ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation:	DUAL IDENTITY AND ETHNIC PROTEST IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES
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What are the conditions in which some countries experience ethnic protests, while others do not? What are the conditions in which an ethnic community member will protest? What explains why some ethnic community members initiate an ethnic protest and some join later? Ethnicity is a crucial societal cleavage and ethnic protest a critical subtype of protest. It is not gender or class that challenge the territorial sovereignty of states, but ethnic-based opposition groups, often in the form of self-determination movements, that make the most extreme demands in terms of separatist policies. This dissertation adjudicates between conflicting expectations in the literature for why ethnic community members protest and why countries experience ethnic protest. It argues that an ethnic member's decision to join an ethnic protest is affected by whether the ethnic member identifies primarily with the ethnic group, or with the ethnic group and the national group (dual identity) as well as if the ethnic member resides in a democracy or non-democracy. An ethnic member's likelihood

of ethnic protest participation impacts a country's likelihood of ethnic protest. A multimethod approach tests the theoretical expectations. Survey-experiments amongst Afro-Panamanians in Panama (which is a democracy), and Greek Orthodox in Lebanon (which is less democratic) examine the micro-level expectations. Interviews with Syrian refugees in Lebanon and with Syrians in Syria via Skype complement the survey-experimental work. The micro-level analysis finds that in non-democracies, dual identity is associated with a decrease in ethnic protest participation likelihood. The decrease is greater during later stages of an ethnic protest. In democracies, however, higher levels of dual identity do not associate with a decrease in ethnic protest participation likelihood. Event data and Afrobarometer survey data are used to examine the conditions in which countries experience ethnic protest. Consistent with the micro-level analysis, in non-democracies, dual identity is associated with a decrease in ethnic protest likelihood. The dissertation finds a previously unexplored conditional effect of identity. In non-democracies, even with a simultaneous ethnic identity, maintaining a national identity can decrease intent to protest.

DUAL IDENTITY AND ETHNIC PROTEST IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES

by

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Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Cliff and Irene Ives.

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I am grateful to all of those who have helped professionally and personally with this project. The Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland has provided a supportive environment to pursue a dissertation. I wish to thank all of the members of my dissertation committee. Their advice has provided me important insight. I would especially like to thank Dr. Kathleen Cunningham for her guidance. Dr. David Cunningham has given me an excellent example to follow. His clarity and precision have greatly helped me. I could not have asked for a better advisor.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

"Why should they [Syrians in Lebanon] protest? They made a war in Syria, and now they're going to make a war here."

Cab Driver, North Governorate, Lebanon

Introduction

People have multiple identities, including ethnic and national identity linkages, yet we sometimes see protests on behalf of the national group and other protests that make claims on behalf of an ethnic group. In Venezuela, for instance, several ethnic groups suffer political disadvantage, but national-level protests broke out against the Maduro regime without a focus on ethnic identity. In Ethiopia, on the other hand, protests broke out, but the claims were made largely on behalf of specific ethnic groups, including the Amhara and Oromo.

The literature on protests offers conflicting expectations for ethnic protest. Whether in democracies or non-democracies, nonviolent protest campaigns that reach a high level of mass participation are remarkably successful. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) find that protest campaigns in which at least 3.5% of the country's population participated achieved success 53% of the time. Ethnic identity, which produces high visibility and stickiness (Chandra, 2006), can facilitate protest mobilization among ethnic group members, leading to an escalation in participation. With such high

expectations of success and ethnic identity's ability to mobilize, why do we not see more ethnic groups protesting?

On the other hand, protests are not all the same. Ethnic protests make claims on behalf of a specific subsection of the population. Ethnic groups are often inherently disadvantaged demographically, and ethnic protests have less ability to generate large numbers because of their size. Furthermore, it is not just larger ethnic groups that protest; smaller ethnic groups also engage in ethnic protest. Because a key factor in protest success is leveraging large numbers and ethnic community members face a demographic disadvantage, what explains why we still see ethnic protests? Why do we see ethnic community members, sometimes facing extreme costs, participate in protest for a group that is likely to struggle to mobilize 3.5% of a country's population?

Existing literature offers two competing expectations for ethnic protest. Nonviolence's effectiveness at obtaining outcomes generates an expectation of high levels of ethnic protest, while the demographic disadvantage that most ethnic groups face suggests an expectation of low levels of ethnic protest. *What, then, explains why some countries experience ethnic protests, while others do not? What are the conditions in which an ethnic community member will protest?*

To answer this puzzle and explain the conditions that facilitate ethnic protest, I first build on previous conceptualizations (Pearlman, 2016) of protest participation occurring in three different stages: first, second, and third movers. I refer to those who plan, publicize, and initiate an ethnic protest movement against a political

authority as "first movers."[1] "Second movers" refer to the subsequent followers (and in situations where the norm is still non-participation and the individual does not pay a cost to not participate). "Third movers" refer to those who participate only as the ethnic protest size approaches a cascade point and as participation becomes more of a norm.

Without second mover protestors, small protests do not develop into large protests, making second movers a critical subject of study (Pearlman, 2016). Political authorities can focus repressive strategies and tactics on first movers who are then unable to mobilize other segments of society. When second movers are mobilized, however, protests increase in size until a point where there are social costs for non-participation. Second movers thus provide a link between first and third movers and play a crucial role in ethnic protest emergence and frequency.

I argue that two factors condition an ethnic member's decision to join an ethnic protest, especially in the second stage: first, the anticipated response of the government, that is, the level of repression that will be used; and second, the anticipated response of non-ethnic co-nationals.[2] The anticipated responses of the

[1] Lawrence (2016) refers to first movers as those "who plan, publicize and initiate anti-regime protest" (3).

Tarrow (1998) refers to first movers as "early risers."

[2] "Non-ethnic co-nationals" refer to inhabitants of country who are not a member of the ethnic group in question. If talking about African Americans in the United States,

government and non-ethnic co-nationals are in turn affected by whether an ethnic member identifies primarily with the ethnic group or with the ethnic group and the national group (dual identity) as well as if the ethnic member resides in a democracy or non-democracy.

Ethnicity is a crucial societal cleavage and ethnic protest a critical subtype of protest. It is not gender or class that challenge the territorial sovereignty of states,[3] but ethnic-based opposition groups, often in the form of self-determination movements, that make the most extreme demands in terms of separatist policies. Corsican independence movements, Kurdish struggles for self-determination, and Uighur demands for increased autonomy illustrate the challenges that countries face. Demands for territorial succession, a direct threat to state sovereignty over its entire geographic area, are not commonly made by gender-based, occupation-based, or other groups. It is ethnic groups and their ability to develop ethnic nationalism that present a major competitor to not just the government but also the state. This makes ethnic difference a critical cleavage to examine when discussing identity.

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for instance, White Americans, Asian Americans, and (many) Hispanic Americans are non-ethnic co-nationals.

[3] Most non-SD based anti-government movements and organizations challenge the government and not territorial sovereignty.

This dissertation examines ethnic protest.[4] To do so, it first offers examination at the micro-level and explains variation in why some ethnic members protest and why some do not. It then examines why ethnic members join an ethnic protest at different stages. Understanding how identity impacts participation at later stages of an ethnic protest helps us understand how ethnic protests emerge and their frequency.[5] This has implications for macro-level behavior. The dissertation examines the consequences of micro-level ethnic protest participation and explains variation in ethnic protest at the country-level. Through examination of ethnic protest at different levels of analysis, the study constructs theory, evidence, and analysis from multiple angles in explaining how regime type structures the impact of identity on ethnic protest.

Ethnic Protest

Most countries enjoy ethnic diversity, but the level of ethnic protest varies. Two cases illustrate differences in ethnic protest participation. After years of bloody civil

[4] Nonviolent ethnic protest is likely to be a function of different determinants compared to violent ethnic protest. As such, this dissertation focuses on ethnic protests that is nonviolent.

[5] I conceive ethnic protest as nonviolent contentious politics where claims are based on an ethnic identity and the collective action is organized around some ethnic marker (see Olzak, 2006: 37). This differs from protest that is based on other cleavages, such as class or occupation, that do not make claims based on an ethnic identity.

conflict, Afghanistan has recently witnessed a revival of nonviolent street protests. In 2015 and 2016, a string of protests making claims on behalf of the Hazara have sprung up in Kabul. Referring to themselves as "Enlightening," thousands of protestors have mobilized to demand greater Hazara political representation and an end to economic discrimination. In contrast, while Algeria's Amazigh population has seen small protests, the ethnic protests have not reached a large size nor been as frequent.

Existing accounts do not provide an explanation with regard to the difference in outcomes. Both ethnic groups had large populations, in relative and absolute terms, were geographically concentrated, and had economic and political grievances. Furthermore, the Amazigh population is located in a region that erupted in street politics and demonstrations, made independence demands, and has ethnic kin in another country, furthering questions regarding the lack of large-scale protests on behalf of the ethnic group. While the Algerian state maintained a strong repressive apparatus, civil conflict in Afghanistan allowed non-state actors to impose high costs on social gatherings for Hazara members, as evidenced by the tragic 2011 twin bombs in Kabul and Mazar-i Sharif. Despite the similarity in circumstances, large-scale Hazara protests erupted, while Amazigh protests did not reach a similar size, motivating the following question: Why do some countries experience a high number of ethnic protests while other countries do not experience ethnic protest or only a small number of ethnic protests? To answer this question, we need to understand why individuals decide to organize or join ethnic protests. Ethnic protests consist of people. It is not clear why an ethnic community member protests on behalf of her or

his ethnic group. Relatedly, it is not clear why ethnic members initiate protest, allowing it to grow, while some join later.

Ethnic protest is not a rare phenomenon. Shia protests, in addition to violent resistance, erupted across Bahrain in 2011 with some protests in the tens of thousands. In 2005, Khuzestan Iranian Arabs protested and rioted in opposition to perceived oppressive practices by the Iranian authorities (Ahvaz/15 April Ahvaz Protests). There were also four bombings, with total causality estimates ranging from five to twenty.[6]

Studies of Central and South American social cleavages often focus on class differences, but linguistic and ethnic differences endure. From democratic Brazil to non-democratic Venezuela, ethnic groups have protested. In Eastern Europe, ethnic Poles in non-democratic Belarus have shown their willingness to engage in protest.[7] Roma, Karachav, Ingush and other ethnic groups in Russia have engaged in ethnic protest to demand better treatment for their respective groups. African countries are no exception. Ethnic groups have expressed willingness to engage in protest to demand better treatment. Since 2000, for instance, Kewri have protested in Mauritania; Malinke in Guinea; and Ibo, Ogani, and Yoruba in Nigeria.

Tibetan acts of civil resistance gain much attention in the popular media, but there have also been considerable Uighur ethnic protests and violence against

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[6] Iran and its minorities: Down in the second class (2005, April 28). *The Economist*.

[7] Assessment for Poles in Belarus. *Minorities at Risk*. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=37002

perceived Chinese oppression. In 2008, ethnic protests erupted across the Uighur strongholds of Hotan and Qaraqash counties in southern Xinjiang Province. The 2009 Uighur ethnic protests[8] quickly transformed into violent riots and left 197 deaths in their path.[9]

Figure 1.1: *Countries and Number of Ethnic Groups that Protested, MAR, 2004–2006*



[8] Branigan, Tania. (2008, April 2). Muslim 'Separatists' Protest as Unrest Spreads in China. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/02/china

[9] Hao, Yah, Geng Ruibin, and Yuan Ye. (2009, July 18). Xinjiang Riot Hits Regional Anti-Terror Nerve. China View. Retrieved from http://www.webcitation.org/5p3pHXm0l



Ethnic protest is not a region-specific phenomenon. Ethnic protest is widespread, but significant variation characterizes how much ethnic protest countries experience. Figure 1.1 above presents a visual description of variation in ethnic protest from 2003 to 2006.

Existing Explanations for Ethnic Protest

What explains ethnic protest? The literature on oppositional political behavior and rebellion is vast, rich, and diverse. The reasons behind this immense body of scholarship lie with the salience of the topic, the distinct types of oppositional behavior, and its consequences for wellbeing. Why people rebel, assist rebels, protest, and join social movements matter for theory and practice. In this section I discuss explanations for ethnic protest from three related but distinct literatures: social movement, ethnic conflict, and social identity.

Social movement literature has developed two rich research agendas on collective action: resource mobilization and political opportunity theories. Both approaches provide insightful theoretical and empirical explanations for political opposition behavior, often focusing on social movements. Resource mobilization theory (see Mccarthy and Zald, 1977; Tarrow, 1998) argues that we need to think more about the instrumental concerns with regard to the perceived costs and benefits facing social movements and potential recruits. Like modernization theorists,

resource mobilization scholars argue that urbanization can recalculate the cost/benefit analysis and encourage oppositional behavior (Wallace, 2013; Goldstone 1991; Gurr 1970). Others have put forth organizational capacity explanations (Kaplan, 2013) and regional diffusion process arguments (Beissinger, 2007, 2009; Gleditsch and Ward, 2011; Weyland, 2009).

Resource mobilization arguments, however, raise three main issues. First, they expect that people will mobilize when they have the means to do so. As with grievance arguments, this is usually not the case. Ethnic members and groups with resources do not always protest. Second, resource mobilization theories do not deal sufficiently with the capabilities of the opponent (the political power to whom the opposition is opposed). And they thirdly, and again as with grievance arguments, do not provide expectations for the type of political opposition, violent or nonviolent, that should arise.

Political opportunity theories (see Fearon and Laitin, 2003; McAdam et al., 1996), on the other hand, consider the opportunity environment in which nascent groups and/or movements are operating. When there is a change in that structure which is conducive to the opposition, we should expect increased activity. Political opportunity scholars have focused specifically on the role of elections (Robertson, 2010), rigged elections (Bunce and Wochik, 2011; Hyde, 2011; and Tucker, 2007), elite divisions (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Goldstone, 1991), and international systematic factors such as pre- and post-Cold War eras (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Political opportunity theories, however, prioritize objective conditions as predictors of protests, giving insufficient attention to the role

of individual and group agency and subjective views on inequality and resource levels.

In the ethnic conflict literature, aspects of resource mobilization and political opportunity theories can be found. Geographically concentrated groups are more likely to challenge the state (Toft, 2003) and make more extreme self-determination demands (Jenne, Saideman, and Lowe, 2007). Poorer and wealthier ethnic groups are correlated with higher likelihood of ethnic conflict involvement (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch, 2011), and political exclusion with ethnic group rebellion (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, 2010). Grievance arguments have long been argued to explain the onset of rebellion (Boix, 2008; Gurr, 1970), violent conflict (Cederman et al., 2011), and social movements (Oberschall, 1994; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001; Tilly 2003; Tarrow, 2011). Yet, other scholars argue that grievances alone are insufficient to explain rebellion or other forms of oppositional political behavior (Goldstone 1991; McAdam 1999; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner, 2009) as political, economic, and social deprivations do not automatically drive people to rebel (see Klandermans, 1989; Lichbach 1998); and, as hinted earlier, there are various means by which to rebel. Much of this literature, however, examines violent ethnic conflict and not the determinates of nonviolent ethnic mobilization. The cost of nonviolent ethnic mobilization is likely to be much lower, and more participants are likely needed for success, suggesting distinct determinants. In a similar fashion, much of the arguments for ethnic conflict focus on the "Why?" question, ignoring the "How(?)" individuals and groups respond to inequalities—Do they use violent or nonviolent methods? (E. Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2015).

Scholars have started to examine the determinants of non-violent mobilization. Building on nonviolent mobilization and ethnic conflict literature, Cunningham (2013) studies both the determinants of nonviolent and violent mobilization amongst self-determination movements. She finds that group size, independence demands, exclusion from political power, geographic concentration, economic discrimination, and political context correlate with nonviolent campaigns. Other studies have further improved our understand of self-determinaiton movement and ethnic group behavior and have examined tactic diffusion (K. G. Cunningham, Dahl, and Frugé, 2017). Overall, literature on ethnic conflict, however, examines less a potentially critical determinant of mobilization capacity: identity. Identity is a resource that ethnic protest leaders can use to mobilize populations. While challenging to observe, a better understanding of identity improves our understanding of the nonmaterial resources available to ethnic groups to express demands through ethnic protest.

Social-psychological research does focus heavily on individuals; recently the field has witnessed an increased emphasis on explaining participation in protests. While ideology and instrumental motivations for participation in protests are discussed, the role of identity has featured prominently in social-psychological research. Scholars have long argued that identity matters for participation. Social identity theory (see Tajfel and Turner 1986; Tajfel 1978) argues that one's sense of self depends on her/his membership in a group, which in turn provides an important source of pride and esteem. This has important implications for political protests and participation as group identity has a large effect on what people feel, think, and do (Terry and Hogg, 1996; see also Mackie, Devos, and Smith, 2000). While the

specific causal mechanisms are complex, the intuition is simple: the more one identifies with a group, the more likely he/she is to participate in protests on behalf of that group (Turner, 1999; van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears, 2008)—and there is a plethora of evidence in support of such theories (e.g., de Weerd and Klandermans, 1999; Simon et al., 1998; Azzi, Chryssochoou, Klandermans; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2007). Yet, individuals usually have multiple identity links. Multiple identity linkages could conflict with one another in terms of influencing political behavior.

Accordingly, scholars have recognized the need to study dual identity—when individuals possess both a subnational and national identity—and its effect on protest participation. Looking mainly at immigrant and/or minority communities in democratic countries (see Brown 2000; González and Brown, 2003; Huo et al., 1996; ; Klandermans et al. 2008; Simon 2011; Simon and Grabow, 2010; Simon and Ruhs, 2008; van Zomeren et al., 2008), much of this research finds that simultaneous subnational and national identity (dual identity) is required to produce group protest participation. Dual identity encourages belief that the subnational protest will generate broader societal support. Believing broader support is possible increases belief that the protest will be successful and thus participation (Simon and Klandermans, 2001).

The Limitations of Existing Approaches to Ethnic Protest

Much of the literature in political science has focused on the country- and group-level. While literature on social movements in the United States and Western Europe has easier access to individual-level data, there remains a dearth of systematic

individual data in conflict zones and in non-democratic contexts. In short, we still have theoretical questions on how and why individuals participate and lack data to examine existing theories (see Beissinger, 2013 and Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008 for exceptions).

Social psychology approaches focus on the individual but are limited in three key ways. First, much research on dual identity focuses on minority communities in democratic countries. Dual identity, to function as a strong predictor of collective action on behalf of one's subnational group, requires the type of collective action to maintain normative characteristics. That is, broader society needs to view the political behavior as socially legitimate and within the norms of accepted political action. In some countries, political protest, especially on behalf of one's ethnic group, does not maintain the same level of behavioral legitimacy. Examining how regime type provides new insight into how political context structures the impact of identity on ethnic protest participation.

Second, the literature does not address sufficiently temporal variation in individual protest participation. There could be distinct motivating factors for people that join at different protest stages. As such, the dissertation's theoretical argument builds on previous literature that examines protest stages (e.g., Pearlman, 2016). Improving our understanding of the mobilizing factors for individual participation at different stages of an ethnic protest helps us understand why initially small ethnic protests develop into larger protests, last over time, or do not develop in frequency or scale.

Third, while work in social-psychology has developed critical findings for personal protest participation, it is unclear what effect an individual's identity has on ethnic protest. Ethnic protest is usually a group event and operates in a broader political context. It is unclear if identity predicts ethnic protest participation when controlling for other meaningful correlates with ethnic mobilization that occur at the group and country-level. More attention is required on the impact of identity on ethnic protest at the group and country levels-of-analysis to determine if identity affects macro dynamics.

Dual Identity as a Resource and a Curse: An Explanation for Ethnic Protest

I address ethnic protest, a group-level dynamic, with an individual-level narrative. I argue that two factors condition an ethnic member's decision to participate. An ethnic member's decision to participate is a function of the anticipated responses of the government and non-ethnic co-nationals. Government and non-ethnic co-national responses, in turn, are impacted by identity and regime type. I then develop an argument on how regime type and identity interact to impact differently participation at different stages of an ethnic protest. Developing an argument on how regime type and identity impact later stages of an ethnic protest leads to a theoretical logic on how ethnic protests occur at the country-level

Self-identifying ethnic group members can have a strong sense of ethnic identity, national identity, or both (dual).[10] Identity can impact ethnic protest participation

[10] Unless specified, I use the terms "collective identity" and "identity" interchangeably from this point forward.

through three pathways: ethnic group anger, and belief that non-ethnic co-nationals (NECN) care about one's ethnic group, and group efficacy beliefs.

Regardless of regime type, ethnic and dual identity holders are expected to have high levels of group anger. Group anger is thus not expected to cause a difference in participation rates for ethnic and dual identity holders.

Ethnic and dual identity differ in their impact on participation, however, through belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care about one's ethnic group and group efficacy beliefs. Because of linkages to the national group, dual identity holders are expected to have higher levels of belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care. The impact of beliefs that non-ethnic co-nationals care on participation, however, depends on regime type.[11] Likewise, the impact of ethnic and dual identity on group efficacy beliefs is dependent on regime type, which results in different expectations for participation.

In democracies, ethnic protest is a legitimate political behavior. A dual identity holder has higher beliefs that non-ethnic co-nationals care and will respond positively to an ethnic protest—a tactic that maintains legitimacy. Higher beliefs of a positive non-ethnic co-national response increases group efficacy beliefs and ethnic protest participation likelihood.

[11] In doing so, this study follows previous literature (e.g., Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon, 2010) and examines how macro institutions structure individual incentives to participate in ethnic protest.

How does identity have distinct impacts on participation at different stages of an ethnic protest? In a democracy, ethnic protest success increases as the ethnic protest grows larger. In an ethnic protest's initial stage, ethnic protest success is low. Because dual identity increases ethnic protest likelihood through increased group-efficacy belief, it does not have a meaningful impact in this stage.

In the third stage, an ethnic protest is close to obtaining success. When dual identity increases group efficacy beliefs, the difference is not meaningful. The conditions of the ethnic protest already resulted in high levels of belief that the ethnic protest will be successful.

Amongst second movers, however, dual identity has a meaningful impact. The ethnic protest is starting to grow, but uncertainty over the outcome persists. The increased group efficacy beliefs from dual identity have a meaningful impact on ethnic protestors. In democracies, dual identity is expected to have the strongest impact on second movers.

The number of ethnic members with higher willingness to join an ethnic protest, especially in the second stage, has implications for ethnic protest at the country-level. In a democracy, more dual identity holders should generate more protest participants in the second stage, develop sustained ethnic protest campaigns, and thus more ethnic protests.

In non-democracies, however, people are more likely to view ethnic protest as non-normative and destabilizing political behavior. Because of linkages to the national group, dual identity holders are concerned about the reaction of non-ethnic co-nationals to what is perceived as illegitimate political behavior. Links to the

national community do not inspire confidence that non-ethnic co-nationals will respond positively to an ethnic protest. Dual identity decreases beliefs that non-ethnic co-nationals will support an ethnic protest. This decreases a dual identity holder's likelihood of joining an ethnic protest. Ethnic identity, in contrast, acts to motivate ethnic protest participation in non-democratic contexts. Ethnic identity holders are concerned less with obtaining national support. In a non-democracy, an ethnic group member with an ethnic identity is more likely to join an ethnic protest.

In non-democracies, too, identity is expected to generate distinct impacts at different stages of an ethnic protest. As an ethnic protest grows in a non-democracy, protestors face higher levels of repression. Dual identity holders are concerned about the reaction of non-ethnic co-nationals to an ethnic protest. The first stage of an ethnic protest does not pose a major threat to the government, and repression is limited. Concerns regarding political stability are not high. Dual identity thus does not serve to discourage ethnic protest to a high level.

Amongst third movers, however, the ethnic protest is a major threat to the government, and repression likelihood of the protestors is higher. Concerns over political stability are high as non-ethnic co-nationals are scared of potential violence. Dual identity generates a high level of concern that non-ethnic co-nationals are scared of the ethnic protest, which discourages participation. In non-democracies, as an ethnic protest grows, dual identity has an ever-larger decreasing impact on ethnic protest participation. In a non-democracy, more ethnic identity holders should generate more second and third stage ethnic protest participants and thus more ethnic protests.

Empirical Approach and Key Findings

To analyze the theoretical argument, I focus on ethnic protest at the micro- and macro-levels and utilize a multimethod approach. Survey-experiments amongst Afro-Panamanians in democratic Panama and Greek Orthodox in less democratic Lebanon and interviews with Syrians are employed to analyze ethnic protest at the individual level. The implications of individual decisions to participate in ethnic protest are tested with cross sectional time series analysis of ethnic protest at the country level.

Results indicate that regime type structures the impact of identity on ethnic protest. In non-democracies, both ethnic and dual identity have strong impacts on ethnic protest participation. In non-democracies, however, dual identity decreases one's inclination to participate, and ethnic identity has a stronger impact. Dependent on regime type, belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care about one's ethnic group can have a positive or negative mediating impact on participation.

Individual inclinations to participate impact the likelihood of ethnic protest at the country-level. Amongst democracies, high levels of ethnic or dual identity increase ethnic protest likelihood. Amongst non-democracies, however, high levels of ethnic identity make a country more likely to experience ethnic protest. High levels of dual identity do not increase a non-democracy's likelihood of experiencing an ethnic protest.

Policy Implications

In improving our understanding of ethnic protest, this dissertation offers two key implications for policy. First, ethnic-based oppositional political behavior can also lead to more costly outcomes and has major implications for global politics

(Cunningham, 2013). After the Kabyle "Black Spring" protests of 2001, encouraged and emboldened by the protests and government response, Kayble nationalism manifested in new political forces, some now advocating for a separate state.[12] Ethnic members may face higher restrictions on their political inclusion**,** and ethnicity is often a cleavage for self-determination (SD) movements to pursue autonomy. Self-determination movements can make the most extreme demands on governments—political separatism. SD conflicts are now the primary source of civil war, and ethnic protest can be an early indicator of potential political instability (Gurr and Lichbach, 1986; Lane and Ersson, 1991), as illustrated in Northern Island and Sri Lanka where violent conflict was preceded by ethnic protests (Douglas 1983; Manogaran 1987).

Second, ethnic protest offers a resource for ethnic members. For instance, Amhara demonstrations have erupted across Ethiopia to protest perceived dominance of the Tigray People's Liberation Front and repression of Amhara persons. When ethnic groups face political marginalization, ethnic protest can act as a tool to generate political engagement between the state and its minority members. Black Lives Matter, for instance, has made salient issues facing African-Americans. Ethnic protests can make states more responsive to disadvantaged ethnic groups and provide excluded ethnic groups greater political inclusion, increasing democratic tendencies.[13]

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[12] For example, the *Mouvement pour l'autonomie de la Kabylie, a* non-violent autonomist Kayble political organization was formed.

[13] As with non-ethnic protest, participating in ethnic protest can empower notions of citizenship, strengthen political participation practices, and as a Amhara protest

The Berber Spring of 1980 in Algeria, for example, created a legacy of activists and platform for future Kabyle politicians, some of whom would later form the Rally for Culture and Democracy and the Berber Cultural Movement.

Structure of Dissertation

The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter II offers a theoretical account for how regime type structures the impact of identity on ethnic protest participation. It first discusses the impact of singular identity, specifically ethnic identity, on ethnic protest. Differences are then discussed in ethnic protest legitimacy in democracies and non-democracies. Descriptive statistics are presented on differing political priorities in democratic and non-democratic contexts. Turning to dual identity, the theoretical framework is developed, and different expectations produced for how regime type structures dual identity's impact on ethnic protest. An argument is next presented on dual identity's specific impact on different stages of an ethnic protest. Finally, the implications for ethnic protest at the country-level are argued. Theoretically-driven hypotheses are developed and stated formally.

Chapter III offers the first empirical test of the study's theoretically-derived hypotheses. It tests the interactive impact of regime type and identity on participation. A survey-experiment was administered to Afro-Panamanian members in democratic Panama and Greek Orthodox members in less-democratic Lebanon.

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slogan suggests—"Respect Amharaness,"—raise awareness of human rights. For example, after Kayble protests in Algeria, the *Mouvement pour l'autonomie de la Kabylie, a* non-violent autonomist Kayble political organization was formed.

Respondents received one of three treatments or a control prompt. The three treatments consist of an ethnic, national, and dual identity prompt, each raising the strength of the identity type. Respondents then answered questions on their ethnic protest intentions. Conducting the survey-experiment in a democracy and a less-democratic context allows for comparison of identity types within each regime type. Furthermore, testing the impact of dual identity in democratic Panama provides a study in a democratic and non-Western European/North American context. Much work on dual identity focuses on Western European and North American contexts. This study contributes to existing literature and examines a more restrictive political environment as well as extends the study of dual identity to a Latin American context.

Chapter IV continues analysis from Chapter III but focuses on mover types. In this chapter, I first examine the experimental work and explore empirically the specific ways in which regime type structures the impact of identity on ethnic protest at different stages.

The experimental work is supplemented with a study of ethnic and dual identity on protests in Syria of 2011. Much work discusses the sectarian nature of the Syrian Civil War. A well-tread narrative describes an initially secular non-violent rise of political protest followed by violence and the sectarianizing of the conflict. At the same time, why the conflict broke down along sectarian, or ethnic lines, is unclear and indicates that at least to some degree that sectarian divisions characterized or were perceived by some actors to characterize the initial protests.

Indepth interviews are used to examine the ethnic (sectarian) nature of the protests that occurred in Syrian from March 2011 to July 2011. Syrian refugees in

Lebanon and Syrians in Syria are interviewed (via Whatsapp) and the role of identity in motiving protest examined. In doing so, this chapter supplements the ethnic protest intention outcomes provided by the experiment with actual evidence of past protest at different stages. Its focus on ethnic protest participation during later stages helps us understand why ethnic protests occur, develop, and are maintained. This is important for understanding why countries experience ethnic protest.

Chapter V tests the macro-level implications of the micro-level theoretical argument. Specifically, it tests how regime type structures the impact of identity on ethnic protest at the country-level. A large-N statistical analysis of ethnic protest from 2005 – 2015 is conducted using various forms of regression analysis. When analyzing the data, a number of claims find strong support. First, in non-democracies, dual identity decreases the probability of ethnic protest outbreak and frequency. Ethnic identity, in contrast, increases the likelihood of both. Second, in democracies, neither dual nor ethnic identity is associated with ethnic protest. This suggests that while dual identity does not increase the likelihood of ethnic protest, it does not decrease its probability. That is, democracies are able to develop simultaneous ethnic and national identities, and ethnic groups maintain the capacity to use identity as a mobilizing resource for political participation on behalf of the ethnic group.

Chapter VI concludes the dissertation. It offers overview of the project, reiterates the study's contributions to literature and principle findings, provides policy recommendations, and gives recommendations for future research on identity and political participation. The theoretical framework contributes to our understanding of

identity and the capacity of ethnic groups to engage in collective action, specifically ethnic protest. It furthermore points to the need to examine the interaction of resources and political opportunity. Rather than examining resources and political opportunity separately, their combination creates new configurations of incentives and deterrents for ethnic protest. The concluding chapter then turns to the practical implications of the findings. It recommends domestic and foreign policies that encourage ethnic minority non-conventional political participation. Policy recommendations also address the potentially destabilizing impact of ethnic protest.

Chapter 2: A Theoretical Explanation for Ethnic Protest

"Why should they [Syrians in Lebanon] protest? They made a war in Syria, and now they're going to make a war here."

Cab Driver, North Governorate, Lebanon

Introduction

This chapter provides a theoretical explanation for how regime type structures the impact of identity on ethnic protest. It first builds on findings that focus on group anger and group efficacy beliefs as causes for ethnic protest participation. To understand better ethnic protest, predictors of group anger and group efficacy beliefs are thus required. Singular collective identity is put forth as a predictor. The chapter next examines a specific type of identity, ethnicity, and its impact on group anger, group efficacy beliefs, and belief that non-ethnic co-nationals caring about one's ethnic group. Group anger and group efficacy beliefs have been found to impact participation (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2008). Belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care is introduced as a third pathway through which identity impacts one's decision to participate. The chapter next explains the actors relevant to the theory. A government and (some) ethnic group members have a disagreement. The government can offer concessions, repress, do a mixture, or do nothing. Ethnic group members and the government are not the only actors, however. Non-ethnic co-nationals

(NECN)[14] can either support the ethnic group's claims, the government, or do nothing. It is the potential of non-ethnic co-nationals to act that can influence an ethnic member's group efficacy beliefs. The chapter then pivots to dual identity and examines its implications for group efficacy beliefs and subsequent ethnic protest participation. Next, regime type is introduced and the consequences for dual identity explained. Then, the chapter focuses on ethnic protest stages and identifies the stages in which regime type and identity exert the greatest impact. Finally, the chapter turns to the theoretical implications of understanding when regime type and identity impact ethnic protest. It theorizes on the conditions in which countries experience ethnic protest. Formalized hypotheses specifying the theoretical expectations are given.

Singular Collective Identity, Group Anger, and Group Efficacy Beliefs

What makes an ethnic member protest? Scholars have focused on the role of group anger and group efficacy beliefs (Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, and Leach, 2004; van Zomeren et al., 2008).[15] Ethnic members with high levels of group anger and group efficacy beliefs are more likely to participate in an ethnic protest. To understand better ethnic protest, a focus on the causes of group anger and group efficacy beliefs is required.

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[14] Non-ethnic co-nationals (NECN) refers to inhabitants of one's country who are not members of one's ethnic group. White Americans, Asian Americans, and Hispanic Americans are non-ethnic co-nationals in reference to African Americans.

[15] Note that these are indirect mechanisms. Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) also posit that collective identity plays a direct role on CA.

Singular collective identity links the individual to the group. As opposed to personal identities, collective identities as discussed in the social-psychological literature are part of a person's self-image that comes from the groups in which he/she is a member. They are a "place in the social world" (Simon and Klandermans, 2001: 320), defined as "an identity shared by members of a group or category" (Klandermans, 2014: 2) that require their "knowledge of his [or her] membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1978: 63). Collective identities are group characteristics shared with other people; they are not characterized by "I" or "me" statements but "we" or "us." The identity's cognitive centrality (the identity's importance), as well as the emotional ties to that group, have meaningful implications for protest. As do Simon and Klandermans (2001), I focus on "relatively enduring group memberships in real-life social groups" (320).

Ethnic protests revolve around power struggles between groups, and identity connects the individual to the group. The connection to the group has meaningful consequences. Social identity theory (see Tajfel, 1978) says that when groups believe intergroup inequality to be illegitimate or unstable, it increases competition between

groups.[16] Relative deprivation theories have argued that group-based (as opposed to individual-based) perceived inequalities can foster group collective action.[17]

Under conditions of strong group identity, a person makes more intergroup comparisons and is more likely to experience increased group injustice.[18] This, in turn, results in more group anger directed toward the perceived source of intergroup inequality (oftentimes the political authority).[19] Greater anger then motivates

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[16] That is, when the higher status group boundary is impermeable. For example, if acceptance to the superordinate identity is off-limits to a minority group.

[17] See H.J. Smith and Ortiz (2002); see also Postmes, Branscombe, Spears, and Young (1999).

[18] Scholars demonstrate that affective elements rather than cognitive components of relative deprivation are better predictors of collective action on behalf of one's group (van Zomeren et al., 2008; H.J. Smith and Ortiz, 2002). Cognitive perceptions of inequality refer to simply being aware that one's group is (perceived to be) disadvantaged relative to another group or to some other baseline. That injustice may or not be justified, however. Affective perceptions of inequality imply that individuals experience group-based emotions, such as group-based anger, because of the (perceived) disadvantaged group position.

[19] Strengthening identity salience also increases group-based anger (see Mackie et al., 2000).

individuals to participate in protests on behalf of their group,[20] as group members want to confront those they consider responsible for the injustice (see Mackie et al., 2000; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, and Leach, 2004).

Strong identity ties lead to higher group efficacy beliefs (van Zomeren et al., 2008) and to an increased belief that one's group can act collectively to obtain its aims (Drury and Reicher, 2005). I refer to group efficacy beliefs as the degree to which an individual believes her/his *subnational* group can accomplish its aim. Stronger belief in group agency and ability to achieve its aims motivate a person to participate on behalf of her/his group (Hornsey et al., 2006; Kelly and Breinlinger, 1996; Klandermans, 1984; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, and Mielke, 1999) and empower people by acting through the group (Drury and Reicher, 2005).

In sum, singular collective identity impacts ethnic protest participation through two mechanisms: group anger and group efficacy beliefs. Having discussed the significance of collective identity for political protest, which identity should we study? After all, the number of potential identity types is vast. The following pages discuss ethnicity and justify focus on this identity type.

Ethnicity

Ethnicity has been—and continues to be—defined in academic and popular discourse in a myriad of conflicting and inconsistent forms. This is not without reason. Studying ethnicity raises conceptual and methodological challenges. For

[20] Group-based emotions can cause increased participation in collective action (Smith, 1993; Mackie et al., 2000; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, and Gordijn, 2003).

example, language and dialect differences have often acted as proxies for ethnic distinctions. A quick look at the American landscape, however, demonstrates the difficulty of using language as an ethnic marker. Linguistic distinctions may not always act as a useful proxy for ethnic differences.

