .804 Sig .285 Sig .402 Sig .027 Sig .000 
YRSFARM -.3204 -.1284 .2422 -.0967 .0046 .1456 .0377 -.4823 - . 1126 
N( 89) N( 89) N( 89) N( 88) N( 89) N( 89) N( 81) N( 71) N( 84) 
Sig .002 Sig .230 Sig .022 Sig .370 Sig . 966 Sig .173 Sig .738 Sig .000 Sig .308 
YRSMANAG -.2174 -.2211 .2840 .1035 -.1629 -.0051 .1530 -.2734 .0251 
N( 56) N( 56) N( 56) N( 55) N( 56) N( 56) N( 50) N( 55) N( 51) 
VI 
N Sig .108 Sig .102 Sig .034 Sig .452 Sig .230 Sig .970 Sig .289 Sig . 043 Sig . 861 
CONTDNR CONTNEIG CONTNONE CONTNRCS CONTOTHE CONTSOIL DEER EDUCATE EROSIO!l 
GRASS20 .9212 
N( 8) 
Sig .001 
GRASS30 .9747 1.0000 
N( 5) N( 5) 
Sig .005 Sig .000 
GRASSPER .9747 .9747 .9487 
N( 5) N( 5) N( 4) 
Sig .005 Sig .005 Sig .051 
GRASSlO GRASS20 GRASS30 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
GROSFARM .3160 .2051 -.0789 .0000 
N( 16) N( 8) N( 5) N( 5) 
Sig .233 Sig .626 Sig .900 Sigl.000 
HABITAT -.5275 -.6382 -.8165 -.7746 -.1225 
N( 13) N( 7) N( 4) N( 4) N( 88) 
Sig . 064 Sig .123 Sig .184 Sig .225 Sig .256 
INCOMLOS -.2662 -.1699 -1. 0000 .3162 .1086 .1215 
N( 14) N( 7) N( 4) N( 4) N( 90) N( 87) 
Sig .358 Sig .716 Sig .000 Sig .684 Sig .308 Sig .262 
LAWN -.3271 -.3169 -.1814 -.3536 .0933 .0850 .0193 
N( 16) N( 8) N( 5) N( 5) N( 125) N( 88) N( 90) 
Sig .216 Sig .444 Sig . 770 Sig .559 Sig .301 Sig .431 Sig .857 
LAWS -.1341 .0858 ?. 7071 . 4472 .1812 .1241 .0740 .0432 
\Jl N( 14) N( 7) N( 4) N( 4) N( 89) N( 86) N( 88) N( 89) 
vJ Sig .648 Sig .855 Sig .293 Sig .553 Sig .089 Sig .255 Sig .493 Sig .688 
MOISTURE .1238 -.1348 .0000 .2108 -.0005 -.0178 . 2643 .1153 .2706 
N( 14) N( 7) N( 4) N( 4) N( 90) N( 87) N( 90) N( 90) N( 88) 
Sig .673 Sig .773 Sigl.000 Sig .789 Sig .996 Sig .870 Sig .012 Sig .279 Sig .011 
NETPFARM .4210 .6669 1.0000 -.5000 . 7138 -.2214 .2173 .1215 .1680 
N( 12) N( 5) N( 3) N( 3) N( 106) N( 73) N( 76) N( 106) 1l ( 74) 
Sig .173 Sig .219 Sig .000 Sig .667 Sig .000 Sig .060 Sig .059 Sig .215 Sig .152 
OTHERUSE 
N( 16) N( 8) N( 5) N( 5) N( 125) N( 88) N( 90) ll( 125) !J( 89) 
Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig 
GRASSlO GRASS20 GRASS30 GRASSPER GROSFARM HABITAT INCOMLOS LJ\W!J LJ\v/S 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
j 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
OWNACRES .0415 .0000 -.4104 .0000 .6481 -.0634 .1890 .0262 .0910 
N( 16) N( 8) N( 5) N( 5) N( 125) N( 88) N( 90) ll ( 125) tl ( 8 9) 
Sig .879 Sigl.000 Sig .493 Sigl.000 Sig .000 Sig .557 Sig .074 Sig . 772 Sig .396 
PASTALL .0000 - . 6971 -.7404 -.5774 .0125 -.1253 - .1337 - . 24 8 ,1 .0097 
N( 16) N( 8) N( 5) N( 5) N( 125) N( 88) N( 90) N( 125) N( 89) 
Sigl.000 Sig .055 Sig .152 Sig .308 Sig .890 Sig .245 Sig .209 Sig .005 Sig . 928 