Scholars have sometimes looked at religion as distinct from ethnicity. In the U.S., this often makes sense. Religion often possesses a fluid nature, belief in the supernatural, and is distinct from a culture inspired by this world. A person can convert to Protestantism or Catholicism and maintain her/his culture (at least partly). In other parts of the world, the distinction between religion and ethnicity is less clear. In China, "folk religions" interact with daily culture to make the two difficult to distinguish. The Kalash of Pakistan expel from their community converts to Islam,[21] demonstrating the link between religion and community (ethnicity). Religious endogamy, a belief in common ancestry, and a combination of culture and religion[22] characterize groups ranging from Jews, to the Hui, to the Parsis, and more. Religion in these contexts commonly serves as an ethnic characteristic or marker, confounding attempts at generalizability that try to distinguish between religion and ethnicity.

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[21] Raffaele, Paul. Smithsonian Jan. 2007: page 66-68.

[22] I do not mean, in this context, to refer to the religiosity of one's beliefs, but to aspects of religious practices and thinking that are part of one's culture.

Contemporary scholarship focuses on (perceived) descent and common ancestry[23] as integral to defining ethnicity. According to Horowitz, "ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate. Some notion of ascription, however diluted, and affinity deriving from it are inseparable from the concept of ethnicity" (1985: 52). All Minorities at Risk (AMAR) data employ a definition where the first criteria for membership is

[23] Chandra (2006) distinguishes her conceptualization of ethnicity from other definitions by not requiring a common, or myth of common, ancestry a requirement; only ancestry or myth of ancestry is required. She uses the example of Black and White ethnic categories in the US. Focusing on the one-drop rule, she argues that myth of common ancestry does not account for this distinction. After all, an individual with seven white great-grandparents and one black great-grandparent can be defined as white. Yet, her example case stems from a situation that maintains unusual features. First, there the rule was developed during a time when White Americans were trying to maintain ethnic supremacy. Second, she conflates objective and subjective beliefs of ancestry myths. No matter the low of amount of (perceived) ancestry, an individual with a small number of ancestors from or descended from Africa still has some (perceived) common ancestry with other African descendants. The relevance of the individual's recent ancestors of European descent depends on the individual, familial, and societal recognition of such ancestry. It is *meaningful* ancestry that is critical for ethnic identity. The objective blood relationship, even across two generations, does not matter.

"determined primarily by descent " (Birnir et al., 2015). Fearon (2003) employs the idea of radial categories to define ethnic groups. Prototypical cases display all of a concept's characteristics. Less prototypical cases may not but could still be defined as such. His characteristics (2003: 201), similar to that of AMAR, define ethnic groups when membership is "reckoned primarily by descent by both members and non-members"; there is awareness of group membership and it is viewed as important; sharing of some distinguishing cultural features, which are "held to be valuable by a large majority of members of the group"; a real or remembered homeland; "a shared and collectively represented history as a group, which "has some basis in fact" and the group is potentially a "stand alone."

While some differences over specifics persist, scholars generally associate ethnicity with some form of ancestry and descent. Aspects of shared culture also matter. Many ethnic groups, however, may or may not share language, religion, or geographic region. As such, it is necessary to focus on properties associated specifically with ethnicity. Ethnicity is a salient cleavage in much of the world, but numerous non-ethnic identities exist within any state. People may identity with others based on class, religion (non-ethnic), ideology, occupation, age, gender, and/or along another cleavage. The following section examines the properties of ethnicity and the implications for ethnic protests. I argue that while non-ethnic identity can impact member protest participation, ethnic identity has the strongest impact.

Ethnic Properties: Group Anger and Group Efficacy Beliefs

Scholars have found group anger and group efficacy beliefs to be important mediators between identity and subgroup protest. Identity types are not equal,

however. Certain types may have distinctive characteristics that impact group anger and group efficacy beliefs. To justify focus on ethnic identity, I focus on three properties associated with ethnicity that are meaningful for impacting ethnic protest through group anger and group efficacy beliefs.

Two properties distinguish ethnicity from non-descent-based social identities: visibility and constrained change. By visibility, I refer to superficial observation that is sufficient to obtain some information regarding one's ethnic identity categories (see Chandra, 2006). Constrained change refers to how ethnicity's "pattern of change and the mechanisms driving it are constrained by an underlying set of attributes" (399).

Ethnicity also has a property that distinguishes it from certain descent-based identities, such as gender. The property comes from the manner in which siblings share ethnicity or ethnic options. I refer to this property as shared sibling ethnicity. Shared sibling ethnicity can generate greater levels of emotional attachment compared to other social identities. Siblings have higher levels of physical closeness and share higher emotional connections. This translates to higher levels of emotional attaching to co-ethnics, as all siblings potentially share this social identity.[24] Other descent-based identities, such as gender, could potentially create conflict amongst siblings or family members who do not share that identity. Ethnicity, and its ability to operate across siblings, reduces the likelihood of inter-sibling clashes. This lessons

[24] Chandra (2006) discusses this potential mechanism and property of ethnicity and credits the idea to Will Le Blanc.

the likelihood that an individual will have to make a choice between two conflicting attachments—one's siblings and one's identity.

How, then, does ethnic identity compare to other social identities in terms of impact on ethnic protest participation? I argue that the three properties associated with ethnicity impact group anger and group efficacy-beliefs, two mechanisms that encourage or discourage ethnic protest participation.

High visibility amongst co-ethnics puts protest entrepreneurs in the ethnic spotlight. While numerous identity-based or non-identity based protest entrepreneurs may exist, visual cues provide co-ethnics with information regarding first movers and the makeup and demands of an early ethnic protest (movement). This increases the likelihood that an individual can identify co-ethnic protest entrepreneurs and first movers. Information and awareness of (potential) co-ethnic protest participation can increase group efficacy beliefs. Other social identities, without the same level of visibility, do not offer individuals insight and information into political behavior.

Higher visibility also impacts group anger. It leads to greater knowledge of group-based inequality and grievance. Government repression of ethnic group members is more obvious to co-ethnic members compared to repression of other social identities. Increased information regarding group-based grievances effects more group anger with implications for protest participation.

Constrained change also impacts group anger and group efficacy beliefs. While "an individual's ethnic identities may change in the short term, the pattern of change and the mechanisms driving it are constrained by an underlying set of attributes" (Chandra, 2006). This hinders short-term identity change. Constrained identity

change engenders more emotional investment in that identity and the value one derives from membership. The result is greater focus on issues relevant to the group, such as group grievance, which increase group anger.

When a non-ethnic identity is easier to change, a person does not need to protest on behalf of that identity. The member can simply change their social identity. A low level of constrained change also generates uncertainty of co-member investment in the group and protest. This reduces group efficacy beliefs. With ethnicity and its property of constrained change, however, an ethnic member has more difficulty changing her/his identity and has more certainty that co-ethnic members will participate. This increases group efficacy beliefs.

Shared sibling ethnicity causes an individual to feel more strongly perceived group marginalization. All of one's siblings have the potential to experience group grievance. Greater emotional attachment to one's siblings translates to higher levels of affinity toward the ethnic group and generates high levels of group anger. Furthermore, sibling attachment across a descent-based cleavage, such as gender, could act to mitigate group anger. Ethnicity does not create such conflicts.

Ethnicity's properties of visibility, constrained change, and shared sibling ethnicity impact group-based anger and group efficacy beliefs. Ethnicity's potential to impact group anger and group efficacy beliefs—through three of its properties—merits the study of ethnic identity relative to other identity types.

Ethnic divisions also have the potential to challenge the state to a degree not seen with other identities. A conflation often exists between ethnic and political boundaries. The concept of the nation-state, that is, where ethnicity and politics

intertwine, is often salient as the perceived norm. France has French. Germany has Germans. China has Chinese. A country's ethnic diversity is often hidden by a country's single color on a political map. Associating ethnicity with polity has resulted in ethnicity being a common identity behind self-determination movements. Ethnic differences, not gender or class differences, are more likely to generate ideas for forming new polities. Ethnicity can threaten not only state stability but state boundaries. Ethnicity's potential for division motivates further the study of ethnic and national identity and their impact on ethnic protest participation.

Dual Collective Identity

People often belong to different groups and maintain multiple identity linkages. Dual identity refers to the ". . . simultaneous identifications with a subordinate and superordinate entity . . . " (Klandermans, 2014: 4).[25] While much scholarship demonstrates the effect of singular collective identity on protest participation, recent work has focused on dual identity (e.g., Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg, 2008; Simon and Ruhs, 2008). Dual identity has the potential to simultaneously push and pull a person in distinct directions and toward different behaviors. Dual identity also brings in new in-group members (e.g., those who are part of the national identity) and can impact decision-making.

[25] In the context of this study, "superordinate identity" refers to the national identity. Thus, the superordinate identity for those of Turkish descent residing in Germany is a German or national identity. Throughout this study, I use the terms "superordinate" and "national" interchangeably unless noted otherwise.

Studies have looked at ethnic, linguistic, or religious minority groups as the subnational identity and the nationality of the country of their residence as the larger identity. For example, Turkish migrants (and their progeny) in Germany can have identity ties to other Turkish descendants in Germany (ethnic subnational identity), other Germans not of Turkish descent (national group identity), and/or identify with both groups (dual identity). See Figure 2.1 below for a visual display of identity options available to an ethnic community member.

Figure 2.1: *Possible Identity Options for an Ethnic Community Member*



Relative to national identity, ethnic and dual identity have been found to predict collective action on behalf of one's subnational group. A subnational identity, such as ethnicity, is required to identify with the cause of the group protest and generate group anger. Even with identity linkages to the national group, simultaneous ethnic identity links maintain a high degree of group-based anger. In line with previous studies, dual identity, with its identity links to the ethnic group, is not expected to

decrease group anger relative to ethnic identity. With dual identity, group differences maintain salience and group anger is maintained (Gartner and Regan, 1996). Ethnic and dual identity are thus both expected to generate high levels of group anger relative to national identity.

Hypothesis A1) Ethnic and dual identity holders will have more group anger relative to those with national identities.

Ethnic and dual identity both maintain an identity link with the ethnic group, which generates group-based anger relative to national identity. Ethnic and dual identity differ, however, in that dual identity maintains an identity linkage with non-ethnic co-nationals. National identity linkages should generate more caring for non-ethnic co-nationals and higher belief that NECN care about one's ethnic group.

Hypothesis A2) A dual identity holder is more likely to believe that non-ethnic co-nationals care about her/his ethnic group relative to an ethnic identity holder.

What are the implications of dual identity's national identity linkage for ethnic protest? Does this difference matter for ethnic protest participation? Group anger is not the only potential mediating factor that can lead ethnic members to participate. To understand better potential distinctions between ethnic and dual identity, the relationship with non-ethnic co-nationals is required. The following subsection discusses the role of non-ethnic co-nationals and their impact on group efficacy beliefs.

The Role of Non-Ethnic Co-Nationals and Group Efficacy Beliefs

When a government faces an ethnic opposition, the dispute does not occur between just two players. Other domestic members and groups exist and observe the disputing sides. Non-ethnic co-nationals can support the government or ethnic opposition. Their support is meaningful for the effectiveness of ethnic protest and thus can impact group efficacy beliefs.

Figure 2.2: *Dispute between Ethnic Members and Government with Non-Ethnic Co-Nationals as Potential Supporters*



As ethnic members are a subset of the national population, ethnic protestors face a distinct mobilizing disadvantage. Obtaining support from non-ethnic co-nationals is critical.[26] Non-ethnic co-nationals can withdraw support from the government or

[26] Non-ethnic co-national support is critical but not easy. Majority group members have been found to more positively evaluate political assimilation strategies that

directly support the ethnic protestors. Both actions can restrict government behavior and bolster the ethnic protestors. Freedom Riders in the Civil Rights Movement in the US, for instance, illustrate how no-ethnic co-nationals (White Americans) assisted an ethnic protest movement. Thousands of white people attended Martin Luther King Jr.'s "I have a dream" speech, and as Rachelle Horowitz, lead aid to organizer Bayard Rustin, states, "The idea really was to say to those people in the middle, white folks in the middle, 'You have to come and support this movement. You can't sit on the fence anymore.'"[27] Weeks before the march, four white men were invited to join six black men as leaders of the march. Their invitation offered strategic benefits as historian David Levering Lewis states, "Unless it could be shown quite graphically, dramatically, how important it was to white people that black people wanted change,

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advance societal interests as opposed to strategies that advance minority group interests (Hindriks, Verkuyten, and Coenders, 2017).

[27] Thompson, K. (2013, August 25). In March on Washington, white activists were largely overlooked but strategically essential. The Washington Post, Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/in-march-on-washington-white-activists-were-largely-overlooked-but-strategically-essential/2013/08/25/f2738c2a-eb27-11e2-8023-b7f07811d98e_story.html?noredirect=onandutm_term=.3f1df66991c6

we wouldn't have gotten there."[28] For the Civil Rights Movement to work, white people had to act, too.

Obtaining non-ethnic co-national (NECN) support has implications for achieving success and thus for group efficacy beliefs. If an ethnic member believes that non-ethnic co-nationals will support the ethnic protest, he/she will believe that the ethnic protest will be more successful; the ethnic member will be more likely to participate.

Both ethnic members and the government want support from non-ethnic co-nationals. What determines the conditions in which non-ethnic co-nationals will support an ethnic protest? One way for ethnic protestors to gain support is to portray ethnic protests as legitimate and the government as illegitimate.[29] Ethnic protestors strive to demonstrate the legitimacy of their claims or place their claims alongside grievances experienced by broader society. In Panama, for instance, an Afro-

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[28] Thompson, K. (2013, August 25). In March on Washington, white activists were largely overlooked but strategically essential. The Washington Post, Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/in-march-on-washington-white-activists-were-largely-overlooked-but-strategically-essential/2013/08/25/f2738c2a-eb27-11e2-8023-b7f07811d98e_story.html?noredirect=onandutm_term=.3f1df66991c6

[29] Studies have demonstrated, at least in highly democratic societies, that non-violent collective action can generate illegitimate feelings toward the government's stance on the contentious issue and support from non-opposition observers (Thomas and Louis, 2014).

Panamanian protestor described both the Afro-Panamanian characteristics of a protest but also how other groups in Panama—various indigenous groups and poor Panamanians—were also suffering from similar issues. Ethnic protestors strive to emphasis that their demands are reasonable, non-threatening to broader society, and legitimate.

The government, on the other hand, wants to limit or repress the ethnic protest and portray its own actions as legitimate. Governments are constrained in their use of repression. The extent of that constraint depends somewhat on how much non-ethnic co-nationals consider legitimate repressive actions. If the government's use of repression is deemed illegitimate by non-ethnic co-nationals, the governments risks losing support.

In sum, ethnic protest does not occur in a vacuum and is not just a struggle between the government and ethnic group. Non-ethnic co-nationals have the potential to either support the ethnic protest or the government.[30] Support from non-ethnic co-nationals can play a large role in generating group efficacy beliefs—an important mediator for participation. To understand potentially different participation rates between ethnic and dual identity holders, we need to understand how ethnic and dual identity differ in their expectations of support from non-ethnic co-nationals. This in turn requires consideration of how non-ethnic co-nationals view ethnic protest and its legitimacy as a political tactic. Whether ethnic protest is a form of voice or

[30] Non-ethnic co-nationals may also support neither side or both sides.

exit,[31] making a legitimate expression of demands or a form of radical behavior, is meaningful for ethnic group protesters.

What is the Role of Non-Ethnic Co-Nationals? The Conditionality of Regime Type

On 3 June 2017, approximately 15,000 protestors filled the streets of Glasgow. Amongst a sea of Scottish flags, pro-independence speakers gave speeches. The event's organizers, All Under One Banner, said the event's aim was to show Britain's prime minister that "Scotland has spoken."[32] The peaceful ethnic protest stands in contrast, however, to the violence that occurred in Bahrain in 2011. Calling in troops from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the Bahraini government responded to mainly Shia protestors with force, violent means, and the systematic use of torture.[33]

Countries differ in their baseline views of ethnic protest legitimacy. Especially in non-democratic contexts, governments strive to portray ethnic protests as delegitimizing and destabilizing. The Moroccan government, for instance, has

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[31] Hirschman's (1970) classic work offers two options to dissatisfied members in a relationship: exit (a withdraw from the relationship) and voice (attempt to improve the relationship through communication).

[32] Thousands march in Glasgow in support of independence. (2017, June 3). *BBC*, Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-40143671

[33] Bassiouni, Rodley, Al-Awadhi, Kirsch, and Arsanjani, M. (23 November 2011). Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry. Retried from http://files.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf

portrayed the Hirak movement as pursuing self-determination and threatening to Moroccan territorial sovereignty. Likewise, in Ethiopia, ethnic protests have been portrayed as acts of separatism driven by foreign interests.[34] Assad described the early protests in 2011 in Syria as a "conspiracy" and emphasized that his primary concern was maintaining security. He also referred to unemployment as the country's "biggest problem." Unsurprisingly, freedom of participation was not prioritized.[35] Ethnic protest may cause fears of instability, and especially in multiparty systems, develop ethnic security fears (Heath, 2016). The legitimacy of ethnic protest has implications for how non-ethnic co-nationals view an ethnic protest and ultimately whether or not an ethnic member believes non-ethnic co-national support is obtainable. In this subsection, I examine regime type, and discuss how variation in views on ethnic protest legitimacy structures how identity impacts group efficacy beliefs and the mediating impact of non-ethnic co-nationals caring on ethnic protest.

While scholarship has long advocated for the primacy of agency over structure to explain nonviolent opposition (Schock, 2005: Sharp, 2005), scholars have started

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[34] Errazzouki, S. (2017, May 18). Thousands rally in north Morocco protest march, *Reuters*, Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-protests/thousands-rally-in-north-morocco-protest-march-idUSKCN18E336. According to the broadcast the "destructive forces" were backed by Eritrea.

[35] Marsh, K. (2011, April 16). Syria protests continue as Bashar al-Assad promises reform. *The Guardian,* Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/16/bashar-al-assad-syria

to focus on the structural conditions that impact nonviolent behavior (Erica Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2017). Building on previous work, I argue that regime type structures the impact of ethnic and dual identity on ethnic protest. I discuss how protest, and ethnic protest in particular, is viewed differently in democratic and non-democratic contexts, which will lay the foundation for a theoretical argument of different expectations for identity.

Because of the difference in ethnic protest participation rates,[36] variation in identity and its relation to ethnic protest will not be theorized across regime type. Instead, distinct expectations within democracies and non-democracies will be generated.

Democratic and non-democratic governments differ in two key ways that structure the distinct impacts of identity on group efficacy beliefs and thus ethnic protest.[37] I argue first that governments in democracies justify their rule from political participation. Non-democratic governments use other sources as justification for their rule. I argue second that the higher use of repression in non-democratic

[36] Democracies experience a higher rate of protest compared to the rate in non-democracies.

[37] Scholars have started to focus on the structural conditions that impact nonviolent behavior (Erica Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2017).

regimes[38] generates belief that ethnic protestors may destabilize a country. In non-democracies, ethnic protest lacks legitimacy as a political tactic because of less norms regarding political participation and because of fear of destabilization. Regime type—through views on political participation and destabilization—impacts ethnic protest legitimacy and structures the impact of identity on ethnic protest.

Democracies are built on the notion of political participation. A norm of political participation, including protest participation, permeates democracies. This norm allows democratic governments to justify their rule. A French friend once joked that Paris will not see any protests in August. Everyone was, after all, on vacation. Come September and work, however, and protest would be widespread. Democracies have normalized protest as an acceptable and legitimate form of participating in the political process.[39] This norm of political participation extends to ethnic protest.[40]

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[38] Hybrid regimes have been found to use high levels of repression. Autocracies may not need to use repression because the threat of repression discourages dissent (see Ritter and Conrad, 2016).

[39] An empirical consequence of this difference is that democracies experience protests more frequently, even with more opportunity for conventional political participation.

[40] Exceptions do exist, however. Madrid's recent violent repression against Catalonian independence efforts illustrate the extent to which democratic governments will use repressive tactics. The example illustrates that the legitimacy of ethnic protest in democracies may not extend to situations where the sovereignty of

Non-democratic governments, in contrast, maintain lower levels of individual political participation and thus face a disadvantage in justifying their rule (Croissant and Wurster, 2013). As widespread political participation is not an inherent political feature, non-democratic governments require a different source to justify rule.[41] Non-democratic regimes may use indoctrination, passivity, performance, democratic-procedures (Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2017), and social services (Cassani, 2017) to justify themselves as rulers.

Emphasizing other means to justify rule decreases the relative value of political participation, including ethnic protest. An emphasis on economic performance, for instance, brings into discourse another basis for which a non-democratic government can stand and generates an alternative motivation to support the government. When some people advocate for increased political participation, economic performance acts as a potential justification for its disallowance. In non-democracies, people value more other government functions and do not prioritize to the same extent rights to political participation and ethnic protest. Not prioritizing ethnic protest decreases its legitimacy as a tactic.

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the state is in play. In such situations, ethnic protest is likely to lack legitimate backing from non-Catalonian Spaniards, and the study's theoretical expectations are less likely to function.

[41] Both democracies and non-democracies can use legitimacy to increase the longevity of rule (Gerschewski, 2013).

Participation in an ethnic protest in a democracy often differs from protesting in a non-democracy. The high cost of participating in ethnic protest in a non-democracy generates fears of instability, which further delegitimizes ethnic protest as a tactic. Semi-democracies are more likely to repress protestors (Regan and Henderson, 2002) and autocracies can deter potential protestors with the threat of repression (see Ritter and Conrad, 2016). In a non-democracy, ethnic protestors often fear government reprisal (Olsson-Yaouzis, 2010) and could face financial repercussions (e.g., state employee could lose her/his job), arrest, and/or repressive violence from state authorities. Moreover, non-democracies are more likely to experience ethnic violence[42] and government repression.

In non-democracies, ethnic protest provides information on the will of the ethnic protestors and the extent to which ethnic members are willing to make demands on the state. It signals their willingness to engage in behavior with potentially destabilizing outcomes or other costly behavior, such as violence. In a non-democratic context, non-ethnic co-nationals view the high costs that ethnic protestors face—government use of repression—and are concerned about potential instability. See Figure 2.3 below for a visual description of regime type differences in use of lethal and non-lethal repression. Non-democracies are more likely to use both types of repression.

Figure 2.3: *Regime Type and Repression Likelihood in Africa, 1990 – 2016*

[42] See CIDCM report



*Data from Social Conflict Analysis Database

In non-democratic Ethiopia, for instance, Oromo protestors have faced heavy state repression and fatalities**.** With such a high risk of violence, non-Oromo Ethiopians have a high level of information on the extent to which Oromo protestors are willing to pursue aims. Oromo protest participants—because of the higher risk of repression—demonstrate high willingness to face costs from the state. Ethnic protestors are more likely to be seen as willing to destabilize the government or use violent tactics, which delegitimizes ethnic protest as acceptable political behavior in the eyes of non-ethnic co-nationals and creates fear of future violent behavior.[43]

[43] It is challenging to find data on the legitimacy of ethnic protests, but descriptive statistics from World Values Survey (Round 6) on similar policy issues offer insight into the priorities of people in democracies and non-democracies. When given the choice of various policy options, political participation is more highly prioritized in

In democracies, however, ethnic protest displays less information on the will of protestors. For instance, on 16 February 2017, mainly Hispanic individuals stayed away from work and protested the immigration policies of the Trump administration. The cost of participating in the "A Day Without Immigrants" protests paled in comparison to the costs of protesting in non-democratic Ethiopia. In the Phoenix Union High School District, which has a large number of Hispanic students, the district's spokesman Craig Pletenik stated ". . . we didn't want to discount it . . . We

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democracies; 11.66 percent of respondents prioritized freedom of speech, while only 6.33% of respondents in non-democracies prioritized freedom of speech. In non-democracies, 50.95% of respondents preferred maintaining order while only 35.69% of respondents did in democracies. The surveys do not ask questions on ethnic protest legitimacy, but other related questions, such as those on the freedom of speech, offer insight into the extent to which non-conventional forms of political participation are prioritized. Examining freedom of speech offers a conservative estimate for ethnic protest legitimacy. As described in the argument above, ethnic protest, because it is on behalf of a critical subnational group, should be expected to lack legitimacy compared to protest in general. Examining freedom of speech for all people provides a conservative proxy for society views on ethnic protest. Support for ethnic protest is likely to be even lower. Overall, descriptive statistics indicate that respondents in democracies prioritize political participation at a higher rate.

respect the right of students for self-expression and peaceful protest . . . "[44] The legitimacy of ethnic protest as a tactic is commonly recognized, even by non-ethnic co-nationals. Furthermore, democratic governments are more able to accommodate ethnic demands.[45] This results in relatively low costs for participation and does not reveal a high level of information on the extent to which ethnic protestors are willing to pursue their aims.

In non-democracies, the high cost of ethnic protest informs non-ethnic co-nationals of the high costs ethnic protestors are willing to endure and signals their willingness to engage in behavior with potentially destabilizing outcomes or other costly behavior, such as violence. In non-democracies, ethnic protestors are more likely to be seen as willing to destabilize the government or use violent tactics, which delegitimize ethnic protest as acceptable political behavior in the eyes of non-ethnic co-nationals.

Descriptive data illustrate the different priorities in a democracy and a non-democracy. Looking specifically at the importance that Germans place on protecting freedom of speech, a difference is seen from their counterparts in non-democratic Kazakhstan. Amongst three other options, 20.52% of Germans prioritize protecting freedom of speech, while only 3.60% of Kazakhs feel that freedom of speech should

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[44] Across the USA: Protests, Closures, on a #DayWithoutImmigrants. (2017, February 17). *USA Today*.

[45] The CIDCM report indicates that democracies are better able to accommodate SD movement demands and find negotiated settlements to civil wars.

be prioritized over the other options. While the right to protest is an important aspect of a democratic society—and a legitimate form of political voice in democracies—non-democracies do not provide it the same level of priority. Protest can be seen as subversive, dangerous, and more radical behavior.

Again, while the descriptive statistics above suggest that people in non-democratic contexts are less likely to support freedom of speech in general, it is likely that ethnic protest is seen as especially dangerous to state stability. Ethnic protests, relative to protests mobilized around other issues and groups, are more likely to face lethal repression and result in a higher number of deaths compared to other protest types.

The high likelihood of government repression of ethnic protest indicates that governments perceive an ethnic protest as threatening.[46] Because of ethnicity's potential for secessionism and territorial division, ethnic protests are especially likely be perceived as causing instability and result repression. In non-democratic regimes, protests lack legitimacy, and the threat of ethnic protest is likely to be higher.

In sum, ethnic protest is more of a legitimate political behavior in democracies. In democratic contexts, political participation is a norm, making ethnic protest a more legitimate political behavior in the eyes of non-ethnic co-nationals. In non-democratic contexts, however, ethnic protest demonstrates to non-ethnic co-nationals that ethnic protestors are willing to engage in costly and potentially destabilizing

[46] Regan and Henderson (2002) find that higher levels of perceived threat are more likely to face political repression.

behavior. The difference in ethnic protest legitimacy across regime type structures the impact of identity on ethnic protest participation.

Regime Type and the Impact of Identity on Group Efficacy Beliefs

Ethnic and dual identity are both expected to generate high levels of group anger. What are their impacts on group efficacy beliefs? I argue that the impact of identity on group efficacy beliefs is conditional on regime type.

In democratic societies, dual identity is expected to generate higher group efficacy beliefs. Ethnic protest is a legitimate political behavior. A dual identity holder views her/his political activity in the context of the national group, in which he/she is a member (e.g., Klandermans, 2014). In democracies, because ethnic protest is a legitimate political behavior, increased beliefs that non-ethnic co-nationals care about one's ethnic group make dual identity holders more likely to believe that that non-ethnic co-nationals will respond positively to legitimate political behavior, part of the mechanism that results in increased group efficacy beliefs. Dual identity generates belief that NECN will listen to her/his voice, care about the grievances and demands of the ethnic protest, and provide support.[47] This further legitimizes their

[47] Recognition from co-nationals (who are not part of the subnational group) plays an important role in allowing dual identity to encourage protest participation. Simon and Klandermans (2001) describes this process as triangulation. Subnational (or "ethnic" in the case of this project) demands do not operate simply in the context of two delineated sides but one with blurred boundaries.

right to protest and make demands (Simon and Klandermans, 2001) and increases group efficacy beliefs.

Ethnic identity members, however, have less belief that non-ethnic co-nationals will support the ethnic protest. Because they do not believe that support from non-ethnic co-nationals will come, ethnic identity holders are less likely to believe that ethnic protest is capable of achieving its aims.

Regime type structures the impact of ethnic and dual identity on group efficacy beliefs. In democracies, dual identity generates belief that non-ethnic co-nationals will support an ethnic protest, which results in higher levels of group efficacy beliefs.

Hypothesis A3) In a democracy, a dual identity holder will have higher group efficacy beliefs relative to an ethnic identity holder.

Support from non-ethnic co-nationals, however, is contingent on ethnic protest as a legitimate form of grievance expression. Because of the perceived radical nature of ethnic protest in a non-democracy, a dual identity holder believes that obtaining support from non-ethnic co-nationals is unlikely.[48] He/she is cautious about ethnic

[48] Even in democracies, the relationship between the ethnic group and NECN may reduce the impact of dual identity on ethnic protest participation. A person with an ethnic identity may perceive NECNs as non-receptive toward her/his membership. For example, while Latino immigrants in the U.S. may have strong attachments toward their American (national) identity, they may believe that they will never be accepted (Wiley, 2013). Anti-immigrant laws passed by the national community can lead to a decrease in the likelihood of protest participation (Wiley et al., 2014).

protest as it could generate future difficulty for ethnic group members living with non-ethnic co-nationals. Dual identity makes one feel that non-ethnic co-nationals care about her/his grievances, but the political context makes one feel that non-ethnic co-nationals will not support an ethnic protest. Neither ethnic nor dual identity holders believe that non-ethnic co-nationals will support an ethnic protest. Without a belief in support from non-ethnic co-nationals, dual identity holders do not generate higher levels of group efficacy beliefs.

Hypothesis A4) In a non-democracy, there will not be a difference in group efficacy beliefs between an ethnic and a dual identity holder.

Regime Type and the Impact of Identity on Ethnic Protest Participation

Do ethnic and dual identity differ in their impact on ethnic protest participation? Democracy and non-democracy differences in ethnic protest likelihood and use of repression hinders comparison. Democracies experience more ethnic protest,[49] and people in non-democracies prioritize political participation less relative to other issues. Because regime type results in different levels of baseline ethnic protest participation and support for protest, I examine variation in ethnic protest within each

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Relatedly and tellingly, Hopkins and Blackwood (2011) found that U.K. Muslims with knowledge that non-British Muslims did not recognize their participation in the national identity were less likely to advocate on behalf of Muslims in the public sphere.

[49] Democracies also experience more self-determination movement protests (Cunningham et al., 2017).

regime type. That is, ethnic protest likelihood as a function of identity is examined within a democracy; ethnic protest likelihood as a function of identity is examined within a nondemocracy separately.

Regime type structures how ethnic and dual identity impact differently ethnic protest participation. The logic behind the impact of regime type lies with ethnic protest legitimacy and potential support from non-ethnic co-nationals. Specifically, regime type structures identity's impact on group efficacy beliefs and the mediating impact of belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care.

Ethnic and dual identity are both expected to generate high levels of group anger—regardless of regime type. Distinct expectations for their impact on group efficacy beliefs and the mediating impact of belief in non-ethnic co-nationals caring, however, offers theoretical reasons to expect different impacts on participation in democracy and non-democracies.

In democracies, dual identity generates more group efficacy beliefs. Higher group efficacy beliefs stem from belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care more about their ethnic group and that ethnic protest is a legitimate political behavior. In line with previous literature, I argue that higher group efficacy beliefs lead to an expectation of higher ethnic protest participation for dual identity holders.

Hypothesis A5) In a democracy, a dual identity holder will be more likely to participate in an ethnic protest relative to those with an ethnic identity.

Hypothesis A6) In a democracy, belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care is expected to mediate positively the relationship between identity and ethnic protest participation.

Unlike expectations from much of the social-psychology research on dual identity in democratic countries (e.g., Simon and Klandermans, 2001),[50] I argue that ethnic identity acts to motivate participation in non-democratic contexts. In non-democracies, ethnic and dual identity holders do not generate different levels of group anger. And because of negative views on ethnic protest, neither ethnic nor dual identity generate higher levels of belief that non-ethnic co-nationals will support an ethnic protest and thus do not differ in group efficacy beliefs.

A dual identity holder, however, cares more about non-ethnic co-nationals and believe that non-ethnic co-nationals care more about her/his ethnic group. In a non-democracy care for/from non-ethnic co-nationals occurs in the context of the potentially destabilizing impact of ethnic protest. This makes dual identity holders more cognizant of non-ethnic co-national fears.[51] A dual identity holder cares more about the potentially negative reaction of non-ethnic co-nationals. In non-democratic contexts, ethnic protest demonstrates to non-ethnic co-nationals that ethnic protestors

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[50] Digrazia (2014) varies not the political system but the type of protest: conventional or nonconventional. His findings suggest that risk associated with the political behavior, its demands and political legitimacy impact the type of participant in each type.

[51] Ethnic heterogeneity is associated negatively with political stability (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002). The dangers of ethnic heterogeneity are made more obvious once an ethnic protest emerges and becomes visible.

are willing to engage in costly and potentially destabilizing behavior.[52] Participating in ethnic protest is likely to upset and generate fear amongst non-ethnic co-nationals. Because ethnic protest is seen as destabilizing and the costs are higher compared to democracies, dual identity holders are forced to confront these costs. Ethnic protest lacks legitimacy as a political tactic, and care for non-ethnic co-nationals dissuades dual identity members from participating in ethnic protest. Relative to those with ethnic identity, a dual identity holder is less likely to participate in an ethnic protest.[53]

Upset with a (perceived) injustice facing their ethnic group, ethnic identity holders act outside of the norms of normative behavior (protest) in order to express grievance. An ethnic identity holder is concerned less with receiving criticism from non-ethnic co-nationals. A lack of identity linkages to non-ethnic co-nationals encourages those with ethnic identity to engage in (perceived) radical behavior.

Hypothesis A7) In a non-democracy, an ethnic identity holder will be more likely to participate in an ethnic protest relative to those with national and dual identities.

[52] This information is not provided in democracies. In non-democracies, the high costs of participating in ethnic protest are visible and potentially costly action.

[53] Indeed, studies in the US have shown that perceived lack of acceptance amongst ethnic members into the broader national identity can potentially limit dual identity holder protest support (Wiley et al., 2014; see also Simon and Ruhs, 2008).

Hypothesis A8) In a non-democracy, belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care is expected to mediate negatively the relationship between identity and ethnic protest participation.

In democracies, political participation is a norm, making ethnic protest a more legitimate political behavior in the eyes of non-ethnic co-nationals. In non-democratic contexts, ethnic protest demonstrates to non-ethnic co-nationals that ethnic protestors are willing to engage in costly and potentially destabilizing behavior. This information is not provided in democracies. Regime type structures how ethnic and dual identity impact ethnic protest participation.

Identity and Mover Type

Thus far, I have examined identity's role on ethnic member participation in ethnic protest. To understand better when we see more ethnic protests, I make a critical conceptual distinction between participation at different stages of an ethnic protest. That is, a distinction between people who initiate an ethnic protest (first movers), those that follow (second movers), and those that join only when social costs for non-participation exist (third movers). Distinguishing between different stages of an ethnic protest helps us understand the process in which micro-dynamics, individual motivations to participate in an ethnic protest, impact macro-level dynamics, why countries experience ethnic protest.

To explain how identity impacts different stages of ethnic protest participation, two keys elements are examined: the likelihood of ethnic protest success in democracies and the likelihood of government repression of ethnic protest in non-democracies. In democracies, variation in the likelihood of ethnic protest success

structures the impact of group efficacy beliefs on ethnic protest participation. In non-democracies, variation in the likelihood of repression of ethnic protest structures the impact of caring for non-ethnic co-nationals on ethnic protest participation.

Different stages of an ethnic protest produce different levels of information on the costs and benefits associated with participation. Information can provide insight into the level of dissent and how willing other people are to participate. It can also reveal the extent of government willingness to make concessions or use repression.

Before an ethnic protest begins, an ethnic member does not know the preferences of other ethnic members, their level of dissatisfaction with the government, and their willingness to protest. Ethnic protest provides information on the number of dissatisfied ethnic members and how willing they are to protest. An ethnic protest in the first stage, for instance, is too small to make demands of the government and is unlikely to be successful. First movers, however, can signal to others that dissent exists (see Lohmann, 1994a, 1994b).

As an ethnic protest grows in size, information on dissatisfaction and ethnic protest willingness increases. Second and third movers have the opportunity to observe the actions of first movers and government/societal reactions to their nascent protest(s). From their observations, second and third movers have an increasing amount of information to calculate the likelihood of opposition success or potential instability.

Ethnic protest also provides information on the government. Government willingness to concede and/or repress is also unclear but becomes clearer with ethnic protest. Compared to first movers, second movers have more information on the

likelihood of government repression, and third movers have more information than second movers.[54]

In this section, I develop an argument of how ethnic protests in democracies and non-democracies produce different likelihoods of success and repression at different stages of an ethnic protest. First, second, and third movers thus have different levels of information from which to decide to participate or not participate. As an ethnic protest grows in a democracy, the likelihood of success increases. In non-democracies, however, as an ethnic protest grows, the likelihood of government repression increases. This difference in governmental response produces distinctions in the impact of group efficacy beliefs and care for non-ethnic co-nationals on participation in the first, second, or third stage of an ethnic protest.

Democracies

Democratic regimes are more likely to accommodate protest movements (Carey, 2006). Throughout the duration of an ethnic protest, however, the likelihood of the ethnic protest achieving success and accommodation varies. As the ethnic protest grows, the likelihood of achieving success and the amount of information pertaining to success increases. Compared to first and second movers, third movers operate in a context where a successful outcome is more likely. Second movers operate in a

[54] De Mesquita (2010) and Ginkel and Smith (1999) both develop models where a political vanguard group initiates in costly protest or violence to provide a signal to the mass of dissatisfaction (de Mesquita) or government power (Ginkel and Smith). The mass then decides to protest or not.

context where a successful outcome is more likely compared to that of first movers. Differences in success likelihood between mover types affects when group efficacy beliefs have the largest impact on ethnic participation. This in turn impacts when dual identity will have a stronger impact on participation compared to ethnic identity.

Previous research suggests that dual identity increases group efficacy beliefs, but when is this difference meaningful for ethnic protest participation? The role of ethnic protest success likelihood plays a critical role in structuring the impact of dual identity. When ethnic group protest success likelihood is low, higher group efficacy beliefs will not increase belief in success to a point that makes a meaningful difference. When ethnic group protest success likelihood is high, higher group efficacy beliefs will not play an important role. Group efficacy beliefs should have the largest impact when an ethnic protest is the second stage. Because group efficacy beliefs are theorized to be the primary mechanism through which dual identity impacts participation differently from ethnic identity, I expect dual identity to have the largest impact on second movers. Its impact on mover stages is discussed in more detail below.

Figure 2.4: *Ethnic Protest Success Likelihood and Mover Types in Democracies*



A low probability of group success characterizes an ethnic protest movement in its first stage. With such a low starting point, increased group efficacy beliefs—through linkages to one's ethnic identity and/or dual identity and belief in support from co-nationals—is less impactful for participation. Consider the following hypothetical example: individual A believes that ethnic protest Z has a two percent chance of achieving its stated aims. Individual B, *ceteris paribus*, and for whatever reason, believes that ethnic protest Z has a four percent chance of success. Group efficacy belief has doubled and moved from a two to four percent likelihood of achieving aims. Both numbers, however, are extremely low. In substantive terms, neither individual A nor individual B believe that ethnic protest Z will achieve its aim. Even if an identity type generates a higher level of group efficacy beliefs, the group's likelihood of succeeding is still low. This suggests increasing group-efficacy beliefs will not result in higher likelihood of ethnic protest participation at the first stage.

What about third movers? How does increased belief in group efficacy impact their likelihood of participation? Amongst third movers, a growing mass of individuals is already participating. At least some degree of imminent success is becoming obvious. Consider individuals A and B once more. Individual A believes that ethnic protest X has an 80 percent chance of achieving its stated aims. While we doubled group efficacy beliefs in the last example, this is not possible here. Imagine that individual B believes that protest X has a 99 percent chance of success. Group efficacy beliefs are high for both individuals. As group efficacy belief increases, its

impact on ethnic protest participation does not increase at the same rate; there are diminishing returns.

Amongst second movers, conversely, group efficacy beliefs matter greatly. Consider: individual A believes that ethnic protest Y has a 20% likelihood of successfully achieving its aim. As with the first mover example above, we double the group efficacy belief for individual B. Her/his belief in the protest's likelihood of succeeding is now forty percent. The jump from twenty to forty percent is a substantive increase. With a 20% chance of success, the likelihood of achieving aims is still relatively low. On the contrary, a 40% chance of succeeding brings the obtainment of aims much closer. As such, increased group efficacy beliefs impact protest stages starting to see signs of success and a realistic possibility of a larger movement in the future, while still not seeing success as a given. See Figure 2.5 below for a summary of when dual identity has a significant impact on participation movers in a democracy.

Figure 2.5: *Expectations of Mover Type and Ethnic Protest Participation in Democracies*

Mover Type	**Ethnic vs. Dual Identity**			**Impact on Mediator**	**Impact on Participation**
First Movers	Ethnic	->	Dual	Group efficacy beliefs increase	Minimal
Second Movers	Ethnic	->	Dual	Group efficacy beliefs increase	**Significant**
Third Movers	Ethnic	->	Dual	Group efficacy beliefs increase	Minimal

Expectations

In a democracy, dual identity can increase belief that non-ethnic co-nationals will respond positively to an ethnic protest.[55] This increases group efficacy beliefs. Group efficacy beliefs, however, have the biggest impact on second movers. For first and third movers, increased group efficacy beliefs do not result in a meaningful change in the level of group efficacy beliefs. Identity's impact—through group efficacy beliefs—should not have a large difference for first and third mover ethnic protest participation. In contrast, for second movers, increasing group efficacy beliefs results in a substantive change in the belief that a protest will be successful. Dual identity, with its ability to generate group efficacy beliefs, is thus expected to have the largest impact on second movers.

Hypothesis B1) In a democracy, the impact of dual identity will be strongest on second stage ethnic protest participation.

Non-democracies

Non-democracies are more likely than democracies to repress ethnic protests[56] or create fears of repression. But non-democracy repression is expected to vary over the course of an ethnic protest. As such, I expect that care for non-ethnic co-nationals will have different impacts across mover types.

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[55] In line with a logic of more positive responses, democracies are expected to be more tolerant of dissident behavior (Davenport, 2007).

[56] Non-democracies are more likely to engage in repression onset (Carey, 2010).

As an ethnic protest grows in a non-democracy, what can we expect? First, government repression increases. Figure 2.6 below offers descriptive statistics on protest size and lethal repression in non-democracies.

Figure 2.6: *Protest Size and Lethal Repression in Non-democracies, 1990 – 2016**



*Data and graph are derived from SCAD

Second, a growing ethnic protest in a non-democracy reveals an increasing level of information on instability. Imperfect information on the preferences of other citizens and how many people oppose the government hinders collective action in non-democracies (Kuran, 1991a, 1991b). Ethnic protest acts to reveal preferences and willingness to engage in collective action. When ethnic protest occurs, there is

more information on the strength of the opposition, likelihood of repression, and potential instability.[57]

Figure 2.7: *Mover Types and Repression in Non-Democracies*



The increased risk of repression and instability shapes how identity impacts ethnic protest participation. As an ethnic protest grows and repression and instability become more likely, I expect care for non-ethnic co-nationals to have an increasing impact on discouraging ethnic protest participation. That is, for third movers, when repression and instability likelihood is highest, care for co-nationals will decrease the likelihood of participation the most. Because dual identity discourages ethnic protest participation through care for non-ethnic co-nationals, dual identity is expected to decrease participation at increasing levels when moving from first to third movers.

Expectations

When attempting to initiate an ethnic protest, repression is most unlikely, and there is a low likelihood of generating instability. In such situations, state stability is not yet threatened, and the (potential) struggle between disgruntled ethnic members

[57] Information on opposition sentiment in non-democratic regimes is likely to be highly restricted. Ethnic protest serves as an important producer of information.

and the government has not yet become salient. That is, the ethnic protest is not large or visible. Non-ethnic co-nationals are not yet fearful of the ethnic protest, and thus their fears are less salient for a dual identity holder. While dual identity can generate concern for non-ethnic co-nationals' fears of instability, in the first stage of an ethnic protest a meaningful difference between ethnic and dual identity holders does not emerge.[58]

In the second stage, there is a higher likelihood of repression than in the first stage but less than in the third stage. As the ethnic protest increases in size, an increasing amount of repression likelihood arises. State stability becomes more of a concern. Non-ethnic co-nationals are more concerned with the threat of the ethnic protest. Dual identity holders are more aware of those concerns. Dual identity holders are cognizant and sympathetic to those fears. As such, repression is justified, and concern for non-ethnic co-national fears increases.[59] A difference between ethnic

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[58] Furthermore, when a government represses first movers, those who initiate an ethnic protest, repression is not visible. The ethnic protest initiators are likely to maintain a low profile, and there is low awareness surrounding their behavior. Because of low visibility, ethnic and dual identity holders are not cognizant of government repressive tactics. Dual identity thus does not have the opportunity to justify repression, which discourages participation.

[59] Ethnic identity holders, however, care less about the fears of instability of non-co-ethnic nationals. Without links to non-ethnic nationals, non-ethnic co-national fears are nether understood nor considered.

and dual identity holders emerges, and in the second stage, dual identity discourages ethnic protest even more relative to ethnic identity.

In the third stage, the likelihood of repression and its severity is high. Repression, the threat of instability, and non-ethnic co-national fears are all at their highest points. Dual identity plays an even bigger role in discouraging participation relative to ethnic identity.

Figure 2.8: *Expectations of Mover Type and Ethnic Protest Participation in Non-Democracies*

Mover Type	Ethnic vs. Dual Identity			Impact on Mediator	Impact on Participation
First Movers	Ethnic	->	Dual	Low non-ethnic co-national fears	**Low**
Second Movers	Ethnic	->	Dual	Higher non-ethnic co-national fears	**Higher**
Third Movers	Ethnic	->	Dual	Highest non-ethnic co-national fears	**Highest**

In sum, because of the different likelihoods of repression and information on stability, care for non-ethnic co-nationals has distinct impacts on first, second, and third movers. In non-democracies, ethnic and dual identity have distinct impacts on ethnic protest participation because of differences in the impact of belief in care from non-ethnic co-nationals. Dual identity members maintain links to non-ethnic co-nationals. As repression and the subsequent threat of state instability increase over an ethnic protest's three stages, dual identity decreases mobilization. Ethnic identity is thus expected to have an increasing impact on participation when moving from first to third movers.

Hypothesis B2) In a non-democracy, the impact of ethnic identity on ethnic protest intentions will increase moving from first to third movers.

Second and Third Mover Participation: Consequences for Ethnic Protest at the Country-Level

In democracies, dual identify holders are theorized to be the most likely to patriciate in ethnic protest in democracies. Dual identity is also expected to have the strongest impact on second movers. In non-democracies, the theoretical logic implies that ethnic identity holders are more likely to participate as the ethnic protest grows. How does individual-level ethnic protest participation impact ethnic protest?

Unlike organized violence, where security concerns may reduce incentives to increase membership, ethnic protest is a public event whose strength and frequency is often dependent on the number of protestors. Ethnic protest is inherently a group activity, and participants are needed to both develop and maintain an ethnic protest. For an activity so dependent on the individual, the role of individual participation in ethnic protest is critical in determining the likelihood of ethnic protest at the country-level.

In particular, the role of individual participation at the second stage is especially critical for macro-level ethnic protest. Second movers provide the necessary link between first movers, who want to form a larger ethnic protest and series of ethnic protests, and third movers, who participate once the ethnic protest has reached a certain size. Understanding motivations to participate in the second stage provides theoretical reasons to expect more ethnic protest events.

In a democracy, a higher level of dual identity provides a non-material resource for ethnic group protest leaders. More ethnic members with dual identity results in a greater number of potential recruits for ethnic protests, specifically in the second stage. More dual identity holders allow larger and more ethnic protests to develop. A greater number of dual identity holders in a democracy should provide more potential for ethnic protest to develop. In contrast, democracies that do not have many dual identity holders are unable to generate turnout, especially at the second stage, which is essential for ethnic protest occurrence and maintenance. Without second movers willing to protest, ethnic protest is not likely to occur with the same degree of scale or frequency.

Hypothesis C1) In democracies, relative to lower levels of dual identity, an increasing level of dual identity will increase the likelihood of ethnic protest. Relative to lower levels of ethnic identity, an increasing level of ethnic identity will not impact the likelihood of ethnic protest.

Because dual identity does not have high mobilizing potential in non-democracies, there should not be a difference in ethnic protest levels in countries with low and high levels of dual identity. More dual identity holders in a non-democracy does not provide a resource for ethnic protest. Dual identity does not encourage individual protest participation, which makes it harder for ethnic protests to occur. In non-democracies, dual identity holders do not generate more potential ethnic protestors.

Ethnic identity, in turn, impacts ethnic protest participation, specifically at the second and third stage. Because of ethnic identity's mobilizing potential, non-

democracies that have high levels of ethnic identity should be more likely to generate and maintain ethnic protest compared to countries that have low levels of ethnic identity. Ethnic protest entrepreneurs are more easily able to mobilize ethnic members, especially at the critical second stage, which encourages ethnic protest.

Hypothesis C2) In non-democracies, relative to lower levels of ethnic identity, an increasing level of ethnic identity will increase the likelihood of ethnic protest. Relative to lower levels of dual identity, an increasing level of dual identity will not impact the likelihood of ethnic protest.

Chapter 3: A Survey-experiment in Lebanon and Panama

"But they [Alawites] control everything. They're ten percent and they're the government."

Syrian Sunni Arab, Beirut, Lebanon

Introduction

Chapter III uses survey-experiments to test the impact of identity and regime type—mediated through group anger, belief in NECN caring, and group efficacy beliefs—on ethnic protest participation. Its examination lies specifically on the impact of identity on participation in general—not participation at different stages. This chapter focuses first on the mediating variables. Regardless of regime type, ethnic and dual identity are theorized to have the same effect on group anger and belief in non-ethnic co-nationals caring. To understand how ethnic and dual identity differ, regime type is then introduced, and the chapter tests ethnic and dual identity's different impact on group efficacy beliefs in democracies and non-democracies. It also examines the mediating impact of belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care.

To examine the theorized relationships, survey-experiments are administered to Afro-Panamanians in democratic Panama and to Greek Orthodox in less-democratic

Lebanon.[60] Information on country and ethnic group case selection, method selection, and sampling procedure are first given.

Empirical results are then discussed. Survey-experiments test specifically how identity—through group anger, belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care, and group efficacy beliefs—impacts ethnic protest participation. The chapter first examines the impact of identity on group anger and belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care. Identity is expected to have the same impact on these two outcomes regardless of regime type. Next, identity's impact, conditional on regime type, on group efficacy belief is examined. Having offered evidence on the relationship between identity and the mediating variables, the chapter examines the relationship between identity and ethnic protest participation. Finally, mediation analysis examines the relationship between identity, the mediators, and ethnic protest participation.

Case Selection: Greek Orthodox in Lebanon and Afro-Panamanians in Panama

Why Lebanon and Panama?

Different regime types in Panama and Lebanon provide distinct political contexts from which to examine the study's hypotheses. Panama is a democracy located in Central America. The country has received high Polity IV scores and since 1990 has consistently been measured as a strong democracy. Lebanon varies between

[60] Institutional Review Board Approval was received from the University of Maryland [(Titles are (1032901-2) and (1139578-1)].

barely making the democratic threshold and being classified as a non-democratic, hybrid regime. For this study, I classify Lebanon as a non-democracy.

Figure 3.1: *History of Regime Type in Panama and Lebanon*[61]



Lebanon's regime type makes it a harder test for the dissertation's theoretical expectations. Testing the theoretical expectations in contexts approaching the lower-end of the democratic threshold offers a conservative test with the potential to demonstrate the theory's robustness. Furthermore, the fact that "hybrid regimes" or "semi-democracies" are relatively widespread also demonstrates the theory's applicability to a broad number of cases. Along with democracies and autocracies, hybrid regimes appear to be a stable feature of the international system.[62]

Examining a country with mixed democratic and autocratic characteristics is also useful because repression and dissent are interrelated strategic decisions, and "murder

[61] Polity IV. *Systemic Peace.* Retrieved from http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/leb2.htm

[62] See Levitsky and Way 2010.

occurs in the middle."[63] That is, mixed regimes are the mostly likely to use repression (Regan and Henderson, 2002).[64] In full-fledged autocracies, governments have high repressive capacity, which deters potential dissenters. In mixed regimes, however, there is more uncertainty with regard to acceptable political behavior and actor capacities. It is thus mixed regimes that are more likely to see dissent and repression. Lebanon's regime type reflects regimes that are the most likely to see both dissent and repression.

While Lebanon's diverse society, ethnic political grievances, and regime type make it an appropriate case to examine, practical reasons also motivate its study. The country is currently stable enough to access and conduct research—a feat not always possible or easy in non-democratic regimes.

Panama and Lebanon share a number of structural characteristics that motivate comparison. Panama is a country of approximately four million people. It seceded from the Republic of Colombia in 1903, which allowed for the construction of the Panama Canal. Revenue from the canal and other developed industries, including commerce, banking, and tourism have resulted in relatively high scores on the Human Development Index and a competitive economy. Panama also has a diverse mix of

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[63] See Fein (1995).

[64] Regan and Henderson (2002) also discuss the role of threat as a correlate with repression. Leaders of all regime types are more likely to respond to dissent with repression when a threat is perceived as high magnitude and highly credible (see also Gartner and Regan, 1996).

ethnicities. The largest ethnic group are Mestizo, whose background includes a mix of European and Native American ancestry. Various Native American groups, including the Ngäbe and Kuna, occupy 12.3% of the population. Mulatto (6.8%), White (6.7%), and Afro-Panamanian (9.2%), the focus of this study, are the other main groups.

Lebanon has a similar population size with approximately six million inhabitants. In 1943, Lebanon held elections that abolished the French mandate that had previously controlled the country. Lebanon maintains a Human Development Index similar to Panama and has developed banking and tourism industries. Similar to Panama, and despite its small size, Lebanon maintains significant ethnic diversity. Eighteen sectarian groups are recognized and act as ethnic markers in the country. While there is limited census data on the country's ethnic makeup, Shias and Sunnis appear to be the two largest groups, each occupying approximately 27% of the population. Maronite Christians are the largest Christian group with approximately 21% of the population. Greek Orthodox, who are the focus of this study, are approximately 8% of Lebanese.

Why Afro-Panamanians and Greek Orthodox?

Panama and Lebanon differ in their regime types and are ethnically diverse countries, but why examine the Afro-Panamanians[65] and Greek Orthodox ethnic

[65] Afro-Panamanians originate from two ancestries. Colonial blacks were brought to Panama during the Atlantic Slave Trade. Afro-Caribbeans came to Panama from Caribbean countries, such as Jamaica, for work, especially on the Panama Canal.

groups? Both ethnic groups are similar along a number of characteristics that associate with ethnic protest, which motivates comparison. Independence demands, for instance, have been found to correlate positively with self-determination movement protest campaigns (Cunningham, 2013). It is critical to test ethnic member likelihood of ethnic protest in contexts where neither ethnic group demands independence. Afro-Panamanians, like Greek Orthodox Lebanese, have not done so, encouraging the comparison.

Studies have demonstrated that self-determination relative group size is correlated with protest campaigns (Cunningham, 2013). Almost counter-intuitively, relatively smaller ethnic groups are more likely to use non-violent protest tactics to make claims against the state and/or other domestic actors. To provide a degree of control over the impact of group size on protest, I select ethnic groups in democratic and non-democratic states that are of similar relative size.

The absolute size of the ethnic group can also impact the likelihood of protest. Larger groups might view protest as an option, as protest size can be a powerful determinant of success rates. The number of Greek Orthodox Lebanese in Lebanon is between approximately 300,000 and 400,000 people. The number of Afro-Panamanians is similar, albeit slightly larger, with approximately 560,000 people.

While tensions have existed between the groups, less hostility exists today. A broader Afro-Panamanian identity is often used. I use the term "Afro-Panamanian" to describe Panamanians who identify as such and regardless of colonial or Caribbean ancestry.

Afro-Panamanians and Greek Orthodox occupy similar geographic conditions. Afro-Panamanians live primarily in urban areas of Panama, such as Panama City and Colon. Small numbers do live in more rural areas, such as Bocas del Toro and Darién Province. Likewise, Greek Orthodox live in urban areas of Lebanon, including the greater Beirut area, in addition to more rural areas such as Koura district.

Both Afro-Panamanians and Greek Orthodox display grievances. While suffering from economic inequality, Afro-Panamanians are not the poorest ethnic group in Panama. Afro-Panamanians also suffer a lack of political power. The ethnic group is not represented proportionally to its population in the national cabinet. Other laws restrict voting for Panamanians who acquired dual citizenship and appear directed toward Afro-Panamanians of West Indian origin.

Lebanese Greek Orthodox, as with other groups in Lebanon, have displayed major political and security grievances. A slogan used by some Christian forces during the country's brutal civil war, نحن هنا وهنا سنبقى (We're here and we're staying), still holds meaning, and menacing signs of نحن هنا (we're here) in the traditionally Greek Orthodox area of Beirut illustrate lingering fear and lingering threat. Growing Shia and Sunni demographics raise fears of losing, and lost, political power. Demographic changes have resulted in many Christians not feeling represented politically, their votes drowning in a sea of Sunni votes, and a sense of lack of

political justice. Moreover, fear of some Lebanese Muslims communities, combined with sectarian tensions in Syria, generate fears of insecurity.[66]

Panama and Lebanon differ in their level of democratic institutions. Panama and Lebanon also have other distinct political institutions. Lebanon's confessional system distributes political and institutional power amongst the country's sectarian groups. One may argue that the confessionalism system makes ethnicity a salient social and political cleavage and makes a directional comparison more challenging. I argue that the theoretical set up, however, mitigates this concern. Political participation on behalf of one's ethnic group should be more likely because of the institutional set up and ethnicity's increased salience. The theoretical argument, however, argues that dual identity will decrease ethnic protest participation in non-democracies. Put differently, ethnic identity in conjunction with national identity decreases participation. One would expect a confessionalism system to encourage ethnic protest participation, but the theoretical argument put forward argues that a simultaneous ethnic and national identity decreases one's likelihood of participating in an ethnic protest. This should make Lebanon a harder case to find evidence in support of the study's hypotheses.

In summary, lack of independence claims, and similar demographic and geographic structures, motivate comparison between Afro-Panamanians and Greek

[66] It is worth nothing that Panama's neighbor, Colombia has also experienced recent civil war.

Orthodox. While not the same along every characteristic, the differences should make support for the study's theoretical expectations harder to find.

Greek Orthodox Lebanese and Afro-Panamanian Survey-experiments

Experiments provide a means by which to control variables that could also contribute to the outcome of interest and allow for controlled variance of the explanatory variable to test its isolated impact. A survey approach would be challenging when studying populations that have more fluid boundaries and population parameters are unclear. The high internal validity of an experimental approach encourages its use.

The major trade-off when it comes to experiments, however, is external validity. By administering a field experiment amongst Afro-Panamanians in Panama and Greek Orthodox in Lebanon, I aim to mitigate those concerns, as respondents come from the population of interest and not an unrelated one (such as American college students or individuals in a democratic society). The experiment takes place within a broad and diverse methodological approach, with the aim to provide evidence of the proposed (mechanisms) suggested in other research avenues.[67]

Examining ethnic protest intentions, as opposed to past ethnic protest participation, is a challenge of the survey-experiment. Addressing this challenge requires creativity. I need to describe to respondents the essential features of each

[67] Experimental studies are becoming increasingly common tools for studying diversity and collective action in economics and political science. See Roth 1995 and Camerer 2003 for reviews.

participation stage (first, second, and third). Identity measurement, however, is more straightforward. The survey-experiment will focus on current identity levels, which do not have the same temporal challenge of measuring past identity.

Sampling Procedure

Because of the fluidity of ethnicity, obtaining a representative sample of ethnic group members is no easy task. Obtaining a representative sample of Greek Orthodox in Lebanon offers even more challenges. Lebanon has suffered from civil war and violence. While currently not experiencing a civil war, the country mimics a conflict zone in terms of lack of trust. In addition to high levels of fear and mistrust, there is no contemporary national census on sectarian groups, as new numbers could produce tensions. Subnational populations are thus difficult to access. As such, a snowball sample was administered to self-identifying Afro-Panamanians over a six-week period (December 2017 – January 2018) and to Greek Orthodox over a three-month period (June 2017 – August 2017).

Snowball sampling is a type of convenience sample used to systematically access critical but hard-to-reach groups. It is ideal for hard-to-identify and marginalized populations. In a conflict zone, all groups may be considered marginalized. Without snowball sampling procedures, marginalized populations might not be included in scholarship, biasing findings. Furthermore, continued interaction within social circles increases trust with the potential to mitigate response bias. Questioning people on identity and protest could potentially generate social desirability bias. The trust involved with snowball sampling can help produce more truthful responses. While the samples cannot be said to be representative at the group

level, the sampling approach proved critical for a project that deals with sensitive subjects such as identity and ethnic protest.

While snowball sampling does not result in a sample representative of the population, used in combination with other techniques, such as quota sampling, this becomes less problematic.[68] Quota sampling refers to the process of defining subgroups within a population, making relative quotas that are comparable to the size in the population, and then meeting those quotas. The process develops "parallel networks of respondents", mitigating concerns regarding the non-representiveness of the sample.

Furthermore, using a nationally representative sample would not allow for representative analysis at the ethnic group level. A representative sample at the national level is not representative of ethnic groups. A snowball sample provides a cost-effective technique to examine self-identifying ethnic group members. Moreover, the high level of trust involved encourages more truthful responses to sensitive questions. A nationally representative survey neither provides group-level representativeness nor is likely to encourage truthful responses.

Because snowball sampling depends heavily on initial contacts, attempts were made to initiate sample chains with diverse respondents. Sample chains were

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[68] Quota sampling refers to the process of defining subgroups within a population, making relative quotas that are comparable to the size in the population, and then meeting those quotas. The process develops "parallel networks of respondents", mitigating concerns regarding the non-representativeness of the sample.

initiated across a diverse range of individuals. I introduced myself as a researcher from the University of Maryland, College Park, studying political participation in diverse societies.[69] In Panama, respondents were recruited from Panama City (Casco Viejo, Santa Ana and Rio Abajo), and different age groups, and men and women were included. In Lebanon, individuals from religious and non-religious backgrounds, Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and North Governance, different ages, and men and women were sought.

Because of the expectation of different male and female participation rates, especially in Lebanon, stratified randomization is employed, and treatment and control prompts are distributed randomly with simple random allocation within a male block and a female block.[70]

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[69] In Panama, I never received questions about my ancestry as there was no doubt that I am not of African descent. In Lebanon, I was usually immediately asked if I was Lebanese, my origin, and my religion. I attempted to deflect questions on my ancestry and vaguely answered (truthfully) that some of my ancestry is from the territory of Romania. This generally resulted in the assumption that I was of Orthodox ancestry and likely generated some ingroup-thinking. This, however, should make it harder to find results amongst dual identity holders, who are theorized to protest at lower levels.

[70] Response rates were high, but this is likely due to the nature of the sampling strategy. Moreover, respondents were not paid for their participation. The motivation behind this decision lies with the fluidity of ethnic identity, especially in

Survey-experiment: Procedure

The survey experiment consists of three treatments and a control.[71] Afro-Panamanians and Greek Orthodox participants are randomly given one of the following: 1) a text describing how unique ethnic/sectarian differences are an essential component of long-term well-being; 2) a text emphasizing that a critical component of well-being in Panama/Lebanon is "thinking about our common identity as Panamanian/Lebanese, without emphasizing ethnic/sectarian differences";[72] 3) a text that discusses the importance of maintaining one's ethnic/sectarian identity while equally valuing identity with broader Panamanian/Lebanese society; or 4) a text on China's economic development that acts as a control. The first text emphasizes and makes salient the ethnic identity; the second, national ties; and the third, dual identity. The texts are based on the prompt used by Ufkes et al. (2016). To reinforce the salience of the identities, participants are asked to write down the "the one best reason why you should focus and think based on your ethnic, national, or dual identity.[73] Figure 3.2 below outlines the procedure of the survey-experiments.

Panama. Respondent compensation could motivate some individuals to identify as Afro-Panamanian when they would not under different circumstances in order to participate in the study and receive compensation.

[71] The survey experiments were conducted in Arabic and Spanish. Some Lebanese and Afro-Panamanian respondents preferred English.

[72] This is taken directly from Glasford and Dovidio (2011).

[73] This follows Walton and Cohen (2011) and Ufkes et al. (2016).

Figure 3.2: *Survey-Experiment Procedure*



Respondents then completed questions on their intentions to participate in protest on behalf of their ethnic group. Protest intentions have often been used in literature pertaining to participation in protests and other forms of collective action (e.g., De Weerd and Klandermans, 1999; Tausch et al., 2011; Ufkes et al., 2016; Wiley et al., 2014) and have been found to associate with actual participation (van Zomeren et al., 2008). Following Ufkes et al. (2016), I use a 7-point scale to gauge ethnic protest intentions.

Because I am interested in first, second, and third movers, respondents are asked three questions on intent to protest. The first question measures how likely individuals are to initiate a protest on behalf of their ethnic group. This variable—

initiate—operates on a seven-point scale.[74] The second question—*second movers*—examines specifically the impact of identity on second movers. Also operating on a seven-point scale, it questions participation intent for a small protest and one that has not yet reached a large size. The question is framed as: *How willing are you to attend a small protest on the political position of Afro-Panamanians/Greek Orthodox in the next two years?* The third mover question highlights a large protest to learn about participation intentions: *How willing are you to attend a large protest on the political position of your sectarian [ethnic] group in the next two years?* The questions were combined to create an overall measure of ethnic protest intentions.

Sample Characteristics: Panama and Lebanon

The Lebanese sample consists of 374 respondents, and 241 men and 133 women participated. The Panama survey had 381 respondents. Two-hundred and twelve men and 169 women participated.

The Panama and Lebanon samples differ along a number of key characteristics. The first is age. The average age of the Lebanon sample is 27.6, while the average age in the Panama sample is 33.4. The level of education is also higher in the Lebanon sample. As mentioned earlier, more men participated in the Lebanon sample.

Eight survey-experiments from the Afro-Panamanian survey and 18 survey-experiments are removed from the Greek-Orthodox survey for several reasons,

[74] This follows other research that uses 7-point scales to measure collective action intentions (e.g., Ufkes et al., 2016).

including lack of variation in responses or incomplete surveys.[75] See Table 3.1 below for descriptive statistics of the two samples. Note that to facilitate and specify comparison between the different identity types, the main analysis does not include the control group.

Table 3.1: *Number of Participants per Treatment and Control Groups*

Panama				Lebanon			
Ethnic	National	Dual	Control*	Ethnic	National	Dual	Control*
92	97	100	92	87	85	96	106

*Control groups were not included in primary analysis.

Variables

I first examine identity's impact on the variables theorized to mediate the relationship between identity and participation: Group anger, belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care, and group efficacy beliefs.

Group anger is measured with a question with a seven-point scale: *When I think about the political situation of my ethnic/sectarian group I feel angry.* Concern for non-ethnic co-nationals is one of the primary means through which identity is theorized to impact ethnic protest participation. I proxy this concept through responses to a statement on how much a respondent believes that non-ethnic co-nationals care about one's ethnic group.[76] Group efficacy beliefs are also measured

[75] The surveys removed refers to those removed from the treatment groups only (not the control groups).

[76] Responses are again on a seven-point agree or disagree scale.

with a 7-response question on whether or not one's ethnic group should give up politically.

I now turn to participation, the main outcome of interest. To examine ethnic protest participation in general, I combine an individual's scores from the three distinct but related ethnic protest intention questions. Combining the scores creates a score of overall inclination to participate in an ethnic protest. The variable ranges from 3 (did not report an intent to participate at the first, second, and third stage) to 21 (reported "very willing" in response to first, second, and third stage ethnic protest intention questions). Table 3.2 below offers descriptive statistics for the dependent and mediating variables.

Table 3.2: *Summary Statistics of Dependent, Independent, and Mediating Variables*

	Variable	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Panama	Combined	281	11.06	4.86	3	21
	Angry	281	3.47	1.74	1	7
	Give up	281	4.72	2.21	1	7
	NECN Care	281	4.38	2.15	1	7
Lebanon	Combined	258	9.88	5.27	3	21
	Angry	258	4.05	2.10	1	7
	Give up	258	4.63	2.03	1	7
	NECN Care	258	4.08	1.96	1	7

As described earlier, the three treatments are the values for the primary independent variable. The independent variable is thus a categorical measure, with three values of identity: ethnic, national, and dual. A control group was also administered and is used in robustness checks.

The survey-experiments also ask several questions that act as control variables. Respondents are asked to list their education levels, age, income, gender, amongst other common demographic questions. While the primary analysis relies on randomization to estimate different effects from the treatment prompts, control variables are used in robustness checks to account for sample differences.

Methods and Analysis:

Identity and Ethnic Protest Participation

To test HA1 and the impact of identity on group anger, the means between the various groups are compared with one-way ANOVA tests.[77] As noted earlier, because of the difference in ethnic protest rates in democracies and non-democracies, I do not make a direct comparison in ethnic protest likelihood between the Panama and Lebanon samples. Rather, I examine the impact of identity in Panama and Lebanon and test the distinct expectations in each context. Regardless of regime type, however, ethnic and dual identity should associate with higher group-based anger compared to national identity.

[77] The sample maintains certain discrepancies from best estimates at the population parameters. To account for these discrepancies, multiple weights were generated to account for gender, age, and occupation and used in robustness checks. The results did not differ significantly.

Amongst Afro-Panamanians [$F(2, 278) = 3.74$, $p < 0.05$)] and Greek Orthodox [$F(2, 255) = 3.32$, $p < 0.05$] results from the one-way ANOVA indicate that identity impacts group anger. Amongst Afro-Panamanians, dual identity respondents reported group anger levels at an intermediate level ($M = 3.43$, $SD = 1.80$). They reported lower levels of anger relative to ethnic identity ($M = 3.84$, $SD = 1.59$), and higher levels compared to national identity holders ($M = 3.16$, $SD = 1.77$).

Table 3.3a: *Identity and Group Anger amongst Afro-Panamanians*

Ethnic	Dual	National	Difference	SE	P - Value
3.84	3.43		-0.41	0.25	0.235
3.84		3.16	-0.69	0.25	0.019
	3.43	3.16	-0.28	0.25	0.512

Results from Tukey's HSD testing indicate that the difference between ethnic and dual identity approaches a conventional level of statistical significance ($p = 0.235$), while the difference between ethnic and national identity was identity reaches a conventional level of statistical significance ($p < 0.05$). The difference between dual and national identity is not significant at conventional levels.[78]

Despite the expectations of HA1, in a democracy, dual identity decreases anger relative to ethnic identity. It is possible that ethnic grievances in democracies are qualitatively different and less severe compared to non-democracies. Because grievances are less severe, it is only by identifying solely with one's ethnic group that group anger develops. Dual identity, with simultaneous identity linkages with one's

[78] Tukey's HSD testing was conducted to determine if differences between treatments reached statistical significance.

national group, may reduce awareness or care of ethnic group disadvantages, which are less severe compared to non-democratic contexts.

Amongst Greek Orthodox, ethnic identity holders reported higher levels of group anger (M = 4.36, SD = 2.13) compared to dual (M = 4.21, SD = 1.90) and national (M = 3.58, SD = 2.21) identity holders. Dual identity holders report group anger at an intermediate level between ethnic and national identity holders. Notably, the difference between ethnic and dual identity is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Both ethnic and dual identity holders are significantly more angry than national identity holders. The difference with ethnic identity reaches conventional levels of statistical significance ($p < 0.05$), and the difference with dual identity approaches statistical significance ($p = 0.11$).[79]

Table 3.3b: *Identity and Group Anger amongst Greek Orthodox*

Ethnic	Dual	National	Difference	SE	p - value
4.36	4.21		-0.15	0.29	0.875
4.36		3.58	-0.78	0.30	0.042
	4.21	3.58	-0.63	0.29	0.116

The results partially confirm HA1. Ethnic and dual identity result in higher levels of group anger compared to national identity, but ethnic identity results in higher group anger compared to dual identity. The difference between ethnic and dual identity does not reach a conventional level of statistical significance, however. To understand how ethnic and dual identity impact participation, it does not appear that group anger plays the largest role.

[79] A Tukey's HSD test was used.

Hypothesis A2 posits that ethnic and dual identity will result in different levels of belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care about one's ethnic group. Again, this difference is not expected to differ depending of regime type.

In both democratic Panama [$F(2, 278) = 8.17$, $p < 0.001$)] and non-democratic Lebanon [$F(2, 255) = 5.39$, $p < 0.01$)], ethnic and dual result in statistically significant differences in non-ethnic co-nationals caring. Amongst Afro-Panamanians, results demonstrate that dual identity holders ($M = 5.06$, $SD = 2.01$) believe that NECN care more about one's ethnic group than ethnic identity holders ($M = 3.81$, $SD = 2.31$).[80] The difference between dual and ethnic identity is significant at conventional levels ($p < 0.01$).