PAST PART .0000 . 6971 .7404 .5774 -.0125 .1253 .1337 .2484 -.0097 
N( 16) N( 8) N( 5) N( 5) N( 125) N( 88) N( 90) N( 125) N( 89) 
Sigl.000 Sig .055 Sig .152 Sig .308 Sig .890 Sig .245 Sig .209 Sig .005 Sig . 928 
PLANT91 .5747 .6382 .8165 .7746 -.0265 .1320 .0831 -.0842 -.0845 
N( 15) N( 7) N( 4) N( 4) N( 113) N( 77) N( 79) N( 113) N( 78) 
Sig .025 Sig .123 Sig .184 Sig .225 Sig .780 Sig .253 Sig .466 Sig .375 Sig .462 
PLANTFOR .1285 -.0910 -.1515 -.0842 -.1553 
N( 15) N( 7) N( 4) N( 4) N( 113) N( 77) N( 79) N( 113) N( 78) 
Vi Sig . Sig . Sig. Sig. Sig .175 Sig .431 Sig .183 Sig .375 Sig .175 
+:. 
PLANTGOV - . 0926 -.0370 
N( 15) N( 7) N( 4) N( 4) N( 113) N( 77) N( 79) N( 113) N( 78) 
Sig . Sig . Sig. Sig. Sig .329 Sig . Sig . Sig .697 Sig 
PLANTGRA .0204 .3191 .2722 .2582 .1668 .1945 .0251 -.1062 .2765 
N( 15) N( 7) N( 4) N( 4) N( 113) N( 77) N( 79) N( 113) ll ( 78) 
Sig .943 Sig .485 Sig . 728 Sig .742 Sig .077 Sig .090 Sig .826 Sig .263 Sig .014 
PLANTNAT -.1221 -.5584 -.5443 -.7746 -.2661 .0920 .0469 .1040 -.0786 
N( 15) N( 7) N( 4) N( 4) N( 112) N( 76) N( 78) N( 112) 11 ( 77) 
Sig .665 Sig .193 Sig .456 Sig .225 Sig .005 Sig .429 Sig .683 Sig .275 Sig .497 
GRASSlO GRASS20 GRASS30 GRASSPER GROSFARM HABITAT INCOMLOS LAW!! LAWS 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I ? N T S - - - - - - - - - -
PLJ'\NTNOR -.3100 -.5149 -.5443 -.2582 .0666 -.1911 .0129 .0679 -.0800 
N( 15) N( 7) N( 4) N( 4) N( 113) N( 77) N( 79) N( 113) tl ( 78) 
Sig .261 Sig .237 Sig .456 Sig .742 Sig .483 Sig .096 Sig .910 Sig .475 Sig .487 
PLANTTIM - . 1963 -.3032 -.5000 .8660 .3109 .0467 .3335 -.0957 .1171 
ll( 12) N( 6) N( 4) N( 3) N( 8 6) N( 84) N( 85) N( 86) ll ( 8 4) 
Sig .541 Sig .559 Sig .500 Sig .333 Sig .004 Sig .673 Sig .002 Sig .381 Sig . 289 
RIPARYES 
N( 16) N( 8) N( 5) N( 5) N( 125) N( 88) N( 90) N( 125) N( 89) 
Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig 
ROWALL 
N( 16) N( 8) N( 5) N( 5) N( 125) N( 88) N( 90) N( 125) N( 8 9) 
Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig 
ROWIDLE -.1456 .0978 .0907 -.0344 .0238 
N( 16) N( 8) N( 5) N( 5) N( 125) N( 88) N( 90) N( 125) N( 89) 
Sig . Sig . Sig. Sig . Sig .105 Sig .365 Sig .395 Sig .703 Sig .825 
vV,l  
ROWPART -.1927 .0830 .3536 .0751 .0773 .0182 .0287 -.1657 
N( 16) N( 8) N( 5) N( 5) N( 125) N( 88) N( 90) N( 125) N( 89) 
Sig .475 Sig .845 Sig. Sig .559 Sig .405 Sig .474 Sig .865 Sig .750 Sig .121 
SEASO!I -.5211 - . 7151 -.8333 .2582 .2151 -.0142 .2585 -.0007 .2850 
N( 14) N( 7) N( 4) N( 4) N( 86) N( 84) N( 86) N( 86) N ( 84) 
Sig .056 Sig . 071 Sig .167 Sig .742 Sig .047 Sig .898 Sig .016 Sig .995 Sig .009 
SHAREBIP -.1065 -.4720 -.8333 .3162 .1638 .0568 .1440 .1237 .1939 