Table 3.4a: *Identity and Belief that Non-Ethnic Co-nationals Care amongst Afro-Panamanians*

Ethnic	Dual	Difference	SE	P - Value
3.81	5.06	1.23	0.31	0.001

As with Afro-Panamanians, amongst Greek Orthodox, dual identity holders ($M = 4.47$, $SD = 1.82$) report higher levels of belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care about

[80] National identity ($M = 4.26$, $SD = 1.99$) holders also believe that NECN care more about one's ethnic group at a higher rate compared to ethnic identity holders ($M = 3.81$, $SD = 2.31$).

their ethnic group compared to ethnic identity holders (M = 3.53, SD = 1.85). The difference between ethnic and dual identity is statistically significant.

Table 3.4b: *Identity and Belief that Non-Ethnic Co-nationals Care amongst Greek Orthodox*

Ethnic	Dual	Difference	SE	p - value
3.53	4.47	0.94	0.29	0.004

In what ways do ethnic and dual identity differ? Hypothesis A2 expects dual identity holders to report higher levels of belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care about their ethnic group—regardless of regime type. The results provide strong evidence in support of the hypothesis. Amongst Afro-Panamanians and Greek-Orthodox, a dual identity holder has a substantively higher level of belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care about one's ethnic group.

I next examine how regime type interacts with identity to produce different outcomes. Hypothesis A3 expects dual identity in democratic Panama to associate with higher group efficacy beliefs. Hypothesis 4A, however, posits that an ethnic and dual identity holder in non-democratic Lebanon are not expected to differ in group efficacy beliefs.

Amongst Afro-Panamanians, group efficacy beliefs does not generate a statistically significant difference between the different values of identity [$F(2, 278) = 2.03$, $p = 0.14$)]. Tukey's HSD testing does not indicate a substantive or statistical difference between ethnic identity (M = 4.83, SD = 2.29) and dual identity (M = 4.98,

SD = 2.34).[81] Overall, HA3 is not confirmed. Dual identity does not associate with a higher level of group efficacy beliefs compared to ethnic identity.

Table 3.5a: *Identity and Group Efficacy Beliefs amongst Afro-Panamanians*

Ethnic	Dual	Difference	SE	P - Value
4.83	4.98	-0.15	0.32	0.89

It is possible that beliefs that originate from belief in the ethnic group itself and belief that the group can be successful through NECN assistance result in different types of thinking about the likelihood of the ethnic protest succeeding. More questions that distinguish between different beliefs in achieving success is needed.

Amongst Greek Orthodox, ethnic and dual identity holders are not expected to have different levels of group efficacy beliefs (HA4). As expected, ethnic (M = 4.86, SD = 1.81) and dual (M = 4.67, SD = 2.11) identity holders reported similar levels of groups efficacy beliefs, and the difference did not reach a conventional level of statistical significance. In Lebanon, dual identity does not increase group efficacy beliefs relative to ethnic identity.

Table 3.5b: *Identity and Group Efficacy Beliefs amongst Greek-Orthodox*

Ethnic	Dual	Difference	SE	P - Value
4.86	4.67	-0.18	0.31	0.825

[81] Both identity types, however, result in higher group efficacy beliefs when compared to the national group (M = 4.36, SD = 1.96). The difference between national and dual identity approaches statistical significance (p = 0.13). The difference between ethnic and national identity is not statistically significant (p = .32).

I turn now the primary outcome of interest: ethnic protest intentions. In Panama, dual identity is expected to correlate positively with ethnic protest (HA5). Furthermore, belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care is expected to positively mediate the relationship (HA6).

Results from the one-way ANOVA indicate that at least some of the differences between the treatment groups reach conventional levels of statistical significance [$F(2, 278) = 7.44$ $p < 0.01$)]. Looking specifically at the differences between ethnic ($M = 11.91$, $SD = 4.77$) and dual identity ($M = 11.79$, $SD = 5.28$), however, there does not appear to be a substantive difference in participation.[82] Results from Tukey's HSD testing indicate that the difference between ethnic identity and dual identity does not reach a conventional level of statistical significance. This conflicts somewhat with existing literature (e.g., Klandermans, 2014) and Hypothesis A5 is not confirmed. Dual identity does not increase ethnic protest likelihood relative to ethnic identity amongst Afro-Panamanians. It should be noted, however, that compared to ethnic identity, and as with other studies (Ufkes et al., 2016), dual identity does not decrease ethnic protest intentions relative to ethnic identity.

Table 3.6a: *Identity and Ethnic Protest Intentions amongst Afro-Panamanians*

Ethnic	Dual	Difference	SE	P - Value
11.91	11.79	-0.12	0.70	0.99

[82] National identity holders reported protest intentions at significantly lower level ($M = 9.55$, $SD = 4.09$) and the differences with ethnic and dual identity reach conventional levels of statistical significance ($p < 0.01$).

Why does dual identity not correlate with higher ethnic protest intentions compared to ethnic identity in Panama? Comments by an individual at an Afro-Panamanian protest in Panama City illustrate the relationship between identity, non-ethnic co-nationals and ethnic protest: "We don't want to cause trouble. We have peaceful intentions." The protestor's comment perhaps relates to stereotypes in Panama which sometimes associate Afro-Panamanians with crime**.** It is possible that in democratic countries with more crime or instability, or with specific ethnic groups perceived as being dangerous, dual identity operates in a similar fashion to dual identity in non-democracies. Ethnic protest in such contexts is regarded with more suspicion, and dual identity does not have the same mobilizing potential.

The results also produce a puzzle. In democracies, ethnic and dual identity holders both express ethnic protest intentions at a similar rate and have similar group efficacy beliefs. Ethnic identity holders, however, express higher levels of group anger, which is a well-tested pathway for group based collective action. Despite the lower levels of group anger, what explains the similar levels of ethnic protest intentions?

Different levels of belief in non-ethnic co-nationals caring is an important distinction between ethnic and dual identity holders. This difference may play an important role in dual identity holders' similar participation rates to ethnic identity

holders. Hypothesis A6 posits the non-ethnic co-nationals caring will mediate positively the relationship between identity and participation.[83]

As suggested by Hayes and Preacher (2013), I use a mediator process model to examine if the impact of identity on ethnic protest intentions is mediated by belief that NECN care.[84] The expectation is that belief in NECU caring will mediate positively the relationship between dual identity and ethnic protest but will not mediate the relationship between ethnic identity and ethnic protest. Confidence intervals are estimated (with 10,000 bootstraps) of the indirect effects of the

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[83] While the theoretical argument suggested that group efficacy beliefs also mediate the relationship between identity and ethnic protest, the lack of a statistically significant difference between ethnic and dual identity and group efficacy beliefs discourage inclusion of group efficacy beliefs in the mediating model. As such, I do not include it, and focus on belief in NECN caring about one's ethnic group as mediating the relationship between identity and ethnic protest participation.

[84] Group anger is not included as a mediating variable because of its strong findings in previous work and to focus on NECN caring as mediating the relationship. As such, a hypothesis was not developed that focused on group anger as mediating the relationship between ethnic/dual identity and ethnic protest participation. Future hypotheses should be developed to examine specifically how differences in group anger mediate the impact of ethnic and dual identity on ethnic protest. Other studies (e.g., Ufkes et al., 2015) examine ethnic versus dual and national identity but look specifically at ethnic versus dual identity.

mediating variables and with a dummy variable: ethnic identity contrasted against dual identity. National identity is not included to test specifically the different mediating effect of belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care. It should be noted that ethnic and dual identity do not produce differences in protest intentions. When running the mediation analysis, the difference should lie with the impact of the mediator, not the likelihood of protest.

I examine the dummy variable, dual identity contrasted with ethnic identity, with belief in NECN caring mediating the relationship. The impact of dual identity on belief in NECN caring is positive and significant $b = 1.23$ ($p<0.01$). Compared to an ethnic identity holder, a dual identity holder believes that non-ethnic co-nationals care more about Afro-Panamanians. But we knew this from the previous analysis. Does this mediating variable then lead to increased protest intentions? Looking at ethnic protest intentions as an outcome, belief in non-ethnic co-nationals caring produces a positive coefficient (0.37) and is statistically significant at a conventional level. The results provide strong evidence that the impact of dual identity on ethnic protest participation flows through belief in non-ethnic co-nationals caring. Ethnic and dual identity have a similar impact on protest intentions, but the pathways are likely distinct. Dual identity generates belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care, which encourages participation. See Figure 3.3 below.

Figure 3.3: *Panama: Dual Identity and the Mediating Impact of Belief in Non-Ethnic Co-Nationals Caring*



The mediating impact of non-ethnic co-nationals caring indicates that dual identity correlates with less group anger compared to ethnic identity. However, dual identity produces another mobilizing feature: belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care about one's ethnic group. Belief in NECN caring mediates the relationship between dual identity and ethnic protest intentions and is consistent with the theoretical logic presented in Chapter 2 and Hypothesis A6.

Amongst Afro-Panamanians, initial results of the mediating variables indicate support for the stated hypotheses. Consistent with H2A, dual identity holders express more belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care about one's ethnic group. This mediates positively the relationship between identity and participation (H6A). It remains to be seen, however, how belief that NECN care about one's ethnic group mediates the relationship with ethnic protest intentions in Lebanon.

I again run a one-way ANOVA but now for Greek Orthodox participants. Results [$F(2, 255) = 8.71$, $p < 0.001$] indicate that a statistically significant (at conventional levels) difference exists between some or all of the treatment groups. Respondents who receive the ethnic identity prompt are the most likely to join an

ethnic protest (M = 11.80, SD = 5.33). The dual identity (M = 9.33, SD = 5.18) prompt decreases the level of protest intentions.[85]

The results from a Tukey's HSD test indicate that, consistent with Hypothesis 7A, ethnic identity holders are significantly more likely to express intent to participate in ethnic protests compared to dual identity holders. Dual identity, relative to ethnic identity, correlates negatively with ethnic protest intentions. The difference between ethnic identity and dual identity reaches a conventional level of statistical significance ($p < 0.01$),[86] which provides strong support for H7A.[87]

Table 3.6b: *Identity and Ethnic Protest Intentions amongst Greek Orthodox*

Ethnic	Dual	Difference	SE	P - Value
11.70	9.33	-2.36	0.77	0.007

The different impacts of ethnic and dual identity on ethnic protest intentions in non-democratic Lebanon is distinct from their impacts in democratic Panama. In democratic Panama, dual identity does not associate positively with ethnic protest

[85] The national identity prompt resulted in the lowest participation intention rates (M = 8.67, SD = 4.88).

[86] The difference between ethnic and national identity was also statistically significant at conventional levels ($p < 0.01$).

[87] National identity correlates negatively with ethnic protest intentions when compared to both ethnic and dual identities. Statistical significance was only reached, however, when compared with ethnic identity.

relative to ethnic identity, but it also does not associate negatively with ethnic protest. That is, Afro-Panamanians in Panama can develop simultaneous ethnic and national identities and not expect decreases in ethnic protest intentions. In Lebanon, however, developing a national identity, even when maintaining an ethnic identity, can result in a decline in ethnic protest intentions.

Why does dual identity associate negatively with ethnic protest participation compared to ethnic identity? Both ethnic and dual identity holders have relatively similar rates of group anger and group efficacy beliefs. Ethnic and dual identity holders differ, however, in their belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care. Hypothesis 8A expects that belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care will mediate negatively the relationship between identity and participation.

I again use a mediation model to examine if belief that non-ethnic co-national caring mediates the relationship between identity and ethnic protest intentions. I am interested specifically in why ethnic identity associates with higher levels of ethnic protest intentions compared to dual identity. As such, I generate a dummy variable comparing ethnic identity to dual identity; national identity is not included. Dual identity is expected to increase belief in NECN caring, which will decrease ethnic protest intentions. This expectation contrasts with the Panama study, where belief in NECN caring associates positively with ethnic protest intentions.

After including belief in NECN caring as a mediating variable in the model, the direct impact of dual identity maintains a negative direct impact on ethnic protest intentions (b = -1.96), which is less than the model without the mediating variable (b = -2.36). As expected, (HA8), dual identity associates positively with NECN caring

(p=0.001), but NECN caring has a negative association with ethnic protest intentions (p=0.04). Approximately 48% of the negative association between dual identity's negative association is mediated by belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care about one's ethnic group. See Figure 3.4 below.

Figure 3.4: *Lebanon: Dual Identity and the Mediating Impact of Belief in Non-Ethnic Co-Nationals Caring*



With a negative coefficient, the NECN mediator illustrates a significant contrast with the Afro-Panamanian study. Dual identity produces more belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care, but this does not translate to increased ethnic protest intentions. It has the opposite effect and discourages ethnic protest participation. Amongst Greek Orthodox, developing identity linkages to the national group can reduce ethnic protest intentions, even when simultaneous ethnic linkages exist. As one respondent reported, "Why would I protest? This is just going to make Sunnis protest—and worse than that. For what benefit? You know what's happening in Syria? We lived through that." The respondent's words highlight feelings of insecurity that may

permeate non-democratic societies. In such contexts, ethnic protest may not be considered a legitimate, or safe, act of political participation.

Conclusion

The results from Chapter III present initial support for some of the theoretical logic. In democracies, dual identity does not discourage ethnic protest and generates ethnic protest intentions at a similar rate compared to ethnic identity. The reasons behind ethnic and dual identity encouraging protest are not the same, however. Ethnic identity generates higher levels of group anger which results in higher ethnic protest intentions. Dual identity, however, generates ethnic protest intentions through higher belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care about one's ethnic group.[88]

In non-democracies, the relationship between identity and ethnic protest differs. Dual identity does not generate ethnic protest intentions to the same extent as ethnic identity. More strangely, both ethnic and dual identity produce relatively similar levels of group anger, making the difference between ethnic protest intentions a puzzle.

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[88] At the first glance, the results are somewhat at odds with recent research on how dual identity in Catalonia reduces the polarizing impact of conflict on identity (Hierro and Gallego, 2018). In such conflict situations, a dual identity holder may withdrawal from politics. Catalonia is a region where independence is a demand, however. Ethnic protests in democracies that have independence demands look more like Hirschman's "Exit" and not "Voice" and may be more illegitimate as a political tactic. It is likely that dual identity does not a mobilizing impact in such contexts.

Belief in non-ethnic co-nationals caring for one's ethnic group provides an answer. Unlike in Panama, belief in non-ethnic co-nationals plays a different role in Lebanon and discourages ethnic protest. Dual identity, through higher belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care about one's ethnic group, discourages ethnic protest.

Overall, the results from this chapter provide significant support for how regime type structures the relationship between identity and ethnic protest. What this chapter does not do, however, is examine the impact of regime type and identity on different stages of an ethnic protest. The next chapter examines how the impact of identity varies depending on the stages of an ethnic protest and tests empirically the hypotheses generated in Chapter II.

Chapter 4: Ethnic Protest: First, Second, and Third Movers

"At first, we didn't care about sect. But as time passed, it become more important."

Syrian Sunni Arab organizer of 2011 protests in Deraa, Syria

Introduction

This chapter addresses how identity impacts ethnic protest participation during distinct stages. Addressing ethnic protest stages helps us understand how micro-level behavior impacts macro-level behavior. When second and third movers are mobilized, or are more likely to mobilize, larger and more frequent ethnic protests should develop.

Two distinct forms of evidence are used. I first use evidence from the survey-experiments in Panama and Lebanon to show how identity impacts participation. Second, evidence from interviews with Syrian Sunni Arabs on the protests that erupted in Syrian in 2011 are used to illustrate the argument in a non-democratic context. These two distinct forms of evidence offer complementary approaches to testing the relationship. Using a combination of the two methodologies provides leverage over this dissertation's question.

Testing participants in Lebanon in addition to those in Syria provides juxtaposition of different levels of non-democratic regimes—the hybrid Lebanese political system and the more authoritarian one in Syria. A test of both countries provides theory generalizability and relevance.

Perhaps more significantly, the Syrian Civil War has resulted in more than a quarter of a million deaths, generated the worst migration crisis in recent years, and created new political and humanitarian challenges for the European Union and the rest of world. In Tunisia and Egypt, populations mobilized in opposition to their governments. The governments restricted their use of violence against protestors. The Syrian regime, however, maintained a significant number of supporters and much support from security forces. The conflict and its origin occupy an important case that, despite the methodological difficulties, merit attention and study.

Survey-experiments and Interviews: What Do We Gain

The survey-experiments are used to exogenously distribute identity type, reducing concern that identity is a product of past ethnic protest or of a confounding variable. The Panama and Lebanon survey-experiments, however, are not perfect. Survey-experiments perform less well with ethnic protest attitudes acting as a proxy for ethnic protest participation. Examining ethnic protest attitudes as a proxy for ethnic protest is especially challenging when dealing with the nuances of participation during ethnic protest stages.

To address this concern, interviews with Syrians offer the opportunity to gain leverage on measuring if a protestor was a first, second, or third mover. Unlike the survey-experiments, researching Syrian protestors allows for coding of real protest participation. It does not rely on protest intentions. Examining past protest participation is better suited to questions that try to identify mover types—and in a highly authoritarian context. It provides a better indication of temporally distinct acts of participation, which is a weakness when dealing with protest intentions.

Using interviews to understand collective identity and ethnic protest has other advantages. First, social desirability bias is a real concern when dealing with sensitive issues such as identity and ethnic protest participation. Interviews can establish high levels of trust and encourage respondents to say their beliefs. In more dangerous contexts, maintaining a comfortable environment for participants to feel free to speak is especially important.

Second, interviews help the researcher understand identity in practical terms and how it translates to practice. Discussing sensitive questions, such as a person's past participation in protests and feelings toward other social groups, could require deeper and more vivid analysis than what surveys and experiments provide (see Wood 2003: 32). One-on-one interviews provide real insight into how respondents articulate their thinking on questions related to the subject matter.

The interviews offer their own challenges, especially capturing past identity levels. The challenge of past identity is addressed by using questions on social distance as identity measurements. This helps to mitigate the difficulties of remembering one's past emotions and identity links.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The survey-experiments are first discussed, and results provided. It then turns to Syria and justifies why a focus on Syria helps answer this dissertation's question. Because Syrians are hard to access, Syrian refugees, along with a number of Syrians in Syria, are used as a sample. A brief background on Syrian history and the development of the 2011 protests is then given. Identity and participation measurements are next described. Finally, analysis of the

interviews provides insight into how identity impacted first, second, and third mover participation in the 2011 protests in Syria.

Survey-experiments

The survey-experiments described in Chapter III are again used to test the relationship between identity and participation. After a manipulation treatment or control, participants in Panama and Lebanon were asked three questions on ethnic protest intentions.

Dependent Variables

I again use the three protest-related questions but do not aggregate them as was done in Chapter III. To reiterate, the three questions are used to distinguish between participation at the first, second, and third stages. The first mover question seeks insight into participants' likelihood of organizing a protest: How willing are you to organize a protest on the political position of your sectarian [ethnic] group in the next two years? The second mover question emphasizes that a small protest has already formed but social pressures remain low: How willing are you to attend a small protest on the political position of your sectarian [ethnic] group in the next two years? The third mover question highlights a large protest to learn about participation intentions: How willing are you to attend a large protest on the political position of your sectarian [ethnic] group in the next two years?

Independent Variable

The independent variable is the same treatments described in Chapter III (See page 84). One difference remains. I am concerned primarily with the different

impact of ethnic and dual identity. To simplify analysis and highlight the differences between ethnic and dual identity, I generate a dichotomous independent variable that compares ethnic identity (0) to dual identity (1). Respondents in the national identity group and the control group are not included in the analysis.

Table 4.1: *Descriptive Statistics for Panama and Lebanon and Mover Types*

	Variable	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Panama	Initiate	281	3.27	1.78	1	7
	Small	281	3.78	1.89	1	7
	Large	281	4.01	2.09	1	7
Lebanon	Initiate	258	3.06	1.87	1	1
	Small	258	3.24	1.95	1	7
	Large	258	3.58	2.07	1	7

Statistical Analysis

Seemingly unrelated regression examines the impact of identity on first, second, and third movers in the Panama and Lebanon samples.[89] Seemingly unrelated regression is appropriate because of expected similar values of the dependent variables. It is unlikely that the equation errors will not be correlated across the three models (first, second, third movers). A seemingly unrelated regression model allows one to examine the related outcomes even though there may be correlation in the equation errors.

[89] Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) is not employed because of correlation between the dependent variables.

Results

I first discuss identity and participation in democratic Panama. Hypothesis B1 expects dual identity to have the strongest impact on second movers. Analysis in Chapter III suggests that ethnic and dual identity holders in Panama do not express intent to protest at different rates. It is still possible, however, that intentions may differ at different stages of an ethnic protest.

The results in Table 4.2 show results for intentions to initiate a protest (Model 1); to join a small protest (Model 2); and to join a large protest (Model 3). Model 1 shows that dual identity has a negative correlation with first movers. More in line with theoretical expectations, dual identity produces a positive correlation for second movers (Model 2). Notably, the coefficient is not significant at conventional levels. The coefficient for the third movers model is also positive and is slightly larger than that of the second movers model. It is also not statistically significant at a conventional level. The lack of statistical significance is due to the similar protest intention rates between ethnic and dual identity.

The results are suggestive of dual identity's larger impact on second movers. Still, a statistically significant difference with ethnic protest is not found. HB1 is not supported.

Table 4.2: *Seemingly Unrelated Regression on Protest Stages, Dual vs. Ethnic Identity, Panama*

Variables	(1) First Movers	(2) Second Movers	(3) Third movers
Dual Identity	-0.395	0.129	0.145
	(0.273)	(0.291)	(0.322)

Constant	3.711***	3.956***	4.244***
	(0.196)	(0.209)	(0.231)
Observations	185	185	185
R-squared	0.011	0.001	0.001

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

I next examine the impact of dual identity on intentions to join different stages of an ethnic protest among Greek Orthodox. The results are found in Table 4.3 below. They offer support with regard to Hypothesis B2, which expects that dual identity will have a decreasing impact on participation over the stages.

As an ethnic protest grows, dual identity holders are less likely to express ethnic protest intentions—relative to ethnic identity holders. For first movers, the coefficient for the dual identity measurement is -0.55 (p=0.54). For second movers, the dual identity measure procures a coefficient of -0.777 (p <0.01). The coefficient for third movers is -1.034 (p<0.01). Turning to the substantive significance of the results, dual identity decreases the likelihood of ethnic protest over the course of the protest intention measures.

Table 4.3: *Seemingly Unrelated Regression on Protest Stages, Dual vs. Ethnic Identity, Lebanon*

Variables	(1) First Movers	(2) Second Movers	(3) Third Movers
Dual Identity	-0.551*	-0.777***	-1.034***
	(0.286)	(0.296)	(0.309)
Constant	3.518***	3.831***	4.349***
	(0.208)	(0.215)	(0.224)
Observations	175	175	175

R-squared	0.021	0.038	0.060

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

While mixed, the results from Tables 4.2 and 4.3 indicate that identity type can have a large impact during the later stages of an ethnic protest. The results are especially strong in the Lebanon sample and has implications for less democratic contexts. As ethnic protests grow larger and develop, dual identity appears to play a stronger role in demobilizing ethnic members.[90]

Ethnic protest may emerge for a variety of local reasons unrelated to ethnicity, such as land grabs or police brutality. One Panamanian respondent spoke to me after the survey-experiment about a local grievance in the mainly Afro-Panamanian community: gentrification and lack of housing for poor people. A small protest had emerged. As it emerged, the protest moved beyond local issues affecting the local Afro-Panamanian community to issues affecting Afro-Panamanians in other parts of Panama, as well. When ethnicity is a salient societal division, local protests may develop ethnic characteristics and identity plays a larger mobilizing role.

[90] It is possible that the ethnic protest intention questions here do not capture the conceptual divisions specified in the article's theoretical story. Respondents, for instance, may have viewed, "small protests" as the beginning of a protest. More work should examine how to measure protest intentions at different stages of an ethnic protest.

Interviews

To complement the statistical analysis, I test the relationship between identity and participating at different stages using interviews with Syrian refugees in Lebanon and with Syrian Sunni Arabs over Whatsapp.[91] Interviews were conducted over two and a half months of fieldwork in the summer of 2018.

Why Syria and Why Sunni Arabs

Like Lebanon, Syria has characteristics that make it an appropriate case to study. The country is non-democratic and the government, while not always perfectly, worked to create a national identity amongst its diverse population.[92] Main ethnic (linguistic and sectarian) groups include Sunni Arabs, Alawites, Ismailis, Druze, Kurds, Turkmens, various Christian sects, and other smaller groups, which combine to form one of the more diversified societies in the Middle East. The non-democratic Syrian regime, the large number of ethnic groups, attempts at generating national

[91] Institutional Review Board approval was obtained from the University of Maryland [Project title is (1221976-2)].

[92] Sectarian and linguistic differences are not the only cleavages existing in Syrian society. Religious vs. secular, urban vs. rural, regional, class/industry sector, and tribal/clan distinctions all exist and divide society. While there has been some discussion on the role of class, economic sector, tribe, and clan influencing political behavior throughout the Syrian protests and subsequent civil war, sectarian differences appear to have had the largest, most apparent, and broadest effect.

identity, and past instances of protest participation provide meaningful motivation to study Syria.

This section focuses on Sunni Arab participation in the 2011 protests in Syria. Much attention, inside and outside of Syria, has focused on the role of ethnic, or sectarian, differences in the Syrian conflict.[93] While sect appears to play a stronger role as the conflict developed, much debated focused on whether the protests were sectarian or national. Just as ethnic identity is sometimes hard to observe, ethnic protest is not always easy to distinguish. Participation as a function of identity should be a better explanation when protests are explicitly ethnic. By focusing on protests that maintained some association with sect, but also had national elements, the 2011 protests offer a hard test for the theoretical expectations.

Sunni Arabs are not a homogenous community. People are divided on religiosity, Sufism, radicals, geography, region, and sometimes tribe and/or clan (Balanche, 2018). Prior to 2011, approximately 65% of Syria consisted of Sunni Arabs. This number could be further diminished if Sunni Arabs who have tribal identities (approximately 15%) are counted as being part of a distinct social group.

Sunni Arabs were the majority population. Still, their numbers were not large enough to the point that they did not need allies to achieve success. Sunni Arabs

[93] When discussing Syrian (and Lebanon), I use the terms "ethnic" and "sect" interchangeably. Sect in Syria is often considered an ethnic marker (e.g., Ethnic Power Relations data).

needed (some) non-ethnic co-nationals to respond positively to the protests. As such, the theoretical logic of non-ethnic co-national support should function.

Sectarian Silence and Sectarian Salience: Background

Syria has often been characterized by the irony of sectarian silence and sectarian salience. Much attention has been placed on the sectarian nature of the Syrian civil war. The (apparently) extreme non-sectarian rhetoric during the rule of Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad raises questions on why the conflict would ostensibly develop along sectarian divisions. This section addresses the sectarian background in Syria and its influence on the protests of 2011.

Under the Ottoman millet system, Sunnis and Shias were nominally listed as Muslim. Jews and a number of Christian sects/denominations had degrees of autonomy. Other sectarian groups, including Alawites, Druze, and Ismaili were considered heterodox. Alawites and other such groups faced geographic and social ostracization and were pushed to the mountains. In the nineteenth century, poverty and violence encouraged some Alawites to farm the lands of rich Sunnis in Latakia and the province of Homs.

Under the French Mandate, ethnic group dynamics changed. Sunni Arab urban elites were disadvantaged by France's explicitly minorities policy (Ajami, 2013: 19). Greater Syria was divided, with a mandate territory named the State of the Alawites (later named "Latakia").

What was essentially Alawite autonomy did not last. Pressure from forces in Damascus, often Sunni Arab urban elites, ended Alawite autonomy. For some Alawites, this nationalism stemming from Damascus was Sunni Arab domination

clothed in ideals of a greater Syria (Ajami, 2013: 20). A petition signed by six Alawite nobles and sent to the French Government described the nationalists as having a "spirit of hatred and fanaticism imbedded in the hearts of the [Sunni] Arab Muslims against everything that is non-Muslim" (Ajami, 2013: 21). (One of the signatories was an Alawite peasant named Sulayman al-Assad. He was known as a strict disciplinarian with his children. His son, Hafez al-Assad, would develop a similar reputation for discipline.) Alawite opposition, however, could not overcome pressures from Sunni Arab urban elites. The Sunni Arab urban elites had their way and developed their own polity—at least initially. Alawite autonomy was gone.

The favored relationship Alawites had enjoyed under the French, however, had lasting consequences. Under the French Mandate, Alawites were recruited heavily into the Troupes Speciales du Levant. Military service offered a path down the mountain and out of poverty and did not rely on sharecropping for a rich Sunni Arab landowner in Latakia or Homs. Alawites traded their shovels for swords, rakes for rifles, and swelled the ranks of the security forces. The loss of Alawite autonomy would ironically lead to Alawite ascension.

Dominating the security forces overturned the seemingly natural order of things. Alawite domination of the security forces led to political power. For Sunni Arab urban elites, Syria was meant to be theirs. Historian Martin Kramar writes, "Alawite ascendance left the Sunnis disillusioned, betrayed by the ideology of Arabism which they themselves had concocted." He continues, "The Alawis, having been denied their own state by the Sunni nationalists, had taken all of Syria instead. Arabism,

once a convenient divide to reconcile minorities to Sunni rule, now was used to reconcile Sunnis to the rule of minorities"[94]

Hafez al-Assad came into power in 1970. He quickly began to consolidate power. With consolidation of power came the ascension of his Alawite clan (Kalbyeh), which led to relative political losses of historically more dominant Alawite clans, including the Haddadin and Khayatin. Kalbyeh political ascension did not necessarily originate from an ideology of clan supremacy but from a process of promoting relatives to powerful positions.

Ever considerate of the costs of excluding non-Kalbyeh members of the Alawite community, Assad made an effort to find positions for Haddadin and Khayatin. To maintain power, he also pursued alliances with some non-Alawite communities to broaden support. By promoting fellow Kalbyeh members and consolidating power, Alawites were placed disproportionately in top positions central to maintaining control of power. Even from an early period (1970-77), main figures in the army and internal security forces were 61.3% Alawite (Balanche, 2018). Only 35.5% were Sunni.[95] The army's various divisions were led disproportionally by Alawites.

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[94] Syria's Alawis and Shi'ism (as cited in Ajami, 2013: 25)

[95] Because of the large Sunni population, favoritism sometimes extended to certain Sunni subgroups, partly to keep divided the broader Sunni population (Balanche, 2006).

Sectarian favoritism was central to the security system, as well.[96] Economic favoritism gave the Alawites (as a group) more economic opportunity, especially in the large public sector (Balanche, 2018).

Hafez al-Assad recognized the visibility of Alawite political, economic, and security power and was cognizant of potential Sunni grievances. He strived to remove discussions on sect from public discourse and politics. He was not always successful. In 1973, soon after taking power, Assad attempted to enact a constitution that did not have *Sharia* as the source of law and did not require the president of Syria to be Muslim (Porat, 2010). Sunni protests and riots, led by the Muslim Brotherhood and religious leaders, followed in Hama, Homs, and Aleppo. In line with events 40 years later, clashes and deaths ensued between troops and protestors.[97] In response, *Sharia* as the source of law was reinstated in the constitution. A clause demanding that the head of state is Muslim was also kept.[98]

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[96] *La Syrie de Bashar al- Asad* [The Syria of Bashar al-Assad] (as cited in Balanche, 2018)

[97] The clashes of 1973 were the not the first with the Muslim Brotherhood. Nine years before, in 1964, the newly-in-power Baath party clashed with the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama.

[98] At the same time, Hafez al-Assad worked to portray Alawites as Muslim to help satisfy this requirement. Alawites had sometimes been considered as non-Muslims by some Sunni Arabs (and others). Assad strived to highlight and create similarities that Alwites religion shared with more mainstream forms of Islam. While working to

The 1973 clashes and protest deaths were not the end to sectarian strife. Threats to the regime, especially coming from the Muslim Brotherhood, were treated harshly. In the late 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood began a major rebellion and used violence against the regime. Alawites in a number of major Syrian cities were sometimes targets. Alawite villages in the countryside surrounding Idlib were targeted, as well (Balanche, 2018: 8). Violence culminated with the regime crushing the Muslim Brotherhood and Hama, a predominantly Sunni Arab city, in 1982. While Hama was crushed, its memory was not.

Hafez al-Assad died in June 2000. His son, Bashar al-Assad took control of the country. The then 34-year-old eye doctor initially raised expectations for reform. During the Damascus Spring, a degree of political space was opened. The political space was short-lived, however. Government repression cracked down on those involved in political openings.

The crackdown coincided with economic transition. Market reforms required cutting subsidies and services. Ties between government and business led to

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make Alawites perceived as part of mainstream Islam, Assad also used religion to consolidate his position and legitimacy within the Alawite community. To bolster his family's historically weak position in the broader Alawite community, Hafez al-Assad politicized Alawite Sheiks to obtain religious authority within the community. He became the honorary president of the Council of the Alawite Sect (Balanche, 2018: 118). This council was used heavily to unify Alawites under a perceived Sunni threat during the conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood.

individuals, often connected to the regime, massing wealth with the new economic opportunities (Lesch, 2013). At the same time, the government neglected other subpopulations, especially those in rural areas. A drought and poor government response worsened conditions.

Both Hafez and Bashar al-Assad used the rhetoric of Syrian nationalism to deny the existence of sectarianism. Yet, sectarian differences were used strategically when the timing was right.[99] Sect served as an important division. Even before the protests, Bashar al-Assad presented himself as the "protector of minorities" and as the only alternative to Islamic (Sunni) terrorism.[100] The Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, was an explicitly sectarian organization that threatened the regime. Hafez al-Assad mobilized along identity lines to counter the threat. Despite the reluctance to explicitly state the prioritization of sectarian identities, in practice sectarian divisions remained strong and present. A level of mistrust based on sectarian division existed and was maintained.[101]

In the political, economic, and security sectors, sect played an important role in determining power dynamics. At the same time, open discussions on ethnic and identity were often discouraged and punished. The conflicting approach to sect often resulted in a confusing idea of sect's importance for Syrian civilians. The seemingly

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[99] This is especially seen in the army's and other security apparatus' demographic make-ups.

[100] Stolleis, (ed.) (2015).

[101] Stolleis, (ed.) (2015).

secular and national-identity based society was deceptive. Socially, for instance, important divisions characterized sectarian relations. High levels of intermarriage between sectarian groups were not found.[102] Talking about ethnoreligious differences in public was uncommon. The lack of dialogue was not due to a lack of meaningful differences. The subject was taboo and considered explosive.

Ignoring sectarian differences did not lead to a national cohesive society and identity. It often led to ignorance between the various communities, which ironically generated mistrust. The irony of sectarian silence and sectarian salience continued through the 2011 Syrian protests.

Sectarianism and the 2011 Protests in Syria

Protests broke out in Tunisia in 2010 and then in Egypt and Libya in early 2011. As Syrians watched events unfold, many were cognizant of Syria's unique situation. Assad was not afraid to use force. He also had domestic supporters and depended less on the United States compared to Egypt. Despite the proximity to major revolutions, a Syrian revolution still did not appear feasible. Assad in an interview with the Wall Street Journal stated, "Syria is stable. Why? Because you have to be very closely linked to the beliefs of the people" (Lesch, 2013: 40). He was confident in the reforms he had implemented. Foreign policy, especially a perceived lack of

[102] While the upper classes in Syria experienced higher levels of marriages between sects, the lower classes did not experience high levels of marrying outside of their sects (see Osseiran, H. (2018, March 6). How Sectarianism Can Help Explain the Syrian War).

complicity in the Arab-Israeli problem, was seen as a stronghold of regime stability. Assad portrayed Syria as immune from unrest—as long as he was in power (Lesch, 2013: 49). Calls for protests in January and February (from inside and outside of the country) did not amount to much and did not seem to have the same energy in Syria as elsewhere.

Syria differed from Egypt in its diversity and location. Much attention has been placed on post-protest sectarianization of the conflict, but Assad portrayed himself as the only point of safety well before 2011 (Lesch, 2013: 50). Both Assad the son and Assad the father played up minority fears of the dangers of a future Sunni regime. Memory of the Muslim Brotherhood insurrection, as well as sectarian strife in neighboring Lebanon and Iraq, served as reminders and warnings. The regime used and created this fear.

Syria also differed from Egypt in the relationship between the armed forces and the regime. Military and security services had a tied fate to the regime. Moreover, most of the loyal divisions consisted primarily of Alawites (Lesch, 2013: 51).

Notably some of the initial protests in Syria were organized by secular activists with explicitly non-sectarian views. Suheir al-Atassi led a protest in Damascus' Bab Touma, a Christian area.[103] Other small protests occurred in Damascus and smaller cities and included more long-term activists, including Al-Atassi and Damascus

[103] QandA: Syrian activist Suhair Atassi. (2011, February 9)

University philosophy professor, Tayeb Tizini.[104] A number of other small protests were attempted but hampered by state repression.

On 6 March 2011, fifteen Deraa teenagers were famously arrested for writing the classic line of the Arab Spring, "الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام" ("The people want the regime to fall").[105] The parents of the children went to the authorities for their release. The prison authorities replied, "Forget your children. If you want children, make more children. If you don't know how, bring us your women and we will make them for you."[106] The parents were denied and insulted; the boys stayed in prison.

On 15 March 2011, a few hundred protestors held a protest in front of the Omari Mosque in Deraa. Their numbers grew until the protest consisted of a few thousand people. Syrian security forces opened fire. Four protestors died.

Three days later, on Friday, 18 March, a day dubbed as the "Day of Rage", approximately 20,000 protestors took to the streets of Deraa. After Friday prayers,

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[104] Middle East unrest: Syria arrests Damascus protesters. (2011, March 16). BBC

[105] Kurds also marched on 11 and 12 March, but this is an annual event.

[106] Tarabay, J. (2018, March 15). For many Syrians, the story of the war began with graffiti in Dara'a. *CNN*. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/15/middleeast/daraa-syria-seven-years-on-intl/index.html

families, friends, and other people began chanting, "We want our kids out of prison."[107] The protests had soon expanded to include second and third movers.

The next Friday, 25 March, protests again erupted. In what was the beginning of a trend, people took to the streets after Islamic Friday prayers. Tens of thousands of protestors took to the streets in Deraa. The city remained the epicenter of the protests, and Deraa's Omari mosque served as a focal point for mobilization. The suburbs of Damascus, Latakia, Baniyas, Homs and other cities also saw protests—and death. Syrian security forces opened fire on protestors across the country, killing dozens of people.[108]

Over the next six months, protests spread throughout Syria. They did not spread everywhere, however. The spread of protests correlated highly with sectarian geography.[109] Protests tended to emerge and concentrate in Sunni-dominated areas, such as Houran (except Sweida) and Homs. In governorates with strong minority presences, protests did not emerge as frequently. Sweida, for instance, has a history of rebellious activity. Yet, the protests that emerged in neighboring Deraa did not spread to there.

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[107] Asher-Schapiro, A. (2016, March 15). The Young Men Who Started Syria's Revolution Speak About Daraa, Where It All Began

[108] Slackman, M. (2011, March 25). Syrian Troops Open Fire on Protesters in Several Cities. *New York Times*

[109] Balanche, Fabrice. (2018). Sectarianism in Syria's Civil War.

In governorates and cities that were mixed demographically, the Sunni areas experienced more protests.[110] In Latakia, Tartous, Homs and the suburbs of Damascus, for instance, Sunni Arab neighborhoods saw large numbers of protestors.[111] Alawite neighborhoods saw less or none. Using the terminology of this dissertation, non-ethnic co-nationals were less likely to support the mainly Sunni Arab protestors. On the contrary, crowds of (often state-sponsored) pro-Assad protestors came out in Damascus, Aleppo, Hasaka, Homs and Hama. Slogans such as "We will sacrifice our lives and blood for you, Bashar"[112] highlighted the high costs of political protest in Syria.

On 30 March, Assad gave his first post-protest speech to the nation. In continuation of decades of using a sectarian-based strategy, Assad emphasized minority fears to maintain support. This is not surprising given the fears of a Sunni regime that both Hafez and Bashar al-Assad used. The Bashar al-Assad-led regime worked hard to portray the protestors as a product of a foreign conspiracy and/or Islamic terrorists. Assad's speech highlighted the potential danger of Islamic

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[110] Balanche, Fabrice. (2018). Sectarianism in Syria's Civil War.

[111] Damascus, as the seat of the regime's power, was tightly regulated. In the highly Sunni Arab neighborhood of Midan, protests did emerge. As I was living in Midan at the time, tensions rose dramatically. Checkpoints with plainclothes men with Alawite accents became common.

[112] Syria unrest: Pro-Assad rallies in Damascus and Aleppo. (2011, March 29). *BBC*

extremism.[113] Protestors were often described as "armed gangs" or "terrorists", which were sectarian-coded terms for Sunni Arab.[114]

Sunni Arab Protests?

Describing the conflict as a purely ethnic battle between Sunni Arabs and Alawites is clearly an exaggeration. Some Sunni Arabs sided with the Assad regime, most famously some of the merchant class and certain tribes.[115] Some Alawites sided against the regime, while others maintained a neutral stance.

While there were nationalist elements to the protests that erupted across Syria in early 2011, the protests also maintained strong sectarian characteristics. And, as was the case during attempts to end the State of Alawites at the end of the French Mandate, nationalism was often used to justify sectarian power dynamics.

In many ways, the Syrian protests of 2011 mirrored the sectarian situation prior to the outbreak of contention: sectarian silence and sectarian salience. Taken without context, overthrowing the regime is a non-sectarian demand. Because sectarian distinctions correlated so highly with the regime, however, a sectarian understanding develops of the protests.

As described above, sectarian distinctions were important in the regime. Alawites were placed disproportionally in the political, economic, and security

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[113] Stolleis, (ed.) (2015).

[114] The similarity with the racially-coded word "thug" in the United States stands out.

[115] Dukhan, H. (2012, December 19). Tribes and tribalism in the Syrian revolution. *OpenDemocracy*

spheres. Perceptions of sectarian distinctions were perhaps even stronger. Sunni Arab perceptions of Alawite domination sometimes resulted in untrue myths. The almost mythical security sector(s), for instance, was heavily associated with Alawites. Security members were often perceived to be everywhere. A common, and likely highly exaggerated, assumption was that one in four people were informers. Because of recruitment trends in the security sector, Alawites were often suspected of being informants. Alawite predominance in the government and military commonly made Sunni Arabs associate sect with power. Perceptions of Alawite predominance generated even further belief that sect and power were linked—likely more than they actually were. Alawites were highly associated with the regime and thus corruption. A common Syrian joke illustrates the perception of close association between Alawites and the regime. It also illustrates the perceived secondary role of Christians in maintaining the regime.

> A teacher enters one of the elementary school classes in the beginning of the year in a village with an Alawite majority. The teacher asks the student sitting in the first seat to state his name. The student replies that his name is "Ali."
>
> The teacher: "What is your ambition in the future, Ali?"
>
> Ali: "I want to be an intelligence officer."
>
> The teacher turns to another student and asks him his name. The second student replies that his name is Ali, as well.
>
> The teacher: "What is your ambition in the future, Ali?"
>
> Ali 2: "I want to be a pilot officer."

> The question is repeated and repeated, and the same answer is repeated and repeated. Everyone is named "Ali." All the boys dream of becoming an officer in the security or military or government sectors. Finally, the teacher reaches a scared student in the last seat of the class. The teacher asks his name, and he replies, "George."
>
> The teacher: "What is your ambition in the future, George?"
>
> George: "I hope to be Ali"[116]

There were protestor attempts to portray the opposition as non-sectarian. The inclusive rhetoric of many of the protestors was not sufficient, however. Deep-seated mistrust amongst sectarian groups[117] required something more than intermittent inclusive rhetoric to overcome deep divisions. Protests emerging from Mosques after Friday prayers colored the protests in a sectarian light. Extremist Sunni figures, such as Adnana Al-Ar'our became more mainstream; and not enough was done to paint the protests as not having a sectarian dimension. One opposition figure states, "Nowadays they're [the opposition groups] looking for one Christian, two Alawites, three Druze, and then they say they're representative."[118] Often opposition to the

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[116] This is a common joke. The translation is my own.

[117] In Baniyas, for instance, the corniche was informally divided between Sunnis and Alawites before 2011 (Shaabo, 2013).

[118] Lund (2012)

regime was expected to be a given.[119] Opposition figures gave less attention to minority concerns of what a new Syria would look like and did not take sufficient steps to make broader appeals.

The protests raised fears of political and economic redistribution of power, which inherently had a sectarian characteristic. Removing Assad implied a redistribution of power. With Sunni Arabs disadvantaged by the current power structure, a regime-change would be to their power. It is worth nothing that prior to 2011 the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, an explicitly Sunni organization, was voicing hope for civil protests in Syria. In language reminiscent to the actual protests that emerged, Muslim Brotherhood leaders hoped that "the Syrian people will perform its duty and liberate Syria from the tyrannical and corrupt regime."[120] In a country and region where political inequalities have implications for ethnic relations, regime change would benefit the Sunni Arab population.

Some protests in 2011 did have explicitly sectarian demands. In Baniyas, for instance, protestors made claims on behalf of Sunnis (14). Favoritism, especially in a minority-in-power context, had generated Sunni Arab resentment and sometimes

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[119] Even Alawites with strong opposition to the Assad regime did not view the alternative as viable or open to Alawites. Fadi, for instance, has family in the army and secret service but has no misgivings about the regime's brutality. The opposition, however, was not viewed as a viable alternative. Fadi does not believe the opposition would accept him because he is Alawite (Stolleis, (ed.) (2015): 21, 22).

[120] See Porat (2010: 6).

hostility toward Alawites. One demand in some Baniyas protests was government creation of 3000 local jobs at an oil refinery to counter high unemployment rates amongst Sunni youths (Balanche, 2018). In Latakia, riots erupted in anger of local authority positions being occupied by Alawites. Often emerging from Sunni mosques, the 2011 protests maintained a Sunni Arab element that gradually increased over time.

In sum, the Syrian protests of 2011 maintained national and sectarian characteristics. The protest characteristics varied geographically as well as over time. The variation in national and sectarian characteristics highlight the challenge and messy work of applying concepts to actual examples. The mix of national and sectarian characteristics makes Syria a hard case to examine the theoretical arguments as the conflict varied it its level of "ethnic protest."

Non-ethnic Co-national Responses to the Protests in Syria

As protests emerged primarily in Sunni Arab-dominated areas, how did non-ethnic co-nationals respond? As done before, the regime encouraged sectarianization of the conflict and painted itself as the protector of minorities.

The regime often used Alawite elements of the military and the multiple Alawite-dominated organizations and *Shabihas* to respond to protests (Lesch, 2013: 104). Using Alawite-dominated forces sectarianized the conflict further—for both sides. The repression of protests by the *Shabihas* and intelligence services increased further Sunni rejection of the ruling community (Balanche, 2018: 8). It made the sectarian divide clearer and painted any rejection of the regime in sectarian terms.

For minority group and members, the Assad trade-off of "us or civil war" was even more apparent and visible—but also a continuation of their same trade-off.

The regime's strategic use of sectarianism, rather than an ideology of shared sectarianism links, helped maintain a sectarian division.[121] Many Alawites, despite having no love for the regime, have family members in the military and/or security forces. Sectarian demographic differences in security forces naturally created a sectarian division between the protestors and the government. For example, Sheikh Mahmoud, an Alawite from a village located east of Homs, has four sons in the armed forces, which affects his political stance. ''I don't support Bashar al-Assad,'' he says ''It is my sons that I support.'' For Sheikh Mahmoud, Alawites from the hinterland are outside of power and do not reap the economic benefits that other Alawite communities, especially those from the coast, enjoy. The lack of economic opportunity, combined with Alawite dominance of the military, encourages poor Alawites to join the army. This division, and history of sectarianism, re-enforces fears of Alawite safety if Assad were removed from power. Salem, an Alawite from the city of Homs city, ''We depend on the regime economically speaking, but we also

[121] While some saw the 2011 March protests as an exhilarating grasp for freedom, others saw fear. In Alawite-dominated areas of Homs and other villages in the area, people's committees (*lijan sha'abiya*) were initiated because of armed gunmen patrolling neighborhoods and shooting in the air (Stolleis, (ed.) (2015): 17). The peaceful revolution was not seen as peaceful. A demand for redistribution of power inherently meant lack of security.

depend on it for safety.''[122] In March 2011, the protests threatened the regime and thus his personal safety. He believes that ''any attempt to overthrow the regime will render Syria very dangerous.''[123]

Alawites are divided in a number of ways. One is by region. Alawites in the Homs area live in the Alawite "hinterland," in close proximity to, or with, Sunnis.[124] While intra-Alawite divisions, including divisions in economic prosperity exist, they do not necessary lead to Alawites opposing the regime. Again, a logic of (in)security dominates and cannot be underestimated. For Salem, ''We [Alawites in Homs area—the hinterland] are a minority here and the Sunnis want to drive us out.'' He continues, ''the question isn't about Bashar al-Assad as a person, but if he goes, Alawites will be in danger, especially those in and around Homs and more so than those on the coast.''[125] Other Alawites also recognize the challenge of living in traditionally Sunni areas and this fear existed prior to 2011. As one Alawite explains, 'Sunnis already hated us before . . . not all Sunnis, just the Muslim Brotherhood because they want to create an Islamic religious state'' (Balanche, 2018: 12). Safety is again of prime concern. As stated by Ali, ''our main concern is not the economy

[122] Stolleis, (ed.) (2015): 13.

[123] Stolleis, (ed.) (2015): 13.

[124] Latakia would be described as the homebase for Alawites.

[125] Stolleis, (ed.) (2015): 13.

but to live in security."[126] This fear of insecurity helps explain the lack of support for the protestors.[127]

Other Alawites discuss the differences in communities prior to 2011. Huda is from Homs. For her, Homs ''was already geographically divided before March 2011. Not that we had any problems with Sunnis,'' she states. Lack of problems, however, do not indicate a positive peace. She continues, "but we couldn't live together. Our customs are different.'' She saw the protests as being sectarian in nature: ''In any case, I cannot trust a revolution whose leader is Sheikh Ar'our.''[128] Again, the fears of a Sunni-dominated opposition limited Alawite support—even from those that did not reap the benefits of Alawite political and economic advantage.

The 2011 protests also put Syrian Christians in a dilemma of supporting an increasingly violent regime or supporting a potentially Sunni-dominated takeover. Many of the leaders of various churches chose to support the regime. One Christian priest in Damascus talked about the "conspiracy" the country was facing. The priest added that sectarian violence against the Christians was probable and "that many

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[126] Stolleis, (ed.) (2015): 15.

[127] Interethnic group relations and group threats are also important for understanding non-ethnic co-national (lack of) support in democratic contexts, as well. In a drastically different situation, the United States, a similar phenomenon can occur. Fear of racial favoritism can drive White Americans to oppose Black leadership (Goldman, 2017).

[128] Stolleis, (ed.) (2015): 24.

people from adjacent Muslim quarters would try to displace us [the Christians in Bab Touma].''[129]

Bashar Al-Assad was often not considered the best leader. Yet, a viable alternative was not usually seen. The regime had long installed fear in Christians. With Iraq and Lebanon next door and a history of tensions, the installation of fear was not hard. The Muslim Brotherhood served and was promoted as a reminder of an alternative government that would severely restrict Syrian Christians' freedoms and safety. Maria, a Christian activist in her twenties notes her relatives' opposition to even the initial protest in Deraa: "[the relative] condemned Dara'a [Deraa's] people and children on the pretext that they knew the regime's violence and yet decided to challenge it by such irresponsible deeds.''[130] Another Syrian Christian, Wi'am, mentioned the continuity in fear that originated in Muslim Brotherhood activities of the 1980s: ''I felt that there was something similar to what happened in the 1980s when the Muslim Brotherhood attacked and Hafez al Assad saved us from them. Today, I am sure that Bashar al Assad will do the same with the Salafists.''[131] Christians had a longstanding fear of Islamist political ascendancy that originated prior to 2011. When the protests originated from Sunni mosques, especially on

[129] Stolleis, (ed.) (2015): 83.

[130] Stolleis, (ed.) (2015): 75.

[131] Stolleis, (ed.) (2015): 75.

Fridays, and with the yell of "Allahu Akbar", it entrenched fears of a Sunni-dominated and Sunni-oriented opposition.[132]

Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and Syrians in Syria

A major concern with studying Sunni Arab protestors and the Syrian case lies with the inability to access face-to-face Syrians in Syria. The ongoing civil war prevents safe travel to Syrian territory. Even if it were possible to enter legally its territory, interaction with respondents could endanger them. Furthermore, millions of

[132] A personal example is telling and describes ethnic differences that were present before the conflict reached civil war status. Damascus in mid-April was both an optimistic and tense context. Protests were breaking out across the country, with some people hopeful for change, while others stockpiling supplies from the markets, worried about that very change. The government's repressive response was severe and death tolls after Friday prayers grew increasingly larger. My roommate, Adnan (name was changed), a Sunni Arab, was highly critical of the Assad regime. Although he had many Alawi friends, he increasingly watched and listened to numerous Sunni clerics blasting Syrian Alawites with chilling rhetoric. Adnan continuously denied that sectarian (ethnic) differences mattered to him, yet he quickly de-friended, through means of a fistfight, his good Alawi friend. Adnan's story sheds light on the salience of ethnic cleavages and their early impact. While some protestors attempted to create a national movement, the use of ethnic overturns was a feature of early protests and rhetoric.

Syrians have left the country. I thus focus on Syrian refugees, specifically in Lebanon. While working with Syrian refugees in Lebanon, the opportunity also arose to interview Syrians in Syria over Whatsapp. I describe the methodological concerns looking at both refugees and Syrians in Syria and justify my decision process.

Focusing on Syrian refugees in Lebanon makes it harder to make general statements about the Syrian population at large. There may be systematic differences between those who stayed in Syria and those who left. Those differences are likely to be endogenous to the probability of protest participation. My claims are thus made with respect to that refugee population.

The Syrian population's internal and external displacement, however, provide a scenario where the refugee population in Lebanon is arguably close to a nationally representative one. A large part (more than 11 million people) of the Syrian population, especially its Sunni Arab population, has relocated, either within Syria or abroad.[133] Over four million Syrians are currently found in neighboring Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey.[134] The refugee population thus is not a small subset of the Syrian population.

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[133] Syrian Refugees: A snapshot of the crisis – in the Middle East and Europe (2016, September). *Syrian Refugees*.

[134] Mercy Corps. (2016, March 1). Quick facts: What you need to know about the Syrian crisis. Retrieved from https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/iraq-jordan-lebanon-syria-turkey/quick-facts-what-you-need-know-about-syria-crisis

Although it is difficult to obtain overall statistics on refugee demographics, most of the refugees abroad are likely Sunni Arabs[135] indicating a higher Sunni percentage of Syrians who left their country.[136] In sum, a large percentage of the Syrian Sunni Arab population has fled to neighboring countries, helping to justify the study of Syrians outside of Syria.

There is also much cross-border movement in certain areas. Syrian refugees in Lebanon, for example, often travel to Lebanon when conflict hits their homes in Syria and move back when there are lulls in fighting. This cross-border movement limits further the distinction between refugees and Syrians who stayed in Syria.

Syrians from across Syria have sought refuge in Lebanon.[137] This diverseness contributes to making the population more representative nationally. While studies

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[135] The Assad regime, army, and pro-government militias have targeted Sunni Arab regions and municipalities, leading to high numbers of Sunni Arab refugees relative to other groups.

[136] Certain areas, specifically the Zaatari Refugee Camp in Jordan and certain border refugee camps in Turkey probably have a higher number of non-Sunni Arab refugees. They are close to regions in Syria that have high percentages of non-Sunni Arab populations, have experienced fighting, and have been targeted by Sunni Muslim insurgent groups. Overall, however, it seems likely that Sunni Arabs have fled at a higher rate than other groups.

[137] As mentioned in the text, Jordan and Turkey have also received large numbers of refugees. I chose to look at Syrians living in Lebanon for the following reasons. The

often focus on a town or village that the researcher deems representative of the greater population, Syrian refugees provide the opportunity to learn about individuals and their choices from all parts of Syria. Regional diversity is important when discussing Syria, as regions commonly have distinct social identities and economic situations (Van Dusen, 1972).

The characteristics of Syrian refugees in Lebanon do not differ greatly from the Syrian population at large, especially with regard to demographic characteristics. In terms of age, the Syrian population in Lebanon is slightly younger than its counterpart in Syria. The median family size and composition are similar, as well. While there is a slight over-representation of urban middle-class and lower middle-class Syrians in Lebanon, the difference is relatively minor. Additionally, there is much variation in terms of personal wealth and skills necessary to survive in Lebanon.[138]

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border is extremely porous and easy to cross, which means Syrians go back-and-forth often between Syria and Lebanon and there is less cost to do so. Lebanon has received Syrians from a broader range of provinces compared to Turkey and Jordan, which receive Syrians mainly from the north and south, respectively. There is also a significant number of Druze Syrians in Jordan. The focus of this study is on Sunni Arabs. Finally, not all Syrians in Lebanon are living in formal refugee camps, facilitating access to interview them. Syrians residing in Turkey are tightly controlled and often restricted, in a variety of ways, in isolated and hard-to-reach refugee camps.

[138] Oxfam Research Report. (2013, November). Survey on the Livelihoods of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon. Retrieved from

Interviews with Syrians in Lebanon opened the door to interviewing Syrians in Syria. Participants offered contact with their friends, family, and acquaintances who remained in Syria. Interviewing Syrians in Syria complements the refugee sample and offers further insight into the broader population.

I argue that looking at Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Syrians in Syria allows for a sample that approaches a level of national representativeness and for cautious predictions about the broader Syrian population. A main goal of this project is to test empirically hypotheses, driven by theory, on the relationship between dual identity and ethnic protest participation. I thus follow Brewer (2000) and Simon and Ruhs (2008: 1356) and argue that controlling for confounding variables is more important than sample representativeness when testing if a relationship does, or does not, exist. Internal validity is a project strength. I make cautious claims about the broader Sunni Arab community.

Sampling Procedure

Since time and resources were limited, I had to be specific with regard to interviewing participants. Snowball sampling was used to gain access to respondents. Snowball sampling is an appropriate method because of the lack of sampling frame (Goodman, 2011).

I relied on data from the Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) for locations of Syrian communities in Lebanon. Syrian

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https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/rr-bric-livelihoods-syrian-refugees-lebanon-211113-en.pdf

refugees concentrate in five areas in Lebanon: North Lebanon, Beirut, South Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and Mount Lebanon. Security concerns dictated to some extent access to certain localities, such as South Lebanon. As such, I interviewed Syrian Sunni Arabs in four locations: Beirut (Hamra and Mar Mikhaël), Mt. Lebanon (Bourj Hammoud and Dekwaneh), the Bekaa Valley (Zahle and Chtoura), and North Governance (Tripoli). Surveying Sunni Arabs in multiple locations provided a better overall sample of Syrians. Multiple initial respondents were also used to obtain a diverse sample. My work with Syrians in Lebanon and previous contacts in Syria enabled access to Syrians still in Syria. Interviews with Syrians in Syria were conducted in a similar manner. Most of the Syrians in Syria were from Deraa. A lesser number were from Aleppo and Damascus.

I informed potential respondents that I was interviewing people across the political spectrum,[139] not just those who participated in the 2011 protests. This was done to mitigate respondent concerns on whether or not the researcher is only targeting one political group. Moreover, non-protest participants offer a meaningful comparison. Solely conducting interviews with protest participants in the 2011 protests would not allow for examining how identity type impacts participation or no participation. To incentivize participation in the interviews, respondents in Lebanon were compensated $10 US. Respondents in Syria were not compensated for their interview because of logistical challenges in compensation. Of note, most of the respondents are young and between the ages of 25 and 45.

[139] I follow Wood (2003) in this approach (see page 40)

One limitation of the sample is the low number of women. Because of cultural norms and security concerns, I had less access to interviewing Sunni Arab women.[140] This concern should be noted when looking at the results. Syrian women played an important role in the 2011 protests,[141] and their participation should not be understated. Evidence from the study should be taken cautiously and with the understanding that the sample consists largely of men.

The interviews were conducted largely in Arabic, unless the respondent chose to speak in English or use a mix of Arabic and English. The duration of the interviews ranged from 15 minutes to over an hour. While the interviews were semi-structured and specific questions were asked, the interviews were often highly emotional for many of the respondents. The questions provoked answers that reflected the participants' emotions and topics of importance to them. I found it both theoretically relevant and emotionally important for the participants to address topics that mattered to them. More specifically, it is difficult, and not desirable, to cut off a respondent when he/she is discussing tragedies in her/his life. Moreover, the open-ended element of the interviews allowed for responses to emerge organically rather than from the structure framed by the researcher.

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[140] A gender discrepancy is also found in other research on Syrian refugees (Pearlman, 2016).

[141] Syria's defiant women risk all to protest against President Bashar al-Assad. (2011, May 21). *The Guardian*

Dealing with Identity Post-Protest

Using post-protest participation questions to study identity and Syrians presents challenges. First and foremost, is the endogenous relationship that exists between identity and ethnic protest. While identity might encourage protest, protests shape identity. Asking individuals questions related to their identity five years prior—and after they have experienced protest, civil war and violent action—runs the risk of dealing with individuals with transformed identities, and who may have difficulty remembering accurately how they once felt. Emotions and past identity are hard to recall, yet other things, such as events are less prone to memory distortion (Markus, 1986).[142]

I look to another form of identity measurement that is less direct compared than asking respondents how they once identified.[143] I asked respondents to reflect on their interactions within their own ethnic group relative to other ethnic groups. This approach provides a social distance measurement to capture identity. It measures affinity to one's ethnic and national group through behavioral attachments.[144] Respondents were asked if they had close relatives, friends, neighbors, and/or

[142] This temporal challenge could potentially be offset by conscious and unconscious desire to downplay sectarian differences that I described above.

[143] See Azab and Santoro (2017) for another example of using behavioral ties as identity measurements.

[144] Social distance is a commonly used concept when studying ethnicity (Brady and Kaplan, 2009).

coworkers who were not Sunni Arabs. Recalling past relationships is easier and less susceptible to bias compared to answering direct questions regarding identity.

An informal conversation with a Syrian refugee in Lebanon highlights the benefits of this approach. Lamenting the sectarian approach of the Syrian government, the opposition, and in his own eyes, the young Sunni man described his process of developing a sectarian identity—and the accompanying loss of non-Sunni friends. Yet, and importantly from an academic standpoint, the man was highly aware that he had once had non-Sunni friends and a certain affinity to non-Sunni Syrians, despite his now self-professed high level of sectarianism. The conversation illustrates the ability of Syrians sectarianized by the war to recall past relationships with non-Sunni Arabs. A social distance measurement of identity provides a useful tool to measure past identity levels.

Dealing with Participation Post-Protest

I used description of specific and relevant events to reconstruct the scenario in which respondent narratives occurred and painted a more vivid picture to complement their recollection. For instance, protests in Syria were named. The naming system assists in providing a framework for remembering specific events. I used the different protest names and other relevant events to give context to respondents when remembering their first instance of protest participation. For instance, 25 March was named, "Friday of Dignity." 22 April, an important day of protests, was named "Friday of Glory." Other relevant events include Syrian army tanks entering Deraa, Baniyas, Homs, and Damascene suburbs, and the US and EU response of tightening

sanctions (18 May 2011); and when the regime's armed forces took control of Jisr al-Shughour (12 June 2011).

Respondents were also asked about the number of protestors at their first event. Structuring the questions around specific protests and other events provided context to the respondents and allowed better recall when listing their participation.[145]

What is a Second Mover?

A quick look at the Syrian protests raises a conceptual challenge of disaggregating participation into three stages. The Syrian protests emerged at different locations at different times. How social scientists determine a second mover depends on how we label a protest occurring in the subject's proximity. Protests broke out in Deraa, for instance. After the initial outbreak of protests, potential second movers had an opportunity to participate. But are potential second movers those located in Deraa, or are they Syrians from across Syria? Small protests initially spread to Homs. The protestors in Homs could be defined as first movers, as they were the first to initiate protests in Homs. We can also define the Homs protestors as second movers. Their protests emerged after the first movers of Deraa.

Following Pearlman, "second movers" refers to the subsequent followers, in situations where the norm is still non-participation, and the individual does not pay a social cost by not participating. Because of the importance of local social forces affecting participation, especially in later stages, I define mover type at a local, rather

[145] I include in Appendix B a list of questions and topics that I discussed with respondents.

than a national, level. That is, I am interested in looking at localities and determining when protests originated and developed as opposed to looking at the first, second, and third protests that occurred throughout the country.[146] Looking at why protests emerged in different parts of the country at different times is important but beyond the scope of this study.

Analysis

I analyze interviews conducted with 68 Syrian Sunni Arabs. Fifty-four of the Syrians were located in Lebanon. Fourteen Syrians were still living in Syria and the interviews were conducted over Whatsapp. Questions were asked on their identity types, participation, lack of participation, and experience in general during the 2011 Syrian protests. The participants mentioned numerous motivations to participate. The results are discussed with relation to theorized argument. See Table 4.4 below.

Table 4.4: *Demographics of Interviewees*

Factor	Number	Percentage
Total number	68	100.00%
Total number in Lebanon	54	79.41%
Total number in Syria	14	20.59%
Men	59	86.76%
Women	9	13.24%
Age (mean)	31.6	
Governate of Origin		

[146] At the same time, it is important to recognize the spread of political behavior across regions (e.g., Cunningham and Sawyer, 2017) and the interconnection of behavior.

Deraa	9	13.24%
Damascus/Rif Damascus	14	20.59%
Homs	10	14.71%
Tartous	6	8.23%
Aleppo	10	14.71%
Hama	7	10.29%
Idlib	5	73.53%
Deir ez Zour	6	8.82%
Unknown	1	1.47%
Participated	44	64.71%
First movers	17	25.00%
Second movers	10	14.71%
Third movers	15	22.06%
No participation	21	30.88%
Unclear participation	3	4.41%

The results suggest that identity played a role on participation. Ethnic identity maintained a higher association with participation relative to dual and national identity. Dual identity holders were more likely to recognize and consider the concerns of non-Sunni Arab Syrians. Concern for non-Sunni Syrians was also mentioned as a deterrent to joining protests. Additionally, dual identity holders were more hesitant to protest. A potential Sunni theocracy was seen as undesirable. Assad's tradeoff of "us or chaos" was given more merit.

Identity's impact was somewhat conditional on the timing of the protests. While a clear distinction was not seen between second and third movers, first movers did have distinctive features from later movers. First movers displayed more national and dual identities and emphasized the non-sectarian nature of the protests. Second and third movers were more likely to have an ethnic identity and displayed ethnic identity behavior such as lack of will for inter-sect marriage. They also spoke of the dispute

in more sectarian terms. Second and third movers were more likely to list Sunni Arab grievances, such as lack of political power compared to demographics, the high number of Alawites in power, the economic benefits that Alawites enjoyed, and lack of respect shown for Sunni traditions. Some also referred to Alawites as non-Muslims and used derogatory terms to describe Alawites. See Table 4.5 below for data on participation rates during different stages by identity type.

Table 4.5: *Identity and Mover Participation amongst Syrian Sunni Arabs, March–June, 2011*

Identity	First Movers Part/Non-Part.	Second Movers Part/Non-Part.	Third Movers Part/Non-Part.	Total Part/Non-Part.
Ethnic	4 (30%)	3 (23%)	6 (46%)	13/18
Dual	6 (46%)	4 (28%)	3 (23%)	13/21
National	8 (44%)	3 (16%)	7 (38%)	18/29

Interestingly enough, as the protests and violence developed to the point of *civil war*, the lack of participation amongst non-Sunni Arabs became a source of anger for dual identity holders. The extremely violent reaction of the regime made dual identity holders feel betrayed by non-Sunni Arab lack of participation, and frustration developed. The frustration suggests that a certain degree of repression may have been tolerated by dual identity holders. After a certain point, however, the frustration reduced their concern for non-Sunni Arabs. This point appears to be when conflict developed civil war characteristics and after third movers have participated. Concern for non-Sunni Arabs transformed into disappointment with their continued support for severe repression. The sentiment suggests that the limiting impact of dual identity on participation might itself have a limit. See Figure 4.1 below for a visual description

of the relationship between identity and participation during the distinct stages. Note that ethnic identity decreased slightly in explaining second mover participation but jumped with third movers.

Figure 4.1: *Identity and Mover Participation amongst Syrian Sunni Arabs, March–June, 2011*



The raw numbers provide insight into identity and participation. The strength of the interviews lies with the qualitative information they provide. In what follows, I divide responses by identity type and relate insight from the interviews.

Ethnic Identity and Participants and Non-participants

Ethnic identity holders were more likely to participate as second or third movers. Moreover, they often listed Sunni Arab grievances. J., for instance, is from Homs.[147]

[147] All respondents are described with a letter. The letter does not correspond to the respondent's first or family name.

As with other Syrians interviewed, he was cautious when first describing the sectarian nature of the pre-civil war. When I mentioned non-Sunni friends, he balked at the idea. J. mentioned the sectarianization of the war but said he did not have many non-Sunni friends prior to the protests. As did others, he brought up lack of trust of non-Sunnis. I classify him as an ethnic identity holder.

J. mentioned the power discrepancy that Sunnis face as a grievance. "Of course," J. said, "everyone knows this," implying the lack of need for discussion on the topic. He continued, "Other Syrians have suffered, too. Assad is a dog and doesn't respect life. But Sunnis suffered the worst."[148] He mentioned the atrocities occurring, and Assad's actions reaching a point of no return. Dead friends and scenes on TV motivated J. to participate. I asked him if he had concern how non-Sunni friends viewed his participation. He replied, "Of course they're scared. But people are dying."[149] His comment implied that their concerns mattered but not as much as the death and destruction caused by the regime. Moreover, Sunni grievances were clear, and the protests considered a means to address those grievances.

J. participated in the protests but did not begin protesting until mid-April when the protests had become larger. He mentioned the sit-in that occurred in Clock Square (19 April), a memorable event, and said he did not attend. He did attend other protests in the vicinity. I classify him as a third mover.

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[148] Personal interview, 21 June 2018.

[149] Personal interview, 21 June 2018.

M. is from Hama. He did not explicitly talk about the protests in terms of sectarian identity. When asked what his opinions were of Alawites, his mood turned darker and spoke of his hate toward Alawite identity members. Given the violence that has engulfed Syria, his response is not surprising. More important to the theoretical argument is his view toward Alawites prior to the outbreak of conflict. "I didn't hate them, but I didn't trust them," he expanded when asked. When interacting with Alawites, M. commonly suspected them of being members of the intelligence services (mukhabarat). He also said he had limited friendships with Alawites and a marriage with a non-Sunni woman would be problematic. The limited friendships is likely due to Hama being a predominantly Sunni city.

Our discussion turned to the nature of the protests. While not explicitly referring to the protests as a Sunni uprising, M. emphasized that Sunni Arabs had the most to gain. "We are the majority; why should they [Alawites] have power. Other people have suffered, too, but we have suffered the most. Look what happened in Hama." He continued. "Sunnis experienced violence from the regime then too."[150] His words echo those of J with regard to Sunni Arabs suffering the most.

M. participated in protest but only well after they occurred. He said that the first time he protested was during the large protests that occurred in early July. I classify him as a third mover.

F. is originally from Homs but was living in Damascus when the protests erupted. His words implied a strong Sunni identity. "I love all people," he said

[150] Personal interview, 3 August 2018.

initially.[151] Yet, such socially normative statements may lack substance. In line with stereotypes of Alawite women, he spoke enthusiastically and rudely of past romantic relationships with non-Sunni Arab women, mainly Christian and Alawite women. He emphasized their drinking habits. With regard to Alawite men, he spoke of distrust. While he said he was not scared of Alawite men prior to the protests, distrust remained. F. also emphasized social relations in Homs and mentioned a lack of mixing between sectarian groups. Alawite neighborhoods and individuals, he argued, enjoyed economic favoritism.

Moreover, romantic relationships with non-Sunni Arab women was limited to casual relationships. His mother did not want him to marry a non-Sunni Arab woman, and he apparently did not want to resist her wishes. F. emphasized a stereotype of promiscuity amongst Alawite women that did not indicate a common sense of decency (in his mind). Because of lack of social attachments to non-Sunnis, I classify F. as having an ethnic identity.

As our conversation continued, deep Sunni-based grievances emerged. F. believed that Sunni Arabs lacked political power. Economically, the government did not provide services to Sunni Arab areas. He expressed strong economic grievances and said Alawites had more opportunities. Grievances were not expressed in religious terms, however, and he made no mention to how "how Muslim" Alawites were.

[151] Personal interview, 15 June 2018.

Political space was limited, and F. did not act in a political manner before the protests. List most Syrians, he witnessed the protests emerge and heard the death counts. He did not initiate any protests. He first attended a protest in a Damascus suburb in mid-April. He did not say which one. After the initial participation, F. made an effort to participate more frequently. He went out of his way to travel through check points and reach Damascene suburbs. I classify him as a second mover. Protests had already started but had not yet reached a large size—according to him. Notably, he did not know people who lived in the suburbs, and his family is from Homs. It does not appear that local social forces pressured F. to attend.

Sectarian identity, however, played a role in his protest participation. The social identity that extended beyond a local identity generated grievances and anger. F. appeared almost opportunistic in defending Sunni grievances and personalizing the group-level conflict. "I'm Sunni. The regime is killing them, and they're Alawites."[152] He appeared to apply a group-level grievance to his personal wellbeing. The protests almost seemed an opportunity for F. to benefit, as he reconceptualized the group-level disadvantage into a personal one.