N( 14) N( 7) N( 4) N( 4) N( 86) N( 84) N( 85) N( 86) II ( 85) 
Sig .717 Sig .285 Sig .167 Sig .684 Sig .132 Sig .608 Sig .188 Sig . 257 Sig .075 
GRASSlO GRASS20 GRASS30 GRASSPER GROSFARM HABITAT INCOMLOS LAI'/!! LAWS 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
SHAREOTH -.0157 -.0804 .7746 .4085 .2588 .0679 .1835 
. 0111 
N( 14) N( 7) N( 4) N( 4) N( 83) N( 81) N( 82) N( 83) N( 82) 
Sig .957 Sig .864 Sig . Sig .225 Sig .000 Sig .020 Sig .545 Sig . 097 Sig .921 
SHARETIM .2010 .1983 . 7071 .9487 .4633 .0186 .1942 .0971 .3091 
N( 14) N( 7) N( 4) N( 4) N( 85) N( 83) N( 84) N( 85) N( 84) 
Sig . 491 Sig .670 Sig .293 Sig .051 Sig .000 Sig .867 Sig .077 Sig .376 Sig .004 
STRMWIDE -.2822 -.2274 -.1814 - .1118 -.1334 .1736 .0576 -.0669 .0147 
N( 16) N( 8) N( 5) N( 5) N( 123) N( 88) N( 90) N( 123) N( 8 9) 
Sig .290 Sig .588 Sig .770 Sig .858 Sig .141 Sig .106 Sig .590 Sig .462 Sig .891 
TREES10 .9359 .9856 .8660 1.0000 .3164 .0718 .0301 -.1596 .0142 
N( 26) 13) N( 6) N( 3) N( 4) N( 29) N( 25) N( 27) N( 29) N( 
Sig .000 Sig .000 Sig .333 Sig .000 Sig .094 Sig .733 Sig .882 Sig .408 Sig .945 
- TREES20 .8933 .9549 .8165 .8944 -.0267 -.7184 -.0981 -.0845 .5524 Vl 
as. N( 6) N( 6) N( 4) N( 5) N( 8) N( 6) N( 7) N( 8) N( 7) 
Sig .016 Sig .003 Sig .184 Sig .041 Sig .950 Sig .108 Sig .834 Sig .842 Sig .198 
TRSES30 .9487 1.0000 1.0000 .9487 -.5000 -1.0000 .0000 .5000 
N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 3) N( 3) N( 4) N( 3) 
Sig .051 Sig .000 Sig .000 sig .051 Sig .500 Sig . Sig .000 Sigl.000 Sig .667 
TRSESPER .9747 .9747 .9487 1. 0000 .0000 -.7746 .3162 -.3536 . 4472 
N( 5) N( 5) N( 4) N( 5) N( 5) N( 4) N( 4) N( 5) ll( 4) 
Sig .005 Sig .005 Sig .051 Sig .000 Sigl.000 Sig .225 Sig .684 Sig .559 Sig .553 
WATERQUL -.1074 -.0728 .0000 -.2582 .1545 .2833 .0167 .1056 .3729 
N( 14) N( 7) N( 4) N( 4) N( 91) N( 88) N( 90) N( 91) ll ( 8 9) 
Sig . 715 Sig .877 Sigl.000 Sig .742 Sig .144 Sig .007 Sig .876 Sig .319 Sig .000 
GRASSlO GRASS20 GRASS30 GRASSPER GROSFARM HABITAT INCOMLOS LAWN LAWS 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
" "is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
j 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
YRS FARM -.1517 -.4404 -.6489 -.8208 .1019 -.2240 .2761 -.0540 .1227 
N( 15) N( 7) N( 5) N( 5) N( 111) N( 81) N( 83) N( 111) N( 82) 
Sig .589 Sig .323 Sig .236 Sig .089 Sig .287 Sig .044 Sig .012 Sig .574 Sig . 272 
YRSMANAG .0036 .1026 .1054 .0000 .1257 - . 0710 .5323 .0959 .0609 
N( 12) N( 5) N( 4) N( 3) N( 79) N( 50) N( 51) N( 7 9 J N( 50) 
Sig .991 Sig .870 Sig .895 Sigl.000 Sig .270 Sig .624 Sig .000 Sig .400 Sig .674 
GRASSlO GRASS20 GRASS30 GRASSPER GROSFARM HABITAT INCOMLOS LAWN LAWS 