N. initially used the term Nusayriyah, a derogatory term for Alawites. He spoke openly of hate for Alawites. He admitted that some of the hate was due to the war but emphasized that these emotions had always been present. He was outspoken in religiosity and his grievances were described mainly in religious terms. Almost immediately after bringing up Alawites, he asked me, "You think Alawites are

[152] Personal interview, 31 July 2018.

Muslims?" Before I could reply, he continued, "They lie and say they're Muslims but they don't partake in Ramadan. They don't have Mosques." He also spoke about Alawites and social norms. "Sunni women couldn't wear headscarves… they [Alawites] drink alcohol."[153] Much of his discourse was on the culture developed by the Assad regime, and in his opinion, Alawites. N. emphasized that Sunni Arabs were the majority, yet cultural norms were not in line with their wishes. While he said that he interacted with Alawites, interactions appeared to be limited to economic and necessary circumstances. I classify him as having ethnic identity.

Inconsistent with the theoretical expectations, N. did not protest. "Why would I want to protest?" he said, "Look what happened? Muslims protested and were shot."[154] Of note, he did not want to tell me where he was from. While he mixed his accent with Beiruti features—quite common with Syrians in Lebanon—he appeared to be from northern Syria. It is possible that by the time protests emerged in his area, repression was already high. Much of the theoretical argument focuses on how ethnic protest has the potential to cause instability. If violence and instability are already high to the point of civil war, ethnic identity might make people more inclined to use protest and to support violent tactics.[155]

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[153] Personal interview, 21 July 2018.

[154] Personal interview, 21 July 2018.

[155] Even in democracies, aggressive collective action that is deemed more efficacious has higher appeal (Saab, Spears, Tausch, and Sasse, 2016). If protests are seen as effective, people may consider violence.

Dual Identity and Participants and Non-participants

Dual identity holders were more hesitant to protest, especially after the first stage as repression was higher. Concern for non-Sunni Syrians was also mentioned as more of a deterrent. A potential Sunni theocracy was not seen as desirable. Assad's tradeoff of "us or chaos" was given more merit.

Interestingly, amongst dual identity holders, there were signs of frustration with non-Sunni Syrians. The frustration suggests that a certain degree of repression may be tolerated by dual identity holders. This reduces their likelihood to protest. After a certain point, however, repression reduces their concern for non-Sunni Syrians. Concern for non-Sunni Syrians transforms into disappointment with their continued support for severe repression. The sentiment suggests that the limiting impact of dual identity on participation might itself have a limit. By the time frustration with non-ethnic co-nationals develops, however, the repression is likely to have developed in a civil war.

Dual identity holders often had a distinct experience with anger. They often recalled having reservations with regard to their anger. They made more effort to understand both the Assad regime's use of repression as well as concerns of non-Sunni Arabs.

One dual identity holder, who participated in protest stated: "I understand why they'd [non-Sunni Arabs] be scared. Look what happened? We said we're not sectarian but look what happened."[156] Another dual identity holder said he had

[156] Personal interview, 29 July 2018.

Christian and Alawite friends. "I know they were scared. Lots of my friends understand the conflict. They don't like Assad. Though, they were still scared."[157] He never protested, although he said he had been highly sympathetic to the protestors.

Z. is a Sunni Arab from Homs. He lived in the old city of Damascus and had a number of non-Sunni friends, including Alawites and Christians. He said his parents were open to him marrying a non-Sunni woman but would prefer a Sunni wife. He described his socio-economic background as normal. I classify Z. as a dual identity holder.

Z. hated the Al-Assad regime and said it denied the people of freedom and democracy. He spoke with anger of the regime's atrocities and was initially very supportive of the protests. While protests were not easy to attend in Damascus (although there were small protests), Z. never protested.

As the protests grew, he saw non-Sunnis not joining the protests and began to re-think the protests. He noted that Assad encouraged sectarian tensions but that they did not emerge from nothing. As the protests grew, Z. became increasingly concerned with radicalism and what sort of society would emerge. Not just for himself and his lifestyle, he said, but for all Syrians. Z. was referring to non-Sunnis and Sunnis, especially secular Sunnis.[158]

Z.'s comments stand in contrast to those of J. Both men are from Homs but had different reactions to the protests. Moreover, Z. and J. expressed anger toward Al-

[157] Personal interview, 2 August 2018.

[158] Personal interview, 14 August 2018.

Assad and were cognizant of non-Sunni fears. For Z., those fears appeared to matter more, and he was more attentive to them. J. recognized that non-Sunnis had fears of a Sunni-dominated opposition but that did not matter to him as much as the deaths in the streets.

Another man, G., was from Damascus. We interviewed over Whatsapp. G. displayed a mix of ethnic and national identity traits. As with many Syrians, he did not want to marry a non-Sunni Arab. He did have non-Sunni Arab friends and emphasized that he considered them his friends just as his Sunni friends. I classify him as a dual identity holder. His words indicate a clear sense of the dangers of the protests. Why would I protest? Assad kept us safe. There are people that don't want peace in this country. The protestors caused problems.' Of course I'm not saying I like his response but why protest?[159] Some people mentioned specifically how protest changed their identity. It is important to note how cognizant the individuals were of such a change. One individual, R., is from Douma, a Damascene suburb that experienced heavy protests and regime violence. R. emphasized that he had multiple friends, acquaintances, and family relationships that were non-Sunni Arabs, including Alawites. At the same time, ethnic distinctions still mattered to him, and he said marriage would probably have to be with a Sunni Arab woman. I classify R. as a dual identity holder.

When the protests emerged, R. was in support of them. He said he was too scared to protest, however. He also did not initially view the protests as being Sunni.

[159] Personal interview, 10 August 2018.

According to R., the protests were over issues from which all Syrians suffered—not just Sunni Arabs. Even prior to the protests, Assad was, in his words, a dictator who "doesn't respect life."[160]

R.'s views on the protests speak to the challenge of defining ethnic protests and the Syrian case in particular. Local issues may generate protests and only sometimes does an initially local protest develop along broader ethnic cleavage lines. The Syrian protests maintained ethnic and national characteristics. When applying to theory to a particular case, the fuzzy and sometimes fluid boundaries of an 'ethnic' protest introduce noise into the analysis.

For R., the protests were initially nationalistic—not ethnic. It appears that his dual identity probably played a role in supporting national protests. Links to the national group did not make him think that non-Sunni Arab would have concerns. After all the protests were national protests. The protests, in his mind, did not have an ethnic characteristic. Yet, as the protests developed, it became clear that Assad would maintain supporters and the conflict would have a sectarian color.

As the protests and deaths grew, spread, and continued, R.'s views changed. His identity became more ethnic. He viewed the protests as more ethnic. It became clear that Assad would maintain supporters. As ethnic distinctions in support for Assad and for the protestors became clearer, R. grew disillusioned with regime supporters, which often correlated with being Alawite and Christian. Political distinctions became tied to ethnic distinctions.

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[160] Personal interview, 4 July 2018.

Still, even as he developed an ethnic identity, R. did not participate. He mentioned fear as a reason. Douma did experience heavy regime repression. According to the theoretical argument, however, ethnic identity generates anger, which helps overcome the fear of a participating in ethnic protest in repressive conditions. Why did R. not participate?

It is possible that his more recent adoption of an ethnic identity differs from those who maintained a more long-term ethnic identity. R. consistently expressed disillusionment with his Alawite and Christian friends and acquaintances and the ethnic groups more broadly. His expressions of bitterness speak to a different relationship to non-ethnic members compared to long-term holders of ethnic identity.

> *Why did they support Assad? Because they're Alawite? They say he is better than terrorists, but people are dying in the streets. He is killing people. And in the beginning the revolution wasn't Sunni. But they don't care. They say they're my friends. They say they're Syrians? It's not right.*[161]

R. expected non-Sunni Arabs to participate in the protests and/or support the protestors. Unlike more long-term identity holders, R.'s developing ethnic identity still maintained a dual characteristic. When his expectations of non-Sunni Arab support were not met, disillusion and frustration developed. Disillusionment and frustration likely reduced his thoughts on the benefits of protesting—even as an

[161] Personal interview, 4 July 2018.

expressive act. He continued, "Why would I protest? People are just dying. No one cares."[162] When I asked him about the use of violence, there appeared to be reluctant support. R. did not like the Islamic State or more extremist groups but was clear in his opinion that protests did not accomplish anything. As such, violence was necessary, both for protection and change.

S. is a woman from Homs. She expressed a dual identity. Her views are interesting because she was one of the early protestors in Homs. She mentioned that events in Deraa, and regime corruption in general, motivated her to protest. S organized and participated in initial protests in Homs, some of them occurring at night. She continued protesting with the rest of Homs throughout the first part of 2011.[163] Dual identity was a motivating factor, especially as S. participated as a first mover.

National Identity and Participants and Non-participants

In line with the theoretical expectations, national identity holders were less likely to protest. When they did protest, they were more likely to initiate the protests. First movers commonly displayed local or national motivations when protesting. M., for instance, participated in an early stage. He continued to work as an activist and is still in Deraa. He had numerous Christian friends, with whom he trusted with this life. Moreover, he said he had high levels of trust for the Christian community, even after six years of the war. M. stated, "I protested because I couldn't do nothing while

[162] Personal interview, 4 July 2018.

[163] Personal Interview, 5 August 2018

people around me were dying". His words echo closely Pearlman's findings on second movers. He also mentioned specifically the non-sectarian nature of the protests. "We went to the Church to hide. We didn't have any sectarian demands, and Christians protested with us."[164]

Of note, M. made no references to Sunni grievances. His grievances were expressed explicitly toward the Assad regime. Moreover, the local nature of his grievances was apparent. It was the regime's initial repression of Deraa, and community members dying, that motivated participation. He did not emphasize a strong ethnic identity and stated again and again that Christians in Deraa were like brothers to him and were part of the protests.

Y. is one of the few women that I was able to interview. She is from Deir ez Zor Governorate but was a student in Damascus at the time of the outbreak. She was clearly aware of Alawite domination of the government and economic spheres. But she had multiple good friends from different sectarian backgrounds and did not appear to have a strong Sunni or even dual identity. A national identity seemed to be the most important one. Y. was active in organizing protests prior to the outbreak of first and second movers. She was active online and spoke of organizing protest online. I classify her as a first mover.

Like other Sunni Arabs who participated in protests prior to 15 March, Y. saw grievances in non-sectarian terms. She initiated protests based on non-sectarian grievances. Over time, however, she became disillusioned with the protestors. Assad

[164] Personal interview, 12 August 2018.

was still a "dog", but she did not trust the opposition anymore.[165] Y. said that she stopped protesting in May.

"I love America", Z. exclaimed to me.[166] Z. is from a village outside of Deir ez Zor City. He said that he developed hatred for Assad but did not feel strong animosity toward Assad prior to the conflict. Only after government shelling destroyed his home and almost took his life did he develop his current view on Assad. Still, he spoke of Assad as an individual and not as representative of Alawites.

Moreover, Z. had made non-Sunni Syrian friends in Lebanon. While he said he did not have non-Sunni friends in Deir ez Zor, he emphasized that this was likely due to geography. He also highlighted that he would not care if he married a non-Sunni Syrian woman. Z. did not appear to have a strong Sunni Arab identity prior to the outbreak of conflict.

Deir ez Zor experienced early protests that did not reach large sizes. Later protests in June were larger. Z., however, did not participate at any stage. Z. mentioned that he had no reason to protest and that protests cause problems. He did not view Assad as tyrannical at the time—that has since changed. He made no reference to Sunnis lack of political power as other interviewees that protested did. It should be noted, however, time under ISIS rule could have played a role in how Z viewed the protests and a Sunni-dominated opposition.

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[165] Personal interview, 28 July 2018.

[166] Personal interview, 22 July 2018.

F. is college-educated, from Baniyas and displayed a mainly national identity.[167] She was open to marriage with a non-Sunni Arab. Part of her reasoning was her perception of gender (in)equality amongst Sunni Arabs. F. spoke somewhat disparagingly of the Sunni Arab community. Treatment of women was mentioned as a major concern.[168] Her circle of friends was highly diverse. Besides briefly describing her origin as a Sunni Arab, she did not appear to maintain strong ethnic characteristics. In turn, she emphasized a Syrian identity—and one that was ethnically inclusive. I classify her as having an ethnic identity.

F. is interesting because she distinguished between protests that occurred in Baniyas and protests that occurred in other areas. She initially supported political opposition to Assad and said she did "some things" online in early 2011. She mentioned that there were talks of protests in Damascus (in February, 2011), which she supported. She was highly opposed to regime repression against the people of Deraa. By that point, however, she had developed concerns on instability

[167] Personal interview, 4 July 2018

[168] F.'s focus on gender dynamics within the Sunni community raises questions into how ethnic, national and views on gender identity. If one perceives membership in an ethnic community as disadvantaging based on gender, other ethnic or national identity options may be pursued. More research is needed to examine how ethnic identity interact with perceptions of gender equality within the ethnic and national communities.

When protests erupted in Baniyas, F. described them as Sunni Arabs protesting, in contrast to the other protest activity. This may be due to the local grievances being expressed in ethnic terms from an early point in Baniyas. The proximity of Sunni Arab and Alawite populations in Baniyas is likely to have given the protestors a sectarian element from an early standpoint.

F. did not participate in the Baniyas protests—at any stage. She also did not participate in the early protests in Damascus, even though she said she was aware of them and supported them. Her verbal support and online activity suggest that she may have participated as a first mover in early Damascus protests if she had lived there.

F. offers evidence of the theoretical expectations. She maintained a national identity and did not participate in the 2011 protests. At the same time, her attitudinal support is in line with implications of the theory. Early protests that erupted in Damascus maintained more national characteristics. F. expressed strong support for them. Protests that erupted in Baniyas had a more ethnic dimension and received less expressions of support. The fluidity of the protests that erupted in 2011 meant the protests had various level of, and perceptions of, ethnic and national characteristics. Protests within the protest movement that had more national characteristics were supported, while protests with more ethnic characteristics were not.

As described above, the Syrian protests had national and ethnic characteristics, which varied temporally and geographically. How people viewed the protests, as national or ethnic, is likely to affect how identity impacted participation. For some people the protests were more national than ethnic—even as the protests developed

over time. For national identity holders who perceived the protests as national, there should be high participation during the second and third stages.

GH., for instance, had a strong national identity. In 2011, GH. was living in his home village in Deir ez Zor province. He had spent time in Damascus, however. He openly recognized the sectarian differences in government and security forces but said he treated individuals as people—and this applied to Alawites. When asking him more directly, he replied, "I didn't think in those terms. I still don't. Some people do and that's because of Daesh."[169] He strongly rejected sectarianism, and did not imply that he suspected Alawites of being security members and did not imply that he distrusted Alawites. He also said that he would marry whoever he wanted, although his father would prefer that he marry a Sunni woman. I classify GH. as having a national identity.

When the protests broke out, GH. was stunned. There were some protests in Deir ez Zor but not to the same extent as Deraa or Homs. The protests, while somewhat frequent, were smaller in size. He emphasized his sympathy for the people of Deraa and for "Syrians" but being in Deir ez Zor, he felt removed. Eventually protests developed further in Deir ez Zor. He first participated in protests prior to the start of Ramadan in July, when they were larger in size. GH. highlighted that he could no longer not participate and said he had to support the Syrian people.

GH.'s case is important because it highlights the challenge of studying the Styrian protests and other protests that have a mix of national and ethnic

[169] Personal interview, 16 July 2018.

characteristics. But Syria is not alone. Other "ethnic" protests may have other mixes of characteristics. In Ethiopia, for instance, recent "Oroma" protests initially had local land concerns. The protests gradually adopted a broader ethnic identity and addressed ethnic group inequalities. Are the protests over land or ethnic inequalities? Different protestors are likely to view differently the protests. Understanding how the participant views the protest is likely to structure the impact of identity on participation. A further challenge lies with the endogeneity between how one characterizes the protest (ethnic or something else) and identity. Both challenges raise future research questions.

Conclusion

This chapter builds on previous work and examines the impact of identity, particularly dual identity, on ethnic protest. It specifically highlights how regimes type structures identity's impact, through belief that non-ethnic co-nationals care, on an ethnic member's likelihood of ethnic protest participation at different protest stages.

The results from the survey-experiment demonstrate that in democratic Panama, dual identity does not reduce one's likelihood of participation compared to a person with an ethnic identity. As ethnic protest increases in size, identity plays an increasing impact on ethnic protest participation, although the findings were not statistically significant. H2A is not supported completely, but there is initial evidence for a distinct impact across stages.

In less-democratic Lebanon, dual identity associates negatively with participating in ethnic protest relative to ethnic identity. Furthermore, identity has

distinct impacts at different stages of an ethnic protest. As ethnic protests develop, ethnic identity plays a stronger role in mobilizing ethnic members. The statistical analysis provides strong support for H2B.

The findings from the interviews offer additional support for identity's distinct effect across protest stages in a non-democracy. Initiators of the protests did not have strong ethnic identity in Syria. Protestors generally had national or dual identities, or at least, had local motivations that did not appear driven by a broad ethnic cleavage. Moreover, many of the participants explicitly stated the non-sectarian nature of the initial protests and their non-ethnic identities.

As protests in Syria developed, however, ethnic identity played an increasingly stronger role on participation. Ethnic identity had an especially strong impact on third movers. Second and third movers emphasized Sunni identity and Sunni grievances. Moreover, a lack of caring for non-Sunni identity group fears was also stated, in line with the theoretical argument.

Dual identity holders in Syria, on the other hand, were more aware of non-Sunni fears. This awareness reduced protest participation. After a certain point, however, dual identities became frustrated with non-protest participations. Links to the national group generated frustration with continued support for the regime despite high repression.

Chapter IV provides statistical and interview evidence for how regime type structures the impact of identity on participation at different ethnic protest stages. The increasing impact of identity on ethnic participation as an ethnic protest grows has implications for the number of ethnic protests that a country experiences. In non-

democracies, mobilization of second and third movers can generate larger and more frequent ethnic protests. The next chapter addresses the macro-level implications of second and third mover mobilization capacity. It asks, when do countries experience ethnic protest, and tests the relationship between regime type, identity and ethnic protest occurrence.

Chapter 5: Macro-level Research on Identity and Ethnic Protest

"…destructive forces [in Oromia]… are on a mission to subvert the system and change the government."[170]

Former Ethiopia Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn

Introduction

The previous empirical chapters demonstrate the significance of government type and identity to explain why a person might protest. Politics, however, often depends on group dynamics for change. What then are the macro-level implications of more or less mobilization potential for individuals? This chapter seeks to answer this question. It provides data and analysis on how regime type structures the impact of identity on the occurrence and frequency of ethnic protest at the country-level. In doing so, this chapter tests the macro-level implications of the micro-level theoretical argument.

I reiterate the theoretical expectations from Chapter II here:

Hypothesis C1) In democracies, relative to lower levels of dual identity, an increasing level of dual identity will increase the likelihood of ethnic protest.

[170] Gaffey, C. (2016, February 24). Ethiopian PM Vows 'Decisive Action' against Oromia Secessionists. *Newsweek.*

Relative to lower levels of ethnic identity, an increasing level of ethnic identity will not impact the likelihood of ethnic protest.

Hypothesis C2) In non-democracies, relative to lower levels of ethnic identity, an increasing level of ethnic identity will increase the likelihood of ethnic protest. Relative to lower levels of dual identity, an increasing level of dual identity will not impact the likelihood of ethnic protest.

This chapter tests the hypotheses with data compiled from multiple rounds of the Afrobarometer, and the Social Conflict and Analysis Database (SCAD). The chapter proceeds in five steps. First, I discuss the set of countries examined. I second examine the measurements of ethnic protest, identity, and government type. Various measures for other arguments are also introduced. Third, statistical testing of the relevant hypotheses is conducted. Fourth, multivariate probit regression tests the impact of regime type and identity on the presence of ethnic protest. Finally, the number of ethnic protests is tested using negative binomial regression.

The results provide evidence of the macro-level implications of the micro-level theoretical framework. Consistent with the micro-level findings, in democracies, ethnic identity does not increase ethnic protest likelihood, and dual identity does not decrease ethnic protest likelihood. In non-democracies, however, only a higher level of ethnic identity provides a meaningful correlate for ethnic protest. When ethnic members in non-democracies develop national identities, even while maintaining ethnic identity links, ethnic protest likelihood decreases.

Research Design

Data

Statistical analysis requires careful coding and measurement of the relevant theoretical concepts. Protests are often messy affairs with a multitude of different groups and identities involved. As the Syrian discussion in Chapter IV indicates, determining if a protest maintained "ethnic" characteristics is challenging. The next section examines how ethnic protest and identity were coded at the country-level and how the measurement challenges are tackled.

To test the study's hypotheses, a measurement of the level of ethnic, national and dual identity is required for multiple countries. I utilize survey data from Afrobarometer to measure a country's level of identity. This approach limits the geographic scope of the study to a subset of countries in Africa. The surveys do, however, offer a crucial question related to ethnic, national, and dual identity and data from both democratic and non-democratic countries. Furthermore, focusing on a region controls unobserved effects that could impact outcomes when looking across regions. A focus on Africa provides a "hard test" for the impact of identity on ethnic protest in democracies. Many democracies in Africa are relatively new and may have concerns over instability, which makes finding an association between dual identity and ethnic protest challenging. Using countries included in Afrobarometer's Rounds 3, 4, 5, and 6, I construct a dataset with aggregated country-level identity measures

and ethnic protest events. The unit of analysis is country-year, and the dataset ranges from 2005 to 2015.[171]

Ideally, the ethnic group would be the unit of analysis. Unfortunately, we do not have data on specific measures of ethnic group identity. Afrobarometer data are not representative at the ethnic group level, which hinder aggregation of responses to the ethnic group. Aggregating identity to the country-level provides a measure of the number of the people with certain identity characteristics that impact the likelihood of ethnic protest. Ethnic protest depends heavily on participation rates. People need to go out into the streets. Unlike other events, such as political violence, greater ethnic protest size is a product of the number of protestors, which mitigates concerns regarding the aggregated measure. The aggregated identity scores provide a measure of the number of protestors with an identity type that encourages or discourages participation in ethnic protest.[172]

Moreover, measuring identity at the country-level follows other studies that have examined ethnic group political behavior as a function of country-level measures such as geography (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Other scholarship in political science, economics and finance also examine aggregated cultural variables to

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[171] A list of countries and survey years is included in Appendix C.

[172] Afrobarometer questions respondents on previous protest participation. Individual-level analysis is not possible, however, because the question does not refer to ethnic protest. Most protests are not ethnic protests, which makes this question unsuitable for this study.

examine meso- and macro-level outcomes, including GDP per capita and growth rate (Guiso et al., 2006), financial decision making at institutional levels, capital structure and firm behavior (Chui, Lloyd, and Kwok, 2002), international corporate cash holdings (Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009), and economic growth (Inglehart, 1997). Aggregating identity to the country-level provides a measure of the number of the people with certain identity characteristics that impact ethnic protest likelihood.[173]

Dependent Variable

Ethnic protest depends on claims being made on behalf of an ethnic identity and nonviolent collective action that is organized around an ethnic marker. In line with these characteristics, I use event data and distinguish between ethnic and non-ethnic protests.

The Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) maintains data on violent and nonviolent events in African countries from 1990 to 2016. It distinguishes between twelve different event categories. I use this event type categorization to distinguish between nonviolent and violent collective action. Four nonviolent categories—organized demonstration, spontaneous demonstration, general strike, and limited strike—are combined to identify nonviolent protests.[174]

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[173] Ethnic protest depends heavily on participation rates. People need to go out into the streets.

[174] Most nonviolent ethnic acts of contentious politics are organized and spontaneous protests.

SCAD also codes the ostensible actors and motivations behind the events. Ethnic discrimination/ethnic issues comprise one of the categories and offers a useful starting point. Using this study's definition of ethnic protest, the dataset underestimates the extent of ethnic protests, however. For example, on 10 November 2003, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) organized a protest in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, demanding that Shell Oil Company provide compensation for ruining Ogoniland. The MOSOP makes claims on behalf of the Ogoni people and have long argued that oil extraction has had negative impacts on Ogoni communities. SCAD codes this organized protest as motivated by two issues: "environmental degradation" and "food, water, subsistence"—and not related to ethnic issues. While the MOSOP has made demands concerning these issues, the group also makes these claims on behalf of a specific ethnic group. To account for cases not included in SCAD's "ethnic discrimination/ethnic issues" category, I recode this protest—and protests that make ethnic claims and mobilize around an ethnic marker—as ethnic protests.[175]

If a country experienced an ethnic protest in a year, the dependent variable received a value of "1" and "0" if it did not. For instance, on 22 April 2005, Maasai in Kenya protested the release of a white rancher accused of murdering a Maasai individual. Kenya received a "1" for 2005. In contrast, Madagascar experienced 18

[175] Further information on how cases for recoding were selected, the extent of recoding, and a list of recoded cases can be found in the online appendix.

protests in 2009, but none of the protests fulfilled both requirements for an ethnic protest. The country received a "0" for 2009.

Independent Variables

To test this study's theoretical expectations, a measure of ethnic, national, and dual identity is required. Because people have multiple ethnic category options, coding ethnicity and identity can be challenging. Following suggestions to use survey data (e.g., Fearon, 2003; McCauley, 2017). I use Afrobarometer data (Rounds 3, 4, 5, 6) to measure identity. A survey does not depend on outside observations of ethnic divisions but allows individuals themselves to define both their ethnicity and national identity.

Using a five-point scale, Afrobarometer asks respondents to list if they feel their identity aligns more with their ethnic identity, national identity, or if they feel both equally. I combine this five-value variable into one with three values (ethnic, national, dual) and then aggregate responses to the country-year level. Aggregating a variable with three values requires creating three separate variables: ethnic identity (the percentage of respondents with an ethnic identity); national identity (the percentage of respondents with a national identity); and dual identity (the percentage of respondents with a dual identity). For example, in 2005, 22.55 percent of Malawians reported an ethnic identity, 28.31 percent a national identity, and 49.14 percent a dual identity. Table 5.1 below provides examples of the ethnic, dual, and national identity make-ups of five African countries.

Table 5.1: *Country-Level Identity Measurement*

Country	Year	Ethnic	Dual	National
Malawi	2005	22.55	49.14	28.31
Mali	2005	27.86	41.63	30.51
Sao Tome	2015	5.41	11.9	82.69
Ethiopia	2013	12.83	29.39	57.79
Senegal	2009	16.64	25.78	57.48

The study's hypotheses have different expectations for democracies and non-democracies. To determine a state's regime type, I classify states with X-Polity scores of 4 or higher as democratic and scores of 3 or lower as non-democratic. X-Polity is an appropriate measure for regime type; its composite measurements do not include variables related to protest and political instability (see Vreeland, 2008 for a discussion on the use of Polity 2 scores when testing outcomes related to protest and rebellion).

Control Variables

While much research has examined ethnic protest at the group-level, this study examines ethnic protest at the country-level. To do so, I use relevant variables correlated with ethnic protest at the country-level. Rather than measure if an ethnic group is excluded politically, for instance, political exclusion is measured by the number of ethnic groups in a country that are classified as "excluded" by Ethnic Power Relations Data (Cederman et al., 2010).[176] More explicit measures of repression are included. I generate a composite measure of three MAR variables on

[176] Ethnic groups vary in their access to political power (Hechter, 1975; Gourevitch, 1979), which could influence the political tactics they use. EPR variable was extended to match the study's time scope.

repression (repression of ethnic group civilian populations, repression of ethnic group members engaged in nonviolent collective action, and repression of ethnic group members engaged in violent collective action). MAR variables are taken from 2004 to 2006 and measure group-level characteristics. To create a country measure, I combine the highest values for each of the three variables. This provides a measure of repression prior to most of the country-years, includes different forms of repression, and importantly address government repression of ethnic groups.

Rather counter-intuitively, self-determination group size has been found to correlate negatively with nonviolent campaigns (Cunningham, 2013). To address this potential predictor of ethnic protest, I include a country-measure for ethnic group size. Using Ethnic Power Relations data (EPR), I measure the number of relevant ethnic groups in a state that have population sizes of less than ten percent.

State population and GDP (logged) are incorporated into the models as proxies for state capacity. A country's level of urban inhabitants can also impact protest likelihood. Protests require individuals to mobilize and publicly gather. More urbanized populations put people in closer contact with one another, facilitating mobilization and protest.[177] As such, the models include a measure of a country's urban population. Elections are preplanned forums for political competition and may impact ethnic identity (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner, 2010). I include a dichotomous

[177] The percentage of urban and rural populations is taken from data produced by the World Bank.

control for whether a country-year experienced an election—presidential or legislative.[178]

Controls are included for the number of non-ethnic protests that a country experiences. By including non-ethnic protests as an independent variable, the models control for other characteristics that might facilitate ethnic protest in a country. To account for situations of intense inter-ethnic relations—and histories of inter-ethnic tensions—I include an index variable on lost autonomy.[179]

Table 5.2: *Descriptive Statistics of Dependent, Independent, and Control Variables*

Variable	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Ethnic Protest	258	0.1511628	0.3589037	0	1
Ethnic Identity	251	13.2741	5.988659	3.97	32.78
Dual Identity	251	39.6949	14.72983	6.39	69.38
Repression	321	5.361371	5.388089	0	15
Non-ethnic protest (log)	315	0.9514309	1.022203	0	4.330733
Democracy	314	0.6974522	0.4600943	0	1
Lost Autonomy	315	0.9738095	1.134851	0	5
Politically excluded groups	310	1.248387	1.793438	0	7
Small ethnic groups	310	3.090323	3.453562	0	12
Country population (log)	313	16.27913	1.368544	12.11388	19.02063
GDP PC (log)	315	6.921265	0.9842784	5.184326	9.284711
Urban	315	37.9541	15.03302	10.641	87.156
Election	314	0.2356688	0.4250935	0	1

[178] Election data come from the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy database (Hyde and Marinov, 2012) and was extended to match the study's time scope.

[179] The variable comes from MAR and is made up of lost political autonomy, the year of autonomy loss, the magnitude of the loss, and the ethnic group's status prior to the autonomy loss.

Analysis

Democracy and non-democracy differences in protest likelihood and use of repression hinders comparison. Democracies experience more protest. Ethnic exclusion may be harder to bear in non-democracies. Because regime type results in different levels of baseline ethnic protest participation, I examine variation in ethnic protest within regime type. Comparing how the likelihood of ethnic protest varies within each regime type controls for institutional differences that may be endogenous to identity and ethnic protest. An interaction between identity and regime is not run because I am not interested in comparing the likelihood of ethnic protest across regime types. Rather, I am interested in how variation in identity acts differently within each regime type.

To assess the impact of identity and regime type on ethnic protest (a binary outcome), I use probit regression. Table 5.3 below presents the results of four probit models.

Models 1 and 2 examine the impact of ethnic and dual identity on ethnic protest likelihood in democracies. The measure for ethnic identity produces a small and positive coefficient (Model 1). Conventional levels of statistical significance, however, are not reached (p-value = 0.85). The coefficient for the dual identity measure is negative (Model 2), indicating a negative association with ethnic protest. The measure, however, does not reach statistical significance. Hypothesis C1 is not confirmed. The results suggest that in democracies, ethnic and dual identity do not produce distinct ethnic protest outcomes.

Table 5.3: *Probit Regression on Ethnic Protest, 2005 – 2015*

	Democracies		Non-Democracies	
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Ethnic Identity	0.00666		0.105***	
	(0.0190)		(0.0358)	
Dual Identity		-0.0254		-0.0690*
		(0.0169)		(0.0352)
Repression	0.0630**	0.141*	-0.203*	-0.329**
	(0.0319)	(0.0755)	(0.123)	(0.159)
Non-ethnic Protest (log)	0.208*	0.347	0.287	0.367
	(0.124)	(0.253)	(0.400)	(0.404)
Politically Excluded Groups	0.160*	0.336**	0.799	0.215
	(0.0940)	(0.136)	(0.669)	(0.778)
Small Ethnic Groups	0.0256	0.0162	0.344*	1.049**
	(0.0500)	(0.0865)	(0.179)	(0.483)
Country Population (log)	0.446***	0.741***	1.140*	1.409
	(0.127)	(0.191)	(0.660)	(0.895)
GDP PC (log)	-0.296	-0.692	1.035	2.664**
	(0.333)	(0.679)	(1.091)	(1.255)
Urban	0.0183	0.0513	0.0264	-0.0372
	(0.0166)	(0.0387)	(0.0446)	(0.0609)
Election	0.236	0.383	-0.554**	-0.670
	(0.344)	(0.785)	(0.279)	(0.413)
Constant	-8.031***	-11.92**	-31.40***	-41.25**
	(2.426)	(4.632)	(11.26)	(18.22)
Observations	177	177	73	73

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Models 3 and 4 examine the impact of ethnic and dual identity in non-democracies. Model 3 produces a positive coefficient for the ethnic identity measure. A higher level of ethnic identity is associated positively with ethnic protest. The result is consistent with the hypothesized association (HC2) and reaches a conventional level of statistical significance (p-value < 0.01). Non-democratic countries with higher levels of ethnic identity experience more ethnic protest.

While identity, as a nonmaterial resource, can be challenging to observe systematically, examples demonstrate identity's potential for mobilization in non-democracies. Uighur resentment of education in Chinese, Uighurs seeking Uighur roommates, and the assertion of Uighur nationalism through maps and the term "East Turkestan" demonstrates a strong Uighur ethnic identity.[180] The result: In 2008 and 2009, Uighurs protested in non-democratic China despite facing high repression costs.

The coefficient produced by the dual identity measure in non-democracies (Model 4) is negative (p-value < 0.10). Non-democracies with more dual identity holders are less likely to experience an ethnic protest. The results are somewhat consistent with Hypothesis C2. Dual identity does not correlate positively with ethnic protest in non-democracies

An illustration of the relationship is useful. One would expect Mozambique to experience ethnic protest. The country is diverse ethnically and as a non-democratic country, ethnic groups could use protest to further their political and social inclusion. Yet, in the early 2000s, the country had developed a strong sense of dual identity. 42.62 percent of the country identified with both their ethnic and national identities. Despite having numerous ethnic groups and an election in 2004, Mozambique did not experience protests with ethnic characteristics.

[180] The Uighurs, China's Embattled Muslim Minority, Are Still Seeking an Identity. *The Atlantic.*

To illustrate further the impact of identity on ethnic protest, I obtain the predictive effects[181] of Model 3, which examines ethnic identity in non-democracies, and Model 4, which examines dual identity in non-democracies. Figure 5.1 below illustrates the impact of different levels of ethnic and dual identity on the likelihood of ethnic protest in non-democratic contexts.

Figure 5.1: *Ethnic and Dual Identity and Ethnic Protest in Non-Democracies, 2005 – 2015*



When 5% of the population in a non-democracy has an ethnic identity, the likelihood of ethnic protest is 6.0 percent. The likelihood jumps to 15.0% when moving to a non-democracy with 15% of its population having an ethnic identity. The difference is 9.0 percentage-points, a substantive jump considering the low initial likelihood.[182] In Gabon, a non-democratic country with low ethnic identity (7.52%),

[181] I use predicted probabilities with observed values (see Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan, 2013).

[182] To account for potential outliers, robustness checks examine the predicted probabilities but exclude extreme cases of the primary independent variables: ethnic

for instance, protests did not develop ethnic characteristics. Uganda, Gabon's non-democratic counterpart, had a high level of ethnic identity (21.24%) and experienced an ethnic protest in 2009.

The analyses in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.1 provide evidence that the impact of ethnic and dual identity is conditional on regime type. Substantive results suggest that in non-democracies, ethnic identity encourages ethnic protest. Dual identity, on the other hand, discourages—or at least does not encourage—that same political behavior. In democratic countries, neither identity type is associated with ethnic protest, suggesting that developing a national identity does not necessarily result in decreased ethnic protest.[183]

I next discuss the regression coefficients produced by relevant control variables. In the two democratic models, the coefficients for the Politically Excluded Groups measures are positive and reach or approach conventional levels of statistical significance. A higher number of excluded ethnic groups correlates positively with ethnic protest. While the coefficients for the measure in the non-democratic models are positive, as well, neither reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

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and dual identities. A change in identity from the 5th to 95th percentile—for ethnic identity—resulted in similar findings to those of the main models.

[183] Robustness checks include a count of ethnic protests in a year as the dependent variable and a negative binomial model (see Appendix C). Result are consistent with the binary dependent variables and probit models.

The finding on political exclusion's impact on nonviolent protest builds on Cunningham's (2013) work that politically excluded self-determination groups are more likely to use nonviolent campaigns. More open political environments, such as democracies, encourage politically excluded ethnic groups to use protest as a non-conventional means to pursue aims. In non-democracies, however, it is possible that political exclusion reduces belief that any nonviolent ethnic group political participation is possible. As hope that structural conditions do not provide conditions that allow the ethnic group to be successful, group efficacy beliefs are likely to not have an effect on participation (Cohen-Chen and Van Zomeren, 2018). Violent behavior may be considered a more realistic alternative to put pressure on the government and obtain political objectives.

In line with the discussion on political exclusion, the repression measure also produces distinct correlations in democracies and non-democracies. In democracies, repression correlates positively with ethnic protest. In non-democracies, however, repression and ethnic protest maintain a negative association. Regime type distinctions in use and type of repression are likely to impact the costs and benefits of ethnic protest. More work should disentangle the complicated relationship (Ritter and Conrad, 2016) , especially for subsets (i.e., ethnic groups) of the population.

The measure for country population produces a positive coefficient in democratic contexts and is statistically significant at conventional levels.[184]

[184] The measure for country population does not produce a statistically significant coefficient in the non-democratic models. This is likely due to a smaller sample size.

Countries with large populations are likely to have a higher number of small ethnic groups, with more potential groups to engage in ethnic protest. Nigeria, with a population approaching 190 million inhabitants, has more than 500 ethnic groups. Lesotho, with a population of only two million citizens, has far less ethnic diversity and far less groups that could potentially mobilize politically. More research can follow Cunningham (2013) and research nonviolent political behavior of ethnic groups and organizations to distinguish better if it is small ethnic groups or large countries that cause ethnic protest.

The measure for elections produces divergent results in the democratic and non-democratic models. In non-democracies, the coefficient on the election measures are negative and reach or approach statistical significance. In contrast, in the two democratic models, the election measures produce positive coefficients. Statistical significance, however, is not reached. It is possible that in African democracies, political leaders mobilize voters on ethnic lines, resulting in electoral political competition revolving around ethnicity. Subsequent protests manifest with ostensibly political party characteristics with ethnic motivations lurking in the background. In Kenya, for instance, political parties mirror ethnic divisions. The Party of National Unity (PNU) had a Kikuyu ethnic base, while the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) maintained heavy Luo support. The veneer of political party, however, could encourage state stability and limit the potential for ethnic divisions to develop into broader macro-cleavages and more extreme self-determination claims. Further research could distinguish between political parties based on ethnic divisions and

those that are not. This would provide insight into the relationship between ethnicity, elections, and protests.

Further Analysis and Robustness Checks

While countries vary in their presence or absence of ethnic protest, they also vary in the number of ethnic protests they experience. Mali, for instance, experienced four ethnic protests in 2014, while in 2009, Senegal experienced one ethnic protest. To address this variation, I employ a second dependent variable: a count of ethnic protests in a country-year. This measure should provide a more nuanced indication of the extent of ethnic protest in a country and allows us to examine variation across countries that experienced at least some ethnic nonviolent mobilization.

To account for an overdispersed outcome variable, I follow Cameron and Trivedi (2013) and employ a negative binomial regression model to determine the association between identity and the number of ethnic protests. When faced with overdispersion, negative binomial models provide more accurate predicted probabilities (Long and Freese, 2014) than other count models.[185] Table 5.4 below provides the coefficients and standard errors.

Table 5.4: *Negative Binomial Regression Model of Ethnic Protest, 2005 – 2015 (Lagged IV)*

	Democracies	Non-democracies

[185] Furthermore, negative binomial regression models include an additional parameter that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2013).

Variables	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Lagged Dual Identity	-0.0170			-0.148***
	(0.0173)			(0.0383)
Lagged Ethnic Identity		-0.0136	0.461**	
		(0.0397)	(0.188)	
Non-ethnic protests	0.0290***	0.0303**	0.470***	0.549***
	(0.00998)	(0.0120)	(0.142)	(0.164)
Political Exclusion	0.390**	0.346**	-0.204	0.257
	(0.165)	(0.165)	(1.194)	(0.692)
Small Groups	0.118	0.115	1.349**	3.074***
	(0.0922)	(0.0925)	(0.610)	(0.870)
State Population (log)	0.950***	0.958***	6.422***	1.095
	(0.184)	(0.193)	(2.423)	(1.004)
GDP PC	-0.000485*	-0.000428**	-0.00332***	-0.00271***
	(0.000254)	(0.000201)	(0.000889)	(0.000932)
Urban Population	0.0344	0.0291	0.473***	0.505***
	(0.0271)	(0.0232)	(0.126)	(0.143)
Election	0.0290	-0.00221	-0.952	-0.972
	(0.591)	(0.561)	(0.847)	(0.751)
Constant	-18.05***	-18.52***	-137.0***	-42.57**
	(3.217)	(3.292)	(43.14)	(17.08)
Observations	177	177	73	73

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Models 5 – 8 correspond to models 1 – 4 but have a count outcome. The results are consistent with the probit models in Table 5.3. In non-democracies, ethnic identity encourages more ethnic protests (Model 7). The measure for the ethnic identity produces a positive coefficient that reaches conventional levels of statistical

significance (p-value < 0.05). Dual identity has the opposite effect and is associated with a lower number of ethnic protests (Model 8).[186]

Concerns on Endogeneity

Endogeneity, especially reverse-causation, is a concern for any study examining the association between identity and group protest. While identity can cause protest, protest can cause identity.

Using time-series data addresses partly the challenge of reverse causality. Measures of ethnic and dual identity vary temporally within countries, and I examine the likelihood of ethnic protest as a function of identity at a specific point of time. Furthermore, regression models are run with lagged independent measurements of identity to account for time (see appendix C). The cause must precede the effect. A control variable on ethnic protest in previous years is also included in models run in the appendix C.

It is also not clear how the reverse relationship—the impact of ethnic protest on identity—occurs. In the United States, for instance, large-scale Latino protests in 2006 did not associate with an increase in ethnic identity. Rather, the Latino protests

[186]As another robustness check, I include a negative binomial regression model with dichotomous measurements of ethnic and dual identity. The results are consistent with the primary probit and negative binomial models. In non-democracies, ethnic identity produces a positive coefficient and dual identity a negative coefficient. Both measures are statistically significant at conventional levels (p-value < 0.05 and < 0.01). The results can be found in Appendix C.

made Latinos feel more American (Silber Mohamed, 2013). Literature suggests that ethnic group political participation can actually make ethnic members feel as if they are a part of the national community. Rather than make ethnic members feel more ethnic and obscure the relationship between ethnic identity and ethnic protest, evidence suggests that ethnic protest develops a national identity.

Moreover, ethnic protests do not necessarily create more ethnic tensions. Ethnic protest may not make non-ethnic co-nationals more prejudiced, scared, or resistant to ethnic group political behavior. In the United States, white people from counties that experienced civil rights protest are more likely to support affirmative action policies and express less racial resentment toward African-Americans (Mazumder, 2018).

Finally, a large literature in social psychology—and much experimental work—demonstrates the causal effect of identity at the individual level (van Zomeren et al., 2008). The country-level results of this chapter are also highly consistent with the findings from chapters III and IV. The robustness of the results, along with the large micro-level literature on identity and protest, offer strong evidence for the impact of ethnic and dual identity on ethnic protest.

Conclusion

Chapter V offers the third piece of the puzzle. This chapter uses country-level analysis to identify a clear determinant of ethnic protest: ethnic identity in non-democratic settings. The empirical results also suggest that dual identity does not have a mobilizing impact in non-democracies.

The results are consistent with the micro-level analysis. They offer another angle from which to examine the relationship between regime type, identity, and

ethnic protest. Chapter III examines the relationship between regime type and identity and ethnic protest at the micro-level. Chapter IV offers empirical insight into participation during different ethnic protest stages. Identity's increased impact on individual participation during later stages affects how likely ethnic protests will develop. And as Chapter V demonstrates, dual identity can discourage ethnic protest in non-democracies. Much work in social and political-psychology is limited in focusing on individual behavior. Other variables play roles in ethnic protest, and it is thus necessary to see if social-psychological factors influence participation in the broader context. This chapter does this by focusing on regime type and identity at the country-level.

Chapter 6: Concluding Thoughts and Policy Implications

"Why didn't they [Christian and Alawite friends] support us? People are dying, but they just support the regime."

Syrian Sunni Arab, Beirut, Lebanon

Introduction

This dissertation strives to explain the puzzle of why some countries experience ethnic protest and some do not. To explain a country-level phenomenon, it questions why and when ethnic community members protest. It shows that regime type and identity interact to affect participation. Moreover, this interactive impact is greater across stages of an ethnic protest.

Ethnic identity is not the only relevant identity for potential protesters, and the broader context of social identification matters for mobilization decisions. An ethnic member's decision to join an ethnic protest is affected by how an ethnic member anticipates responses from the government and non-ethnic co-nationals. An ethnic member's anticipation of the responses of the government and non-ethnic co-nationals is in turn affected by two factors. First, whether the ethnic member identifies primarily with the ethnic group, or with the ethnic group and the national group (dual identity), impacts an ethnic member's anticipation of how government and non-ethnic co-nationals will respond. Second, whether the ethnic member resides in a democracy or non-democracy impacts how an ethnic member anticipates responses.

Self-identifying ethnic group members can have a strong sense of ethnic identity, national identity, or both (dual). Compared to ethnic identity holders, and because of identity linkages to the national group, a dual identity holder cares more about non-ethnic co-nationals. Caring for non-ethnic co-nationals impacts ethnic protest. The relationship, however, is conditional on regime type.

In democracies, ethnic protest is a legitimate political behavior. A dual identity holder has higher beliefs that non-ethnic co-nationals care and will respond positively to an ethnic protest—a tactic that maintains legitimacy. Higher beliefs of a positive non-ethnic co-national response increase ethnic protest participation likelihood.

In non-democracies, however, non-ethnic co-nationals are more likely to view ethnic protest as destabilizing political behavior. Because of linkages to the national group, dual identity holders are concerned about a negative reaction from non-ethnic co-nationals to a tactic perceived as illegitimate political behavior. This decreases a dual identity holder's likelihood of joining an ethnic protest. Ethnic identity, in contrast, increases ethnic protest participation likelihood in non-democratic contexts. Non-democratic countries with high levels of ethnic identity experience more ethnic protests.

While identity, as a nonmaterial resource, can be challenging to observe systematically, examples demonstrate identity's potential for mobilization in non-democracies. Uighur resentment of education in Chinese, Uighurs seeking Uighur roommates, and the assertion of Uighur nationalism through maps and the term "East

Turkestan" demonstrates a strong Uighur ethnic identity."[187] The result: In 2008 and 2009, Uighurs protested in non-democratic China despite facing high repression costs.

Ethiopia illustrates further the impact of ethnic identity on ethnic protest. A largely rural non-democratic country with a repressive regime, participation in anti-governmental protests can result in arrest, detention, and/or death.[188] Despite facing a repressive state apparatus, ethnic protests persist in Ethiopia, even amongst populations that do not advocate for independence, which has been found to predict self-determination movement nonviolent campaigns. What makes ethnic members go into the streets to protest the government? Ethnic identity is high and dual identity is low. Amhara identity, often intertwined with pan-Ethiopism and a concept of dual identity, is giving way to a prioritized ethnic Amhara identity, especially when faced with Oromo nationalism. The result: an increase in Amhara protesting on behalf their group.

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[187] The Uighurs, China's Embattled Muslim Minority, Are Still Seeking an Identity. T*he Atlantic.*

[188]"Some 11,607 individuals have so far been detained in six prisons, of which 347 are female, in connection with the state of emergency declared in the country," official Taddesse Hordofa said in a televised statement on November 12 after the state of emergency was implemented (Ethiopia: Ethnic nationalism and the Gondar Protests. *Aljazeera*).

Findings

A multimethod approach examines how regime type structures the impact of identity on ethnic protest. The third chapter tests the micro-level expectations. Original survey-experiments are conducted amongst Afro-Panamanians in Panama, and Greek Orthodox in Lebanon. Findings illustrate that amongst Afro-Panamanians, dual identity holders express intent to participate at a similar rate compared to ethnic identity holders. As long as an Afro-Panamanian maintains identity links to her/his ethnic group, participation likelihood is high. Developing simultaneous identity links to the national group does not reduce intent to participate. Care for non-ethnic co-nationals plays a crucial role in encouraging dual identity holders to participate.

Amongst Greek Orthodox, however, dual identity decreases ethnic protest intentions. Care for non-ethnic co-nationals mediates the relationship, discouraging dual identity holders from expressing intent to participate.

Building on the previous chapter, the fourth chapter extends the theoretical logic and considers participation at different stages of an ethnic protest. Conceptually, it builds on previous conceptualizations of protest participation occurring in three different stages: first, second, and third movers.

The argument draws from theoretical and empirical studies of regime type differences in concession and repression likelihoods. I argue that in a democracy, as an ethnic protest grows, the likelihood of concessions increases. In a non-democracy, however, the likelihood of repression increases the larger the ethnic protest is. Increased likelihoods of concessions and repression result in distinct expectations for participation at different ethnic protest stages.

The chapter uses the above-mentioned survey-experiments to examine ethnic protest intentions at different stages. Amongst Greek Orthodox, relative to dual identity, ethnic identity has an increasingly large association with participation across protest stages.

To bolster the findings that rely on intent to protest, in-depth interviews with Sunni Arab Syrians examine actual protest participation in Syria in 2011. Findings illustrate that identity impacts ethnic protest participation at increasing rates as an ethnic protest grows. Syrian Sunni Arabs that expressed dual identity were more likely to consider the reactions of non-Sunni Arabs. This consideration reduced participation—albeit more strongly in later stages of the 2011 protests.

Chapter IV sets the stage for analysis at the country level. The fifth chapter uses event data and Afrobarometer survey data to examine the conditions in which countries experience ethnic protest. The findings are consistent with the micro-level findings. In democracies, higher levels of ethnic or dual identity associate positively with ethnic protest likelihood. In non-democracies, however, only a higher level of ethnic identity provides a meaningful correlate for ethnic protest. When more ethnic members in non-democracies develop national identities, even while maintaining ethnic identity links, ethnic protest likelihood decreases.

Implications for Ethnic Conflict, Social Psychology and Social Movement Literatures

The dissertation contributes insight to literature on ethnic conflict and social psychology and lays new groundwork in understanding ethnic group political behavior.

Ethnic Conflict Literature

The term "ethnicity" is used quite frequently in academia, journalism, and popular discourse. It is often conceived as static and unchanging: our blood. While there may be meaningful consequences for political behavior stemming from belief that ethnicity is unmoving, our concept of ethnicity should recognize its dynamic nature. This study takes seriously a dynamic conceptualization of ethnicity by using survey data to determine the ethnic makeup of certain African countries and individuals' relationship to the nation. Limiting our measurements of identity to approaches that do not incorporate multiple identities, we ignore how communities and members view themselves. This limits our understanding of ethnicity's impact on political behavior, specifically ethnic protest.

This dissertation identities a clear determinant of ethnic protest: ethnic identity in non-democratic settings. The empirical results at the micro- and country-levels of analysis suggest that dual identity does not have a mobilizing impact in non-democracies. Increasing identity links to the national community—even when maintaining ethnic linkages—can decrease ethnic protest.

This dissertation contributes to a broad and rich ethnic conflict literature by addressing fundamental assumptions of what it means to be an ethnic community member. Its use of experimental and survey data addresses concerns over how people identify as compared to how outsiders identify people. Moreover, its focus on multiple identities recognizes that ethnic identity members have identity options. An ethnic identity may not be a person's strongest sense of who he/she is. Ethnic

structure has important implications for ethnic conflict research. Focusing on identity options forces us to reconceive our notions of what ethnic structure looks like.

Social Psychology and Social Movement Literatures

The project makes two major contributions to social psychology literature and improves our understanding of the conditions in which identity impacts political behavior. It builds on literature that finds that a society's "non-ethnic co-nationals" play an important role in dual identity's impact on ethnic protest participation. It then builds on recent work that examines the limitations of group efficacy beliefs in mobilizing ethnic minority members (Cohen-Chen and Van Zomeren, 2018). The theoretical argument identifies regime type as conditioning the impact of identity on group efficacy beliefs and perceptions of how much non-ethnic co-nationals care—and thus on participation.

The project second uses an important concept in literature on social movements and contentious politics—mover type—and theorizes further that protest participation does not always look the same.[189] Initiating an ethnic protest and joining an existing ethnic protest are likely to differ in the costs, benefits, and emotions involved. By applying insight from contentious politics to the study of identity and participation, the project has generated novel theories and hypotheses.

[189] See, for instance, Tarrow (1993).

Avenues for Future Research

This dissertation raises new research questions for ethnic conflict. It theoretically and empirically highlights the role of non-ethnic co-nationals. Non-ethnic co-nationals are an important feature in a potential contest between an ethnic group and the government. The dissertation presents a theory on how ethnic member perceptions of non-ethnic co-national views are important.

Further research should focus on the conditions in which non-ethnic co-nationals develop pro-ethnic protest or anti-ethnic protest views. Related research should examine when non-ethnic co-nationals will support government repression of ethnic protest and how much repression will be supported. China, for instance, has recently been accused of putting thousands of ethnic Uighurs in security compounds that have been described by some as concentration camps.[190] While we have limited insight into Chinese citizens' views on the repression, there does not appear to be much government concern of a backlash from non-Uighur Chinese.[191] What are the conditions in which non-Uighurs will not support the Chinese government's repression of Uighurs or even support Uighur political behavior? A less extreme example is in the United States. A number of observers feel that Colin Kaepernick and the NFL protests for African-American civil rights have caused players to not be

[190] Editorial Board. (2018, November 24). China is creating concentration camps in Xinjiang. Here's how we hold it accountable. *The Washington Post.*

[191] Sudworth, J. (2018, October 24). China's hidden camps: What's happened to the vanquished Uighurs of Xinjiang?. *BBC*.

hired. The National Anthem Protests have also gained the ire of President Trump. What are the conditions in which White Americans pressure the US government to act in a different manner or put pressure on businesses and industries to encourage or support the ethnic protest?

This dissertation also highlights the need to look at a broader number of ethnic groups. Ethnic conflict literature focuses heavily on ethnic minorities and disadvantaged ethnic groups. Ethnic groups that are advantaged politically, however, may also mobilize—and have critical consequences. For instance, although White Americans are advantaged politically, protests on behalf of White Americans occur. The Charlottesville rally—and riot—illustrates a protest on behalf of a politically advantaged ethnic group. In other countries, too, politically advantaged ethnic groups protest. In Egypt, Arab Muslims have protested and made claims on behalf of the ethnic group. Hindu nationalism in India has had significant implications for domestic and regional stability. The Indian government effectively stripped four million mainly Muslim people of citizenship. A political leader from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party even stated that "if these . . . illegal immigrants do not leave India respectfully, then they should be shot and eliminated."[192] Anti-minority rhetoric undermines India as an appropriate and stable partner for the U.S.

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[192] Cockburn, H. (2018, July 31). 'Shoot Bangladeshi and Rohingya immigrants who won't leave', says Indian politician. *Independent.* Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/bangladesh-rohingya-immigrants-india-shot-dead-killed-bjp-raja-singh-a8472036.html

Examining a broader spectrum of ethnic groups will paint a fuller picture of inter-ethnic group relations, conflict, and our understanding of security. Protest on behalf of politically advantaged ethnic groups can increase ethnic tensions. Ethnic minorities, who may suffer political, economic, or cultural discrimination, may view politically advantaged ethnic protest as threatening. Minority groups may not view the advantaged group, or by extension, the government, as willing to engage politically across ethnic divides. This perceived threat is likely to reduce minority trust in the government. Lack of minority trust in the government can worsen inter-ethnic group relations. Minority groups may view (further) autonomy or independence as more attractive political goals. These demands can increase the likelihood of violence and civil war.

Additional research should also focus on the impact of regime type and identity on ethnic protest from the ethnic group-level. Data concerns make it challenging to determine the identity make up of specific ethnic groups. Better survey data that is more representative at the ethnic group level will make it more feasible to examine the theoretical expectations at the ethnic group level of analysis. While we have some data in select democratic countries on identity within an ethnic group, a next step, if possible, is to collect survey data in non-democratic contexts. Analyzing ethnic group behavior will provide further evidence of the theoretical mechanism from an important level of analysis.

One way to address the challenge of collecting data at the ethnic group level is to examine organizations making claims on behalf of an ethnic group. Text analysis of statements and comments by group members, supporters, and non-participants could

be used to determine identity levels for organizations that make claims on behalf of ethnic organizations. Some ethnic organizations are likely to have exclusively ethnic identities, but others will have links to both an ethnic and national identity—dual identity. Analyzing ethnic organization identity is another promising research avenue to pursue.

Implications for Policy

The role of identity in encouraging or discouraging ethnic protest participation has two key policy implications. First, in certain political contexts formal political institutions are inaccessible to ethnic groups. Ethnic protest allows ethnic members to informally access the state and encourages government accountability to their most marginalized populations. Formal political institutions may be inaccessible to ethnic groups, but ethnic protest can provide excluded ethnic groups greater political inclusion, increasing democratic tendencies.

The Berber Spring of 1980, for example, created a legacy of activists and platform of inclusion for future Kabyle politicians. Ethnic protest can empower notions of citizenship, strengthen political participation practices, and as an Amhara protest slogan—"Respect Amharaness"— in Ethiopia suggests, raise grassroots awareness of human rights. Knowing that ethnic protest is an option assists policymakers in assessing the wellbeing of ethnic groups domestically and internationally. From normative and strategic standpoints, this research helps U.S. policymakers to understand better which and when ethnic groups can pursue economic, political, and social inclusion through ethnic protest. This provides a better understanding of a nonmaterial resource—identity—that ethnic groups possess

and better assessment of how it impacts their political behavior. When ethnic groups are faced with an identity that limits their ability to mobilize, policymakers should devote more attention to the wellbeing of these groups, develop other means by which they can access state resources, or work on encouraging identities capable of mobilization.

Second, ethnic-based oppositional political behavior can also lead to more costly outcomes and has major implications for global politics. Civil war—as opposed to inter-state war—has become the predominate form of violent conflict. Over the last twenty years, the most common source of violent civil conflict has been disputes between self-determination movements (often based on ethnic groups) and governments. When peaceful protest is inaccessible, dissatisfied ethnic members may turn to violent tactics to pursue aims. The Kabyle "Black Spring" protests of 2001 encouraged Kabyle nationalism to manifest in new political forces, some advocating for a separate state. Ethnic groups—often acting for greater self-determination—appear to make the most extreme demands on governments, may pursue separatist policies. Conflicts over self-determination are now the primary source of civil war. When peaceful protest is inaccessible, dissatisfied ethnic members may turn to violent tactics to pursue aims. Ethnic protest may indicate political instability (Gurr and Lichbach, 1986; Lane and Ersson, 1991), as seen in Northern Island and Sri Lanka (Douglas, 1983; Manogaran, 1987). While ethnic protest can certainly be used to better conditions for ethnic groups, policymakers should pay close attention to ethnic protest's capacity to develop into violent ethnic conflict. Exploring when and if

ethnic members protest provides critical insight toward understanding the basis of civil war, the most predominant form of political violence today.

Governments strive to develop national identities; in certain contexts, however, ties to the national group—or simultaneous ties to one's ethnic and national group—can discourage ethnic protest participation and put a lid on a boiling pot of tension. Ethnic groups that cannot participate politically through ethnic protest may use violence in pursuing aims. Explaining the determinants of ethnic group protest and lack of protest provides meaningful insight for both the rights of ethnic groups and civil violence.

Conclusion

Stories abound of non-ethnic co-nationals assisting ethnic minority members. Oskar Schindler, the Sudeten German man who saved thousands of Polish Jews is immortalized in the film *Schindler's List*. Freedom riders consisted of black and white individuals (and others) who challenged bus segregation in the United States in the 1960s. Fifty years later, some were reunited on *The Oprah Winfrey Show*. Joe Slavo, a South African of Jewish-Lithuanian descent, was a military commander of the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and leading member of the African National Congress. Songs and movies have centered on his actions. Society seems to recognize, rightly or wrongly, the importance that non-ethnic co-nationals have on bettering the conditions of ethnic minority groups.

Much attention is placed on ethnic group attributes. Ethnic groups are not acting in isolation, however. They are acting within the context of a broader national group. Ethnic members also have differing levels of political, economic, social, religious,

and ideological links with the national group. These various links tie or divide together peoples of a society. Rather than conceive ethnic members as a distinct unit within a society, we need to understand better how ethnic members fit in that society.

Understanding how ethnic members fit in a society opens the door for understanding the political behavior of ethnic members. By focusing on simultaneous identity links to the national group, we can understand better how ethnic members relate to broader society. Regime type, and whether the political behavior is deemed legitimate or illegitimate, furthers our understanding of how identify impacts ethnic group political behavior.

Appendix A – Survey-experiments

Table A1.1: Descriptive Statistics for Experiment Groups

	Panama				Lebanon			
	Ethnic	National	Dual	Control	Ethnic	National	Dual	Control
Gender (Male)	0.55	0.53	0.57	0.57	0.68	0.64	0.61	0.65
Age	33.2	35.1	33.91	31.1	29.1	28.1	28.7	25.2

Panama

Instructions: Please read the following essay carefully (you will be asked some questions about this essay later).

Inter-Ethnic Relations in Panama

The population in Panama is diverse. There are different ethnic groups in the country, and it is critical that we find ways for members of different ethnic groups to be proud on their own unique ethnic heritage. Experts from different fields have concluded that recognizing how members of different sectarian or ethnic groups are different could potentially be a great asset for society. We are all members of our own ethnic group. Specifically, social scientists argue that an approach that emphasizes ethnic identities is an essential component of long-term well-being in Panama and other countries. Recognizing that all of us are members of different ethnic groups that have different traditions can contribute to making a better nation. We should validate the identities of the different ethnic groups that comprise Panama, historically and in the present. We can allow each group to stress its unique identity. In other words, each of us is a member of a certain ethnic group, and we should have the opportunity to define ourselves and celebrate our unique identity: We all have our unique "ethnic identity!" In sum, it is essential for the well-being of all people to appreciate the differences in traditions between sectarian groups.

Instructions: Please read the following essay carefully (you will be asked some questions about this essay later).

Inter-Ethnic Relations in Panama

The population in Panama is diverse. There are different ethnic groups in the country, and it is critical that we find ways for members of different sectarian groups to live peacefully and productively together. Experts from different fields have concluded that emphasizing a common category to all groups could potentially be a great asset. We are all members of a common group--Panamanian. Specifically, social scientists argue that an approach that emphasizes our common

identity as Panamanian, without emphasizing ethnic differences is an essential component of long-term well-being in Lebanon and other countries. Recognizing that all of us are Panamanian can contribute to making Panama a better nation. Regardless of our ethnic group, we are all first and foremost Panamanians. As Panamanians, we have strengths and weaknesses, and by acknowledging them, we validate the identity of each person as a Panamanian. Instead of focusing on our particular ethnic group, we need to understand that we all belong to the same big whole. Separate group identities are less relevant. In other words, while each of us is a member of a certain ethnic group, we should have the opportunity to define ourselves and celebrate our identity as Panamanians—without feeling the necessity to regard ourselves in terms of our ethnic identity as well: "Foremost, we are all Panamanians!". In sum, we all are a part of a common group (Panamanians) sharing similar values and beliefs that unite us and bring us together. It is a common shared identity that connects all Panamanians.

Instructions: Please read the following essay carefully (you will be asked some questions about this essay later).

Inter-Ethnic Relations in Panama

The population in Panama is diverse. There are different ethnic groups in the country, and it is critical that we find ways for members of different ethnic groups to live peacefully and productively together. Experts from different fields have concluded that emphasizing a common category to all groups could potentially be a great asset. We are all members of a common group—Panamanians. Experts from different fields have concluded that recognizing how members of different ethnic groups are different while emphasizing our common identity as well could potentially be a great asset. We are all members of our own ethnic group and a common group— Panamanians. Specifically, social scientists argue that an approach that emphasizes the ways ethnic identities and Panamanian identity support each other is an essential component of long-term well-being in Panama. Recognizing that all of us are members of ethnic groups that have different traditions while sharing a common Panamanian identity can contribute to making Panama a better nation. We are all member of our ethnic group, and we are all Panamanians. As Panamanians, we can validate the identities of the different ethnic groups that comprise Panama, historically and in the present. We can allow each ethnic group to stress its unique identity as well as the Panamanian aspects its identity. In other words, we should have the opportunity to define ourselves and celebrate our identity as Panamanians along with being a member of a certain sectarian group: We have "dual identities!" In sum, it is the appreciation of our different sectarian group traditions coupled with our common shared identity that binds all Panamanians.

Instructions: Please read the following essay carefully (you will be asked some questions about this essay later).

China's Contribution to the Global Economy

China is a super economy of 1.3 billion people. Its ability to grow and increase its global influence in the context of the international financial crisis has made much of the world look at the Asian giant as a beacon in the middle of the storm.

The downturn in the global economy contrasts with China's successes since it began the process of reform and opening more than 30 years ago. Since 1978 until today, Beijing has been given the task of growing economically for the benefit of its people, but also the challenge of becoming a global base.

In recent years, its economy is equivalent to 30% of the Global Gross Domestic Product, and it is among the top five countries that invest the most in other markets, making China one of the engines of the global financial crisis.
The list of successes of the Chinese, coupled with their commitment to stability above any goal, have been essential for the international community to put their hopes in them. Between 1980 and 2015 the Chinese Gross Domestic Product (GDP) multiplied by 16 and in 2010 surpassed that of Japan and became the second largest in the world, surpassed only by the United States.

Before, in 2009, it had already surpassed Germany to become the first universal exporter.

China, as a power, has said that it does not pretend to flee from its responsibility for the rest of the nations and for that reason it suggested the construction of an innovative world economy to generate new vectors of growth, open to extend the scope of the development, interconnected to forge synergy interactive and an inclusive basis to strengthen the bottom line of win-win outcomes.

Instrucciones: por favor, lea el siguiente texto cuidadosamente (se le harán algunas preguntas sobre este ensayo más adelante).

Relaciones interétnicas en Panamá

La población de Panamá es diversa. Hay diferentes grupos étnicos en el país, y es fundamental que encontremos formas para que los miembros de los distintos grupos étnicos se sientan orgullosos de su propia herencia étnica. Expertos en varias áreas han llegado a la conclusión de que el reconocimiento de cómo los miembros de distintos grupos étnicos son diferentes, podría ser un gran valor para la sociedad. Todos somos miembros de nuestro propio grupo étnico.
Específicamente, los científicos sociales argumentan que un enfoque que enfatiza las identidades étnicas es un componente esencial del bienestar a largo plazo en

Panamá y en otros países. Reconocer que todos somos miembros de diferentes grupos étnicos que tienen distintas tradiciones puede contribuir a crear una nación mejor. Debemos validar las identidades de los diferentes grupos étnicos que componen Panamá, históricamente y en el presente. Podemos permitir que cada grupo haga hincapié en su identidad única. En otras palabras, cada uno de nosotros es miembro de un determinado grupo étnico, y debemos tener la oportunidad de definirnos a nosotros mismos y celebrar nuestra identidad característica: ¡todos tenemos nuestra "identidad étnica"! En resumen, es esencial para el bienestar de todas las personas el apreciar las diferencias en las tradiciones entre los grupos étnicos.

Instrucciones: por favor, lea el siguiente texto cuidadosamente (se le harán algunas preguntas sobre este ensayo más adelante).

Relaciones interétnicas en Panamá

La población de Panamá es diversa. Expertos de diferentes campos han llegado a la conclusión de que reconocer cómo los miembros de diferentes grupos étnicos son diferentes, y al mismo tiempo, también hacer énfasis en nuestra identidad común, podría ser un gran valor. Todos somos miembros de nuestro propio grupo étnico y de un grupo en común: los panameños. Específicamente, los científicos sociales argumentan que un enfoque que enfatiza la forma en que las identidades étnicas y la identidad panameña se apoyan mutuamente es un componente esencial del bienestar a largo plazo en Panamá. Reconocer que todos somos miembros de grupos étnicos que tienen tradiciones diferentes mientras que compartimos una identidad panameña común, puede contribuir a hacer de Panamá una nación mejor. Todos somos miembros de nuestro grupo étnico y todos somos panameños. Como panameños, podemos validar las identidades de los diferentes grupos étnicos que conforman Panamá, históricamente y en el presente. Podemos permitir que cada grupo étnico destaque su identidad única, así como los aspectos panameños de su identidad. En otras palabras, deberíamos tener la oportunidad de definirnos y celebrar nuestra identidad como panameños, además de ser miembros de un grupo en específico: ¡tenemos "identidades duales"! En resumen, es la apreciación de nuestras diferentes tradiciones de grupos específicos, unidas con nuestra identidad común compartida, lo que une a todos los panameños.

Instrucciones: por favor, lea el siguiente texto cuidadosamente (se le harán algunas preguntas sobre este ensayo más adelante).

Relaciones interétnicas en Panamá

La población de Panamá es diversa. Expertos de diferentes campos han llegado a la conclusión de que enfatizar una categoría en común en todos los grupos podría ser un gran valor. Todos somos miembros de un grupo común: los panameños. Específicamente, los científicos sociales argumentan que un enfoque que enfatiza una identidad nacional común, sin hacer énfasis en las diferencias étnicas, es un componente esencial del bienestar a largo plazo en Panamá y en otros países. Reconocer que todos somos panameños puede contribuir a hacer una mejor nación. Independientemente de nuestro grupo étnico, somos, ante todo, panameños. En lugar de enfocarnos en nuestro grupo étnico particular, necesitamos entender que todos pertenecemos al mismo gran conjunto. Las identidades de grupo separadas son menos relevantes. En otras palabras, si bien cada uno de nosotros es miembro de un determinado grupo étnico, deberíamos tener la oportunidad de definirnos y celebrar nuestra identidad como panameños, sin sentir la necesidad de considerarnos también en términos de nuestra propia identidad étnica: "¡Ante todo, somos panameños!". En resumen, todos somos parte de un grupo común (los panameños) compartiendo valores y creencias similares que nos unen. Es esta identidad compartida común la que conecta a todos los panameños.

Instrucciones: por favor, lea el siguiente texto cuidadosamente (se le harán algunas preguntas sobre este ensayo más adelante).

La contribución de China a la economía mundial

China es una súper economía de 1 300 millones de habitantes. Su habilidad para crecer y aumentar su influencia global en el contexto de la crisis financiera internacional ha hecho que buena parte del mundo mire al gigante asiático como un faro en medio de la tormenta.

La depresión de la economía mundial contrasta con los éxitos cosechados por China desde que inició el proceso de Reforma y Apertura hace más de 30 años. Desde 1978 a la fecha, Beijing se dio a la tarea de crecer económicamente para beneficio de su población, pero también se planteó el reto de convertirse en una referencia global.

Durante los últimos años, su economía equivale al 30 % del Producto Interno Bruto Global y está entre los primeros cinco países que más invierten en otros mercados, lo que convierte a China en uno de los motores de las alicaídas finanzas globales.

La lista de éxitos de los chinos, sumado a su apuesta por la estabilidad por encima de cualquier meta, han sido esenciales para que la comunidad internacional cifre sus esperanzas en ellos. Entre 1980 y el 2015 el Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) chino se multiplicó por 16 y en el 2010 superó al de Japón y se convirtió en el segundo mayor del mundo, sobrepasado solo por el de Estados Unidos.

Antes, en el 2009, ya había superado a Alemania para convertirse en el primer exportador a nivel universal.

China, como potencia, ha dicho que no pretende huir de su responsabilidad con el resto de las naciones y por ello sugirió la construcción de una economía mundial

innovadora para generar nuevos vectores de crecimiento, abierta para ampliar el alcance del desarrollo, interconectada para forjar sinergia interactiva e inclusiva para fortalecer la base de los resultados ganar-ganar.

How willing are you to organize a protest on the political position of Afro-Panamanians in the next two years?

Scale 1 (not very willing) – 7 (very willing)

How willing are you to attend a small protest on the political position of your Afro-Panamanians in the next two years? Most of your neighbors are too busy to attend.

Scale 1 (not very willing) – 7 (very willing)

How willing are you to attend a large protest on the political position of your Afro-Panamanians in the next two years? Most of your neighbors plan to go.

Scale 1 (not very willing) – 7 (very willing)

Other Panamanians care about the wellbeing of Afro-Panamanians.

Scale 1 (not very willing) – 7 (very willing)

Other Panamanians would be upset if Afro-Panamanians protested for our group

Scale 1 (not very willing) – 7 (very willing)

Afro-Panamanians might as well give up politically because we cannot make things better for ourselves in the future.

Scale 1 (not very willing) – 7 (very willing)

When I think about the political situation of Afro-Panamanians I feel angry.

Scale 1 (not very willing) – 7 (very willing)

¿Qué tan dispuesto estaría usted a organizar una protesta sobre la posición política de los afropanameños en los próximos dos años?						
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

¿Qué tan dispuesto estaría usted a asistir a una pequeña protesta acerca de la posición política de los afropanameños en los próximos dos años? (La mayoría de sus vecinos están demasiado ocupados para asistir).						
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

¿Qué tan dispuesto estaría usted a asistir a una gran protesta acerca de la posición política de los afropanameños en los próximos dos años? (La mayoría de sus vecinos planea asistir).						
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Hay panameños que se preocupan por el bienestar de los afropanameños.						
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Los afropanameños podrían también darse por vencidos políticamente porque no podemos mejorar las cosas en el futuro.						
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Me enojo cuando pienso en la situación política de los afropanameños.						
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Instructions: Please read the following essay carefully (you will be asked some questions about this essay later).