NETPFARM .2659 
N( 76) 
Sig .020 
OTHERUSE 
N( 90) N( 106) 
Sig . Sig 
Vi 
-..J mmACRES -.0122 .4394 
N( 90) N( 106) N( 125) 
Sig .909 Sig .000 Sig 
PASTALL -.1847 -.0913 -.0665 
N( 90) N( 106) N( 125) N( 125) 
Sig .081 Sig .352 Sig . Sig .461 
PASTPART .1847 .0913 ,0665 -1. 0000 
N( 90) N( 106) N( 125) N( 125) N( 125) 
Sig .081 Sig .352 Sig. Sig .461 Sig .000 
PLANT91 -.0796 -.0293 .0172 -.1294 .1294 
N( 79) N( 94) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) 
Sig .485 Sig .779 Sig . Sig .857 Sig .172 Sig .172 
MOISTURE NETPFARM OTHERUSE OWNACRES PASTALL PASTPART 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
PLANTFOR .0230 .0725 .0475 -.1294 .1294 -.0463 
N( 79) N( 94) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) 
Sig .840 Sig .487 Sig . Sig .617 Sig .172 Sig .172 Sig .626 
PLl\NTGOV -.1318 - . 0724 .1572 -.1572 -.0203 -.0203 
N( 79) N( 94) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) 
Sig . Sig .205 Sig. Sig .446 Sig .096 Sig .096 Sig .831 Sig .831 
PLANTGRA .0233 .0163 .1306 -.2167 .2167 - . 0967 -.0967 -.0425 
N( 79) N( 94) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113} 
Sig .838 Sig .876 Sig . Sig .168 Sig .021 Sig .021 Sig .308 Sig .308 Sig .655 
PLANTIJAT .1733 -.0942 -.0043 -.2274 .2274 -.1159 -.1159 -.0509 
N( 78) N( 94) N( 112) N( 112) N( 112) N( 112) N( 112) N( 112) N( 112) 
Sig .129 Sig .367 Sig. Sig .964 Sig .016 Sig .016 Sig .224 Sig .224 Sig .594 
- PLANTNOR -.1168 .0698 -.1075 .4251 -.4251 -.2210 -.2210 -.0970 v-, N( 79} N( 94) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) 
oc Sig .305 Sig .504 Sig. Sig .257 Sig .000 Sig .000 Sig .019 Sig .019 Sig .307 
PLANTTIM .0547 . 3624 . 2967 -.0247 .0247 .0647 .0633 
N( 85) N( 71) N( 86) N( 86) N( 86} N( 86) N( 75) N( 7 5) N( 7 5) 
Sig .619 Sig .002 Sig Sig .006 Sig .821 Sig .821 Sig .581 Sig .589 Sig 
RIPARYES 
N( 90) N( 106) N( 125) N( 125) N( 125) N( 125) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) 
Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig 
ROWALL 
N( 90) N( 106) N( 125) N( 125) N( 125) N( 125) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) 
Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig 
MOISTURE NETPFARM OTHERUSE OWNACRES PASTALL PASTPART PLANT91 PLANTFOR PLAllTGOV 
(Coefficient / (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
ROWIDLE .1173 -.1294 -.0582 .0582 -.0203 -.0203 -.0089 
N( 90) N( 106) N( 125) N( 125) N( 125) N( 125) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) 
Sig .271 Sig . Sig. Sig .150 Sig .519 Sig .519 Sig .831 Sig .831 Sig .925 
ROWPART .0905 .0646 .0977 -.2830 .2830 -.0874 .0360 -.0384 
N( 90) N( 106) N( 125) N( 125) N( 125) N( 125) N( 113) N( 113) N( 113) 