Inter-Ethnic Relations in Lebanon

The population in Lebanon is diverse. There are 18 recognized sects in the country, and it is critical that we find ways for members of different sectarian groups to be proud on their own unique sectarian heritage. Experts from different fields have concluded that recognizing how members of different sectarian or ethnic groups are different could potentially be a great asset for society. We are all members of our own sectarian group. Specifically, social scientists argue that an approach that emphasizes sectarian identities is an essential component of long-term well-being in Lebanon and other countries. Recognizing that all of us are members of different sectarian groups that have different traditions can contribute to making a better nation. We should validate the identities of the different ethnic groups that comprise Lebanon, historically and in the present. We can allow each group to stress its unique identity. In other words, each of us is a member of a certain sectarian group, and we should have the opportunity to define ourselves and celebrate our unique identity: We all have our unique "sectarian identity!" In sum, it is essential for the well-being of all people to

appreciate the differences in traditions between sectarian groups.

Instructions: Please read the following essay carefully (you will be asked some questions about this essay later).

Inter-Ethnic Relations in Lebanon

The population in Lebanon is diverse. There are 18 recognized sects in the country, and it is critical that we find ways for members of different sectarian groups to live peacefully and productively together. Experts from different fields have concluded that emphasizing a common category to all groups could potentially be a great asset. We are all members of a common group—Lebanese. Specifically, social scientists argue that an approach that emphasizes our common identity as Lebanese, without emphasizing sectarian or ethnic differences is an essential component of long-term well-being in Lebanon and other countries. Recognizing that all of us are Lebanese can contribute to making Lebanon a better nation. Regardless of our sectarian group, we are all first and foremost Lebanese. As Lebanese, we have strengths and weaknesses, and by acknowledging them, we validate the identity of each person as a Lebanese. Instead of focusing on our particular sectarian group, we need to understand that we all belong to the same big whole. Separate group identities are less relevant. In other words, while each of us is a member of a certain sectarian group, we should have the opportunity to define ourselves and celebrate our identity as a Lebanese—without feeling the necessity to regard ourselves in terms of our ethnic identity as well: "Foremost, we are all Lebanese!". In sum, we all are a part of a common group (Lebanese) sharing similar values and beliefs that unite us and bring us together. It is a common shared identity that connects all Lebanese.

Instructions: Please read the following essay carefully (you will be asked some questions about this essay later).

Inter-Ethnic Relations in Lebanon

The population in Lebanon is diverse. There are 18 recognized sects in the country, and it is critical that we find ways for members of different sectarian groups to live peacefully and productively together. Experts from different fields have concluded that emphasizing a common category to all groups could potentially be a great asset. We are all members of a common group—Lebanese. Experts from different fields have concluded that recognizing how members of different sectarian and ethnic groups are different while emphasizing our common identity as well could potentially be a great asset. We are all members of our own sectarian group and a common group—Lebanese. Specifically, social scientists argue that an approach that emphasizes the ways sectarian identities and Lebanese identity support each other is an essential component of long-term well-being in Lebanon. Recognizing that all of us are members of sects that have different traditions while sharing a common Lebanese identity can contribute to making Lebanese a better nation. We are all member of our sectarian group, and we are all Lebanese. As Lebanese, we can validate the identities of the different sectarian groups that comprise Lebanon, historically and in the present. We can allow each sectarian group to stress its unique identity as well as the Lebanese aspects its identity. In other words, we should have the opportunity to define ourselves and celebrate our identity as a Lebanese along with being a member of a certain sectarian group: We have "dual identities!" In sum, it is the appreciation of our different sectarian group traditions coupled with our common shared identity that binds all Lebanese.


Instructions: Please read the following essay carefully (you will be asked some questions about this essay later).

China pledges to contribute to maintaining world economic growth

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said his country could not achieve economic growth in isolation from the world and vowed his country would contribute more to balanced global economic growth. China will continue to increase its investments in Europe, he said, expressing confidence that the European economy will be able to rise again. "He believes that the European economy is capable of advancing and China will continue to increase its investments in Europe," Jia said in his opening remarks to the World Summer Economic Forum in Dalian, northeast China. He also expressed confidence that the US economy will recover fully from the crisis it is going through. The BBC's Juliana Liu says that the word has shown some confidence in the global economy's recovery and this optimism is not shared by delegates from the countries participating in the forum. China is the second largest economic power in the world, but it is widely criticized for its economic policies. Critics say it focuses heavily on the export sector and stabilizes its currency exchange rate for that purpose. Jia said China will push ahead with structural reforms and boost domestic consumption to support long-term economic growth. The slowdown in economic growth was the result of the government's tightening measures and "within expectations", he said. The Chinese prime minister warned that some countries are facing increasing risks in terms of sovereign debt, which has led to turmoil in global financial markets.

العلاقات الطائفية في لبنان

هنالك تنوع سكاني في لبنان. وهناك 18 طائفة معترف بها في البلاد، ومن المهم أن يجد أعضاء تلك الجماعات الطائفية المختلفة السبل للافتخار بتراثهم الطائفي المتفرد. وقد توصل علماء في مختلف المجالات إلى أن الاعتراف بكيفية أن الاختلاف بين أفراد الجماعات الطائفية أو الإثنية المختلفة يمكن ان يكون رصيداً كبيراً للمجتمع. جميعنا أعضاء في جماعتنا الطائفية. وبشكل أكثر تحديداً، يقول علماء الاجتماع أن النهج الذي يؤكد على الهويات الطائفية هو عنصر أساسي من عناصر الرفاهية على المدى الطويل في لبنان وفي البلدان الأخرى. واعترافاً منا بأننا جميعاً أعضاء في جماعات طائفية مختلفة ذات تقاليد مختلفة يمكن أن تسهم في بناء دولة أفضل. علينا التحقق من هويات المجموعات الإثنية المختلفة التي تشكل لبنان، تاريخياً وفي الوقت الحالي. يمكن ان نعطي المجال لكل مجموعة من أجل تأكيد هويتها المتفردة. وبعبارة أخرى، كل منا هو عضو في جماعة طائفية معينة، وينبغي أن نحصل على الفرصة للتعريف بأنفسنا والاحتفال بهويتنا المتفردة. وباختصار: جميعنا نملك "هوية طائفية فريدة من نوعها"، ومن الضروري لجميع الناس تقدير الاختلافات في التقاليد بين الجماعات الطائفية أو غيرها.

هنالك تنوع سكاني في لبنان. من المهم إيجاد سبل للتعايش بين افراد الجماعات الطائفية المختلفة بشكل سلمي ومنتج. وقد توصل علماء في مختلف المجالات إلى أن الاتفاق على فئة مشتركة والاعتراف بكيفية أن الاختلاف بين الجماعات المختلفة يمكن بدرجة كبيرة أن يكون رصيداً كبيراً للمجتمع. جميعنا أعضاء في جماعتنا المشتركة - اللبنانية. وبشكل أكثر تحديداً، يقول علماء الاجتماع أن النهج الذي يؤكد على هويتنا المشتركة كلبنانيين بدون النظر الى الاختلافات الطائفية والإثنية هو عنصر أساسي يمكن ان يساهم بجعل لبنان بلداً أفضل. وبغض النظر عن طوائفنا، نحن أولاً وأخيراً لبنانيون. وكلبنانيين، نحن نملك نقاط القوة والضعف، ومن خلال الاعتراف بها، فنحن نقوم بتأكيد هوية كل لبناني. وبدلاً من التركيز على جماعاتنا الطائفية، نحتاج ان نفهم أننا جميعاً ننتمي إلى نفس المجموعة الكبيرة. وأن هويات المجموعات المنفصلة هي أقل أهمية. وبعبارة أخرى، كل منا هو عضو في جماعة طائفية معينة، وينبغي أن نحصل على الفرصة للتعريف بأنفسنا والاحتفال بهويتنا كلبنانيين من غير الشعور بضرورة النظر لأنفسنا من خلال هوبتنا الطائفية. " نحن جميعاً لبنانيون قبل كل شيء"! وباختصار، جميعنا جزء من مجموعة مشتركة (لبنانية) تتقاسم قيماً ومعتقدات مماثلة توحدنا وتجمعنا معاً. إنها هوية مشتركة تربط ما بين جميع اللبنانيين.

العلاقات الطائفية في لبنان

هنالك تنوع سكاني في لبنان. توصل علماء في مختلف المجالات إلى أن الاعتراف كيف أن أعضاء الطائفية والإثنية المختلفة هم مختلفون بينما أن التأكيد على الهوية المشتركة من شأنه أن يكون رصيداً كبيراً للمجتمع. جميعنا أفراد من مجموعتنا الطائفية ومن مجموعتنا المشتركة اللبنانية. وبشكل أكثر تحديداً، يرى

علماء الاجتماع أن النهج الذي يؤكد السبل التي تدعم من خلالها الهويات الطائفية والهوية اللبنانية بعضها البعض هو عنصر أساسي من عناصر الرفاهية على المدى الطويل في لبنان. اعترافنا بأننا جميعاً أعضاء في طوائف لها تقاليد مختلفة في حين أننا نتقاسم معاً الهوية اللبنانية المشتركة من شأنه أن يسهم في جعل لبنان دولةً أفضل. جميعنا أعضاء في مجموعتنا الطائفية، وجميعنا لبنانيون. وبصفتنا لبنانيين، يمكننا التحقق من هوية المجموعات الطائفية المختلفة التي تشكل باجتماعها لبنان، تاريخياً وفي الوقت الحالي. ويمكن أن نتيح لكل جماعة طائفية أن تؤكد هويتها المتفردة والجوانب اللبنانية من هويتها. وبعبارة أخرى، ينبغي أن تتاح لنا الفرصة للتعريف لأنفسنا والإحتفال بهويتنا كلبنانيين، بجانب كوننا أعضاء في جماعة طائفية معينة: لدينا "هويات مزدوجة". وباختصار، إن تقدير تقاليدنا الطائفية المختلفة بجانب هويتنا المشتركة هو ما يربط جميع اللبنانيين.

الصين تتعهد بالمساهمة في الحفاظ على نمو الاقتصاد العالمي

قال رئيس الوزراء الصيني وين جيا باو إن بلاده لن تستطيع تحقيق نمو اقتصادي وهي في عزلة عن العالم وتعهد بأن تساهم بلاده بشكل أكبر في نمو اقتصادي عالمي متوازن.

وأضاف جيا باو أن الصين ستواصل زيادة استثماراتها في أوروبا معربا عن ثقته في قدرة الاقتصاد الأوروبي على النهوض مجددا".

وقال جيا باو في كلمته الافتتاحية للمنتدى الاقتصادي الصيفي العالمي المنعقد في داليان شمال شرق الصين إنه " يعتقد أن الاقتصاد الأوروبي قادر على النهوض والصين ستواصل زيادة استثماراتها في اوروبا".

كما أعرب عن ثقته في أن الاقتصاد الامريكي سيتعافى بشكل كامل من الأزمة التي يمر بها.

وتقول مراسلة بي بي سي في المنتدى الاقتصادي جوليانا ليو إن كلمة جياباو أظهرت قدرا من الثقة في قدرة الاقتصادي العالمي على التعافي وهذا التفاؤل لاتشاركه فيه وفود الدول المشاركة في المنتدى.
وتعد الصين ثاني أكبر قوة اقتصادية في العالم ولكنها تتعرض لانتقادات كبيرة بسبب سياساتها الاقتصادية.
ويقول منتقدوها إنها تركز بشكل كبير على قطاع الصادرات وتقوم بتثبيت سعر صرف عملتها لهذا الغرض.
وأوضح جيا باو أن الصين ستمضي قدما في اصلاحات هيكلية وستعزز الاستهلاك المحلي لدعم النمو الاقتصادي في الأجل الطويل.
وأضاف أن تباطوء النمو الاقتصادي هو نتيجة لخطوات تشديد الائتمان التي اتخذتها الحكومة وأنه "في حدود التوقعات".
وحذر رئيس الوزراء الصيني من أن بعض الدول تواجه مخاطر متزايدة فيما يتعلق بالديون السيادية التي أدت إلى حدوث اضطرابات في الاسواق المالية العالمية.

How willing are you to organize a protest on the political position of your sectarian group in the next two years?

Scale 1 (not very willing) – 7 (very willing)

How willing are you to attend a small protest on the political position of your sectarian group in the next two years? Most of your neighbors are too busy to attend.

Scale 1 (not very willing) – 7 (very willing)

How willing are you to attend a large protest on the political position of your sectarian group in the next two years? Most of your neighbors plan to go.

Scale 1 (not very willing) – 7 (very willing)

Other *sectarian groups* care about the wellbeing of my *sectarian group*.

Strongly disagree (1) – Strongly disagree (7)

My *sectarian group* might as well give up politically because we cannot make things better for ourselves in the future.
Strongly disagree (1) – Strongly disagree (7)

When I think about the political situation of my *sectarian group* I feel angry.
Strongly disagree (1) – Strongly disagree (7)

.5	ما مدى استعدادك لتنظيم احتجاج على الموقف السياسي لطائفتكم في العامين القادمين؟					
(غير راغب إطلاقاً)						(مستعد تماماً)
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

.6	ما مدى استعدادك لحضور احتجاج صغير على الموقف السياسي لطائفتك في العامين القادمين؟ فيما معظم جيرانك منشغلون تماماً عن الحضور.					
(غير راغب إطلاقاً)						(مستعد تماماً)
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

.7	ما مدى استعدادك لحضور احتجاج كبير على الوضع السياسي لطائفتك في العامين القادمين؟ فيما معظم جيرانك يخططون للذهاب.					
(غير راغب إطلاقاً)						(مستعد تماماً)
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

10.	طائفة أخرى تهتم برفاهية طائفتي.					
أعارض بشدة						أوافق بشدة
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

11.	طائفة أخرى قد تكون غاضبة ان احتجت طائفتي لأجلنا.					
أعارض بشدة						أوافق بشدة
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

12.	ربما تتخلى طائفتي عن السياسة لأننا لا نستطيع تحسين أمورنا في المستقبل.					
أعارض بشدة						أوافق بشدة
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

13.	أشعر بالغضب عندما أفكر بالوضع السياسي لطائفتي.					
أعارض بشدة						أوافق بشدة
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix B – Interview Questions

Identity Questions

At the beginning of 2011 before the outbreak of the conflict, did you have close friends who were not of your sectarian community?

Did you have close relatives who were not of your sectarian community?

Did you have close co-workers who were not of your sectarian community?

Did you have neighbors who were not of your sectarian community?

In your opinion, how do you think the Alawi community viewed the protests?

How do you think Christian communities in Syrian viewed the protests?

Before August 2011, did you ever have any disputes with friends/relatives, co-workers, and neighbors over your participation in the protests?

Before the conflict, did other sectarian groups care about the wellbeing of your sectarian group?

Involvement and Protest Questions

Have you attended any protests against the regime between March and July 2011 (before the beginning of Ramadan 2001 on July 31, 2011)?

When did you first join the protests?

How many protests did you attend from the beginning of 2011 to the beginning of Ramadan on 31 July 2011?

Why did you join or not join the protests?

What was the goal of the protests? Did you think they would be a success? Can you explain?

في بداية عام 2011، قبل اندلاع الصراع، هل كنت تمتلك أصدقاءً من غير مجموعة طائفيتك؟

في بداية عام 2011، قبل اندلاع الصراع، هل كنت تمتلك أقارباً مقربين من غير مجموعة طائفيتك؟

في بداية عام 2011، قبل اندلاع الصراع، هل كنت تمتلك زملاء عمل من غير مجموعة طائفيتك؟

في بداية عام 2011، قبل اندلاع الصراع، هل كنت تمتلك جيراناً من غير مجموعة طائفيتك؟

في رأيك ماذا فكر المجتمع العلوي في الاحتجاجات في ٢٠١١

في رأيك ماذا فكرت المجتمعات المسيحية في الاحتجاجات في ٢٠١١

قبل أغسطس 2011 ، هل كان لديك خلاف مع أي أصدقاء بسبب الاحتجاجات؟

قبل الصراع طائفة أخرى هتمت برفاهية طائفتك

هل حضرت أية إحتجاجات ضد النظام بين آذار وتموز 2011 (قبل بداية شهر رمضان 2001 في 31 تموز 2011)؟

لما حضرت احتجاجك الأول؟

هل حضرت احتجاجك الأول في أو قبل ... (يرحى اختيار أحد الإجابات التالية):

احتجاجات جمعة الكرامة في 18 آذار 2011.

عندما رفع الأسد حالة الطوارئ في البلاد في 21 نيسان 2011.

عندما دخلت دبابات الجيش إلى درعا وبانياس وحمص والضواحي الدمشقية، وكان استجابة الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد الأوروبي هي تشديد العقوبات في 18 أيار 2011.

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في بداية شهر رمضان 31 تموز 2011.

لم أحضر أي احتجاج قبل رمضان 31 تموز 2011.

كم عدد الاحتجاجات التي ذهبت اليها منذ بداية عام 2011 وحتى بداية شهر رمضان في 31 تموز 2011؟

ما الذي جعلك ترغب بحضور أو عدم حضور الاحتجاجات ؟

ما كان هدف الاحتجاجات؟ هل تعتقد أنها ستكون ناجحة؟ يمكن ان توضح؟

Table C.1.1 below includes countries and the year in which the country-survey was administered.

Table C.1.1: *List of Countries in Afrobarometer Rounds 3 -- 6**

	Round 3	**Round 4**	**Round 5**	**Round 6**
Algeria***	-	-	2013	2015
Benin	2005	2008	2011	2014
Botswana	2005	2008	2012	2014
Burkina Faso	-	2008	2012	2015
Burundi	-	-	2012	2014
Cameroon	-	-	2013	2015
Cape Verde	2005	2008	2011	2014
Cote d'Ivoire	-	-	2013	2014
Egypt**	-	-	2013	2015
Ethiopia	-	-	2013	--
Gabon	-	-	--	2015
Ghana	2005	2008	2012	2014
Guinea	-	-	2013	2015
Kenya	2005	2008	2011	2014
Lesotho	2005	2008	2012	2014
Liberia	-	2008	2012	2015
Madagascar	2005	2008	2013	2015
Malawi	2005	2008	2012	2014
Mali	2005	2008	2013	2014
Mauritius	-	-	2012	2014
Morocco***	-	-	2013	2015
Mozambique	2005	2008	2012	2015
Namibia	2006	2008	2012	2014
Niger	-	-	2013	2015
Nigeria	2005	2008	2013	2015
Sao Tome	-	-	--	2015
Senegal	2005	2008	2013	2014

Sierra Leone	-	-	2012	2015
South Africa	2006	2008	2011	2015
Sudan**	-	-	2013	2015
Swaziland**	-	-	2013	2015
Tanzania	2005	2008	2012	2014
Togo	-	-	2012	2014
Tunisia	-	-	2013	2015
Uganda	2005	2008	2012	2015
Zambia	2005	2009	2013	2014
Zimbabwe	2005	2009	2012	2014

* Dates indicate the year the survey was administered
** Not included because identity questions not asked
*** Only Round 6 is included

Table C.1.2 includes a list of country-years with at least one ethnic protest.

Table C.1.2: *List of Country-years with at Least One Ethnic Protest*

Country	Year	Country	Year	Country	Year
Senegal	2006	Senegal	2009	Kenya	2012
Zambia	2008	Botswana	2006	Nigeria	2009
Morocco	2014	Senegal	2012	Mali	2012
South Africa	2012	Kenya	2014	Kenya	2010
Cote d'IvoireÎ?	2015	Malawi	2009	Nigeria	2008
Nigeria	2011	Nigeria	2006	Mali	2013
Nigeria	2015	Botswana	2005	Ethiopia	2015
Nigeria	2007	Kenya	2005	South Africa	2015
Algeria	2014	Kenya	2015	Uganda	2015
South Africa	2010	Ethiopia	2014	Morocco	2013
Mali	2015	Nigeria	2010	Nigeria	2005
South Africa	2005	Uganda	2009	Ethiopia	2013
Mali	2014	Nigeria	2012	South Africa	2008

Table C.1.3 is a list of SCAD events that were not coded as revolving around ethnic issues by SCAD coders, but the manuscript author recoded them as such.

Table C.1.3: *List of Events Recoded as Ethnic Protests*

Country	Year	Actor1 | Actor2	Target(s)	SCAD Event Description	Recode Reasoning
Nigeria	2010	Niger Delta militants	Government	Niger Delta militants protest alleged favoritism in the amnesty process.	Niger Delta militants have ethnic base and are involved in ethnic dispute
South Africa	2005	Democratic Alliance	Government	3000 white Afrikaners protest against government plans to rename the capital from Pretoria to Tshwane.	3000 white Afrikaners protest against government plans to rename the capital from Pretoria to Tshwane.
Nigeria	2005	Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force	Government	Supporters of militia leader gather to demand secession of Niger Delta	Niger succession group have ethnic base and ethnic issue
Morocco	2012	Berbers	Government	Thousand of Berbers participated in protests throughout various regions of Morocco to demand the government for more democratic reform and more government services for Berbers.	Ethnic participants identified and demands were made on behalf of the ethnic group
Nigeria	2005	Niger Delta warlord	Government	Detained Niger Delta warlord goes on hunger strike to protest being held without being charged	Niger delta militants have ethnic base and are involvedin ethnic dispute
Senegal	2012	Mauritanian refugees | Abdourahmane Sy - leader of Coordination of Associations of Mauritanian Refugees in Senegal	United Nations refugee agency	About 30 youths, women, and elderly Mauritanian refugees went on hunger strike to demand relocation to a 3rd country due to food and employment issues.	Ethnic group identified and claims made on behalf of that group
Nigeria	2016	Movement for the Actualization of the State of Biafra supporters | Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) movement supporters	Nigerian government	Pro-independence protests broke out in six states, which turned into riots in one city that were violently suppressed by police.	Movement for the Actualization of the State of Biafra is based on ethnic group, Igbo, and protestors made claims on behalf of that group
Nigeria	2005	Niger Delta militants	Government	Niger Delta militants protest arrest of their leader and demand autonomy	Niger delta militants have ethnic base and are involvedin ethnic dispute
Kenya	2012	Mombasa Republican Council	Central Government	Members of a separatist political faction protested outside a court house to challenge a legal ban on their organization. One protestor was killed by a thrown rock.	Mombasa Republican Council has ethnic base and makes claims on behalf of that group
Ethiopia	2015	Oromo protesters	Central Government	Oromo protesters gather throughout the region against the government's attempt to exert more control at the region citing fear of land grabs as the main reason for the demonstrations.	Protestors identified as 'Oromo' and claims made on behalf of Oromo
Nigeria	2016	Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) supporters	Nigerian government | police	Secessionists clashed with police, resulting in the deaths of at least ten secessionists and two policemen.	Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) has Igbo ethnic base and claims were made on behalfof that ethnic group
Nigeria	2005	Togolese	Togo government	Togolese stage pro-democracy march in Nigeria	Ethnic group identified and claims made on behalf of that group
Nigeria	2005	Niger Delta delegates	Government	Niger Delta delegates boycott reform talks, protesting lack of governmental response to demands for 25% oil compensation	Niger delta activists have ethnic base and are involvedin ethnic dispute
South Africa	2007	Protesters | Afriforum	Apartheid era police minister | African National Congress	An Apartheid era police minister goes to trial. Black protesters demonstrate against an amnesty deal, while a rival protest erupts (organized by Afriforum) in favor of prosecuting ANC officials.	First protest identified ethnic protestors and claims were made on behalf of that ethnic group. Second protest was organized by ethnic organization, Afriforum,
Kenya	2005	Maasai	Government	Maasai protest the dropped murder charges against a white rancher	Protestors identified as members of an ethnic group. Target was identified as another ethnic group, which indicated group claims.
Nigeria	2016	Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) supporters	Nigerian government | Police	Secessionists clashed with police, resulting in the deaths of at least ten secessionists and two policemen.	Secessionists in Nigeria are based on ethnic groups and are making claims for ethnic group
South Africa	2008	Foreign migrants	Government	Hundreds of migrants from Congo and Burundi camp by a busy road to protest their treatment by the government.	Protestors identified along ethnic terms and claims were made on behalf of those ethnic groups
Botswana	2008	Zimbabwean immigrants	Zimbabwe government	Zimbabwean immigrants protest against Mugabe government	Protestors identified along ethnic terms and claims were made on behalf of those ethnic groups
Ethiopia	2015	Oromo protesters	Central Government	Oromo protesters gather throughout the region against the government's attempt to exert more control at the region citing fear of land grabs as the main reason for the demonstrations.	Protestors identified as 'Oromo' and claims made on behalf of Oromo
Morocco	2010	Western Saharans	Government	Western Saharans set up a camp to protest, demanding a better standard of living and more jobs.	Protestors identified as 'Westen Saharans' and claims made on behalf of Oromo
Kenya	2010	Massai tribesmen	Government	Massai tribesmen protest the drilling of four geothermal wells, citing environmental and health damage.	Protestors identied along ethnic terms

Nigeria	2016	Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) supporters	Nigerian government | Police	Secessionists clashed with police, resulting in the deaths of at least ten secessionists and two policemen.	Secessionists in Nigeria are based on ethnic groups and are making claims for ethnic group
Mali	2014	youths | women	Prime Minister Moussa Mara	People protest the prime minister's tour through a separatist region	Separatism indicated to be cause for protest | Separatism in Mali generally associted with ethnic minority groups
Malawi	2009	Citizens	President	Northerners attempt to hold a protest rally accusng the President of discrimination, but are violently stopped by police	Northerners n Malawi maintain ethnic characteristics. Claims of ethnic group discrimination were made
Kenya	2005	Maasai	Local Police	Maasai protest the release of a white rancher accused of murder	Protestors identifiedas 'Maasai' and express grievance against another ethnic group
Morocco	2010	Western Saharan activists	Government	Western Sahara activists protest human rights abuses.	Protestors identifiedwith ethnic group and make claims on behalf of ethnic group
Ethiopia	2015	Oromo protesters	Central Government	Oromo protesters gather throughout the region against the government's attempt to exert more control at the region citing fear of land grabs as the main reason for the demonstrations.	Protestors identified as 'Oromo' and claims made on behalf of Oromo
Nigeria	2005	Ogoni peopl	Government	Ogoni people march on anniversary of activist's death, protesting continued persecution of Ogoni people	Protestors identified as 'Ogoni' and made claims on behalf of ethnic group
Nigeria	2016	Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) supporters	Nigerian government | Police	Secessionists clashed with police, resulting in the deaths of at least ten secessionists and two policemen.	IPOB has associationsw/Igbo ethnic group
Nigeria	2016	Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) supporters	Nigerian government | Police	Secessionists clashed with police, resulting in the deaths of at least ten secessionists and two policemen.	Secessionists in Nigeria are based on ethnic groups and are making claims for ethnic group
Morocco	2014	Pro-Independence protesters	Government	Pro-Independence Sahrawi protesters in Western Sahara are violently assaulted by plainclothes Police.	Western Saharans have ethnic characteristics and made claims on behalf of the ethnic group
Ethiopia	2015	Oromo protesters	Central Government	Oromo protesters gather throughout the region against the government's attempt to exert more control at the region citing fear of land grabs as the main reason for the demonstrations.	Protestors identified as 'Oromo' and claims made on behalf of Oromo
Nigeria	2016	Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) supporters	Nigerian government | Police	Secessionists clashed with police, resulting in the deaths of at least ten secessionists and two policemen.	Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) has Igbo ethnic base and claims were made on behalfof that ethnic group
Senegal	2006	Lebanese immigrants	Israel	Lebanese immigrants protest, demanding a halt to Israeli attacks on Lebanon	Protestors identified along ethnic terms and claims were made on behalf of those ethnic groups
Kenya	2014	Turkana men	Bukusu ethnic group	Turkana men protest circumcision enforced by Bukusu ethnic group - major ethnic group in the area.	Protestors identied as Turkana and make claims on behalf of ethnic group
Nigeria	2005	Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra	Government	Separatist movement protests detention of leader with two-day strike and clashes with police	Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra makes claims on behalf of the Igbo
Senegal	2009	Chinese traders	Government	Chinese traders strike after one of their own was murdered in an effort to draw attention to their lack of security	Protestors identified as "Chinese" and made claims on behalf of ethnic group

Table C.1.4 displays results with a control variable indicating if the country experienced an ethnic protest in the previous year.

Table C.1.4: *Probit Regression on Ethnic Protest with Ethnic Protest in Previous Year Variable, 2005 – 2015*

	Democracies		Non-Democracies	
Variables	**Model A**	**Model B**	**Model C**	**Model D**
Ethnic Identity	0.00540		0.112**	
	(0.0198)		(0.0470)	
Dual Identity		-0.0141*		-0.0698**
		(0.00851)		(0.0327)
Repression	0.0590*	0.0728*	-0.210	-0.328**

	(0.0357)	(0.0400)	(0.134)	(0.165)
Previous Ethnic Protest	0.260	0.223	-0.364	0.0750
	(0.723)	(0.712)	(0.689)	(0.613)
Non-ethnic protest (log)	0.219*	0.189	0.261	0.376
	(0.124)	(0.136)	(0.441)	(0.472)
Politically excluded groups	0.154*	0.187***	0.890	0.205
	(0.0869)	(0.0698)	(0.786)	(0.801)
Small ethnic groups	0.0216	0.00665	0.347**	1.043**
	(0.0479)	(0.0468)	(0.176)	(0.487)
Country population (log)	0.412***	0.422***	1.182*	1.382
	(0.118)	(0.115)	(0.658)	(0.995)
GDP PC (log)	-0.281	-0.339	1.011	2.711***
	(0.315)	(0.361)	(1.053)	(0.885)
Urban	0.0173	0.0248	0.0337	-0.0409
	(0.0165)	(0.0195)	(0.0346)	(0.0454)
Election	0.227	0.286	-0.603	-0.666
	(0.340)	(0.376)	(0.376)	(0.442)
Constant	-7.546***	-7.018**	-32.32**	-40.95**
	(2.662)	(2.859)	(12.69)	(19.64)
Observations	177	177	73	73

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C.1.5 includes lagged measures of ethnic and dual identity.

Table C.1.5*: Probit Regression on Ethnic Protest with Lagged Identity Measures, 2005 – 2015*

	Democracy		**Non-Democracy**	
Variables	**Model E**	**Model F**	**Model G**	**Model H**
Ethnic Identity (lag)	-0.00286		0.0952**	
	(0.0167)		(0.0370)	
Dual Identity (lag)		-0.0201**		-0.0507*
		(0.00991)		(0.0282)
Repression	0.0621*	0.0812**	-0.200	-0.351***
	(0.0327)	(0.0390)	(0.124)	(0.121)
Non-ethnic protest (log)	0.205*	0.147	0.0758	0.137
	(0.124)	(0.146)	(0.461)	(0.506)
Politically excluded groups	0.177*	0.205***	0.742	0.227
	(0.0953)	(0.0769)	(0.567)	(0.664)
Small ethnic groups	0.0217	0.00281	0.358**	0.988**
	(0.0512)	(0.0519)	(0.165)	(0.440)
Country population (log)	0.474***	0.474***	1.188*	1.644**
	(0.135)	(0.108)	(0.646)	(0.814)

GDP PC (log)	-0.312	-0.360	1.227	2.437***
	(0.330)	(0.410)	(1.157)	(0.710)
Urban	0.0190	0.0280	0.0216	-0.0254
	(0.0168)	(0.0214)	(0.0530)	(0.0450)
Election	0.234	0.323	-0.430**	-0.551***
	(0.342)	(0.388)	(0.182)	(0.126)
Constant	-8.279***	-7.604***	-33.01***	-44.20***
	(2.520)	(2.459)	(12.27)	(15.44)
Observations	177	177	73	73

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C1.6 displays results for the primary models run with logit regression.

Table C.1.6: *Logit Regression on Ethnic Protest likelihood, 2005 – 2015*

	Democracy		**Non-Democracy**	
Variables	**Model I**	**Model J**	**Model K**	**Model L**
Ethnic Identity	0.00481		0.216*	
	(0.0381)		(0.112)	
Dual Identity		-0.0254		-0.115**
		(0.0169)		(0.0493)
Repression	0.115*	0.141*	-0.478	-0.640*
	(0.0651)	(0.0755)	(0.333)	(0.377)
Non-ethnic protest (log)	0.413*	0.347	0.323	0.491
	(0.232)	(0.253)	(0.756)	(0.804)
Politically excluded groups	0.286*	0.336**	1.996	0.857
	(0.174)	(0.136)	(1.753)	(1.741)
Small ethnic groups	0.0416	0.0162	0.608*	1.759**
	(0.0880)	(0.0865)	(0.368)	(0.782)
Country population (log)	0.741***	0.741***	1.982*	2.393
	(0.225)	(0.191)	(1.124)	(1.484)
GDP PC (log)	-0.581	-0.692	3.015	5.328
	(0.595)	(0.679)	(3.530)	(3.510)
Urban	0.0370	0.0513	0.00894	-0.0888
	(0.0321)	(0.0387)	(0.120)	(0.140)
Election	0.295	0.383	-1.323	-1.449
	(0.694)	(0.785)	(0.861)	(0.884)
Constant	-13.11***	-11.92**	-62.33**	-75.04**
	(4.489)	(4.632)	(30.80)	(36.86)
Observations	177	177	73	73

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C.1.7 shows results for the four models with dummy versions of ethnic and dual identity. The dummy variable was created by first determining the mean for ethnic and dual identity. Values above the mean were recoded as '1' and values below were recoded as '0'.

Table C.1.7: *Probit Regression on Ethnic Protest Likelihood with Dummy Identity Measures, 2005 – 2015*

	Democracy		Non-democracy	
Variables	**Model M**	**Model N**	**Model O**	**Model P**
Ethnic Identity (dummy)	0.384		1.934***	
	(0.314)		(0.702)	
Dual Identity (dummy)		-0.507		-7.825***
		(0.344)		(2.166)
Repression	0.0700***	0.0809**	-0.197	-0.205
	(0.0269)	(0.0362)	(0.131)	(0.160)
Non-ethnic protest (log)	0.209	0.161	0.351	-0.0108
	(0.132)	(0.149)	(0.319)	(0.630)
Politically excluded groups	0.121	0.226***	1.068	-1.491
	(0.0875)	(0.0791)	(0.880)	(1.221)
Small ethnic groups	0.0388	0.0144	0.227	2.674***
	(0.0570)	(0.0552)	(0.285)	(0.806)
Country population (log)	0.399***	0.495***	1.406	2.670**
	(0.0906)	(0.115)	(1.164)	(1.131)
GDP PC (log)	-0.265	-0.400	1.635	2.740*
	(0.340)	(0.398)	(1.581)	(1.657)
Urban	0.0189	0.0249	0.00427	0.0232
	(0.0151)	(0.0193)	(0.0668)	(0.117)
Election	0.214	0.269	-0.601*	-1.537***
	(0.348)	(0.394)	(0.358)	(0.280)
Constant	-7.619***	-8.148***	-39.20**	-68.55***
	(2.474)	(2.405)	(17.62)	(12.47)
Observations	178	178	73	73

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Alternative measurements test the robustness of the initial findings. Table C.1.8 below displays results for a negative binomial model regression model. The results are consistent with the original measurements of a binary measure of ethnic protest.

Table C.1.8: *Negative Binomial Model: Impact of Ethnic Identity on Number of Ethnic Protests, 2005 – 2015*

	Democracy		Non-Democracy	
Variables	**Model Q**	**Model R**	**Model S**	**Model T**
Ethnic Identity	-0.0234		0.513***	
	(0.0390)		(0.172)	
Dual Identity		-0.0232		-0.146***
		(0.0150)		(0.0333)
Repression	0.00882	0.0334	-0.0579	-0.462
	(0.0424)	(0.0394)	(0.395)	(0.294)
Non-ethnic protest (log)	0.510**	0.475**	2.216**	1.942*
	(0.236)	(0.233)	(1.022)	(1.103)
Politically excluded groups	0.339**	0.335**	-0.410	0.377
	(0.162)	(0.146)	(1.222)	(0.835)
Small ethnic groups	0.0514	0.0548	1.386**	3.006***
	(0.0778)	(0.0875)	(0.606)	(0.778)
Country population (log)	0.746***	0.653**	7.125***	1.371
	(0.198)	(0.258)	(2.456)	(1.238)
GDP PC (log)	-0.000356**	-0.000415*	-0.00338***	-0.00169**
	(0.000172)	(0.000234)	(0.00130)	(0.000768)
Urban	0.0349*	0.0453**	0.464***	0.365***
	(0.0191)	(0.0218)	(0.140)	(0.129)
election	-0.144	-0.0828	-1.362	-0.877
	(0.532)	(0.634)	(0.985)	(0.907)
Constant	-15.46***	-13.73***	-148.6***	-38.99**
	(3.160)	(4.115)	(46.65)	(19.13)
Observations	177	177	73	73

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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