Sig . 396 Sig . 511 Sig . Sig .278 Sig .001 Sig .001 Sig .357 Sig .705 Sig . 687 
.SEASOtJ .1989 .2890 .1826 - .1317 .1317 -.1425 .0553 
N( 86) N( 72) N( 86) N( 86) N( 86) N( 86) N( 75) N( 7 5) N( 7 5) 
Sig .066 Sig .014 Sig. Sig .092 Sig .227 Sig .227 Sig .223 Sig .638 Sig 
SHAREBIP .2232 .0883 .1114 -.0207 .0207 -.1546 .0628 
lJ ( 85) N( 71) N( 86) N( 86) N( 86) N( 86) N( 75) U( 75) N( 7 5) 
Sig .040 Sig .464 Sig. Sig .307 Sig .850 Sig .850 Sig .185 Sig .592 Sig 
SHAREOTH -.0073 .1986 .3101 -.1951 .1951 -.1509 .1049 
N( 82) N( 68) N( 83) N( 83) N( 83) N( 83) N( 72) N( 72) N( 7 2) 
Vi Sig .948 Sig .104 Sig. Sig .004 Sig .077 Sig .077 Sig .206 Sig .380 Sig 
\C 
.Slll\RETIM -.0764 .2498 .3746 -.0857 .0857 -.1414 . 2111 
N( 84) N( 70) N( 85) N( 85) N( 85 l N( 85) N( 74) N( 74) N( 7 4) 
Sig .490 Sig .037 Sig. Sig .000 Sig .435 Sig .435 Sig .229 Sig .071 Sig 
STRMIHDE .1115 -.1162 - .1011 - .1145 .1145 .0887 .1820 .1451 
N( 90) N( 104) N( 123) N( 123) N( 123) N( 123) N( 112) N( 112) lJ ( 112) 
Sig .295 Sig .240 Sig . Sig .266 Sig .207 Sig .207 Sig .352 Sig .055 Sig .127 
TREESlO .0018 .2711 .3447 .1187 - .1187 .4830 -.1458 
N( 27) N( 21) N( 29) N( 29) N( 29) N( 29) N( 29) N( 29) N( 2 9) 
Sig .993 Sig .235 Sig. Sig .067 Sig .540 Sig .540 Sig .008 Sig .450 Sig 
MOISTURE NETPFARM OTHER.USE OWNACRES PASTALL PASTPART PLANT91 PLA!lTFOR PLAJlTGOV 
(Coefficient / (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
TREES20 .2774 -.1579 -.0732 -.1291 .1291 .7977 
N( 7) N( 5) N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) N( 7) N( 7) N( 7) 
Sig .547 Sig .800 Sig . Sig .863 Sig .761 Sig .761 Sig .032 Sig Sig 
TREES30 .5000 1.0000 -.6325 - . 7071 . 7071 1.0000 
N( 3) N( 2) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 3) N( 3) N( 3) 
Sig .667 Sigl.000 Sig. Sig .368 Sig .293 Sig .293 Sig .000 Sig Sig 
TREESPER .2108 -.5000 .0000 -.5774 .5774 .7746 
N( 4) N( 3) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) 
Sig .789 Sig . 667 Sig . Sigl.000 Sig .308 Sig .308 Sig .225 Sig Sig 
WATERQUL .1462 .0674 .1119 -.0476 .0476 -.0209 -.1006 
N( 90) N( 76) N( 91) N( 91) N( 91) N( 91) N( 80) N( 80) N( 80) 
Sig .169 Sig .563 Sig . Sig .291 Sig .654 Sig .654 Sig .854 Sig .375 Sig 
YRSFARM .1608 .3511 .2630 -.0845 .0845 -.2169 .0704 - . 14 71 
N( 83) N( 94) N( 111) N( 111) N( 111) N( 111) N( 99) N( 99) N( 99) 
Sig .146 Sig .001 Sig. Sig .005 Sig .378 Sig .378 Sig .031 Sig .489 Sig .146 
0-, 
0 
YRSMANAG .2140 .3359 .2181 .0383 -.0383 -.0159 -.0255 -.0829 
N( 51) N( 67) N( 79) N( 79) N( 79) N( 79) N( 67) N( 67) N( 67) 
Sig .132 Sig .005 Sig . Sig .053 Sig .737 Sig .737 Sig .898 Sig .838 Sig .505 
MOISTURE NETPFARM OTHERUSE OWNACRES PASTALL PASTPART PLANT91 PLANTFOR PLANTGOV 
PLANTNAT -.2346 
N( 112) 
Sig .013 
PLANTNOR . -.4617 -.5556 
N{ 113) N( 112) 
Sig .000 Sig .000 
PLANTGRA PLANTNAT 
{Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
PLANTTIM -.0085 -.0476 -.0095 
N( 75) N( 74) N( 75) 
Sig .942 Sig .687 Sig .936 
RIPARYES 
N( 113) N( 112) N( 113) N( 86) 
Sig Sig Sig Sig 
ROWALL 
N( 113) N( 112) N( 113) N( 86) N( 125) 
Sig Sig Sig Sig Sig 
ROIHDLE -.0425 .1771 -.0970 .1657 
N( 113) !J ( 112) N( 113) N( 86) N( 125) N( 125) 
Sig .655 Sig .062 Sig .307 Sig .127 Sig Sig 
ROWPART .2246 .1488 -.2647 -.0544 .2058 
N( 113) N( 112) N( 113) N( 86) N( 125) N( 125) 0\ N( 125) 
Sig . 017 Sig .117 Sig .005 Sig . 619 Sig . Sig . Sig .021 
SEASON -.0584 .0112 .0418 .7331 .1626 .0346 
N( 75) N( 74) N( 75) N( 82) N( 86) N( 86) N( 86) N( 86) 
Sig .619 Sig .924 Sig . 722 Sig .000 Sig . Sig. Sig .135 Sig .752 
SHAREBIP -.2541 . 0670 .1755 .2825 -.0701 -.2572 .2078 
N( 7 5) N( 74) N( 75) N( 84) N( 86) N( 86) N( 86) N( 86) ll ( 82) 
Sig .028 Sig .571 Sig .132 Sig .009 Sig . Sig . Sig .522 Sig .017 Sig .061 
SHARSOTH . 0513 .0552 -.0866 .3619 -.0518 -.1055 .3260 
N( 72) N( 71) N( 72) N( 81 l N( 83) N( 83) N( 83) N( 83) N( 79) 
Sig .669 Sig .647 Sig .470 Sig .001 Sig , Sig . Sig .642 Sig .342 Sig .003 
PLANTGRA PLANTNAT PLANTNOR PLANTTIM RIPARYES ROWALL ROWIDLE ROWPAP.T SEAS Oil 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
SHARETIM .0009 -.1593 .0157 .4077 -.0141 -.2896 .4188 
N( 74) N( 73) N( 74) N( 83) N( 85) N( 85) N( 85) N( 85) N( 81) 
Sig .994 Sig .178 Sig .895 Sig .000 Sig . Sig . Sig .898 Sig .007 Sig .000 
STPJ1'i'7IDE .0389 .1235 -.2601 -.0062 .1819 .2015 -.0152 
N( 112) N( 111) N( 112) N( 86) N( 123) N( 123) N( 123) N( 123) 11 ( 8 6) 
Sig .684 Sig .197 Sig ,006 Sig .955 Sig. Sig . Sig .044 Sig .025 Sig .890 
TREESlO .0379 -.0503 -.1856 -.1184 -.1094 -.1692 
N( 29) N( 28) N( 29) N( 24) N( 29) N( 29) N( 29) N( 29) II ( 26) 
Sig .845 Sig .799 Sig .335 Sig .582 Sig . Sig . Sig . Sig .572 Sig .409 
TREES20 -.1595 -.2657 -.5584 -.6350 .2535 -.3689 
N( 7) N( 6) N( 7) N( 6) N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) N( 8) N( 7) 
Sig .733 Sig . 611 Sig .193 Sig .176 Sig , Sig . Sig . Sig .545 Sig .415 
- TREES30 -.5000 -.5000 .5000 -.5000 C',. N( 3) N( 3) N( 3) N( 3) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 3) 
N Sig . Sig .667 Sig .667 Sig .667 Sig . Sig . Sig . Sig . Sig .667 
TREESPER .2582 -,7746 -.2582 .8660 .3536 .2582 
N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 3) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N( 5) N ( 4) 
Sig .742 Sig .225 Sig .742 Sig .333 Sig. Sig . Sig . Sig .559 Sig .742 
HATERQUL .3253 .Oll5 -.2139 -.0435 -.0322 .0941 -.0277 
N( 80) N( 79) N( 80) N( 86) N( 91) N( 91) N( 91) N( 91) N( 86) 
Sig .003 Sig .920 Sig .057 Sig .691 Sig . Sig . Sig . 762 Sig .375 Sig .800 
YRSFARM -.0795 .1535 .0177 .2957 .0954 -.0029 .2713 
N( 99) N( 98) N( 99) N( 79) N( 111) N( 111) N( 111) N( 111) N( 80) 
Sig .434 Sig .131 Sig .862 Sig .008 Sig. Sig . Sig .319 Sig .976 Sig .015 
PLANTGRA PLANTNAT PLANTNOR PLANTTIM RIPARYES ROWALL ROWIDLE ROWPART SEASON 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
YRSH~JAG -.2061 .0979 .0897 . 2646 -.1267 .2459 
N( 67) N( 66) N( 67) N( 48) N( 79) N( 79) N( 7 9) N( 79) lJ ( 4 9) 
Sig .094 Sig .434 Sig .471 Sig .069 Sig . Sig . Sig . Sig .266 Sig . 089 
PLANTGRA PLANTNAT PLANTNOR PLANTTIM RIPARYES ROWALL ROWIDLE ROWPART SEASO!J 
SP.AREOTH .4799 
H( 82) 
Sig .000 
SHARETIM .3476 .5837 
N( 84) N( 82) 
Sig .001 Sig .000 
STRM'i'1IDE .1215 -.0174 - .1387 
N( 86) N( 83) N( 85) 
Sig .265 Sig .876 Sig .206 
a-, TREESlO -.0037 -.0426 .1091 -.1530 
l.,.) N( 26) N( 25) N( 26) N( 29) 
Sig .986 Sig .840 Sig .596 Sig .428 
TREES20 -.3495 -.1165 .3884 -.6543 .6307 
N( 7) N( 7) N( 7) N( 8) N( 7) 
Sig .442 Sig .804 Sig . 389 Sig .078 Sig .129 
TREES30 -.5000 .5000 .0000 .8660 .8165 
N( 3) N( 3) N( 3) N( 4) N( 3) N( 4) 
Sig . 667 Sig . Sig .667 Sig 1. 000 Sig .333 Sig .184 
TREESPER .3162 .7746 .9487 - .1118 1.0000 .8944 .9487 
N( 4) N( 4) N( 4) N( 5) N( 4) N( 5) N( 4) 
Sig .684 Sig .225 Sig .051 Sig .858 Sig .000 Sig .041 Sig .051 
SHAREBIP SHAREOTH SHARETIM STRMWIDE TREESlO TREES20 TREES30 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
"is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
- - - - - - - - - - - S P E A R M A N C O R R E L A T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S - - - - - - - - - -
l'iATERQUL .1608 .3050 .1572 .1775 -.3575 .1861 -.5000 -.2582 
N( 86) N( 83) N( 85) N( 91) N( 27) N( 7) N( 3) N( 4) 
Sig .139 Sig .005 Sig .151 Sig . 092 Sig .067 Sig .690 Sig .667 Sig .742 
YRS FARM .1333 .0146 .2065 - . 2114 .1757 -.1683 -.8333 -.8208 -.1513 
N( 79) N( 76 l N( 78) N( 109) N( 28) N( 7) N( 4) N( 5) N( 84) 
Sig .242 Sig .901 Sig .070 Sig .027 Sig . 371 Sig . 718 Sig .167 Sig .089 Sig .169 
'fRSMANAG .2157 .0771 .4692 -.2655 .0575 .5000 .0000 .0000 -.0863 
N( 48) N( 47) N( 46) N( 77) N( 11) N( 4) N( 3) N( 3) N( 51) 
Sig .141 Sig .606 Sig .001 Sig .020 Sig .867 Sig .500 Sig 1. 000 Sigl. 000 Sig .547 
SHAREBIP SHAREOTH SHARETIM STRMWIDE TREESlO TREES20 TREES30 TREESPER WATERQUL 
YRSMANAG .5787 
N( 66) 
Sig .000 
~ 
YRSFARM 
(Coefficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
" "is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
~~ ---- .. 
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